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Exploring the Mobilization
Strategy of the Islamic State
Eveline van Dijk S1515950
Master Thesis – Crisis and Security Manamgent
Supervisor: Dr. J. Vüllers
Second reader: Dr. B.W. Schuurman Word count: 20027
Table of content
Chapter 1 - Introduction 3
1.1. Mobilization of rebel groups 3
1.2 Research Question 4
1.3 Academic and Societal Relevance 4
1.4 Thesis Outline 5
Chapter 2: Literature Review 6
2.1 Civil Wars & Rebel Groups 6
2.2 Grievances 8
2.3 Greed 9
2.4 Competition & support 10
2.5 Networks 11
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 13
3.1 Causal Mechanisms 13 3.2. Micro level 14 3.3. Meso level 15 3.4 Macro level 17 Chapter 4 – Methodology 19 4.1 Research design 19 4.2 Multi-level approach 20 4.3 Data 20
4.4 Validity & Reliability 21
Chapter 5: Iraq, Syria and the Islamic State 22
5.1 Iraq 22
5.2 Syria 23
5.3 The Islamic State 24
Chapter 6 - Micro analysis: Motivations 28
6.1 Al-Suri and his influence on IS’s mobilization strategy 28
6.2. Da’wah offices 29
6.3. Ideology and the power of Persuasion 30
6.4 Emotions 31
6.5 Broadcasting strength 32
6.6 Former Jihadi fighters 33
6.7 Money 34
6.9 Sub-conclusion 35
Chapter 7 - Meso analysis: Network 37
7.2. Prisons 37
7.3 Prison Breaks 39
7.4 Da’wah offices 40
7.5 Other networks 40
7.6. Sub-conclusion 41
Chapter 8 – Macro Analysis: Political Opportunities 42
8.1 The Sunni-Repression 42
8.1.1. Brief history of the Sunni-Shia divide 42
8.1.2 Repression: Analysis of the Sunni-Shia divide 43
8.2. Political Relations and Power Vacuums: Iraq Government, US and the Arab Spring 44
8.2.1 Brief history of the power relations in Iraq 44
8.2.2. Analysis of Political Relations and Power Vacuums 45
8.3 Sub-conclusion 46
Chapter 9 - Conclusion 48
9.1. Discussion of the hypothesis 48
9.1.1 Motivations 48 9.1.2 Networks 49 9.1.3 Political opportunities 50 9.2 Conclusion 52 9.3 Limitations 53 Bibliography 54
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Pictures featuring groups of men holding up rifles and triumphantly waving a black flag have been a familiar sight on media outlets around the world. These men belonged to the Islamic State, which at one point held territory the size of Great Britain in the Middle East (Al Jazeera, 2019). Moreover, it consisted of an estimated 100.000 fighters (Sly, 2018), including a large amount of foreign fighters (Schmid, 2015). This means that the Islamic State [IS]1 has used a successful mobilization strategy. Without it, they would have been unable to mobilize this amount of people to fight for their cause.
1.1. Mobilization of rebel groups
A lot of research has been done regarding mobilization of rebel groups and terrorist groups before and during civil wars. For example, Jeremy A. Weinstein (2006) studied rebel groups and why certain insurgency groups act differently than others. Another scholar, Jacob Shapiro argues that terrorists are rational actors, who join a group for rational reasons (2013, p. 18). There is also attention in the scholarly world for modernizing mobilization strategies, such as the use of twitter as a recruitment tool (Klausen, 2015). Researchers studying IS are mostly looking at the foreign fighter phenomenon and research why many individuals decide to join the organization. Nevertheless, scholars also looked at the mobilisation from a more individual level. For instance, Hassan Hassan (2016) studies the ideological appeal of the organization. Scholars also approached the growth of the Islamic state from a more local/regional perspective, like Craig Whiteside who argued that the widely spread idea about Hussein’s Ba’atists influence on the organization of the Islamic State has been given too much credit, because veterans of Salafist-Jihadi movements have had a larger role (2017). However, despite the rich research already written about IS, the early mobilization efforts of IS remains unresearched.
1 The Islamic State is one of the many names that this organization has used and has been given. The group
started under al-Zarqawi under the nam Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, later on it changed it name to Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers. In 2006, al-Zarqawi’s successors announced the creation of the Islamic state of Iraq, which was more commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. Although, the group never pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda or Bin Laden. Nowadays, it is known as Da’esh, The Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). To keep it consistent and more understandable, this paper will use the acronym IS when the group of al-Zarqawi and his successors is meant.
1.2 Research Question
So, to add to this body of knowledge, this thesis will answer the following research question;
How did the Islamic State attract members through their early mobilisation efforts in Iraq and Syria between 2006 and 2013?
This research question is formulated to look at the dynamics of mobilization on a local level with a multi-level approach. The micro, meso and macro level will be used to gain a broad understanding of IS’s recruitment strategy. This thesis will honour the request of Lorenzo Bosi and Donatella della Porta (2012). They researched the perception of fighters in the Irish Republican Army and distinguished motivations, the existence of networks and political opportunities as factors contributing to their mobilization into the IRA and argued that there should be more focus on the formation of motivations, networks and political opportunities in action (p. 381). This means that the micro level will study the utilization of motivations by IS. The meso level will focus on the usage of networks and the macro level will look at how IS used political opportunities to see how these dynamics played a role in the recruitment process of IS.
Moreover, this research will mostly look at the mobilization processes between 2006 and 2013 and focus on local and regional mobilization. This time period is chosen because IS officially declared its existence in 2006, and starting in 2013, a large influx of foreign fighters took place, which lasted until 2015 (Bakker, Paulussen, & Entenmann, 2014, p. 13; Soufan Group, 2015). Thus, including the mobilization strategy after 2013 in the analysis would be difficult, because foreign fighters started to be an important target of the mobilization campaign. Therefore, it would be difficult to differentiate between the data. Despite the establishment of IS in 2006, this thesis will occasionally consider earlier mobilization processes of IS’s predecessors. This provides context to IS’s mobilization efforts from 2006 onwards.
Lastly, this research will be a case study of the mobilization strategy of the Islamic State and will use a qualitative approach. This is a well-suited approach to look at dynamics and processes, which is the goal of this research.
1.3 Academic and Societal Relevance
This research is of academic significance because it will honour the request of Bosi and Della Porta (2012) to look at different dynamics of recruitment by using a multilevel approach and
group, leading to an insufficient picture. Moreover, this study will give detailed insight in the mobilization strategy of IS that can be used in additional research regarding IS or other multi-level research into mobilization efforts. The conclusions drawn from this approach will give new insight into IS and could be used to understand its future behaviour. Furthermore, when similar conclusions are drawn as other researchers have found, it validates the existing knowledge. This will be especially relevant for policy makers that deal with IS or similar upcoming organizations.
Moreover, for society at large it is relevant to understand the dynamics of armed group mobilization due to the threat it can pose to society. The study of IS recruitment specifically is important because IS may be able to remobilise local support in Syria and Iraq or other parts of the world. Thirdly, when these dynamics are recognised and understood, policies can be made to counter or undermine those dynamics to avoid another Islamic State or rebel group that could threaten many lives.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis will start with a literature review that addresses the relevant literature and findings in the field. This will be followed by the Theoretical Framework and Research Design. The theoretical framework will be divided in five parts. First it will discuss the three-fold approach and the causal mechanisms. Then it will introduce the three parts that explain each level of analysis. At the end of each part, the hypotheses for these levels will be stated. After this framework, the fourth chapter will give a brief history of Iraq, Syria and the Islamic State to give the necessary background for the analyses. Then the analyses will start. This part will be divided in accordance to the three level of analyses. Firstly, the micro-level will focus on the motivations used by IS, the meso level will focus on networks created and used by IS and, lastly, the macro-level political opportunities will be analysed. The analyses will be followed by the conclusion that will use the results of the analyses.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
A lot has been written about mobilization and mobilization strategies of terrorist and rebel groups, which will be the main topic of this literature review. This literature review will be structured around five main topics that have been featured prominently in the discourse. However, it first focusses on civil wars and rebel groups in general, then it will focus on grievances, greed, competition and support, repression and, lastly, on networks.
2.1 Civil Wars & Rebel Groups
Throughout history, groups of people, whether large or small, have gathered to resist or change the status quo of power relations, often turning violent. Such as the Batavi revolt against the Roman Empire in 69-70 AD (Lendering, 2011), the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka (Pletcher, sd) and the PKK in Turkey (Bruno, 2007). There are hundreds of examples of groups fighting, revolting or protesting for change. These groups have also attracted the attention of scholars, especially the use of violence in their strategy. Scholars sought an explanation for why these groups came into existence and asked themselves why and how they managed to attract participants and sympathizers.
Especially in the last few decades there has been an increased interest in civil wars. Lars-Erik Cederman and Manual Vogt (2017) found that since the 1990s there has been a large increase in the amount of work relating to civil wars (pp. 1993-1994). It is not surprising that scholars turned their attention to groups that are challenging regimes or the status quo, because in the second half of the twentieth century there have been around 127 civil wars, while only 25 interstate wars have taken place (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 75). Many researchers have attributed different causes to why groups rebel and protest against the status quo. In addition, they often used different methodologies to prove or disprove arguments and theories (Meyer, 2004).
Civil wars are often described as a war between a government and a non-state actor that claims sovereignty over the state or part of the territory of the state (Cederman & Vogt, 2017, p. 1993). Kalyvas (2009, p. 2) defines it as an armed combat that takes place within the borders of a sovereign state. It is often a conflict that has been militarized, with at least two parties competing and it includes the challenging of the sovereign authority. Moreover, naming a
describe a civil war going on in a country (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 1). So, civil wars often include one or more rebel group that is fighting a government or fighting for their cause.
Theories and Debates
There has been a lot of debate among scholars about why people mobilize and want to violently challenge the status quo. Scholars have looked at a variety of root causes and other related issues and from different perspectives. For instance, Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel (2010) used an economic lens. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2008) noticed that there exists a large amount of seemingly conflicting theories about this topic. They tried to quantify data to support theories about mobilization and identified three main school regarding mobilization theories, mostly from an individual perspective; Grievances and Participation, Selective Incentives and Social Sanctions (pp. 439-443). They argued that there is empirical evidence for all three schools, making the competition between those schools nothing more than artificially created. Which means that there should be more research into the interaction between mobilization strategies.
One of the most well-known theories in regard to civil war, rebel groups and mobilization is the collective action theory. The idea of this theory is that a group of people have difficulties to efficiently reach their goal, due to the need of a certain group size and the problem of free riders that let the group do the hard work. This theory was first introduced by Mancur Olson and had a large influence on the idea about mobilization and organization of groups in different aspects of life (Udéhn, 1993). Charles Tilly (1978) built on the idea of collective action and argued that it is necessary for a rebel group to challenge regimes and change the status quo. Mobilization is one of these components that is needed. The other elements necessary for successful collective action are; interest, opportunity and collective action itself. (pp. 10-11). DeNardo (1985), makes a similar argument about mobilization in his book Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. A good mobilization strategy is required for an effective civil war. This strategy is not only aimed at the outside, but also at the inside of the organization (pp. 144-145). He argued that it is necessary to look at not only successful strategies, but also at reasons why certain strategies are not chosen to understand an organization and its behaviour (pp. 6-7). This shows that mobilization is a heavily discussed topic among scholars.
Furthermore, one of the most well-known debates about mobilization and the reason why people join rebel groups has been the ‘greed versus grievances debate’. Already in 1962, James C. Davies refers to the work of Karl Marx’s and Tocqueville. Davies argues that, once
the lower class realised that they have the right for a better standard of living they would revolt against the elite (1962, pp. 5-6). Davies (1962) argues that people will probably revol if a period of increased social development and economy is followed by a sudden, but strong, retraction, introducing the J-curve theory. At the same time, this theory is criticized because it does not account for the size of the dissatisfaction needed for a revolt, nor does it explain why revolts occur in one society, while not in other similar societies ((Cohan, 1975, p. 158) found in (Gurr & Lichbach, 1986)). This shows that greed and grievances were already discussed in the early works about civil wars, even before the debate gained more traction around 2000. Moreover, it confirms that grievances and greed are seen as motivators for individuals to join a rebel group.
2.2 Grievances
Before the introduction of greed as part of the debate, the general conception was that people join a rebellion because they experienced grievances (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 319). Similar arguments exist for why people join a terrorist group (Crenshaw, 1981). One of the most well-known scholars arguing that relative deprivation of resources and political opportunity leads to rebellion has been Ted Gurr (1970) in his book Why Men Rebel. Relative deprivation is about the individuals perspective of the discrepancy between their value expectations, goods and conditions they feel that they are rightfully entitled to and what they are capable of getting (p. 24). This is similar to the argument Davies (1962) made a few years earlier. He argued that the difference between expectations and practice, in regard to achievements, contributes to the willingness of people to turn to violence. Nevertheless, Gurr’s relative deprivation model received criticism about its data collection. This led to a revision by Gurr and Lichbach (1986, p. 4) to try and create a better prediction structure for rebellion. Still, despite the concept that grievances can lead to rebellion is intuitive, data supporting this theory is not always conclusive (Brush, 1996, pp. 524-532). Later on, Gurr and Moore (1997) linked repression and grievances to mobilization and rebellion (p. 1081). They argued that grievances and mobilization increased the levels of rebellion, but could not find exhaustive evidence (pp. 1082, 1101-1102). In his book People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Gurr (2000) revisited his arguments and empirically tested data, where he found that protesting and rebellion by at risk-groups has to do with incentives and opportunity. One of the aspects of opportunity is the
about grievances has been the linking of structural inequality to mass political violence and revolution. Edward Muller and Mitchel Siligson (1987) found evidence for the effect of income inequality on political violence, while creating a causal model which incorporates regime oppression, acts of coercion, separatist intensity and the level of economic development. If there is high income inequality, the chance for political violence is also high (pp. 443-445). Moreover, it is important to realize that income inequality and relative deprivation is inherently different. Income inequality focusses on the differences between members of a society, while relative deprivation focusses on the individuals perspective on the situation (Regan & Norton, 2005, pp. 320-321).
Another form of grievances that has been discussed in the academic literature is repression. The idea that repression can lead to political violence has been around for a long time (DeNardo, 1985, p. 230). For instance, Regan and Norton (2005) found that political repression could lead to rebellion and, depending on the level of repression, could be an incentive for people to join a rebellion (pp. 333-334). Joseph K. Young (2013) reached a similar conclusion, arguing that rebellion and civil war is more common in weak states that are repressive. DeNardo (1985) agrees that repression can lead to mobilization. He argues that terrorism can lead to repression of civilians by a regime, which in turn leads to incentives for individuals to mobilize and support rebel groups. Nevertheless, this repression is often short lived and therefore not a good sole motivator for people to stay loyal to the group (p. 235).
To summarize, grievances have been thoroughly explored from different perspectives as a cause or an explanation for political violence and as a reason for mobilization because rebel groups profile themselves as a solution for perceived grievances. However, it is also clear that there is a significant amount of discussion amongst scholars about the impact of grievances and the effects of other causes for rebellion and rebel participation.
2.3 Greed
The greed argument focusses on the idea that individuals join a rebel group because they will gain more from joining the group than not. This avoids the free rider problem that is present in the collective action approach, when a private gain is present when joining an organization, individuals will join to avoid missing out on this gain (Hoeffler, 2011, p. 274). This argument may seem to paint an individual as a selfish being, but this idea is in line with the assumption that persons are rational beings that want to improve their situation (p. 276).
In 2000, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000) introduced the greed and grievance debate. This debate focuses on two sides of motivations of rebel groups: the economic motivations of rebels, which is mostly grounded in economic and organized crime theories (pp. 3-4), and the motivation to appease grievances, most often related to ethnic or inter-religious hatred and political exclusion (pp. 11-12). In their research about the causations of civil unrest, they found that economic factors have a better explanatory power than grievances because the proxies for grievances in their research were found to be insignificant (2004, pp. 563, 587-589). In contrast, Regan and Norton (2005) argue that greed and grievances do not have to be separate theories. They argue that grievances are often the backbone of rebellion, but economic and material incentives are necessary to keep a rational individual involved in the rebel group. Tullock (2005) argued similarly that individuals will participate in a rebellion when the benefits outweigh the costs. He agrees that despite the fact that the common good and grievances are dominant in the debate, the greed aspect of the equation has received too little attention, while they are key to understand participation (pp. 174-85).
Hence, greed is also a motivator for participation in rebellion. Rebel groups can use this to their advantage by using money or other forms of compensation in their recruitment propaganda.
2.4 Competition & support
During a civil war, there are often more than one non-state group fighting the status quo (Wood & Kathman, 2015, p. 167). This means that different groups challenge the government and/or each other. This also implies that they have to compete with each other for popular support. So, this means that groups are not only in competition for resources, but also competing for members who may want to join a rebel group.
Violence
One often cited factor of competition between rebel groups is the increased level of violence against civilians. Stephen Nemeth’s (2013) findings suggest that the presence of rivalling terrorist groups indeed increases violence against citizens. People will not join an organization that is inactive. Hence the use of violence by rebel groups and terrorist organizations to convey the message to their members that they are still active and relevant (p.
suicide attacks can mobilize support for their cause, and leads to more groups using this method (p. 78). To secure the mobilization and support of civilians to their group, a group can thus use violence to manipulate increased support. Weaker groups especially tend to use this increased violence tactic, since they do not have other means to create support (Wood, 2010, p. 612). Moreover, as Robert Pape (2003) explained, suicide terrorism can also work in another strategic way, by provoking strong government reactions as retaliation to the attacks. This is confirmed by the study done by Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson (2007), who found that counterattacks by governments can heighten the mobilization of terrorist groups, due to the increase of grievances and the opportunity for rebellion rose. Thus, this is in line with the arguments that government repression, after attacks, can lead to an increase in mobilization and can be utilized by rebel groups to gain support.
Identity
Another way to secure support for their specific rebel group, is to target specific individuals, focussing on specific aspects of their life, such as their ethnicity (Eck, 2009). Weinstein (2006) argued that mobilisation that is based on the ethnicity of individuals will yield more loyal support to the group. Individuals will feel more attached to a group supporting their identity (pp. 103-107). Moreover, aspects relating to identity of individuals, such as cultural obligation, kinship with a group or social pressure, can be used by rebel groups to create support for their cause, as is identified by Christopher Paul (2010, pp. 494-497). This means that groups use these factors to distinguish themselves form other groups and thereby appeal to individuals. It is clear that there can be a lot of competition between rebel groups, which changes their mobilization tactics that could lead to violence. Especially when smaller groups feel the need to outbid other groups. Moreover, to persuade individuals to join a specific group, rebel groups specifically target traits of individuals or groups to create a groups identity.
2.5 Networks
After 9/11, terrorist networks around the globe have gained a lot of attention in the regular media and the scholarly world. A lot of attention has been given to networks in terrorist groups, networks that are used to carry out attacks, but also how these play a role in recruitment of individuals. For example, Weinstein (2006) found that clandestine networks in the National Resistance Army in Uganda played a role in recruiting new members (p. 96). A difference can be made in the mobilization literature between individuals from one place that join a group in
another location, like European jihadists that join groups in the Middle East (Bakker, 2006; Weggemans, Bakker, & Grol, 2014), and literature mostly focussed on local recruitment in rebel groups (Bosi & Porta, 2012).
Networks are important in either form of recruitment in the sense that they tie individuals to a group. Social ties and other forms of networks connecting individuals to a cause help to resolve the collective action dilemma because when they believe they will stay involved with the group and its members, their cooperation means that others will also cooperate with them in the future (Weinstein, 2006, p. 99). Weinstein (2006) argues that ethnic and religious linkages leads to a bond between the group and the individual, it encourages trust and establishes common goals (p. 101). In turn, this leads to more effective mobilization. Another function of recruiters and their network is investigating a potential recruit and its reputation, to see whether they fit the group (107). This also relates to the idea of Heggehammer (2012), who proposes the idea that the recruitment process is a game of trust between recruiters and recruits (pp. 3-4).
In recent years, a new form of networks and mobilization has been studied by scholars; social media to forge new networks, especially for reaching individuals outside their vicinity. Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder (2015) explore how social media networks were used to increase recruitment for around the globe. Jytte Klausen (2015) looked into Twitter, as a tool to create broad networks outside the battle zone of an organization. This shows that networks can play an increasingly important role in mobilization literature since it evolves with new kind of technologies available to rebel groups.
In sum, a lot has been written about recruitment and mobilization in the context of groups contesting the status quo, resulting in different theories focussing on different aspects of the recruitment process of rebel groups and terrorist organizations. However, the core idea is that rebel groups are using networks to mobilize new recruits.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
The dependent variable of this research is IS’s mobilization strategy. The following independent variables are used to research the mobilization strategy: individual motivations, networks and political opportunities. These variables represent the three level of analyses, respectively; the micro, meso and macro level.
Inspired by the work of Bosi and Della Porta (Bosi & Porta, 2012; Della Porta, 2013), this thesis is based on the idea that analyses using those three levels and their interaction provides good insight into the mechanisms at play. It will allow for an understanding of the delicate interplay of factors at different levels and thus help answering the research question of this thesis.
Moreover, it is important to understand that a mobilization strategy concerns the recruitment of individuals for the organization. This research will only focus on direct participation as successful mobilization, meaning that a person joins the organization as a fighter or does some other service for the organization, such as being a driver or a cook. It will not include civilians who are just tolerating a group in their area. Otherwise, the scope of this thesis will be too broad, it would raise questions about personal responsibility in situations that can be morally hard to define. This would make the research blurry and unclear.
This chapter will first discuss causal mechanisms and the idea behind it, then it will follow with the three frameworks for the analyses. At the end of each framework two hypotheses for this research will be introduced.
3.1 Causal Mechanisms
The analyses of the three levels allow the study of the causal mechanisms of IS’s recruitment strategy. In the social sciences, mechanisms are not a purely descriptive approach to a chain of events (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998, p. 2). Social mechanisms focus on the consequences of individual actions reacting to others. The macro level is always influenced by individuals and is thus affected by the micro level (pp. 24-25). Donatella Della Porta (2013) has proposed a new conceptualization of causal mechanisms in her book Clandestine Political Violence “Mechanisms are chains of interaction that filter structural conditions and produce effects” (p. 24). This definition includes the actions of individuals and collective actors. In this definition, the causal mechanisms are understood as a chain of generative actions that link macro causes to cumulative effects through agency of individuals and collective actors (p. 24). This means
that causal mechanisms are not separate from each level of analyses, but that they influence each other.
3.2. Micro level
The micro level analysis will focus on the exploitation of motivations by IS for mobilization purposes. As is discussed in the literature review, there are many different ideas on why people join rebel groups and that these groups can exploit these reasons in their recruitment strategy. Following the work of other scholars such as Weinstein (2006, p. 40), this research will work with the assumption that individuals that decide to join a rebel group or armed resistance are rational beings. Individuals will think that joining a group will be in their best interests to reach their individual goals, wants and needs. Similarly, rebel groups like IS can also be regarded as rational actors, whom are doing a cost-benefit analyses and acting accordingly when following the logic of Shapiro (2013). Shapiro examined al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations and deemed them mostly rational actors (p.18-22). A terrorist organization has its own goals in mind and believes that the methods they use to reach its goals are the most efficient. IS has a management style that can be described as rational economic policy. For example, they pay their fighters, but cut their pay when the means to pay decreased (Humud, Pirog, & Rosen, 2015; Mohdin, 2016). Moreover, they had their own bureaucracy set up in order to be more efficient (Abdul-Ahad, 2018), which fits the description of them as a rational actor.
For this research, to increase the understanding of IS’s strategy, motivations will be split into material and immaterial motivations. This will allow for a more thorough research. Material motivations are defined as tangible goods, such as food and money. Immaterial motivations are defined as grievances, ideologies and other intangible factors, such as emotions and greed. This level will thus look if and how IS used these factors in their recruitment strategy.
A real-life example of a combination of material and immaterial motivations of individuals to join a rebel group can be found in Sierra Leona. During the civil war between 1991 and 2002, individuals who were unemployed or dropped out of school got offered a place to stay and an adventure by the Revolutionary United Front [RUF]. Other examples from individuals joining this group were illicit miners who saw the group coming into the region. The RUF promised them free mining in the area, which means that this was a good incentive for these individuals to join (Keen, 2005, pp. 56-59).
Figure 1: A visual representation of the causal mechanism on the meso-level
The causal mechanisms between IS and the individual recruit will be visible when looking at the material and immaterial factors, as is illustrated in figure 1. When material and immaterial motivations are utilized by recruiters, it will lead to the cumulative effect of these motivations that leads mobilization of the individual. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.1: The Islamic State utilizes material needs of individuals in favour of their
mobilization strategy.
Hypothesis 1.2.: The Islamic State utilizes immaterial factors to attract individuals as part of
their mobilization strategy
3.3. Meso level
The meso level addresses the space between the individual micro level and the larger macro level. A Meso level network is a network that bridges the individual to the collective. It reduces the path between the individual and the organization drastically, relative to the path between the organization and the individual when this network does not exist (Hedström, Sandell, & Stern, 2000, p. 146). This research focusses on networks that are used in the mobilization strategy of the Islamic State.
This level may be the most difficult level to define, since networks are a broad concept. Networks can range from drug trafficking networks to social media networks, such as Facebook. They are often described as a set of nodes that are tied together via relationships (Whelan, 2012, pp. 2-3), those ties can differ in the network or across networks. Some nodes are closer than others or the quality between them is different. The same goes for the types of
Micro:
Motivation
Material
---Immaterial
IS
mobilization
interaction between the nodes (Thorelli, 1986, p. 38). A group of people can be seen as a network, they are a set of nodes that are connected through links, some are attached to more links, those nodes are hubs. The links between nodes create a network, and those links are connected to more isolated nodes (Sageman, 2011, p. 137). At this level, IS’s ability and usage of networks to attract and recruit new members is being analysed. Moreover, this level is complex because IS itself could arguably be the link between the micro level and the macro level and thus could be the network itself. IS exists of hubs and nodes, linked together via their shared goals. However, its mobilization strategy is the object of analyses. This means that in this research IS will be seen as both a network, as well as a hub, that carefully creates new links to reach potential recruits.
Networks are relevant when studying mobilization, Bosi and Della Porta (2012) found many examples of people joining a resistance due to the close social ties with people already involved. For example, in one of their interviews, the interviewee, a former IRA member, told them that they had a Republican family and that family networks got him involved as well, for example his uncle was involved in the IRA (p. 369). Networks are integral for attracting members, without networks individuals would be unable to join an organization.
To better understand the usage of networks by IS for their recruitment strategy, this research will differentiate between direct and indirect recruitment. Direct networks are defined as consisting of personal connection to reach and mobilize individuals. Indirect networks are defined as the use of impersonal means to forge links between IS and a potential recruit, such as social media. Direct recruitment would be preferred because recruiting new members into the network can be a dangerous endeavour (Della Porta, 1988, p. 164). Therefore, using existing social ties would be a safer option due to the knowledge about these individuals involved. Nevertheless, forging ties with unknown individuals could be useful when these individuals show potential. Moreover, recruiters could also utilize newer methods of recruitment, such as social media apps like Telegram to reach new recruits (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). This method has been fairly popular in recruiting foreign fighters from the West to groups in the Middle East (Shane & Hubbart, 2014).
Figure 2: A visual representation of the causal mechanism on the meso-level
As figure 2 illustrate, the causal mechanisms on the meso level will become uncovered when studying the usage of these networks by members of IS. When using direct or indirect networks to reach a potential member of the organization, it could lead to the action of mobilization of this individual. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.1: Direct networks are used by the Islamic State to mobilize individuals. Hypothesis 2.2.: Indirect networks are used by the Islamic State to mobilize individuals.
3.4 Macro level
The Macro level focuses on the political environment that exists during events. More specifically, this thesis focuses on the political opportunities that arise from this environment. It is important that the political environment is reviewed when addressing the mobilization of a rebel group (Meyer, 2004, p. 127). Rebel groups are influenced by political processes and do not operate in a vacuum. The political environment provides the context for the existence and operations of a group (p. 28). Additionally, as Tilly (1978) described, political opportunities are the relationship between the group and the outside world (p. 111). In this thesis political opportunities will be defined as the dynamics taking place in the broader political environment that impact the world where the group operates in.
To clearly analyse the political opportunities, there will be a differentiation made between repression, political relations and power vacuums caused by political entities. Repression is often used in the literature of mobilization (Giugni, 2009, pp. 361-362) because political repression can lead to grievances and even to violence (Regan & Norton, 2005, pp. 333-334). Political relations between governments and relations inside the country can also affect the political environment. Furthermore, power vacuums will be defined as the lack of
Meso:
Networks
Direct
---Indirect
Mobilization
effective control of a government in an area. The seemingly contrasting factors of a power vacuum and political relations have to be studied because these often influence the behaviour of rebel groups.
A recent example of groups taking advantage of political opportunities is the situation in Colombia. The government signed a peace agreement with the FARC, who occupied large areas in Colombia. After this peace agreement, there has been no effective control in the area, leaving a power vacuum, This power vacuum is being used and filled by other criminal groups because the government is unable to take immediate control (Brodzinsky, 2017). Another example of the influence of dynamics on the political level are state policies that create grievances and identities. For instance, Polish dissidents at the end of the Cold War wanted to address their grievances and utilized the opening up of the government to mobilize themselves to address these grievances (Meyer, 2004, p. 140).
Figure 2: A visual representation of the causal mechanism on the macro-level
As figure 3 shows, the causal mechanisms on the macro level will be uncovered when the political opportunities in Iraq and Syria are being analysed. This will uncover if and how IS used the effects of these opportunities in their mobilization strategy. Thus, this theoretical framework leads to the following hypotheses regarding the macro-level of IS’s recruitment strategy:
Hypothesis 3.1.: The Islamic state utilized the repression by the regimes in Iraq and
Syria to mobilize individuals.
Hypothesis 3.2.: The Islamic state utilized political relations in Iraq and Syria to
mobilize individuals.
Macro:
Political
opportunities
Repression
---Political
Relations
---Power
Vacuum
Mobilization
Chapter 4 – Methodology
4.1 Research design
This research is a case study into the mobilization strategy of IS in Iraq and Syria between 2006 and 2013. A case study is suitable to get an in-depth understanding of a real-life problem (Yin, 2009, p. 17). According to Yin, a case study is relevant when you think contextual conditions are relevant to the case and you want to explain the causal mechanisms behind that single event or case (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 545). The mobilization strategy of IS is a real-world phenomenon that needs understanding to see how IS was able to mobilize individuals. This research will consist of an embedded single-case study, because it will analyse different levels of mobilization-strategies used by IS. An embedded single-case study will allow a rich insight into the independent variables and how this links back to the dependent variable (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 550). Additionally, it has been acknowledged that often single case study conclusions cannot be generalized (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2011, p. 98). However, generalizations can still be made, when the findings are relevant (p. 105). This is especially necessary in a world were rebel groups can seemingly strike from one day to another and policy has to be created quickly in response.
This case is an extreme case study, due to IS being an extreme dependent variable of this research. It is not being argued that the existence of IS is unique. For instance, the Taliban has been able to occupy almost 90% of Afghanistan in the past (CNN, 2019). However, IS has been able to make use of many dynamics that allowed them to attract a large amount of local and western fighters. When IS is understood, the findings may be applied to less extreme cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 301-302). Limitations of extreme cases are that they can evolve in other type of case studies, due to hypothesis being discovered during the study (Gerring, 2008, pp. 653-655).
Moreover, this research is qualitative. Qualitative research is useful when researchers try to understand a phenomenon in context (Cresswell, 2007, p. 40). Although it was thought that qualitative research would be insufficient to understand them, nowadays researchers agree that a qualitative case-study is suitable to explain causal mechanisms (Maxwell, 2013, p. 221). Furthermore, Gerring (2004) argues that case studies are well suited to determine causal mechanisms that link independent variables to dependent variables (p. 348). This makes this research design useful for uncovering the dynamics at play.
4.2 Multi-level approach
As has been made clear in the theoretical framework, this research will use a multi-level approach. Using more than one level of analysis helps to explain a dependent variable in a more encompassing way (Courgeau & Baccaini, 1998, p. 68). When only focussing on the micro level, the danger exists that the knowledge generated does not make sense when put together. Another advantage of this approach is that it is being acknowledged that micro-level dynamics observed are part of a larger political, economic or social process and local dynamics can have wider consequences (Balcells & Justino, 2014, pp. 1345-1346). This means that the different levels are intertwined. This follows the logic of Della Porta, who makes the argument that political violence follows the ‘cycle of contention,’ meaning that it cannot be seen as an isolated incident (Balcells & Justino, 2014, p. 1354). That is why it is important to take into account the different levels of recruitment efforts of IS to understand the whole picture. Nevertheless, it can be difficult to link micro and macro processes because macro-level data cannot be used to test micro-level theories (Balcells & Justino, 2014, p. 1348). This research avoids this pitfall. It is not testing the micro-level theories with macro-level data but is merely trying to understand the dynamics.
Lastly, this research will use deductive research methods to answer the research question. Deductive research means that the predetermined variables are used to understand the phenomenon, and to test the hypotheses. (Bengtsson, 2015, p. 10).
4.3 Data
This research will build upon the generated knowledge of other researchers studying IS. The data used for this research is mostly coming from secondary sources, and sometimes primary sources. Unfortunately, there is a lack of primary data available in English that directly links to IS’s mobilization strategy and it was impossible to gather primary data via interviews by the writer of this thesis. So, there is a reliance on secondary sources to extract correct information.
The most used database for the academic background of this research is the Leiden University Catalogue and Google scholar. Moreover, news articles from well-regarded newspapers will be used, such as the Guardian, the BBC and the New York Times. Primary sources, such as translated documents from IS that have been captured are being used when
Furthermore, when relevant, reports of credible (governmental) organizations such as the International Community for Counter-Terrorism or the RAND cooperation are used.
4.4 Validity & Reliability
It is understood that validity of a single-case study can be challenging and that its findings cannot always be generalized (Yin, 2013, p. 321). Hence, a clear theoretical framework has been created that can be applied to study other rebel groups. To have a high reliability and increase the stability of the research (Bengtsson, 2015, p. 12), indicators have already been established. In this research the micro level material and immaterial factors are identified. Indicators for the meso-level are split up between direct and indirect contacts and the macro-level indicators are split between repression and power vacuum and political relations. Additionally, indicators of the variables are appointed before analysing the data. Furthermore, a clear research question and hypotheses have been established before starting the analyses. So, there is a clear framework to guide the research to answer the main research question.
Lastly, to increase internal validity, this research will draw from a rich pool of data. Data triangulation is used to avoid bias and ensure correct information. (Tellis, 1997, p. 4). This is especially important, because of the high use of secondary sources.
Chapter 5: Iraq, Syria and the Islamic State
The following chapter will offer the background information necessary for the analyses. The Middle East has a turbulent past. The twentieth century especially saw many power shifts and changes in relations in the region due to colonial rulers, the world wars and independency wars. This chapter will focus on the history of Iraq and Syria, followed by the origin and history of IS.
5.1 Iraq
Iraq is a Muslim country, that has a majority of Shia Muslims living in the country (Lipka, 2014). Iraq used to be part of the Ottoman Empire until this ceased to exist and Iraq fell under control of the British who installed Faisal I of Iraq as the king of the country. While they also appointing many Arab elites, many of whom came from Sunni background, to important positions (Trip, 2002, p. 31). In 1932 the Brits granted the Kingdom of Iraq independence, but during the second world war they invaded Iraq to secure oil supply to the West, this occupation lasted until 1947. In 1968 the secular Baath Party in Iraq overthrew the military rule that existed in the country (BBC, 2018). Afterwards, Saddam Hussein grew increasingly in control of the party and took over Iraq’s supreme executive body in 1979 (Trip, 2002, pp. 186-187, 206-214 ). The Iraq-Iran war took place between 1980 and 1988 and has cost the lives of many civilians (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Moreover, in the last years of the war the Al-Anfal campaign against Iraqi Kurds took place, which led to a genocide that killed a large number of civilians (BBC, 2007). This already shows the lingering internal conflicts in Iraq that would recur in the future. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, after it failed to get oil concessions from the state. This led to a United States [US] led coalition intervention (Trip, 2002, pp. 243-250). After this war, there were several Shia uprisings against Saddam’s regime, which were successfully oppressed by Saddam’s security forces (Black, 2007; BBC, 2018). This led to sanctions for Iraq and in 1996 the oil for food program to decrease the effects of the sanctions for civilians (Otterman, 2005a).
In 2003 the American led intervention, following the War on Terror took place, officially due to the findings of weapons of mass destruction, but these claims have been contested (Trip, 2002, pp. 272-275; Berger, 2004). It did not take long before an insurgency
Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity (BBC, 2018). US troops withdrew from Iraqi cities in 2009, followed by the rest of the country in 2011 (BBC, 2018). At the end of 2006, Sunni tribes, who were fed up with IS and other extremist groups in the country, bonded together with US forces and pushed these military groups out of many parts of the country, which is now known as the Sunni Awakening (Phillips, 2009, p. 65).
Nevertheless, the country did not gain much stability afterwards, as Maliki’s government did not do much to appease the strained relations between different groups in the country. Already, during the first elections in 2005, many Sunni Iraqi’s boycotted the elections. In 2006, the first Prime Minister of Iraq was elected; Nouri al-Maliki. During his time in power his ‘de-Baathification’-project3 resulted in targeting the Sunni minority of the country and pushing them out of the government (Weisener, 2018). This led to the feeling of marginalization by many Sunnis.
Furthermore, the effects of the Arab Spring in 2011 were also visible in Iraq. Iraqi people also started to demonstrate against the Maliki government. However, these were violently shut down (Sly, 2013; Denselow, 2011). The effects of the Syrian civil war were also noticeable in Iraq, with many people joining the fight against Assad or joining one of the opposition groups. In the meantime, IS gained strength in Iraq and was able to occupy large parts of the country, including some major cities, killing many civilians in the fights (Carey, 2018). Moreover, they committed genocide on the Yazidi in the north of Iraq. This also led to a large international intervention. IS’s territorial presence in Iraq was shrinking from 2015 and from 2017 onwards the group no longer held any territory in the country (BBC, 2018).
5.2 Syria
Syria has a similar history to Iraq in the sense that they were under colonial rule after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and many coups have occured. Syria has a Shia minority and a Sunni majority in the country, while President Bashar al-Assad is Alawite, which is an offshoot of Shia Islam (Lipka, 2014).
From 1920, Syria was under French rule, until 1936 when negotiations for independence took place and a president was elected (BBC, 2019a). However, the French government never ratified this independence. After the second world war, in 1946 Syria became independent and soon was involved with the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. After the independence of Syria, there were a number of coups, resulting in more power going to the military. In 1958, in the wake of
Pan-Arab ideologies, Syria shortly merged with Egypt (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 324-325). In 1967 they lost the Six Day war against Israel. In 1970 Hafez al-Assad took power via a coup and in the years to follow Syria still was involved in a lot of regional politics, such as conflicts with Israel and the invasion of Lebanon (BBC, 2019; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 415-425). The situation in Syria remained unstable due to strict government repression. In 2000 the second son of Hafez al- Assad, Bashar al-Assad took over. During his reign tensions with the US remained in place. President Bush described Syria as part of the “Axis of Evil”, due to its ties to Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, its suspected nuclear weapon program and their alleged stockpiling of biological weapons (The Washington Times, 2003). Relations with the West remained problematic throughout the decade.
In March 2011, the Arab Spring also reached Syria. It began with protests in the city Deera, followed by a crackdown by Syrian forces. This was followed by unrest and violence that spread across the nation (BBC, 2019a). Anti-Assad groups met in Turkey, forming the Syrian National Council as well as the Free Syrian Army to fight Assad. During this war, many groups got involved, hundreds of thousands of civilians died, and millions of Syrians have been internally displaced or have fled the country (BBC, 2019b). The international community largely condemned the actions of the government against civilians. This war also split the international community, with Russia siding with Assad and the US with the anti-Assad opposition, such as the Syrian Free Army (Rahman-Jones, 2017). During this civil war IS and other groups fighting were able to capture large parts of Syrian territory. Assad is still the president of the country, while IS has been largely defeated at the time of writing.
5.3 The Islamic State
To understand and analyse the mobilization strategy of IS it is important to know what IS actually entails and its history. First of all, IS is an extremist rebel group that was mainly located in Iraq and Syria. They follow a radical Islamist school of thought, which is rooted in a Sunni background. At the time of writing its Caliphate has collapsed, nevertheless the idea of IS is still in the minds of many jihadists around the globe (Hénin, 2019). Moreover, it is important to realize that IS has not always been one singular group, during its existence a lot of splits and allegiances between different jihadi, militant groups and factions took place4. They themselves
can be seen as a split from al-Qaeda. Another example of the broad concept of IS, are the attacks carried out in the name of IS, while the group themselves did not have close relations to perpetrators. A recent example is the terrorist attacks on Christian targets during Easter in Sri Lanka (Hénin, 2019). This chapter will mostly focus on history of IS, with special attention to the leaders of the organization to understand the group as well as possible.
First of all, as mentioned above, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the international coalition engulfed the country in chaos. This was the perfect time for Al-Qaida to establish themselves in Iraq. In 2004 the jihadist group of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad aligned themselves with Al-Qaida, but al-Zarqawi kept continuing forging his own path and strategy (Fishman, 2016a). Al-Zarqawi would become the spiritual father of IS. He was born and raised in Jordan and left Jordan to fight in Afghanistan in 1989, where the Soviet Union had just withdrawn its military. This is where he met al-Maqdisi, a writer and intellectual that influenced al-Zarqawi. They returned to Jordan in 1993 and together established a militant group called Bayt al-Imam. They were not very successful, and both were arrested and convicted on terrorist charges after some failed attacks. They were freed in 1999 and they went their separate ways (Brooke, 2006, pp. 52-54; Fishman, 2016b, pp. 4-9). Al-Zarqawi went to Afghanistan because he wanted to join the fight in Chechnya and needed the right connections (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 8-9). In Afghanistan a lot of powerplay took place between the different groups that operated under the protection of the Taliban. In this period, al-Qaeda gained fame due to its focus on the US. This caused tension between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Al-Qaida saw an opportunity to strengthen its base in the Levant when al-Zarqawi arrived in Afghanistan. However, this was not always a clear-cut deal, due to the fact that al-Zarqawi was more extreme in his ideas than Osama bin Laden. The conclusion was that al-Qaeda would pay al-Zarqawi to set up a camp close to the Iranian border and would help with logistical support. He called this camp Jund Sham, soldiers of the Levant, while the banner above the camp said Jama’at
al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad. (Fishman, 2016, pp. 17-20; Hassan & Weiss, 2015, pp. 37-42) In 2002,
Zarqawi and his jihadi’s went to Iraq, where they got welcomed bya Kurdic Jihadist group, who probably introduced him to Islamic governance (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 23). During the US invasion, al-Zarqawi decided that his first goal was to hold territory in Fallujah, a city in the Iraqi province al-Anbar. Abu Anas, the head of Zarqawi’s Shariah Committee united different jihadi groups under one banner, the ‘Mujahidin Shura Council’ that would coordinate the fighting in the city. Zarqawi’s group was able to hold Fallujah for 10 months (Fishman, 1026b, pp. 52-55; Hassan & Weiss, 2015, pp. 70-75)
At the end of 2004, al-Zarqawi finally swore bayah (allegiance) to Al-Qaeda, despite the differences of opinion about topics such as tafkir (excommunication), violence against the Muslim population and strategy, between Bin Laden and Zarqawi. The name of al-Zarqawi’s group changed to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, which is more commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (Hassan & Weiss, 2015, pp. 71-72). In the meantime, Mosul became the home area of the al-Zarqawi and the organization, while they prepared for the second battle of Fallujah. On 15 January 2006 al-Qaeda in Iraq created the Mujahidin Shura Council, with a similar name to the defence council of Fallujah and Abdallah bin Rashid al-Baghdadi became the face of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, while Zarqawi became less visible to be able to recruit groups to join this council. One of these groups was the Army of the Followers of the Sunnah and Collective, one of the people in this group became future Caliph of IS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2006, Zarqawi still tried to be in line with Zawahiri’s views of al-Qaeda because they did not approve of their methods, especially in regard to media presence (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 79-80). During this time sectarian violence was increasing, ultimately a large attack on a Shia shrine started a civil war along sectarian lines in Iraq (p. 81). Not long after this, al-Zarqawi got killed in a drone strike by the US (Burns, 2006). Killing him, but not his legacy.
In October 2006 his successors announced the split from al-Qaida and establish the Islamic State of Iraq5 and announced Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the leader of this group (CNN, 2019). He was relatively unknown, including to the al-Qaeda leadership (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 89-90). Al-Baghdadi was born in Hadithah, a city in the Anbar province and joined al-Zarqawi’sgroup in 2003. The establishment of IS led to controversy in Iraq and among jihadis around the world. Most note-worthy is that Al-Qaeda was not very pleased with these steps of Zarqawi’s group, especially after they diminished their ties with al-Qaeda (pp. 92-93). During this time, Sunni leaders who opposed the tactics and violence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its successor IS, declared their collective opposition against the Mujahidin Shura council and IS, leading to the Sunni Awakening (Phillips, 2009, p. 65). This forced IS to withdraw more to the North and the East of Iraq. In 2007, under pressure from the coalition, Iraqi security forces and the Sons of Iraq, consisting of grassroots groups fighting IS, led to the fact that IS had to move even further north. Here, IS was able to take de facto control over the governorate Ninewa, including Iraq’s second city Mosul (Johnston, et al., 2016, p. 23). Due to its losses, IS actually started unravelling internally and externally (Fishman, 1026b, pp. 105-106) in terms of control,
especially its local leaders failed to deliver effective leadership and control (p. 107). By late 2008, the area where IS was in control was divided into thirty sectors in Iraq and besides the fact that IS was weakened, it was still thriving in Mosul (p. 134).
At this time, IS was still a highly functional terrorist group, capable of performing large scale terrorist attacks in Iraq, especially in Baghdad (p. 142). In early 2009 IS was weakened in the Mosul area, due to increased counterterrorism efforts (Shatz & Johnson, 2015, pp. 7-9). However, during this time, IS was able to contact senior political members to infiltrate the government and profit from contract and create political cover for their existence (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 145-146).
A year later, IS was still carrying out large attacks in Iraq but lost their two most important leaders, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and al-Masri (Johnston, et al., 2016, pp. 14-26). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over as leader of IS (Mccants, 2016). In the same period, many countries in the Middle East got a spark of the Arab spring, one of these countries was Syria. The developments against Assad’s regime were closely followed by ISI and al-Qaeda (Fishman, 2016b. p. 160). The chaos in the country was a perfect breeding ground for these organizations to expand their influence (CNN, 2019) (CISAC, 2018). During the turmoil of the Arab Spring, in August 2011, al-Baghdadi sent Abu Mohammad al-Jolani into Syria to secretly create a Syrian cell (Hassan & Weiss, 2015, pp. 253-254). This was done to stay as much under the radar as possible. This group became knowns as Jahbat al-Nusra when they came out in the open In January 2012 (Lister, Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra, 2016, pp. 5, 55-56). On April 8th 2013, IS officially announced al Nusra’s merge with IS, creating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This claim was refuted a few days later by the leadership of al Nusra. Showing the world that there are quite some internal power struggles within the extremist jihadi groups (Lister, 2016, pp. 12-18). Nevertheless, in the years to follow, IS was able to create a larger following. Especially foreign fighters increased the numbers of fighters of IS. The vicious fighting and killings of IS made al-Qaeda finally denounce their affiliation with the group.
In the end, it is clear that IS started off as a small group of jihadis, that was able to take control of different areas in Iraq during its existence. Their strategy was successful to consolidate power in Iraq and Syria during the short-lived Caliphate.
Chapter 6 - Micro analysis: Motivations
The main question for this section is whether IS used material and immaterial motivations to recruit potential members. As mentioned before, micro-motivations are motivations that have to do with individuals or small groups. These are actions and measures taken directed at a person to try and create support and gather recruitment for a common objective.
6.1 Al-Suri and his influence on IS’s mobilization strategy
First of all, IS recruitment has been influenced by many individuals, such as local emirs recruiting local people. Especially when looking at IS in general it is clear that the organization used the work of Abu Musab al-Suri as a basis for its recruitment strategies. Both al-Zarqawi (Rej, 2016, p. 4) and al-Baghdadi have cited his work (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2017, p. 6), showing that they understood and used his thinking as a blueprint. Al-Suri was generally known as a jihadi strategist and theorist of the global jihad (Hassan, 2013). He was both admired and often despised by the al-Qaeda leadership due to differences in their point of views and rivalry between them (Fishman, 2016a, pp.30-31). Al-Suri and Zarqawi’s paths have crossed a few times in their life, they met in Afghanistan where they were both opposed to Bin Laden’s resistance to larger autonomy for jihadi groups. It is believed that al-Suri joined Zarqawi’s group in Iraq in 2004. Although, this is denied by al-Suri himself (Rej, 2016, p. 4).
More importantly, al-Suri is the author of the book The Global Resistance Call, this 1600-page manifesto describes the strategy for jihadi groups and individual jihad. In this book he describes seventeen reasons for the failure of the jihadi’s in the past. He argues that they failed to build strong ties with local communities. Moreover, he says that past jihadi groups focused only on cities, while large swaths of the countryside where neglected. Moreover, he reasoned that there was too much reliance on support from outside, while there was no plan for support on the local level. Another reason was the focus on quantity of fighters at the expense of religious awareness and personal abilities (Hassan, 2013). This focus on the failure to win over the local population for support has been noticed by Hassan (2013) who argues that IS has put real effort in avoiding these mistakes. This means that IS has tried to look more at the local level, including rural areas and being able to support themselves and train fighters more effectively. Furthermore, al-Suri wrote that there should be a focus on creating support from
The following part will analyse the use of da’wah offices, ideology and persuasion, emotions, strength, former Jihadi fighters, money and media as part of IS’s mobilization strategy.
6.2. Da’wah offices
First of all, often a practical approach towards individual mobilization was used via the establishment of da’wah offices6. This strategy was found in Haji Bakr’s plans that were found after his death. He was part of the senior leadership of IS. Da’wah offices were set up in areas where IS wanted to establish its presence. The offices often offered religious schooling to the area, in line with IS’s ideology. Through these offices, IS recruiters could contact the local population and use as an intelligence base to counter IS rivals in the area (Reuter, 2015). IS also used them to infiltrate an area, where informants helped them find crucial information before they would enter (al-Tamimi, 2015). These informants were often local boys and young men who would be motivated by the money paid to them by IS and due to the exciting nature of the work (Reuter, 2015). This already shows that besides the obvious lure of money, ‘fulfilment’ of a job can also be an attractive factor for recruitment. The da’wah offices were also used for personal contact with individuals, where IS would talk about its ideology to attract people and join them to their training camps (Hassan, 2015). Besides the fact that IS had a strict plan for infiltrating neighbourhoods and areas, they also realized that to mobilize a neighbourhood, they had to adjust their tactics to the area. For example, when necessary they identified Turkmen speakers for specialized outreach and offered religious training to reach potential recruits. Due to the mapping of areas via these offices, IS knew which leaders to approach during their outreach. They rated them on, amongst other things, their financial status and brought them gifts, clothes, religious books and more to create a well-willing leader and thus an open community (Fishman, 2016b, p. 134).
To summarize, IS employed these offices to scout local areas and used not only goods and gifts to mobilize support from tribal leaders, but also focussed on individual needs, by adjusting their language and offering religious schooling. Through this schooling they could share their ideology and create ideological motivations in individuals to join their cause.
6.3. Ideology and the power of Persuasion
Ideology can be a strong motivator for individuals. The spreading of IS approved ideology via IS owned da’wah as part of their recruitment strategy is unsurprising. However, IS was also able to persuade less religious individuals in believing their ideology and goals. Major General Doug Stone oversaw Camp Bucca, an American Prison in Iraq. He observed how younger men were easily persuaded by the charisma of al-Baghdadi, who was also held in the prison at the time (Cockburn, 2015, pp. 44-45). At least that is what the prison records shows, it is uncertain if this person was a decoy or the real al-Baghdadi (Hassan & Weiss, 2015, pp. 148-153). Nevertheless, this person was able to appeal to the sense of duty and belonging of many individuals in this prison while using his own charisma and the message of IS.
Weiss and Hassan (2015) found in their interviews across Syria and Iraq that many individuals were inspired by IS’s ideology and its form of intellectualism. This entails the way how IS brings their ideological narrative, blended with Islamic imagery, history and politics (pp. 260-262). This mobilization strategy of IS appeals to the minds and hearts of individuals. They persuade them into believing that IS will lead them to the right path.
Furthermore, IS made use of a refined media strategy, they send out inspiring messages to convince people to join the organization. That was also the reason why media emirs were heavily targeted during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (Shatz & Johnson, 2015, p. 9). In cyberspace they created a large ideological based following on Islamic forums. The Sinjar records, found in 2007 by American troops, showed that for recruitment the online approach was not always effective, but they still swayed the opinion of users online (Fishman, 2016b, pp. 118-119). So, media presence was used to broadcast their message and inspire individuals to join their organization. However, in regard to recruitment strategy it is hard to say whether it was aimed on the local population or a broader audience.
In sum, IS used their ideology to inspire and persuade individuals to join the organization. This was done via different means, such as individuals in prison and the (online) media.
