China’s institutional choices: The rationale behind the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

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1 Master Thesis

Political Science: International Politics Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

China’s Institutional Choices:

the rationale behind the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Pieter Redelijkheid s. 1530070 Supervisor Dr. N.R.J.B. Blarel Second reader Dr. G.K. Hirschmann January 10th 2019 Word count: 9374

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2 Abstract

This study aims to reveal China’s rationale for establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The existing literature can be divided in two sharply contrasting interpretations. On the one hand, the creation of the AIIB has been considered as part of China’s social competition strategy. On the other hand, the establishment of the AIIB has been regarded as part of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy. This study tests the relevance of both of these assumptions, that are derived from social identity theory, by examining primary sources related to the Chinese government, notably statements from Xi Jinping and Jin Liqun. A systematic content analysis of primary sources has been lacking in the current literature. Therefore, this study’s content analysis offers a methodological and empirical contribution to the ongoing debate about China’s motivations behind the establishment of the AIIB. The findings of this study illustrate that China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB has changed since the time of its establishment, because both arguments describe different stages of the AIIB story.

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3 Table of Contents Introduction……… 4 Literature Review………...6 Theoretical Framework……….. 10 Method Section………..……… 13

Analysis of official Chinese government documents……… 17

Analysis of Xi Jinping’s statements………... 21

Analysis of Jin Liqun’s statements……… 26

Discussion……….. 29 Conclusion………. 31 Reference list………. 33 Appendix A……… 37 Appendix B……… ………44 Appendix C……… ………50

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4 Introduction

China’s influence has rapidly been increasing in the realm of global governance in recent years. Within this context, the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been regarded “a landmark development in global economic governance” (Wilson, 2017, p. 148). Xi Jinping initiated the idea of the AIIB in 2013. Subsequently, the AIIB started its operations in January 2016. The creation of the AIIB illustrates China’s shifting foreign policy strategy. The AIIB reveals that China is no longer an institution-follower, but rather an institution builder, given that the AIIB is the “first international economic organization

conceived, initiated, and led by China” (Wilson, 2017, p. 148). In particular, China’s rationale behind the launch of the AIIB has been a debated topic (Yang, 2016, p. 755). On the one hand, the AIIB has been considered as a vehicle to promote and realize China’s ambition to economically supersede the United States (US) (Chan, 2017). On the other hand, the AIIB has been considered a legitimate institutional innovation that has contributed to Asia’s desire for infrastructure investment. As such, the establishment of the AIIB did not challenge the hegemony of the US (Wilson, 2017, p. 151).

The main goal of this thesis is to understand China’s rationale for the establishment of the AIIB, because the debate is still unresolved and ongoing (Cammack, 2018). Therefore, the research question of this study is the following:

What was China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB?

Yet, this question has already been addressed in the existing literature. However, through the use of content analysis and the social identity theory framework, this project aims to shed new light on the ongoing debate. In doing so, this project tries to make a methodological and empirical contribution to the existing literature by presenting a systematic analysis of primary sources that are directly related to China’s foreign policy ambitions and the creation of the AIIB. The current literature lacks such an extensive analysis of primary sources. The analysis

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5 of primary sources runs from 2013, the year in which the AIIB was first mentioned by Xi Jinping, China’s president, to 2016, the year in which the AIIB started its operations.

First, I will present an overview of the current literature on China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB. Second, in the theoretical section, the social identity theory in international relations of Larson and Shevchenko (2010) will be explained. Subsequently, I will derive two hypotheses to test the assumptions of the social identity theory with regard to the establishment of the AIIB. Third, in the method section, I will explain how both

hypotheses can be tested through the use of content analysis. Fourth, the results of the content analysis, which include statements from the Chinese government, and of Chinese leaders Xi Jinping and Jin Liqun, will be presented. Finally, in the conclusion, I will argue that China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB had changed in the period from 2013 to 2016 because of international concerns about the modus operandi of the AIIB.

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6 Literature Review

In order to examine China’s rationale behind the launch of the AIIB, China’s foreign policy options in the realm of international institutions must first be discussed. Subsequently, building on the discussed foreign policy options, China’s institutional behaviour will be presented. Finally, the contrasting interpretations of the role of the AIIB within China’s foreign policy strategy will be introduced. In doing so, I will conclude that there is a gap in the literature with regard to a systematic analysis of China’s foreign policy ambitions, because the main insights, regarding the establishment of the AIIB, are derived from general

assumptions on the institutional choices of rising powers and not actually building from China’s expressed intentions. This study tries to fill this gap.

In general, there are five different institutional choices that a rising power can make according to Ikenberry and Lim (2017, pp. 7-8). Firstly, a rising power can join the existing international institutions as a regular member. If a state chooses to do so, it becomes a status-quo stakeholder. The concept of status-status-quo stakeholder refers to a state that accepts and embraces the current international system with its rules and norms. Secondly, rising powers might be incorporated in the international system, but seek to renegotiate the terms of influence and power within the system. In doing so a state becomes an authority-seeking stakeholder that aims for distributive change, a greater influence through redistributing decision-making processes (Ikenberry & Lim, 2017, p. 7). Thirdly, rising powers might choose to alter, obstruct, or contain the pursuit of undesirable rules, practices and norms that come along with the current international institutions. More specifically, a rising power can join the existing international institutions, but has the intention to obstruct its workings. Fourthly, external innovation is an option that differs in form from the first three. This option entails the creation of a new international institution. In the building of new institutions, a rising power offers an alternative form of cooperation and promotes alternative rules and

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7 norms. Finally, a rising power can strive for outright opposition to or non-participation within the existing institutional framework (Ikenberry & Lim, 2017, p. 8).

China’s institutional behaviour has changed over time, because China has used different strategies to achieve its goals. On the one hand, China has proven its willingness to accept existing norms and institutions in the area of multilateral diplomacy “by its growing integration and continuing reliance on some of the main institutions of global diplomacy” (Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 120). On the other hand, China has also made attempts to revise existing international norms and institutions, especially in the economic realm (Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 134). The reason behind these differences in terms of China’s institutional choices has to do with the fact that “China frames itself, and its objectives, in different ways to different audiences and partners” (Breslin, 2013, p. 633). For established western powers, China portrays itself as a responsible partner within the existing international system. In this sense, China is seeking some reforms in the system, but, more importantly, China plays an important role in the international institutional framework, for example as a key veto player in the United Nations, and does not want to cause instability. For some developing powers, however, China acts as a ‘Great Power’ that represents and promotes the collective interests in their search for change on a global scale (Breslin, 2013, pp. 633-634). Therefore, Chinese foreign policy has not explicitly been revisionist nor a typical example of a status-quo stakeholder.

However, from 2013 onwards, under Xi Jinping’s presidency, China seemed to have changed its foreign policy strategy (Breslin & Zeng, 2016, p. 774). In doing so, “China has abandoned its strategy of keeping a low profile and is instead proactively striving to establish a favourable international environment for China’s national rejuvenation” (Breslin & Zeng, 2016, p. 774). From 2013 onwards, China has initiated some reforms for global economic governance through, for example, the AIIB and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and

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8 South Africa) New Development Bank (Breslin & Zeng, 2016, p. 777). In this respect, some scholars argued that the initiative of the AIIB, launched in 2013, underpinned China’s shift toward deliberately revisionist strategies in the economic sphere (Chan, 2017; Ren, 2016). Accordingly, the AIIB was designed to break the western monopoly over the international financial system and pose a deliberate challenge to the US-led Bretton Woods system (Etzioni, 2016; Harpaz, 2016; Tang, 2015). Additionally, Chen and Lui (2018) claimed that the creation of the AIIB has been part of China’s geopolitical strategy that aims to balance against the US’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ (pp. 795-796). The goal of the US’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ was to strengthen the economic supremacy of the US in the Asian-Pacific region as a response to China’s economic development (Chan, 2017, p. 570). With regard to China’s institutional choices, both claims suggest that the creation of the AIIB seems to fit into the category of external innovation (Ikenberry & Lim, 2017, p. 10). By contrast, Wilson (2017) stressed that China’s institutional choices are not binary categories but rather ideal types. Therefore, Wilson (2017) argued that the creation of the AIIB is not explicitly part of a revisionist strategy. Wilson (2017) argued that China changed its rhetoric toward the AIIB after international concerns about the modus operandi of the bank. The Chinese government and AIIB leadership claimed that there are no nefarious agendas behind the bank’s establishment (Wilson, 2017, p. 148). According to them, the AIIB’s mission is to help fill infrastructure gaps in Asia. Asia lacks a good, interconnected, infrastructure network. This posed a region-wide bottleneck with regard to the development of Asian states, because infrastructure

construction is the foundation for economic growth (Ren, 2016, p. 436). Both the ADB, which had less than 80 billion dollars in capital, and the WB, which in practice can only loan some 50 billion dollars per year to different parts of the world, were not sufficient to match Asia’s need to invest 8 trillion dollars in national infrastructure and an additional 290 billion dollars in regional infrastructure projects (Tang, 2015).

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9 There is an apparent puzzle here: China’s institutional behaviour has changed over the years. However, some scholars believe that the establishment of the AIIB illustrates China’s shift toward a revisionist foreign policy strategy. Accordingly, the AIIB’s establishment has been cited as “the first and most prominent shift in Chinese foreign policy toward revisionist strategies, at least in the economic sphere” (Wilson, 2017, p. 150). By contrast, Wilson (2017) claimed that even in the case of the AIIB, after the international community kept a watchful eye on the AIIB’s development, China has changed its strategy from revisionist to status-seeking. “This transition also reveals the flexibility of Chinese economic statecraft, and its willingness to compromise with partners to boost its claims to leadership status in the global economy” (Wilson, 2017, p. 151). Besides Wilson’s (2017) argument, no other studies have looked at whether there actually had been a change in China’s rationale toward the

establishment of the AIIB. Wilson (2017) derived his argument from a selection of primary sources, such as Xi Jinping’s speech to the Indonesian Parliament and the Articles of

Agreement of the AIIB, but there is no extensive analysis of a wider array of primary sources over China’s rationale for the establishment of the AIIB. The aim of this thesis is therefore to fill this gap by undergoing a content analysis of an extensive set of primary sources related to China’s foreign policy ambitions with regard to the establishment of the AIIB. In order to get a better understanding of Chinese economic statecraft, the social identity theory applied to international relations will be introduced in the theoretical framework. In the context of international relations, social identity theory argues that a rising power predominantly adopts one of the three status-seeking strategies: social competition, social mobility, and social creativity. These status-seeking strategies help to reveal China’s motivations behind the establishment of the AIIB.

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10 Theoretical Framework

As discussed in the literature review, there are contrasting interpretations of China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB in the existing literature. On the one hand, some scholars argued that the AIIB was created as part of China’s revisionist foreign policy strategy (Chan, 2017; Tang, 2015). On the other hand, Wilson (2017) claimed that the AIIB is no longer part of a Chinese revisionist strategy. Both arguments, will be discussed through the framework of social identity theory in international relations. First, a brief outline of the social identity theory will be presented. Subsequently, the strategies, and their practical application, will be introduced. In doing so, two hypotheses will be derived from each theoretical argument.

Social Identity Theory

Larson and Shevchenko (2010) drew on social identity theory (SIT) to improve their insights into the role of status for rising powers in international politics. According to the typology of Larson and Shevchenko, a state may purse one of the three status-seeking strategies: social competition, social mobility, or social creativity (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, pp. 66-67). Yang (2016) referred to social competition as: “engage in geopolitical rivalry, compete for sphere of influence, promote rival norms, values and institutions to equal or replace the leading powers” (p. 760). Yang (2016) described social mobility as: “adhere to established rules of the game, follow common practices and join international organisations in hopes of being admitted into the elite club” (p. 760). Finally, social creativity was cited as: “Find a distinctive niche, promote alternative models, norms and institutions in global governance to boost status and prestige” (Yang, 2016, p. 760).

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11 The AIIB as part of China’s social competition strategy

According to the social competition strategy within the SIT framework, a rising power tries to decrease the sphere of influence of the dominant state to gain more status in the international system. As discussed in the literature review, some scholars have suggested that the AIIB was created as a tool for China to challenge the US-led Bretton Woods system (Etzioni, 2016; Tang, 2015). Thereby, the establishment of the AIIB was a deliberate strategy to revise the US in the economic sphere, because strategies of traditional military balancing were

abandoned due to the hegemonic position in terms of military capabilities of the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Paul, 2005, p. 47). Therefore, other non-military balancing strategies are being used to compete with other states over the sphere of influence in a region. In the case of China, soft balancing became a regular strategy (Chan, 2017, p. 573). Walt (2005) conceptualizes soft balancing as: “Conscious coordination of diplomatic action on order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences- outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual supports” (p. 126). Building on the concept of soft balancing, Chan (2017) claimed that the AIIB serves to fulfil China’s grand strategy of regional order-(re)building, which aims to undermine the hegemony of the United States (p. 574). Accordingly, the argument that the AIIB was created to challenge the US-led Bretton Woods as well as the assumption that the creation of the AIIB was a response to the US’ rebalance policy in Asia can be considered as an illustration of China’s soft

balancing strategy (Ren, 2016, pp. 436-437). Currently the United States is still not a member of the AIIB, which seems to indicate that the creation of the AIIB conflicted with US’

preferences in the field of global economic governance. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is derived:

(H1): The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was created (Y) as a result of China’s social competition strategy (X1)

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12 The AIIB as part of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy

According to Larson and Shevchenko (2010), social mobility entails emulating the dominant values and practices of the established powers. In doing so, the rising power wants to attain integration into elite clubs (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 75). With regard to the launch of the AIIB, the social mobility strategy, through following established practices for

international financial institutions, was vital to the bank’s legitimacy and credibility (Yang, 2016, p. 763). However, Xi Jinping’s presidency is associated with a change in China’s foreign policy strategy. In this respect, the AIIB was established to promote an alternative niche for global economic governance (Yang, 2016, p. 770). Yet, contrary to the revisionist explanations for the establishment of the AIIB, the AIIB can be both an institutional

innovation and legitimate, according to the Chinese government and AIIB leadership (Yang, 2016, p. 769). Thereby, China seems to pursue both a social creativity strategy and a social mobility strategy, because the AIIB adheres to the existing rules and values for international financial institutions (Yang, 2016, p. 771). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is drafted to evaluate both the social creativity and social mobility strategy in the case of China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB:

H2: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was created (Y) as a result of both China’s strategy of social creativity and social mobility (X2)

In summary, Both hypotheses aim to explain China’s rationale behind the creation of the AIIB from different perspectives. According to the social competition strategy, H1 claims that China established the AIIB to compete with the US in the economic sphere. On the other hand, H2 states that the AIIB was created as a legitimate institutional innovation to improve the global economic governance system. In doing so, China adheres to the status-quo and does not challenge the US.

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13 Method Section

The way in which both hypotheses are tested in this project is the main contribution to the existing literature. Currently, only some sparse references have been made to primary sources, such as the Articles of Agreement of the AIIB and president Xi Jinping’s speech to the

Indonesian Parliament in 2013, in order to understand China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB (Gu, 2017; Yu, 2017; Ren, 2016; Wilson, 2017, Chan. 2017). This study offers to test the explanatory power of the SIT framework with regard to China’s rationale behind the creation of the AIIB. Both hypotheses are recapped below:

H1:The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was created (Y) as a result of China’s social competition strategy (X1)

H2: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was created (Y) as a result of both China’s strategy of social creativity and social mobility (X2)

First, I will present an outline of the case-selection strategy. Secondly, after discussing the differences between qualitative and quantitative content analysis, I will explain why this study makes use of qualitative summative content analysis. Third, the selection of the primary sources to be analysed is discussed. Finally, I will elaborate on the operationalisation of the hypotheses.

The creation of the AIIB is an anomalous case with regard to China’s foreign policy behaviour, because the building of a new Chinese-led institution seemed to break with

China’s past foreign policy actions as the AIIB is the first international economic organisation initiated, realized, and led by China (Wilson, 2017, p. 148). In this respect, the initiative of the AIIB, launched in 2013, underpinned China’s intentions to create an alternative model for global economic governance (Menegazzi, 2017, p. 292). The establishment of the AIIB therefore qualifies as an extreme case. Extreme cases are selected by their dependent variable, which is in this study the creation of the AIIB. The purpose of extreme case selection is to

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14 identify the cause of this extreme outcome (Gerring, 2006, pp. 101-104). The establishment of the AIIB has been regarded “a landmark development in global economic governance”, marking China’s maturation from an institution-follower to institution-builder” (Wilson, 2017, p. 2). This study will, through the use of content analysis, try to grasp China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB.

In general, content analysis can be quantitative or qualitative. The main line of division lies in the fact that quantitative content analysis privileges “manifest meaning” and qualitative analysis privileges “latent meaning” (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449). Manifest meaning can be established by analysing a small segment of the material, whereas latent meaning is more demanding and requires wider examination of the communication and the related background information. Therefore, “qualitative content analysis makes more

inferences to context, authors, and recipients than its quantitative counterpart” (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449). Consequently, “due to the priority given to manifest meaning, it is usually easier to gain high reliability with quantitative content analysis, whereas latent meaning affords an advantage in attaining validity qualitatively. Since quantitative content analysis tends to focus on manifest meaning, it can address ‘what’ questions, whereas the emphasis on latent meaning makes qualitative content analysis more suited for dealing with ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions as well” (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449). Since the focus of qualitative content analysis rests primarily on answering the question of ‘how’ and ‘why’ things are said rather than ‘what’ is said, qualitative content analysis suits this project better than quantitative content analysis (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449). This study wants to put emphasis on ‘why’ the AIIB was created and ‘how’ the creation of the AIIB was framed, because there is currently little consensus on China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB. With regard to qualitative content analysis, summative content analysis seems to be the most adequate method, because both hypotheses could already be drafted from the examination of the existing literature

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15 (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). As a result of the contrasting interpretations about China’s

rationale for establishing the AIIB, the coding scheme is divided between social competition on the one hand, and both social creativity and social mobility on the other hand.

This study analyses primary data sources between 2013, the year in which Xi Jinping first mentioned the AIIB, and 2016, the year in which the AIIB started its operations. These primary data sources are considered as the unit of analysis, because these documents provide first-hand evidence of China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB. Three different types of primary sources are used to test both hypotheses. First, documents published by the Chinese government with regard to China’s foreign policy, two white papers and one policy report, will be analysed. Both white papers, ‘China’s Foreign Trade’ and China’s Peaceful

Development’, offer insight in China’s ambitions in its twelfth Five Years Plan (2011-2015) on foreign policy. The policy report, ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, reveals China’s goals in relation to the OBOR-Initiative. Second, I will also analyse five statements from Xi Jinping. Through this analysis it will be evaluated whether China’s foreign policy strategy has changed under Xi Jinping’s presidency, according to the SIT framework. Finally, three statements from Jin Liqun, president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, are also analysed. This analysis provides the rhetoric for the bank’s establishment from an AIIB perspective.

The full coding schemes and the overview of the different sources are presented in the appendices. In the coding scheme, the coding unit, “that is, the constellation of words or statements that relate to the same central meaning” consists of “sentences or paragraphs containing aspects related to each other through their content and context” (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004, p. 106). The coding unit supports either H1 or H2. On the one hand, if H1 is to be confirmed, evidence is found that the AIIB was created as a tool for China to compete with the US to increase China’s sphere of influence. Accordingly, references are found that

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16 stress China’s intentions, either unilaterally or jointly with other countries, to enhance the wide array of parallel economic structures that are not controlled by the US (Yang, 2016, p. 766). On the other hand, if H2 is to be substantiated, evidence is found that the AIIB was created as part of China’s status-seeking objective to make a novel contribution to the global economic governance system in order to fulfil Asia’s need for infrastructure investment. In doing so, China has emulated the established rules and norms for international financial institutions to achieve its status-seeking objective (Yang, 2016, pp. 763-773). Accordingly, references are found that illustrate China’s willingness to adhere to the dominant values in the global economic governance system through open trade liberalization (Yang, 2016, p. 764).

In summary, the systematic analysis of these primary sources is a novel contribution to the current debate about China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB. Therefore, this project hopes to shed new light on the question whether China established the AIIB either as part of its social competition strategy or as part of both its social creativity and social mobility strategy. In the analysis, I will divide the coding units that are directly mentioning the AIIB from the coding units that are not directly referring to the AIIB. This division helps to test whether the AIIB is part of China’s foreign policy. In doing so, the findings of the content analysis will be presented through the use of tables. On the one hand, tables 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 will show the amount of references made to either China’s social competition strategy or China’s social creativity/social mobility strategy. On the other hand, tables 1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 3.2 will present some examples of coding units that reveal China’s ambitions with regard to its foreign policy strategy. The goal of the textual analysis is to test both hypotheses, thereby evaluating the relevance of the assumptions presented in the literature review.

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17 Analysis of official Chinese Government Documents

Chen and Lui (2018) argued that the creation of the AIIB has been part of China’s

geopolitical strategy that aims to balance against the US’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy (pp. 795-796). The US’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy was launched as a rebalancing tool in the Asia-Pacific and was initiated in the middle of the Obama administration’s first term in 2011. The goal of this policy is to strengthen the US’ supremacy and hegemony, both economically and

military, in the Asian-Pacific region as a response to China’s rise (Chan, 2017, p. 570). Militarily, the US expanded its naval control by deploying more naval troops and equipment in the region(Chan, 2017, p. 571). Economically, the US tried to maintain its dominant position in the regional economic order through the 12-country initiative of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) trade agreement. Although the US was not the initiator of the trade agreement, the Obama administration included the agreement in its rebalancing policy (Ren, 2017).

In order to confirm whether the creation of the AIIB is a part of China’s social competition strategy in response to the USA’s ‘Pivot to Asia’, both white papers of China’s twelfth Five Years Plan, that describe China’s foreign policy goals in terms of development and trade, have been analysed. The findings are presented in table 1.1. Table 1.2 demonstrates some examples of different coding units, depending on China’s rhetoric toward its foreign policy strategy. Additionally, the full coding scheme is presented in appendix A. The overall finding, with regard to both white papers, is that China’s twelfth Five Years Plan seem to support H2 rather than H1 with 8 references to China’s social competition strategy and 82 references to both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy (Table 1.1). Out of these 82, many are devoted to stress China’s desire for mutual beneficial trade relations as illustrated in table 1.2. The establishment of the AIIB is not mentioned in both white papers, because the AIIB was only initiated by Xi Jinping in 2013. Nevertheless, the analysis of both

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18 white papers is still relevant for this study, because it illustrates that China’s foreign policy objectives, from 2011-2015, seemed to follow both the social creativity and social mobility strategy. Therefore, within the context of China’s white papers, China’s foreign policy did not seem to challenge the US. As a result, the analysis seems to support H2, because China did not prioritize the strategy of social competition in both white papers.

However, the analysis of the 2015 policy report about the One Belt One Road Initiative presents a sharply contrasting outcome. In total, 40 of the 53 coding units contain elements of China’s social competition strategy, whereas only 13 references support the claims of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy with regard to the OBOR-Initiative (Table 1.1). The report holds 2 direct mentions of the AIIB and in both instances, the AIIB is presented as a tool to contribute to China’s social competition strategy. Table 1.2 illustrates that China framed the OBOR-Initiative as a vehicle to promote economic

cooperation within the Asian-Pacific. As Wilson (2017) argued, it was during the early stages of its establishment that the AIIB was regularly linked to the OBOR-Initiative, confirming the impression that the AIIB served to fulfil China’s “master plan” of regional order-building, which aims to undermine the hegemony of the USA (Chan, 2017, p. 574). Accordingly, the analysis of the report seems to support H1.

In conclusion, the analysis of both the white papers and the policy report provides contrasting results. On the one hand, the white papers seem to describe both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy. On the other hand, in the policy report of the OBOR-Initiative, the AIIB seems to be a tool for China’s strategy to undermine the presence of the US in the Asia-Pacific. Ren (2016) argued that under Xi Jinping, China had changed its foreign policy rhetoric. In order to find out if China’s foreign policy strategy did change under Xi Jinping’s presidency, statements of Xi Jinping will also be analysed.

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Table 1.1 Overview of coding units according to the analysis of Chinese government documents

Coding units Social Competition

Social Creativity/ Social Mobility

(1) White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development, 2011

Words: 8693

Total amount of coding units: 51

No direct relation to AIIB 51 5 46

Direct relation to AIIB 0

(2) White Paper: China’s Foreign Trade, 2011 Words: 7789

Direct relation to AIIB 0

(3) Policy Report, 2015. Words: 5594

No direct relation to AIIB ₅₁ ₃₈ ₁₃

Direct relation to AIIB 2 2 0

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20 Table 1.2

Social Competition versus Social Creativity/Social Mobility: Chinese government documents (1) White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development, 2011.

(2) White Paper: China’s Foreign Trade, 2011.

(3) Policy Report: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st_{-Century Maritime Silk Road, 2015.}

No direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social Creativity / Social Mobility

o (1): “China maintains business and trade ties with 163 countries and regions. It has signed ten free-trade-zone agreements, bilateral investment treaties with 129 countries, and double taxation avoidance agreements with 96 countries. All this shows that China is actively promoting liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment” (Chinese State Council, 2011a).

o (2): “China’s foreign trade development benefits greatly from its reform and opening up, from economic globalization, and from taking the path of cooperation and mutual benefit. China cannot develop itself in isolation from the rest of the world, and global prosperity and stability cannot be maintained without China’s participation” (Chinese State Council, 2011b).

o (3): “The initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider areas” (Chinese State Council, 2015).

• Social Competition

o (1): “China will uphold the Asian spirit of standing on its own feet, being bold in opening new ground, being open and inclusive and sharing weal and woe. It will remain a good neighbour, friend and partner of other Asian countries” (Chinese State Council, 2011a).

o (2): “China proactively participates in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation” (Chinese State Council, 2011b).

o (3): “We should continue to encourage the constructive role of the international forums and exhibitions at regional and sub-regional levels hosted by countries along the Belt and Road” (Chinese State Council, 2015).

Direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social Creativity / Social Mobility

o (1): - o (2): - o (3): - • Social Competition o (1): - o (2): -

o (3): “Financial integration is an important underpinning for implementing the Belt and Road initiative. We should deepen financial cooperation, and make more efforts in building a current stability system, investment and financing system and credit information system in Asia” (Chinese State Council, 2015).

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21 Analysis of Xi Jinping’s statements

Xi Jinping came into office in March 2013. China demonstrated a proactive posture under his presidency (Ren, 2016, p. 435). President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang visited several South-East Asian countries in October and November 2013. During these visits, the initiative of the establishment of the AIIB was proposed (Ren, 2016, p. 437). In Xi Jinping’s speech to the Indonesian Parliament, there were 16 references to China’s social competition strategy and 2 references to both the social creativity and social mobility strategy, according to this study’s textual analysis (Table 2.1). Within this speech, the creation of the AIIB was once mentioned in order to strengthen the OBOR-Initiative, confirming the link between the OBOR-Initiative and the AIIB in the Bank’s early stage of establishment, thereby supporting the expectations of H1 (Chan, 2017, p. 574).

Likewise, in 2013, Xi Jinping’s speech to the APEC CEO Summit had similar

references to both strategies. Again, according to the references made, social competition was the predominant strategy in the speech. However, there was a difference in terms of rhetoric with regard to the creation of the AIIB as Xi Jinping argued that the AIIB would work together with existing multilateral development banks (Table 2.2.1). The change in rhetoric, with regard to the establishment of the AIIB, was the result of international concerns over whether the AIIB would be a Chinese-dominated bank and led to some toning down of the linkage between the AIIB and the OBOR-Initiative (Chan, 2017, p. 574).

Following the de-linkage of the AIIB and the OBOR-Initiative, China hoped for more Western states to join the AIIB to enhance its legitimacy (Chan, 2017, p.575). Xi Jinping’s joint press conference with President Obama, his interview with Reuters and his speech at the inauguration ceremony of the AIIB support this statement. According to table 2.1, elements of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy prevailed over the social

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22 China’s changed rhetoric in the speeches with regard to its foreign policy objectives. In

addition, appendix B presents the full coding scheme for the analysis of Xi Jinping’s

speeches. However, the contribution of these findings to determine China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB is problematic, according to Breslin (2013). He argued that “China frames itself, and its objectives, in different ways to different audiences and partners” (Breslin, 2013, p. 633). Therefore, in order to address this problem of measuring the discrepancies between rhetoric and intentions, primary sources directly

referring to the AIIB should prove whether this change in rhetoric is really caused by the de-linkage of the OBOR-Initiative and the AIIB. In doing so, the AIIB’s-perspective is analysed by looking at Jin Liqun’s statements.

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23

Table 2.1 Overview of coding units according to the analysis of Xi Jinping’s statements

Coding units Social Competition Social Creativity/ Social Mobility (1) To the Indonesian Parliament, 2013 Words: 3296

(2) To the APEC CEO Summit, 2013

Words: 3518

(3) Joint Press Conference with President Obama, 2014. Words: 4967

No direct relation to AIIB ₂₁ ₀ ₂₁

(4) Q&A by Reuters, 2015. Words: 4743

(5) Address at AIIB inauguration ceremony, 2016

words: 1445

Total amount of coding units:13

No direct relation to AIIB 0

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24 Table 2.2.1

Social Competition versus Social Creativity/Social Mobility: Xi Jinping’s statements (1/2) (1) Speech to the Indonesian Parliament, 2013.

(2) Speech to the APEC CEO Summit, 2013.

(3) Speech in a joint press conference with Obama, 2014. (4) Q&A by Reuters, October 2015.

(5) Speech at the inauguration ceremony of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank , January 2016.

No direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social creativity / Social mobility

o (1): “We should draw upon the experience of other regions in development and welcome a constructive role by non-regional countries in the development and stability of the region” (Xi, 2013a).

o (2): “If China is to make progress, it must deepen reform and opening-up in all respects” (Xi, 2013b).

o (3): “China is committed to open regionalism. And we believe the various

regional cooperation initiatives and mechanisms should have positive interaction with each other, and that is the case at the moment” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

• Social competition

o (1): “We will build a more closely-knit China-ASEAN community of common destiny so as to bring more benefits to both China and ASEAN and to the people in the region” (Xi, 2013a).

o (2): “China will work energetically to boost regional development and prosperity, and broaden opportunities for mutual benefit in the Asia Pacific” (Xi, 2013b). o (3): -

Direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social creativity / Social mobility

o (1): -

o (2): “This proposed bank will work together with the existing multilateral development banks in and outside the region and complement one another” (Xi, 2013b).

o (3): “These proposals and initiatives are open and inclusive in Asia; they are not exclusive. We welcome the active participation of the United States and other relevant countries so that together we can promote and share prosperity and peace in Asia Pacific” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). • Social competition

o (1): “China is committed to greater connectivity with ASEAN countries. China will propose the establishment of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that would give priority to ASEAN countries’ needs” (Xi, 2013a).

o (2): “To this end, we propose to establish an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to help fund the infrastructural development of ASEAN countries and other developing countries in the region” (Xi, 2013b).

o (3): “China has initiated the AIIB in order to offer support and facility to regional infrastructure development” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

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25 Table 2.2.2

Social Competition versus Social Creativity/Social Mobility: Xi Jinping’s statements (2/2) (1) Speech to the Indonesian Parliament, 2013.

(2) Speech to the APEC CEO Summit, 2013.

(3) Speech in a joint press conference with Obama, November 2014. (4) Q&A by Reuters, October 2015.

(5) Speech at the inauguration ceremony of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank , January 2016.

o (4): “I believe new progress in China-UK relationship will inject new momentum into the growth of China-EU relationship across the board and make new contribution to the building of China-EU partnership as a whole” (Reuters, 2015).

o (5): - • Social competition

o (4): “China will continue to pursue friendship and partnership with its neighbours, build a harmonious, secure and prosperous neighbourhood and follow through on its policy of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness towards its neighbours” (Reuters, 2015).

o (5): -

Direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social creativity / Social mobility

o (4): “We agree that the AIIB should fully draw on the experience and practices of other multilateral development banks, observe high international standards in terms of governance structure, operation guidelines, and human resources management, and ensure its professional and efficient operation as well as transparency and integrity” (Reuters, 2015).

o (5): “The AIIB shall remain committed to open regionalism. The institution and existing multilateral development banks may complement each other for mutual strength” (Xi, 2016).

• Social competition

o (4): “China’s initiative to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank aims to promote infrastructure development and connectivity in Asia and boost

regional cooperation” (Reuters, 2015).

o (5): “The founding and opening of the AIIB will effectively boost investment to support infrastructure development in Asia. It will serve to channel more resources, particularly private investment, intro infrastructure projects to promote regional connectivity and economic integration. It will bring along a better investment environment and more job opportunities and trigger greater medium- to long-term development potential on the part of developing members in Asia” (Xi, 2016).

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26 Analysis of Jin Liqun’s statements

Also, the analysis of Jin Liqun’s statements reveals that there seems to be a change in rhetoric after the de-linkage between the OBOR-Initiative and the AIIB. Table 3.1 demonstrates that the AIIB’s ambitions do not seem to support H1. In sum, 16 references to both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy are found, whereas only 7 references to China’s social competition strategy are found. The statements by Jin Liqun, the president of the AIIB, illustrate that China’s ambitions toward the AIIB changed as the institution began to take form (Wilson, 2017, p. 152). In all three analyses, both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy seem to prevail over the hypothesised social competition strategy with regard to China’s rationale for establishing the AIIB (Table 3.1). These findings support the expectations of H2. The examples of coding units in table 3.2, under social creativity/social mobility, illustrate that the AIIB adheres to the status-quo for global economic governance through both its ambitions regarding organisational performance and its appreciation of other multilateral development banks. What is more, a direct reference to an element of a social competition strategy is, in most occasions, directly followed by an emphasis on the AIIB’s embrace of extant practices for global economic governance. Chen and Lui (2018) pointed out that Jin Liqun has sought on various occasions to reassure other states, and to clarify China’s position that the AIIB is a multilateral development bank that serves the interests of all of its members and that it would finance projects in all emerging economies rather than just the countries that are in direct relation to the OBOR-Initiative (p. 808). According to table 3.1 and the examples of coding units in table 3.2, the statements by Jin Liqun seem to support H2. Hence, Jin Liqun presented the philosophy of the AIIB as “lean, clean and green” (Wilson, 2017, p. 10). The complete coding scheme of Jin Liqun’s statements is presented in appendix C.

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27

Table 3.1 Overview of coding units according to Jin Liqun’s statements

Coding units Social Competition

Social Creativity/ Social Mobility

(1) Speech to the BOAO-Forum, 2014

Words: 1445

(2) Statement at a Press Conference in Tiblisi, 2015 Words: 823

Total amount of coding units:

8

(3) Article in China Daily, 2015.

Words: 876

No direct relation to AIIB ₀

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28 Table 3.2

Social Competition versus Social Creativity/Social Mobility: Jin Liqun’s statements (1) Speech to the BOAO Forum, 2014.

(2) Statement at a Press Conference in Tiblisi, 2015. (3) Article in China Daily, 2015.

o (1): - o (2): - o (3): - • Social competition o (1): - o (2): - o (3): -

Direct relation to AIIB in coding unit • Social creativity / Social mobility

o (1): “We have engaged America, Japan, India, Australia and some European countries in some well-responded bilateral talks” (Jin, 2014).

o (2): “I am also appreciative of the support and technical advice that have been kindly provided to us by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank, and other members of greater family of MDBs” (AIIB, 2015). o (3): “The AIIB’s founding members have a clear management vision: We will set

a clear and high bar for organizational performance and governance, by upholding openness, transparency, accountability, and independence as its core institutional principles” (China Daily, 2015).

• Social competition

o (1): “Last year when President Xi Jinping of China visited Indonesia, he introduced the idea of establishing an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to boost the regional connectivity and infrastructural development” (Jin, 2014). o (2): “The AIIB aims to improve the livelihoods of the Asian people and those of

future Asian generations” (AIIB, 2015).

o (3): “For starters, the AIIB’s unique ownership and shareholding structures reflect the institution’s regional character and provide members with a greater voice in policy direction and decision-making” (China Daily, 2015).

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29 Discussion

The implications from the results from this project need to be qualified for the following reasons. First, this research relies on translated transcripts. Translation issues may suggest different emphases in terms of China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB. However, as the coding unit consists of a paragraph, or multiple sentences, the context will mostly offset small translation errors. Second, the process of coding whether the coding unit confirmed or not the social competition strategy or the social creativity/social mobility strategy is subject to some degree of interpretation. As a result, some paragraphs could be interpreted and coded differently by another researcher. Yet, the size of the data sets should rule out huge discrepancies.

Overall, through the process of triangulation between the primary sources and

secondary literature, the findings of this study seem to confirm Wilson’s (2017) argument. He argued that China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB had changed (Wilson, 2017, p. 22). In 2013, when both the idea of the OBOR-Initiative and the creation of the AIIB were launched, the AIIB tended to be part of China’s social competition strategy. However, China’s strategy with regard to the establishment of the AIIB had shifted over time. After the AIIB started its operation in 2016, Wilson (2017) claimed that the AIIB had adopted best practices in terms of governance practices and policy frameworks for development financing. The AIIB has showed cooperative rather than competitive relationships with other MDBs, and has depended upon these organisations for technical expertise and projects. In addition, China holds the largest share of capital stock, which grants China a veto over governance decisions, but it does not control the activities of the bank (Wilson, 2017, pp. 22-23). Together, these factors seem to contradict the assumptions of China’s social competition strategy. Wilson (2017) argued, in summary, that the establishment of the AIIB has had its impact on the global economic governance system, because it was the first multilateral organization initiated

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30 and led by China. The AIIB has unlocked an additional $100 billion for infrastructure projects in Asia. Nevertheless, these developments for global economic governance fall well-short of the argument about China’s social competition strategy, as the AIIB does not challenge existing institutional practices, norms and rules for international financial institutions.

In short, the AIIB largely conforms to the status-quo of multilateral development banks (p. 23). Wilson (2017) also argued that the Chinese government had made a change in its foreign policy strategy with regard to the AIIB. In doing so, China’s initial pitch for the AIIB showed resemblance with the argument that the AIIB was initiated as part of China’s social competition strategy, evidenced by both China’s desire for reform in global economic governance and its pitch for the OBOR-Initiative (p. 23). However, after international concerns over whether the AIIB would be a Chinese-dominated bank, China had changed in rhetoric regarding the AIIB. The change in rhetoric led to some toning down of the linkage between the OBOR-Initiative and the AIIB (Chan, 2017). The content analysis supports this argument, because the analysis seems to indicate that there was a change in China’s rationale with regard to the establishment of the AIIB.

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31 Conclusion

The creation of the AIIB was chosen as this project’s case study, because it is considered a turning point in China’s foreign policy strategy. Hence, the establishment of the AIIB relates to the question of whether the AIIB was created as a tool to promote China’s foreign policy strategy. This study has used the social identity theory in order to evaluate China’s status-seeking behaviour.

On the one hand, according to the social competition strategy, the creation of the AIIB has been the result of Chinese soft-balancing in response to the US’ ‘Pivot to Asia’. In doing so, the AIIB had been a tool for the Chinese government to undermine the influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. More specifically, according to this strategy, the AIIB was designed to serve as the financial injection for the implementation of the OBOR-Initiative (Wilson, 2017, p. 2). Accordingly, the AIIB was presented as an organisation competing with other multilateral development banks and by doing so would “dilute their efforts to promote transparency and social and environmental standards in development financing” (Wilson, 2017, p. 2). On the other hand, according to both the social creativity and social mobility strategy, the AIIB was created to complement the existing institutional framework for global economic governance in order to fulfil Asia’s desire for infrastructure investments.

Accordingly, the AIIB adheres to the extant practices in the global economic governance system.

Through the use of content analysis, this study has found support for both

assumptions, because China had changed its foreign policy rhetoric toward the AIIB before it started its operations in 2016. According to China’s white papers, China’s twelfth Five Years Plan seemed to indicate that China’s foreign policy followed both the social creativity and social mobility strategy. However, under Xi Jinping’s presidency, a shift toward a social competition strategy was found. Yet, with regard to the analysed documents on the

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32 establishment of the AIIB, international concerns over the linkage between the AIIB and the OBOR-Initiative led to some toning down of the social competition strategy. The coding units in Xi Jinping’s press conference with Obama, his interview with Reuters, and his address at the AIIB’s inauguration ceremony seem to demonstrate the change in China’s foreign policy rhetoric. Additionally, the analysis of Jin Liqun’s statements seem to reveal that the AIIB’s agenda supports the assumptions of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy. In sum, it appears that China’s rationale behind the establishment of the AIIB had changed. In the early stage of the AIIB’s establishment, the AIIB seemed to be part of China’s social competition strategy, thereby supporting the expectations of H1. However, after the

de-linkage of the AIIB and the OBOR-Iniative, the AIIB seemed to be part of both China’s social creativity and social mobility strategy, thereby supporting the expectations of H2.

This study has demonstrated the flexibility of Chinese economic statecraft. Because of China’s changed rhetoric toward the AIIB it might be very interesting to add more case-studies in order to draw a more general picture and to strengthen the causal mechanisms leading to China’s changed international institutional behaviour. For further study I suggest to add the case of the New Development Bank, which was founded by the BRICS. This case can be meaningful in terms of revealing China’s international institutional behaviour. But China’s role therein is different from the AIIB, because the New Development Bank is a more of a collective effort (Yang, 2016, p. 756). To continue this study, it might also be interesting to add more Chinese primary sources to the analysis, because this study only relies on English transcripts and transcripts translated to English. Hence, the addition of Chinese primary sources will help to improve this project’s data access.

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33 Reference list

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (2015). Statement by Jin Liqun at a Press Conference in Tiblisi. Retrieved from:

https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2015/20150826_001.html

Breslin, S. (2013). China and the global order: signalling threat or friendship?. International Affairs, 89(3), 615-634.

Breslin, S. & Zeng, J. (2016). China's ‘new type of Great Power relations’: a G2 with Chinese characteristics?. International Affairs, 92(4), 773-794

Cammack, P. (2018). Situating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the context of global economic governance. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 1-18.

Chan, L. H. (2017). Soft balancing against the US ‘pivot to Asia’: China’s geostrategic rationale for establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(6), 568-590.

Chen, Z. & Liu, Y. (2018). Strategic Reassurance in Institutional Contests: Explaining China’s Creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Journal of Contemporary China, 27(114), 795-810.

Chin, G. & Thakur, R. (2010). Will China change the rules of global order?. The Washington Quarterly, 33(4), 119-138.

China Daily (2015). AIIB to benefit Asia and beyond. Retrieved from:

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-12/28/content_22836923.htm

Chinese State Council. (2011a). China’s Peaceful Development. Retrieved from: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm

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34 Chinese State Council. (2011b). China’s Foreign Trade. Retrieved from:

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7143951.htm

Chinese State Council. (2015). Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Retrieved from:

http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html

Etzioni, A. (2016). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: a case study of multifaceted containment. Asian Perspective, 40(2), 173-196.

Gerring, J. (2006). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University Press.

Graneheim, U. H. & Lundman, B. (2004). Qualitative content analysis in nursing research: concepts, procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness. Nurse education today, 24(2), 105-112.

Gu, B. (2017). Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB. Journal of International Economic Law, 20(1), 137-158.

Harpaz, M. D. (2016). China’s coherence in international economic governance. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 21(2), 123-147.

Hsieh, H. F. & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative health research, 15(9), 1277-1288.

Ikenberry, G. J. & Lim, D. J. (2017). China’s emerging institutional statecraft.

Jin, L. (2014). A Speech on the Establishment Progress of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Retrieved from: http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/14301.jhtml

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35 Larson, D. W. & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to

US primacy. International Security, 34(4), 63-95.

Menegazzi, S. (2017). Global economic governance between China and the EU: the case of the Asian infrastructure investment bank. Asia Europe Journal, 15(2), 229-242.

Pashakhanlou, A. H. (2017). Fully integrated content analysis in international relations. International Relations, 31(4), 447-465.

Paul, T. V. (2005). Soft balancing in the age of US primacy. International security, 30(1), 46-71.

Ren, X. (2016). China as an institution-builder: the case of the AIIB. The Pacific Review, 29(3), 435-442.

Ren, X. (2017). US Rebalance to Asia and Responses from China’s Research Community. Orbis, 61(2), 238-254.

Reuters (2015). Exclusive Q&A with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Retrieved from:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-britain-xi-q-a-idUSKCN0SC03920151018

Tang, S. M. (2015). The Politics of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). ISEAS Publishing, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Walt, S. M. (2005). Taming American power: the global response to US primacy. WW Norton & Company.

Wilson, J. D. (2017). The evolution of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: from a revisionist to status-seeking agenda. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 149-176.

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36 White House Office of the Press Secretary (2014, November). Remarks by President Obama

and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference. Retrieved from:

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference

Xi, J. (2013a). Speech to Indonesian Parliament. Retrieved from:

https://reconasiaproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/88/fe/88fe8107-15d7-4b4c

8a590feb13c213e1/speech_by_chinese_president_xi_jinping_to_indonesian_parliame nt.pdf

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37 Appendix A

The content analysis of China’s white papers (China’s Peaceful Development and China’s Foreign Trade) and China’s policy report (Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) on the OBOR-initiative is presented beneath:

1: White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development, 2011.

Source: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm

2: White Paper: China’s Foreign Trade, 2011.

Source: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7143951.htm

3: Policy Report: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st_Century

Maritime Silk Road, 2015.

Source: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html

(1) China’s Peaceful Development, 2011 Words: 8693

Total references to social

competition strategy: 5 Total references to social creativity/social mobility strategy: 46

Coding unit Social competition strategy x: no direct relation to AIIB +: direct relation to AIIB

Social creativity/social mobility strategy

x: no direct relation to AIIB +: direct relation to AIIB “China has declared … of

peaceful development” x

“Over the past … of human

civilization” x

“Viewed in the … and common

development” x

“China has learned … itself

increasingly wider” x

“The Chinese nation … peace

and stability” x

“There are always … survival

and progress” x

“Countries are becoming …

development and prosperity” x

“Thanks to its … of the world” x

“A historic transformation …

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38 “China has made … relations

with China” x

“China plays an … Korean

nuclear issue” x

“China seeks to … sub-regional

cooperation” x

“China’s development since …

and economic order” x

“China’s overall goal … of

China’s development” x

“To achieve modernization …

for achieving modernization” x

“China will focus … promote

common development” x

“The size of … will further

expand” x

“China will continue … through

opening-up” x

“We will speed … in

international trade” x

“We will attach … the host

countries” x

“We will continue … of

economic globalization” x

“China will continue … with

these countries” x

“We will continue … other

Asian countries” x

“We will expand … and mutual

benefit” x

“We will enhance … their

common interests” x

“We will actively … and more

equitable” x

“We will continue … of other

countries” x

“China’s foreign policy … a

current task” x

“Politically countries should …

respected and upheld” x

“Economically countries should

… the 21st_century” x

“Culturally countries should …

world more colourful” x

“In terms of … should be

avoided” x

“In terms of … addressing

climate change” x

“The Chinese people … in

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39 “China aligns its … civilization

to everyone” x

“In terms of … challenges to

security” x

“Regarding common security …

upholding common security” x

“With regards to … against one

another” x

“For China the … comprehensive strength increases”

x “China actively enhances …

other Asian countries” x

“The Chinese people … peace

and friendship” x

“Imbued with the … with

distant states” x

“China will remain …

exchanges and cooperation” x

“Economic globalization has …

between big powers” x

“Global challenges have …

suffer disastrous setback” x

“The global trend … the

international arena” x

“The global trend … of peaceful

development” x

“China’s peaceful development

… from this path” x

“Economic globalization and …

prosperity and development” x

“China cannot develop … of

peaceful development” x

“Looking back at … future for

mankind” x

(2) China’s Foreign Trade, 2011

Words: 7789

Total references to social

competition strategy: 3 Total references to social creativity/social mobility strategy: 36

Coding unit Social competition strategy x: no direct relation to AIIB +: direct relation to AIIB

Social creativity/social mobility strategy

x: no direct relation to AIIB +: direct relation to AIIB “In 1978 China … labour and

competition” x

“The structure of … very

significant roles” x

“China has formed … to 4.3

percent” x

“China’s international