Exploiting Emotion = Engagement:
Communication and Mental Health in the
Age of Social Media Platforms
By Louie Oestreicher
MA Thesis for New Media and Digital Cultures 2017/18
Student Number: 11623837 Words: 22,945 Due: 29th June 2018 Supervisor: Alex Gekker Second Reader: Marc Tuters
Abstract
Modern age communication is being dictated by Social Media Platforms (SMPs) and running parallel to this digital domination is a rise in mental health issues, particularly in adolescents. Emotion and attention are the key commodities being mined in the digital age and are the backbone of SMP business. A system is proposed in the form of the Social Media Capitalist Engagement Cycle (SMCE cycle) to explain how SMPs manipulate users into increased usage and how this benefits SMPs financially. This cycle ultimately suggests the instigator for SMPs links to users poor well-being. Causality between SMPs and mental health has been critically suggested but is difficult to determine, and as such previous findings from the fields of medical and psychopathology are contemplated. Generally previous research indicated that users with previously diagnosed mental health issues were more likely to be affected by the use of SMPs, however some forms of interaction with SMPs could be be determined a risk. A media theory approach is then taken to offer an alternative to the previous research. An original methodological framework is then proposed in the form of the Imagined Affordance Infrastructure Framework (IAIF), which is grounded in varying theories of affordance and its differing historical and contemporary definitions. The IAIF is then applied to case studies highlighting troubling features of SMPs in the form of Snapstreaks (Snapchat), read-receipts (Facebook) and Safety Check (Facebook). All prove to be theoretically and logically detrimental to mental health especially when compared to media theory and the previous medical research. All are summated in relation to the Facebook “Mood Experiment” of 2012. The IAIF is applied again but with alternate findings due to users lack of awareness of the experiments occurrence. Public responses to combat the negative causality conclude the thesis including considerations of the “Time Well Spent” movement and recent examples of SMPs having a political effect.
Table of Contents
Abstract 2
1. Chapter One - Introduction 4
2. Chapter Two - Social Media Platforms and “Addiction” 13
3. Chapter Three - Affordance as Method 18
3.1 - History of Affordance 18
3.2 - Contemporary Affordance 20
3.3 - Methodology 23
4. Chapter Four - Case Studies 29
4.1 - Snapstreaks (Figure 6) 29
4.1.1 - Subject Context and Functional Affordance (Figure 6 - 1) 29
4.1.2. Cognitive Affordance (Figure 6 - 2.1) 31
4.1.3. Sensory Affordance (Figure 6 - 2.2) 32
4.1.4. Communicative Affordance (Figure 6 - 3) 32
4.1.5. Imagined Affordance (Figure 6 - 4.1 & 4.2) 35
4.2 Facebook 36
4.2.1. Facebook Case 1: Read Receipts (Figure 8) 37
4.2.1.1. Subject Context and Functional Affordance (Figure 8 - 1) 38
4.2.1.2. Cognitive Affordance (Figure 8 - 2.1) 39
4.2.1.3. Sensory Affordance (Figure 8 - 2.2) 40
4.2.1.4. Communicative Affordance (Figure 8 - 3) 42
4.2.1.5. Imagined Affordance (Figure 8 - 4.1 & 4.2) 43
4.2.2. Facebook Case 2: Safety Check Feature (Figure 12) 44
4.2.2.1. Subject Context and Functional Affordance (Figure 12 - 1) 45
4.2.2.2. Cognitive Affordance (Figure 12 - 2.1) 46
4.2.2.3. Sensory Affordance (Figure 12 - 2.2) 47
4.2.2.4. Communicative Affordance (Figure 12 - 3) 48
4.2.2.5. Imagined Affordance (Figure 12 - 4.1 & 4.2) 50
4.3 Case Studies Summation 51
5. Chapter Five - Facebook Mood Experiment 53
6. Chapter Six - Conclusion 61
6.1 Conclusion 61
6.2 Limitations & Future Research 62
1. Chapter One - Introduction
A staple rule of modern society stipulates that one is twinned with some form of electronic technology regardless of income, social status or geography. With five billion people expected to own a mobile phone by 2019 and over half of those being smartphones (see Statista: Smartphone Users), it is evident that one of the main focuses of humans twinning with technology regards communication. Through our internet-accessible phones, laptops and tablets the endless ways to interact with each other becomes overwhelming. As we continue to produce content, building our online personas and evolving our digital döppelgangers, the interdependency between the technological and the societal intertwines evermore. Through the “rise of user-generated content and value in 2.0 culture” Stephen Wright has fashioned the term usership with reference to the participatory community of users inhabiting these platforms (66). Networked culture embodies the rise of users playing a key role as “producers of information, meaning and value, breaking down the long-standing opposition between consumption and production” (Wright: 1). Any previous, passive and individualist presence of “the user” is diminishing in present social media realms, and instead the collective usership contribute, combine and intertwine to manufacture our digitised social spheres. Consequently, when a situation arises where there is anomaly within the techno-social ecosystem, the usership of such technologies and platforms have logical license for aggravation.
A fitting example can be found in February 2018 when Snapchat released an update for their mobile application (app). It heralded an enormous outcry from its usership resulting in the signing of a 800,000+ strong petition pleading for a reversal on its redesign (Watson). Scorn was simultaneously tweeted by many high-profile endorsers of the app which, combined with the might of the petition, convinced Snapchat to oblige and revert to its previous design (Godlewski). Any thankful reaction expected by Snapchat was largely undermined however due to one problem with the reversal: it was deleting users Snapstreaks. A Snapstreak (or streaks) is a term for when two friends have “snapped” (sent an image but not texted) each other within twenty-four hours for more than three consecutive days (see Snapchat). This is signified by the fire emoji next to a friends name (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Screenshot of Snapstreaks (Lorenz).
Streaks are counted with the number of days represented beside the emoji (different emojis are introduced to represent lengthier streaks) and when a streak is nearing expiration, users are notified by an hourglass emoji. Naturally before the update reversal, many users had collected numerous lengthy streaks and the thought of losing them was upsetting. As one adolescent describes, not only were they losing the effort and time they had put into the app but “if you lose the streak, you lose the friendship” (Lorenz: Business Insider). Through quantifying friendship, Snapchat had emotionally invested users in their app to such an extent that a lack of input resulted in the success or indeed the downfall of a users social status. Snapstreaks is just one of many examples that highlights the severity of social media platforms (SMP/s) consuming nature and the emotional dependency certain technologies and platforms afford their usership.
Over 40% of Americans credit technology as being the most important factor in an improvement of lifestyle over the last fifty years (Strauss) and consequently technology corporations want to make this absolutely apparent in their marketing. One of Apple’s founding taglines was “the power to be your best” (Apple), as well as a similar Microsoft campaign in the last decade touting “Your potential. Our Passion” (Microsoft). Most recently PayPal took the unsubtlest of stances by plainly stating that they are simply “making life easier, one click at a time” (PayPal). Understandably technology companies are not going to reveal too much about their business models through their advertising and will generally take a somewhat neutral stance in this respect. Facebook for instance championed a new mission statement in June 2017 with the goal to “build community and bring the world closer together” (Constine: ‘Facebook Changes Mission Statement’). While that message denotes positive connotations of networking and human
interaction, what is hidden from such statements is how these companies in fact make their money. With respect to Facebook and Snapchat, personalised advertising fuel their business models as well as other avenues including harvesting data for resale to third-parties. These are inherent processes for these technology companies but is also something that is not explicitly promoted to the end-users of such platforms. Combine these details with the fact that to ensure such processes are efficient and financially beneficial, users are being emotionally exploited, the situation becomes concerning. Technology is being advertised as positive but in doing so is distracting from the potential issues such technologies have on their userships due to their exploitative business practices.
While it is clear that modern technology is being advertised as the ever-evolving phenomenon which is greatly improving our lives, its positive trajectory is mirrored by a significant rise in mental health issues in the last 25 years, particularly in adolescents (Bedell; Twenge, Martin & Campbell). Any potential correlation between these occurrences has begun to be seriously appraised particularly where internet and SMPs are concerned. Indeed in 2013 when the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was released by the American Psychiatric Association, it included the addition of “internet addiction” to its list of diagonsible dysfunctional compulsions (Davies: 346). Addiction is a strong and loaded term which can be used exaggeratedly in common parlance especially in the dramatic arena of tabloid media. Where internet usage is concerned, while experts believe 6% of the world population suffer from such an addiction, confirming this clinically is debatable due to a lack of “consistent criteria” for measurement (Cheng & Li in Longstreet & Brooks; Walters). Media commentators including Philip Agre, still conclude however that “technological change is generally inseparable from broader social changes” (747).
In William Davies’s book The Happiness Industry he draws attention to the work of Richard Graham, a psychologist who studied the impact of video games on the behaviour of young people (347). Graham treated a young boy who consistently played World of Warcraft up to fifteen hours a day for over three-years. When his concerned parents unplugged the modem denying networked access to the game; he became violent. Graham posited that “the boy was not simply addicted to technology but to a particular type of egocentric relationship which networked computers are particularly adept at providing” (348-9). He further stressed that the boy was not addicted to the computer game as such but more that he desperately desired some form of human interaction but only within a very particular, private and autonomous space (349).
Thinking of this example in relation to Snapstreaks, it would be naive to oversimplify the source of upset as an interference with a form of internet addiction. Considering the update of the app in a purely literal sense, Snapchat had simply interrupted an innate human desire: to interact. As humans we are naturally programmed to communicate and one of the several methods of modern life that affords this possibility are SMPs. In this sense is it not perfectly warranted for users to be upset if their mediation of communication and interaction is altered or removed? Perhaps then the use of the term “addiction” has to be reassessed, as what is being witnessed is more definitively the manipulation of the inherent human desire to interact.
With this in mind, it is evident that with the advent of the smartphone and “the app”, technology companies such as Facebook are defining social practices and embedding their platforms as necessities for communication. The result of this leads many of us to abide in a state of being “always on” or “constant[ly] “connect[ed]” (Turkle: 16). A normal day is dictated by a consistent stream of notifications varying from the important to the pointless. With such regularity and frequency of information, one comes to expect it. Consequently when it is lacking, anxiety replaces the lack of dopamine we crave when our “obsession” for notification isn’t being satisfied; not unlike an addiction (Parkin). A precedent to be “liked” or an expectancy to be “replied to” are just a couple of the many anxieties that are now twinned with a digital lifestyle fuelled by SMPs. Ex-Facebook founder Sean Parker admitted in November 2017 that Facebook exploited “a vulnerability in human psychology” from the outset of the platforms creation (Parkin). Parker revealed that in the beginnings of Facebook’s development the goal was to create ways to consume users time and attention. It was with such a mindset that the “like” button was made, exploiting the human desire to be “liked” or appreciated, instigating “a little dopamine hit” when received and subsequently further encouraging content production (Solon: Ex-Facebook President). A diluted Pavlovian conditioning is now at work as users anticipate and crave human interaction in the form of notifications, signalled by a vibration or the sound of ringtone. This engrained practice has even bore a new phenomenon dubbed Phantom Vibration Syndrome where one believes one’s phone has vibrated or “dinged” when it has not. Indeed nine in ten suffer from this modern affliction according to a 2015 study (Rosenberger).
As ex-Google Ethicist Tristan Harris denotes, the social media monopoly are vying for the “market share of attention” which fundamentally fuels their business (Center for Humane Technology). Our attention and engagement is profit, so entrapping our devout attention equals monumental financial gain. Our captivation ensnared, SMPs capitalise on their catch by treating attention as commodity. These actors further subject their harvest to multiple forms of personalised advertising contributing to the cyclical nature of this “attention economy” in which we now dwell (Davenport & Beck). I propose a system to
depict this situation in the form of the “Social Media Capitalist Engagement Cycle” (SMCE cycle) and offer a prototype for visualisation below (Figure 2).
Figure 2 - Social Media Capitalist Engagement Cycle (SMCE Cycle).
Beginning with the target of every profit-orientated, ad-revenue-based company for increasing profits (Stage 1), methods to manipulate users (Stage 2) into further engagement (Stage 3) are employed with the goal of amassing higher quality and quantities of data (Stage 4). With the increased wealth of user data, SMPs are then continually able to offer more personalised and targeted advertising (Stage 5). Marketing on SMPs that follow such models deem this an attractive space for advertisers, all of whom will be willing to pay competitive amounts for such lucrative opportunities, thus increasing the profits of SMPs (Stage 6). Other SMPs may follow different methods like LinkedIn who employ a “freemium” model; allowing free access to selected features, but with an additional paid option for all-access. There are numerous variants of differing models however this thesis solely concentrates on those who rely on advertising to fuel their SMP.
Through this cycle the “attention economy” is evidently at work as human engagement becomes a commodity to be traded for financial gain. Indeed as Benjamin Grosser states when studying the metrics of
Facebook, its “value is entirely dependent on how much users participate and contribute to its databases” as its “survival depends on its ability to sell targeted advertising” (4, 8). This cycle provides the condition for this thesis in the form of a conceptualisation under which the “attention economy” functions and as such will be a prominent reference when considering the case studies.
Tiziana Terranova offers a more contemporary angle on Davenports definition in respect to the information overload overwhelming the attention of userships, as she deems our attention a “scarce resource” (2). This scarcity of attention encourages new practices to be designed and administered (Figure 2 - Stage 2). Within existing SMP spheres a prime example is the quantification of sociality through the measurement of units. In metaphorical contrast, Harris defines such design practices as grounds for attention “hijacking” and which he cites as a cause for concern. Here one is caught between Terranova’s defining of attention as commodity and Harris’s depiction of attention as a form of vehicle which can be redirected. It is my belief that both forms are valid as indeed attention can be consumed but also certainly
rerouted from its original concentrations. I suggest an alternative metaphor in the form of attention being the new “oil”. While it can still be deemed a commodity to be mined by the original owners of attention, it also has the potential to be immorally siphoned off by illicit miners. The “original owners” of attention could be anything from other websites to spending time with family, while the siphoning by illicit miners in this case would be akin to the manipulative features of SMPs. This new metaphor of “attention as oil” allows more of a fluidity to its depiction as it sits within an economy that gives the ability for it to be consumed as well as “hijacked”. Whichever way the attention economy is depicted, not only is it troubling due to the autotelic nature of SMPs processes, but it is even moreso when considering the further ethical ramifications and responsibilities of SMPs in relation to their consumers.
If SMPs all tamper with our natural human desire for interaction in return for monetary gain, at what point will our well-being be seriously abused to continue to favour their SMCE cycles? That is to say, if they are not already doing so. As Parker states the very foundations of Facebook were based on such “vulnerabilities”, so when do these “vulnerabilities” become dangers to our mental health? And as such should these companies not be investigated and potentially regulated against such detrimental emotional manipulation?
Facebook came under massive scrutiny in 2012 after it published results of a psychological experiment that altered the newsfeed of over 650,000 users. Developers programmed newsfeeds to portray either predominantly positive or negative content in an effort that determined that they could alter the emotional
state of their users through emotional contagion (Kramer et al.). It is fitting at this juncture to explore Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri’s concept of “Empire” so that social media behemoths like Facebook (and to an extent Snapchat) can be critically situated. Hardt & Negri depict “Empire” as such:
The concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire “civilized” world...Empire not only manages a territory and a population but also creates the very world it inhabits. It not only regulates human interactions but also seeks directly to rule over human nature (Hardt & Negri: xiv - xv).
The existence of Empire is usually consigned to the annals of history but when placed metaphorically within a 21st century context, reappears fittingly in a contemporary form particularly alongside the mite of SMPs. Facebook for example sits well in this notion of Empire, not only because of their monumental reach to users of the “civilized” world, but particularly due to the aforementioned regulation of “human interactions”. Indeed Hardt & Negri describe the global economy in a stage of post-modernisation that favours “the production of social life itself” over that of mass factory labour, leaving “the economic, the political, and the cultural [to] increasingly overlap and invest one another” (xiii). Respectively one finds this imperial dominance in the sheer occurrence of the “Mood Experiment”, epitomising Facebook as Empire through the SMPs ability to “directly rule over human nature” (Hardt & Negri: xv).
While surprised and apologetic towards the negative backlash received upon publishing these results, in doing so, Facebook had revealed an imperial influence over their monumental usership that includes roughly a third of the world population (2.2 billion monthly users - see Statista: Facebook Users). As Silicon Valley’s engineering elite conjure evermore cunning, alluring and manipulative interface designs, as users we are simultaneously being influenced into a emotional dependency, enticing us to engage in their apps hungry for more. But at what cost to our well-being?
If the techno-determinist narrative fed to us by these powerful technology behemoths is to be accepted, it is important to consider who is promoting such an agenda and who the actors are in this arena. The methods of the technology companies is a patent beginning for critique and analysis and it is at this crux where the basis of this thesis takes place.
examined as well as considering its future. Similarly, it is of great importance to critique the many claims of correlation between mental health and SMPs made by medical professionals. When considering the previous research in this arena, Varnum & Grossmann highlight the challenge that medicine and psychopathology face with current research methods (in Twenge). They acknowledge there is a general difficulty in pinpointing forces and causality for cross-cultural change (in Twenge: 12). However despite this and with respect to current methods, it is deduced that the most likely cause for a cultural force leading to lower well-being could be the increase in electronic communication (Twenge: 12). This lack of certainty needs to be clarified further but can only be realised through an alternative approach that can contribute and complement previous medical research. In this vein, this thesis proposes an alternative method for analysis that avoids the limitations of empirical work by approaching the subject from a media perspective. As such one of the goals for this thesis was to explore the existing research and elaborate on any findings through the use of a media theory lens. In this respect, Natasha Schülls “Machine Zone” is appropriate for a comparison as she considers the plight of those suffering from gambling addictions. The potential similarities to userships suffering supposedly at the hands of SMPs are proportional, as in both cases interaction is manipulated through interface design. Similarly Davies work can also complement previous research by providing another fitting theoretical coupling. His questioning of the World of Warcraft example and whether addiction can indeed be defined as such, provides a perfect theoretical accompaniment for the medical research on SMP addiction and well-being.
Furthermore in response to Varnum & Grossmann’s challenges in pinpointing a correlation between a cultural causality, I include further musings on media theory in my research by employing the application of affordances and grammars. If an object's affordance is what it “offers” the individual interacting with it, the notion of grammars can depicted as the traits of the object’s affordance (Gibson: 127; Agre: 745-6). Such definitions of the terms here are basic to provide insight however the many varying intricacies are deliberated further on in Chapter Three. Applying such concepts to SMPs allows a novel angle for analysis and one not currently present in previous research. As such this thesis endeavours to answer the following research questions:
● What are the cultural and societal grammars being afforded by the design of features present in the Facebook and Snapchat platforms?
● How are these design choices manipulating and exploiting the userships of such platforms to encourage regular and frequent engagement? And what is the effect of this design on user mental health?
● How is the potential causality between social media and mental health being challenged? And what does the future hold?
In order to determine the outcome of these questions, Chapter Two firstly scrutinizes medical articles and their relevant findings to associations between mental health and SMPs. Seabrook, Kern & Rickard’s Social Networking Sites Depression and Anxiety: A Review is used as a core text and provides the basis for contemplative reference for a variety of medical research throughout the chapter and rest of the thesis. Absolutist claims are easy to administer within such boundaries, especially where many present variables cannot be eliminated or underestimated, so a careful concern for any causality is undertaken in this section. Any medical findings are complemented by media theory such as Schüll’s “Machine Zone” linking interaction design to addictive gambling behaviours as well as William Davies notion of addictions relationship with emotions. Chapter Three grounds the succeeding case studies within a theoretical media framework. Firstly I detail and explore the evolution of affordance as definition, as well as grammars of action (Gibson; Agre). A mixture of historical and contemporary definitions are combined together for the proposal of an original methodological framework to be applied to the case studies. Chapter Four applies the proposed framework to the SMP case studies which includes Snapstreaks, read-receipts present within the Facebook Messenger and Whatsapp platforms and the Facebook Safety Check feature. Chapter Five discusses the other case studies in relation to the Facebook Mood Experiment as well the public and political reaction to SMPs causality with poor mental health. Chapter Six concludes the thesis with a summation of the discourse, highlighting any limitations as well as proposing any avenues for future research.
2. Chapter Two - Social Media Platforms and “Addiction”
When considering previous research concerning SMPs and mental health, Seabrook et al. provide the perfect starting point with their definitive review of findings from the medical and psychopathological fields. The researchers perfectly collage an exhaustive collection of results on the potential associations between SMPs and mental disorders; namely depression, anxiety and well-being. Seabrook et al. are keen to cite psychologist Corey Keyes in that defining “a complete model of mental health” involves including not only an absence of psychopathology, but also a focus on subjective well-being. Mental health is therefore a consuming term and thus, when considered alongside the usership of environments such as SMPs, is logical to predict that such states and environments could affect each other bidirectionally, with complexity and in a valence of ways.
There have been a wealth of studies on the relationship between SMPs and mental health, all concentrating on differing variables. “Addiction” to SMPs (and smartphones) is the prominent concern in related literature and as such are the most relevant to this thesis. Emotional attachment and dependency to smartphones has been established (Cheever et al.; Clayton, Leshner & Almond; Thorsteinsson & Page) leading to evidence of compulsive usage (Bian & Leung; Lee et al.) through the encouragement of “habits” (Osatuyi & Turel; Oulasvirta et al.). More specifically with relation to SMPs, users with low life satisfaction (Hawi & Samaha; Longstreet & Brooks) or who were extraverted, narcissistic or neurotic (Blackwell et al.; Turel, Poppa & Gil-Or; Wilson, Fornasier & White), particularly adolescents (Glover & Fritsch; Twenge et al.; Vanucci, Flannery & Ohannessian; Woods & Scott) were most likely to suffer from SMP addiction. Returning to the example of Snapstreaks for instance, the likelihood for such addiction is comprehensible if SMPs are used as a means for youth to maintain friendships.
It was also found that if an individual subscribed to multiple SMPs, the use of a numerous amount was more likely to result in reports of depression or anxiety rather than the frequent use of a single SMP (Primack et al.). Primack et al. point to the nuances of differing SMPs, and that navigating through and maintaining numerous differing digital worlds is strenuous and could be the potential cause of “negative mood and emotions” (5). Such maneuvering relates back to the aforementioned “attention economy” as numerous and differing SMPs compete for the mining of captivation, each vying for the devotion of users time.
messaging) could (in moderation) benefit those with social anxiety (Derks, Fischer & Bos; Glover & Fritsch; King et al.). This is due the platforms ability to connect users to peers in a more comfortable and digital setting in contrast to the angst felt by social anxiety sufferers for real life interaction. Similarly the same could be said when considering Grahams deductions of the World of Warcraft example. However the evidence is outweighed in comparison to the new forms of social anxiety that are forming with increased SMP engagement and problematic SMP use.
Chou & Edge found that the longer a user had used Facebook, the more they perceived that their peers enjoyed a better lifestyle than their own (119). Extended exposure to mostly positive content is their reasoning for the manifestation of such beliefs as it encourages a comparison with one’s own lifestyle. Such exposure is not relative of reality however as mostly users will post positive content over the negative, portraying an unrealistic version of their peer’s lives. Consequently such users begin to feel their life is unfair or not as good in comparison, subsequently inducing an additional anxiety in the form of a “Fear of Missing Out” (FOMO) (Obesrt et al.; Przybylski et al.). Not always akin to SMP’s, FOMO depicts individuals feeling left out of life events shared with their peers or a feeling that they are not experiencing their own key life occurrences, even when this may not be true (Obesrt et al.: 53). Obesrt et al. found that a presence of depression and anxiety can lead to FOMO and increase “maladaptive mobile phone use” (58). However witnessing positive misrepresentations of others lives through increased exposure to SMPs could logically induce the reasoning that said user is not involved in significant events, thus further inflaming any present state of FOMO. This could be contrasted alongside Davies example of the World of Warcraft
player. Perhaps the user is not addicted to SMPs but to a type of inherent human interaction, and in the case of FOMO; a desire for shared experience with peers. Through Facebook a diluted version of said experience can be “shared” through accessing messaging, picture or video content from other peers. This worryingly hints at Stage 2 and 3 of the SMCE cycle (Figure 2). Through the SMP illusion that your peers are having a better life than your own or simply that a user has access to experiences that does not include them (Stage 2), users participate in further engagement not only to potentially confirm such suspicions, but to relieve the paranoia and feel included (Stage 3). FOMO as a condition seems “addictive” and cyclical in its nature, for to partake in increased in SMP use may not achieve relief but could logically exacerbate the symptoms.
Other terms have been coined to describe the more general effects of SMP usage in the form of “techno-stress” (Lee et al.) and “social media fatigue” (Bright, Kleiser & Grau). End users are overloaded with information from SMPs competing with each other for the market share of the “attention economy”.
Understandably such frequent exposure to consistent, varying and emotionally-loaded content will deplete the users “scarce” amount of attention rationally resulting in a state of stress or fatigue through continued usage (Terranova: 2).
Such is the desire for the causality to be recognised that theorists have even proposed models for application of further research in the form of the Social Anxiety Scale for Social Media Users (Alkis, Kadirhan & Sat), and the Social Media Disorder scale (van den Eijnden, Lemmens & Valkenburg) amongst others. Longstreet & Brooks note however that this breadth of research should not necessarily imply direct causation, “but show support for the existence of a relationship between the factors” of mental health and SMPs (75).
Alongside this medical research it is fitting to apply a media theory angle to conceptualise addiction. Media Scholar Alex Gekker cites anthropologist Natasha Schüll’s work on the “Machine Zone” and gambling machines as an analogy to understanding addictive behaviour. For gamblers, the affordance of winning or losing is curtailed by the design of the machine interfaces namely its lights and sounds. Instead the act of succeeding at the game is replaced with an encouragement for basic repeat engagement, situating the action and subsequent satisfaction of pleasure within the “playing” of the game itself, over the monetary winning or losing. Consequently this drives the consistent stream of monetary input from the gambler and furthers the profits of the casinos. Indeed Schüll remarks that “through the collective, steady repetition of their play, low-rolling local machine gamblers displaced high-rolling tourist table gamblers as the heavyweights of the gambling scene in Las Vegas” (40). While Schüll concentrates on the intricate and careful design of the gambling machine interface, Gekker projects Schüll’s stance unto digital interfaces like the video game
Diablo’s use of numbering to encourage participation and “mediate[...] existence” (108). Similarly with SMP’s, users with FOMO for example seek increased participation in an SMP as a false pretence to achieving their goal. While for Schüll gamblers are encouraged to concentrate on the “play” over the monetary winnings, similarly users with FOMO are coerced into seeking digital interaction over actual attendance of an event or meeting with a peer they may feel FOMO towards. Gekker highlights how the user interface of games are able to foster “addictive behaviours” or “addictive loops”, which with this example can be also said of the interface designs for SMPs (116).
Within internet, SMP or any kind of addiction, all share similar traits of addictive “behaviours” or “loops” that are responsible for encouraging compulsive behaviour. Indeed as Davies denotes, neuroscience has shown that “the pleasures associated with internet use can be chemically identical to those associated with
cocaine use or other addictive pastimes” (346). But as mentioned in the introduction with relation to Graham’s example of World of Warcraft, a “broader cultural logic” must be reflected on here (Davies: 350). It is imperative to look beyond the material or functional addiction to SMPs as a platform, and instead concentrate on the apparent compulsion to communicate, albeit through a specific process. These “addictions” are compulsive due to their associations with emotional states and exploitation of human vulnerabilities. As social beings, naturally we have personal worth and want to be respected by our peers. The examples of World of Warcraft, Snapstreaks and the “like” button all share a similarity in that they are tied up in emotional interaction, so naturally users will repeatedly engage with these processes and are understandably upset when they are withdrawn or lacking. Just like Schülls depiction of gambling, SMPs encourage meaning to be found in the “play” of SMPs (ie. the gaining of “likes” or collection of numerous friends) over the actual content of interaction with peers. Davies wryly signals this situation when considering current advertising theory as he claims “emotions are back ‘in’ again” because “most importantly it is what leads us to get our credit cards out of our pockets” (127, 130). Thinking back to the SMEC diagram in the introduction (Figure 2), it is then feasible that SMPs manipulatively design their features to be emotionally “addictive” (Stage 2), in order to achieve their capitalist goals (Stage 1). But is this actually occurring? Are platforms taking advantage of our malleable and exploitative mental capacities for financial gain? From a medical standpoint the verdict is mixed.
While there is ample research in this area, any foundation for clarity and certainty is somewhat undermined by particular limitations of the studies. Seabrook et al. point out that different methodologies can contribute to different results with respect to temporal elements. They cite Steers et al. for example who received conflicting results when using a retrospective survey compared with that of a daily diary. Similarly “time distortion” is flagged as an issue where addiction-like symptoms are present, as the concept of time can be unreliable in affected users (Turel, Brevers & Bechara). It can also separately have an effect on “immediate and delayed effects of social sharing” (Brans et al.). In fact Seabrook et al. claim that only a few studies relevant to the review “utilized [SMP] derived data” compared with the majority that were based on self-report surveys relying “on participant estimates of their [SMP] behaviours”. This meant that sample size is generally small, with the demographic usually being isolated to an undiverse grouping such as a collection of university students relative to the origin of the research (Alkis, Kadirhan & Sat; Blackwell et al.).
Seabrook et al.’s general summation details that while there is a definite correlation between SMP use and mental health and wellbeing, whether the effect is positive, negative or negligible is dependent on the
mental state of the user in question. Users with predisposed personality disorders were most likely to be negatively affected by their use of SMPs (Lee Won, Herzog & Park; Moreau et al.; Obesrt et al.; Wegmann, Stodt & Brand) due to their state of mental health acting as a “moderator” (Kross et al.) that exacerbated compulsive behaviours and negative mental states. Such associations were generally non-significant for users who were not diagnosed with mental health issues, who - it was determined - would not be affected with symptoms of depression or anxiety through average use of SMPs (McCord, Rodebaugh & Levinson; Muench et al.). Seabrook et al. did highlight however prominent risk factors for depression and anxiety that could be found in the form of what they define as “frequent [SMP] social comparison, negative perceived interaction quality, addictive or problematic [SMP] use, and rumination (or brooding)”. While they singled out frequency of [SMP] use as another potential risk factor, on the whole this variable “suggested no clear association with depression and anxiety”. That said however, none of the studies included in the review supported a decrease in anxiety or depressive symptoms through frequent use (Seabrook et al.).
In conclusion, the medical arena has established that users with mental health issues are prone to negative associations with SMPs, with the youth being the most vulnerable demographic. Psycho-pathological symptoms can both encourage and exacerbate SMP use, which has instigated new anxieties in the form of FOMO and heightened social comparison for example. The implication of using multiple SMPs leaves us mentally depleted, as users manoeuvre through not necessarily their “addictions” but instead the exploitation of their emotions and desires to interact. This connection to emotion signifies what could be the basis for Stage 2 of the SMCE cycle, but without further analysis of specific case studies cannot be confirmed at this moment.
Considering the limitations of medical research, it is fitting that a new “more nuanced assessment of social media use” is employed (Vanucci, Flannery & Ohannessian: 165). Very little of the medical journals that Seabrook et al. and I have mentioned, consider the specific features of SMPs and their direct effect on the mental state of their usership. Hence through this thesis, I aim to build on the aforementioned research by honing in on particular traits and techniques of SMPs. Unlike the medical research, I approach the case studies from a theoretical and autoethnographical angle instead of an empirical method. To ensure the approach is “more nuanced” as per Vanucci et al.’s suggestion, the case studies and their ties to emotion are explored through the concept of affordances. But beforehand, the definition of affordance is explored to establish its use as methodological framework.
3. Chapter Three - Affordance as Method
3.1 - History of Affordance
The concept of “affordance” was pioneered by psychologist James Gibson who encouraged the theorisation of the relationship between organism and environment. “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” and as such affordances are therefore relative to the organism in question (Gibson: 127). A typical analogy depicts a human interacting with a surface, one that can mediate sitting. The surface has adequate size, flatness and rigidity to support the human form thus affording the possibility of a seat or indeed the perception of one. If all technology “has some affordance for benefit or injury to someone” then consequently organism and environment are complementary or relative to one another, not divided dualistically as separate entities (Gibson: 140). Despite this Gibson is keen to stress that objects such as in the surface example are not always defined by interpretation from the organism, for it is in itself a “value-rich ecological object[...]” (140). Such a surface could provide many affordances to many organisms, not just the practice of sitting, so consequently a single object can have multiple meanings and provide a differing mediation for many. Essentially for Gibson the concept of perception for humans is not learned but innate as he hypothesizes “that there has to be an awareness of the world before it can be put into words” (258). If the perception of our environment is inherent therefore so is our comprehension of potential affordances. Indeed as Gibson writes; one “does not need to have ideas about the environment in order to perceive it” (304).
Gibson’s definition of affordances is somewhat antiquated and the term has evolved in recent times in line with technological and cultural change. A fitting example concerns the concept of design with respect to the work of designer and cognitive scientist Donald Norman. Norman’s 1988 book The Design of Everyday Things directly challenged Gibson’s theory of affordances as his discrepancies lay in his disagreement that perception was inherent. While Norman largely agreed that affordances refer to the “perceived and actual properties of [a] thing”, he conversely believed that this was learnt from a basis of past knowledge and experience and thus
applied to perception, rather than perception being an inherent primary ability (1988: 9, 219). It is noteworthy to mention that in the 2013 revised edition of the book, Norman redefines affordance as “the relationship between a physical object and a person”, the importance here being the mention of the “physical” (2013: 11). This is particularly poignant if considering such a definition in a modern context with relation to Facebook or
Snapchat. To contemplate the affordances of digital platforms with respect to Norman’s definition certainly feels outdated for the virtual ecosystem they replicate can hardly be described as “physical”. While Norman’s angle is inclusive of design and would be fitting in respect to the contemplation of the case studies, a more modern definition of affordance that respects virtual and digital objects is needed for this thesis. Potential and more contemporary definitions are considered further on in the next section (3.2).
Before doing so it is important to note that Norman was also keen to stress that alongside affordance, the concept of constraint holds a dominant presence (2013: 123). Constraint here refers to the perceived limits of possibilities rather than the range of potential action or mediation that affordance describes. Thinking again of the surface example; while a surface may afford us the possibility of sitting, due to its size, it may not afford us the added potential to lie down, constraining our ability to sleep or rest. Norman states that a “thoughtful” combination of both affordances and constraints within design correctly informs the proper course of action for any user (2013: 125).
Taking Norman’s notion that within design sits affordances and constraints, design is therefore programmed with significant intentions which, in turn, produce a language for the receiver to learn, interpret, use and repeat with other similar designs. Such “language” is defined by Information Studies professor Philip Agre as
grammars of action or more simply; grammars. Agre championed that if the activity of humans can be treated as a language, then consequently the techniques, traditions or rules applied to any such activity provide a
grammar applicable to such actions (745-6). Indeed these grammars can be created, learned or even enforced and sit within Agre’s wider ideology dubbed the “Capture Model”: “the situation that results when grammars of action are imposed on human activity” (746). Agre uses the model not only as a language analogy but also as a metaphor within the context of computing, as the “human activity” of the capture model becomes “represented by computers in real time” (746). Computing mimics that of a system that captures human actions into a grammartisation and thus builds an institutional process. For example, the simple moving of a document from one folder to another within a computing interface becomes a “standardized” process that users adapt to, as they “orient their activities toward the capture machinery and its institutional consequences” (Agre: 746, 747). As Agre highlights, the issue here is that such adaptation can extend beyond simple “real-time capture” or replication of human activity. Institutions frequently impose grammars on activities for reasons other than capture such as “security, efficiency, protection from liability, [or] simpl[y] control” (Agre: 747).
As a concept, grammars compliment affordances significantly. Considering the example of the surface: if the surface affords us the possibility of sitting, in doing so it is affording us certain grammars of sitting that are
specific to the surface provided. For instance if the surface is soft in texture then it would provide a grammar of a comfortable sitting experience. Simply put, if an affordance is a possible action, then the grammars are the attributes of this action. If we then reconsider Norman’s definition of design and affordance, the designer becomes the author and subsequently the writer of any resulting grammars. Through the combination of affordance and constraint products are designed, generating grammars which become inherent attributes specific to that product. For example two furniture companies could exist which differ in the types of chairs they make. One company makes chairs for offices that are adequately comfortable but upright and applicable for sitting at a table. Alternatively another company makes armchairs for homes that are comfortable with the ability to lean, applicable for relaxing in a living room. Both companies provide products that offer the same affordance of ‘sitting’ but intentionally differ in their grammars as the sitting experiences require different attributes of design.
3.2 - Contemporary Affordance
While the origins of affordances provide an appropriate historical context, it is imperative to cite the more contemporary works of Mel Stanfill and HR Hartson at this juncture. Through their respective works The Interface as Discourse and Cognitive, physical, sensory, and functional affordances in interaction design, Stanfill and Hartson fittingly situate affordances within modern new media settings. They provide a clear theoretical framework for applying affordance to human-computer interaction which Stanfills defines as Discursive Interface Analysis (DIA) (1061). When applying DIA to website interfaces Stanfill uses Hartsons division of affordance types to divide the differing possibilities available. This is split into “physical”, “functional”, “cognitive” and “sensory” affordances (Hartson: 319, Stanfill: 1063). Stanfill then takes Hartson’s work further by situating the concept within our internet era with respect to the website interface. As the method of DIA concerns virtual environments, Stanfill rightly states that the consideration of the “physical” affordances is inapplicable in this situation (Stanfill: 1063). The remaining affordances are described by Hartson as such: “functional” depicts what an object can do, “cognitive” defines how users comprehend what the object can do or is, and “sensory” facilitates sensing something such as seeing, hearing or feeling (323). Both Hartson and Stanfill’s work are vital examples for the digital development of the definition of affordance, as Hartson admittedly states his paper is an affirmative reaction to Normans definition (2013: 315). In applying these divisions to the Facebook and Snapchat case studies, the separations that are significant to this thesis are mostly “cognitive” and “sensory”. The “functional” affordances of Facebook and Snapchat, on a generic level are quite apparent and undebatable, as they simply afford the ability to communicate with others through a web platform and as such are not extensively considered.
That being said, it is worth mentioning Stanfill’s ruminations on Michel Foucault’s notion of “power as productive” in regards to functional affordances (1060). Through functional affordances “norms [sic]” are produced implying users “ought [sic] to do this and not that” signifying a influence or indeed a streamlining of the users actions when interacting with the interface (1063). Therefore, functional affordances construct the notion of normalcy and what is to be expected across a usership and between userships. Apart from this notion however, it is “cognitive” and “sensory” that highlight the more complex notions of affordance which are fit for examination. These types of affordances provide a methodological lens to explore SMPs, by encouraging the exposure of the grammars (and constraints) that dictate our communication lexicon authored by the social media monopoly.
While Stanfill’s framework is an adequate starting point for methodological replication in this thesis, there are still significant musings on the term to be considered, particularly with regards to Nagy & Neff’s proposed reconstruction of the term: “imagined affordance” (1). Their development aims to be inclusive by referencing all actors in the digital communication process namely users, designers and the technologies themselves, ultimately awarding the term an inclusivity, a versatility and an overall less “static” state (1-2). Nagy & Neff state that, within communication discourse, the original term has been limited to the seemingly conscious and rational actions that are afforded or constrained by humans (2). Instead they propose that “imagined affordances emerge between users’ perceptions, attitudes, and expectations; between the materiality and functionality of technologies; and between the intentions and perceptions of designers” (5). Nagy & Neff here provide a multi-layered definition for affordance that favours conceptual possibilities over the physical, further evolving the term away from any Normanic origins. They conclude their theorisation with the sentiment that “affordances are not only related to the design features of devices but also to the psychological and social characteristics of human–technology interaction” (7). This particular aspect of their affordance redefinition is absolutely integral to any further contemplations in this thesis. Unlike the previous definitions, Nagy & Neff’s crucially includes emotion as a trait of communicative affordance. Subsequently it is vital that this particular aspect is given careful consideration when examining technologies such as SMPs. With a combined wealth of usership and consequential power of influence, technology giants like Facebook and Snapchat have significant potential to affect users’ conscious or unconscious emotion through the engineered and intended grammars of their choosing (the extent of which are discussed in the next chapter).
I lastly consider Taina Bucher and Anne Helmond’s exhaustive paper within which they finely delineate between the most notable definitions of affordance with relation to SMPs. For Bucher & Helmond “features
[of SMPs] are objects of intense feelings” and fittingly compare them to Ganaele Langlois’s notion of features as “communicational actors” that “produce meanings” (52). Indeed for them “a feature is not just a feature” much in the similar vein that Gibson believed that objects were rich in value and not arbitrary (Bucher & Helmond: 2, Gibson: 140). Over the course of their paper Bucher & Helmond cover the historic journey of affordance amicably, beginning with Gibson, evolving into Norman as well as giving their dues to Professor of Design William Gaver whose definition lies entrenched within the concept of interaction. Gaver defines affordances as not being confined to “individual action, but for social interaction as well”, for “these are not social affordances [...] but affordances for sociality” (Gaver: 114). Alongside Gaver, Bucher & Helmond are keen to include sociologist Ian Hutchby’s definition of “communicative affordance”. Similarly to Gaver, Hutchby hints at a techno-determinist slant with their concepts depicting a causality between technology defining the progress of society and culture. For Bucher & Helmond, Hutchby provides a “middle term” that situates technologies as being socially constructed whilst being materially enabling and constraining, but ultimately focusing on the “impact of technology [on] communication” (10, Schrock: 1233).
Bucher & Helmond are keen to stress throughout their paper that the term affordance is loaded and must be considered from a multi-layered approach. It is their suggestion that affordances can be split into “high” and “low-level” affordances, with “high-level” being associated with more abstract or conceptual affordances such as thoughts or emotions, and “low-level” providing concrete, functional and feature-oriented affordances (12). Furthering a high-level approach, Bucher & Helmond lastly cite McVeigh-Schultz & Baym and their definition of affordance as “vernacular” (Bucher & Helmond:15, McVeigh-Schultz & Baym:1). Crucially “vernacular” affordances acknowledge “how action possibilities cannot be determined once and for all” and are thus relative to the individual (Bucher & Helmond:15). Through McVeigh-Schultz & Baym’s “vernacular” the definition has also has come full circle, as it returns from a Normanic structure where feature-teaches-action, and back to the Gibsonian belief of perception being inherent. Bucher & Helmond write as such when they describe vernacular affordances as being “grounded in peoples own perceptions and experiences” instead of being initiated by a designer and regardless of their intentions (15). Indeed they continue to clarify that vernacular affordances are “as much [a] part of users’ experiences and perceptions of technologies as the technologies themselves” (16).
Bucher & Helmond conclude by stating that any form of social media affordance analysis must take a “platform-sensitive approach” and consequently should “consider the specificity of the digital environment more explicitly” (26-7). With this contemplation they champion how the affordance infrastructure of a platform (and its resulting grammars) can be exported from its own techno-ecosystem into other environments
but most crucially, that the affordances are not only unidirectional (30, 16). On top of what SMPs affords end-users, Bucher & Helmond propose future reflections of “what end-users afford or do to technology” as it is their belief that they sit dualistically (16). As SMP users we perpetuate through a feedback loop of interaction ever-contributing to a personalised set of data that depicts our online character (Figure 3 - Stage 4). This in turn drives customised advertising (Figure 3 - Stage 5), ultimately furthering the profits of the social media monopolies (Figure 3 - Stage 6) that provide the affordance of interaction.
2. Introduction of the Facebook “like”: a feature that easily endorses, agrees and supports content posted by peers.
3. A “like” is extremely easy and quick to use, allowing for increased interaction/engagement with content on platform. eg. more efficient than writing a comment
4. All “likes” are tracked and categorised by Facebook. The type of content that is liked are used to build a profile about the users personality, life choices and preferences.
5. The profile allows for more specific advertising. eg. if numerous content on the topic of football is liked, the advertising of football-related products can be pushed to user resulting in logical increased likelihood of a purchase.
Figure 3 - Revised SMCE cycle using example of a Facebook “like” and a user.
If the grammars of this economic cycle are to be accepted then it is logical to believe that users provide affordances for technology and its designers as well, which speaks to the inclusive and dualistic approach of Nagy & Neff’s notion of “imagined affordance”. For Bucher & Helmond, any definition of affordance applied to a similar situation must be twinned with a sensitivity of the platform in order to better define any affordance of technology unto the user, or vice versa.
3.3 - Methodology
Considering all the aforementioned definitions of affordances, while some provide a decent basis for application, others are either outdated or not applicable for the following case studies. I now reflect and
delineate over the chosen definitions that were used methodologically with respect to the affordances, constraints and grammars of Facebook and Snapchat.
Whilst being sensitive of Gibson’s definition as a grounding, this thesis makes use of the Normanic definition of affordance as a basis but only in respect to perception being learnt. While interface design is seemingly Gibsonian as it relies heavily on the practice of Skeuomorphism (the mimicking of visual cues indicating known physical attributes to resemble physical affordance), this would not be applicable to the chosen case studies. Within a virtual interface a fitting example of Skeuomorphism would be a graphic that depicted a button that once clicked, appeared as if it was “pushed-in” to indicate it being “on”. This would point to perception here being inherent as it resembles the functions of an everyday situation that can virtually be mimicked, which leans more to the Gibsonian definition. The nature of the chosen case studies however are conceptually more complex than the mimicking of turning “on” a button. In the context of this thesis the case studies are chosen not so much for their functional affordances but their subsequent emotive affordances resulting from said function. These resulting affordances indeed could be learnt but are secondary to the initial function meaning any learning may not be immediate for the user or indeed learnt at all; hence the choice to concentrate on the Normanic definition and one of the reasons for including the chosen case studies. As Norman’s affordance is only defined within a physical construct however, this was the only aspect of the Normanic definition used by this thesis.
While I am appreciative of McVeigh-Schultz & Baym’s “vernacular” definition being inclusive of user perception and experience, their lack of consideration for the intention of the designer however is naive if applied in this setting. Any disregard for the role of the designer would be ignorant particularly in this study, due to its basis being situated in a discussion between the potential causality of SMP design and mental health. Therefore this definition, while a progressive redefinition, was not included. Nagy & Neff’s “imagined affordance” however was a preferred definition due to their intention for the term to embody an inclusive selection of actors and traits. “Imagined affordances” is preferable as it adheres to the appropriate notions of McVeigh-Schultz & Baym’s “vernacular” with respect to user perception while simultaneously encompassing other actors such as the designers and the technologies themselves. Due to the focus of thesis concerning well-being, it is also fitting to lend from Nagy & Neff as for them “imagined affordances” are grounded in “the psychological and social characteristics of human–technology interaction” (7).
While Bucher & Helmond provided a definitive summation of potential frameworks for which to apply affordances to SMPs, this thesis instead proposes a synthesis of the previously discussed definitions, that
together provide a comprehensive methodological framework. The framework is applicable for the study of SMPs that are reliant on advertising as main source of revenue. Additionally the case studies can be situated critically within versions of the proposed SMCE cycle (eg. Figure 2). The proposed framework provides an encompassing and all-inclusive method to ensuring the case studies can be understood.
The “Imagined Affordance Infrastructure Framework” (IAIF) (Figure 4) depicts a selection of the pertinent affordances that correspond adequately to a study of the traits of SMPs. It is my belief that the differing types of affordance sit within the “high-level” and encapsulating world of “imagined affordance”. The terms are situated and mapped within an infrastructure relative to each other not only in hierarchy, but also in order of methodological application. The intended journey of analysis begins in the centre, with lower-level considerations of affordances and then follow a route out through the differing layers to an ultimate and conclusive “high-level” consideration (as indicated by the “analysis route” arrow). As per Bucher & Helmonds call for the concept of affordance to be considered with a “multi-layered” approach, I believe such a proposal heralds their cry (16).
Figure 4 - Imagined Affordance Infrastructure Framework (IAIF).
