Prospect theory and identity: Why leaders take risks against all odds

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Prospect Theory and Identity

Why leaders take risks against all odds

Vincent van de Scheur S6140984

Bachelor project: Political Leaders in International Relations 2018-2019 IBO Supervisor: Dr. Femke Bakker

Second reader: Prof. Dr. Petr Kopecký 8328 words

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1. Introduction

In our everyday life, risk is a familiar phenomenon. As we are only boundedly rational (Bendor, p.18, 2010), information to guide our actions is limited and we are unable to fully oversee the consequences. When faced with a choice, we perceive our situation, weigh our available options and make a decision that is most optimal for us. Expected utility theory attempts to predict human choices under conditions of uncertainty, and assumes that we have a constant, ordered set of preferences in which we rank our options according to their expected utility or economic benefit (Levy, 1992, p.173). Prospect theory was developed to account for deviations of expected utility theory. Where expected utility theory would prescribe us to make the same choice independent of our situation, prospect theory posits that situational and framing factors influence whether we are risk-averse or risk-seeking in our choices, so that two dilemma’s concerning the same expected utility may lead to different outcomes (Levy, 1992, p.176).

For political scientists, the study of risk behaviour could not be more relevant. Our world is shaped by the choices that prime ministers and presidents make under conditions of uncertainty. Politicians are rewarded for their ability to grapple with conditions of uncertainty and to take steadfast decisions in times of crises (Boin, 2017, p.169). Prospect theory predicts that leaders are risk-averse when in the domain of gains, and risk-acceptant in the domain of losses. Most empirical research confirming these expectations has been outside the political realm, so forming these expectations for political leaders requires scrutiny. Research amongst Dutch MP’s by Linde & Vis (2017) suggests that the risk propensities aligned by prospect theory apply to their choices. However, Kowert & Hermann (1997) and Lebow (2008) show examples, in which heads of state made political and military gambles more risk-seeking than prospect theory’s standard predictions. There still appears to be a dark spot in our theories of risk.

Perhaps leaders’ personalities and their search for self-esteem increases their willingness to take risks. Leading a country is not a normal job and takes its toll on the psyche. In their analysis of UK and US heads of state, Owen and Davidson (2009) found an abundance of narcissistic, hubristic personality traits. Hubris, a Greek tragic concept, is a sense of overweening pride and confidence that may possess those who occupy the office of power.

The question that this thesis attempts to answer is the following: Why are political leaders sometimes more risk-accepting than prospect theory predicts? I argue that prospect theory is slightly reductive in its focus on material and financial reference points, and that self-esteem1

may - in addition to material incentives - influence the framing and choice outcomes of prospect theory. Following this lead, I look specifically at the condition of Hubris, which reflects self-esteem. Can Hubris influence risk propensities? Kowert and Hermann (1997) argue that the situational effects of prospect theory are only one stage of the risk-taking process. Other factors, such as character traits, lead to an increased

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6 chance of taking risks within their decision model and precede the situational effects of prospect theory. My hypothesis is that self-esteem makes political leaders more risk-accepting with respect to gains and very risk-accepting with respect to losses, contrary to the predictions of prospect theory.

First, I will discuss the relevance of studying leaders and their choices. Then, I explain the origins and central tenets of prospect theory, after which I will argue for a widening of the theory’s theoretical scope. After this, I introduce the concept of Hubris as a hypothetical cause for risk-acceptant behaviour. I set out how this interacts with prospect theory dynamics, and explore the value of the hypothesis in a qualitative comparative case study of Tony Blair. I end with general findings and recommendations for further research.

2. The impact of leaders and their choices

In our analysis of the past, we are susceptible to over-determination and succumb to a ‘hindsight bias’, attributing the cause of world events to sweeping structural factors that lead to an inevitable climax (Lebow, 2010, pp.8-9). The past, however, is far from parsimonious, and a single event or person may tip the scales. If events such as World War I or the end of the Cold War had been inevitable, they would have been more predictable at the time (Lebow, p.10). Although we cannot brush aside structural dynamics in international relations that grand theories such as liberalism or realism describe, history provides enough examples to suggest that the agency of leaders has a significant impact on International Relations. Hermann & Hagan (1998, p.126) suggest that leaders form their nation’s international and domestic constraints, as their perspective on international affairs influences what a government sees as available options. Contemporary leaders such as Trump and Putin, with their persona and eccentricities, have also led scholars to look to psychological explanations for political behaviour (Kertzer & Tingley, 2018, p.321). Greenstein (1967, p. 629) argues that we must look to leader’s personalities to gain a deeper understanding of political activity. Kaarbo & Hermann (1998), for example, have researched how personality differences between British prime ministers influence policy outcomes. Furthermore, existing grand theories rely on ‘implicit psychological assumptions’ that would be worthwhile to uncover (Goldgeier & Tetlock, 2001, p.68). Many theories entertain normative ideas on human nature and behaviour, which can be tested in empirical research. Political psychology can contribute in the explanation of historical events, to a deeper understanding of existing theory, and as a crucible, helping to connect relevant insights from existing grand theories in an actor-centred approach. (Kaarbo, 2015, p.209). These factors make political psychology a valuable branch of research in International Relations.

It is important to look at the conditions that must be in place for a leader to ‘count’. It seems reckless to assume a puritan, unimpeded form of agency, studied in isolation. Leaders’ personal impact is context-dependent, and grows when the environment is open to change (Post, 2004, p.18) and admits of restructuring (Greenstein, 1967, p. 634), such as in situations that require a swift political or military response. On crisis management, Boin (2017, p.3) mentions that citizens look to their leaders in times

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7 of crisis. Leaders may have to drop old procedures in order to adapt to the new status quo. Hermann & Hagan (1998) mention that during international crises, elites’ ‘experiences, fears, interests and expectations’ are more likely to influence policy, as time pressure necessitates decisions that are less democratic and participatory (p.128). Crises often compel leaders to make choices under conditions of uncertainty (Kowert & Hermann, 1997, p.612). It appears that crises are an adequate setting to investigate the risk that political leaders take.

3. The theoretical purchase of prospect theory

3.1 A theory of taking risks

As politics is a game of uncertain outcomes, we need a theory of risk to understand foreign policy choices (Kowert & Hermann, 1997, p.612). When faced with dilemmas, we make choices that may be either risk-seeking or risk-averse (Kahneman, Tversky, & Pallak, 1984, p.341). Some believe that rational principles guide these decisions. Expected Utility Theory is a prescriptive decision model fundamental to rational choice theory, widely employed in political science and economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.263; Linde & Vis, 2017, p.101). Within this theory, individual’s decisions are subordinate to principles of rationality such as invariance, dominance and transitivity of preferences (McDermott, 2004a, p.148; McDermott, 2004b, p.291; Kahneman et al., 1984, p.343). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory as an alternative explanation for how people make risks. Contrary to expected utility theory, prospect theory is descriptive, steering clear of normative claims about human nature (McDermott, 2004b, pp. 291-292). While the rationalist assumption is that choices are outcome-orientated and independent from the particularities of their presentation, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argue that our choices are also determined by how they are framed. In their fictional crisis2_{, participants decide between options with a different formulation of equal outcomes – defined by} the number of lives saved or lives lost. When outcomes are framed as gains, individuals are risk-averse, while when framed as losses, they are risk-seeking. Risk-taking behaviour thus differs, while both outcomes have the same utility. In short, prospect theory considers situational and perception effects, by explaining how options are framed and weighted under conditions of risk (McDermott, 2004a, pp. 148-149).

Empirical research appears to support the premise that risk-taking behaviour changes with the prospect of either loss or gain (Levy, 1992, p.284; McDermott, 2004b, pp.290-291). If an individual stands to lose something, she is more inclined to be risk-seeking, while if there is something to be won, she is inclined to be risk-averse (McDermott, 2004b, p.291). This inclination is confirmed in several experiments by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.268; 1981, p.453) and Kahneman et al. (1984, p.342).

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8 In many historical cases, prospect theory can give an accurate description of why actors take risks (McDermott, 2004b, p.292). McDermott (1992) uses prospect theory to explain why Carter chose for a rescue mission during the Iranian hostage crisis. She sets out how he was in domain of losses domestically and how the options to resolve the crisis where presented to him by his advisors. Carter made a risky military decision in order to return to the status quo, while his Secretary of State Vance, who did not perceive the US as being in a domain of losses, disagreed with the mission (p.248). This is exemplifies the significance of perception. The reference point for individuals is subjective: Whether an outcome is perceived as a loss or gain vis à vis their perception of the status quo, is guiding in choices that individuals make.

In her study of Roosevelt during the Munich Crisis, Farnham (1992) explains how Roosevelt changed from being risk-averse to risk-acceptant by a frame change that led him to view war on the European continent as a loss. These case studies provide an adequate explanation of preferences and decisions that expected utility theory is unable to explain.

3.2 Beyond prospect theory

Despite its empirical foothold and applicability to real world events, prospect theory does not rule out all anomalies. According to the theory, actors are inclined to be risk-averse when faced with the prospect of gain. In empirical research, one third of subjects do not display the predicted framing effects (Kowert & Hermann, 1997, p.613). Kowert & Hermann (1997, p.630) mention several historical examples in which political and military leaders show a remarkably high willingness to take risks. Scanning through the pages of history, certain ‘black swan’ cases may surface in which political leaders appear to take risks to gain something even from a position of relative comfort. After wresting control over most of Europe by 1811, Napoleon took the risk to invade Russia (Gompert et al., 2014, p.41). Although the invasion was in accordance with his plans to submit the European continent (Parker, 1990, p.145), Russia did not form an existential threat and Napoleon misjudged his ability to shape events. (Gompert et al., 2014, p.42). Leading up to World War I, Wilhelm II pursued a risk-acceptant and aggressive strategy from a position of economic comfort (Lebow, 2008 p.365). Both leaders appeared to show a tendency to be risk acceptant in the domain of gains, at a specific moment in their political lives. These examples suggest a psychological cause that influenced the willingness of these leaders to take great risks, against better judgement. Heads of state like Napoleon, Wilhelm and many others form a special category. Perhaps their previous successes and the grandeur of their position led to overconfidence. Post (2017, p.218) asserts that leaders’ narcissistic traits, evident in their search for self-esteem and dreams of glory is a drive that has – positively and negatively - affected world history. Cases like the above do not form a watertight dismissal of prospect theory dynamics but they do raise the question if there could be a theoretical explanation for anomalies.

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4. The role of identity in prospect theory

Prospect theory was developed to explain anomalies, but as mentioned, some cases leave even prospect theorists at a loss for answers. Levy (2003, p. 219) briefly discusses the possibility of gambling. Such risk-seeking behaviour for the prospect of gain may be caused by a tendency to overweight small probabilities (p.219). Levy looks solely to financial examples and experiments to explain this – concerning insurances and betting behaviour (p.219). Experiments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.268; 1984, p.342; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p.453) have been predominantly concerned with consumer preferences, market dynamics and the framing of outcomes in numbers, and this economic reference point is also chosen in descriptive research, such as in Elms (2004) or Camerer (2003). However, immaterial factors may also influence our preferences and drive our choices. According to Lebow (2008, p.365), prospect theory is mostly developed and tested for material motives, such as in the economic and utility dominated experiments mentioned above. Based on historical examples and empirical research3 (pp.134-135) he argues that when motives concerning identity and self-esteem come into play, actors are risk-accepting concerning gains and very risk-accepting concerning losses, as we attribute a greater weight to identity motives in our risk-assessment.Ergo, the reference point that actors adopt in their choices is variable: It may be either identity or material related depending on an individual or culture, influencing the outcomes of prospect theory.

Lebow places prospect theory in the light of his cultural theory, presented in his book A Cultural Theory of International Relations (2008). Lebow argues that the choices of individuals and groups are guided by human drives/motives, the balance of which may differ on the individual and group level (p.567). Lebow distinguishes the drives Spirit and Appetite, one of which will always be more dominant than the other (p.510). Spirit leads individuals and groups to pursue self-esteem, honour and standing, and to be highly defensive about these values. Its manifestation is dependent on our definitions of esteem, justice and shame, which may differ across cultures (p.126). Societies where the drive Appetite dominates are motivated by material interests and will fit the liberalist worldview (p. 509). Where the drive Spirit dominates, the need for self-esteem is the highest good and the identity of actors and the groups they belong to is a primary motive for action (p.509). The balance of these values may change from society to society across time and place. In general, Lebow argues that existing theories underestimate the impact of Spirit as a human motive and a catalyst for change. The Spirit drive incites individuals to gratify their need for self-esteem, and to pursue honour and standing (Lebow, 2008, p.509). This pursuit is often costly and contrasts with what material incentives would lead us to do (p.509). When unconstrained, it may cause nations and their leaders to start uncertain wars, gambling their security (p.509).

3_{Lebow (2008, p.135) discusses a research program called Terror Management Theory (TMT). Relevant}

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10 Lebow primarily applies his theory of drives on a societal level, although he acknowledges the balance of drives in individuals as a necessary level of analysis (p. 563). What drives individuals and leaders ultimately affects the culture of the group they belong to.

When applying Lebow’s Spirit / Appetite division to prospect theory, the latter appears to be mostly a theory of appetite and material motives. The reference points that actors in experiments have, to determine their relative loss or gain, are often economical and numerical, described in terms of utility. His theory invites to look at identity, the need for self-esteem and search for standing of actors to explain risk-seeking behaviour.

5. Spirit and risk-acceptant behaviour

5.1 Hubris: A manifestation of Spirit on the individual level

Although Lebow works out the concept of Spirit on a socio-cultural level in several case studies, he does not operationalize it for the individual. He defines Spirit loosely and broadly to capture the cultural differences and forms of expression that it might have. I attempt to operationalize a manifestation of Spirit in the individual by focussing on the element of self-esteem. In his research on Hubris amongst scholars and politicians, Stebbins (2017) defines Hubris as an expression of self-esteem. A central theme in Greek myth and tragedy, Hubris (ὕβρις) was a ‘sense of overweening pride and confidence’ (Birch, D., & Hooper, K, 2012).4

Yet Hubris is also a contemporary phenomenon. Fetweiss (2013, p.188) states that hubris, ‘the behavioural manifestation of narcissism’, can be found when researching both states and individuals. When making decisions in conditions of risk, it has the effect of lowering expectations of costs while increasing expectations of success (p.188). Fetweiss illustrates this effect in reference to U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. Due to their view of the US as messianic hegemon, U.S. senior officials were unrealistically optimistic of the military invasion in 2003. (p.186). Hubris leads to a pursuit of intuitive judgements, unchecked by analyses on how these judgements relate to reality (Claxton et al., 2015, p.66).

Hubris is a political phenomenon. It is encouraged by the political arena, as inflating your image and capabilities is rewarded electorally (Stebbins, 2017, p.48). Hubris uses experience of the past to formulate an - unrealistic - expectation of success (p.14). Stebbins names the example of Trump priding on his success in business as an important qualification for the office of president. Hubris also causes leaders to become ignorant to advice and to isolate their decision-making process (Fetweiss, 2013, p.188). Although experience may naturally boost confidence in leaders (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2013, p.372), Hubris is more pernicious than ‘regular’ overconfidence, as it has a pathological element to it, Owen and Davidson (2009) argue.

4_{A tragic example is Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone, who defies the will of the Gods and the people of Thebe,}

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11 In their analysis of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers, Owen and Davidson (2009) describe Hubris as a position-related personality disorder: It is an abnormal condition, a mental illness that occurs only upon assuming an office of power. Their profile of the hubristic leader can be summarized as someone who is obsessed with self-image, is excessively overconfident, and led by a staunch, personal moral vision that he or she is not easily dissuaded from. In Owen and Davidson’s analysis, many leaders have hubristic traits, but only a few had Hubris.

Based on the classical understanding of Hubris and the abovementioned authors, I have chosen to define hubris as a special condition of overconfidence that a leader may develop in a position of power, with several defining aspects: (1) A preoccupation with personal image, (2) an overconfidence in their personal judgement and isolation of decision-making, disregarding advice, and (3) a prioritization of personal moral vision above practicalities.

5.2 A three-stage model of decision making

Hubris, as a manifestation of Lebow’s Spirit on an individual level, affects aspects of a Leaders’ personality. As mentioned, the expectation is that Spirit also influences the outcomes of prospect theory. It is important to clarify how this might happen. The conventional decision model of prospect theory is comprised of two stages; a framing stage and a decision stage (Kowert & Hermann, 1997, p. 620). In the framing stage, a frame of gain5_{leads to risk aversion, while a frame of loss}6_{leads to risk acceptance} (p.620). Based on their research, Kowert and Hermann propose a three-stage model of risk-taking that incorporates individual differences in personality (p.625). Here personal style precedes the framing stage and influences the outcomes of the decision stage: Agreeable leaders have a tendency to be risk-averse, while sensation seekers and intuitive leaders are inclined to be more risk-acceptant. Hubris affects personality, and will, congruent to the differences in character described by Kowert and Hermann, precede the framing stage. The hypothetical influence of Spirit is illustrated in figure 1. This model is a more specific rendition of the three-stage model presented by Kowert and Herman (p. 626).

Figure 1: Hypothetical influence of Spirit on the outcomes of prospect theory

5_{An individual is facing an opportunity for gain} 6_{An individual faces the prospect of a loss}

Spirit Manifested as Hubris Risk acceptance Risk aversion Intensifies Prospect theory Loss/Gain

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6. Method

The uniqueness of Hubris, the multiplicity of indicators and the context-dependence of risk-taking behaviour make a qualitative case study most suitable for exploring the relationship between Spirit and risk-acceptant behaviour. A case study also creates room for process, besides outcome (Kaarbo and Beasly, 1999 p.388), which is especially important when examining the decision-making process of political leaders. The focus of this case study is to explore and refine theory in the subject area, and provide a stepping-stone for further, more rigorous research. Its aim is to be hypothesis-generating as described by Lijphart (1971 p. 692), to illustrate how Lebow’s Spirit can be operationalized on the level of the individual Leader.

I investigate if Spirit is present and influences the tendency to be more risk-seeking, and if this behaviour can be explained by prospect theory alone. I investigate how a leader frames the situation and options, and how they are weighted. According to Lebow’s expectations, a ‘spirited’ political leader will be risk-seeking within the domain of gains, or highly risk-seeking within the domain of losses. Risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of gains is the best test of my theory, as a difference between risk-seeking7 and highly risk-seeking8 in the domain of losses is difficult to determine. However, whether a leader is in a domain of gains or losses, is hard to predict a priori.

I will look at a specific crisis, as these are events in which leaders have most autonomy and are confronted with high-risk decisions. A choice is a risk when there is uncertainty and unpredictability of outcomes. A hubristic, overconfident leader is expected to tolerate a higher level of uncertainty of outcomes than a non-hubristic leader.

In their analysis of leaders, Owen and Davidson (2009) diagnose Tony Blair with Hubris, and in a more detailed case study Owen (2008) sets out how Blair developed Hubris over his time in office. To examine the effect of Spirit on his decision-making and sensitivity to risk, I compare the period where Blair was hubristic to the period before in a Most Similar Systems Design.

I am interested in the influence of independent variable Spirit - manifested as Hubris - on Blair’s risk-seeking behaviour as a dependent variable. Similarly, Kowert and Hermann (1997) investigated the influence of personality on the framing and decision stage. In my cases, after a brief contextual introduction, I will explain whether Blair was hubristic and how he framed and weighted his options.

The British intervention in Kosovo changed Blair. Owen (2008) points to the war in Kosovo as the point from which Blair started to show signs of Hubris. Kampfner (2003) refers to Kosovo as a change in worldview. Dyson (2009, p.47) also sees Kosovo as a transformative experience, fueling his moral determination and centralization of power.

7_{Standard prospect theory prediction} 8_{Lebow’s expectation}

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13 Before this moment is Operation Desert Fox, the intervention in Iraq in 1998. I analyze Blair’s account in the decision to fight this war and how he framed and weighted his options. In 2003, the UK and the US, without multilateral support, invaded Iraq to force a regime change, under the pretense that Saddam had acquired WMDs9_{. This moment was after the war in Kosovo. I analyze Blair’s account in} the decision to fight this second war and investigate again how Blair framed and weighted his options. These cases are similar because they involve the same political leader, in close negotiation with the US, faced with the option to intervene in a certain way in the same dictatorship, while Saddam repeatedly disregarded UN inspections searching for WMDs.

Table 1: A Most Similar Systems Design

9_{Weapons of Mass Destruction}

Case 1: Iraq 1998 Case 2. Iraq 2003 Dependent variable: Expected

Risk-propensity

Normal risk-acceptance.

Risk-averse in the domain of gains or Risk acceptant in the domain of losses

Increased risk-acceptance.

Risk-acceptant in the domain of gains or highly risk-acceptant in the domain of losses

Independent variable: Presence of Spirit, manifested in Hubris

No Hubris Hubris

Similarity Uncertainty over Saddam’s possession of WMDs War against Saddam’s Ba’athist regime

Close cooperation and negotiation with the US UN inspections

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7. Case study

7.1 Context

After three years of leading Labour, Tony Blair succeeded conservative John Mayor as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1997. With Labour obtaining a majority of 179 seats in the House of Commons, the election was a decisive one, owing partly to his laborious project of transforming the party into New Labour, also referred to as the Third Way (Kavanagh & Seldon, 1999, p.3). With it, ‘rising star’ Blair became the youngest and most popular PM of the century. Following his election, Blair enjoyed almost unanimous approval from the British population (Jones, 1999, p.1).

At a glance, Blair’s preoccupation with foreign policy stands out amongst his fellow prime ministers: He has fought more wars than any British MP. This is remarkable when taking into consideration that he had no affinity with foreign affairs at all before acquiring office (de Waard, 2007, p.185; Kampfner, 2003, p.5). In his General Election campaign, Blair saw foreign policy as a side issue (Kampfner, 2003, p.4). In the run-up to his election as MP, his right-hand Mandelson wondered whether the young Labour politician would be able to make military decisions, observing that he had not made any mention of defense (Kampfner, 2003, p.9). Upon assuming office, Blair had to be briefed on a plethora of foreign policy issues (Kampfner, 2003, p.10). In contrast, most of his tenure would be defined by foreign policy, emanating from the prime ministerial office at Downing street Number Ten, while then-Chancellor Gordon Brown was left in charge of domestic matters (Dyson, 2009,p.38). This makes Blair’s foreign policy a representative domain to investigate his risk-behaviour as a politician.

Blair’s doctrine of interventionism appears to have surfaced only when he became prime minister. In 1982, at an early stage in his political career, Blair was criticised for a comment on Thatcher’s Falkland war. In an interview, he stressed the importance of diplomacy and negotiations. He was subsequently accused by the media of being an anti-patriot (Kampfner, 2003, p.6).

The above suggests that a change took place in Blair’s views on foreign policy, and begs the question if his character also played a role in this change and his risky foreign policy choices.10

10_{Dyson (2009) carried out a content analysis of Blair’s discussions on foreign policy in House of Commons, and grouped the content}

annually (p.33). He observes an above average need for power, low conceptual complexity and a high belief in the ability to control events. Dyson (p.154) sets out how these traits are manifested in Blair’s behaviour in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003). He leaves out Blair’s first intervention in Iraq in his analysis, for no clear reason. His conclusions on Blair’s character strengthen the suggestion that Blair was abnormally overconfident, but do not appear to signal a clear trend or a development over time of certain characteristics, contrary to Owen (2008).

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7.2 Case 1: Iraq 1998

Blair’s first military intervention was approximately one and a half year after his triumphant election victory and assuming the office of Prime Minister. On 16 December 1998, in response to Saddam’s repeated obstruction of UN weapon inspections, the US and UK held a bombing campaign against Iraq (Kampfner, 2003, p.27; Condron, 1999). To legitimate this, they relied on earlier passed UN resolutions for legitimacy, but had no mandate from the Security Council (Landale & Inglefield, 1998). Iraq had been threatened earlier with military repercussions would they fail to cooperate with UN inspections, which had raised the stakes considerably. A month earlier, following the Iraqi’s initial refusal to cooperate with UN weapon inspections11, American Bombers were already in the air when the UN received a letter from Saddam promising ‘clear and unconditional’ cooperation with the inspectors (Hamilton & Dettmer, 1998). When the inspections were subsequently hindered again, the US an UK decided that the only option to protect their credibility was to strike without further negotiation, as there was no additional ultimatum to be posed.

Independent variable: Spirit, manifested as Hubris

At the time, Blair did not show signs of Hubris. Although the risks were marginal, Blair was sensitive to the risks involved. While the RAF were in the air, Blair was described as ‘distinctly nervous’, until he knew that they had returned home safely (Kampfner, 2003, p.32). After the attacks, he was ‘cool and rational’ in his discussion of the mission and considerate of the domestic complexities in Iraq, a contrast with the restlessness and moral fervour in his discussion of later missions (Owen, 2008 p.255).

Did Blair perceive the situation as a domain of gains or lossess?

From the perspective of public opinion, Blair was in a winning position and expected to become a successful leader (Owen, 2008 p.255.). His role following the death of Diana – famously dubbing her ‘the people’s princess’ – and his part in the Good Friday agreement had earned him national and international recognition (de Waard, 2007, p.183).

Blair himself was troubled over the situation, however. He reportedly described Saddam as an evil dictator that posed a growing threat to peace and stability in the region (Kampfner, 2003, p.33). Blair had a moral view of international affairs and felt a responsibility to act. Relinquishing this responsibility had a significant moral cost. One could contend that he perceived the situation as a domain of losses, with respect to his moral reference point. He referred to the dangers of appeasing to Saddam as ‘deadly serious’, referring to the UNSCOM report finished by head of inspections Robert Butler on December the 15th (Kampfner, 2003, p.22).

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16 What were Blair’s options?

One was to forfeit the threat of military repercussions but to keep up the pressure of inspections and diplomacy and keep scrutinizing Saddam. The air strikes meant war and for that, UNSCOM had to be pulled back - and they would not be allowed back in. Blair did not see this as an option, however (Kampfner, 2003, p.33). There were also more radical options. When asked earlier in 1998, Blair stated that he did not intend to enforce a regime change in Iraq: ‘It is not for us to say who should be president of Iraq’ (Owen, 2008, p.254). Discussing Desert Fox in House of Commons, Blair stated that a full-scale invasion to depose Saddam would be an overreaching mission with only a slim chance of success (Landale, 1998). In his statement to Commons on the day of the attack, Blair motivated the air strike as a last resort, remaining as the only option after Saddam’s repeated failure of co-operation. The objectives of the war were limited. Blair mentioned keywords such as ‘degrading’ Saddam’s ability to build and use WMDs, ‘diminishing’ his threat in the region and ‘weakening’ his military capabilities (Landale, 1998; Hamilton & Dettmer, 1998). Internationally and domestically, the air strike option did not face much opposition. The majority of MPs in the house backed the decision to attack Iraq (Webster, 1998).

Dependent variable: Was his decision risk-seeking or risk-averse?

Blair was only slightly risk-seeking in his decision to intervene: There were other, less risky alternatives than a military intervention. However, a high-risk option - boots on the ground – was ruled out, and he described the objectives of the mission in cautious terms. Blair felt morally that the intervention was required, but he did not overreach in this judgement. There was discussion between Blair and Clinton after pulling back and reading the letter from Saddam (Kampfner, 2003, p.31), with his – false – renewed promise to comply with inspections. Clinton, in disbelief, suggested to restart the attacks the next day, while Blair felt that the timing was wrong, and urged Clinton to wait (Kampfner, 2003, p. 31).

7.3 Case 2: Iraq 2003

Following the events of 1998, the US and the UK had spent their best efforts. With the UN inspectors gone, Saddam had considerable freedom to pursue his own ends (Kampfner, 2003, p.153). No-fly zones and UN economic sanctions were enacted against Iraq, but Saddam’s threat was not diminished (Owen, 2008, p.269) and sanctions did not have the expected political effect, but only worsened humanitarian conditions (Kampfner, 2003, p. 153). There was a growing humanitarian concern for how Saddam let national health deteriorate and oppressed Shiite and Kurdish minorities, and it was clear that the US and UK policy of containment was failing (Owen, 2008, p.269; Kampfner, 2003, p.155).

The Bush administration, following 9/11, repeatedly expressed the intention to intervene in Iraq, to combat ‘terrorism in its broadest sense’ (Kampfner, 2003, p.156). Blair was supportive of the US policy and saw a threat in Saddam’s regime, but invading Iraq was never openly discussed in cabinet before 2003 (Kampfner, p.157).

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17 In April 2002, meeting Bush at Crawford, Blair had already privately agreed to Bush to commit to an invasion in Iraq (Kampfner, 2003, p.191). Blair and Bush were determined that Saddam had to go, but in the following months, Blair did not yet show this to the public (Kampfner, 2003, p.169). Blair needed a reason for war that would convince the British public and the UN. On September the 24th_, Blair released a government dossier on Iraqi WMDs to frame the threat, but it only contained evidence of a potential threat (Dyson, 2009, p.99). UN inspectors were sent, and this time encountered greater Iraqi cooperation, while Blair and Bush anxiously waited for the report, hoping that their justification for a war would not disappear. The 12.000-page declaration was vague and unsatisfying. The UK and US lose their faith in the UN inspections (Kampfner, 2003, p.233). As the US grows more and more impatient (Kampfner, 2003, p.293), Blair fails to get a second resolution at the UN to justify the war, when it is only supported by four countries (de Waard, 2007, p.338; Kampfner, 2003, p.296).

On the 13th of March 2003, Bush tells Blair that the waiting game is over, and the decision to go to war the next week is made (Kampfner, 2003, p.295-296). On the 18th of March, Blair addresses House of Commons and says that it is time for the house to show that they stand for justice. Blair stated that, although intelligence was sensitive and circumstantial, the threat Saddam posed was ‘real and growing’. People would have to trust him. A last motion against the war fails in the House of Commons, and on the 20th_{of March, Bagdad is under fire (de Waard, 2007, p.341).}

Independent variable: Spirit manifested as Hubris

By 2003, Blair had developed Hubris. Owen (2008) mentions that during the Kosovo Crisis Blair began to grow in his personal dominance and overconfidence in foreign affairs. Owen and Davidson (2009, p.7) describe it as a turning point, from which Hubris began to develop. In this section, I set out how Blair exhibited Hubris, looking at the aspects found in theory.

(1) A preoccupation with personal image

By 2002, Blair is convinced of his historical interventionist mission in his country and the world (de Waard, 2007, p.294). Owen (2008) suggests that Blair became preoccupied with his image. Travelling around the world following 9/11, Blair was able to preach his narrative of good and evil. He was preoccupied with presentation, wanted to be in the centre of media attention, and attributed to himself a crucial role concerning the situation in Iraq, stating that he was ‘the one Western Leader the US will really listen to’ (Owen, 2008, p.265).

This attitude became apparent in Blair’s push towards a second UN resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, even though he saw the invasion as inevitable (Dyson, 2009, p.103). Blair set himself at the centre of the project of framing the Iraqi threat; it was part of his personal mission. He released a dodgy dossier based on speculative intelligence, plagiarized and fabricated information, claiming that Iraq had WMDs that it could fire within forty-five minutes against British targets (Dyson, 2009, p.103). It had a personal foreword by Blair. Foreign secretary Jack Straw had not known anything

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18 about the dossier, and Leader of the House Robin Cook referred to it as Blairs’ ‘glorious, spectacular, own goal’ (Dyson, 2009, p.104).

(2) An overconfidence in personal judgement and isolation of decision-making, disregarding advice From 2001 onwards, Blair further increased his autonomy by centralizing the power of 10 Downing Street, where he established his own secretariats (Hoggett, 2005, p.425; Owen, 2008, p.258). Owen (2008, p,258) describes the reduction of cabinet influence on these matters as hubristic vandalism. Kavanagh & Seldon (1999, p.301) compare Blair’s early tendency of bringing in his own trusted senior advisors into Number Ten to the way a US president brings his own team to the White house. Foreign Office feels these changes as Blair increasingly sidelines the institution (Kampfner, 2003, p.235). Between 9/11 and 2003, British ambassador in Washington had not a single policy discussion with Foreign Office, compared to an abundance of contact with number Ten (Owen, 2008, p.265). During the Iraq war of 2003, Blair was reluctant to engage parliament in decision-making (Kampfner, 2003, p.301), and failed to provide the cabinet with detailed briefings (Hoggett, 2005, p.425).

(1) A prioritization of personal moral vision above practicalities

In line with Dyson’s (2009) judgement on Blair’s low complexity, Owen (2008, p.261) mentions that Blair increasingly preferred a ‘Language of certainty and simplicity’ to a ‘language of nuance and qualification’, with zealous undertones.

On 24th_{of September 2002, presenting a report on WMDs in the House of Commons, Blair} describes Saddam’s WMDs programme as active, detailed and growing, giving his intelligence services the benefit of the doubt (Kampfner, 2003, p.202). ‘We cannot publish everything we know’ Blair said, while the agencies had actually used ‘Just about everything we had’, according to a senior official (Kampfner, 2003, p.203). Despite his confident public affirmation of the evidence, Blair reportedly had his doubts, but hoped and felt he was right (Kampfner, 2003, p.207). Hoggett (2005, p.219) states that Blair blurred the distinction between the potential and imminent threat of Saddam’s regime. Inconclusive raw evidence spurred worst-case scenario thinking and was enough to confirm his clear-cut moral convictions.

When discussing the details of the Iraq mission, Blair was immune to all arguments about practical difficulties that might ensue, but simplified everything in a moral visor. He reportedly said, ‘I am Winston Churchill and Saddam is Hitler’ and was insensitive to the complexities of Iraqi society, mainly seeking affirmation of his belief that removing Saddam would remove evil from Iraq (Owen, 2008, p.276).

Blair believed that his moral choices would be judged by History or God. In a last meeting before the invasion with Bush and Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, Blair says that in his job, one should not choose the easy way but the right way, and that he will be judged by History (de Waard, 2007,

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19 p.340). In hindsight, referring to Iraq, Blair said ‘If you have faith about these things then you realize that judgement is made by other people. If you believe in God, it’s made by God as well’ (Owen & Davidson, 2009, p.7).

To sum up, leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, Blair shows himself to be occupied with his own esteem, excessively overconfident, and entrenched in a staunch moral vision.

Did Blair perceive the situation as a domain of gains or losses?

For Blair, Saddam threatened the status quo. I contend that he perceived himself and the UK to be in a domain of losses. This is apparent from his moral condemnation of Saddam’s regime and his securitization of the threat.

Owen (2008 p.271) states that Blair, on discussing the invasion with him personally, had a rigid determination, complete confidence in himself and a restless, hyperactive manner. Blair was messianic, focused on toppling Saddam for moral reasons. The goal of the war was regime change (Owen, 2008 p.271). Kampfner (2003, p.173) posits that Blair was not ‘dragged into the war against Iraq’ but that it was simply in accordance with his own beliefs.

In his New Year’s message (Kampfner, 2003, p.234), referring, amongst other threats, to Iraq, Blair said: ‘The future of Britain is at stake, whether we survive and prosper or decline in the face of this insecurity depends crucially on the political decisions Britain now takes’. To the public, he repeatedly stressed the imminent danger of Saddam’s pursuit of WMDs and a nuclear option: ‘It must be a preoccupation of the entire world’ (Kampfner, 2003 p.198); ‘I for one do not want it on my conscience that we knew of the threat, saw it coming and did nothing’ (Tempest, 2002). On the eve of the war, Blair addressed the British nation, stating that Saddam ‘posed a danger to each and every Briton’, an unprecedented threat to British security (Kampfner, 2003, p.312). He suggested that Saddam had WMDs and was ready to use them (Kampfner, 2003 p.312).

With this relentless, arguably reckless pursuit of his moral convictions, Blair gambled his position: He was met with great opposition both domestically and internationally. During the war, however, Blair was ‘possessed with certainty’, as Stothard12 (2003 p.3) describes.

What were Blair’s options?

Contrary to operation Desert Fox, Blair did not exhibit any willingness to discuss alternatives to an invasion. Even when faced with fierce opposition internationally, in parliament, and from the public, he did not produce a formal government paper setting out the options (Kampfner, 2003, p.295). Blair’s mind on invading Iraq was made up early, motivated primarily from a moral perspective. Although he did not show this to the public, he believed war to be inevitable and was simply searching for means to convince the international community, parliament and the public of this. In 2002, Blair had two worries:

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20 That the Americans would go at it alone, without the UN and without him, and that Britain would join a military mission breaking international law, endangering his party and government (Kampfner, 2003, p.192).

Not invading and further coercing Saddam was not an option, even though some proposed it. In 2002, an ‘Iraq Briefing’ was held for Labour MPs. Saddam’s regime was a ‘demonstrable threat to the stability of the region’, with human rights abuses and violations of UN resolutions, and a capacity to redevelop WMDs in a couple years’ time. The briefing advocated for a return of UN inspectors, as previous teams had contained Saddam’s military ambitions considerably (Kampfner, 2003, p. 165). In September 2002, Blair was not eager to give Saddam more time. He told journalists: ‘inaction is not an option’ (Kampfner, 2003, p.196). After the invasion, UN secretary Kofi Annan ruefully stated that, had the US and UK been prepared to wait longer, the international community could have enforced Saddam’s compliance peacefully, or intervened with far greater legitimacy (Kampfner, 2003, pp.311-312).

Blair strove to sell the invasion domestically and internationally. He sought UN approval, and pushed for a second resolution providing the war with full legitimacy, but did not succeed (Kampfner, 2003, p.192). The UN route had to be taken in order to convince Labour and the British public; regime change and the threat of WMDs alone was not convincing enough. Blair also pressed the US to commit to a plan for peace between Israel and Palestine, in order to frame the coalition’s invasion as part of a broader policy for peace in the Middle East (Kampfner, 2003, p.308).

Was his decision risk-seeking or risk-averse?

A complete risk-assessment, containing an overview of policy alternatives and their prospected risks, was not part of Blair’s approach to Iraq in 2003. Foreign affairs and Defense had expressed their worries on the legality and the risks of the war (Kampfner, 2003, p.305), but Blair had reserved the decision-making to himself and was only counselled by a close circle of handpicked advisors at Number Ten. Blair knew that he was risking his job, but took this risk willingly. ‘When people ask me why am I willing to risk everything on this politically, I do not want to be the Prime Minister when people point the finger back from history and say: “You knew those two threats were there and you did nothing about it”’(Kampfner, 2003, p.266). Blair confided privately: ‘This could lose me my job. I may have to pay the price for doing what I think is right’ (Kampfner, 2003, p. 195). ‘Sometimes it [unpopularity] is the price of leadership and the cost of conviction’, Blair said to a stop the war rally in February 2003 (de Waard, 2007, p.337; Kampfner, 2003, p.273).

In 2002, Owen speaks with Blair and hears of his plans to commit to Bush’ Iraq invasion. He asks him in detail about the consequences, but Blair did not want to explore them (Owen, 2008, p.270). Since Number 10 drove Iraq policy, efforts made by the Foreign Office to engage with the US on the aftermath also came to nothing (Owen, 2008, p.278). Major General Cross told Blair that post-war planning was incoherent, but Blair did not seem alarmed (Owen, 2008. p.279). De Waard (2007, p.328)

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21 mentions that Blair never wanted to think of an exit strategy. Based on the above I contend that Blair’s approach to Iraq in 2003 was profoundly risk-seeking.

Blair knew he was taking a risk, but had an unwavering moral conviction to do so, and firmly believed in his own moral judgement that what he was doing was right. This was an a priori conviction. It was not a conclusion based on a comprehensive analysis of the consequences.

8. Conclusion and General Findings

The question I have attempted to answer is the following: Why are political leaders sometimes more risk-accepting than prospect theory predicts? I have argued that studying the risk-assessment of leaders is relevant to the field of International relations. Especially during crises, the choices of leaders can make a difference. I have assessed the value of expected utility theory and prospect theory for explaining how leaders take risks and have found that political leaders may sometimes be unusually risk-seeking. Inspired by Lebow (2008), I proposed that self-esteem, - attributed to Spirit - might be a drive for actors to exhibit this kind of behaviour. In order to operationalize Lebow’s Spirit for the individual, I hypothesized that Hubris, as an element of personality that reflects self-esteem, precedes any situational effects of prospect theory and may intensify actors’ risk-seeking behaviour, just like other character traits do in Kowert & Hermann’s (1997) decision model.

To investigate the value of this operationalization and the hypothesized relationship, I compared Blair’s attitude to risk regarding the 1998 British intervention in Iraq with the invasion of 2003. I researched if he was in a domain of gains or in a domain of loss. In both cases, Blair framed the situation in Iraq as morally deplorable, and as a threat to the status quo of world peace. I therefore believe that he perceived to be in a domain of loss.

This study certainly does not dismiss the effects of prospect theory. The predicted effects of prospect theory are dependent on an actor’s perception of the status quo. In his moral fervour, Blair saw Saddam’s ‘evil’ dictatorship as a stain on the fabric of world peace that had to be removed in order to return to the status quo. This could explain why Blair started both interventions, in conformation with the predictions of prospect theory: He was risk-seeking in a domain of loss. However, one would not be able to explain the comparatively high risk that Blair takes in 2003, side-lining an adequate risk assessment, insensitive to the complexities and the aftermath of the mission. It was a mission he saw as inevitable - An option that he had earlier deemed far too risky, when considering it during operation Desert Fox.

It appears that Blair’s developed Hubris led him to pursue a moral vision without room for nuance and practicalities of policymaking, simplifying a highly complex situation. The battle against evil had a higher priority for Blair than an adequate risk-assessment.

Dyson (2009, p.29) attributes Blair’s overconfidence to his character. In the case study, both cases involve Blair making a decision, while he appears to be more risk-tolerant in the second case. This suggest that Blair’s character is not the only variable. Dyson bases his trait analysis on Blair’s

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22 foreign policy discussions in House of Commons, concerning four consecutive interventions, but excludes operation Desert Fox. It would be relevant for further research to investigate how character and Hubris interact. Hubris and self-esteem in general, remain elusive concepts to define and operationalize, but this does not mean that we ought to stop trying.

Hogett, (2005, p.425) mentions how groupthink at Number Ten could have influenced the decision-making leading up to the 2003 war. For further study it might be worthwhile to research the effects of Blair’s entourage.

Returning to the broader picture, the best test of Lebow’s Spirit’s influence on risk-behaviour would be a situation where a leader is risk-seeking in the domain of gains. However, I doubt whether risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of gains exists. Even though an actor is in a material position of economic comfort13, he or she may perceive to be in a domain of losses due to Spirit-related motives. I believe that Lebow is right in stressing the influence of Spirit on risk-behaviour, but that this is in line with prospect theory predictions concerning the domain of loss or gain. Prospect theory would do well to incorporate non-material motives, and it would be worthwhile to further investigate empirically how the difference between material / Spirit motives influences individuals’ risk-tolerance in a domain of losses.

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Prospect theory and identity: Why leaders take risks against all odds