Can Sartre's for-itself be reduced to a metaphysics of presence?

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MA Philosophy

Master’s Thesis

Can Sartre’s for-itself be reduced to a metaphysics of presence?

by

Oliver Beck

August 2017

Supervisor: Dr. Christian Skirke

Second Reader: Dr. Josef Früchtl

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The condemnation of phenomenological accounts due to their concealed metaphysical presuppositions was a process infamously championed by Derrida. Echoing Heidegger’s ‘destruktion’, Derrida turns this critical approach towards phenomenology itself, which he believes to be internally contradicted by the metaphysical concept of presence. Among the phenomenologists with whom Derrida takes issue, Sartre is granted the least philosophical credibility, being dismissed off-hand as a metaphysician. Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness proves to be the primary target of Derrida’s considered criticism; a tacit metaphysics of presence by Derrida’s understanding. Regarding the deconstruction of Husserl, there exists a sizeable body of literature; with respect to Derrida’s take on Sartre, there is little to be found. The lack of engagement between the two thinkers leaves much room for speculation and analysis, as this thesis will demonstrate. I aim to reassess Derrida’s critique of phenomenology through a two-stage rehabilitation of Sartre’s position.

The first stage will provide a thorough analysis of Husserl’s time-consciousness, and assess its ability to resist Derrida’s critique. As stated, Derrida’s most precise articulation of metaphysical presence is directed towards Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, and, to the corresponding transcendental ego. In charging Husserl’s conception of the subject, he identifies flaws within the temporal structure Husserl proposes, specifically, contradictory temporal dimensions contained in the now-moment. I propose to demonstrate that this critique does not succeed as Derrida intended, with reference to John Brough’s defence of Husserl’s position. Understanding Derrida’s deconstruction, as well as a robust defence of Husserl, will provide a basis from which to begin an original assessment of Sartre’s subject and its own temporal relations.

In the second stage, I shall analyse Sartre’s account of temporality, citing important

developments from Husserl’s theory, vital to understanding Sartre’s conception of the subject as nothingness. My analysis will demonstrate that Sartre’s subject equally resists the critique of a metaphysics of presence, with even greater force than his predecessor. Gary Gutting remarks that, “A critique in terms of presence would be effective only if it could come to terms with Sartre’s transformation of Descartes’ cogito into a non-substantial, non-self-identical nihilation of being. The fascinating question, which it would have been very exciting and informative to see Derrida take up, is whether Sartre’s conception of consciousness in terms of negation could be reduced to an instance of metaphysical presence.” 1

This is

precisely the area of inquiry I shall expand upon, illustrating that Sartre’s temporal account of the subject anticipates the deconstructive arguments of Derrida directed at Husserl, and explicitly avoids them. Beyond simply avoiding Derrida’s critique, there are surprising similarities between Derrida and Sartre’s positions, brought to light by Christina Howells’ interpretation; I shall be arguing that this similarity extends to Sartre’s conception of temporality.

Time-consciousness is considered by Husserl to be “the most difficult of all phenomenological problems”2

and “perhaps the most important in the whole of phenomenology”3

; it is in accordance with this claim that I consider subjectivity and

temporality to be of equal importance, and fundamentally connected. Time is the cornerstone

1_{Gutting G. Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960, p. 76}

2_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.39 – p. 286} 3_{Ibid., No.50 - p. 346}

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of Derrida’s critique, and is appreciated by both Husserl and Sartre to be essential in

understanding consciousness and subjectivity. I shall explore how both Sartre and Husserl are able to avoid charges of metaphysical presence in their own distinct ways, and thereby, make the claim that Sartre’s subject offers a position of unique philosophical interest, unjustly overlooked by Derrida. In the course of my discussion, I shall look at the motivating factors and goals of each thinker, considering the respective influence of Heidegger, and take into account a variety of contemporary interpretations, observing the stylistic differences in each approach. I shall begin by examining the salient points of Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness, tracing its developments and assessing its merits as I proceed, with a view to assessing the supposed internal contradiction of presence.

2. Husserl’s account of time-consciousness

Husserl puts forward a rigorously detailed conception of time-consciousness, in keeping with his phenomenological style and methodology. Unlike his contemporaries, Heidegger and Sartre, Husserl is not primarily concerned with questions regarding the nature of ‘being’ in his phenomenological inquiry. Instead, he seeks to find truths in our experience, and believes phenomenology is the best way to access truth. He finds that “pure phenomenology is the science of pure consciousness.” 4

and seeks to establish a rigorous science of consciousness, under the operation of the phenomenological reduction.

His account of time-consciousness developed over subsequent years, with his writings on time scattered across numerous texts. I intend to cover his development across these texts, in order to establish exactly what Husserl is doing with his theory of time-consciousness, but also, what he is not, equally important in understanding his often-confusing enterprise. I shall later be investigating the relation between his conception of the transcendental ego and time-constituting consciousness, as the latter is to be considered constitutive of the former. Firstly, I shall look at the phenomenological reduction, which shapes and guides his philosophy. 2.1 The reduction and the transcendental ego

The phenomenological reduction, or epoché, entails bracketing the ‘natural attitude’, namely, the commonplace thought and understanding of the world under which the current

‘prejudiced’ sciences operate, as clarified by Moran; “The reduction removes reference to the real world of existent entities, and all appearances are taken as genuine in their own right” and “all features of consciousness must be taken as they appear”5

. Husserl is searching for apodictic certainty, those beliefs that cannot be mistaken in their certitude. The reduction eliminates everything that is not directly given to consciousness, and places us in the presence of ‘the things themselves’; that which remains can be considered apodictic. Husserl’s quest for certainty calls for the reduction, as the world of existents and reality claims are set aside, and the remaining structures are considered beyond doubt. With claims of reality set aside, and the natural attitude out of play, “we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ within itself, all worldly transcendencies.”6

Significantly, Husserl claims that the reduction discloses the realm of transcendental subjectivity; “The epoché can also be said

4_{Husserl E. Pure Phenomenology: Its Method and its Field of Investigation, p. 5 (of transcript)} 5_{Moran D. Introduction to Phenomenology, pp. 152-153}

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to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego”.7

Husserl conducts his phenomenological inquiries under the transcendental epoché, exploring the infinite, open-ended world of subjective experience with which we are presented. The bracketing of the natural attitude and worldly objects extends to his twofold conception of the ego. He defines the ego in two distinct ways; empirical and transcendental. The two can be decisively distinguished by the operation of the phenomenological reduction, though Sokolowski points out that “the philosophical self who views the natural ego is not another entity, not somebody else, it is the same ‘me,’ but now stretched into a new form of

reflection.”8

The empirical ego is identified as part of the natural attitude; it is that which we consider to be part of the world, causally connected to things. It is the actually existent stream of one’s perceptual acts; Natanson elucidates, stating “the empirical ego has a neural history conjoined with a personal biography of unique events of consciousness which renders individual consciousness a natural object within the spatio-temporal world of nature.”9

This is one side of the ego; part of the world, and understandable through natural, worldly

processes, which by Sokolowski’s reading means that “if we were to take the self simply as one of the things in the world, we would be treating it as what can be called the empirical ego.”10

. As the epoché brackets objects and structures of this kind, it cannot be taken as the base form of consciousness.

Alternatively, the transcendental ego survives the reduction, standing against the world whilst inherently being part of it. “By phenomenological epoché, I reduce my natural human Ego and psychic life- the realms of my psychological self-experience- to my transcendental-phenomenological self-experience.”11_{Husserl advocates phenomenological inquiry as a}

science of consciousness, with the reduction serving to disclose things of which we can be certain by putting us in the presence of things in themselves. As such, by “restricting what you accept as a philosopher to what is apodictic, you are, at least initially, now restricted to your conscious self and its ‘thoughts’- to your ‘pure’ self and your ‘pure’ thoughts”12

comments Smith. The field of transcendental consciousness is the world understood purely and apodictically; again, Natanson illuminates, describing the transcendental ego as “the pure stream of consciousness, freed from the causal conditions that occasion psychic events and independent of the concrete character of any elements within the stream.”13

Heidegger and Derrida both take issue with Husserl’s implementation of the reduction, arguing that the presence of the present is unjustly left out, and subjectivity itself is not properly scrutinised. Heidegger seeks to return to the fundamental nature of our experience, taking nothing for granted; Derrida too believes the presence is privileged as a foundation in Husserl’s inquiries without justification, seeing the present as corrupted by alterity.

Additionally, Sartre cites the distinction between the empirical and transcendental ego as 7_{Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 21} 8_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 122} 9_{Natanson M. Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology, p.} 45 10_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 112} 11_{Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 26} 12_{Smith A.D. Routledge Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p. 26} 13_{Natanson M. Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology, p.} 45

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contrary to our experience, claiming it is not given in the way Husserl proposes and as a result, is beyond the scope of apodictic certainty. Further, splitting consciousness in this way results in consciousness taking on a sense of opacity, contravening his identification of consciousness as translucent and empty. These criticisms surrounding Husserl’s conception of the transcendental ego will be addressed in due course.

For now, it suffices to say that Husserl is attempting to understand subjectivity by describing the structural forms that constitute the transcendental ego, and one of those forms, perhaps the most important, is time. This process must take place under the phenomenological reduction, which Sokolowski says reveals that “The dative of manifestation, the

transcendental ego, is not a single static point; it involves a process that goes on in time, but in its own internal temporality, not in the objective temporality of clock and calendar.”14

As the transcendental ego itself is defined by temporal processes, understanding

time-consciousness is of paramount importance in ascertaining the nature of the subject. I intend to describe this process and thereby show that time-consciousness is the most fundamental structure of the transcendental ego, and later assess the resulting implications.

2.2 General features of time-consciousness under the reduction

Under the reduction, with the natural world bracketed, the phenomenologist begins to try and make sense of experience in a neutral fashion, as it appears to him, including time. Husserl states “Just as the actual thing, the actual world, is not a phenomenological datum, neither is world time, the real time, the time of nature in the sense of natural science and even in the sense of psychology as the natural science of the psychic.”15

The inquiry into time under the reduction means that the conception of time as a metaphysical entity, or quantitative form held by natural science, is put to one side; “With respect to the problem of time, this means that we are interested in experiences of time...We seek to bring the a priori of time to clarity by exploring the consciousness of time, by bringing its essential constitution to light”. 16

Husserl chooses to look at the structures of consciousness that allow us to interpret something as temporal. Regarding the consciousness of time, Husserl identifies different levels that structure experience. The lowest, most obviously apparent level of time is objective (transcendent) time, the time of clocks; it is public, verifiable and observable in the world. The level we find above this is subjective time, otherwise known as immanent or internal time. As the name suggests, and as Sokolowski reiterates, this time “belongs to the duration and sequence of mental acts and experiences, the events of conscious life.”17

Intentional acts are significant in Husserl’s project; their order and duration play a fundamental role in his conception of time-consciousness. Intentionality is made possible by time-consciousness, as well as being demonstrated within it, as will eventually be seen with regard to temporal objects, both transcendent and immanent.

These two levels of time would commonly be regarded as accounting for temporality; the objective time of the world and the internal time of the subject. However, for Husserl, a third level, the ‘consciousness of internal time’ is vital in making sense of inner temporality itself, as Sokolowski explains, “the second level alone is not enough to account for its own self-awareness; we must introduce a third level to account for what we experience on the

14_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 133}

15_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), pp. 4-5} 16_Ibid., p. 10

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second.” 18

This level of time processes the levels beneath it, and also, requires no further level to order it; it constitutes itself. The introduction of the ‘absolute flow of

time-constituting consciousness’ provides Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry with a foundation, a most basic temporal structure.

The relationship between transcendent and objective time is such that, against the commonly held view, objective time is dependent on immanent time; Sokolowski states “Worldly things can be measured by clocks and calendars, and can be experienced as enduring, only because we experience a succession of mental activities in our subjective life”. 19

To comprehend worldly time, it must pass through internal time; the appearance of things as temporal relies on the temporal flow of our conscious experience. Immanent time is constituted by

consciousness of internal time, which means, by extension, it also constitutes our understanding of transcendent time.

With the interaction of the levels of time adumbrated in brief, I can begin to examine the experience of time more closely. Husserl marks two types of temporal objects that we encounter in our experience; transcendent and immanent. Transcendent temporal objects are those objects we encounter in the world, and immanent temporal objects are those mental acts that can be considered to have temporal extension. The time of transcendent objects is

understood through immanent temporal acts. One must appreciate that “Natural things just as immanent things are temporal unities that have properties but are not themselves

properties”. 20

Instead, temporal objects present themselves in temporal modes of

appearance; past, present and future, with things appearing as past or future in relation to the now-moment, i.e., things that were past were once now, and the future is something that will be now. “Every temporal being ‘appears’ in some running-off mode that changes

continuously…The ‘consciousness,’ the ‘experience,’ is related to its object by means of an appearance in which precisely the ‘object in its way of appearing’ [‘Objekt im Wie’] stands before us.”21_{A thing’s now-ness is not a part of the temporal object, it is simply a mode of}

appearance, and because object and mode are not identical, it is possible to talk of the same object presenting itself in different modes of temporal appearance.

As time is experienced as flowing, continuously, one may claim that instead of making intentional life readily available to us, the reduction actually exposes the inherent ‘flowing away’ of our experience, the continual passing away of the now. This perpetual passing of time would mean that reflection is not possible, as there is no point at which we could

effectively conduct it. The phenomenological enquiry falls flat, as the point at which we have to make phenomenological discoveries escapes us immediately. This criticism is levelled at Husserl by the deconstructionist, claiming that we cannot even experience the now, as it continuously evades us. However, according to Brough, “What the flow of time takes away, Husserl argues, the consciousness of time restores.”22

.

In understanding how the flow operates, one must first appreciate perhaps the most striking aspect of Husserl’s writing on time; his notion of the extended present, and the inherent, 18_{Ibid., p. 131} 19_{Ibid., p. 132} 20_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.39 – p. 282} 21_Ibid., p. 28 22_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. xxiii

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complex modes of intentionality that characterise it. The extended, or ‘living present’ is the idea that the present moment is not simply composed of the now, but has a degree of temporal extension, with regard to both the immediate past and the immediate future. William James aptly states; “the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end. 23

Husserl’s own unique conception, the living present, matured over the course of his lifetime, which I shall analyse after looking at how he arrived at his mature notion

2.3 An overview of the development of time-consciousness

Before considering his most mature conception of time-consciousness and the living present in richer detail, I shall take an historical look at his earlier ideas, and subsequent reaction to Brentano, in order to understand exactly what Husserl is not doing. As I shall now

demonstrate, the turning away from his contemporaries, and the development of his own conception of the living present was important in making time-consciousness a defensible system.

Even dating back to his earlier models, (those before the 1905 lectures), having implemented the reduction, we are confronted with temporal objects; “objects that are not only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves”24

, inherently temporal in either their succession, simultaneity or duration. Though time itself is considered a form, it is a form comprised of these individual, temporal objects. They appear to us through intentionally directed acts; the reduction entails that the intended object, and its time, are described

through the intentional act that encapsulates them. Key to the idea of Husserl’s time-consciousness is the notion that the perception of a temporal object “is itself a temporal object, and as such has its phases”.25_{Brough provides further detail; “Of the phases that}

make up the extended perception of a melody, only one will be ‘actual’ at any moment. Others will be past or future in relation to the phase that is actual.”26

This creates a dilemma, one that Husserl spent many years trying to overcome; perceiving a temporal object that enjoys only a single moment of actuality seems counter-intuitive. If we are given a series of nows, one after the other, we cannot experience succession or duration. To be conscious of only now-phases does not allow for the overlap required in experiencing a temporal object, as made clear by Zahavi; “perception of a temporally extended object as well as the perception of succession and change, would be impossible if perception provided us only with access to a momentary or pure now-slice of the object and if the stream of consciousness itself was a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like a line of pearls. If our perception were restricted to being conscious of that which exists right now, it would be impossible to perceive anything with temporal extension and duration, for a succession of momentary points of experience does not, as such, enable us to be conscious of succession and duration.”27 23_{James W. The Principles of Psychology, pp. 609-610} 24_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), p. 24} 25_{Ibid., No.30 – p. 235} 26_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. xxxiii 27_{Zahavi D. The Time of the Self, p. 151}

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Husserl appreciates that we must reach out beyond the now. Franz Brentano, a fellow

commentator on time realised this too; he sees the need for each phase of an act to intend not only the now, but those phases that have elapsed or are yet to elapse. However, if awareness of the past and future phases is itself preserved in the present, when listening to music we would not hear a harmonious tone, but a random jumble of sounds, as we could only be conscious of the simultaneity of tones, not their succession. Brentano and Husserl both appreciate the necessity for modification; we must modify the preserved past. If we do not modify it in some way, we will only have convoluted sound; what is needed is an explanation of ordered succession.

Husserl agrees with the need for modification, but provides a different account of

constitution. Brentano’s constitution works through ‘original association’. Stumpf describes its function; “at every moment of an (inner or external) perception, a presentation is

produced of the content of the perception which is qualitatively the same but which is temporally more remote”.28

In a melody, successive phases of the perception recreate the previous phases of that extended temporal object, until the melody ends. We are conscious of the previous phases as past, and with the new phase, a representation of the previous phase as past is produced with it, with expectations produced as representations of future phases as well. This sees temporal experience go beyond the now.

Nevertheless, Brentano’s model still only involves perception in the now-phase; the past and future that accompany a temporally extended object are provided by imagination. Original association restricts perception to the present. “We believe that we hear a melody and therefore that we still hear what is just past, but this is only an illusion proceeding from the vivacity of the original association.”29

The ‘just-past’ moment, as Brentano presents it, is a product of phantasy by Husserl’s reasoning; “it is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time Brentano does not take into consideration at all the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time”30

. If just-past experiences are taken to be a product of phantasy, “The temporal moment ‘past’ would have to be a present moment of experience in the same sense as the moment red that we are experiencing right now – which is surely an obvious absurdity.”31

. Though phantasy and memory differ, they are both types of re-presentation. As such, Brentano’s original association is analogous in some respects to Husserl’s conception of secondary memory, due to its re-presentative nature. However, Husserl sharply distinguishes representation from his notion of retention.

The issue at hand with Brentano’s account is that the past is not presented to consciousness, but is re-presented; it re-presents all the pasts in an extended perception, as opposed to being a direct presentation of the past. Brough, referring to Brentano, says that he “assumes that what is past, precisely because it is past, is no longer available to consciousness. One can only be aware of what is actually present or now.”32

As it is no longer available to

consciousness, it is instead re-presented to consciousness, which takes place in the present, the realm of availability and awareness. However, to confer pastness upon an experience in 28_{Stumpf C. Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 38} 29_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), p. 14} 30_Ibid., p. 17 31_Ibid., p. 18 32_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. xxxviii

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the present contradicts temporal experience. It is not possible to experience pastness in the present, as they are exclusive temporal modes. What makes the past ‘past’ is the fact that it is no longer present. Husserl seeks to overcome this contradiction and establish a theory

whereby we have conscious awareness of the just-past and just-to-come.

In response, Brough notes that “Husserl argues that the intentionality is perceptual in each of its three moments.” 33

This marks a significant step in Husserl’s progression; in his first lectures on the consciousness of internal time, he made clear the importance of triple

intentionality, but the workings of this trifold intentional structure did not mature until 1909 onwards. Prior to the 1905 lectures, Husserl used the terms ‘primary memory’ and ‘primary expectation’ to represent the past and futural aspects of his trifold structure. They enable past and future phases of the temporal object to be perceived, and are not the product of phantasy, as with Brentano’s modifications. In Husserl’s following model, the ‘schematic

interpretation’, the triple intentionality of each phase is deemed perceptual. However, the schematic interpretation was also abandoned, for reasons similar to his dismissal of Brentano. Brentano’s re-presentations occur in the now, and hence, appear as such, present. A wholly perceptive account, using primary memory, gives us consciousness of the past as past, in the present; as Kelly’s interpretation demonstrates; “Primary memory denoted the

past-apprehension of a past content still apprehended in the present but as memory, that is, consciousness of the object as past, or ‘consciousness of the tone that has been’. The ‘primary memory’ mode of apprehension in the schema-apprehension model could only ensure that a past sensation was still on hand in the now (yet somehow animated) as past. This position produced the absurd conclusion that we cannot perceive the past but only remember it, which in turn, entails the counter-intuitive claim that memory makes possible the perception of a temporal object.”34

The perception of the past as primary memory in the now-moment is clearly not tenable. Looking again to Brough’s introduction, he deduces that “The contents to be animated by apprehensions as past are in fact all present in the actual momentary phase of

consciousness…they in fact exist in the actual phase of consciousness, as they must if they are to be available to apprehension, they will not be neutral, they will be now”35

and as they “are not able to switch their temporal function: the now cannot stand before me as not-now, the not-now cannot stand before me as now.”36

Brentano’s original association seeks to explain all temporal experiences in the ‘actual’ now; Husserl’s schematic interpretation similarly maintains that pastness is given in the present, through primary memory. This relies on the concept shown here by McInerney, that “Present entities are thought to be actual or ‘operative’ while past and future entities are not, so that all awareness of past and future entities must be by means of present phases of acts, not past and future act-phases”. 37 Perceptual awareness in the present alone would fail to go beyond the present, ignoring trifold structural awareness. As Husserl realises in response to Brentano, and now, his own work, what is needed is an account of direct awareness that goes beyond the now-moment.

33_{Ibid., p. xxxviii} 34_{Kelly M. Phenomenology and the Problem of Time, p. 88} 35_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. xlvii 36_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No. 49 - p. 334} 37_{McInerney P. Time and Experience, pp. 29-30}

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2.4 Husserl’s mature time consciousness and the living present

In the texts between 1909 and 1911, the abandonment of a purely perception based model, combined with the proper implementation of the absolute flow of time constituting

consciousness is evident, marking the beginning of Husserl’s mature writings on time. Having established what Husserl is not doing, and the need for direct awareness in an extended temporal segment, I shall return to the preliminary themes outlined prior to the historical tracking of Husserl’s thought.

The introduction of a higher level of time constitution, above that of the transcendent time of objects, and the immanent time of experience, enables Husserl adequately to assign different intentional correlates, corresponding to both of these lower levels of temporal experience, as well as to find the role of perception in temporal awareness. Husserl realised that perception must be understood itself as an immanent temporal object; it cannot account for temporality on its own. It has phases, one of which is actual. It is now understood simply to be another act of consciousness, akin to memory or phantasy, with regard to its temporal extension. The absolute flow, the highest level of time-consciousness equally has phases, and each phase has its own triple intentionality. The terms retention, protention, and primal impression replace primary memory, primary expectation and now-moment. Each phase is a moment on the level of absolute consciousness, through which one is aware of a perceptual act as an immanent temporal object. Retention, primary impression and protention all intend immanent temporal objects; they are impressional forms of consciousness. This trifold structure is only divisible via abstraction, it is “an inseparable unity, inseparable into extended sections that could exist by themselves and inseparable into phases that could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole running-off”.38

No part of the trifold structure can exist on its own; each form necessary parts of one unified act, and we understand them separately only through abstracting from our integral temporal experience. Only one phase of an act is ‘actual’, “Every phenomenon has its comet’s tail, or every phenomenon is a continuity of phases with a principal phase”39

, this principal phase being the actual-now.

The absolute flow does not perceive the immanent acts beneath it in the commonly understood manner. Instead, they are given via impressional forms of consciousness. I am aware of intentional acts in impressional consciousness, of which Brough says “Unlike perception or memory or reflection, which thematise their objects… impressional

consciousness might best be described as the nonthematizing awareness of what is immanent to consciousness, such as an act or content in its temporal extension.” 40

Husserl remarks that “every experience is itself experienced [erlebt], and to that extent also ‘intended’

[bewusst]”41

We experience our experiences on the level of the absolute flow, we have an inherent awareness of them, referred to by Brough as “the implicit self-consciousness that always attends my conscious life”.42

The absolute flow inherently bestows upon one a nonthematizing awareness because it is devoid of content; the content is on the level of 38_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), p. 29} 39_{Ibid., No.44 - p. 306} 40_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. xlix-l 41_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.41 - p. 301} 42_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. l

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immanent temporal objects that the flow constitutes. The criticism that the now-moment actually contains past and future, hence making them present, no longer applies, as the living present of the absolute flow contains nothing but impressional consciousness, and the phases are understood only as abstractions from a temporal synthesis.

The flow is able to account for different levels of temporality in a comprehensible manner, due to its constant, steady flowing nature; “we necessarily find the flow of continuous

‘change’; but this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither ‘faster’ nor ‘slower’.”43

Smith argues that the flow has its own, monotonous temporality; “It does not flow through time; it is, rather, that time flows through, or wells up, within it –the absolute, living source point of all constitution.”44

I shall demonstrate shortly how Husserl propounds the flow’s ability to constitute itself and all levels below it.

Having discussed how the flow allows for temporal objects to be understood, and how it dictates those levels below it, it is essential to consider in more detail the living present, and the differences between retention and secondary memory, and protention and anticipation. As shown, the ‘living present’ is the full, immediate experience of temporality at any given moment, experienced on the level of the absolute flow, and is an inseparable whole, comprised of three parts; retention (past), primal impression (present), and protention (future). An often-overlooked subtlety to Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness that Sokolowski articulates is that “retention does not immediately retain an earlier phase or frame of the temporal object that is being experienced, such as the melody or the feeling anger. It retains the elapsed living present, the elapsed experience of temporality.”45_The

retained living present, just like the current one, is trifold in nature. In retaining it, one retains the retention implicit in it too, which retains the one preceding it, and so on; Sokolowski continues, “we have a whole series of elapsed living presents that are retained through the mediation of prior living presents, through the mediation of prior retentions.”46

This permits us to have a continuous stream of experience.

Our experience seamlessly flows because we retain the previous temporal segment, which includes a retention within, and so on. The reason our experience develops seamlessly and continuously is due to the very particular difference between retention and memory, as well as protention and anticipation. Retention is direct consciousness of the past, and equally, protention differs from anticipation in that “it gives us the first and original sense of ‘something coming’ directly upon what we have now”47

says Sokolowski. Via the medium of protention and retention, one can extend beyond the confines of the now.

Memory is a mediated act taken as an immanent temporal object, intended in the mode of recollection; “the re-presented now is not a now; it re-presents a now, but one that was a now- that is to say, it lets us become conscious in a new way of a time-point whose running-off mode is a particular mode of the past.”48

Memory entails re-presenting one’s previous consciousness to consciousness, it presents one’s past experience in the now, it “does not merely seize in the manner of retention what has just been as just having been in its 43_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) No. 54 - p. 381} 44_{Smith A.D. Routledge Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p. 98} 45_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 137} 46_{Ibid., p. 137} 47_{Ibid., p. 137} 48_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.53 - p. 378}

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continuity with the continuously flowing present now”.49

It is an experience of an experience, akin to second-order reflection. The original experience becomes an object of the current experience, and as such, cannot be consciousness of the current experience, but must be experience of the past, as a temporal object having elapsed and ‘faded into oblivion’, outside of conscious awareness.

Retention on the other hand provides consciousness of what has just been, providing an intentional relation to the immediate past. It is used to “designate the intentional relation… of consciousness to phase of consciousness”.50

It offers the immediate past as directly presented to consciousness, as a first-order reflection. “We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in retentions: specifically, the ‘nearest’ parts of the duration or phases of the duration- those that lie nearest to the actually present now-point”51

. As an actual-now passes, “I am

conscious of a continuity of time-points as ‘immediately past’ and of the whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-point as elapsed.”52

We are aware of the just-past moment immediately as just-past, via a non-thematising awareness of an elapsed conscious phase of experience, “the running-off does not simply exist, it exists in a way of appearing.”53

We have an awareness of it in its mode of appearance as a past elapsing before it fades into obscurity or ‘oblivion’. The difference between memory and retention cannot be understated; retention is immediate; an aspect of the original experience itself, “we can be conscious of a time-point intended in a changing mode of the past in a two-fold

manner: in the original retention, in the original consciousness of what is sinking backwards; and at the same time in a reproductive mode, understood as re-presentation that re-presents the earlier original appearing and, together with it, the original sinking-backwards that attaches itself to the original appearing.”54

Similarly, protention differs from anticipation in terms of the way it is intended, “I can direct my attention to the way in which it is given.” 55

and from this, the future can be understood in different ways. Sokolowski shows that protention is too an aspect of the temporal whole, "when a phase of a process registers itself in a primary impression, it had already been protentionally ‘anticipated’, at least as regards its temporal form, and hence it is given as having been awaited.”56

The immediate future is intended in protention, which differs from past modes as it has not happened, or is not happening, so there is “an essential difference between protention, which leaves open the way in which what is coming may exist and whether or not the duration of the object may cease and when it may cease, and retention, which is bound.”57

As the future is undetermined, it is not intended in the same manner as past intentional modes. However, protentions “emptily constitute what is coming as coming”58

, as they are just-to-come, whereas anticipation is directed towards the more distant future, and is intended as such. The primary difference between retention and memory, between protention and anticipation, is the way they are intended by consciousness, and a clear understanding of 49_{Ibid., No.51 - p. 356} 50_{Ibid., No.50 - p. 346} 51_{Ibid., No.53 - p. 372} 52_{Ibid., No.53 - p. 370} 53_{Ibid., No.53 - p. 377} 54_{Ibid., No.53 - pp. 378-79} 55_{Ibid., No.53 - p. 370} 56_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, pp. 142-143} 57_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.45 - p. 309,} Footnote No. 42 58_Ibid., p. 54

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these distinctions is necessary to appreciate Derrida’s critique and the subsequent defence I propose.

The remaining aspect of the living present to be discussed is primal impression, which Brough aptly describes as “the immediate consciousness of the now-phase of the immanent object”59

. Just as retention and protention are abstractions, the primal impression must too be considered a mere abstraction from the temporal whole. It can be understood as that which separates retention from protention, an abstract mode of appearance unintelligible when separated from the whole temporal synthesis. Each now-phase of the living present has a now-phase of the object correlated with it, and the aspect of the object correlated with the elapsed but retained living present is an earlier now phase, “each perceptual phase has intentional reference to an extended section of the temporal object and not merely a now-point”. 60

It can be seen from this that the now, in relation to a temporal object, is just a mode of its appearance, and the primal impression is just the way it is intended as present.

“Since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves correspondingly and uniformly ‘downwards’ into the depths of the past.”61

The actually present now moves along continuously, and its retentional and protentional modes function in providing what has just-past and what is just-to-come to consciousness. The current living present retains the prior one, and the one before it, continuously. This provides ordering of the temporal phases of the object. In experiencing a temporal object, the primal impression marks a present phase of the temporal object; Sokolowski asserts that “They are stamped with a place in time and internally ordered in their succession.”62

The primal impression serves as a ‘source-point’ for an experience, and moves along in combination with its protentional and retentional modes, constituted by the flow. What remains to be seen is how the flow constitutes itself.

Husserl’s explains the flow’s self-constitution through double intentionality. The trifold structure of the living present on the level of the absolute flow makes possible temporal awareness of an elapsed immanent object and the transcendent object, of which the immanent act is aware. This is due to the absolute flow’s double intentionality; horizontal and

transverse. Brough contends that horizontal intentionality “intends the elapsed phases of the absolute consciousness”63

, which constitutes the flow’s own appearance to itself as a non-temporal non-temporalizing, “the unity of the flow itself becomes constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional quasi-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of reproductive modifications and by virtue of the circumstance that these modifications are, continuously, reproductions of one another”64

. In experiencing past phases of the flow, the flow’s appearance comes to light; “the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing.”65 59_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. lii 60_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.32, p. 239} 61_{Ibid., No.53 - p. 377} 62_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p.139} 63_{Brough J. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (Translator’s} Introduction), p. liii 64_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), No.54 - pp. 391-392} 65_{Ibid., No.54, p. 393}

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Transverse intentionality is consciousness of the elapsed phases of the immanent object which horizontal intentionality makes possible. It traces the temporal object across its

temporal appearances because horizontal intentionality provides self-awareness; awareness of the experiences of the flow over time. The transcendent object can be grasped as temporal because the living present is a non-temporal-temporalizing, a standing-streaming awareness. Kortooms pertinently summarises the two types of intentionality as follows; “the transverse intentionality is the intentionality that ensures that one and the same immanent temporal object is given in the successive modes of givenness in the stream of absolute consciousness, and the horizontal intentionality is the intentionality that ensures that these successive modes of givenness themselves are retained.” 66

The flow must be non-temporal; if it were successive, it could not account for succession on the lower levels. Though non-temporal, it has time-constituting status, as it gives us our sense of past and future in the retentional and protentional modes of the living present. It is

considered absolute, the bottom line, needing no further level to assure it. By retaining the elapsed phase of consciousness, and thereby the past of the object, retention unifies consciousness’ flow and the time span of the perceived temporal object, thus providing at once a non-objective self-awareness and an objective awareness of spatio-temporal entities. Husserl’s assertion that the flow constitutes itself, and requires no further level is

questionable, and I shall critically assess the idea of the absolute flow as fundamentally basic when reflecting upon Derrida’s critique.

2.5 The temporal nature of the transcendental ego

Before addressing the variety of Derrida’s deconstructive charges more closely, attention should be directed towards the status of the subject in relation to the experience of time, as concepts of unity, oneness, and the standing-streaming nature of temporal consciousness all point towards subjectivity. Moran notes that “Husserl gradually came to see that the ego is given in temporal profiles.” 67

and in the ‘Cartesian Meditations’ we can observe that he claims the unity of the temporal synthesis is “a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as ‘the same’ objectivity / belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes ‘constituted’”68

Our temporal

experience discloses subjectivity. This subjectivity, as we have seen, is discovered through the epoché, uncovering the transcendental ego.

The discovery of the structures of time-consciousness results from examining our temporal experience under the epoché, and from this, the absolute-flow is given as the primal form of subjectivity. Kortooms states that “immanent temporal, transcendental life is itself a

constituted formation (konstituiertes Gebilde, C 2, 8b), and as such it must be subjected to phenomenological reduction. This reduction results in the uncovering of, what Husserl calls, a transcendental primal ego, and a transcendental primal life.”69

This ego is not considered a unifying structure; instead it is considered a fundamental condition of subjectivity, as Zahavi illustrates; “If we turn to Husserl’s later lectures on time-consciousness, we will find the same view with no reference to the ego as the ultimate unifying or synthesizing agent. Rather, the unity is established or woven through the interplay between primal impression, retention

66_{Kortooms A. Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time-Consciousness, p. 101} 67_{Moran D. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 174}

68_{Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, pp. 41-42}

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and protention, i.e. through the structures of inner time-consciousness.” 70 The transcendental ego is no longer whole or complete, as it was in earlier conceptions.

The reduction reveals the trifold structure of the living present, and further Kortooms claims that “the reduction to the living present is the most radical (C 3, 4a) reduction that leads to the uncovering of transcendental subjectivity.”71

The absolute flow’s temporal structure not only allows us to experience temporally extended objects, but it also allows for the subject to manifest itself, as he further demonstrates, in that “The living present is the primal shape (Urgestalt, C 2, 10a) of the being of transcendental subjectivity”.”72

As the subject of transcendental life, Sokolowski says of the transcendental ego, “we stand over against the world and have it appearing to us, and the temporal flow of our conscious experiences is a condition for the appearing of the world and the things in it. The paradoxical relationship of the self as both a part of the world and the one who has the world comes to the fore again in regard to temporality: the intentional flow of consciousness is nested within the processes going on in the world, but it also stands over against the world and provides noetic structures that allow the world to appear.”73

Husserl further remarks that “Time is the universal form of all egological genesis”. 74

This understanding of the ego as not ‘unifying’, but ‘unified’ by temporal experience seems less metaphysically suspect than Husserl’s earlier models of subjectivity. In its early form, Husserl’s transcendental ego was criticized for ‘bringing the world into existence’, as it is given as prior to the empirical ego, and the absolute, primal basis for all experience. In his later works, the ‘I’ appears, but not as part of a mental process. It is not an object; its presence is continual and unchanging in its flowing. Zahavi claims that “the retentional process not only permits us to experience an enduring temporal object, it does not merely enable the constitution of the identity of an object in a manifold of temporal phases, it also provides us with non-observational, pre-reflective temporal self-consciousness.”75

This elongated, retentional consciousness entails pre-reflective consciousness, a transcendental ego. This notion of a temporally unified ego will be scrutinized once Derrida’s critique has been explicated.

In ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, Sartre rejects Husserl’s conception of the transcendental ego, on account of its pre-givenness. The more advanced conception of the ego, as disclosed in temporal profiles, may be more in line with Sartre’s later account of consciousness found in ‘Being and Nothingness’. Sartre undoubtedly would still disagree with the separation into empirical and transcendental, arguing such a conception gives consciousness opacity, thereby destroying it. Whether or not this is a fair appraisal will become clearer once I have

considered both Derrida’s deconstruction, and subsequently, Sartre’s own rejection of

Husserl. With Husserl’s time-consciousness and his temporal transcendental ego having been adumbrated, I shall now outline the deconstruction offered by Derrida, which seeks to

undermine Husserl’s efforts, by using his own work against him.

70_{Zahavi D. The Time of the Self, p. 153} 71_{Kortooms A. Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time-Consciousness, p. 233} 72_{Ibid., p. 233} 73_{Sokolowski R. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 132} 74_{Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 75} 75_{Zahavi D. The Time of the Self, p. 152}

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3. Derrida’s charge of metaphysical presence 3.1 Heidegger’s influence on Derrida

Inspired by Heidegger, Derrida diagnoses all post-Plato philosophy as infected by

metaphysics in one way or another. "The enterprise of returning 'strategically', ‘ideally’, to an origin or to a priority thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. all metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the

impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among others, it is the

metaphysical exigency"76

. As opposed to these dualistic traditions, Derrida seeks to keep judgements in suspense, not committed to any truth in the traditional sense of the word. This is based on his belief that structures, theories of meaning or significations do not stick to the sort of things metaphysics prescribes. Derrida wants to give full sceptical reign to

phenomenology, offering a sort of ‘reduction behind the reduction’, to expose the inherent instability in our condition.

Though Heidegger’s project is not the focal point of this thesis, an analysis of his position provides insight into a key influence on Derrida’s project of deconstruction, and the philosophical terrain surrounding phenomenologists at the time. With ‘Being and Time’, Heidegger seeks to rethink traditional conceptions of the subject, which he finds to be loaded with metaphysical presuppositions. His desire to avoid such presuppositions leads him to establish his own conception of the subject, ‘Dasein’, a radically new conception of the human being. This is established on the back of his ‘destruktion’, a technique employed in order to form a notion of the human being free of the metaphysical presuppositions of old. As he says, “If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since.” 77

Carman states that he “undermines traditional subjectivist conceptions of understanding and interpretation that purport to leave all metaphysical or ontological questions untouched”.78

Heidegger’s dismantling of traditional ontology is aimed at being as presence, specifically subjectivist versions of being, such as Husserl’s. Heidegger’s primary criticism is that subjectivist theories of intentionality take the being of the mind and the mental for granted, forgoing any preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. This sceptical approach towards subjectivist accounts is continued by Derrida, and a clear influence on his work.

Upon first glance, Derrida’s and Heidegger’s positions may be viewed as synonymous. In terms of approach, there are rather striking similarities between Heidegger’s destruktion and Derrida’s deconstruction; the desire to overcome the mistakes and false dichotomies of

76_{Derrida J. Limited Inc, p. 93}

77_{Heidegger M. Being and Time, p. 44}

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traditional ontology. However, Moran claims that for Derrida, it does not go far enough; “Derrida also sees in Heidegger some remainder of the traditional metaphysics of presence, a kind of ‘nostalgia’ for presence…Derrida then wants to make Heidegger more radical, to release Heidegger’s texts of a certain commitment to presence and to metaphysics.” 79_What

is needed is a total change of terrain, linguistically and ‘philosophically’. Whilst their goals may be similar, Heidegger does not remove himself entirely from the language of

metaphysics; I shall return to this notion shortly, as a critique of a similar kind is levelled at Husserl.

3.2 Derrida against the philosophy of presence

Returning to Husserl’s project, Derrida believes it is contested from within by its own descriptions of the movement of temporalization. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is controlled by metaphysics from the outset, according to Derrida, and he questions whether it has successfully eliminated all presuppositions from his enquiry, as Moran explicates, “his unmasking of Husserl’s dependence on metaphysical assumptions is meant to point to the inability of phenomenology to be the radical science it wants to be; the inability of

philosophy ‘to think its other’”80

The metaphysics of presence is a direct challenge to the assumption that the presence of the present is naturally given, the grounding of

phenomenology’s central tenet of being a pre-suppositionless science, as well as any other unjust privileging of the present.

The hallmark of Derrida’s deconstructive arguments is to undo dualistic oppositions and privileges and to bring to light what he sees as internal contradictions in time-consciousness; within phenomenology he sees presence and absence as one of these false dichotomies. Equally, the indivisible, unified notion of self-presence is challenged. Derrida’s critique is multi-faceted, so I shall address only those criticisms that would damage Husserl’s theory and be of equal interest when I later direct them towards Sartre’s temporal subject. I speak specifically of the various logocentric arguments Derrida proposes; they will not be

entertained here; instead I shall analyse the philosophical discussion of presence. I intend to show Derrida’s purposeful refusal to adhere to the subtleties of Husserl’s position means that he is not successful in his deconstruction.

In his specific deconstruction of Husserl’s project, Derrida initially notes that, “If the

punctuality of the instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited

metaphysical concept, or all that at once, and if the present of self-presence is not simple, if it is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, then the whole of Husserl’s

argumentation is threatened in its very principle”. 81

With this in mind, he first analyses the concept of the punctuality of the now. He maintains that this understanding of the now is important for Husserl’s time-consciousness, and “Undoubtedly, no now can be isolated as a pure instant, a pure punctuality.”82

Husserl maintains that the temporal movement of our experience, and the trifold structure of that experience, entails that no now can be isolated as a pure instant. It is the punctual phase of the now, the ‘actual’ or ‘living’ now that is present at any given moment, but not in isolation, with a certain breadth or, ‘spread’, of retentions

79_{Moran D. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 661} 80_{Ibid., p. 456}

81_{Derrida J. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, p. 61} 82_Ibid., p. 61

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and protentions “The spread is nonetheless thought and described on the basis of the self-identity of the now as point, as a ‘source-point’.”83

The running-off of our temporal experience begins from the living now, which persists in form through change in matter. The actual now has self-same identity, that carries through our temporal experience. Derrida takes issue with the unjustified privilege that the actual now is afforded, “within philosophy there is no possible objection concerning this privilege of the present-now; it defines the very element of philosophical thought, it is evidence itself.” 84 Derrida wants to re-evaluate this notion of apodicticity; the privilege that direct intuition in the now-moment is afforded.

Philosophy is always a philosophy of presence according to Derrida, and is in conflict with theories that reflect upon nonpresence; the latter should be given more credence. The now in Husserl, taken as a form, persists despite changes in our experience; Derrida sees this as “integral to the system of the founding contrast established by metaphysics, that between form (or eidos or idea) and matter”. 85

This represents another false distinction propagated by traditional philosophy. Derrida would prefer a conception of time with a focus on deferral, and Caputo stresses that to appreciate Derrida’s outlook, one must acknowledge that “Every time you try to stabilise the meaning of a thing, try to fix it in its missionary position, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away”.86

The meaning of things is always in flux, and to try and fix meaning, especially in the most changeable aspect of our experience, the temporal dimension, is facile in its attempt.

Derrida goes on to say that Husserl, “both confirms the dominance of the present and rejects the ‘after-event’ of the becoming conscious of an ‘unconscious content’.”87

He is calling for “a meditation on nonpresence”88

; a change of investigative terrain as a whole. Instead, he desires a new philosophical approach, bereft of all of the trademarks of traditional

philosophy. As stated before, this extends to his take on Heidegger; Derrida argues in ‘The Ends of Man’ that Heidegger has not fully escaped metaphysical tradition. Despite his project being directed towards the destruction of traditional ontology, by utilising the same language in his ‘destruktion’, he too falls into the web of metaphysics, specifically regarding presence. Derrida argues that the analytic of Dasein is motivated by the principle of presence and self-presence; “Heideggerian thought is guided by the motif of Being as presence, understood in a more original sense than in the metaphysical and ontic determinations of presence or of presence in the present, and by the motif of the proximity of Being to the essence of man.”89

By not changing the language of the deconstruction, Heidegger has confirmed or

consolidated what he sought to deconstruct; for Derrida, deconstruction must go further, completely changing terrain. So, Lawlor states that “While Heidegger wants to ascend back up to the far side of the metaphysical concept of humanitas, in fact, his discourse, using the name ‘man’, enacting a repetition of the essence of man, remains dependent on this

concept.” 90 83_Ibid., p. 61 84_Ibid., p. 62 85_Ibid., p. 63 86_{Caputo J. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, p. 31} 87_{Derrida J. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, p. 63} 88_Ibid., p. 63 89_{Derrida J. The Ends of Man, p. 49} 90_{Lawlor L. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, p. 39}

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This is not the place to assess his charges against Heidegger. However, it is possible to see repeated not only the specific call for a new kind of meditation, of a hyperbolic standard, but also, that he identifies similar problems of presence in vastly different phenomenological models. Further, one can see Derrida’s style, citing specific passages to bring to light internal contradictions. Though Derrida diverges from Heidegger, Moran claims that “In agreement with Heidegger, and against Husserl, Derrida criticises the presumption that the present is the totally real moment which gives itself to us in our intuitions.”91

3.3 The contradiction in Husserl’s time-consciousness

I now turn to Derrida’s next issue, which Garver concisely puts forward in his introduction;

“A central aspect of Derrida’s argument…lies in his examination of the claim that we can

intelligibly think about and talk about present moments that are pure and simple”92

.

Husserl’s punctual now has been taken to be the ‘primal form’ of consciousness, meaning it is to be understood as pure and simple, free of alterity. Yet, “the body of description in ‘The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness’ and elsewhere prohibits our speaking of a simple self-identity of the present.”93

As has been seen in my initial analysis of Husserl, the issue of conflating the present with other temporal dimensions is a problematic area. The notion of simplicity entails that the now-moment cannot be corrupted by its opposites, or ‘otherness’, thereby maintaining its purity. Derrida diagnoses that Husserl has corrupted the sanctity of the now-moment, and this shakes the fundamental phenomenological principle of a pure field of experience to explore, in the now, Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’, “that everything originarily… offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.” 94

Derrida sees the presence of the present as an unjustified foundation; Eagleton claims that Derrida “labels as ‘metaphysical’ any such thought system which depends on an unassailable

foundation, a first principle or unimpeachable ground upon which a whole hierarchy of meanings may be constructed.”95

Any metaphysics of presence seeks a solid foundation, the base of this structure needing to be something that presents itself self-evidently in the now, as pure and simple. Pure experiences can be understood as direct and unmediated awareness of the present moment and its content. Husserl uses this as a point of departure for a supposedly pure, phenomenological inquiry. Despite this, Derrida claims, “the presence of the perceived present can appear only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention. These nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do they occasionally accompany, the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility.”96

Retention is given as perception; “only in primary memory do we see what is past; only in it does the past become constituted- and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively”. 97 Husserl calls it a perception, “because he holds to establishing a radical discontinuity between retention and reproduction, between perception and imagination, etc., and not 91_{Moran D. Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 457} 92_{Garver N. Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, (Preface), p. xxiii} 93_{Derrida J. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, pp. 63-64} 94_{Husserl E. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, p. 44} 95_{Eagleton T. Literary Theory: An Introduction, p. 114} 96_{Derrida J. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, p. 64} 97_{Husserl E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), p. 43}

Can Sartre's for-itself be reduced to a metaphysics of presence?

MA Philosophy

Master’s Thesis