Depends upon This
The strategic culture of Imperial Japan and the attack on Pearl Harbor,
1905-1941
Thesis MA Militaire Geschiedenis, UvA
Arjan Rijvers
Studentnumber: 11160713
Supervisor: Dhr. dr. Remco Raben January 26t h 2017
The picture on the previous page is a still from a Japanese film captured by American forces. It shows a Nakajima Kate taking off from the deck of the Zuikaku for Pearl Harbor with deck crew cheering them on, n.d.
movie still, viewed 20-01-2017,
<http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/464/The-Miraculous-Torpedo-Squadron.aspx>
Note on the text
Japanese names are rendered in the Japanese style with the family name coming first and the given name second. This style is the one most often used in historical literature, though the English language Japanese press often adopts the Western order of names as saying ‘Yamamoto Isoroku’s dilemma’ for instance sounds very strange to a native Japanese reader. Seeing as I will discuss events involving two Yamamoto’s and two Katō’s, it is important to note that these names are associated with extended clans and none of them are related to each other directly. In fact, Yamamoto Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family. When confusion seems likely I will refer to them by their full names.
When referring to Japanese Emperors, I will follow the somewhat inconsistent English language custom of referring to Emperor Hirohito (the Shōwa Emperor) by his given name, something the Japanese never do, and to the earlier Meiji Emperor and Taishō Emperor by their ‘era’ names. At times I refer to the pre-1945 Shōwa Era as simply the Shōwa Era, any statements about that period do therefore not pertain to the post-war reign (1945-1989) of Emperor Hirohito.
Japanese words and names are rendered in Latin script (Romaji) with diacritical marks as per the norm, with their literal translation or practical meaning in brackets. Foreign terms not found in the Merriam-Webster dictionary are in italics. When called for additional information is presented in the footnotes.
Contents
Introduction...5
1. Culture and strategy...10
The concepts of military culture and strategic culture...10
The establishment of a modern navy...15
Strategic culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy...19
Western way of war, Eastern way of war...24
Those below overcome those above...30
2. Escalating expansionism...37
The imperialist project...37
Myths of empire...44
The crisis of Taishō diplomacy...48
Strategic culture of militarism...55
Failures of deterrence and compellence...60
3. The Pearl Harbor shif...66
The great all-out battle strategy...66
The naval aviation revolution...72
Envisioning the impossible...75
The appeal of the pre-emptive attack...79
A strategic culture shift...82
Conclusion...88
Introduction
On the 27th of May 1905, at Tsushima Strait, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō called his outgunned
fleet to action by the raising of the ‘Z’ flag and by signaling the following words to his men: “The Empire's rise or fall depends upon the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.”1 This fatalistic message of inspiration was intentionally repeated word for word, on the
evening of December 6th 1941 in a message by Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku to the Japanese
carrier fleet, then in the middle of the Pacific.2 Like Tōgō before him he seemingly believed
that a single battle would decide all. And so, with an Empire in the balance the planes took off from the carrier decks, towards infamy or glory depending on perspective.
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific that followed require little introduction. The fateful attack by over 300 aircraft from 6 carriers on the base of the Pacific Fleet on the island of Oahu is one of the iconic moments of history. For decades Japan had sought to expand and secure its empire in the face of the threat posed by the established empires of the West. In early December 1941 the Japanese Empire, still considered by most to be a second rate power, destroyed the status quo in the Far East. Besides the great raid on the Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor the Japanese also carried out, in rapid succession, attacks on British, Australian, Dutch, and American positions throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asia. This was the Japanese gambit to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere3 in one far-reaching surprise offensive. And indeed four months later the
sun rose on a greater Japanese Empire.4 By setting out on this course, however, Japan went
to war with the world’s greatest industrial power, the United States, as well as the world’s largest empire, Britain, all while already committed to a war of attrition in China. What followed was a long, gruesome, yet fundamentally unequal fight in the Pacific.
1 As quoted in: Wiliam J. Koenig, Epic Sea Battles (London 1975) 141.
2 Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Cambridge 1978) 14. It is commonly believed a copy of Tōgō’s ‘Z’ flag was also raised aboard the Akagi but this is disputed by some sources as the ‘Z’ flag had by this time become an ordinary naval signal that could have caused confusion. See: John Toland, The
Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York 1970) 333.
3 This concept originated in 1938, at first it was mostly used when referring to China, Manchuria and Korea but the concept expanded to include Southeast Asia and was central to Japanese foreign policy from the 1st of
August 1940 onwards.
4 At this point, beside previous gains in China Japan now occupied: British Borneo and Malaya, Hong Kong, parts of Burma, Guam, Wake Atoll, practically all of the Dutch Indies and parts of Australian New Guinea. In almost every area of operations they had exceeded their own expectations.
This is however not the story of what the Pacific war became, nor is it the story of the events of December 7th 1941, it is a study of how and why it all began. Specifically, I will address the
Pearl Harbor plan in the context of Japanese strategic culture. In so doing I will offer a broad understanding of the decision to go to war and to undertake the Pearl Harbor attack. The Hawaii Operation represented a confluence of strategic thinking that stands in uncertain relation to the strategic culture of Japan up to that point. My aim is therefore to explore this relation and answer the question of whether the attack on Pearl Harbor was consistent with the strategic culture of Imperial Japan.
As the Pearl Harbor attack was a seemingly radical departure from some core tenets of Japanese strategic culture, particularly its pursuit of a ‘mahanist’ decisive battle,5 this begs
the question to what extend Pearl Harbor was in line with the overall strategic culture. Answering this question requires an overview of the strategic culture of Imperial Japan. Both on the level of Japanese foreign policy and on the level of military, particularly naval, operations. The former involves addressing the increase over time in Japanese expansionistic aggression and studying the effects military rule has on a country’s strategic culture. The second involves identifying the strategic precepts that defined the Imperial Navy to then show in what respects Pearl Harbor falls within, and in what respects it falls outside of that system. Pearl Harbor is therefore approached through two intertwined levels of strategic culture. 1. the foreign policy that it reflects and 2. the military strategy it embodies.
To this end several fundamental concepts need to be explored. In chapter one I address the concepts of military culture and strategic culture and apply them to the case of Imperial Japan, and specifically its navy. Military culture, is not of primary importance to this study but as it has conceptual ties to strategic culture and as it helps shape military decision-making it needs to be addressed.
This will be followed by an analysis of strategic culture as a concept and the debates surrounding it. Simply put, strategic culture refers to a nation’s or a military organization’s long-standing tendencies in strategy. As the myriad interpretations have left it a broad term I use strategic culture in a broad sense. Strategic culture is not restricted to military strategy but rather pertains to the whole of national policy, of which military strategy is a part. As such I will address strategic tendencies of modern imperialism and militarism, as well as developments in naval strategy, which are essential in understanding the Japanese path to war, the decision to include the US in that war, and the decision to open the war by attacking Pearl Harbor.
Another recurring concept will be the imperial myth which I address in chapter 2. The Imperial myth is a way of explaining the tendency of empires to over-extend themselves and so cause their own destruction. I consider it an important way of understanding the
strategic tendencies of Imperial Japan, and its development through time is therefore a core element of my discussion of the foreign policy of Imperial Japan.
By no means an understudied subject, the Pacific war in general, and Pearl Harbor specifically are popular amongst historians to this day with countless works describing it on every level of sophistication. Many were written from an American viewpoint, but neither has the Japanese side been neglected, though many of these efforts suffer from a lack of surviving Japanese war documentation and the difficulties of translation.6 One of the most
persistent tendencies in the historiography remains the representation of the Japanese decision to go to war as fundamentally irrational. The mostly war-generation authors essentially plead insanity on behalf of the former enemy. Despite the correctness of many of their arguments the facility of the conclusion is to be guarded against. Additionally, many of the post-war military writers on the subject were influenced by their own Cold War era strategic culture and sought to present the Japanese as irrational and insusceptible to deterrence as their own strategy depended on the deterrence nuclear weapons exerted on rational actors.
As I have said the literature on the Pearl Harbor attack is vast. Seeing as I cannot read Japanese, the number of primary sources I could use was however limited. In this I am by no means alone, as most of the, predominantly American historians, who wrote on the Pacific War and its origins could not read Japanese. My thesis is therefore out of necessity based on secondary literature, and such translated sources as are available to me.
The surviving primary sources consist of microfilms of the surviving Japanese war documentation, now mostly located in American Defence Department libraries. In recent years a part of the Japanese eyewitness accounts recorded by the late historian Gordon Prange, have been translated into English and published. Of these I have used The Pacific
War papers: Japanese documents of World War II.7 This work consists of a collection of
translated essays written by Japanese who were involved in these events though most have been written down after the war from memory. They include an overview of the development of Japanese naval strategy. Additionally, there are the war diaries and memoirs of several Japanese leaders, among whom the diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki is the most important, it primarily deals with the course of the war but this provides a valuable insight of the strategic culture of Japan in practice. Ugaki’s diary was translated into English relatively
6 Regrettably much Japanese war documentation was destroyed during the war. See: Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon (ed.), The Pacific War papers: Japanese documents of World War II (Dulles 2004) xi; Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) introduction; Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein (ed), Katherine V. Dillon (ed), At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York 1981) X-XI.
7 Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon (ed.), The Pacific War papers: Japanese documents of World War II (Dulles 2004).
recently and was published under the title Fading victory: the diary of Admiral Matome
Ugaki.8
Among the secondary sources used, one of the most important is At Dawn We Slept:
the Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by the aforementioned Gordon W. Prange,9 of all authors
who have written on this subject Prange had the greatest amount of Japanese witness accounts to work with and this work is considered as near as definitive a work on the question of why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor as we are likely to ever see.
The modest contribution that I offer to the extensive and ongoing debates surrounding the culture of strategy and the attack on Pearl Harbor lies in a reevaluation of the cultural factors of military culture and strategic culture of Imperial Japanese strategy based on some of the most enlightening studies on these concepts. The idea stems from my belief that the very scope of the literature on this subject has led to a loss of a comprehensive view on the events and the ideas that shaped them. While many works have given comprehensive long-term overviews, the recent (meaning over the last 50 years) tendency however has been to study Pearl Harbor in terms of specific theoretical frameworks that had not been conceptualized before. Therefore, the newer works are often quite narrow and enlightening but tend to reduce the matter by explaining them in light of a single concept, for instance compellence theory. My approach is to let these concepts overlap, and to connect them to each other, while attempting to maintain the overview that characterizes the older comprehensive studies. Even so, some historic reductionism in such a well-studied, complex, and misrepresented matter as Japanese strategic culture and the events leading up to Pearl Harbor can hardly be avoided.
By my approach to strategic culture I also intend to bring together the concepts of the ‘new military history’, that introduced cultural mechanics into military history and the more classic operational military history of strategy, tactics, and battles. It seems to me that the ‘new military history’ has sought abstraction and a focus on society to the point that its concepts seem detached from the realities of strategy and war. By taking this single historical case, though a complex one, we can reconnect the culture of war to actual war.
This thesis covers developments from the entirety of the Imperial Period (1868-1945) but the focus will be on the period 1905-1941. This time-frame includes the reigns of all three Emperors of the Imperial period, the Meiji Emperor (October 23, 1868 - July 30, 1912), the Taishō Emperor (July 30, 1912 - December 25, 1926) and the pre-war part of the reign of the Shōwa Emperor, Hirohito (December 25, 1926 - January 7, 1989). The years 1921-1936
8 Western order of names in the title. Masataka Chihaya, Fading victory: the diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki (Annapolis 2008).
9 Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein (ed), Katherine V. Dillon (ed), At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of
comprise the treaty era. During these years the major navies of the world were bound to the naval arms limitation treaties of Washington (1921) and London (1930).10 These treaties had
a profound effect on the composition of the world’s major navies and therefore naval strategy and foreign policy. Importantly, this period was one in which the military gradually appropriated national policy, allowing it to pursue ambitious plans.
In chapter 1 ‘culture and strategy’, I explore the concepts of military culture and strategic culture to create a theoretical framework. I then present an historical overview of the development of the Imperial Japanese Navy as it was the primary actor in these events. In the next segment the strategic culture of the navy is presented. Afterwards I question long held assertions concerning whether the Japanese way of war should be considered western or eastern, in the context of which I also pause to explain the importance of Mahan in Japanese strategic culture. Lastly I address a core characteristic of Japanese military culture, a phenomenon commonly called gekokujō (those below overcome those above), that would greatly effect national strategy.
In chapter 2 ‘Escalating expansionism’, an overview of the evolution of Japanese expansionism is presented. By this I mean to explore the higher grand-strategic side of Japan’s strategic culture, in other words the reasons for war with America. In the first and second segments, I present Japanese imperialism in a historical and an analytical context, using the concept of ‘imperial myths’ to explain the motivations and misconceptions that supported it. Afterwards I point out the roots of militarism and over-expansion in a multi-faceted crisis in Japan during the period (1912-1936) with the fourth segment addressing what strategic tendencies we may ascribe to militarism in general, and Shōwa militarism in particular. Lastly I address how American real politik pushed this system to the breaking-point.
In chapter 3 ‘The Pearl Harbor shift’, I address the shifting military strategic outlook that allowed for the Pearl Harbor attack to take place. I start by describing the strategy that Japan developed in the first decade of the 20th century for dealing with the United States and
which would, in somewhat altered form, remain in force until admiral Yamamoto Isoroku radically changed it in 1941. I then address a key reason for this change, the innovation of the aircraft carrier and its operational use. While in third segment I show how contentious Yamamoto Isoroku’s idea was to illustrate the workings of strategic culture. In the fourth segment I connect the core appeal of the Pearl Harbor attack, that of a surprise pre-emptive attack, back to the imperial myth. Lastly I compare the pre-Pearl Harbor plan strategic mind-set with a new mind-mind-set embodied by the bold operation.
1. Culture and strategy
In this chapter I aim to explain the debates surrounding the terms of military culture and strategic culture and apply them to the case of Imperial Japan, and particularly its navy. Additionally, I will address the evolution of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the context of a modernizing Japan and point out a too often overlooked element of Japan’s military and political culture that greatly affected the Japanese road to war. In this way I mean to uncover the connection between the cultural and the strategic in Imperial Japan.
The concepts of military culture and strategic culture
Though I am mainly concerned with the strategic culture of Imperial Japan I will first need to address a related concept, that of military culture. In the 1960’s cultural and social history had emerged, putting pressure on classic military and political history, the introduction of military culture and strategic culture may be considered as part of the ongoing attempt by military history to adapt to the broadening of the historiographical field by creating a ’new military history’.11
The Japanese path to war and the specific way in which the Japanese would persecute that war has often been approached through the concepts of military and strategic culture. As a concept military culture or rather the culture of war, was introduced into the historiography by Martin van Creveld in his best known book The Culture of War.12 Generally
it refers to the collective habits, symbols, and rituals that arise in armed forces. Some of these cultural characteristics can be said to distinguish the armed forces of a nation from those of other nations or distinguish the different branches that make up any nation’s military from each other. These characteristics affect the strategic culture of an armed force as they determine how the organization defines itself, its mission, and how strategic decisions are made.13
Arguably military culture’s primary purpose is to differentiate the military realm not from that of rival militaries but from its own civilian society. It is a collection of symbols, rituals, values, and beliefs, not static but forever in motion, that determine the conduct of those involved in the business of war. Military culture creates a cultural sphere decidedly separate from civilian society. One that may however, through militarist usurpation of political institutions and indoctrination of the population, come to dominate all of society. In
11 Peter Paret, ‘The New Military History’, Parameters 21 (1991) 10-18. 12 Martin van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York 2008).
this thesis I will pay particular attention to why the so-called ‘Taishō democracy’(1912-1926) gave way to militarism and how this ties in with the change in foreign policy and military strategy that led to the Pearl Harbor attack.14
The military culture of modern Japan, when understood statically, is often tied to the country’s feudal past. The view of 20th century Japanese officers and soldiers as modern
samurai adhering to the precepts of Zen-Buddhism and Bushidō (litt. The way of the warrior) still survives today, and is often used to explain Japanese fanaticism and war crimes. In reality much of the Bushidō code, as well as the term itself is 19th century invention, though some
elements may be genuinely derived from feudal Japan and later invoked to enrich the modern military culture.15 Arguably, the very fact that it is modern invention makes it an
intrinsic part of modern Japanese military culture. Both Japanese officers of samurai descent and of common lineage invoked the past of the samurai and their conduct was influenced by these ideas, as the many references to pre-modern military concepts and pro-verbs attest. However, the Imperial Army was definitely more effected by these notions than the Imperial Navy, which heavily influenced the development of their respective military cultures.16 The
army proved to be the more ideologically conservative yet also the more fanatical of the two services. While the navy on the other hand was, out of necessity, more outward looking and pragmatic.
The significance of culture for the military historian lies in how cultural perspectives affected events and conduct in war. As I am mainly concerned with strategy making I will address the origins of the concept of strategic culture and the way it had developed since. Even more so than military culture, strategic culture is a difficult and disputed concept. It has proven to be one of the major problems of strategic culture as a concept that it defies easy definition. Firstly, it connects strategy to culture, which in itself is hard to define.17 In practice it is
usually negatively defined. In many works strategic culture appears as the residue of strategic thinking after the rational actor is removed.18 In other words that which is not based on
common sense must be something cultural. This implies that strategic culture is the irrational element in strategy. And in fact historical literature has a tendency to attribute strategic failures to strategic culture prevailing over reason. It is important to point out that strategic cultures have their origins in very real strategic circumstances that have conditioned the thinking of a strategizing body, like most traditions it has logical roots even if it becomes obsolete and ends up defying logic. Rather than say strategic culture is irrational it is better to see it as conditioning what is rational in the first place.19
14 See: Escalating expansionism, ‘The crisis of Taishō diplomacy.’
15 Victor Hanson, Why the West has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam (New York 2001) 331. 16 Compare: Oi, ‘The Japanese navy in 1941’ in Goldstein, Dillon (ed.), The Pacific War papers, 6,7.
17 Forrest E. Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: Implications for Coercive
Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century (Westport 2003) 18.
18 Rashed U. Zaman, ‘Strategic Culture: A “Cultural” Understanding of War’, Comparative Strategy 28 (2009) 1, 68-88, 76.
Surely many cases of strategic failure in history have been caused by strategic culture lagging behind developments, something Forrest Morgan calls “jousting in the mirror” and which Alastair Johnston refers to as ‘inertia of choice’.20 Strategic situations give birth to strategic
concepts and preferences to deal with them that are internalized and institutionalized so that they persist after the conditions from which they arose now longer apply. The cultural element in strategy is a pervasive, relatively constant factor among the rapidly changing conditions within which strategy making takes place. In effect strategic culture theory postulates that strategy is not only made on the basis of circumstance and one’s, and one’s adversary’s capabilities but also on an evolved system of assumptions, preferences and prevalent discourses within which the strategizing actor operates. It is important to note that strategic culture does not of itself motivate strategic choices.21 Rather the strategic
circumstances and events motivate a response, a strategy, which the strategic culture conditions by effectively limiting the number of possible outcomes. Its effect is limiting, as out of all possible strategic options the strategic culture leads some to not even be imagined and others to be dismissed due to the assumptions and preferences that make up the strategic culture of the strategist(s).22 In other words it determines what is considered
impossible and undesirable with regards to foreign policy and military strategy. I see the concept as one of enormous importance in understanding strategy but it needs to be understood that overemphasizing its role or misuse of the term can lead to an overly simplistic, static, and essentialist view of strategy, up to the point of racial stereotyping.23
The risk of the term strategic culture leading to a reductionism or determinism was also a worry of Jack Snyder who had coined the term in the 1970’s. Snyder studied Soviet deterrence policy and found that the US assessments of Soviet strategy had been wide of the mark. He attributed this to the tendency to assume others to react as you yourself would, in other words mirror-imaging, while in reality each operates within a different culture of strategy resulting in different strategies.24 Before Snyder’s work, strategy was generally
considered to be a rational realm within which people of all cultural backgrounds, all things being equal were able to, and generally would, arrive at the same strategic conclusions.25 His
work led to the creation of a historiographical movement centred around the concept of strategic culture, with other authors applying it to other historical cases than just nuclear strategy. Snyder’s concept of strategic culture specifically pertains to tendencies in strategic thinking that persist long after the conditions from which they arose have disappeared, in other words forming a culture in what would normally be assumed to be the territory of the rational. He defines it as follows: “The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have
20 Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan, 10; Alastair I. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security 19 (1995) 4, 32-64, 34.
21 Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan, 10-11. 22 Ibid., 22.
23 Porter, Military Orientalism, 15-16.
24 Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan, 5-6; Zaman, ‘Strategic Culture’, 73. 25 Jack Snyder, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor’, in: Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power:
acquired through instruction or imitation.”26 By conditioned he means that something can
only be ascribed to strategic culture if “…a distinctive approach to strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force posture,” i.e. when “strategic culture had taken on a life of its own, distinct from the social interests that helped give rise to it.”27 Here he
evidently points to the role that social interest groups have in creating and maintaining a strategic culture, something that also plays a role in his views on imperial myths which we will address later.28 The concept of strategic culture as I use it is a broad phenomenon that
affects all levels of political and military decision making. In this I align with David Jones who identified three levels of a state's strategic culture:
A macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethnocultural characteristics, and history; a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society; and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations. This strategic culture did not just delimit strategic options; it pervaded all levels of choice from grand strategy down to tactics.29
To Snyder’s apparent annoyance scholars who prescribed to this idea have since used it in such a way as to suggest that strategic culture is derived from innate national characteristics. In Snyder’s view this often leads to an overly deterministic view on strategy, as he pointed out in ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor’ (1990), by which he disavowed himself from the movement.30 However, it cannot be denied that within specific nations the
bodies that occupy themselves with strategy making, the executive and the military staffs primary among them, form their own strategic approaches, organization-specific cultures of thought and imagination. As they work in close relation to each other and are all positioned within the larger national culture, political system, and importantly share the same strategic language, they often align on key principles which differ substantially from those of other nations. I believe this allows historians to characterize their policies as indicative of a national strategic culture. That being said, I concur with Snyder in that presenting a strategic culture as a product of a specific national culture often leads us to a deterministic view on strategy making and historical events, as well as leading to essentialism and stereotyping, something particularly evident in the case of Japan.31
The most important aspect of strategic culture that guards against deterministic stereotyping is that the ‘relatively constant factor’ changes over time as new strategic circumstances demand a revaluation of assumptions and preferences. In fact, Japan’s
26 As quoted in: Zaman, ‘Strategic Culture’, 76. 27 As quoted in: Ibid., 76.
28 See: Escalating expansionism, ‘Myths of empire, 43.’
29 David R. Jones, ‘Soviet Strategic Culture’, in: Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power: USA/USSR (New York 1990) 35-49, 35; As quoted in: Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, 37.
30 See: Jack Snyder, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor’, in: Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic
Power: USA/USSR (New York 1990) 3-9.
31 Forest Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: Implications for Coercive Diplomacy
transformation into a modern state in a remarkably short amount of time shows that both civil culture and strategic culture sometimes can change quickly. As culture in general, strategic culture is not truly ‘constant’, change often takes the form of a paradigm shift, old views disappearing as leaders retire or die, and new instructors begin to teach at military academies. As I will show, Japanese military culture made sure that this could occur more rapidly in Japan due to the great influence of younger, lower rank officers.32 Sometimes the
shift takes the form of a dialectical process in which factions within a body hold opposing strategic views resulting in one or the other’s victory or resulting in a synthesis of the two. In Japan the volatile political scene and intense factionalism and inter-service rivalry contributed to a dynamic strategic culture.33 But perhaps the greatest shifts occur after
confronting ‘the other’, an outside threat with a different way of war and strategic outlook. One of the best examples is the transformation of Japan into a modern empire with a modern strategic culture, due to an incursion by a foreign power.
It was long thought that the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867)34 through a policy
called Sakoku (litt. closed country)35 consciously aimed to isolate Japan from the outside
world. However, no country exists in a vacuum, not even relatively homogenous Japan. New critical examinations by authors such as David Howell have revealed that, not only is Sakoku as a term a 19th century invention, but no such conscious policy of isolationism can be said to
have existed at the time. Edo-period Japan was never completely isolationist and Japan did not exist in complete detachment from the Asian mainland, though we can speak of a ‘relative isolation’ when it came to contact with the West.36 Enter US Commodore Matthew
Perry. When Perry arrived with his steam powered ‘black ships’ on July 8, 1853 Japan was forced to confront the implications of its relative isolation. It was by this exemplary piece of gunboat diplomacy, that Japan was forced to open itself to western powers.37 After the
country was opened to western trade and ideas the strategic culture of Japan rapidly adopted many western concepts as well as western technology. The Japanese government and military adopted the ways, means and to some extend the discourse of European/American modern strategy, yet it was a uniquely Japanese interpretation of modern strategy. These modern concepts formed a new strategic culture that included vestiges of the native military tradition, as well as new native strategic preferences but it can
32 See: Culture and strategy, ‘Those below overcome those above.’ 33 See: Culture and strategy, ‘Those below overcome those above’, 31-33.
34 The Shogunate was a feudal yet central military government. Also called Bakufu which can be translated as ‘tent rule’ showing that the government has a military origin and that it claimed to be provisional. The shogun exercised power in name of the Emperor, whose significance in this period was mostly symbolic and religious. This period is also called the ‘Edo period’ after the Tokugawa capital (now Tokyo), or the ‘Edo Bakufu’.
35 Supposedly implemented by several edicts in 1633-1639 and forcibly repealed in 1853 after the incursions of US commodore Matthew Perry.
36 David L. Howell, ‘Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868’, Social Science Japan Journal 15 (Oxford 2012) 170-173, 170.
37 Commodore Matthew Perry of the US Navy arrived in Edo bay in July 8, 1853 with 4 modern steam driven warships. He left after having secured a promise of further trade talks and returned half a year later with 10 ships at which point the Japanese opened themselves to American trade. Other western nations used the opportunity to obtain similar trade treaties. For more information, see: William G. Beasley, The Perry Mission to
nonetheless be considered thoroughly modern. Imperial Japan came to adhere to a modern imperialism and a modern way of war that had originated in Europe but which they made their own. And though specific customs, discourses, and ways of thinking that characterize a nation may persist through major upheaval, these ‘nation-specific’ elements do not exclusively make up a strategic culture, much of it is shared with other nations because of intense interaction or because of similar strategic situations. Though emphasizing the feudal vestiges in Japan’s strategic culture may be more dramatic it is more accurate to acknowledge the many similarities between Japanese strategic culture and those of western nations at the time.
The establishment of a modern navy
In this segment I will address the evolution of the Imperial Japanese Navy as a means to elucidate its strategic characteristics, and to introduce the connections between naval expansion and imperial expansion. As an Island nation Japan naturally has an important connection to the sea and therefore possessed a naval tradition of its own. Though Evans and Peattie argue that compared to other nations this naval tradition was not particularly strong.38 However, the pre-modern Shogunate never established a true national navy as it
considered rebellion, not a naval incursion by a foreign power, to be the main threat. The last attempted invasions of the Japanese islands, those by the Mongol Empire in the 13th century,
had been overcome by heavy storms with Japanese land forces defeating those that managed to come ashore.39 This stroke of good fortune was interpreted as divine
intervention, and gave rise to the belief that Japan was under divine protection and unconquerable. The sort of ships used during the Senguko Jidai (1467-c.1603 litt. Warring States period) and Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) were either used as troop transports or infantry fighting platforms. Their lack of large guns and limited seafaring capabilities made these ships far inferior to oceangoing European ships, called Kurofune (black ships) by the Japanese,40 who started visiting the Islands from the mid sixteenth century onwards.41
Though warships were occasionally used to considerable strategic effect, a focus on land combat and an inward view limited further advances in naval organisation and technology. The samurai who dominated society generally opposed political and military centralisation to
38 Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1887-1941 (Annapolis 1997) 5-7.
39 Well known to be the origin of the term Kamikaze (divine wind). M. Hughes and W. Philpott, Palgrave
Advances in Modern Military History (Basingstoke 2006) 199.
40 Kurofune (Black ships) is a Japanese pre-modern term for European style ships. Originally ‘black’ referred to the pitch used to paint Portuguese sailing ships, but later it referred to the black smoke produced by western steamships such as those of Commodore Perry.
protect their privileged status.42 Technological innovation and foreign influences were feared
as threats to a privileged class but also as threats to the moral integrity of the nation. There was no central naval organisation as up to 1871 most warships were owned by the Daimyō (clan leaders) of the largely autonomous domains.43 The sort of warships that would have
been needed to effectively oppose encroaching European naval powers would have been a heavy burden on any single domain or the Edo government at this time. It goes without saying that none of these things are conducive to the establishment of a modern navy. A navy is more than a collection of warships; it is the governmental sphere at sea, something Japan at this time lacked. Despite the re-evaluation of Sakoku as a myth, Japan in the 19th
century was undeniably inward looking compared to Europe. Driven by the search for profit, western nations would seek to use their naval advantage to force unequal treaties on Japan, as they had done in China.
The opening of Japan to foreign trade by Commodore Perry directly led to a major overhaul of Japanese politics, society and strategic culture. Considering that this had been brought about by a show of naval strength the Japanese response included a new focus on naval defence, and an effort was made to belatedly modernize the military. Western steamships and coastal batteries were purchased by the Shogunate as well as by some of the more powerful domains, Satsuma in particular built a sizeable modern naval force.44 The
humiliations at the hands of the Western powers and the threat of change led some clan leaders, the heads of the Satsuma and Chōshū domains first among them, to declare their support for the end of the Shogunate and a restoration of Imperial rule. The last Shogun (Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 1837-1913) surrendered his power to the young Emperor Meiji ( 1852-1912) on November 9, 1867.45 With the Meiji Restoration, a new time dawned on Japan. A
new time that had been brought about by naval incursions of foreign powers, a fact that would put Japan on a path of naval expansion and eventual confrontation with western navies. The Meiji government pursued westernization, centralization and industrialization as means of strengthening Japan against western encroachment. This was expressed in the abandonment of the rebel imperialist slogan sonnō jōi (litt. Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians) in favour of Fukoku kyōhei (litt. Enrich the state, strengthen the military), which called for bringing in foreign ‘barbarian’ advisers.46 The naval history of Japan truly begins
42 It must however be noted that most samurai at this time were salaried administrators not land-owners or warriors as they had been during the warring states period.
43 A Daimyō led a clan and held land, the Han (domain). In the literature it is customary to use the term domain, also when referring to the clan.
44 In these early efforts the Japanese looked mainly to the Netherlands for ships and naval expertise and mainly to France for modern firearms and army expertise.
45 Despite the Shogun’s abdication, the Boshin War (January 27, 1868 - June 27, 1869) erupted between the imperial and Shogunate factions. The Imperialists defeated the Shogunate’s forces at the battle of Toba–Fushimi (27-31 January 1868). The majority of the Tokugawa naval forces managed to escape and form the breakaway republic of Ezzo on Hokkaido until they too were defeated on July 4, 1868 by the Imperialist forces.
46 As expressed in ‘the Charter Oath’ (April 7, 1868), one of the intended goals of the Imperial forces rebelling against the Shogunate was the expulsion of ‘the barbarian’ from Japan. In fact, when the new government started to westernize it sparked a rebellion by the clan that had been the most supportive of the Imperial faction, Satsuma, not only a pillar of the Meiji regime but also the region most engaged in maritime matters. The Meiji regime only turned to full modernization and centralisation from 1871 onwards. For more
with the Meiji restoration and the establishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy (hereafter also referred to as the IJN) in 1868.47 The IJN started out as a fleet with European-built ships
manned by Japanese who could hardly handle them under the command of Japanese officers educated abroad or European advising officers. European powers, especially Britain, were given ship-building contracts and invited to send naval missions regularly.48 The IJN
primarily modelled itself on the British Royal Navy, as it was the largest, most prestigious and most advanced navy. Yet as I will address, the relative weakness of the young navy meant French influence would also have a lasting effect.49
The navy was however not set up as a separate and equal institution but rather as a support element for the Imperial Japanese Army (hereafter also referred to as the IJA) which was primarily responsible for national defence.50 At first the Meiji government seemed intent
on building a strong and institutionally independent navy, putting forth an overly ambitious plan in 1870 to build a 200 ship fleet and establishing the Navy Ministry in 1872. Yet the Imperial Japanese Army gained dominance as the risk of a reactionary rebellion grew stronger in the 1870’s and the army successfully argued security from foreign naval powers in the short term was best achieved by a strong coastal and land based defence. Riskushu Kaijū (army primacy) in national strategy would remain in place until the rise of Yamamoto Gombei in the 1890’s (1852-1933, no relation to Yamamoto Isoroku).51
Yamamoto Gombei and his erstwhile superior, navy minister Saigō Tsugumichi (1843-1902) elevated the IJN from a navy of regional significance to one of global significance. Under their leadership the IJN developed into a truly modern naval force.52 These men
reformed the bureaucracy of the navy ministry, removed the older, more conservative men from the Admiralty and replaced them with young professionals eager to modernize, in the process ending clan-based favouritism in the navy. Yamamoto rose to become navy minister and served as prime minister twice.53 The foundations of the IJN that would confront Russia
and latter, the United States were laid down by Yamamoto. He not only reformed the officer corps and the ministry but also obtained Japan’s first battleships and more importantly brought about the repeal of Riskushu Kaijū (army primacy). The issue of primacy in strategic defence had come to the fore because victory in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) had proven that the navy was capable of defeating a powerful adversary at sea, thus undermining
information, see: T. J. Pempel, ‘Political Parties and Representation: The Case of Japan’, Political Science and
Politics 25 (1992) 13-18, 13; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 7.
47 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 7. 48 Ibid., 10.
49 See: Culture and strategy, ‘Western way of war, Eastern way of war’, 27-28.
50 The primacy of coastal defence was called shusei kokubō (static defence). This conclusion was reached partly due to the poor performance of both the Imperialist and the rebel Ezzo Republic naval forces during the final months of the Boshin War (1868-1869).
51 ‘Gombei’ is also rendered as ‘Gonnohyōe’ and ‘Gonbee’, Yamamoto Gombei came from a Shimazu (Satsuma) samurai family, yet effected the end of Satsuma dominance over the navy in favour of a more meritocratic system. For more information, see: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 20-22.
52 Saigō was Yamamoto’s patron during his early career and he is mostly responsible for the bureaucratic reforms in these early years while Yamamoto reformed the recruitment system.
the army’s position that national defence would necessarily take place on land. Yamamoto and his supporters even argued for naval supremacy, basing their claims on navalist theories of writers such as the Colomb brothers, John Laughton and primarily Alfred Mahan.54 I will
address the effect of navalist theory on Japanese naval strategy in the next segment but arguably Mahan and his fellow navalist theorists had a greater impact on the battlefield of institutional autonomy and fund-allocation. Their books lent the weight of western expert opinion to the IJN’s insistence on an equal institutional position to the IJA, as well as providing justification for the IJN insisting that poor Japan built a top-notch battleship fleet, with an oceanic range of operation. Most of the navy’s policies can be understood as part of a pursuit of autonomy for itself as an organization and seeking to enhance its operational integrity. Besides the fight for an equal position in national defence strategy the navy’s ‘emancipation’ depended upon the establishment of a separate Naval General Staff (Kaigun
Gunreibu). The establishment of the Naval Staff in 1893 meant that the Navy now answered
directly to the Emperor just like the Army, whereas previously it had fallen under the authority of the Army General Staff. A fully equal institutional position for the navy was however not truly secured until the victory over Russia in 1905, and the political dominance of the IJA remained until the end of the imperial period.55
Apart from institutional autonomy and the attainment of fuel resources, attaining operational integrity was also dependent on the development of a native industrial military complex. A strong combination of military owned facilities and private companies, munition factories, shipyards, and later aircraft factories, formed a small but vibrant military industrial complex. The Japanese were able to build increasingly larger and complex ships, initially after European designs and out of imported parts, but gradually developing the industrial know-how to produce every part themselves and designing the ships themselves.56 In some fields
Japan began to lead rather than follow, but even then the Japanese would still on occasion commission a ship abroad to check up on their competitors’ technological advances. By the process of gradually gaining naval autonomy, Japan secured national autonomy by reducing reliance in defence matters on the very countries they feared as potential enemies.
Strategic culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Despite the difficulties inherent to the concept of strategic culture it is possible to find multiple characteristics that are typical of the strategic culture of the Imperial Japanese military.57 Firstly a cult of the offensive marks the Japanese way of war both on land and at
sea, but this is most consistently visible on the levels of operations and tactics. Strategically
54 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 24.
55 For more information, see: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 20-22. 56 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 161.
Japan saw itself on the defensive most of the time but as a long war was not in its best interest it would seek to aggressively attack the enemy’s forces, and use aggressive tactics to destroy them. The willingness of both the IJA and the IJN to risk and to incur heavy casualties was noted by western observers, this contributed to an emphasis on mass and morale which often overshadowed strategic considerations. The seeming contradiction of a nation feeling existentially threated and strategically on the defence placing such emphasis on offensive operations and armaments is not as exceptional as it seems. The ideas of the superiority of the offensive and the virtues of the pre-emptive attack are recurring parts of the ‘imperial myth’ that I will address in a later chapter.58
In their focus on destroying the enemy’s forces rather than occupying territory or indirectly attacking the enemy’s ability to make war Japanese naval strategy is decidedly Mahanist.59 The schwerpunkt that Japanese naval strategy targeted was always the enemy’s
fleet.60 This attitude arises from the assertion that Japan could not viably occupy the
heartland of any of its major rivals, additionally in a long conflict with a major power Japan would face an ever increasing numerical disadvantage. The formula of a decisive naval battle early in the war, which had been so successful in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), also defined Japanese strategy vis à vis the US in the interwar period in the form of ‘the great all-out battle strategy’, the Japanese inter-war strategy for fighting the United States Navy that I will address in detail in a later chapter.61
Seeking the decisive battle on terms favourable to Japan forms the focus of Japanese naval strategy pre-1941. The Japanese had determined such an operation would give them chance of winning a war and dedicated everything to making that operation successful, often neglecting to set up contingency plans on a strategic level. Japanese wargames focused on testing the concept of the decisive battle in great detail to perfect the concept but only limited attention was paid as to how an unwilling enemy might be brought into that battle, how to act when the enemy fought that battle differently than expected or what offered the best chance of victory in case no such battle occurred.62 Additionally, the focus on a battle in
nearby waters, the desire to fight a short war, and a focus on the operational level also meant that for a long time ships were built with a limited range of operations, logistics were neglected, and forward support facilities underdeveloped. This meant the IJN was generally unsuited to sustained long range operations. In contrast the United States Navy (hereafter also referred to as the USN) was far more suited to long-range operations due to the huge American merchant fleet, superior engine systems and doctrines that stressed trans-oceanic offensives.63
58 See: Escalating expansionism, ‘Myths of empire’.
59 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783 (Boston 1890) introduction; Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis 2013) 29-33. 60 Usually translated as center of gravity. The aspect of the enemy’s war effort that is to be targeted to bring about its collapse.
61 See: The Pearl Harbor shift, ‘The great all-out battle strategy’ 62 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 146.
63 For more information, see: Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–
It is really no wonder the Japanese believed in decisive victories, both at sea and in general they had known decisive victory, while on the other hand they had no real experience with long, total wars. WWI however kindled an interest in German theories on total war among some Japanese military leaders, particularly those of the Tōseiha (litt. control) faction in the army.64 From the 1930’s onwards they attempted to prepare Japan for a total war, precisely
because the country was ill-equipped to fight such a war. This involved an expansion of the military-industrial complex, a strengthening of governmental control over the economy, and plans for measured expansion to achieve autarky in strategic materials. This acknowledgement of the possibility of a total war however did nothing to weaken the notion of a decisive naval battle mainly because it was considered the best way to confront an enemy who had time on its side.
The most important factor in gaining success in a decisive battle against a stronger opponent was perceived to be attaining strategic surprise. Seizing the initiative and appearing where one is not expected.65 Strategic surprise was not only considered an
important part of the decisive battle but of all major operations and it therefore forms an integral part of Japanese strategic culture. It was pursued even when it came at great risk, and the possibility of achieving it was generally assumed. The value of strategic surprise as a force multiplier would however be effectively denied to the Japanese in every battle after Coral Sea as their naval code was broken by the American decoding project ‘Magic’ in May 1942, in time for the battle of Midway (June 4–7, 1942). ‘Magic’ would enable the Americans to read the majority of IJN communications as the Japanese never realised the code had been compromised. This would prove instrumental in the American victory at Midway as the surprise element Yamamoto was counting on was completely lost. Subsequent actions by the IJN could always be anticipated, although operational details were often transmitted by other means.66 American code-breaking had also compromised Japanese diplomatic efforts during
the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) and the last ditch diplomatic effort to avert war, the so-called Nomura-Hull talks (November 27, 1941 - December 7, 1941).67 Therefore,
both on the grand-strategic level and the operational level the Americans were able to deny the element of surprise to the Japanese at several key moments, with the major exception of the starting of hostilities with the US and the Pearl Harbor operation which were kept secret by elaborate safety measures and deception.
64 See: Culture and strategy, ‘Those below overcome those above’, 32.
65 Oi, ‘The Japanese navy in 1941’ in Goldstein, Dillon (ed.), The Pacific War papers, 11.
66 Geoffrey Parker (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumpf of the West (Cambridge 2008) 334.
67 Named for the Japanese dignitary Nomura Kichisaburō (1877-1964) and US secretary of state Cordell Hull (1871-1955), these talks had been hopeless from the beginning as the Japanese military would not accept any compromise on the main issues of Japanese withdrawal from China and Indo-China. Nomura’s delay in handing over the official declaration of war on the morning of the Pearl Harbor attack has remained a point of
controversy. For more information, see: Frederick W. Marks III, ‘Facade and Failure: The Hull-Nomura Talks of 1941’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 15 (1985) 1, 99-112.
The navy’s perpetual weakness relative to its potential enemies, and the pursuit of strategic surprise fostered an emphasis on carefully working out intricate battle plans that were aimed to mislead the enemy. The greatest problem with such meticulous planning is that it necessarily assumes a particular course of action of the enemy, and when reality works out differently the plan can rapidly lose value. It is also interesting to note that the Japanese might have believed in decisive battle, and therefore in strategic force concentration, but their preference for intricate plans of deception usually meant that forces would be tactically or operationally divided so as to surround the enemy or hit him from an unexpected direction. Such operational and tactical dispersal would contribute greatly to Japanese defeats at Midway and Leyte Golf. Morison argues in ‘Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions: May 1942 - August 1942’:
They overvalued surprise, which had worked so well at the beginning and always assumed they could get it. They believed that the pattern for decisive battle was the same at sea as on the land-lure the enemy into an unfavourable tactical situation, cut of his retreat, drive into the flanks, and then concentrate for the kill.68
Fleet manoeuvres were a regular part of peace-time activities but due to security concerns and to save fuel these manoeuvres often only trained specific parts of operational plans rather than plans in their entirety. Consider that Japanese naval commanders have often been characterized as indecisive and unimaginative and one can imagine unforeseen circumstances wreaking havoc.69 This meant that the Japanese navy was itself not well
equipped to cope with strategic surprise when achieved by the enemy, as happened at Midway.
Fully aware that Japan was always likely to face a quantitative disadvantage the Japanese military focussed on quality rather than quantity. Decisions concerning what kind of materiel to produce are fundamentally strategic questions, particularly in the case of the fleet as ships take a long time and a major investment to build. As ships generally stay in service for 20 years or more the strategic capabilities of a navy are determined by long-term construction trends. Strategic planning depended on a successful decisive battle operation, operational planning and success depended on the quality of Japanese ships. Japan therefore took great pains to be at the forefront of ship design. The fixation on combat quality and the focus on the offensive in tactical and technical matters as well as in the operational art would lead Japan to continuously seek to incorporate the heaviest possible armaments in ship designs,
68 Samuel E. Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, Volume IV, ‘Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions: May 1942 - August 1942’ (New York 1949) As quoted in: Hanson, Why the West has Won, 364.
culminating in the construction of the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi.70 With their
46cm (18.1 inch) guns Yamato and Musashi were monuments to the ideal of the battleship duel and to the Japanese will to meet American numbers with superior quality. Japanese carriers also reflected this offensive preference, they were practically unarmoured so as to carry the greatest possible amount of offensive aircraft.
Larger guns also meant a greater range, which was a linchpin in Japanese battle planning, which sought to ‘outrange’ the enemy.71 Effective long-range gunnery had been
decisive at the battle of Tsushima (1905). Large guns were supplemented by the most advanced torpedo’s in the world, the type 93 ‘long lance’ torpedo, with twice the range of contemporary American torpedo’s. Japanese cruisers and destroyers were designed as battleship-killers rather than as mere support or escort vessels, as such they were relatively lacking in anti-air and anti-submarine armaments but equipped with as many torpedo tubes as possible. The focus on range also helps explain why the Japanese took to aircraft carriers with such a passion as these could project firepower at the greatest range possible at the time.
Besides firepower, tactical speed was considered just as important. Speed had also been a major factor at Tsushima (1905) where it allowed the Japanese fleet to ‘cross the T’ twice on the Russians.72 Thus firepower, weapons range and speed were emphasized, usually
at the expense of armour, operational range, and stability. During the 1930’s this was actually taken to far as several Japanese ships sank during manoeuvres in rough seas because their heavy armaments and relatively small fuel compartments made them dangerously top-heavy. After expensive reconstructions these ships were made more stable but the Japanese fleet would uphold its offensive mind-set and built ships accordingly, leading to characteristic defects. Additionally, this specialisation of warships for a certain function meant that that the navy was wholly unsuited for other tasks such as convoy sailing.73
The Japanese placed much faith in innovative tactics by which they hoped to surprise the enemy and so offset the expected disadvantage in numbers. For instance, the IJN embraced night-actions like no other navy in the world. Japanese battle planning depended heavily on the effectiveness on both long-range torpedo volleys and daring night-time short
70 Launched in 1940, these two ships remain the largest battleships ever made. These ships were expected to start a new battleship race, with the nice complication that any American ship of comparable power and size would not be able to navigate the Panama Canal. Indeed, the Montana class, would have been unable to. The Montana’s were abandoned after the Battle of Midway in favour of more carriers, a clear sign that the USN had learned the lesson that carriers were the future. Gow, Military intervention in pre-war Japanese politics, 110. 71 Gun range is also limited by at what range a ship can spot and target an enemy. The Japanese therefore developed the most advanced targeting optics and build the highest possible superstructures on their battleships, contributing to the tendency of Japanese warships to be top-heavy. Japan however lagged behind in electronic fire-control systems which negated whatever advantage they had in optics. Jordan, Warships after
Washington, 274.
72 ‘crossing the T’ refers to the classic naval tactic of steaming in line astern (each behind the other) crossing in front of the enemy line before they do, allowing one to bring all guns to bear while the enemy is only able to use his frontal guns.
range torpedo attacks by cruisers and destroyers. The navy also placed great hope in miniature submarines, which in practice however produced little results. The Japanese also developed techniques such as below-water gun targeting and one-way air strikes that were however never employed in battle.
A qualitative advantage was sought not only by superior equipment enabling superior and innovative tactics, but above all by superior morale and fighting spirit. The Japanese assumed that in a naval war they would usually face an enemy with more, and perhaps also better ships. To compensate they stressed efficiency by rigorous training.74 Within the Army the
Kodoha (litt. Imperial way) faction had an influence on doctrine that lasted far longer than
their influence in politics. They stressed the importance of morale and élan above that of modern equipment and industrial war-potential. In the navy as much as in the army it was assumed that the Japanese had a superior fighting spirit compared to westerners and particularly Americans. This belief in Nihon Seishin (the Japanese spirit that could prevail over any foe) was an essential part of the belief of Japanese racial superiority.75 Morale was
further strengthened by propaganda and an emphasis on honouring one’s family, one’s superior officers, the nation and the Emperor by fighting bravely. This trust in morale did not only encompass morale as a factor in battle but also as a factor in war. The will of the Japanese people to endure the hardships of war and to endure setbacks was perceived as greater than that of their Western and Chinese enemies. Though it is interesting to note the military governments tendency to withhold news of military setbacks from the people, partly to uphold morale, partly to avoid a challenge to the military’s power. It was however repeatedly said that a single or few military defeats would bring about the collapse of the American will to fight, which rather proved to have the opposite effect. Reliance on morale became even more pronounced when the situation was desperate.76 When one realizes the
situation is desperate but nothing more can be practically done, one instead refers to the abstract. It is therefore perhaps to be seen as a fall-back position, one that vindicates the work that has been done, the plans made and the ones who made it. It can be seen as those in responsibility reassuring each other and their wavering inferiors that there is something in their favour that will balance any scale.
The IJA was more known for fatalism in the face of the overwhelming odds but the IJN too would execute increasingly desperate ploys towards the end of the Pacific War. The
Kamikaze (litt. divine wind) suicide attacks are a testimony to that fact. Similarly desperate
operations such as the Yamato sortie were undertaken to send a message to the army and to
74 In fact, the training of Japanese soldiers was so rigorous that it was considered to actually be demoralizing, which is why the army tried to reform it during the war, but many training officers instead continued to harass and abuse trainees in the belief it strengthened their spirit.
75 Thomas Cleary, The Japanese Art of War, Understanding the culture of strategy (Boston 1991) 43.
76 Masataka Chihaya, Fading victory: the diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki (Annapolis 2008) 301; Jisaburo Ozawa, ‘Development of the Japanese navy’s operational concept against America’ in Goldstein, Dillon (ed.),
let their ships ‘go down fighting’, rather than out of any real hope for operational success.77
Whereas other navies, when confronted with such odds, might have reverted to a fleet-in-being strategy to constrict enemy actions while conserving what naval strength remained.78
Though admittedly, such a strategy of denying battle by remaining in harbour had been greatly compromised by the new power of aircraft and submarines, as the attack on Taranto (November 11-12, 1940) and the sinking of the Tirpitz (November 12, 1944) had shown.79
Western way of war, Eastern way of war
Apart from the debates surrounding strategic culture, another historiographical debate that needs to be addressed when speaking of modern Japanese warfare is the one concerning the so-called ‘Western way of war’. It has been said that with the acceptance of European modernity by the Japanese they also accepted the Western way of war though retaining elements of their own military culture. Inspired by Edward Said’s work on orientalism,80
authors such as Patrick Porter see defining strategic cultures as part of the Western way of war or its opposite, the ‘Eastern way of war’ as a form of orientalism.81 Military orientalism
projects the orientalism theory unto the culture and conduct of war by arguing that thinking in these terms is not only painting with a broad brush and creating a false dichotomy, but also creates and perpetuates racial stereotypes.
Atrocities, fanaticism and strategic failure on the part of Japan have been, and sometimes still are, explained as part of a general oriental culture of war. Both within the original theory, which claimed the existence of a Western way of war and which sought to explain ‘the rise of the west’ in the modern era by its inherent superiority, and within the revisionist school of military orientalism, which asserts this claim is derived from (racial) stereotyping, Japan takes a unique position. Japan is usually cast as an archetypical eastern nation that nonetheless successfully brought its economy, culture and military into the industrial age created by the West.82 At the same time though, aspects of the Japanese
military culture were attributed to a residual ‘Eastern way of war’. The Japanese soldier was
77 In Operation Ten-Go (April 7, 1945) the Yamato and supporting ships steamed for Okinawa to help repel the imminent attack on the island. The attack was suicidal due to complete American air supremacy. It was the last major operation of the IJN of the war.
78 Fleet-in-being refers to the strategy of keeping the fleet in port to constrict enemy options by the threat posed by its mere existence.
79 The British air attack on the Italian port of Taranto showed the vulnerability of anchored ships to torpedo attack. See: Thomas P. Lowry, The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor (Mechanicsburg 2000); The German battleship Tirpitz had acted as a fleet-in-being in Norwegian waters but was the target of repeated British air attacks and an attack by mini-submarines which ultimately succeeded in sinking it. See: Wiliam J. Koenig, Epic Sea Battles (London 1975) 205.
80 For more information, see: Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London 1977). 81 Porter, Military Orientalism, 4-5.
