It pays off to slack;
A study on the effects of a Slacktivism Gradation
Scale on a traditional form of activism: making a
donation
Lianne Nelemans
10003402
Master Thesis Corporate Communication
26.06.2015
Abstract
In recent years, we are witnessing a change in the way people support non-profits and how we give meaning to the concept of activism. The term ‘slacktivist’ is used to describe this new kind of social activist whose participation solely takes place online and consists of little effort. As the popularity of slacktivism increases, non-profits are concerned that this might replace traditional forms of activism such as making a donation. A survey among 208 respondents demonstrates that participation in six types of slacktivism acts actually increases donation intent and donating behaviour. Our results thereby contribute to the statement that slacktivism is beneficial for subsequent civic action, instead of a threat. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that there is a gradation to be made in different slacktivist acts. Our prosposed Slacktivism Common Gradation Scale posits that the more effort one puts into his slack; the more one will be willing to donate. Therefore, it pays of to slack, and even more, to slack high on the Slacktivism Common Gradation Scale.
Introduction
"Like us on Facebook and we will vaccinate zero children against Polio" (‘‘Unicef asks people…’’, 2013). This campaign slogan from the non-profit organization Unicef gives a good example of how people tend to give their support to non-profit organizations nowadays. The liking part of Unicef’s slogan refers to the use of social media to show support for social causes and is directed at a new kind of social activist. They are called: slacktivists.
The Internet, and in particular social media platforms, has had a significant effect on our support mentality and the meaning giving to the concept of activism (Castells, 2008). Whereas in the 1970’s until the 1990’s people perceived activism as participating in a physical demonstration or making a monetary contribution in order to create social change (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014), nowadays people can easily show their disapproval by clicking on the like button in the comfort of their own living room (Skoric, 2012).
The term ‘slacktivism’ can be used to describe these types of online participation to non-profits (Hsieh & Lee, 2013). This form of activism contains a minimal effort in showing support for a social cause and includes everything from
online petitions to activities on social media (Butler, 2011). Rotman et al. (2011) define slacktivism as civic action performed online, which is directed at producing social change and characterized as being rather low-risk and low-cost behaviour. As social media has made it fairly easy to make a less physical and more effortless contribution to a social cause, they are increasingly playing an important role in the way people contribute to non-profits (Shulman, 2009).
The Unicef campaign provides us with an excellent example of the challenge non-profit organizations are facing due to this change in contributions being made. Even though these activities on social media can help raise awareness and monetary contributions for social causes, it also raises questions whether these new kinds of social activists would be beneficial or form a threat to non-profits (Skoric, 2012). As Unicef states in their campaign press release: ‘‘just pressing the like button, won’t save any lives. In order to pay for vaccinations, we need people to actually donate.‘’ (‘‘Unicef asks people…’’. 2013). Whether or not these low-cost online contributions will make a significant and lasting impact, is currently topic of debate (Hsieh & Lee, 2013; Rotman et al., 2011).
The existing literature shows that there are mainly two perspectives on this trend called slacktivism (Kelly Garrett, 2009; McCaughey & Ayers, 2013; Vegh, 2003). On the one hand, critics of slacktivism are questioning the actual benefits of slacktivism for non-profits and social causes (Gladwell, 2010; McCofferty, 2011; Morozov, 2009). It could replace other forms of civic action, like making a donation, in the sense that people feel like they have done enough to show their support (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). In this perspective, slacktivism is seen as a threat towards activism as it would substitute making a monetary
contribution (Morozov, 2010). The reasoning behind this is that in order to establish social change, one has to put actual effort in time or money-consuming activities (Skoric, 2012). After all, in order for non-profits to maintain their license to operate and reach their social missions, non-profits need people to make a monetary
contribution and therefore participate in traditional forms of activism (Saratovsky & Feldmann, 2013).
The opposing camp takes the perspective that slacktivism is a rather positive phenomenon (Amtzis, 2014; Effron & Monin, 2010; Kristofferson, White & Peloza, 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). McCaughey and Ayers (2013) state that non-profits need to be happy these days that they get this free media attention as they are competing
with profit organizations. According to Kelly Garrett (2009), people need to realize that slacktivism is a form of activism and is, as any form of activism in favor of the social cause, therefore beneficial. Earl & Kimport (2011) suggest that slacktivism can be effective because of the characteristics of social media. It enables high levels of mobilization in short periods of time and is therefore effective of creating awareness for social causes.
Despite the two-sided take on the slacktivism matter, little research has been done to demonstrate the effect it has on traditional forms of activism as making a donation (Christensen, 2012; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). To our knowledge, there are two studies that demonstrate this effect for two different types of slacktivism: signing a petition and wearing an initial token of support (Kristofferson et al., 2013; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Due to the fact that each study looked at different types of slacktivism, the assumption raises that different types of slacktivism might have different effects on the willingness to make a monetary contribution to non-profits. Undoubtedly, there is a difference in effort being made in just liking a social media post or actually creating own content like a film clip. If there are indeed fundamental differences between different types of slacktivsm, translating findings based on one type of slacktivism into expectations about its effect on actual activism will require greater care.
However, whether or not there is some type of gradation in behaviours to be made, has not been subject of study yet. Our analyses should point out whether the decision to participate in some type of slacktivism affects donations made to charity and answer our general research question: ‘’Which types of slacktivism can be
perceived as either threatening or beneficial for subsequent participation in
traditional activism in terms of making a donation?’’. Secondary to answering our
general research question, this study tries to generate a Slacktivist Gradation Scale to see whether we can arrange these different slacktivist behaviours according to the amount of effort one puts into their behaviour. This study therefore contributes to existing literature as no other study has looked at these specific types of slacktivism. Nor has previous research considered the existence of some sort of a slacktivism gradation scale yet. On a professional level, the results will be helpful for non-profits facing the challenge to deal with these untraditional forms of social support. The recommendations made based on these results, will have profound implications for
how non-profits should organize their communication campaigns in terms of targeting these new types of social activists.
After this introduction, we start off with the theoretical background. Here, we address existing literature on traditional activism and slacktivism, and assess theories
explaining effects. We then discuss methods, the development of our Slacktivism Gradation Scale, and give an overview of the analysis and the results. We finalize with a conclusion, discussion and some practical recommendations. Moreover, since the development of our Slacktivism Gradation Scale is exploratory in nature, we will give some recommendations for future research.
Theoretical background
From activism to slacktivism
As the introduction states, the Internet has had a significant effect on the way people tend to support nonprofits nowadays (Castells, 2008; Christensen, 2011; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Morozov, 2009; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2009). Especially social media websites have provided people with new, and moreover quick and easy, ways to demonstrate their social engagement for an issue (Kozinets, Belz & McDonagh, 2012; Kristofferson et al., 2013; Shulman, 2009).
Traditional forms of activism are considered to be time- and money
consuming activities, which generate social, political, economic, or environmental change (Martin, Hanson & Fontaine, 2007). According to Kristofferson et al. (2013), participating in traditional forms of activism require the participant to either donate a significant amount of time or to make a financial sacrifice. In both ways, the
participant is taking a substantial risk by performing these acts, as opposed to not participating (Martin, Hanson & Fontaine, 2007). Lee and Hsieh (2013) refer to more traditional forms of civic action with examples like hosting a community meeting or writing a letter to the government. Other, well-known, examples of traditional activism are attending a protest or making a donation (Kristofferson et al., 2013). These types of civic action are all identified as high-cost behaviours as people have to make an actual effort to perform these activities (Katzev & Johnson, 1987; Skoric (2012).
Garrett (2007) defines Internet activism as engaging in political activities by means of electronic communication technologies such as e-mail or blogging. As Internet
activism is also aimed at generating social change, the main difference between the two lies in the amount of effort one puts into their civic action (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Contrary to traditional activism, Internet activism can be seen as rather low-cost behaviour (Skoric, 2012). They are therefore positioned as opposites, as the ‘costs’ of participating in Internet activism does not require one to take a substantial amount of risk in means of a financial sacrifice or a physical effort (Skoric, 2012). The
substantial risk one takes with participating in Internet activism is considerably less to non in comparison with traditional forms of activism (Mozorov, 2009). A, somewhat controversial and moreover negatively charged, term used to describe these low-cost civic actions, which are performed online, is ‘Slacktivism’ (Christensen, 2011; Kristofferson et al., 2013; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). The word ‘Slacktivism’ is an amalgamation of the words ‘slacker’ and ‘activism’ and is intrinsically linked to certain features of social media platforms (Leonard, 2009). Examples of these features are the Like- and Share button on Facebook or the Favorite- and Retweet button on Twitter. They facilitate low-cost online engagement by enabling the user to quickly share content with ones own network (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Ellison, Lampe & Steinfield, 2009; Langley & van den Broek, 2010; Lovejoy, Waters, & Saxton, 2012). Besides these specific acts of slacktivism, which are explicitly related to the social media features liking and sharing; other types of slacktivist actions are more closely related to traditional forms of activism. As signing a petition at the local train station is perceived as traditional activism, the Internet allows for the signing of e-petitions. This is categorized as slacktivism as it is an online, low-cost civic activity (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Another example can be found in one joining an online community as opposed to one joining an actual community in the physical sphere (Karpf, 2010). Again, this action consists of low-cost behaviour as joining a group on Facebook takes often one click for an acceptance request, and therefore less effort, than being physically present at a meeting. With these slacktivist behaviours, the barriers of participation are considerably low (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010).
The debate around slacktivism
The debate around slacktivism is divided into two camps (Lee & Hsieh, 2013; McCafferty, 2011; Rotman et al., 2011). Opponents of slacktivism question whether
this type of civic action makes a meaningful contribution to an issue and even perceive slacktivism as a threat towards traditional forms of activism (Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2009; Shulman, 2009). According to Skoric (2012), the low-cost behavioural characteristic of slacktivism is the main reason why people are more likely to partake in acts of slacktivism than in traditional activism. With the threshold to participate online being considerably low, people who would otherwise not partake in activism or not that often, are now provided with tools to show their support in much easier and effortless ways (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). However, Skoric (2012) also states that in order to make a meaningful contribution to a cause, one has to partake in time- and money consuming activities. Accordingly, the lower the substantial risk imposed with partaking in civic actions, the less likely they are to actually contribute in producing social change. According to Mozorov (2009) and Christensen (2011), Slacktivism can be seen as a threat to traditional forms of activism as it might work as substitute behaviour. Engaging in an act of slacktivism would satisfy feelings of altruism and good citizenship, and therefore refrain people from participating in more meaningful contributions. The threat, as explained by Morozov (2011) and Christensen (2011), lies in the fact that non-profits need people to make a more meaningful contribution and therefore engage in high-cost
behavioural activities such as volunteering or donating. In this study, a meaningful contribution is described as making a monetary contribution: a donation.
On the contrary, supporters of Slacktivism actually perceive the low-cost behaviour characteristic as a positive asset (Lee & Hsieh, 2013; Vie, 2014). As mentioned before, this type of civic action helps raises awareness amongst a wide range of people (Skoric, 2012). It allows people to make a quick and easy
contribution to a cause without them perceiving this as a substantial risk, time- or moneywise. Furthermore, slacktivism facilitates a quick distribution of knowledge about a certain social issue (Rotman et al., 2011). This is a key aspect of its efficacy, as a lack of knowledge about a certain social problem, is often one of the core reasons why it even is a problem (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, Whitmarsh, 2007). Knowledge about a social cause is critical in order to get people willing to achieve social change (Lubchenco, 1998). When people don’t know something is wrong, or if they haven’t got the facts, people don’t know they have to take action. Slacktivism therefore plays an important role in this distribution of knowledge and awareness creation (Lee & Hsieh, 2013).
However, as this debate around slacktivism goes on, its effects have actually not been topic of research that often. To get a more accurate look on the concept of slacktivism, we compare two studies that specifically look at the effects of slacktivism on traditional activism in terms of making a donation. To our knowledge, these are the only studies that focus on an act of slacktivism in a donating sphere.
Previous studies on the effects of slacktivism
Lee and Hsieh (2013) look at the effects of signing an e-petition as an act of slacktivism, on the willingness to partake in other forms of activism. Respectively attending at a protest, buying products in support of a social cause, attending a community meeting, debating with others, persuading friends, posting or forward news, signing another e-petition, volunteering, writing a letter to the government, and making a donation. In their study, they did not specifically indicate which types of civic action can be categorized as rather low-cost or high-cost behaviours. However, in our understanding of slacktivism, posting or forwarding news and signing another e-petition can be seen as online low-cost behaviours and therefore be categorized as slacktivism. Attending at a protest, buying products in support of a social cause, attending a community meeting, debating with others, persuading friends,
volunteering, writing a letter to the government, and making a donation can be seen as high-cost behaviours and therefore be categorized as more traditional forms of
activism.
When looking at the effects of an act of slacktivism on the willingness to participate in other forms of slacktivism, they found positive results. Their findings suggest that signing an e-petition increased the chances of one participating in other forms of slacktivism, like forwarding or posting news with the use of Internet. Partaking in slacktivism behaviour is therefore beneficial for partaking in other slacktivism behaviours. Furthermore, their findings indicate mixed results when looking at the effects of slacktivism on the willingness to participate in more traditional forms of activism. According to Lee and Hsieh (2012), signing an e-petition had a negative effect on the willingness to partake in a physical protest. Here, slacktivism had a negative effect on the intention to partake in high-cost civic action and therefore, partaking in slacktivism can be seen as a threat towards this form of traditional activism. However, when looking at the intention to partake in high-cost civic action like making a donation, they found a moderate positive effect.
‘’Fortunately, contrary to critics’ concern, we found no evidence that performing one form of slacktivism (i.e., signing online petitions) will undermine a subsequent civic activity (i.e., donating to a charity)’’ (Lee & Hsieh, 2012, pp. 8). In the light of our research question, whether participating in certain types of slacktivism will threaten of benefit partaking in traditional activism in terms of making a donation, these results indicate that the negative view on slacktivism might not be justified.
The second study, conducted by Kristofferson et al. (2013), looks at the effect of a so-called initial token of support on the willingness to make a ‘meaningful contribution’ to a cause. Despite the fact that their definition of slacktivism does not fully
correspond with our definition, their theorizing gives us some interesting insights. Kristofferson et al. (2013) define slacktivism as: ‘’a willingness to perform a
relatively costless, token display of support for a social cause, with an accompanying lack of willingness to devote significant effort to enact meaningful change’’. In this description of slacktivism, the focus lays on the low-cost characteristic of the civic action and not on the requirement of the act being performed online (Christensen, 2011). The latter is actually crucial in our understanding of slacktivism, as with the definition held by Lee and Hsieh (2013). However, interesting for our study is their consideration of a token of support being public or private. Accordingly, a private token of support is a contribution to a social cause being made in the private sphere and therefore not publicly viewable (Kristofferson et al., 2013). These tokens of support are made based on intrinsic motives and therefore more likely to result in a ‘meaningful contribution’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000). On the contrary, a public token of support is an act of support, which is publicly viewable for everyone to see
(Kristofferson et al., 2013). These acts are based on motives of impression management and used by people as a means to create or maintain an image of themselves (Jeong & Lee, 2013; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). According to Kristofferson et al. (2013), a public token of support therefore decreases the
probability of one partaking in more traditional forms of activism afterwards, as they are extrinsic of nature. Their results confirm this: ‘’… an initial act of public token support is no more effective than no initial act of support, and less effective than a private act of token support, in motivating meaningful contributions to a cause’’ (Kristofferson et al., 2013, pp. 1155). As the majority of the slacktivist acts included in our study are public by nature (Kent, 2010), translating the findings of
Kristofferson et al. (2013) to our current study therefore implies that partaking in slacktivism will decrease chances of one making a donation. In this, slacktivism could be seen as a threat towards traditional activism.
As shows, both studies indicate different effects of Slacktivism on traditional forms of activism. Lee and Hsieh (2013) carefully posit slacktivism as beneficial for partaking in donating behaviour as the result of their study turned out positive. Kristofferson et al. (2013) nuance this statement by differentiating between private and public
slacktivist acts. Accordingly, slacktivism forms a threat to partaking in donating behaviour when the act of slacktivism is public by nature (Kristofferson et al., 2013). To establish whether or not Slacktivism can actually be seen as a threat or a benefit towards traditional forms of activism, both studies substantiated their theorizing with the use of moral balancing theory and cognitive dissonance theory (Kristofferson et al., 2013; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). The theory of moral balancing and cognitive
dissonance theory are often used to explain why people are motivated or not motivated to act morally (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009; Tsang, 2002). In this study, ‘to act morally’ is to engage in meaningful civic action, to support a social cause. Contrary, to not engage in meaningful civic action would be considered as immoral behaviour, as it is our duty as citizens to perform altruistic actions where needed (Stern, Dietz & Black, 1985). As stated by Skoric (2012), one will only be able to contribute in a meaningful way when participating in time- and money consuming activities. Therefore, meaningful civic action is explained as high-cost civic action, a.k.a. traditional forms of activism. A social cause is a problem in need of wider social support (Krebs, 2008), so therefore, to support this cause by partaking in traditional forms of activism would be considered as moral.
Moral Balancing Theory
Opponents of slacktivism arm themselves with moral balancing theory to explain why slacktivism would form a threat toward traditional forms of activism (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). The concept of moral balancing states that when deciding to act morally or immorally, costs and benefits of the act, as well as past behaviours will be taken into account (Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Paz Espinosa & García-Muñoz, 2013; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Costs of the act relates to the amount of effort one has to make performing a specific behaviour (Sachdeva et al., 2009). When the benefits overrule the costs being
made, one will be likely to engage in these actions as people like to make minimum effort and get maximum results (benefits) (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986; Granovetter, 1978). Besides this cost-benefit analysis, partaking in civic action will also be based on previous moral or immoral behaviour (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Moral balancing can be divided into two concepts: moral licensing and moral cleansing. Both concepts can be perceived as an account on which one has to maintain balance in morality and immorality (Hollander, 1958). Too much good doing will be countered by immoral choices until one feels they have to partake in moral behaviour again (Blanken, Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015; Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010). On the other hand, too many immoral choices will lead to one feeling obligated to do the right thing
(Conway & Peetz, 2012; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In this metaphor, moral balancing is, as the name states, about balancing morality and immorality actions (Hollander, 1958).
Moral Licensing
In the case of moral licensing, one will draw on previous good deeds to not partake in future moral activities (Sachdeva et al., 2009). According to Merritt et al. (2010), moral licensing can be seen as a process in which past good deeds timely allow the individual to loosen up on their civic duty to partake in helping behaviours. The individual accepts these immoral behaviours as one feels to have met their obligation to perform altruistic actions (Monin & Miller, 2001). The effects of moral licensing have been demonstrated through various studies and in multiple domains (Blanken et al., 2015; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2009). Of particular significance for our research question are those studies, which demonstrate the effects of moral licensing on the willingness to participate in subsequent traditional activism, namely: making a donation.
A study by Sachdeva et al. (2009) demonstrated that the way people present themselves by using morally or immoral words, affects their willingness to donate. According to their results, presenting yourself using moral words like ‘trustworthy’ or ‘honest’ creates an image of one being a moral person. This licensed participants to donate less to charity than their less moral counterparts. People, who described themselves using immoral words like ‘competitive’ or ‘selfish’, created an image an
immoral person. This had an instant negative effect on their donation behaviour. People were more willing to donate, and also donated more money, to the cause as a compensation for their immoral personalities. The latter refers to the moral cleansing effect, which we will discuss later in this theoretical.
The same effect was stated by Conway and Peetz (2012). In their study, they requested participants to recall a moral or immoral act and tested the effect of moral licensing on the willingness to partake in a moral activity such as donating money. Likewise with the study of Sachdeva et al. (2009), Conway and Peetz (2012) also demonstrated that an immoral image of oneself resulted in a higher willingness to make a donation and also to donate more money. This again demonstrates moral licensing effect.
The two studies on slacktivism described above tested moral licensing theory by having participants of their experiments creating a rather positive image of themselves (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Sachdeva et al., 2009). These moral images armored
participants with so-called ‘moral credits’ and allowed the participant to ‘slack’ on their subsequent moral duties like making a donation. Translating this to our study, suggests that partaking in an act of Slacktivism would function as a ‘moral credit’, which one could use to condone not partaking in traditional activism afterwards. An act of Slacktivism, according to critics of this concept, would therefore refrain people from making a donation, as it could be seen as a morally good deed in itself.
H1. Participating in an act of slacktivism, will decrease the likelihood of one being willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (moral
licensing).
As Sachdeva et al. (2009), Jordan et al. (2009), and Lee and Hsieh (2013) all state, performing or imagining good deeds makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviour in the future. However, none of the above indicates that the perceived costs of particular behaviour might lead to increased or decreased moral licensing. We suggest that partaking in a perceived high-cost behavioural act might result in one experiencing higher degrees of moral licensing, allowing the person to slack on future other high-cost behavioural acts or to slack on moral acts for a longer period of time. In the contrary, partaking in low-cost behavioural acts might allow the person to slack on future low-cost behavioural acts or to slack for a shorter period of
time. The feelings of being licensed to slack on future moral choices will therefore be influenced by the amount of effort one puts into his initial act of morality. Via this argumentation, we propose that different types of slacktivism might have different effects on the experience of moral licensing. Partaking in slacktivist acts that require little effort, compared to slacktivist acts that require more effort, will therefore generate less feelings of ‘slack’ for the partaker. Partaking in slacktivist acts that require more effort, in comparison to slacktivist acts requiring less effort, will hence generate more feelings of ‘slack’.
H2. The higher the act of slacktivism, the less likely one is willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (based on moral licensing).
Moral Cleansing
The opposite of moral licensing is known as moral cleansing (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) provide us with a clear-cut description: ‘’Moral cleansing is being altruistic after being selfish’’ (pp. 199-200). With this, one feels obligated to partake in moral decisions as he or she is out of, so-called, moral-credits (Blanken et al., 2015). Relating this to the bank account comparison, moral cleansing lets the individual feel as if one has to make up for past immoral deeds (Sachdeva et al., 2009). According to Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), future moral behaviour can
therefore be explained by looking at ones’ immoral choices made in the past. Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green and Lerner (2000) and Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) both show that talking about oneself in a negative manner creates an immoral image of the individual, which increases the willingness to make moral decisions in the near future. Sachdeva et al. (2009), Jordan et al. (2009), and Conway and Peetz (2012) also
demonstrated these effects for the willingness to make a donation to a good cause. Translating this to our study suggests that not partaking in an act of slacktivism will be perceived as not partaking in moral behaviour. As a result, one feels, as he or she has to make up for this in some way in order to break even (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Therefore, to balance ones ‘moral’ bank account, the individual will be more willing to partake in more traditional forms of activism.
willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (moral
cleansing).
Likewise with moral licensing, we also want to consider the influence of different types of slacktivism acts in terms of effort being made on the experience of moral cleansing. As our theorizing shows, moral cleansing occurs when the individual feels he or she has not acted morally enough in the past (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Not participating in an act of slacktivism, could be considered as not acting morally, and therefore lead to one feeling obligated to partake in subsequent moral actions (Blanken et al., 2015). However, with the lower forms of slacktivism requiring the least amount of effort possible, they will also generate the least feelings of ‘slack’. In this, feelings of morality can still be unsatisfied, leaving the individual with an urge to partake in future moral acts. We therefore theorize that moral cleansing might also occur when the individual partakes in lower forms of slacktivism.
H4. The lower the act of slacktivism, the more likely one is willing to participate in
traditional activism in terms of making a donation (based on moral cleansing).
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Where the concept of moral balancing can be used to explain why slacktivism might form a threat to actual activism, supporters of slacktivism base their arguments on the concept of cognitive dissonance theory (Conway & Peetz, 2015; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that we seek balance in life by maintaining consistency in our attitudes (Reed, Aquino & Levy, 2007). According to Festinger (1957), people experience an inner drive to keep their behaviours consistent. As not being consistent in the way we act leaves individuals with feelings of unpleasantness, perceived in congruency between ones behaviour will put the individual in a so-called state of cognitive dissonance (Effron & Monin, 2010; Conway & Peetz, 2015). A response to these feelings of unpleasantness will result in one trying to reduce this dissonance by changing his or hers behaviour (Reed et al., 2007).
In the case of supporting non-profits and social causes, cognitive dissonance theory can be used to explain why people would continuously support a social cause, once they have decided to do so (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Changing
behaviour by not supporting a social cause after do supporting a social cause would leave one with unpleasant feelings of tension (Waters, 2009). The outcomes of cognitive dissonance theory on the willingness to make subsequent meaningful contributions have been demonstrated in several studies (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2005) show a positive effect of partaking in a low-cost civic action on the willingness to buy an environmental friendly product to support that particular cause. The low-cost civic action in this study consisted of one agreeing or disagreeing with statements about a social cause. Their study provided evidence that behavioural consistency after a commitment extends to the domain of purchase intentions (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2005). That is, in order to be consistent with their expressed commitments, people are willing to modify their purchase intentions. This shows that people are willing to change their spending to keep behaviour consistent.
Other studies that look at the direct effects of cognitive dissonance theory on making a donation to a non-profit organization also provide evidence for the
application of this theory to this field (Lee & Hsieh, 2013; Schwarzwald, Bizman & Raz, 1983). Schwarzwald et al. (1983) demonstrate that people who sign a petition were more willing to donate than people who were not previously approached with the petition. Also, Lee and Hsieh (2013) found a moderate but positive effect for the willingness to keep behaviour consistent when one was asked to sign an e-petition and afterwards to make a donation.
Translating these findings to our research question might imply the following. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that people will be motivated to keep their future behaviours consistent with past behaviours (Festinger, 1957; Reed et al., 2007). Therefore, one can expect that partaking in an act of slacktivism, any for that matter, would lead to people being more likely to partake in subsequent civic actions like making a donation. Showing support for a social cause in terms of liking,
commenting, sharing, inviting friends to like a page, posting, and signing an e-petition could lower the threshold of one agreeing on making a donation to the social cause. Partaking in this subsequent civic action would allow the individual to keep his or her behaviour consistent, avoiding feelings of unpleasantness (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013).
H5. Participating in an act of slacktivism will increase the likelihood of one being
willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Cognitive
dissonance theory).
However, even though the results of Lee and Hsieh (2013) demonstrated a positive effect, their results also indicated the influence of high versus low-cost behaviours on the need to keep behaviour consistent. Meaning, participants were motivated to keep behaviour consistent when the subsequent request entailed the same amount of costs or risk (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Subsequent behaviour, which would be perceived as too high-cost in comparison with the slacktivist act, would not be performed (Cialdini & Ascani, 1976). An example of a subsequent act that is perceived as too high is taking part in a strike after signing an e-petition (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). The influence of high- versus low-cost subsequent requests was also demonstrated by Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2005). Their results show that the first request forms a benchmark for the individual to measure his or her future behaviours (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2005). If the second request would be perceived as being too effortful in comparison to the first request, one could no longer feel the urge to keep their behaviour consistent with past behavioural acts (Cialdini & Ascani, 1976). Another example can be provided by the study of Foss and Demspey (1979), who requested participants to donate blood after partaking in a small token of support by agreeing with statements. This request was perceived as too high-cost and therefore participants no longer felt the urge to keep their behaviour consistent.
These results demonstrate how the willingness to support a social cause can change after receiving a larger request, which is perceived as too cost or high-risk (Cialdini & Ascani, 1976; Foss & Demspey, 1979; Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2005). As mentioned before, we expect that different acts of slacktivism might have different effects on the decision to partake in traditional activism; based on the amount of effort they take. Therefore, one could also expect that the request to partake in the slacktivism acts that take the least amount of effort would form a risk for deciding to partake in more meaningful, and therefore more effortful, civic actions afterwards.
H6. The lower the act of slacktivism, the less likely one is willing to participate in
activism (based on cognitive dissonance theory).
The other way around, we can also theorize that the more effort one puts into his behaviour, the more likely he or she is to experience the need to keep his behaviour consistent. Via this argumentation, effortless behavioural acts are more likely to be experienced as rather meaningless behaviour and therefore might not leave a cognitive expression behind. We expect that the more effort one puts into their
behaviour, the more likely one will be to experience this as meaningful behaviour and also the need to keep this consistent. Specifically, the more effort an act of
slacktivism takes, the more likely the individual will be to align his future behaviour, and therefore partake in traditional activism.
H7. The higher the act of slacktivism, the more likely one is willing to participate in
activism in terms of making a donation (based on cognitive dissonance theory).
Cognitive dissonance theory can also explain why the decision to not partake in moral behaviour in the past influences future decisions to act immoral again (Festinger, 1957; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). As one strives to keep his behaviour consistent, not performing civic actions in the past may function as a benchmark for future
behaviour, therefore refraining the individual from partaking in future civic actions (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Deciding to perform a civic act would be inconsistent with past behaviour and result in feelings of discomfort (Festinger, 1957; Waters, 2009). To keep behaviour consistent, after deciding to not participate in an act of slacktivism, one will be more likely to not partake in subsequent traditional activism in terms of making a donation.
H8. Not participating in an act of slacktivism will decrease the likelihood of one being
willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Cognitive
dissonance theory).
As our theoretical shows, both theories, moral balancing and cognitive dissonance theory, can be used to demonstrate the effects of slacktivism on traditional activism. To give a clear overview of our opposing hypotheses, Table 1 shows how both theories are adopted to explain the negative and positive effects of an act slacktivism
on donating behaviour. Table 1
Overview of hypotheses arranged by theory
Moral balancing theory Cognitive dissonance theory
H1. Participating in an act of slacktivism,
will decrease the likelihood of one being willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Moral licensing).
H5. Participating in an act of slacktivism will increase the likelihood of one being willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Cognitive dissonance theory).
H2. The higher the act of slacktivism, the
less likely one is willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (based on moral licensing).
H6. The lower the act of slacktivism, the
less likely one is willing to participate in activism (based on cognitive dissonance theory).
H3. Not participating in an act of
slacktivism will increase the likelihood of one being willing to participate in
traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Moral cleansing).
H8. Not participating in an act of
slacktivism will decrease the likelihood of one being willing to participate in
traditional activism in terms of making a donation (Cognitive dissonance theory).
H4. The lower the act of slacktivism, the
more likely one is willing to participate in traditional activism in terms of making a donation (based on moral cleansing).
H7. The higher the act of slacktivism, the more likely one is willing to participate in activism in terms of making a donation (based on cognitive dissonance theory).
Method
Procedure
The aim of this study is to identify the potential negative or positive effect
Slacktivism on Facebook has on traditional activism in terms of making a donation. To test the hypotheses, an Internet-based survey was conducted. The participants were
approached on Facebook and received a personal message with an invite to
participate. Herewith, the sample was gathered by means of a convenience sample as the data is collected through the researcher’s personal and professional network. By clicking on a link (www.helplianneafstuderen.nl), the respondent was directed to a special page we had created for the questionnaire. The ‚click here’ button would direct the respondent to a Qualtrics survey. The questionnaire started with a brief introduction to the study, explaining there are no right or wrong answers and the estimated time it takes to fill in the survey. Also, participants were pointed out that participation was voluntary, they could stop any time they wanted, that results will be processed anonymously, and that this study is conducted under the guidelines of the Ethics Committee of ASCoR. The survey ended with acknowledgements and an opportunity for the participant to leave their e-mail address in case he or she would be interested in the results.
Respondents
In total, 264 people started the survey from which 208 people completely finished it. With our survey being spread on Facebook and people spreading our invitation to participate in their own personal networks, it is hard to estimate an exact response rate, as we cannot know for sure how many people were approached to participate. However, when looking at the respondents who started our questionnaire and who finished it, a response rate of 78.78% came out (N = 208). 63.9% of respondents was female (N = 133) and 36.1% was male (N = 75). Respectively, 52.4% of respondents were highly educated, followed by 30.8% average education and 16.8% low educated. Furthermore, 59.6% were currently studying, 36.1% was working, 2.4% was
unemployed, and 1.9% was retired.
Measures
Routing
The survey consisted of sixteen closed-ended questions. The questions were created around two well-known non-profits in the Netherlands: het Wereld Natuur Fonds (WNF) and Amnesty International. As the researcher independently conducts this study, there is no collaboration with any of the non-profits. To increase the realism of
our survey, we integrated a routing question in the survey. With this question, we asked respondents to make a choice between ten opposing statements (so five questions in total) on which one could answer by clicking on the statement that one agrees with most. The five statements on the left side indicated one having stronger feelings towards human oriented social causes. The five statements on the right side indicated one having stronger feelings towards saving the environment. An example of two opposing items on which the respondent was asked to indicate what is most important to them can be found in the following: ‘Social wellbeing of people - the maintenance of nature’. We expected that this would create a situation in which the participant is most likely to participate in slacktivism, as the topic falls within their area of interest. Based on the respondent’s answers, he or she was directed in the survey to the questions about Amnesty International or the questions about the WNF. Regardless of whether the respondent participated in the Amnesty questionnaire or the WNF questionnaire, all questions were prepared the same. To check whether or not the type of no-profit respondents saw, had an influence on our results, we computed the five questions and dummy-coded it into the new variable Route with 0 meaning ‘Amnesty International’ and 1 meaning ‘WNF’.
Slacktivism
An act of slacktivism was measured using three questions. At each question, the respondent viewed a Facebook post, containing an image and additional text, from either Amnesty International (Appendix 1) or the WNF (Appendix 2). The respondent was asked to imagine being logged into his or her own personal Facebook account and to indicate which type of act one would perform after seeing the Facebook post. One could answer on a seven-point scale containing the option to do nothing and our six slacktivist acts: liking, sharing, commenting, inviting friends to like a page, posting, and sign an e-petition. As one has the opportunity to engage in multiple slacktivist acts in real life, multiple answers were possible. The three separate questions were computed into a new variable called Slacktivism and used in further analyses to construct our proposed slacktivism measures. A principal component matrix with varimax rotation demonstrates the items to load on 1 component with an eigenvalue of 1.96 and a total explained variance of 65.37%. This scale proved to be reliable (α = .77, M = 1.80, SD = 2.03). It could be improved with 0,01 by deleting the second question of our variable Act of slacktivism. However, this improvement
was negligible and therefore we decided to use this variable to compose our Act of Slacktivism measures.
Effort of slacktivist acts
To check whether there is a gradation to be made in our included slacktivist acts in terms of effort being made, we asked respondents to rank all six behaviours from 1 (littlest effort) to 6 (most effort). To make sure respondents would make their own categorization and not simply agree with our suggested order, a randomization check was used to diverge the order of the ranking. According to our results, the slacktivist act ‘liking’ was most often appointed as taking the least amount of effort (M = 1.09, SD = 0.54). Signing an e-petition was most often appointed as the act that cost the most amount of effort (M = 5.23, SD = 1.08). In between are respectively
commenting (M = 2.64, SD = 0.97), sharing (M = 3.26, SD = 1.07), posting own message (M = 4.02, SD = 1.26), and inviting friends to like a page (M = 4.75, SD = 0.99). Figure 1 gives a visual presentation of the most common slacktivist acts gradation.
Figure 1 Gradations of slacktivsm acts in terms of effort made to perform
4 Measures for a Slacktivism Gradation Scale
As there appears to be a substantial difference in effort being made between just clicking on the like-button and actually generating your own content, we suggest that the amount of effort a slacktivist puts into their contribution may affect his or her decision to participate in traditional activism. However, no sufficient measure exists through which to study the effects of different types of slacktivism on a traditional form activism, namely making a donation. Therefore, this study tries to test and compare four alternative measures to constitute our proposed Slacktivism Gradation Scale. For one, by looking at the effects of participating in slacktivism, compared to not participating, on traditional activism. Second, without considering the ranking of our proposed gradations in slacktivist acts. In this composed scale, everything weighs
the same (1) so there is no gradation to be made. Third, by considering the individual differences in perception of effort being made with the six different slacktivist acts. And fourth, by considering the most common ranking of the slacktivist acts (Figure 1).
Measurement 1: the effect of participating in slacktivism on activism
To test the effect of participating in slacktivism, any for that matter, on the willingness to partake in traditional activism, we dummy-coded the Act ofSlacktivism variable with 0 meaning ‘not partaking in slacktivism’ and 1 meaning ‘partaking in slacktivism’. This variable ‘Slack Dummy’ can be used in further analysis to demonstrate whether the decision to simply partake or not to partake in slacktivism, any form whatsoever, will be a threat or a benefit towards traditional activism.
Measurement 2: the effect of Slack No Weight on activism
The measurement for an act of slacktivism that does not consider the ranking of our proposed gradations in slacktivism is called Slack No Weight. This new variable was constructed by giving each of the six slacktivist acts that constituted the variable Act of slacktivism the same weight, namely 1. By this, Slack No Weight does not consider the effects of our proposed gradations in different slacktivism behaviours. A principal component matrix with varimax rotation demonstrates the items to load on 1
component with an eigenvalue of 2.07 and a total explained variance of 69.13%. This scale proved to be reliable (α = .77, M = 1.80, SD = 2.03). It could be improved with 0.01 by deleting the second question of our variable Act of slacktivism. However, this improvement was perceived as negligible.
Measurement 3: the effect of Slack Relative on activism
The measurement for an act of slacktivism that takes the individual rankings
respondents gave in the ranking question into account is called Slack Relative. This new variable was constructed by multiplying the six slacktivist acts that constituted the variable Act of slacktivism with the individual rankings. By this, Slack Relative considers the effects of the respondents’ individual proposed gradations in different slacktivism behaviours. A principal component matrix with varimax rotation
demonstrates the items to load on 1 component with an eigenvalue of 1.96 and a total explained variance of 65.37%. This scale proved to be reliable (α = .74, M = 5.59, SD = 6.59). It could be improved with 0.03 by deleting the second question of our
variable Act of slacktivism. However, this improvement was also perceived as negligible.
Measurement 4: the effect of Slack Absolute on activism
The measurement for an act of slacktivism that takes the most common rankings respondents gave in the ranking question into account is called Slack Relative. This new variable was constructed by multiplying the six slacktivist acts that constituted the variable Act of slacktivism with the most common ranking as displayed in Figure 1. By this, Slack Absolute considers the effects of the respondents’ most common proposed gradations in different slacktivism behaviours. A principal component matrix with varimax rotation demonstrates the items to load on 1 component with an eigenvalue of 2.06 and a total explained variance of 68.51%. This scale proved to be reliable (α = .77, M = 6.53, SD = 7.83). This scale could be improved with 0.03 by deleting the second question of our variable Act of slacktivism. Again, this
improvement was perceived as negligible.
Willingness to donate: donation intent
The variable Donation Intent measured whether or not respondents were willing to donate to the non-profit after their act of slacktivism. One could answer on a seven-point scale from 1 (Totally disagree) to 7 (Totally agree). Respondents partially disagreed with the statement to be willing to donate to the social cause (M = 3.76, SD = 1.61).
Donating behaviour
As there appears a substantial difference between saying to act in a certain way
(Donation intent) and actually performing the act (Donating behaviour), we integrated a so-called donation button into our questionnaire. By clicking at the button, the respondent was told to be directed to the original website of the non-profit where he or she could make their monetary contribution. In fact, the donation button was a heat map question, which measured if one clicked on it or not. Donating behaviour was
therefore measured as a dummy variable with 0 meaning ‘not clicked on the button’ and 1 meaning ‘clicked on the button’. Out of 208 respondents, 21 have clicked on the button, compared to 187 respondents who did not click on the button. Out of 132 respondents who answered not being willing to donate, 11 still clicked at the donation button. From the 76 respondents who indicated being willing to donate, only 10 clicked at the button.
Gender, Education, Past Donation Behaviour
Gender was measured as a dummy variable with 0 meaning ‘male’ and 1 meaning ‘female’. As Education was measured as an ordinal variable, we first recoded the nine categories into three subgroups. Low Educated contained the categories no education, primary school, VMBO, and MBO. Medium Educated contained the categories HAVO and VWO. High Educated contained the categories HBO, Bachelor’s degree, and Master’s degree. To include this variable in further analyses, we constructed two dummy variables. Education (Average) with 0 meaning ‘no’ and 1 meaning ‘yes’ and Education (High) with 0 meaning ‘no’ and 1 meaning ‘yes’. The variable Past
Donation Behaviour measured whether or not respondents have donated to a non-profit in the past twelve months. One could answer on a seven-point scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Six times or more). Respondents indicated to have donated to social causes in the past twelve months between two to three times (M = 3.50, SD = 2.35).
Correlation of four Slacktivism Gradation Scales
We conducted a correlation analysis to see whether our different Slacktivism Gradation Scales measure the same. As Table 2 demonstrates, especially the Slack Relative -, Slack Absolute -, and Slack No Weight scales correlate exceptionally strong with each other. This indicates that the scale based on individual differences, the sale based on most common scores, and the scale that does not consider any gradations in slacktivist acts, correlate significantly so they are likely to measure the same concept. The correlations between Slack No Weight, Slack Relative, Slack Absolute, and the dummy-coded Slack variable are considerably lower but still relatively high. This indicates that Slack Dummy does not measure quite the same as the other three Slacktivism Gradation Scales. This can be explained by the fact that Slack Dummy measures partaking in behaviour by 0 (no) and 1 (yes). This variable
does not measure the six slacktivist acts separately and also does not imply a gradation in behaviours. The latter three do by complying these acts with the individual, most common, or equal weights that respondents gave to them as mentioned above.
Table 2
Correlation analysis for four scales of slacktivism acts
Correlation Slack No Weight Slack Relative Slack Absolute Slack Dummy Slack No Weight 1 Slack Relative .872** 1 Slack Absolute .906** .964** 1 Slack Dummy .676** .645** .634** 1 Note. N = 208. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
To test the validity of our composed scales we conducted a two-way analysis of variance with the recoded variable Education and the dummy-coded variable Gender as control variables. Research shows that women are more active on social media and also score higher on scales of altruistic behaviours and empathy than their male counterparts (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Hojat, Gonnella, Nasca, Mangione, Vergare & Magee, 2014). For this reason, we expect woman to be more active on slacktivism as well and therefore also score higher on our Slacktivism Gradation Scales. Also, research shows that education seems to have no influence on social media usage (Correa, Hinsley & De Zuniga, 2010). Apparently, the increasing popularity of social media goes through all layers of the population. Therefore, we expect education to not provide a significant outcome on our Slacktivism Gradation Scales. The results of the two-way analysis of variance should validate that women do participate in slacktivism more than men do and that education has no influence on ones score on our composed scale. Furthermore, the results of the three Slacktivism Gradation Scales provide us with some evidence for the validity of our scales (Table 3).
Table 3
Validation Slacktivism Gradation Scales and Slack Dummy
Anova
df E f p η2
Slack No Weight Education .2 202 .767 .466
Gender 1 202 8.664 .004** .041 Slack Relative Education 2 202 .329 .720
Gender 1 202 11.231 .001*** .053 Slack Absolute Education 2 202 .130 .878
Gender 1 202 11.495 .001*** .054 Slack Dummy Education 2 202 1.956 .144
Gender 1 202 14.368 .000*** .065
Note. N = 208.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
The result of the two-way anova with our Slack Dummy variable holds our
expectations, F (1, 202) = 14.37, p < .001, η2 = .07. Women are more likely to partake
in slacktivism acts (M = 0.73, SD = 0.45) than men do (M = 0.47, SD = 0.50). These results correspond with our expectation that women tend to be more active on social media and therefore also in slacktivism. As Table 3 shows, the three conducted two-way anova’s with our proposed slacktivism scales, with the first being Slack No Weight, F (1, 202) = 8.66, p < .01, η2 = .04, the second being Slack Relative, F (1,
202) = 11.23, p < .001, η2 = .05, and the third being Slack Absolute, F (1, 202) =
11.60, p < .001, η2 = .05, all showed a significant, big effect of gender on respondent’s
scores on the Slacktivism Scales. Women tend to score higher on our Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on individual rankings (M = 6.70, SD = 6.68) than their male counterparts (M = 3.63, SD = 5.99). Women also score higher on our Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on most common rankings (M = 7.94, SD = 7.95) compared to men (M = 4.03, SD = 6.98). As for our Slacktivism Scale based on no gradations of slacktivism acts, women again tend to score higher (M = 2.11, SD = 2.08) than men (M = 1.25, SD = 1.82). For all scales, education did not show to have a significant effect. As the creation of a Slacktivism Gradation Scale in this study is exploratory in nature, more validating should be done in future research. For now, we take this outcome as an indication of the validness of our scale to conduct further analysis. To check whether or not using no ranking (Slack No Weight), the individual rankings
(Slack Relative) or the most common ranking (Slack Absolute) would have an impact on further analysis; we included all three slacktivist scales in our study. We conducted several analyses to check which Slacktivism Gradation Scale can be used best to predict partaking in traditional activism.
Results
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with a two-step method was used to test the hypotheses. The variable Donation Intent was used as the dependent
variable and the variable Slack Dummy was entered as an independent variable in the first block. Past Donation Behaviour was centered and entered as independent
variable in the second block together with the dummy-coded variables Gender, Education (Average), Education (High) and the Routing variable.
Table 4
Effect slacktivism (yes/no) on donation intent
Donation Intent b se b* p Constant 3.055 .307 .000 Slack Dummy .865 .226 .260 .000*** Gender (1= female) .388 .227 .116 .090 Education (Average) -.027 .321 -.008 .934 Education (High) -.068 .296 -.021 .819 Past Donation Behaviour C .195 .047 .272 .000***
Route -.200 .254 -.052 .431 R2 .17 F(6,201) 6.87 (p < .001) Note. N = 208. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
The model turned out to be significant, F (6, 201) = 6.87, p < .001. Even though donation intent can be predicted by a mere 17% on the basis of participating in slacktivism, education, gender, past donation behaviour and the routing (R2 = .17), these results seem to be in favor of supporters of slacktivism (Table 4). An act of slacktivism, b* = .26, t = 3.83, p < .001, VIF = 1.12, shows a significant, moderately
strong correlation with intention to donate, when we control for the other variables in the analysis. Participating in any kind of slacktivism, compared to not participating in an act of slacktivism, will result in one experiencing 0.87 more donation intent (on a scale from 1 till 7). This allows us to confirm hypothesis 5 and 8 and refute
hypotheses 1 and 3. Furthermore, besides participating in slacktivism, past donation behaviour also demonstrated a significant, moderately strong correlation with the intention to donate, b* = .27, t = 4.16, p < .001, VIF = 1.03. An extra point on Past Donation Behaviour (on scale from 1 till 7) is associated with a 0.20 higher score on Donation Intent (on a scale from 1 till 7). Previous donation behaviour can therefore predict future donation behaviour.
We ran similarordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses for the Slacktivist Gradation Scales based on individual rankings, most common ranking, and without considering gradations between slacktivism acts (Table 5). The model using Slack Relative to predict donation intent demonstrated a significant effect, F (6, 201) = 6.87,
p < .001. Here, donation intent can be predicted by a mere 18% on the basis of
slacktivism based on the individual rankings, education, gender, past donation
behaviour and the routing (R2 = .18). Also, the model using Slack Absolute to predict donation intent shows a significant effect, F (6, 201) = 7.90, p < .001. Here, donation intent can be predicted by a mere 19% on the basis of slacktivism based on the most common ranking, education, gender, past donation behaviour and the routing (R2 = .18). The model using Slack No Weight to predict Donation Intent also shows
significant results, F (6, 201) = 7.90, p < .001. Here, donation intent can be predicted by a mere 16% on the basis of slacktivism without considering gradations in
behaviours, education, gender, past donation behaviour and the routing (R2 = .16). Comparing the three scales shows us that the Slack No Weight scale, which does not control for gradations in slacktivist acts, performs the least in predicting donation intent (R2
= .16). Also, this scales beta (b* = .23), is somewhat lower than the beta’s from the Slack Relative scale (b* = .28), and the Slack Absolute Scale (b* = .30). Even though the differences are minor, we take this as an indication that in order to predict donation intent you do need a scale that considers some kind of ranking in behaviours. As we are trying to point out which scale could best be used to predict traditional activism, we decided to conduct further analyses with the use of our slacktivism scales based on the individual rankings and the most rankings.
Looking at the model with Slack Relative as independent variable, an act of slacktivism based on the individual rankings shows a significant, moderately strong correlation with intention to donate when we control for the other variables in the analysis, b* = .28, t = 4.16, p < .001, VIF = 1.08. An extra point on our Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on individual differences (on a scale from 0 till 24) is associated with one being 0.07 more likely to donate (on a scale from 1 till 7). Looking at the model with Slack Absolute as an independent variable, an act of slacktivism based on the most common rankings also shows a significant, moderately strong correlation with intention to donate when we control for the other variables in the analysis, b* = .30, t = 4.49, p < .001, VIF = 1.08. An extra point on our
Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on most common rankings (on a scale from 0 till 32) is associated with one being 0.06 more likely to donate (on a scale from 1 till 7). The higher one scores on the Slacktivism Gradation Scales (both Slack Relative and Slack Absolute), the more likely one is to make a donation. This allows us to confirm hypothesis 6 and 7 and refute hypotheses 2 and 4.
Table 5
Comparison Slacktivism Gradation Scales’ predicting value of donation intent
Donation Intent
b se b* p
Slack Relative Constant 3.622 .293 .000
Slacktivism .069 .017 .282 .000***
Gender (Female) .404 .228 .120 .079
Education (Average) -.109 .327 -.031 .741
Education (High) -.111 .303 -.034 .715
Past Donation Behaviour .161 .048 .224 .001***
Route -.205 .259 -.053 .429
Slack Absolute Constant 3.674 .277 .000
Slacktivism .061 .014 .296 .000***
Gender (Female) .392 .222 .118 .079
Education (Average) -.135 .314 -.039 .668
Education (High) -.167 .290 -.052 .565
Past Donation Behaviour .170 .047 .236 .000***
Route -.142 .249 -.037 .569
Slack No Weight Constant 3.624 .282 .000
Slacktivism .183 .053 .231 .001***
Gender (Female) .464 .225 .139 .041
Education (Average) -.131 .320 -.038 .683
Education (High) -.135 .296 -.042 .649
Past Donation Behaviour .185 .047 .258 .000***
Route -.202 .256 -.053 .432
Note. N = 208.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
The effect of a Slacktivism Gradation Scale on donating behaviour
To check whether a higher score on our Slacktivism Gradation scales also lead to increased donation behaviour, we conducted two logistic regressions with a two-step method to test this hypothesis. These analyses might also help us to point out which scale can ultimately best be used to predict actual donating behaviour. The variable Donating Behaviour was used as the dependent variable. The slacktivism scales based on individual rankings (Slack Relative) and the scale based on most common rankings (Slack Absolute) were centered and entered as independent variables together with a centered version of Past Donation Behaviour and the dummy-coded version ofGender in two separate logistic regressions. The results from the logistic regressions are displayed in Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 6
Slacktivism Relative Gradation Scale’s prediction value of Donating behaviour
Donation behaviour
b se p
Slack Relative .075 .032 .020*
Gender (Female) -.349 .496 .482
Past Donation Behaviour .055 .106 .605
Constant -2.074 .382 .000
Cox & Snell R2 .028
Nagelkerke R2 .057 Chi-square(3) 5.821 (p = .121) Note. N = 208 * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Table 7
Slacktivism Common Gradation Scale’s prediction value of Donating behaviour
Donation behaviour
b se p
Slack Relative .080 .027 .003**
Gender (Female) -.447 .505 .377
Past Donation Behaviour .052 .107 .628
Constant -2.071 .388 .000
Cox & Snell R2 .043
Nagelkerke R2 .089
Chi-square(3) 9.132
(p = .028)
Note. N = 208
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Our analyses indicate significant results for both slacktivism scales when we do not control for gender and past donation behaviour. Predicting donation behaviour solely using the Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on individual rankings is significant, chikwadrant (1) = 5.06, p = .025. Also, the model that predicts donation behaviour solely using the Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on the most common ranking is
significant, chikwadrant (1) = 5.06, p = .025. However, when controlling for gender and past donation behaviour, only Slack Absolute demonstrates a significant effect, chikwadrant (3) = 9.13, p = .028. Participating in an act of slacktivism ranked according to the most common gradation shows to have a significant effect on the chance to click versus not click on the donation button, b = 0.08, p < .01. An extra point on our Slacktivism Gradation Scale based on the most common ranking (on a scale from 0 till 32) is associated with one being 8.4% more likely to click on a donation button and therefore to partake in actual donating behaviour. This indicates that our Slack Absolute Scale, now to be called Slacktivism Common Gradation Scale can best be used to predict actual donating behaviour.
Conclusion and recommendations
A change in the way people show their support for non-profits nowadays has had an influence on our understanding of the concept of activism (Castells, 2008). Whereas traditional forms of activism are defined as time- and money consuming activities (Martin, Hanson & Fontaine, 2007), modern Internet-based slacktivism is moreover understood as low-cost civic action. With slacktivism being intrinsically linked to certain features of social media platforms (Leonard, 2009), making an online contribution to a non-profit is therefore easier than ever before. Supporters of
Slacktivism actually perceive this low-cost behaviour characteristic as a positive asset (Lee & Hsieh, 2013; Vie, 2014). Accordingly, it helps to raise awareness amongst a wide range of people in a quick and far more effortless way then is the case with traditional forms of activism (Skoric, 2012; Vie, 2014). Critics however, are worried slacktivism will replace other forms of civic action like making a donation, as it might satisfy ones need to be a moral person (Morozov, 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009).
By means of an Internet-based survey, this study however refutes critics’ arguments by demonstrating a positive effect from slacktivism on traditional activism. It therefore contributes to supporters’ arguments based on previous work by Conway and Peetz (2015) and Kristofferson et al. (2014). More specifically, this study
demonstrates a positive effect from six types of slacktivism acts on Facebook (liking, sharing, posting, commenting, inviting, and signing an e-petition) on the willingness
