The Challenges and Limitations of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy in Moldova: Expanding the EU Boundaries

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University of Amsterdam MA Thesis in European Studies

European Policy Track Graduate School for Humanities

The Challenges and Limitations of the European Union

Neighbourhood Policy in Moldova: Expanding the EU

Boundaries

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Abbreviation List

AA – Association Agreement

AIE – Alianța pentru Integrare European (Alliance for European Integration) CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area EaP – Eastern Partnership

EC – European Community

EEAS – European External Action Service EHEA – European Higher Education Area ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI - European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument EU – European Union

EUBAM – European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine EUMAP – EU-Moldova Action Plan

EUROPOL - European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation FRONTEX - The European Border and Coast Guard Agency

IR – International Relations

MSSR – Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NIS – Newly Independent States

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

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2 PCRM – Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova (Party of Communists of the

Republic of Moldova)

PDM – Partidul Democrat din Moldova (Democratic Party of Moldova)

PMR – Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Приднестровская Молдавская Республика) TACIS - Technical Aid Programme to the Commonwealth of Independent States

UN – United Nations

USSR - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Table of Figures

Figure. 1. The Map of the Republic of Moldova including Transnistria ... 27 Figure 2. Moldova’s Export sales with Russia and the EU between 2005-2015. ... 39

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3

Introduction

Only a few years ago Moldova was praised for being the ’poster child’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a ’success story’ in the Eastern neighbourhood, having also the highest rate of public approval for the European Union’s (EU) integration among the other Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Montesano et al. 2016; Popescu and Wilson 2009). Today Moldova is considered the ’problem child’ of the EaP with its highly corrupted political system led by a pro-European government at least in its name (Montesano et al. 2016). This situation has been fuelled by newly elected Moldova’s president with a pro-Russian orientation, who in 2017 during his official visit to Russia expressed his position against the Association Agreement (AA) which was signed by Moldova in the framework of the EaP in 2014. His statement unveiled hopes for the 2018 parliamentary elections in which he expects that the ‘Socialist Party... will get the parliamentary majority and the agreement [AA] will be repealed’ (The Kremlin 2017). Furthermore, the April 2017 survey conducted by the Moldovan Institute of Public Policies showed that 40% of the respondents would support Moldova’s integration with the Eurasian Economic Union, while 39% integration with the EU (Institute of Public Policies 2017, 76). This shift in public opinion for stronger ties with Russia raises questions in regard to the limitations and challenges of the ENP/EaP in Moldova. Although the most recent report on the policy implementation shows a certain progress in reaching the objectives of the AA there is still a gap between Moldova’s commitments and actual policy implementation (European Commission 2017a).

The objective of this paper is to analyse the challenges and limitations of the ENP/EaP in Moldova and more specifically identify how these relate to the main objectives of the neighbourhood policy concerning stability and security in the Eastern neighbourhood. In order to identify the challenges and limitation of the ENP/EaP in Moldova, this paper will make use of the external governance approach which was theorised by Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig and which is concerned with the transfer of the EU’s rules and policies to countries beyond EU’s borders. The process of governance extension requires the EU to expand and shift its invisible boundaries and in the following chapters, it will be analysed how it was done in the case of Moldova as one of the partners in the ENP and consequently EaP. External governance perspective has been used mainly in the analyses of EU’s domestic policies such as justice and home affairs, environmental and energy policies. However, as

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4 threats are perceived to arise within the EU and outside its borders, the traditional division between internal and external security in the case of the EU tended to be more blurred. Therefore, the EU’s relation with its neighbours is viewed more as an external dimension of internal policies (Lavenex 2008).

Authors such as Elena Korosteleva, Olga Danii and Mariana Mascauteanu have used the external governance framework in analysing the relation between Moldova and the EU within the ENP/EaP by adding the concept of four boundaries as developed by Michael Smith (Korosteleva 2012, Danii and Mascauteanu 2011). This has been done to overcome the limitations of the external governance approach in terms of interpretation of partners’ reaction to the ENP/EaP on the ground (Korosteleva 2010). Considering the argumentation of Korosteleva, this paper will follow the proposed theoretical framework with the additional concept of four types of boundaries as developed by Smith.

This paper will also take into account the conditionality and socialisation mechanisms which are the main instruments of the external governance approach applied by the EU in its relations with non-member states and which will identify certain patterns of power relations between Moldova and the EU and consequently between Moldova and Russia as an important factor in the region with a strong influence on Moldova. Russia’s presence and involvement in Moldova in terms of the conflict in Transnistria and as the sole supplier of energy recourses and a supporter of pro-Russian political groups, play a key role in Moldova’s capabilities to further integrate with the EU. Considering this strong tie between Moldova and Russia due to its Soviet legacy this paper could not ignore the importance of this factor in the progress of the ENP/EaP in Moldova. Therefore, when analysing the EU involvement in Moldova this paper will also outline Russia’s reactions and actions taken to counterbalance the EU influence by deploying its traditional instruments of hard power and more lately developed tools of soft power. The first chapter of this paper will present the main points of the external governance approach as theorised by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig by taking use of the boundaries approach developed by Smith as a concept to complement the theoretical approach. Although the theory has been mainly used in the field of environment and home and justice affairs it has also been used by authors like Korosteleva and Christian Hagemann to analyse the EU’s engagement in the Eastern Neighbourhood in the framework of the ENP/EaP (Korosteleva 2012; Hagemann 2013). Therefore, it will be used in this paper to interpret the developments in Moldova and

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5 also will aid in a further engagement with the existing debate on the limitations and challenges of the ENP/EaP broadly.

The second chapter will outline the context in which the ENP and consequently EaP developed as external policies and the main objectives which constituted the foundation of the policies. Although the ENP has been perceived as an option to appease the pressure on the enlargement policy, nevertheless it gained some criticism. Therefore, some of these lines of criticism will be outlined in this chapter and will be considered in identifying the shortcomings of the policy. Additionally, considering the geopolitical situation of the EaP countries and Moldova inclusively the chapter will also provide an overview of the main reactions from Russia to the initial policy initiatives and the more significant steps taken by Moldova specifically in signing the Action Plan (AP) and the AA.

The third chapter will provide a historical overview of Moldova’s developments since its independence from the Soviet Union. The main focus of the chapter will be on political developments, the conflict in Transnistria and the evolution of Moldova’s external relations with the EU and Russia as two main regional powers. This overview is relevant in presenting a general background of the country which will aid in analysing the shift of direction in its external policy.

In the final chapter, the theoretical framework of external governance will be applied to interpret the developments in Moldova since the commencement of the integration process with the EU and will look at the policy limitations and challenges in the case of Moldova. Finally, it will aim to interpret the conclusions in a more broader perspective of the ENP/EaP implementation in the region and what are the challenges encountered by the partners and the EU in its quest for governance expansion beyond its borders.

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1. Theoretical Framework

In order to analyse the EU’s influence and the mirroring of its values and interests on Moldova within the ENP and the EaP, the external governance perspective has been chosen. External governance approach has been applied by authors in analysing the EU’s engagement with neighbouring countries (Korosteleva 2012, Hagemann 2013). In the light of this theoretical perspective, the chapter will aim to emphasise the main points of the external governance approach and establish a link between the theory and EU’s objectives which led to the launch of the neighbourhood policy.

The external governance concept has emerged from the EU’s expansion of its internal policies beyond its borders and represents an analytical framework for understanding the shift of invisible boundaries between the EU and external actors. Smith has identified four types of boundaries – geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural - which the EU shifts and blurs in its relations with its neighbours. Therefore, this chapter will firstly focus on defining and explaining these boundaries and the way they are used to divide the actors between insiders and outsiders. Secondly, it will present the concept of external governance by outlining its emergence in the field of International Relations (IR) and its adaptation to analysing the EU external policies.

The chapter will also outline the main mechanisms used in external governance such as conditionality and socialisation. It will provide some examples in the way these mechanisms have been used in Moldova in order to identify their effectiveness or lack of it.

The final part of the chapter is concerned with the application of the theoretical framework to the case study. It will outline the method of application of the theoretical perspective in order to answer the research question of this paper, which is concerned with the limitations and challenges of the ENP/EaP in Moldova. It will aim to identify the outcomes of the research and put them into a broader perspective of understanding the challenges in the Eastern neighbourhood.

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1.1 External Governance Concept and the Expansion of the Four Invisible Boundaries

The European Union has been regarded on the international level as a ‘civilian power’, established and developed on the principles of ‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’ (Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. III-292). These principles contribute to self-representation of the EU and its perception by external actors as a power which guides its external policies by internal values and norms (Lucarelli 2006, pp.51-52). This representation attracted many newly democratic countries to aspire for membership in the EU after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Before the late 1980s, the European Community (EC) has conducted a ‘politics of exclusion’ which was linked directly to the geopolitical situation of the Cold War with the division of the European order between East and West (Smith 1996, 19). These politics was reinforced by the boundaries which separate the EC/EU from its external environment. In fact, these boundaries and the way they are moved or displaced play a significant role in EU’s interaction with external actors and its impact on them. According to Michael Smith, boundaries represent a ‘disjunction between an entity and its environment’ (Smith 1996, 13). He identifies four types of boundaries in the analysis of the EC/EU’s external politics: geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural (Smith 1996, p.13). All these boundaries have an impact on the EU and its environment and their shift, movement or eradication depend on EU’s internal developments.

The geopolitical boundary implies a clear division between insiders and outsiders and was strongly reinforced during the Cold War with the bipolarisation of the Europe into East and West. This boundary is closely linked to the terms of security and stability, which have been defining the EC amidst the disorder of the Cold War and what followed after the dissolution of the USSR. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War represented a redrawing of this boundary which led to an increased permeability of geopolitical boundary (Gänzle 2009, 1719). Manipulation with this boundary can affect the stability of the European order, and in the case of the former Soviet states can cause internal tensions in the EU and in its relations with external powers (Smith 1996, 15).

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8 The next boundary is the institutional/legal, which represents the key element of the EU governance by deciding “who is a club member and who is not” (Gänzle 2009, 1719). This boundary defines the position of the EU as a ‘civilian power’ by supplying institutional and legal tools in support of its image as civic statehood (Smith 1996, 15). It is probably the most guarded of all four boundaries as it represents the backbone of the EU, which preserves the ‘investment’ of the member states in the interest of their nations (Smith 1996, 15). It is one of the most inflexible boundaries and its expansion will involve high transformation costs and acceptance of the governance system (Gänzle 2009, 1728). It is argued that the EU exerts its governance beyond its borders only when this boundary is moved (Lavenex 2004, 683). The third boundary is transactional, formed by the customs union and the common external tariff. This is probably one of the most permeable boundaries of the EU for third countries which are granted the privilege to access the single market (Gänzle 2009, 1719). Despite the permeability, it is a boundary of a significant importance especially when it closely overlaps with geopolitical and institutional/legal boundaries (Smith 1996, 17). The division between the EU insiders who can freely operate in the single market and outsiders, who would like to achieve similar rights in a transaction with the EU is often distinctive and well-guarded (Smith 1996, 17). For example, in the case of application of different rules to freedom of goods and services as opposed to freedom of people in the single market can cause instability and tensions in the EU as well as in its neighbourhood (Smith 1996, 17).

The last type of boundary is cultural, which assumes a difference in culture between member states and outsiders. This boundary is based on political and democratic values which are quite volatile and can be used to represent the outsiders as a threat or friends, by extending the advantages of the EU culture (Smith 1996, 17). It is used in the development of various agreements between the EU and external actors which cooperate with the EU to reflect the concepts of good governance (Smith 1996, 17).

Hence, the relationship between the EU and its external environment is influenced by the way the EU maintains, strengthens, moves or blurs these boundaries (Friis and Murphy 1999, 217). By aligning all these boundaries, the EU can create a strong division between itself and the outside. Nevertheless, even outside its borders, it can create separation among actors by shifting its own boundaries.

In the late 1980s arose the need in redrawing EC/EU geopolitical and cultural boundaries as a consequence of changes occurring in the external environment and the desire of newly

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9 independent states to become part of the European Community (Smith 1996, 21). It is argued that the EC switched in this period of time from the ‘politics of exclusion’ to the ‘politics of inclusion’ (Smith 1996, 21).

The ‘politics of inclusion’ resonates with the European Commission’s initiative launched in 2003 for a ‘wider Europe’, which states ‘the Union’s determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ (Commission 2003, 4). This initiative comes as a reaction to the ever-greater interdependence of the EU with its neighbours in the south and east. It proposes the creation of a ‘ring of friends’ who will be ‘sharing everything with the Union but institutions’ as described by Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission (Prodi 2002, 5). This new approach to the EU external relations with near abroad has contributed to the development of the external governance perspective, which considers alternative ways of integration with the EU by excluding the promise of membership in the near future (Lavenex 2009, 792).

External governance approach emerged as an answer to the failing enlargement policy and as a solution to EU’s interdependence with neighbourhood countries. The concept of external governance has derived from international relations and comparative politics. In the IR field, the theoretical notion reflects a new political order which is not governed by any public global government, while in comparative politics it emerged as an opposition to the concept of government by focusing on state co-operation rather than interventionism (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010, 5). These two conceptualisations are combined in the new approach to external relations and more specifically external governance as understood in the EU context (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010, 2).

The notion of external governance is concerned with the expansion of norms and values promoted by the EU to non-members states. The governance part should be understood in this context as “institutionalised form of coordinated actions that aim at the production of collectively binding agreements” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010, 5). The main role in the action of governance is played by the institution which is concerned with the expansion of rules and values beyond the borders of the Union and takes as the starting point the expansion of internal policies to third countries.

External governance is not concerned extensively with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) but rather with the external dimension of internal politics (Lavenex 2004, 681).

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10 Therefore, a key role in this approach plays the way the EU perceives its interdependence with third countries and to what extent it is capable institutionally to expand its boundaries. Near abroad to the east and south of the EU is a strategic area and as it was stated in 2003 ‘enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe…We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours to the East while tackling political problems there’ (Council of the EU 2003, 7-8).

The last waves of enlargement policy from 2004 and 2007, which doubled the number of EU member states, have also started a debate on the limits of the EU and where the borders of ‘Europe’ should end, but also questioned the ability of the EU to integrate any new members. Therefore, the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy was seen as a solution to tackle the existing issue of enlargement policy by providing ‘a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the immediate term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions’ (European Commission 2003, 5).

Hence, external governance perspective is grounded in the capacity and competencies of the EU institutions to promote norms and transfer policies to third countries or to put it in a definition ‘external governance takes place when parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states’ (Lavenex 2004, 683).

1.2 Conditionality and Socialisation as External Governance Mechanisms

In order to expand its governance beyond member states, the EU requires certain mechanisms of influence over non-member states, some of whom will not even have the prospect of membership. Two main mechanisms widely used by the EU to spread its values, and influence the implementation of the reforms in non-member states are conditionality and socialisation. As the ENP was very much influenced by the procedures and instruments of the enlargement policy it is therefore not surprising that it also ‘inherited’ the mechanisms and procedures from the enlargement policy.

Conditionality is used by the EU as a direct leverage on a non-member state by application of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments in order to influence policy adoption by the state in question (Kubicek 2002). It is used by the EU to provide non-member governments with financial aid and market access or delay the delivery of the incentives if the EU’s conditions are not

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11 implemented (Schimmelfennig 2012, 8). The effectiveness of this mechanism depends mainly on credibility, which translates into the equation that ‘the EU needs to be less dependent on or interested in the agreement than its partner, and the partner needs to be certain that it will receive the rewards only when the conditions are met’ (Schimmelfennig 2012, 8).

In the enlargement policy, the main ‘carrot’ in the application of the conditionality mechanism is the membership status. Considering that the ENP/EaP does not promise this ‘reward’ in the process of integration it has been argued that this is the main shortcoming of the ENP/EaP as the neighbouring countries will be less willing to adopt EU rules (Schimmelfennig 2012, 21). Another shortcoming of the conditionality mechanism as applied to the ENP/EaP partners is EU reluctance to use the ‘stick’ and preferring often to have a ‘carrot’ approach (Khasson et

al. 2008, 231). This can be explained in the light of the EU as a ‘normative power’ which

prefers to reward rather than punish especially when the agreements with the partners are in the running mode and their interruption will slow down the process of policy implementation and democratisation (Khasson et al. 2008, 232). However, the non-application of the ‘stick’ in the cases when non-member governments do not comply with the provisions of the agreement can lead to EU’s losing the support of the public opinion in the partner’s country.

In the case of Moldova conditionality has been exerted by the EU in the form of incentives rather than sanctions within the ENP/EaP framework (Hagemann 2013, 771). The most successful sectorial policy implemented in Moldova within the ENP framework is the customs service and border management. In terms of the requirements of the Action Plan (AP) in improvement and regularisation of the customs services in Moldova according to EU standards, these have been met completely according to the Progress Report conducted in 2009 (Hagemann 2013, 776). After the implementation of the reforms in the field of customs service, Moldova received financial aid and a promise of trade facilitation with the EU (Hagemann 2013, 776). Furthermore, the EU border assistance mission (EUBAM) which was initiated in 2005 in partnership with Moldova and Ukraine proved successful in improving border management and control, particularly in regard to transparency of foreign trade operations of the separatist region of Transnistria (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 43). The recent initiative supported by the EU is the establishment of a Moldovan – Ukrainian joint control at the Kuchurgan – Pervomaysk border checkpoint which will allow the control of export and import operations in the Transnistrian region (Government of Republic of Moldova 2017). This is a step forward in improving a level of control over the Transnistrian region by monitoring the

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12 borders between Ukraine and Transnistria and overall contributing to the maintenance of security in the region.

Border management and control proves to be one of the most successful policies implemented in the framework of the ENP/EaP in Moldova where conditionality has been credible in providing the incentives once the agreement provisions have been met. This success is also due to the aspiration of both partners in keeping control over the goods and persons crossing the borders.

However, not all the sectors under the ENP/EaP have been as successful as the border management and control. Freedom of expression and freedom of the media is still a concern in Moldova. According to Freedom House Report for 2016 press freedom in Moldova is partly free (Freedom House 2016). Although the constitution and legislative provision are in place to guarantee freedom of expression, these encounter difficulties in the process of implementation (Freedom House 2016). The main issue is that most of the media outlets are owned by political and business interest groups, which significantly undermine the independence and transparency of the press (Montesano et al. 2016; Freedom House 2016). In 2007, it was reported that media was serving mainly the interests of certain political groups and even today the main broadcasting outlets are owned by party members such as Vladimir Plahotniuc (PDM), Chiril Lucinschi (PLDM) or by Russian non-commercial agencies (Ziarul de Garda 2015). Nevertheless, the EU did not apply its conditionality mechanism of sanctioning. For example, the 2007 Progress Report on the AP although acknowledged the shortcomings of the policy implementation in Moldova did not delay or stop the following financial aid but even increased it, which can be interpreted as the unwillingness of the EU to apply ‘the stick’ and continue providing financial support as long as the situation does not become worse (Hagemann 2013, 778).

Considering the examples provided above on the application of conditionality in the case of Moldova within the ENP/EaP it can be outlined that the EU prefers to encourage developments by providing incentives and avoids sanctioning the partner as long as it stays on the path of the integration even if the progress is insubstantial at times. This can be interpreted by the fact that the ENP/EaP lacks the ‘golden ticket’ of membership and in order to maintain the interest of the partner, the EU agrees to accept no progress as long as the situation is not regressing. Another mechanism which is used by the EU in influencing policy adoption in the non-member state is socialisation. Socialisation has been viewed as complementing conditionality

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13 mechanism by extending its influence beyond the policy areas strictly defined by conditionality (Sasse 2008, 304). Socialisation refers to all the action taken by the EU to ‘teach’ the political elites of the non-member states the EU policies and convince them that these are the most appropriate and legitimate one (Schimmelfennig 2012, 8). The process of elite socialisation starts by introducing the vocabulary of the democracy in the political discourse and slowly persuading the elites in supporting democratic values (Schimmelfennig 2012, 13). The effectiveness of this tool depends on the EU capacity to convince the elites in accepting the EU’s authority (Schimmelfennig 2012, 8).

In the case of the ENP/EaP, socialisation efforts on the EU’s part have been relatively weak which is due to the core objectives of the ENP of keeping stability and security in the region (Schimmelfennig 2012, 20). Besides this, considering the particularities of the region and its Soviet past it is also a challenge to identify the elites with whom the EU values and principles will resonate.

Nevertheless, Moldova’s participation in EU initiated projects such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning or participation in the organisation such as OSCE or Council of Europe contributed to the establishment of a political dialogue, provided a platform for transmission of democratic norms and exchange of best practices in integration process (Buscaneanu 2015, 260-61).

The definition of the two mechanisms is relevant in analysing the modes in which the EU chooses to engage with its partners and Moldova in particular. As it has been outlined above, EU acts in its relations with Moldova as a ‘normative power’ focusing its effort on norms and values transfer. Therefore, the mechanism it uses reflect this approach. Both conditionality and socialisation are soft instruments however conditionality can be applied in a negative way. Nevertheless, the EU avoids applying negative conditionality in Moldova’s case as it does not want to discourage the costly and arduous process of reform implementation. This is particularly relevant considering that the biggest incentive, which enlargement policy offers is unattainable for the ENP/EaP countries.

1.3 Methodology

In order to apply the theoretical framework of external governance with the additional four boundaries concept to the analyses of the challenges and limitation of the ENP/EaP in Moldova this paper firstly will understand the external governance perspective as the EU expansion of

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14 its rules, norms and values to Moldova as a partner within the ENP/EaP. In this context, the governance notion will be understood in terms of cooperation between partners focused on process rather than output and on voluntary instruments (Lavenex 2008, 940). The four boundaries concept will be used to interpret the EU engagement in Moldova and the way it shifts or moves its boundaries to apply its governance modes in a non-member state.

The use of primary and secondary sources will aid the analyses and the application of the theory by taking into account the objectives of the policies, interpretations made by experts of the events which either contributed to the expansion of the EU governance in Moldova or hindered Moldova’s integration process.

The thesis is divided into four main chapters which are structured in a way to firstly provide the theoretical framework of the external governance and the tools engaged by the EU within the framework of the ENP/EaP. Secondly, in order to answer the research question of this thesis, which is concerned with the challenges and limitations of the ENP/EaP in the case of Moldova it is necessary first to identify the objectives and overall goals of the policy. Consequently, the second chapter is concerned with the ENP and the developments which led to the establishment of its Eastern dimension. As the policy received criticisms from its very beginnings some of the lines of criticism will be outlines along the factors which influenced the policy implementation.

In order to apply the theory to the case study, this paper will present some important background information on Moldova’s historical development and its relations with the regional powers. The last chapter of the thesis will analyse certain relevant events in Moldova in the light of the external governance approach. It will analyse the progress done in the expansion of the four boundaries: institutional/legal, transactional, geopolitical and cultural. By applying the theoretical framework, the research will aim to identify the factors which hinder a deeper and comprehensive integration of Moldova in the EU and define the main limitations of the policy as well as challenges encountered.

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2. European Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern Dimension (EaP)

The ENP has been developed with the scope of ensuring security and stability in the newly acquired neighbourhood as an outcome of the Eastern enlargement waves. Closeness to the troubled regions prompted the EU to rethink its approach to external relations with neighbours in the east and south by launching a policy driven by the internal concerns.

This chapter will outline the internal and external factors which led to the development of the ENP and consequently its eastern initiative EaP. It will focus on the main objectives set in the external policy towards the neighbourhood and the mechanism applied to deliver on these objectives. As the research question of this paper is concerned with the challenges and limitation of the policy, these will be outlined in the process of analysis.

Furthermore, from the very beginning of the policy definition, authors identified its shortcomings and weak points. Therefore, this chapter will include the main lines of criticism identified in the academic literature ranging from the ambiguity of concepts defined in the ENP/EaP to lack of consideration of the geopolitical environment in the Eastern neighbourhood.

Lastly, the chapter will also take count of the third-party influence on the ENP/EaP development. Since the post-Soviet region has been historically perceived as Russia’s sphere of influence it has been inevitable that involvement of another power, the EU, will lead to new tensions in the region. Therefore, the chapter will analyse the initial reaction of Russian authorities to the EU external policy in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ and the tools it used to put pressure on the countries included in the EaP. In this context, we will look at the concept of soft and hard power as developed by Joseph Nye.

2.1 European Neighbourhood Policy/ Eastern Partnership: Context and Objectives

European Neighbourhood Policy was launched by the EU in 2004 as a response to the challenges of the enlargement policy. It covers a large and heterogenous group of countries: Armenia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia was also invited to join the ENP it refused the offer considering that its position in the relationship with the EU

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16 will not be on an ‘equal’ basis whereas Russia aspired for a privileged cooperation with the EU (Smith 2005, 759; Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 536).

The main activities of the policy are focused on four major domains such as: ‘good governance and democracy, rule of law and human rights; economic development for stabilisation; security, migration and mobility’ (EEAS 2016). The relationship between the EU and these countries is based on a bilateral approach in order to impact each country’s internal and external policies in the areas mentioned above (Smith 2005, 762). However, contrary to the enlargement policy, with which ENP is being often compared, it does not offer membership, EU’s most successful foreign policy instrument (Lavenex 2008, 938-44).

ENP is not the first external policy initiated by the EU which will provide integration without the promise of membership. Since 1989 when the European Community created the European Economic Act, offering the European Free Trade Area members everything but the participation in the decision-making process, the Union had several attempts to promote policies towards its neighbours without letting them in (Smith 2005, 761). Consequently, the ENP is not a radically new policy but rather a continuation of the previously developed policies towards the neighbourhood which aims to enhance the elaborated acquis of the former policies (Dannreuther 2006, 190). It should be acknowledged that despite being a form of continuation of the previous policies the ENP did bring several innovative elements such as a stake in the Internal Market and the four freedoms for its partners, a more tailored approach with each of the partners, a better coherence and consistency in the neighbouring states and better developed financial instruments (Dannreuther 2006, 190-93).

Notwithstanding these previous policies, the preconditions for the development of the ENP laid both in internal and external to the EU factors. The enlargement wave of 2004 significantly strengthened the power of the EU through the territorial expansion and by promoting it as an actor capable of state transformations through economic and civilian instruments rather than through military capabilities (Dannreuther 2006, 183-84). However, as a consequence of internal division on external situations such as the Iraq war and the rejection of a drafted European constitution led to a review of the enlargement policy and EU’s capabilities in integrating new members (Dannreuther 2006, 186).

Despite this change in the enlargement policy, the EU also acknowledged its global role and its inevitable readiness ‘to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ (Council of the EU 2003, 1). As the 2004 enlargement process was bringing

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17 economically and politically troubled areas closer to the EU borders, it focused the EU’s attention on the issues of security and stability. In the European Security Strategy from 2003 issues such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime were identified as the key threats for the European borders and its Member States (Council of the EU 2003). Therefore, the key objective on which the ENP was built and developed was ‘to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean’ (Council of the EU 2003, 8). Until the development of the ENP, the EU was reluctant to get involved in the post-Soviet space conducting overall a reactive politics in the area in particular in relations to the solution of ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region (Khasson et al. 2008, 221). Therefore, the security issues in this region brought out by the Security Strategy paper in 2003 outlined the negative impact the ‘frozen conflicts’ have on the socio-economic development of the countries in question and therefore the ENP was particularly concerned to address these problems and set out objectives to overcome them in the Action Plans which represent the ‘backbone’ of the neighbourhood policy (Khasson et al. 2008, 222).

Although security issues are at the core of the ENP development these are overall put in a broader perspective. Considering that the EU promotes itself as a ‘civilian power’ on the international level it aims to achieve the security in the neighbourhood through a ‘carrot’ approach by providing financial funding and framework for cooperation and dialogue rather than an implication of the military factor (Khasson et al. 2008, 220). In the spirit of its ‘civilian power’ approach the EU avoids the inclusion of the military component in the Action Plans nevertheless it does not hesitate to stress the importance of international organisations such as OSCE, UN and NATO indirectly assigning them the ‘hard security task’ (Khasson et al. 2008, 223).

Despite different priorities of the ENP Action Plans all of them revolve around border protection with some specifics for eastern European countries and separately for Mediterranean neighbours. In the case of Eastern partners, there is a more emphasis on border control and trafficking (Khasson et al. 2008, 227). Even though the ENP objectives are clearly set in the Action Plans it has been acknowledged that the way to achieve them has been generally ambiguous and lacking clear guidelines (Khasson et al. 2008, 227). Nevertheless, the EU has significant power in its relations with the ENP partners and this is due to the asymmetrical relations and EU-led agenda (Khasson et al. 2008, 228).

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18 The EU deploys several instruments in its persuasion of ‘encouragement of reformers’ in the neighbourhood among which the most relevant are conditionality, technical and financial assistance, political dialogue and a promise of a share in the Internal Market (Khasson et al. 2008, 229-32).

As the ENP was developed to deal with the pressures enlargement policy has encountered, it, therefore, did provide the partner countries with deeper cooperation with the EU and participation in the Internal Market, but it also excluded accession to the membership as a possible goal. It can be argued that the goal of the ENP was to give the EU enough time to further integrate its large number of new members and at the same time develop a policy which will provide a framework to influence the development and stability of the newly acquired neighbours, especially those to the East (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 537). The avoidance on the EU’s side to further enlarge by promoting its ENP which offers ‘everything but institutions’ has been at times ambiguous, leading Eastern neighbouring countries to believe that there is ‘a hidden “membership carrot”’ after all (Khasson et al. 2008, 226). However, this position of keeping ‘the outside outside and at bay’ proved to be challenging when the countries from Eastern neighbourhood claimed their belonging to the European values and historical heritage, which meant that the question of accession will not be completely off the agenda (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 537).

As the ENP was generally taking a ‘one-size fits all’ approach which was unacceptable for the countries which were EU’s immediate neighbours compared to those which did not even share a border with the EU this raised a new debate for a more tailored initiative. Additionally, to this debate, there were also external factors such as the conflict in Georgia from summer 2008 which prompted the EU to adopt two separate initiatives within the ENP – one for its neighbours in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus and the other one for the neighbours in the Mediterranean (European Commission 2008, 2). In 2008 Swedish-Polish proposal called for the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) which had as its main objectives to ‘deepen bilateral cooperation and offer a more profound integration with the EU’ with the six Eastern partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). In 2009 the policy was launched as an Eastern dimension of the ENP aimed to complement the latter (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 14). As it was the case with the ENP, regional stability and security of the region were at the core of the EaP as the external events of that time showed.

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19 The deeper bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the framework of the EaP is based on the Association Agreements which would establish free trade areas, support the improvement of the administrative capacities in each partner country, strengthen energy security of these countries and provide a visa-free movement of the citizens (Council of the European Union 2009). The EaP initiative offers its participants new projects and instruments for their implementation by working simultaneously in bilateral and multilateral capacities with the future aim of creating a ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’ (European Commission 2008, 2).

2.2 Criticism of the Neighbourhood Policy

Both the ENP and its eastern dimension EaP received criticism in their conceptualisation and implementation process. One of the criticisms refers to the ambiguity and definition of the concept of ‘partnership’ which in the EU documents is based on ‘shared values, common interests and joint ownership, and exclude the imposition of priorities or conditions by the EU on its ENP partners’ (European Commission 2004, 8). However, already in the development process of the policy, there is a prioritisation of the EU agenda. As one of the examples of this shift is Article 7a of the Treaty of Lisbon in which the EU ‘aims to establish an era of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union’ (Treaty of Lisbon 2007, Art. 7a). In a later document, the concept of values in the relations to the ENP reflects a normative character of the EU by stating that ‘in building a more effective partnership in the neighbourhood… the Union will pursue its interests through the promotion of universal values’ (European Commission 2015, 2). In this context, there is an ambiguity in regard to which values are being promoted.

The problematic and often ambiguous definition of certain concepts and principles in the EU documents related to the ENP/EaP reflects an expansion of the EU governance to its neighbours with its top-down approach and imposition of conditionality. This is particularly erroneous considering that the states under the ENP are not candidate countries and most likely will not be in any near future (Korosteleva 2011, 6).

Another point which has been addressed in academic literature regarding the shortcomings of the ENP/EaP is the EU’s objective to surround itself with a ‘ring of friends’ which are economically and politically secure and therefore creating a ‘buffer zone’ (Konstanyan et al. 2017, 45). As the ENP from its very beginnings has been built on the concepts of security and

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20 stability of the territories on its immediate borders, it conditioned its neighbours to reinforce and secure their borders in order to keep at bay common threats. This can consequently lead to losing good neighbourly relations among the ENP countries and as well as their relations with third countries (Zaiotti 2007, 149). It can be argued in this context that instead of conducting a policy of inclusion, the EU creates on the ground new division lines through ENP which at its core is considered by some authors to be about separation and othering (Nielsen and Vilson 2014, (Browning and Christoiu 2010, Joenniemi 2007)

Considering that most of the EaP countries are dealing with ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories as a consequence of their Soviet past, there is a vital need for the EU to develop instrumental capabilities for these countries to deal with the issue in order to be able to move forward with their rapprochement with the EU (Nielsen and Vilson 2014, 260). However, the EaP does not provide any tools for conflict resolution, which hinders the development of these countries and their process of association with the EU.

The ENP in its development has been influenced by the enlargement instruments and principles and one of these principles, which also has been viewed with a criticism is the concept of conditionality and the way the EU applies it to the neighbouring countries. Conditionality is a sanctioning mechanism which is applied in the situation of non-compliance with the EU standards or objectives (Konstanyan et al. 2017, 21). It has been argued that this mechanism bares risks if it does not improve political relations by causing more damage in EU’s relations with its partners if the issue is more of a matter of foreign policy (Konstanyan et al. 2017, 21). Or, it can be even ineffective in the case of the ENP states which prove to be difficult to integrate with the EU or seek accession even if it is not on the agenda (Joenniemi 2007,147). The ENP in its initial development phase has not considered geopolitical context specific to the Eastern neighbourhood and the potential tensions the policy could bring between the EU and Russia on one hand and Russia and the post-Soviet states included in the ENP/EaP on the other hand, which historically considered this region its privileged sphere of influence (Sieg 2016, 4). Considering the geopolitical context several authors have criticised the ENP for not acknowledging the regional particularities and the involvement of another power in the Eastern Europe, which eventually can lead to destabilisation of the region and Russian – EU relations and ‘diminish rather than increase EU security’ (Aliboni 2005, 6; Sasse 2008).

It has been also argued that the ENP will not be successful in the Eastern neighbourhood considering that most of the governing regimes in these countries are either semi-authoritarian

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21 or semi-democratic and consequently the leading elites will not commit themselves to reform the system as it will bring them out of their power (Sasse 2008, 303).

2.3 The Influence of Russia of the ENP/EaP Development

The Eastern Partnership initiative covers a region claimed by Russia to be its traditional sphere of influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the acknowledgement of an external actor which could have an impact on the direction taken by the countries from the EaP initiative was inevitable. Nevertheless, at the launch of the ENP Russia’s initial reaction was more neutral rather than negative, which could have been attributed to a few factors. Firstly, it was Russia’s scepticism towards the EU’s foreign policy conducted in the ‘shared neighbourhood’, which would have not unified countries with different interests (Gretskiy et

al. 2014, 377). Secondly, the ENP required the neighbouring states to undergo a complicated

process of reform implementation and market liberalisation without offering in the future a membership card (Gretskiy et al. 2014, 377). Therefore, it was highly unlikely that countries will accept these conditions and sustain a high level of motivation.

The initial perception of the policy by Russia has changed with the events in Ukraine in 2004, which set Ukrainian foreign policy on a pro-European path. This development prompted Russia to realise that the EU’s involvement in the region can represent a potential threat to Russia’s regional interests. In assessing the impact of the ENP, Russia stressed that ‘European integration and the CIS could not go hand in hand’ (Gretskiy et al. 2014, 378).

The development of the EaP only deepened the antagonistic approach on Russia’s side considering certain statements made by the EU officials stating that the EaP was developed as a consequence of the war in Georgia and Russian actions against Ukraine (Nielsen and Vilson 2014, 249). However, this position was denied by other member states stating that the EaP is not directed against Russia (Nielsen and Vilson 2014, 249).

Russia’s objections to the EaP could be outlined in economic, political and ideological terms. Economically, Russia raised worries that EU products will flow its market by bypassing Russia’s tariffs considering the DCFTA and the free trade agreement the members of the CIS are part to (Sieg 2016, 6). Political objectives are concerned with Russia’s inability to influence the governments of the EaP countries if the integration process is successful and political

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22 stability is reached (Sieg 2016, 6). Losing its political leverage in this region can lead to Russia’s regional isolations and potentially undermine its perception as a great power. Final objectives refer to the ideological points. Russia presents itself as a distinct culture which through Orthodox tradition and Soviet legacy shares common values with the post-Soviet states (Sieg 2016, 6) If the EaP succeeds in transferring the western model to the region then this distinctiveness of shared values and common legacy of the post-Soviet space will be under question (Sieg 2016, 6).

Russia’s initial mechanism to influence the countries from the post-Soviet space in the pursuit of European integration was the deployment of hard power both in the military and economic spheres. In the military sphere, Russian troops are present in the territories of all six countries of the Eastern Partnership, in some of them (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) this presence is very unwelcome and comes against the law (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 40). Nevertheless, Russia refuses to withdraw its troops and indirectly uses them as a threat. In 2016 the U.S. sent 200 troops to Moldova for joint military exercises, which steered protests from the Socialist Party of Moldova with pro-Russian views (Romania Libera 2016). However, only a few months later in a joint Russian – Transnistrian military action, several tanks crossed the River Dniester within a simulation exercise of a military attack (Ziare.com 2016). This shows Russia’s preparedness to act even with military forces in order to maintain this region under its influence. From an economic perspective, Russia has not hesitated to apply trade embargoes as political instruments by banning agricultural products and wine from Georgia and Moldova in 2005 or by tightening the conditions for work permits for workers from these countries (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 44).

Using hard power instruments is a traditional Russian method of coercion of its ‘near abroad’ to act in Russia’s interests. However, in the past years, Russia’s strategy in pursuing its influence in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ has turned more toward soft power. Russia is changing its strategy in the neighbourhood by building an alternative model to the EU (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 29). In 2011 Vladimir Putin announced his support to build the Eurasian Union, which would bring together the former Soviet states under the umbrella of Russian geopolitical interests and would offer these states an ‘EU-like’ model (Laruelle 2015, 3).

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23

3. Historical Background of Moldova

The Republic of Moldova is a relatively ‘young’ state, which after the declaration of its independence in 1991 struggled to define its national identity and deal with internal conflicts which threatened its territorial borders. As other newly independent states in the post-Soviet space, Moldova underwent a process of liberalisation and democratisation after decades of the ideological and centralistic influence of the Soviet era. In its transition period to statehood and market economy, Moldova faced difficult economic and political challenges, and on top of that a military conflict in the region between River Dniester and its border with Ukraine. Furthermore, as Moldova has almost never existed as an independent state and spent almost half a century in the USSR, where most of the economic planning and political decisions were taken in Moscow, it had limited experience on how to deal with the challenges of establishing an open economy in a democratic state (Löwenhardt et al. 2001, 613).

The badly managed economy and corrupt government led to almost a decade of recession after the declaration of Moldova’s independence (Korosteleva 2010, 1268). The economic situation was critical with almost 80 per cent of the population living below poverty by the beginning of 2000 (Korosteleva 2010, 1268). Although economically the country has been making progress since 2000 with 5 per cent growth annually nevertheless by 2014 around 40 per cent of Moldova’s population lived on less than 5 USD a day, which is below the regional line (World Bank Group 2016, x). Most of the economic growth was and still is heavily relying on the remittances and private consumption. According to International Organisation for Migration more than 20 per cent of Moldovans are residing abroad and about 10 per cent have been identified as temporary migrant workers (IOM 2016, accessed 13 June 2017).

After the dissolution of the USSR Moldova continued to be heavily dependent on Russia in terms of export with almost 80 per cent of its products sold on the Russian market. (Korosteleva 2010, 1268) At the same time dependent on Russian natural gas imported at a subsidised price in the first years after independence (Orttung 2011). Today Moldova’s gas market is de facto monopolised by Gazprom, which owns 50 per cent of shares in Moldovagaz, a Moldovan-Russian joint stock company, and another 13 per cent of the shares controlled by Transnistria are also owned indirectly by Gazprom (Nuțu and Cenușă 2016, 6). In spite of these factors, Moldova sought to loosen this dependency by launching in the 1994 negotiations with the European Union for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (Korosteleva 2010, 1268).

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24 This chapter will provide an overview of Moldova’s political and geopolitical struggle which often drove the country to oscillate between the two main external actors – Russia and the EU. Although a relatively small and economically poor country, Moldova has been looking to break away from its Soviet past and shape itself as an independent state. Nevertheless, Russia’s influence has been present in the country from the very beginning of its existence as an independent republic. The more recent interest of the EU in supporting Moldova’s democratisation process and its political and economic stability has raised some questions regarding EU’s expansion of its governance beyond its borders. In order to analyse the positions of the EU and Russia on Moldova and their pursuit of regional security through different means, this chapter will firstly provide a brief overview of the main historical, economic and territorial issues. Secondly, it will focus on the political developments of Moldova and the events which led to ‘state capture’ (Tudoroiu 2015). It will then look at an important moment in the history of Moldova, the Transnistrian conflict, which still represents an issue for Moldova’s territorial integrity and further integration with the EU. The last sub-chapters will focus on Moldova’s foreign relations with the EU and Russia as two powers which aim to influence its future development.

3.1 Political Developments in Moldova since its Independence

In the first decade of its independence, Moldova has been qualified as a democratic state with a parliamentary system despite the attempts of the former president Petru Lucinschi to introduce a presidential system (Całus 2016, 20). Consequently, the parliament and the government gained significant powers while president’s prerogatives have been reduced (Całus 2016, 20). The same period of time is characterised by inconsistency in terms of governing parties. Every election the ruling party was replaced by the opposition, which created a dissatisfaction among public opinion which viewed the ruling government as beeing opportunistic and inefficient (Całus 2016, 21). People’s nostalgia for the Soviet times and stability associated with that period was growing more intense, which partially can explain the overwhelming results of the parliamentary elections in 2001, in which the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) won 71 seats in parliament out of 101 (Całus 2016, Iglesias 2013). Although the name of the party would suggest a returning of the Soviet communism, it does have little in common with the classical communist ideology. It was more

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25 of an attempt ’to mirror the totalitarian past with the limited instruments of authoritarianism’ (Tudoroiu 2011, 240).

Consolidation of power by the PCRM with the nomination of their leader, Vladimir Voronin, as the president of the Republic of Moldova is described by Tudoroiu as a ’state capture’ (Tudoroiu 2015). During its two mandates, Voronin managed to instaurate a de facto presidential system by controlling the majority of the parliament and by appointing trusted people in the key position of the state administration including the prime minister, the head of the Central Election Committee, and even taking control of the judicial apparatus by appointing prosecutor general and various judges (Całus 2016, 23-24). The Communist Party also took hold of most of the media outlets in the country which completed the process of the ’state capture’ (Całus 2016, 24).

In April 2009 Moldova was also part of the wave of ’colour revolutions’ or as in this case it was called ’Twitter Revolution’ which started as a consequence of parliamentary elections in which the PCRM gained 50 per cent of the votes. This was in discrepancy with the polls and therefore the elections were claimed by the opposition rigged (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 138). As a consequences of April events, in which protesters damaged and set on fire presidential office building and parliament building, and installed both Romanian and the EU’s flags on these buildings, a series of arrests were conducted by the police and several human rights violations were recorded, when people in police custody were reported to be tortured and even killed (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). Despite the Communists winning the majority of the seats in the parliament they still were short of one vote to appoint their candidate for the presidency.

As a result of a snap elections in July 2009, the four pro-European parties (the Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova, the Democrat Party of Moldova, the Liberal Party and the ’Our Moldova’ Alliance) have formed a governing coalition named the Alliance for the European Integration (AIE – Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană) which gave them the 53 seats in the Parliament (Całus 2016, 25). Although these developments might have indicated some fundamental change in the political direction of Moldova, this was a short-lived hope (Tudoroiu 2011, 243). Instead of fighting the corrupted system so well-crafted during the Communist government the leading members of the ruling coalition were conducting internal fights in controlling state institutions (Konstanyan 2016, 2). Two main political personalities have been more prominent in this regard: Vlad Plahotniuc the leader of the Democratic Party and one of the richest man

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26 in Moldova, and Vlad Filat, the former prime minister and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, who was arrested and investigated for corruption and 1 billion USD bank fraud in 2015 and sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment (Całus 2016, Konstanyan 2016, Anticoruptie.md 2016).

Despite the internal clashes, the AIE kept Moldova on the pro-European path and implemented some reforms according to the Action Plan. However, these have been done very superficially and mainly to secure the continuous flow of the funds provided by the EU (Konstanyan 2016, 2).

In November 2016 after two decades Moldovans elected directly their new president, the leader of the Socialist Party, Igor Dodon. The new president has clearly outlined on his agenda the rapprochement with Russia, bringing Moldova into the Eurasian Economic Union and denouncing the AA with the EU. Although presidential powers in Moldova are limited Dodon promised to push for new parliamentary elections in hope that his Party of Socialist will gain the necessary votes to form a government (Ivan 2016).

3.2 Transnistria

One of the key moments which influenced the development of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state was the military conflict in Transnistria the consequences of which still play a major role on country’s political, economic and social directions. The conflict has still not been solved therefore for decades now the Transnistrian situation has been qualified as a ‘frozen conflict’. The term has been defined as ‘conditions on territories where active armed conflict may have ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides’ (Grigas 2016, 1). It has been commonly used with the reference to the conflicts which arose in the post-Soviet space.

The territory, which is called now Transnistria is situated on the left bank of the River Dniester (or Nistru as it is called in Moldova). Historically this territory has a more distinctive Slavic identity compared to the territory on the right bank of the River Dniester and bordering on River Prut, also known as Bessarabia (Bowring 2014, 161). The two regions, Bessarabia and what today is called ‘Transnistria’ had historically a different development and influence of different powers. While parts of the Dniester left bank belonged to Russia starting with 1793

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27 until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bessarabia was occupied by Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire then annexed to the Romanian Kingdom until 1940, when under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Soviets annexed this territory (Kolsto et al. 1993, 977-78). Under the Soviet Union, the territory of Bessarabia has been immediately rearranged administratively: some parts of the Bessarabia were joined to Soviet Ukraine and the rest unified with the territory on the left bank of the River Dniester and named Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic (MSSR) (Kolsto et al. 1993, 978). It is considered that this territorial rearrangement was done to complicate the return of Bessarabia to Romania in the future (Kolsto et al. 1993, 979).

Figure. 1. The Map of the Republic of Moldova including Transnistria.1

1_{Source: Wikimedia Commons, available at}

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Maps_of_Moldova#/media/File:Moldadm.png Accessed 21 June 2017

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28 During perestroika in Moldova sprang a movement for the independence of the republic led by the Moldovan Popular Front. At the same time in 1989, the annexation of Bessarabia under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was declared illegal by the Second Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, which led to the idea of reunification with Romania (Kolsto et al. 1993, 980). Neither of these ideas resonated with ethnic Russians and Ukrainians from the Transnistrian region, who immediately after the declaration of sovereignty of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova in 1990 declared the creation of Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) (Приднестровская Молдавская Республика) and elected its first president – Igor Smirnov (Bowring 2014, 161).

The first military clashes between separatist groups and local policemen started in November 1990, which resulted in several victims. The military clashes intensified in its scale at the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992 (Bowring 2014, 162). It is still debated who conducted the military actions as besides the Soviet’s 14th Army which was stationed on the territory of PMR there were also Cossacks and other volunteers who came from different parts of the former USSR to support the separatist regime (Kolsto et al. 1993, 987). When the ceasefire was agreed in 1992, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established a Mission in Moldova to help solve the conflict (OSCE 2017). Until this day the Transnistrian situation has not been solved as the PMR is not recognised internationally as an independent state but as a region of Moldova, nevertheless, Moldova does not have any control over this territory. In 1997 Moldova and PMR signed Moscow Memorandum (or Primakov Memorandum) which defined the basic terms for normalisation of relationships between two parts among which were the participation of both parties in the decision making regarding the Transnistrian territory, participation of the PMR representatives in Moldova’s foreign affairs on the issues concerning the interests of the former and the settlement of the conflicts through negotiations with assistance from Russia, Ukraine and OSCE, who also countersigned the Memorandum as guarantors (Bowring 2014, 162- 63).

One of the attempts to solve the Transnistrian problem was in 2003 under the Kozak Memorandum, drafted by the Russian administration as a consequence of direct negotiations between Moldova and Russia. The Kozak Memorandum proposed the creation of a federal system in Moldova, which would have given the PMR a greater autonomy and representation in a new legislative system (Bowring 2014, 163). The President of Moldova at that time,

The Challenges and Limitations of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy in Moldova: Expanding the EU Boundaries