Framing immigration?
The effects of news framing on attitudes
toward Muslim immigrants in Denmark
Emma Pedersen Student ID: 11300345
Master’s Thesis University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Communication Master’s programme Communication Science Erasmus Mundus: Journalism, Media, and Globalisation
Supervisor: Rachid Azrout June 1, 2017
Abstract
This paper examines framing effects in relation to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in Denmark. Adding to existing theory, the study sets out to explore the moderating influence(s) of political knowledge and ideology. To test for effects, this study uses an online experiment with a split-sample (3 x 3 x 3) post-test-only design, where the participants (N = 432) are exposed to either one of the two framing conditions (solidarity vs. threat) or a control condition. The findings show that only the threat-frame has an attitudinal effect on the respondents. Overall, both political knowledge and political ideology have moderating effects in the group of high-knowledgeable, while the low-knowledgeable are not affected. Further, the results indicate reversed moderation effects of political knowledge in the solidarity-frame condition, where participants unexpectedly become more negative toward Muslim immigrants.
Introduction
Today, it is well-known that media play a role in the daily life of most citizens. Yet, how the media exactly influences people remains an area of interest in the scientific world. Especially during the past two decades, ‘framing’ is a topic that has gained attention among scholars worldwide. The concept has been discussed extensively in relation to various subjects, which makes it a topic of continuous relevance. Much research has found evidence for framing effects, while others criticise the idea of traditional framing theory (e.g.
Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Nevertheless, framing is a widely-recognised theory when speaking of opinions, feelings, and attitudes toward immigrants.
In Denmark, as in other Western countries, there has been a notable increase in immigration rates within recent decades, and since the 1960s, immigrants have mainly come from non-European countries (Anderson & Antalikova, 2014; Danmarks Statistik, 2016; Tawat, 2014; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). This makes immigration a topic of public interest, and as Dinesen et al. (2016) state: “how public opinion toward immigration is formed has become as relevant as ever” (p.55). Today, 12.3 percent of the total Danish population are
immigrants or born of immigrants, and the number is estimated to increase (Danmarks Statistik, 2016). The recent refugee crisis in Europe, caused by the civil war in Syria, is proof of the continuing societal importance of immigration issues and how immigrants are
perceived by the public.
Turning to academic literature, research has found that public perception on the importance of immigration increases concurrently with intensified news coverage of the topic (Dunaway, Branton & Abrajano, 2010; Dunaway et al., 2011). Further, it can be argued that the way media present and frame immigration affects how public attitudes on immigrants are shaped (Dunaway et al., 2011; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; van Klingeren et al., 2015). Despite these findings, though, Thorbjørnsrud (2015) points out that “it is striking that so few studies explore the relationships between news discourses and public opinion; we do not know how people actually regard the coverage of […] immigration” (p.775).
Inspired by these literary observations and the recent refugee crisis in Europe, this study aims to examine the relationship between media framing and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in Denmark. More specifically, the study sets out to explore whether exposure to specific frames influences people’s attitudes. Furthermore, literature also suggests a range of moderating variables, which might influence how individuals process framed messages (Lecheler, de Vreese & Slothuus, 2009). Studies particularly concerning framing of
immigrants have focused on moderators such as ‘political knowledge’ (e.g. Nelson, Oxley & Clawson) and ‘political ideology’ (e.g. Plener et al., 2017; Semyonov et al., 2006). Based on these findings, the following research question (RQ1) and sub-research question (RQ2) are proposed:
RQ1: How are attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in Denmark affected by framing in news
coverage?
Theoretical framework
Immigration in relation to media framing has, especially in recent years, been
academically approached with various methods and different focus. In the following section, the concepts of framing (effects), immigrants, and attitudes will be defined. These
conceptualisations will serve as theoretical groundwork for explaining which literary gaps the current study taps into. Based on this, three hypotheses are developed to state which general results that are expected from the study.
Framing effects
An extensive range of framing literature has suggested specific definitions of the concept. Many of them rely on Entman’s definition from 1993, stating that ‘framing’ is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Another definition is provided by Neuman et al. (1992), who identify ‘news frames’ as “conceptual tools which media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (p.60). This study relies on a combination of both definitions. Furthermore, literature often distinguishes between generic frames and issue-specific frames (Bos et al., 2011; Lecheler, de Vreese & Slothuus, 2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). While generic frames can be applied to a number of various topics (Lecheler, de Vreese & Slothuus, 2009, p.401), issue-specific frames “are built for a particular context, issue or event” (Bos et al., 2011, p.98). The latter is present in coverage of immigration, for which reason this paper focuses on issue-specific frames.
Framing effects are not only different from propaganda and regular persuasion; it should also not be confused with other types of mass media influences, such as agenda-setting
theory or priming effects (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997). Contrary to other forms of media influences, framing revolves around “the effects of media content rather than the mere
coverage of a problem” (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p.567). Framing can thereby be viewed as a selection process, in which media “select and emphasise certain aspects of reality” (Bos et al., 2011, p.98). In the context of this research, the topic of immigration can be covered with emphasis on different aspects. It can, for example, be covered with a frame presenting immigrants as a problem for society. In turn, it can also be covered with emphasis on the benefits immigrants have for society. While the act of ‘framing’ is created in the construction of messages about a topic, the ‘effect’ of framing appears in people’s opinion about this topic (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Thereby, the ‘effects’ of framing occur when a framed message influences the audience’s considerations (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).
Framing immigration
Numerous scholars have examined some of the prominent frames in media coverage of immigrants. First, studies have found that ‘human interest framing’ is frequently used in news reporting on immigrants (Aalberg & Beyer, 2015; Benson, 2013; Figenschour & Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Wright, 2002; Valkenburg, Semetko & de Vreese, 1999; van Gorp, 2005). According to Aalberg and Beyer (2015), “[human interest] news frames are typically constructed around a particularly telling story of an individual, and often include perspectives that take the immigrant’s own viewpoint, focusing on emotional aspects of human tragedy or (more seldom) stories with happy endings” (p.860). In that way, the ‘human interest’ frame portrays a more personalised angle of a story and is often used for stories with emotional appeals such as compassion. However, this frame is a generic frame, which can be applied to a range of issues, and it is thus not in line with the issue-specific focus of this study. But following the line of more positive and empathy-evoking frames, the
‘humanitarian frame’ (Benson, 2013; Garcia, 2008), and the ‘victimization frame’ (van Gorp, 2005; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007) are also established patterns in news coverage concerning immigrants.
Second, previous literature has found strong empirical evidence for the existence of a ‘threat frame’ in news about immigrants (Bos et al., 2016; Dunaway et al., 2011; Helbling, 2014; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Lawlor, 2015). More specifically, this frame has been identified as the ‘Islam-as-threat frame’ (Bos et al., 2016; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007), and the ‘threat of violence’ frame (Lawlor, 2015, p.923). In the same category of more negative emphasised frames are the ‘security frame’ (Helbling, 2014), the ‘economic
consequences frame’ (Neuman et al., 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Valkenburg, Semetko & de Vreese, 1999), the ‘infiltrators frame’ (Hochman, 2015, p.362), and the ‘intruder frame’ (van Gorp, 2005).
As this brief overview indicates, it is arguable that two dominating themes currently exist in immigration news, where “immigrants and minority groups are most often presented as either threats to the host society (…) or as (innocent) victims” (Bos et al., 2016, p.99). In accordance with these key-findings from prior literature, two overall issue-specific frames were developed for this study: threat-frame and solidarity-frame. The threat-frame represents the media frames that portray immigrants as a threat to individuals or society, while the solidarity-frame is a symbol of the media frames that portray immigrants in a positive or compassionate manner.
While this section has provided a modest insight into some of the existing frames in immigration news, it is worth emphasising that these various frames are presented at a general level, which does not reflect the entire complexity of them. The generic ‘human interest’ frame does, for instance, not necessarily reflect solidarity, since a negative story with a threat-frame potentially also can be presented from a ‘human interest’ perspective. Accordingly, the
‘economic consequences frame’ does not necessarily reflect a threat to society. Instead, it can also bear more positive meanings, such as economic benefits for society. For example, the studies by Valkenburg, Semetko and de Vreese (1999) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) operationalise the ‘economic consequences frame’ in terms of both financial losses and gains. However, the aim of the two frames (threat vs. solidarity) is to link findings from previous studies together in two overarching valence-frames; each reflecting one side of the spectrum. The concept of ‘valence’ originates in the idea that news frames “either contain arguments in favour or against an issue” (Bos et al., 2011, p.98).
As previously described, the overall mechanism of framing effects occurs when the audience changes considerations and evaluations about a given topic based on the specific ways the news emphasises and organises the information around the subject. In accordance with the two issue-specific valence-frames, the purpose is to either promote negative (threat-frame) or positive (solidarity-(threat-frame) attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. More specifically, exposure to the solidarity-frame is meant to generate feelings of solidarity and compassion toward immigrants, while exposure to the threat-frame is intended to generate negative and threatening evaluations of immigrants. Thereby, both frames will highlight certain
considerations in people’s minds – positive or negative – which eventually may lead to an attitude change.
Conceptualising immigrants
The word ‘refugee’ can be defined as “a person who has been forced to leave their country to escape war, persecution, or natural disaster” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-a). Meanwhile, the term ‘immigrant’ is “a person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-b). This study focuses on the term ‘immigrant’, since it aims to explore the full ethnic-population in Denmark, instead of limiting the investigation to
‘only’ refugees, who are newcomers or staying temporarily. To test the attitudes towards this whole group, the term ‘immigrant’ seems most suitable.
Several scholars have emphasised that immigrants in Northern and Western Europe mainly are identified by religion rather than ethnicity (Anderson & Antalikova, 2014; Brubaker, 2013; Hussain, 2000). Accordingly, Danish media coverage focuses almost solely on Muslims when covering ethnic minorities (Hussain, 2000). Meanwhile, other minorities, such as Jews or Hindus, are labelled by ethnicity rather than religion when portrayed in the media (Hussain, 2000). In connection hereof, previous studies have found that negative attitudes towards immigrants in Denmark most often derive from negative attitudes toward Islam (Anderson & Antalikova, 2014; Hussain, 2000, Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). According to Spruyt and Elchardus (2012), anti-Muslim feelings thus appear to be more widespread than general anti-immigration feelings.
On the contrary, a transnational experiment from 2014 has concluded that Muslim immigrants were not viewed more negatively than other immigrants (Strabac, Aalberg & Valenta, 2014). However, the authors state that respondents might automatically think of Muslims when answering questions about ‘immigrants’ in the first place, which is an
alternative explanation for the outcome. At the same time, the latest official numbers indicate that the current majority of asylum-seekers in Denmark originate from countries with Islam as main religion (Udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet, 2016). Based on these findings, the current study will be operationalised with explicit focus on ‘Muslim immigrants’. This will of course leave out a considerable part of the complete immigrant population in Denmark. Yet, the aim for this specification is to reach a more precise result. By defining a particular group of immigrants in Denmark, the questions become “clear and unambiguous” (Babbie, 2005, p.255), which is beneficial for the research’s outcome.
To sum up, the term ‘immigrant’ was chosen to reach a broader spectrum than the term ‘refugee’ would provide. To somehow specify this large group, immigrants with Muslim background were chosen, since this group is a minority often portrayed (negatively) in the Danish media (Hussain, 2000). The idea is thus to create coherency and prevent diversified understandings among the participants. A limitation of this choice is the possibility that the results will be influenced by religious intolerance. To comply with this in the best possible way, the stimulus material will not concern ‘Islam-as-threat’ content (Vliegenthart &
Roggeband, 2007). Hence, religion will only be used in the labelling of ‘Muslim immigrants’ as a consistent reference group in the questions.
Conceptualising attitudes
The noun ‘attitude’ can be defined as “a settled way of thinking or feeling about something” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-c). According to recent literature, there can be several explanations for how attitudes toward immigrants are shaped. First, studies have investigated how immigrant attitudes can be explained by psychological predispositions; such as the level of openness (Dinesen et al., 2016; Gallego & Pardos-Prado, 2014), in-group versus out-group feelings (Pehrson et al., 2009), and the distinction between us and them (Bos et al., 2016). Second, scholars address how real-world developments and immigration numbers directly affect attitudes toward immigrants; especially when it involves non-EU immigrants
(Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006). However, recent literature suggests that real-world numbers have little impact in Denmark (Manevska and Achterberg, 2013; van
Klingeren et al., 2015). In accordance with these indicators, it is notable that the Danish population tends to overestimate the actual number of Muslims in Denmark. The average public estimation of the Muslim population is 15 percent (Ipsos Mori, 2016), while only 4.1 percent of the Danish population is Muslim (Ipsos Mori, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2015).
Finally, studies examine immigration attitudes in relation to media coverage (Seate & Mastro, 2016) and framing theory (Bos et al., 2016; van Klingeren et al., 2015). Some scholars have found that the media has a determining influential factor in the shaping of immigration attitudes (Bos et al., 2016; Seate & Mastro, 2016), while others, such as van Klingeren et al. (2015), have found no or little evidence for such impact. However, these authors emphasise that further research needs to be conducted to measure this accurately; especially because they found an effect in the Netherlands and not in Denmark. They suggest an experimental research design as most suitable, since this method “relies on individual level media exposure measures” (van Klingeren et al., 2015, p.279). Therefore, the current study aims to address this gap in the existing literature. The purpose is thus to investigate the influence(s) of framing exposure on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in Denmark.
Hypotheses
In the present paper, the three concepts of framing, immigrants, and attitudes are all integrated in the process of framing effects. This study aims to measure framing effects through forced manipulation exposure, and the possible effect will be evaluated by looking at the participants’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants after exposure. In line with the research questions, I overall expect a framing effect from the experiment. Further, I expect moderating effects from political knowledge and political ideology.
Research has previously suggested that negatively framed messages have more persuasive effects on people than positively framed messages (Pfau et al., 2002; Shiv et al., 2004), and that that negative news in general gain more attention among the public (Pfau et al., 2002; Sheafer, 2007). For instance, Dunaway et al. (2011) found that negative news coverage of Latino immigrants in Louisiana, USA, had a bigger effect on public attitudes toward the minority than positive coverage. It is interesting to explore whether the hypothesis
from their research can be supported when applied to a new context of Muslim immigrants in Denmark. Based on this, the threat-frame is expected to have a bigger effect than the
solidarity-frame. In accordance with the two valence-frames presented in this study, it is expected that people are affected in the direction of the emphasis in the specific frame. Thereby, it is expected that participants exposed to the solidarity-frame will be more positive toward immigrants, and opposite, that participants exposed to the threat-frame will be more negative toward immigrants. These assumptions are summarised in the following hypotheses:
H1a: There is a threat-frame effect; generating negative attitudes H1b: There is a solidarity-frame effect; generating positive attitudes H1c: The threat-frame is more effectful than the solidarity-frame
Political knowledge has often been discussed as a moderating variable in relation to framing effects (e.g. Hansen, 2007; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). Some studies suggest that people with high political knowledge are more affected by framing than people with low political knowledge (e.g. Hansen, 2007; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). Overall, this assumption originates in the idea that that the high-knowledgeable have more knowledge before being presented to a framed message, for which reason they are better equipped to disregard it. In comparison, the low-knowledgeable do not have enough knowledge to counter-argue the frames when processing information (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012). Closely related are results from Dunaway et al. (2011), which indicate that public concerns about immigrants decline as the level of education and knowledge increases. Accordingly, findings from Manevska and Achterberg (2013) show that “ethnic threat is more present among low-educated individuals” (p.445). Based on these arguments, it is thus expected that potential framing effects are moderated by the level of political knowledge. More concrete, the assumption is that
participants with high political knowledge are less likely to be affected by the frames than participants with low political knowledge. Moeller and de Vreese (2015) define political knowledge as two dimensions: ‘factual knowledge’ and ‘structural knowledge’. This study will focus on the most commonly used dimension in academia, factual knowledge, which is understood as “surveillance knowledge such as correctly identifying political key players” (Moeller and de Vreese, 2015, p.4). Hence, the following hypothesis stems from the expectation that factual political knowledge has a moderating effect on the participants:
H2: People with low political knowledge are more affected by the frames than people with
high political knowledge.
Other studies have suggested that political orientation is a crucial factor when investigating attitudes toward immigrants (Plener et al., 2017; Semyonov et al., 2006). Therefore, the last hypothesis adds ‘political ideology’ to the previous hypothesis, and thus combines political knowledge and political ideology as moderating variables. By including both, this study differentiates from previous research, where the moderators only have been assessed in isolation. Thereby, the current study adds to the body of knowledge within the academic field of framing effects on immigration attitudes. An effect from political ideology alone is not hypothesised in this research. Instead, the combination of political knowledge and political ideology creates a three-way interaction with the dependent variable, which is the focus of the current study.
Hansen (2007) has conducted a study in Denmark, which showed that participants with high political knowledge were more affected by the frame that supported their predisposition. Conversely, he found that people with low political knowledge were more affected by the frame that contradicted their predisposition. In the current paper,
predispositions are determined by the participants’ political ideology. More precisely, political ideology is used as general measure for initial immigration attitudes of the
respondents. Here, I build on an ideological rationale that people with a right-wing ideology are more sceptic toward immigrants, and that they thus mostly favour the threat-frame. The other way around, I assume that people with a left-wing ideology are more welcoming toward immigrants, and that they thus mostly favour the solidarity-frame.
As stated in the second hypothesis, people with high political knowledge are expected to counter-argue the frames, while the low-knowledgeable are more likely to follow the premise of the frames. When including political ideology in this calculation, it is further hypothesised that high-knowledgeable are more likely to be affected by the frame they
already favour, since they have the necessary knowledge to argue against the opposing frame. In turn, it is hypothesised that low-knowledgeable are more easily convinced to move their initial evaluations in a different direction. Inspired by Hansen (2007), and based on the idea of a three-way interaction with two moderating effects, the last hypotheses were developed:
H3a: People with high political knowledge are more affected by the frame that supports their
political ideology.
H3b: People with low political knowledge are more affected by the frame that contradicts
their political ideology.
Methodology
To test the hypotheses and measure framing effects, this study uses an experimental research design. It is a suitable tool, since it allows forced exposure to be evaluated on individual levels, which creates strong internal validity. Conversely, the set-up of the experiment has lower external validity, as it is uncertain whether people would read the manipulated stories in real life (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011). The experiment is designed as a split-sample (3 x 3 x 3) post-test-only; comprising three conditions (solidarity-frame vs. control vs. threat-frame), political knowledge as moderator (low vs. medium vs. high), and political ideology as moderator (left-wing vs. center vs. right-wing). The data was conducted
online with a collection period of two weeks in the beginning of April 2017. On average, it took eight minutes to complete the experiment, and it was distributed through Facebook and e-mail, where snowball sampling was used.
Sample
Only completed responses were included in the analyses, which resulted in a final sample size of N = 432 respondents from Denmark, of whom 57% are females and 43% are male. Further, the ages span from 16 to 89 years with a mean age of 36 years (SD = 14.43). Out of the total sample, 18% of the respondents have finished upper secondary school, 20% has obtained a middle level vocational/technical education, and 58% of the respondents have completed a university degree. The last 4% of the participants have either finished elementary school or have no schooling at all. For ‘current occupation’, 55% of participants are
employed, 6% is self-employed, 26% is studying, 3% unemployed, and 10% is either retired or reported ‘other’. Even though the present sample is not broad enough to generalise from, the demographics display a rather varied and balanced representation of the Danish
population.
Procedure
The experiment consists of a pre-manipulation questionnaire and a post-test, where one condition (framing or control) is placed in-between.1 In the pre-manipulation
questionnaire, demographical questions, political ideology question, and political knowledge questions are asked. After being presented to one of the three conditions (for at least 20 seconds), the participants are presented to a post-test, which is measuring framing effects based on questions on Muslim immigration attitudes (dependent variable). Thereafter, all
participants answer two manipulation check questions, and finally, they are debriefed with specific emphasis on the nature of the research design and the partly fictional news story they were presented to.
Stimulus material
The experiment has three conditions: an immigrant story with a solidarity-frame (1)2, an immigrant story with a threat-frame (2)3, and a control condition concerning sports (3)4. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (1 = 33.1%, 2 = 33.6%, 3 = 33.3%). The randomization was successful in terms of age, education, knowledge, and ideology. However, the randomization check showed more women in the solidarity-frame condition (63% female vs. 37% male), and marginally more women in the threat-frame
condition (58% female vs. 42% male), while gender was equally distributed in the control condition (50% vs. 50%). Therefore, the variable ‘female’ was added to the models of analysis as control variable.
As previously described, the two framing conditions (1 and 2) are constructed as valence-frames with focus on emphasis-framing; meaning that both stories focus on the same multicultural neighbourhood in Denmark, but with emphasis on two different perspectives of the story – either solidarity or threat. The stimuli consist of short fictional texts concerning the neighbourhood ‘Gellerupparken’, which is an area frequently portrayed in the national media. Hence, the framework of the stories reflects reality. Still, the content in both conditions is manipulated, so that the two frames appear stronger. Furthermore, the two framing stories are written with a personal narrative. By doing so, the aim is to add personal meanings to the stories, and ideally make them more persuasive in terms of framing effects.
2 See appendix A1 (Danish) and A2 (English) 3 See appendix B1 (Danish) and B2 (English) 4 See appendix C1 (Danish) and C2 (English)
Research has previously pointed out that even minor differences in manipulated material can lead to mixed results (Han & Fink, 2012; Wojcieszak et al., 2015). In the
creation of the manipulations, I thus aimed at creating the two immigration stories as identical as possible. Therefore, the two stories have the same length (225 words in native language), same fictional author, and the same layout as newspaper articles. Further, no expert
statements are used in the stories, since that potentially could recall bias from participants. The control-group stimulus (3) concerns sports and is thus non-related to immigration. There are several considerations behind this choice. First, it is very challenging to create an immigrant story without any wording or phrasing in the direction of certain frames. A control condition about a completely different topic eliminates the possibility that the story in any way includes emphasis-framing. Second, the pre-manipulation questionnaire already addresses immigrants in the knowledge questions. Therefore, the respondents are already exposed to immigration content before the stimulus, and a story about immigration in the control condition is thus unnecessary. Lastly, with the sports story as control condition (instead of alternatively no story in the control-group), all respondents are introduced to the same procedure of the experiment, as described above. In that way, all participants answer based on the same overall context.
The three conditions were pre-tested twice before the distribution of the experiment. First, they were pre-tested on ten individuals, who answered the manipulation check
questions. Afterwards, the conditions were modified and again pre-tested on ten other individuals. This indicated successful manipulation of all three conditions, which was
confirmed by manipulation checks in the final sample. On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), respondents in the solidarity-frame condition reported that the story encourages
solidarity towards immigrants, to a higher extent than the participants in the threat-condition (M = 5.85 vs. M = 2.26; F(1,430) = 104.51, p < .001). On the contrary, respondents in the
threat-frame condition reported that the story portrays immigrants as a threat to the Danish society, to a higher extent than the participants in the solidarity-condition (M = 5.26 vs. M = 1.78; F(1,430) = 93.08, p < .001).In comparison, respondents in the control condition
reported the story low on both encouragement of solidarity towards immigrants (M = 1.91, SD = 1.37) and the portrayal of immigrants as a threat to Danish society (M = 1.56, SD = 1.18), which again indicates successful manipulation5.
Measures
The dependent variable, Muslim immigrant attitudes, is measured based on seven items: two questions on general feelings towards immigrants (e.g. what is your immediate feeling when thinking of Muslim immigrants in Denmark?), three questions on social distance (e.g. how willing are you to have a Muslim immigrant as your doctor?), and two questions about opinions on immigration restrictions in Denmark (e.g. to what extent do you think Denmark should restrict the number of immigrants entering the country?)6. To test whether the seven items measure the same thing, a principal components factor analysis was carried out. First, a rotated component matrix showed that all seven factors loaded high (Cronbach’s a = at least .80). Second, a varimax rotation indicated that five of the seven items loaded on one component (eigenvalue = 3.6), while the last two items loaded on a second component (eigenvalue = 1.4). However, both Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s Test show significant results (KMO = 0.75, p < .001), and moreover, the eigenvalue criterion shows that the point of reflection in the scree plot mostly loads on 1. Therefore, it can be argued that a reliable
5 In the comparisons between the control condition and the two framing conditions, Post Hoc Tests showed no significant difference between the solidarity-condition and the control condition in the threat manipulation question (p < .585). There was a marginal significant difference between the threat-condition and the control condition in the solidarity manipulation question (p < .095).
6 To match the other five questions, the two questions about restrictions were recoded, since they were phrased negatively. Therefore, the values (1-7) were recoded in reversed order (7-1).
correlation between all seven items is present. Besides, a reliability analysis indicated high reliability with all seven items included (Cronbach’s a = .80, M = 4.59, SD = 1.66), with no magnificent improvements if the two last items were omitted (Cronbach’s a = .82 and .83). Therefore, all items were included in the final analysis as measure for general immigration attitudes. The mean of the seven items was finally composed into one representative
dependent variable, Muslim immigrant attitudes, where 1 indicates negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, and 7 indicates positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The overall average for Muslim immigrant attitudes in the total sample was (M = 3.57, SD = 1.33), which is almost in the center of the scale.
To measure the moderator, political knowledge, five factual knowledge questions were asked as multiple choice with five options each. These questions were inspired by recent political developments in Denmark and the Danish Journalism School’s annual ‘knowledge test’, which is part of the entrance requirements. The first three factual questions are general political questions on three levels of difficulty (e.g. which of the following parties is not in the government?), while the last two questions are concerning knowledge on immigrants in Denmark (e.g. requirements for getting a citizenship). In that way, it is possible to identify both the levels of political knowledge and more immigrant-specific political knowledge. Based on all five factual knowledge questions, political knowledge was divided into three almost equal sized groups: low political knowledge (n = 143), medium political knowledge (n = 149), and high political knowledge (n = 140).
The second moderator, political ideology, is inspired by Plener et al. (2017) measured by asking the respondents to rate their general political ideology on a seven-point Likert-scale spanning from far left-wing (1) to far right-wing (7) with center in the middle (4). For the analysis, political ideology was also divided into three groups: left-wing (n = 223), center (n = 71), and right-wing (n = 138). Alternatively, this moderator could be divided into two groups
only (right-wing vs. left-wing) with a median-split, since this would be beneficial for having somewhat equal-sized groups of respondents. Nevertheless, this approach would place respondents from the center in the right-wing category, which is not fully representative of what the participants reported. Therefore, it was disregarded, and political ideology was instead divided into three uneven, but representative, groups.
Data analysis
To examine the first hypothesis (H1a, H1b, H1c & H2), a two-way ANOVA was conducted to test for main effects of manipulations and comparisons of means through planned contrasts; meaning that the results from each framing conditions individually were compared to the results of the control-condition. To answer the second hypothesis (H2), the moderator, political knowledge, was added to the comparative ANOVA analysis. Again, I tested for main effects of the manipulations by means of planned contrasts, and examined the interaction between the manipulations and political knowledge. To test the three-way
interaction in the third hypothesis (H3a, H3b), a three-way ANOVA was carried out. Here, the two moderators, political knowledge and political ideology, were both included in the univariate analysis. Planned contrasts were again used to compare the results of the two framing conditions with those of the control-condition.
Results
The results from the first two-way ANOVA is presented in Figure 1, where the estimated marginal means of Muslim immigrant attitudes across the three conditions are displayed. The analysis showed a significant difference in the mean of Muslim immigrant attitudes between the threat-frame condition and the control-condition (Mdiff. = 0.31, SE = 0.15, p < .039). This indicates a framing effect in the threat-frame condition, for which reason
H1a is supported. There was no significant difference in the mean of Muslim immigrant
attitudes between the solidarity-frame condition and the control-condition (Mdiff. = 0.10, SE = 0.15, p < .579), which indicates no framing effect in the solidarity-frame condition, and H1b is thus not supported. Following these findings, hypotheses H1c is supported, since a bigger attitudinal difference is found in the threat-frame condition than in the solidarity-frame condition.
Figure 1: Mean value of dependent variable by condition.
The second two-way ANOVA, including political knowledge, showed a significant difference in the mean of Muslim immigrant attitudes in the group of high political
knowledge in the threat-frame, in comparison to the control-condition (Mdiff. = 0.77, SE = 0.27, p < .004). Meanwhile, there was marginal statistical significance between the solidarity-frame and the control-condition in the same group of high-knowledgeable (Mdiff. = 0.51, SE = 0.27, p < .052). However, the participants in the solidarity-frame condition reported
marginally more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, in comparison to the control-condition, as displayed in Figure 2. This finding indicates a reversed moderation effect of
3,39 3,71 3,62 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8
Threat-frame Control-condition Solidarity-frame Mean of immigrant attitudes (DV)
political knowledge. In turn, no attitude change was found in the group of low political knowledge, since there were no significant differences from the control-condition in neither the threat-frame condition (Mdiff. = 0.11, SE = 0.27, p < .684) or in the solidarity-frame condition (Mdiff. = 0.11, SE = 0.27, p < .690). These findings contradict the expectation of the second hypothesis, where the group of low-knowledgeable was predicted to be stronger affected by the frames than the group of high-knowledgeable. Therefore, H2 is not supported.
Figure 2:
Mean value of dependent variable by condition and one moderator (political knowledge)
In the three-way ANOVA, the only significant results were found in the group of high political knowledge and left-wing ideology (see Table 1). Following H3a, it was expected that this group of participants would be more affected by the solidarity-frame, which is in favour of their predispositions. Accordingly, it was expected that they would be less affected by the threat-frame condition, since it contradicts their predispositions.
3,49 3,39 3,28 3,66 4,17 3,4 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 Solidairity-frame Control-condition Threat-frame High political knowledge Low political knowledge
Table 1: Mean value of dependent variable by condition and two moderators (political knowledge and political ideology). Numbers in brackets represent the standard error (SE).
* = Significant difference (p < .05) in mean value compared to control-condition.
As displayed in Table 1, the comparisons to the control-condition showed effects both in the solidarity-frame condition (Mdiff. = 0.82, SE = 0.33, p < .012) and in the threat-frame condition (Mdiff. = 0.77, SE = 0.36, p < .030). As hypothesised, these numbers indicate a slightly higher significance in the solidarity-frame, even though significant effects were found in both framing conditions. Contrary to the expectation, however, the solidarity-frame
generated more negative feelings in comparison to the control-condition (M = 3.95 vs. M = 4.77, SE = 0.33). Therefore, an effect was found, but since it occurred in an unexpected direction, the hypothesis is not supported. In accordance with H3b, it was expected that people with low political knowledge would be more affected by the frame that contradicts their political ideology, because they were not expected to have enough knowledge to
counter-argue the frames. Since no significant effects were found in the group of participants with low political knowledge across the conditions, this hypothesis is not supported.
Political ideology
Left Right
Political knowledge Low High Low High
Framing condition Solidarity 4.12 (0.26) 3.95* (0.22) 3.12 (0.30) 2.87 (0.41) Control 3.61 (0.28) 4.77 (0.24) 3.35 (0.34) 3.11 (0.31) Threat 3.68 (0.25) 3.99* (0.26) 3.10 (0.29) 2.70 (0.30)
Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this study was to explore framing effects in respect of news about immigrants in Denmark. The research questions addressed how attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are affected by news framing (RQ1), and questioned the moderating roles of political knowledge and ideology (RQ2). These two research questions were accompanied by three hypotheses, which were tested in an experimental design. In the experiment, there were two framing conditions (solidarity vs. threat) and one control-condition.
The first hypothesis (H1a, H1b, H1c) was developed from the assumption that there would be an overall framing effect, and further, that the threat-frame would have a larger effect than the solidarity-frame. As expected, there was an effect in the threat-frame
condition; generating negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Surprisingly though, the analysis did not show any framing effect in the solidarity-frame condition. Therefore, the threat-frame had the strongest effect on the participants, as hypothesised. These results are in line with findings from Dunaway et al. (2011), who also found that negative news coverage of minorities is more effectful than positive coverage. Literature has also underlined how Danish news about immigrants are strongly dominated by negative stories (Hussain, 2000; van
Klingeren et al., 2015). Thus, it is especially noteworthy that only the negative frame had an effect in this study. Other empirical research shows that people generally are relying more on the media than on actual events and economic circumstances when forming opinions about immigrants (Sides & Citrin, 2007; van Klingeren et al., 2015). In a broader perspective, the finding is thus of societal relevance, since it suggests that negative news content influences more than positive.
The bigger effect in the negatively loaded threat-frame can of course be influenced by the labelling of Muslim immigrants in the experiment. For instance, Anderson and Antalikova (2014) found that attitudes in Denmark were more negative “when the target was framed as a
Muslim, rather than an immigrant” (p.593). However, since other studies have pointed out that especially non-whites often are portrayed negatively in the media (Dunaway et al., 2011), and that Danish news coverage almost solely is focusing on non-European immigrants
(Hussain, 2000), it is both relevant and realistic to examine attitudes toward this particular minority. Furthermore, other indicators are of probable importance when investigating attitudes in relation to immigration framing. For instance, Sides and Citrin (2007) mention that conflicting events, such as the Mohammad cartoons, are part of the reason why Danish people might have difficulties accepting Muslim immigrants. It is, however, worth noticing that negative news coverage of Muslim immigrants also peaked in the aftermath of this event (Sides & Citrin, 2007; van Klingeren et al., 2015). For future research, it would thus be relevant to make comparisons of how media framing and real-life events affect attitudes toward (Muslim) immigrants.
The second hypothesis (H2) was built on the expectation that participants with low political knowledge would be more affected by the frames than participants with high
political knowledge. The analysis showed a marginal effect in the high-knowledgeable group, while there were no significant effects in the low-knowledgeable group. Therefore, there was a moderating effect of political knowledge, but in an opposite direction than hypothesised. Furthermore, the marginal significant effect in the solidarity-frame condition generated more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, while it was expected that the attitudes would follow the positive valence of the frame. This finding indicates a reversed moderation effect.
In the third hypothesis, it was expected that people with high political knowledge would be more affected by the frame that supports their political ideology (H3a). In turn, it was expected that people with low political knowledge would be more affected by the frame that contradicts their political ideology (H3b). The analysis did not show support for these hypotheses. The only significant findings occurred in the group of high-knowledgeable and
left-wing ideology, who were slightly more affected by the solidarity-frame than the threat-frame. However, the solidarity-frame again generated more negative attitudes, which goes against the valence of the frame and implies reversed moderation effects.
Both in the second and third hypothesis, only participants with high political
knowledge were affected. Besides, in both analyses there were reversed moderation effects of political knowledge in the solidarity-frame condition. There are several factors that might explain these unexpected findings. In the present research, the moderating influence of political knowledge works opposite than first hypothesised. Contrary to this finding, previous studies have emphasised that people with high political knowledge generally are less affected by framing, because their predispositions “act as a filter for the effect of the argument” (Hansen, 2007, p.391). In that way, research suggests that people with high political knowledge “are more likely to be better informed about policy views and more able to distinguish and integrate relevant pieces of information” than people with little political knowledge (Milesi, 2016, p.259). Turning this theory around, an alternative explanation can be that since the high-knowledgeable better understand and process information, they are also more likely to be affected by the frames, simply because “only individuals with higher levels of knowledge can comprehend and integrate a framed message into their mental stockpile” (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011, p.966). This line of thought on moderating effects of political knowledge follows prominent scholars in the field, who also believe that high-knowledgeable are most influenced by media effects (e.g. Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997).
Second, the participants with high political knowledge generally reported more negative attitudes, regardless of which frame they were exposed to. Since only the threat-frame had an overall effect, it indicates that the solidarity-threat-frame did not work as projected. However, since the manipulation checks showed that the solidarity-frame successfully
emphasised solidarity, an alternative explanation might be found in the multicultural area ‘Gellerupparken’, which serves as the overall context of the two framing stories. Since this area has been covered extensively by the media over the years, it might automatically evoke certain feelings or opinions in the minds of especially the high-knowledgeable, who often follows the news, and therefore might have more prior knowledge about this multicultural area.
As mentioned above, research emphasises that Danish news mostly cover immigrants in a negative light (Hussain, 2000; van Klingeren et al., 2015). Therefore,
high-knowledgeable participants might be negatively primed to the neighbourhood prior to the framing exposure in this study. Hence, the high-knowledgeable participants already have an integrated opinion about the framed topic, for which reason the positive solidarity-frame does not have an effect. This suggestion leads to more general criticism on framing theory. The concept of framing is often criticised for being confused with other theories on
communication influences; such as priming and agenda-setting (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016; Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997). Priming is identified as “the process of activating a particular construct in memory resulting in that construct becoming more available and influential in subsequent thinking” (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016, p.12). Hence, this concept is especially relevant to consider in relation to this study, since it is a possibility that the effects originate in priming theory rather than in framing theory. In light of these findings, the content in the manipulated stories could be reconsidered for future studies.
Third, a potential limitation can be addressed in relation to the questions for measuring political knowledge, which may have been constructed easier than intended, so that the level of political knowledge generally was measured too high. Here, the distribution through snowball sampling can be problematic. Yet, since political knowledge was split into three
almost equal-sized groups for the analysis, there was a clear division in the levels of knowledge. In comparison, the second moderating variable, political ideology, was not divided into equal-sized groups. It is noteworthy that there was an effect in the larger left-wing group (n = 223), while no significant effects were found in the considerably smaller right-wing group (n = 138). Since the right-wing group is noticeably smaller than the left-wing group, the non-significant findings in the former can possibly be explained by the small sample.
Some general limitations of this study must be addressed. Regarding the research design, it would have been ideal with both a pre-test and a post-test to measure actual attitudinal effects before and after stimulus exposure. Although, this could potentially compromise with the number of respondents in the experiment. Some interesting insights might also have been retrieved from additional open questions in the post-test, such as ‘thought-listing’. To test for more nuanced results in the analyses, an opportunity could be to divide the dependent variable, Muslim immigrant attitudes, into three dimensions: general feelings, social distance, and opinion on restrictions. Overall, this study is not broad enough to generalise from, and it should thus be considered a modest contribution to further research. In a future perspective, it would, for example, be interesting to conduct an experimental framing-research in Denmark, where attitudes toward immigrants of various ethnicities and backgrounds could be examined and compared. Ultimately, by combining the two moderators of political knowledge and political ideology in a three-way interaction, this research offers unique insights into the field of moderating effects in framing theory. Thereby, this study adds to the growing body of literature on framing effects in relation to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.
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Appendix A1: Solidarity-frame story in Danish (condition 1)
Lise har boet I Gellerupparken i 45 år:
»Vores mangfoldige fællesskab er fantastisk«
By Kasper Linnestrøm k.linnestroem@outlook.com
Det er nu 50 år siden, at den største boligafdeling i Danmark, Gellerupparken, blev bygget. Gennem årerne har et stigende antal ikke-vestlige indvandrere bosat sig i området, som ligger i Brabrand ved Aarhus, og i dag er beboerne i Gellerupparken sammensat af mere end 80 forskellige nationaliteter.
I de senere år er kvarteret blevet fremhævet som et pragteksempel på yderst vellykket integration, blandt andet på grund af mange naboaktiviteter. Lise Jørgensen, 67 år og pensioneret overlæge, har boet i Gellerupparken siden starten af 70’erne.
»Vi har et fantastisk naboskab her i området, og det er helt sikkert grunden til, at jeg aldrig kommer til at flytte herfra,« siger hun.
Lise har gennem årene oplevet, hvordan kvarteret har ændret sig på grund af det stigende antal muslimske indvandrere. For eksempel har den multikulturelle shopping-basar »Bazar Vest«åbnet og tilføjet nye handlemuligheder.
»Den lokale basar er det sociale samlingspunkt for hele kvarteret, hvor etnisk-danskere og indvandrere mødes over lækker mad,« siger hun med et smil og fortsætter:
»Det er så spændende at få åbnet sine øjne for anden mad og andre kulturer. Jeg er helt overbevist om, at kulturel mangfoldighed beriger vores samfund. I bund og grund er vi jo alle blot mennesker, uanset hvor i verden vi er født.«
Appendix A2: Solidarity-frame story in English (condition 1)
Lise has been living in Gellerupparken for 45 years:
»Our culturally diverse community is fantastic«
By Kasper Linnestrøm k.linnestroem@outlook.com
It is now 50 years since the biggest residential area in Denmark, Gellerupparken, was constructed. Over the years, a growing number of non-Western immigrants has been settling in the area, which is located in Brabrand in the Western part of Aarhus. Today, the residents of Gellerupparken consist of more than 80 different nationalities.
In the last few years, the neighbourhood has been highlighted as a magnificent example of successful integration due to neighbourly activities. Lise Jørgensen, 67 years old and retired chief surgeon, has been living in Gellerupparken since the beginning of the 70s.
»We have a fantastic sense of community in this neighbourhood, and it is the sole reason why I’ll never leave this place,« she says.
Through the years, Lise has experienced how the neighbourhood has changed due to the rising number of Muslim immigrants. For instance, the multicultural shopping bazaar»Bazar
Vest« has opened and added new shopping opportunities to the area.
»The local bazaar is the social hub of the community, where ethnic Danes and immigrants
meet and socialise over delicious food,«she says with a smile and continues:
»It is so exciting to get your eyes opened to different kinds of food and other cultures. I am completely convinced that cultural diversity enriches our society. In the end, we are all just humans, despite where in the world we were born.«
Appendix B1: Threat-frame story in Danish (condition 2)
Lise har boet i Gellerupparken i 45 år:
»Indvandrerne tvinger mig til at flytte«
By Kasper Linnestrøm k.linnestroem@outlook.com
Det er nu 50 år siden, at den største boligafdeling i Danmark, Gellerupparken, blev bygget. Gennem årerne har et stigende antal ikke-vestlige indvandrere bosat sig i området, som ligger i Brabrand ved Aarhus, og i dag er beboerne i Gellerupparken sammensat af mere end 80 forskellige nationaliteter.
I de senere år er kvarteret blevet fremhævet som et eksempel på ekstremt mislykket
integration, blandt andet på grund af ghettodannelse og kultursammenstød. Lise Jørgensen, 67 år og pensioneret overlæge, har boet i Gellerupparken siden starten af 70’erne.
» Området er ikke det samme efter så mange muslimske indvandrere har slået sig ned her. De ødelægger kvarteret, og jeg føler mig snart tvunget til at flytte,« siger hun.
Lise har gennem årene oplevet, hvordan kvarteret har ændret sig på grund af det stigende antal muslimske indvandrere. For eksempel har den multikulturelle shopping-basar »Bazar Vest«åbnet og erstattet tidligere butikker.
»Den lokale basar er endnu et eksempel på, hvordan andre kulturer har overtaget området. Jeg kan ikke en gang købe spegepølse eller rugbrød i mit eget nabolag mere,« siger hun frustrerende og fortsætter:
»De har en helt anden kultur og respekterer overhovedet ikke de danske værdier. Det er trist, at det Danmark, jeg kender, bliver overtaget af folk, som udnytter samfundet.«
Appendix B2: Threat-frame story in English (condition 2)
Lise has been living in Gellerupparken for 45 years:
»The immigrants force me to move«
By Kasper Linnestrøm k.linnestroem@outlook.com
It is now 50 years since the biggest residential area in Denmark, Gellerupparken, was constructed. Over the years, a growing number of non-Western immigrants has been settling in the area, which is located in Brabrand in the Western part of Aarhus. Today, the residents of Gellerupparken consist of more than 80 different nationalities.
In the last few years, the neighbourhood has been highlighted as an example of extremely failed integration due to ghettoization and cultural clashes. Lise Jørgensen, 67 years old and retired chief surgeon, has been living in Gellerupparken since the beginning of the 70s.
» The area is not the same after so many Muslim immigrants have settled here. They destroy the neighbourhood, and I feel that I’m forced to move,« she says.
Through the years, Lise has experienced how the neighbourhood has changed due to the rising number of Muslim immigrants. For instance, the multicultural shopping bazaar»Bazar
Vest« has opened and replaced previous stores.
»The local bazaar is another example of how other cultures have overtaken the area. I
cannot even buy salami or ryebread in my own neighbourhood anymore,«she says
frustrated and continues:
»They have a completely different culture and do not respect the Danish values at all. It is sad that the Denmark I know is being taken over by people, who exploit the system.«
Appendix C1: Control story in Danish (condition 3)
Racerkører Kevin Magnussen styrtede i Melbourne
By Kasper Linnestrøm k.linnestroem@outlook.com
Kevin Magnussen var naturligt skuffet efter sit løb i Melbourne, hvor han måtte udgå på 51. omgang ud af 57.
»De her ting sker i ræs. Og jeg vidste, jeg var nødt til at satse i starten, og det betalte sig
ikke. Forhåbentlig starter vi bedre næste gang, så vi ikke behøver at sætte det hele på spil i
første sving,« siger Magnussen efter løbet.
Selv om weekenden ikke endte med en podieplads for danskeren, kan Kevin Magnussen alligevel se lyspunkter:
»Bilen er hurtig, og det er sindssygt positivt. Det har været en fornøjelse at køre denne her
weekend. Det var ærgerligt, at vi ikke fik noget ud af det overhovedet som team denne her
weekend,« siger han.
Allerede på 15. omgang måtte Magnussens teamkammerat Romain Grosjean parkere bilen i pitten. Franskmanden imponerede ellers stort i kvalifikationen lørdag med en sjetteplads, men problemer med Haas-raceren tvang ham ud af løbet.
