The Path of Least Resistance to Zero by 2055;
A Regime-Effectiveness Analysis of the French and German
Energy Regime’s Capabilities at Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions.
Supervisor: Dr. Robin Pistorius
Student: Vincent Noteboom
Student Number: 11044985
International Relations (Political Science)
University of Amsterdam
Research Question: To what extent is German and French energy policy, from 2011 onwards,
comparatively effective at reducing greenhouse gasses, whilst maintaining energy security for
Table of Contents
1) Introduction ... 3
2) Theoretical Framework for Energy Regime-Effectiveness ... 8
2.1) Regimes theory as theoretical framework ... 8
a) Establishing Context to Regimes ... 8
b) Socio-technical regimes ... 10
c) Socio-institutional regimes ... 10
d) Justification for Regime theory ... 11
2.2) Defining Regime effectiveness, its concepts, Path Dependency, and Energy security 11
a) Dimensions of Regime-effectiveness: Problem-Solving effectiveness ... 12
b) Regime-Effectiveness: Concepts of Output and Impact ... 13
c) Regime Effectiveness: Concepts of Equity and Efficiency... 14
d) Path Dependency ... 14
e) Energy Security ... 15
3) Research Design ... 17
3.1) A Standard for Evaluation ... 17
3.2) Points of Reference ... 18
a) Collective Optimum ... 18
b) No-Regime Counterfactual ... 18
c) Metric of Evaluation ... 18
d) Definition of Regime-Effectiveness ... 19
e) Calculating Effectiveness ... 19
f) Case Selection ... 20
4) Sub-Question One: How are the contemporary policy and regulatory features of French and
German energy policy predicated on their energy histories? ... 21
4.1) Energy Transitions ... 22
4.2) Catalysing Substitution ... 24
4.3) The Nuclear Revolution of France ... 25
4.4) The Energiewende a German Evolution ... 28
4.5) The European Energy Regime ... 35
4.6) Answering Sub-Question One ... 36
5) Sub-Question Two: How effective are the French and German energy regimes? ... 38
5.1) The comparative analysis of differences in national energy mix. ... 38
5.2) The Energy Mix: France ... 39
5.3) The Energy Mix: Germany ... 41
5.4) The Emissions ... 43
5.6) Establishing NR, CO, and AP. ... 47
5.8) The cost of the German Energiewende ... 52
5.9) Calculating Effectiveness. ... 55
5.10) Answering Sub-Question Two ... 55
6) Sub-Question Three: To what extent are French and German energy policy effective whilst
regarding the concept of energy security? ... 57
6.1) The Prices ... 57
6.2) Energy Import Dependency ... 60
6.3) Calculating Energy Security Adjustment Score ... 61
7) Conclusion & Discussion ... 63
7.1) Answering the Research Question ... 63
7.2) Areas of improvement: ... 64
Attachment One ... 65
How does a nuclear reactor operate? ... 65
How did Chernobyl Occur ... 65
1) Introduction
There now is a consensus within the relevant scientific community that man-made greenhouse gas emissions are causing an accelerated greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2017). In short, the earth is
surrounded by a group of light gasses that stay in the earth’s atmosphere from fifty to hundreds of years. The radiation, or energy, coming from the sun is both minimised by this layer and the amount that does penetrate it is then imprisoned beneath it. This causes the temperature on earth to be far more stable than planets without such an atmosphere, which in turn makes earth capable of supporting our life forms. However, ever since the invention of fire, human-kind has used, mostly carbon based, resources present on earth to create energy. During the industrial revolution it was discovered that coal and oil are incredibly dense sources of energy. However, burning these fossil fuels does not only release energy, it also releases carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrate. All these gasses belong to the aforementioned greenhouse gasses group. Because of the exploding size of human populations and with that an ever-increasing need for energy, far too much of these gasses were released into the atmosphere. This process is resulting in climate change, which is most easily measured in the increasing average temperature globally. (Dittmar & Nicollerat, 2004)
Governments globally have reacted differently to the challenge posed by climate change. The scientific findings presented in the report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sketch a rather dire picture. If we collectively wish to keep the overall global temperature increase to a minimum, incredibly drastic actions are needed and even if those actions are taken immediately it could still be too late (IPCC, 2017). The emissions which drive climate change are a cumulative problem. A reduction in emissions alone will not suffice. It is critical that emissions are reduced to basically zero. So, although an increase in average temperature is inevitable, a global goal was set to limit this increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius (IPCC, 2017). This limit was chosen because if we pass the 2-degree threshold, the negative consequences in some regions will be twofold (IPCC, 2017).
Many sectors produce greenhouse gasses but some produce far more than others.
most utilised sector drastically reduces emissions can cause the most significant reduction of the overall emissions. National policies, like the German Energiewende, or international treaties, such as the Paris climate accords, might not be effective at reducing global emissions fast enough. However, what wealthy countries, those that developed before the awareness of climate change, can do is reduce their own emissions to zero as fast as possible and through that find, develop, and make more
affordable, the innovations everybody will need to achieve zero emissions.
Source: IPCC, 2014
Presented in figure 1 is an overview of all major emitting sectors by percentage share of the years emissions. Whilst observing the pie chart it becomes abundantly clear that one sector in particular is by far the largest contributor, the energy sector. Globally international treaties, regimes,
41% 20% 6% 1% 5% 24% 3%
Fig 1: Emissions per Sector Globally in 2014 (%)
Electricity and Heat Production Industry
Residential Agriculture and Fishing
Other Energy Industries Transport Commercial and Public Services
national and international policies have attempted to address this issue and the issue of climate change in general.
At the core of the emissions issue, caused by the energy sector, lies the now ongoing energy transition. The current energy transition is not the first one in history, but it is the first where so much is at stake. Energy transitions normally occur in a more organic matter but waiting for that to occur today could have disastrous consequences for the environment. Especially, considering that a significant portion of the planet’s inhabitants have not reached a level of development which would be deemed acceptable by most. Their development will inevitably lead to an increase in emissions, something which we just cannot afford to occur.
Many politicians, scientists, and other experts point to innovative technologies which could plausibly fulfil our energy needs in a more sustainable way (Paris Climate Agreement, 2016). The most politicised, and the most popular of these technical solutions is the electrification of transport. Currently, the technology is primarily about road transport, and in particular cars. Currently, privately owned cars represent ~10.5% of all emissions in the EU (European Parliament, 2019). Laws are being used to ‘push innovation’ in the desired direction. One of these legal tools is the Euro 7 emissions rating. In 2021 all cars sold by a company need a fleet average of 95 gram of CO2 per kilometre (KM) (European Commission, 2020). This is pushing many cars manufactures to remove models and try to introduce electrified versions which tend to have a significant smaller range and a much higher price tag. If this is not going to make car ownership more restricted to higher socio-economic classes will have to be seen (Gibbs, 2019). The Primary ascribed goal by many governments is to achieve zero-emission by a certain year. Such as the UK’s “Road to Zero” plan. The ambition is for all new cars and vans to be zero-emissions by 2040. That year it will also become prohibited to sell new internal combustion engine cars or vans (Department for Transport, 2018).
Principally all emission reduction plans hinge on the phasing out of fossil fuels, who are the primary emitters of greenhouse gasses. However, throughout this energy transition it is certain, at least with the currently available technology, that we will to some extent still have to depend on fossil
fuels (Petite, 2013). Firstly, because many other products rely on fossil fuels, such as plastic. Secondly, because current renewables suffer from an intermittence problem where they cannot provide the constant power needed for society to function the same as it does today. Basically, if you utilise solar energy and everybody turns on their lights at night, where is the electricity being produced when there is no sun. Furthermore, storing renewable energy for later consumption has proofed to be a serious technical challenge (Petite, 2013).
The energy is not only the most polluting sectorbut it is also onewhich is fundamental to developed and developing nations. An enormous number of other sectors depend on the energy sector to exists, such as industry, households, transport, and agriculture. Unsurprisingly, researching the best policies to transition our energy production to zero-emissions results in a highly complex web of interacting variables. Therefore, an attempt here will be made to utilise an extensive array of regime and regime effectiveness theories to study a comparative case of policy aimed at fostering low to zero emissions energy production. The case will compare German and French energy policy from 2011-onwards.
The socioeconomic situation in both the aforementioned nations make them a critical area of study in regards to effective energy regimes. Their privileged positions give them the ability to try multiple methods and technologies which for many developing nations is a socio-economic
impossibility. Therefore, the developed world has two primary functions in leading the charge against climate change. Firstly, they need to lead by example and do as much as they possibly can to reduce their emissions. Secondly, they need to pilot climate policies, laws, programs, technology, and methodologies to see which are most effective. This is why studying the current ongoing transition within the developed world is fundamental to creating a ‘roadmap’ for fighting climate change globally tomorrow.
To study this energy transition, it is important to look at different energy regimes and compare them to find the optimal way forward. However, energy regimes are very complex and exist out of a
vast number of variables. A strong theoretical framework and research design needs to be established. Therefore, throughout this work a regime-effectiveness calculation will be utilised, based on the work of Young, Underdal, and Bernauer
Young and Bernauer, try to capture a dimension that reflects on ‘fairness’ or ‘equitable methods’ when measuring the overall effectiveness. Instead of trying to quantify that during sub-question two, it seemed more sensible to utilise the concept of energy security as representative of equitability of the regimes. Regimes, regime effectiveness, and energy security will all be further expanded upon in the Theoretical Framework which will precede the analysis.
Taking that into account the following will be the Research Question and Sub Questions for this work:
To what extent is German and French energy policy, from 2011 onwards, comparatively effective at reducing greenhouse gasses, whilst maintaining energy security for its citizens?
Sub Question One - How are the contemporary policy and regulatory features of French and German energy policy predicated on their energy histories?
Sub Question Two - How effective are the French and German energy regimes?
Sub Question Three - To what extent are French and German energy policy effective whilst regarding the concept of energy security?
2) Theoretical Framework for Energy Regime-Effectiveness
2.1) Regimes theory as theoretical framework
Throughout this regime-effectiveness analyses a theoretical framework will be utilised. That theoretical framework has been built on regime-effectiveness, and further supported by socio-technical regime theory, socio-institutional regime theory. Beyond that it will also utilise the concepts of path dependency and energy security. All these theories serve together as theoretical structure from which a regime effectiveness research design will be defined and then used to study the energy regime of both France and Germany from 2011-onwards.
Regime theory has been chosen for its ability to help study grand societal challenges who can be understood as systemic. The concept of a regime can be defined as: a stable and dominant
configuration in a societal system. (Loorbach et al., 2017) Ergo, making these societal challenges only possible to be resolved with fundamental systemic adaptions within societal regimes. Climate policy is a example of this phenomenon, since man-made emissions are causing an accelerated greenhouse gas effect, and those emissions are primarily from technologies without which most of contemporary society would not function, such as transport, electricity, or agriculture. The current stable and dominant configuration in our societal system allows these emissions to occur. Therefore, the resolution to the problem can only be solved with fundamental systemic adaptions (Loorbach et al., 2017).
a) Establishing Context to Regimes
To study regime effectiveness, it is important to establish the regime’s characteristics and context. All regimes are affected by their environment either through historical context or the
interplay of different public and private institutions, including states themselves. In general, there are two ways to observe the effectiveness of a regime, its relative and its absolute outcomes. Furthermore, if the intention is, as it is here, to use the conclusions of this work as an analytical tool for what is and what isn’t an effective energy regime, then the context of the regimes in question are critical.
backdrop to ensure that observations made by data are representative of reality. Not doing so can result in false conclusions.
For example: country A, who generates more than 90% of its energy through renewable sources, has positive empirical outcomes, such as low emissions. Since the energy sector is the largest contributor to emissions that number of renewables would have a measurable impact on the total emission of country A. However, country A has a relatively small population and a large national oil-reserve. Most of the renewable’s build in country A have been constructed with profits from selling oil. Resulting in an effective-regime when observing the empirical data without the context of where the money for these renewables came from. Once the regime context is established the regime might be classified less effective, since most of its renewables were created by selling a fossil fuel whose negative externalities, like pollution, are not represented in countries A’s emissions. Therefore, it is important to establish regime context, so that an empirical analysis is not merely making assumption about the true impact of the regime with only understanding a limited scope of its available empirical data.
This problem of deferring assumptions, or false conclusions, from a regime-effectiveness analysis is exactly why not only regime-effectiveness is utilised. The mere variation and depth of energy regimes makes establishing a complete context difficult. Therefore, also socio-technical regime and socio-institutional regime theory are used. These two theories do have overlap but it is their focus that sets them apart. Socio-technical regimes are built on the concept of a dominant technology, something that does occur in almost every energy regime. The energy regime not having a dominant technology on itself would offer insightful regime context. Socio-institutional regime theory offers more insight into finding and describing regimes in transition their institutional cultures. In energy regime most problems, and solutions, are politicised and they come into existence based on the interaction between societal groups and the cultures of the energy regime’s institutions. The concept of Path dependency and Energy Security are also utilised. Path dependency is a concept that clearly outlines why
dominant technologies form in regimes, and offers key insights into explaining the behaviour of regimes that fall victim to path dependencies. Energy security is utilised because it offers an
empirically measurable way to account for equity as a component of the regimes-effectiveness analysis. Equity will also be expanded further upon in the section on regime effectiveness.
To further enhance the regime context the following two theories: (1) socio-technical regime, (2) socio-institutional regime, will be expanded upon below. Followed by a further explanation of: (3) why regime theories are the most appropriate to answer the RQ; (4)
b) Socio-technical regimes
Socio-technical regimes are regimes which emerged around a dominant technology. Dominant technologies are a core element to energy regimes. To provide an adequate context to ensure impact isn’t inferred from output this regime theory is needed to establish the start point of the contemporary every regime analysed. Mostly, empirical studies within this approach are considering the processes of technology substitutions, for example transitioning from candle light to electric light, as the result of the interaction between three key elements; emerging niches, external landscape pressures, and incumbent regime structures (Loorbach et al., 2017). Emerging niches refers to incumbent socio-technical regimes. This approach is used to map the patterns and dynamics of a regime change through data analysis and research. However, since this research is observing a currently ongoing transition this approach will be critical to answer sub question one but is inadequate to answer the RQ.
c) Socio-institutional regimes
This is where the socio-institutional regime and approach comes into play. This approach tries to find and describe institutionalised cultures, practices, and structures with the intent to analyse them as regimes in which transitions occur (Loorbach et al.,2017). Unlike with the socio-technical approach the attention is not so much on the technological aspect of the regime but on how incumbent discourses, powers, interest, routines, and regulations can cause path dependency and how this path dependency is confronted by (revolutionary) social innovations (Loorbach et al., 2017). This point of interaction between the technological aspect and the institutional aspects of regimes in transition is the primary reason why both are needed to sufficiently answer the RQ.
d) Justification for Regime theory
The energy transition, which lies at the centre of this research, is the single largest dynamically stable configurations which is facing the challenge of being unsustainable, for the climate, in its current form. Transition in the broader academic sense “refers to a nonlinear shift from one dynamic equilibrium to another” (Loorbach et al., 2017).
The goal of this research is to use a comparative analysis of the French and German energy regime-effectiveness to gain further insight into the most effective possible transition management strategies or transition pathways. However, trying to analyse these energy regimes, who have a vast number of multidisciplinary elements, from politics to engineering, means that the core concept of transitions should serve as a link between the different societal challenges and scientific disciplines. Because the energy transition is necessarily interdisciplinary if it was not it wouldn’t be able to overcome the problem it sets out to solve, curbing the effects of man-made climate change. This is supported by the core thesis in the field of transition which is: “grand societal challenges should be understood as systemic, and that dealing with such challenges is only possible though fundamental systemic changes in societal regimes” (Loorbach et al., 2017). Meaning that if a problem is of enormous proportion, such as the energy transition or climate change, it should be observed as systemic in nature, or part of the current socio-political, economic, and technical regimes. Ergo, to resolve these issues significant elements of those regimes need to be permanently altered. (Loorbach et al, 2017)
2.2) Defining Regime effectiveness, its concepts, Path Dependency, and Energy security
Regime effectiveness attempts through a plethora of theories to try and articulate the answer to what the conditions are “under which the arrangement that is established will be effective, in some specified meaning of the word” (Underdal, 1992). Underdal poses three questions which are relevant to designing a framework for the evaluation of a regime’s effectiveness. “(1) What precisely
constitutes the object to be evaluated? (2) Against which standard is this object to be evaluated? (3) How do we operationally go about comparing the object to our standard, or what kind of measurement operations do we have to perform in order to attribute a certain score of effectiveness?” (Underdal,
1992). The answer to these questions are as follows: (1) The objects are the French and German energy regimes from 2011-onwards; (2) The objects are to be evaluated against a theoretical best regime outcome, a theoretical no-regime outcome, and one another; (3) the comparison is made by first establishing regime context and then utilising a formula to place the object on a point between the theoretical best regime outcome and theoretical absence of a regime. To establish the best regime and regime absence outcomes it is important to establish a distinction in regards to regime effectiveness.
There are two distinctions in regards to regime effectiveness, problem-solving effectiveness and compliance. Problem-solving effectiveness refers to attaining the goals of the regime by either hitting specific regime targets or overarching goals. (O’Neill, 2009) Compliance is normally defined as “the extent to which the behaviour of a state – part to an international treaty – actually conforms to the conditions set out in this treaty” (Faure & Lefevere, 2015).
Compliance means that the minimum effort has been made to comply to the regime’s goals. For example, a country makes has partaken in the Kyoto protocols but will only do the absolute bare minimum to hit the required targets. This country is now operating in the regime under compliance. Ergo, regimes with the highest level of compliance might just be the weakest regimes and not the most effective. Therefore, this research will focus on problem-solving effectiveness and its two dimensions as laid out by Oran Young. (Young, 1999; O’Neill, 2009).
a) Dimensions of Regime-effectiveness: Problem-Solving effectiveness
There are two dimensions of problem-solving effectiveness in regards to regimes. There is goal attainment, which is either through hitting the specific regime targets or overarching goals, and there is Problem-solving, which is measured in absolute and relative change in environmental quality.
Goal attainment through specific regime targets would merely mean that the country merely complied with the agreement of the regime without trying to achieve the spirit of the regime. The spirit, in this context is referring to the principle or goal behind the regime. (Weiss and Jacobson, 1998)
Goal attainment through overarching goals not only represents compliance but also the attempt to achieve the spirit behind the regime. An example would be, not merely completing the requirements of the Paris climate accords but going beyond those to further curb the effects of climate change. The spirit of the Paris accords is to curb climate change, and those that go beyond the requirements are therefore achieving the overarching goals.
Problem-solving through absolute change in the environment. This form of regime-effectiveness will be used as basis for the regime-effectiveness formula. The absolute change in the environment will be measured by looking at the changes in emissions of greenhouse gasses, who are the primary drivers of climate change. This concept is important to analyse how effective the energy regime really is at achieving the goal of zero-emissions by 2050.
Problem-solving through relative change in the environment. Unlike absolute change this concept reflects more on the ability of the current regime to improve the relative state compared to last regime, or when there was no regime at all. Although the latter does not exist in any developed country in regards to energy regimes. The relative change will be measured compared to 2011 and will offer insight into the relative current change. A regime which does abysmal in the absolute change might still do well in relative change. This would indicate that the regime might be effective after all just its starting position made absolute change difficult or slow.
b) Regime-Effectiveness: Concepts of Output and Impact
Furthermore, it is also important to differentiate between the concepts of output and impact in regime-effectiveness analysis. The output encompasses all the rules, norms, and principles constituting the regime itself. The impact is the consequences of the enactment and tweaks of a regime. The difference between output and impact are further important when analysing the effectiveness of different political instruments. Primarily the difference between instruments manipulating incentives (such as subsidies) and command-and-control legislation (such as
criminalising behaviour). The former is much harder to analyse in particularly if the regime is still ongoing. Therefore, establishing at which phase the regime implementation currently is, will be needed to predict the possibility for significant impact on change in the future. Ergo, two
consequences of studying regime effectiveness, is that it clearly needs to be stablished if output or impact is being studied and that attempting to “infer impact from data only about output” (Underdal, 1992) has to be done with the greatest caution.
This has to be done with the greatest caution because of the aforementioned regime context and false conclusions. Which is exactly why sub-question one also serves to establish the necessary regime context without merely relying on empirical data (output) to establish what the regime has achieved (Impact).
c) Regime Effectiveness: Concepts of Equity and Efficiency
Both the definitions of Young and Bernauer, include the aforementioned ideas of equitable
measures or equity (Bernauer. 1995; Young, 1999). The equity element of regime effectiveness tries to counterweight the inherent problem of studying anything without concern for the asymmetrical affect it might have towards some groups. To create a hyperbolic argumentation, as example, the best thing for effective reduction of emissions would be to start a war, and through that reduce the population, who exist and therefore pollute. The horrific ideas such a solution presents, regardless if it would work, is exactly why both Young and Bernauer include the ideas of equity to counterweight the measure of effectiveness. The concept of energy security is meant to entail that critical element of equity to ensure that the solution is not imposing an asymmetrical cost on those that might not have the socio-economic position to either defend themselves or bear it.
d) Path Dependency
Path dependency is a concept closely related to transitions and socio-technical regime theory; it illustrates the effects of real-world developments. Path dependency, or maintaining the current regime, is caused by three primary reasons: sunken cost of investment, co-evolutionary dynamic within the regime, and benefits of scale. (Loorbach, 2017) The first and third are economic in nature, whilst the second is more expansive and elaborate. The sunken cost of investment is a natural consequence of choosing to implement one technology over another, even if at the time of implementation, the latter technology was the best choice. For instance, the implementation of nuclear energy in Japan has systematically lowered the price of producing new nuclear power plants. However, if Japan were to
build a wind park, the costs invested in making nuclear energy more economical will be permanently lost (Navarro, 1988). This is the concept of benefit of scale; once production of those power plants starts, if the exact same power plant were produced every time, then through economies of scale and other benefits of scale, this power plant will be cheaper to build every time a new one is constructed (Navarro, 1988). Lastly, the co-evolutionary dynamic within the regime could be through a plethora of ways For example, the artificial continuation of mining operations in the United States of America (US) through subsidies is the result of the co-evolutionary dynamics between the mining communities and their representatives in the federal government(Redman et al, 2017). This is the result of
representatives in the US fearing that their constituents would not elect them if too many lose employment, so despite the negative economic, ecological, and plausibly social consequences, he or she might use their political power to ensure the operation of their local mine. However, this is merely one example of an interaction causing the regime to keep unsustainable elements artificially alive and therefore falling victim to path dependency.
e) Energy Security
Energy security covers two critical concepts for any nations: (1) a state’s energy reserves; (2) and also the price of energy for citizens and private enterprise within its borders. Access to affordable electricity for the entire population is an indicator of a state with higher energy security. The first is normally measured by the ability of a country to supply its own national energy needs without import and export, normally measured in units of time such as hours, day, or weeks. The second is measured as not only the access to electricity but also the price per kWh adjusted to median national income (Petite, 2013). This data will be used to ascribe a value to the energy security of both countries which then can be used to calculate the adjusted value of their regime effectiveness number. The used indicators for answering sub-question three have been chosen based on the article: Conceptualizing and measuring energy security: A synthesized approach, in which the authors have created an overview of the most indicative indicators per Component, in this case the relevant components are security of supply and production and access and equity. The reason for not merely relying on indicators from the later component, access and equity, is that they both interact. (Sovacool &
Mukherjee, 2011) With interact it is meant that one could sacrifice access and equity for an overall increase in security supply and production and vice versa. Since the latter also reflects on reserves and, by for example artificially controlling the price of energy, sometimes those reserves will be depleted in the name of access and equity.
The indicators, which will be used for answering sub-question three, are focused on those two components and the following three of their indicators; (1) the average electricity price for a
household; (2) the % of annual income spend on electricity; (3) andthe energy import dependency. Using this data, the outcome of the regime-effectiveness will be adjusted and discussed and adjusted using the following formula:
(the percentage of median income spent annually on energy times
((average net import during regime) divided by 100) is regime-effectiveness energy security
adjustment score. After which there will be enough information regarding the energy regimes, to
adjust the regime-effectiveness to account for equity through the concept of energy security, to answer the RQ.3) Research Design
Throughout this research design all the necessary indicators will be presented for the regime-effectiveness calculation. This is done by establishing the standard for evaluation and relying on existing literature in the field to establish which indicators will be most relevant for answering the sub-questions and eventually RQ. This research design exists out of 5 parts who all together form the theoretical basis and justification of this regime-effectiveness analysis. These parts are the following, presented in order; (1) a standard for evaluation; (2) points of reference; (3) metric of evaluation; (4) definition of regime-effectiveness; (5) calculating effectiveness; (6) case selection.
The first, a standard for evaluation, will define what a standard of evaluation is, why it is necessary, and how it is defined. The second, points of reference, will explain the two points of reference needed, collective optimum and no-regime counterfactual, and how they will be calculated. The third, metric of evaluation, will discuss the indicators and units used ion the regime-effectiveness calculation. The fourth, is the definition used for an effective energy regime throughout this work. The fifth, is how, using all previous elements, the effectiveness of the regime will be calculated. The sixth, and final element is why France and Germany were selected as case and why it is important to do the regime analysis.
3.1) A Standard for Evaluation
To properly execute a regime-effectiveness analysis a standard of evaluation needs to be
established. The standard for evaluation is necessary to guarantee that the eventual data is
comparable between the two countries. That standard involves two steps; (1) points of reference
(Collective Optimum/No-Regime Counterfactual); (2) metric evaluation. The first is normally complex to establish, thankfully, in this research, relative and absolute improvement will be used. Meaning that the vast imperial data with historical context should provide enough information to establish it. Comparative relative improvement, which does not offer a complete insight to the perfect transitional strategy but it will hopefully show which avenues are worth pursuing and which are not.3.2) Points of Reference a) Collective Optimum
The collective optimum (CO), or best outcome for all, is luckily rather simple to establish in this very particular case. The collective optimum is zero-emission in 2055 following the recommendation of the IPCC (IPCC, 2017). If this collective optimum is possible remains to be seen. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the cumulative nature of the climate change problem makes the need for humanity to eventually achieve this a simple necessity. More appropriate would be a Pareto Frontier as outer limit. However, the Pareto Frontier, the maximum outcome for all parties to gain without one or more parties being worse off, does not lend itself well for empirical studies. The vast number of elements and the needed specified variables makes it a tool more suited for studying very specific negotiations outcomes, such as the Paris climate accords.
b) No-Regime Counterfactual
Another concept that needs to be established for the analysis is, No Regime Counterfactual (NR). Throughout this study the NR will be a stagnate state of energy regime as it was in 2011. This is an unrealistic scenario where nothing changes permanently. However, imaging a hypothetical state of nature or no-regime condition is both unhelpful and unrealistic. Predicting innovations and behaviours of millions of individuals far extents most realistic research capabilities. Therefore, to keep analysis in a plausible scale the situation of both countries in 2011 as a stagnate state will be used as the NR.
c) Metric of Evaluation
The final element is the metric of evaluation, since this research is focused on the German and French energy regimes and the differences in outcomes they produce, there is a need for a
standardised metric of evaluation. These metrics come in two variations costs and emissions. Cost exists out of two types of costs, expenditure to maintain or build the regime, and the cost for the citizenry to consume from it. Emissions come primarily in one form, CO2 in tons per capita. The second exists to overcome elements of the regime which are much harder to quantify, for example adjustment of behaviour. If the price and emissions of country A is significantly higher but the
increased costs have been successful at changing behaviour it could still result in an effective and equitable regime.
d) Definition of Regime-Effectiveness
The definition of regime-effectiveness for this work is: An effective regime is one that both achieves relative and absolute gains, in their reduction of emissions, whilst maintaining an equitable solution which is reflected in their energy security.
e) Calculating Effectiveness
To establish a consistent comparison between the two policies their effectiveness an equation will be used. That equation exists out of 5 elements and is supposed to represent the position of the observed object on the theoretical spectrum from Collective Optimum (CO) to No-Regime
Counterfactual (NR). However, as mentioned before in this comparative analysis it is not just the NR we are using as a baseline but the other nation’s comparative effectiveness. NR in this instance is the state of both countries in 2011 observed as if stagnate to see how much, if any, improvement has occurred. Four units will have to be established before utilising the equation: (1) Emission by Energy Source (MT CO2), (2) Energy Emission per capita (tons of CO2), (3) Electric Power Consumption (kWh per capita), (4) Total Annual Emissions million tons (Per Capita); Energy Security measured using the following indicators: (5) the average electricity price for a household; (6) the % of annual income spend on electricity; (7) andthe energy import dependency.. The formula itself is the following:
Effectiveness = Actual Performance (AP) – No Regime Counterfactual / Collective Optimum – No Regime Counterfactual.
The AP will be calculated using the mean of emissions adjusted for population from 2011-2017. The resulting number should be a value between zero (NR) and one (CO). This number should give insight into both their relative improvement from NR and their relative position to one another. However, these numbers will only reflect on the regime effectiveness of the energy policy. Any significant investment and innovations in other carbon intense national sectors will not be deducible
from this data. Nevertheless, the electric sector is critical to all other sectors and a reduction in emissions within the energy sector will still have the most significant impact for either country. (Young, 2011).
f) Case Selection
France and Germany are the 6th and 4th largest economies in the world, respectively, as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World bank, 2018). Furthermore, France and Germany are the two most populous countries within the European Union (EU) and hold the most political power within the region and within the EU. Both countries ’current energy policies focus on the reduction of GHG emission however their approaches have been drastically different.
As the energy transition is a relatively larger financial burden on developing nations than it is on developed nations, it is critical to map the experience of the developed countries with the intention to find optimal paths for those that have to follow. Preferably, this would result in a roadmap for other nations to navigate the energy transition more effectively. Effectively, in this instance can be
described as a solution that maximises adoption by balancing reduction in emissions with financial burden whilst ensuring energy security. This is one of the reasons why studying energy regimes in transition is more important today than ever before. It will be impossible for some countries to adopt more than one technology, and unlike the wealthy states, switching tactics midstream might be detrimental to their economies. France and Germany are both states who do have flexibility and wealth to throw against the problem. They are on the surface very alike, they ascribe to the same international agreements, treaties, and organisations. Nevertheless, their energy regime history, and current structures are so fundamentally different, that comparing the two will give us much needed insight into the most effective manner to transition other states, their energy regimes, in the future.
4) Sub-Question One: How are the contemporary policy and regulatory features of French and German energy policy predicated on their energy histories?
Throughout this paper, the necessary regime context will be created utilising the
aforementioned theories. This context is needed to ensure that no conclusions about the regime’s impact are made without a clear understanding of output. The differences in the dominant
technologies, before the awareness of the climate, is a real limiting factor on the impact the regimes could possibly create. However, if the overall improvement is substantial it could result in a very effective contemporary regime. This process will consists of four theoretical and four empirical elements.
The concepts and theories from the framework are interconnected and interacting; concepts of path dependency, socio-technical regimes, and socio-institutional regimes do not exist in a vacuum. The three key elements of path dependency; sunken cost of investment, co-evolutionary dynamic within the regime, and benefits of scale, are all fundamental to both the creation of a socio-institutional and socio-technical regime. The creation of a dominant energy source present locally, such as coal, results in an industry which pressures politicians to invest in the technology. The consequences of this situation, when for example an energy regime start acknowledging climate change.
A socio-technical regime substitutes technology because of the interaction of three elements: emerging niches, external landscape pressures, and incumbent regime structures. Throughout this overview, these three elements will be established as they are needed to answer all sub-questions. Attempting to answer these questions merely with a contemporary data analysis in a vacuum without context would lead to unreliable conclusions.
Socio-institutional regime theory offers insight into why, if they do at all, some regimes can become slaves to path dependency through routines, powers, interest, regulations, and incumbent discourse. Furthermore, it can elucidate if this has occurred in the past, whether the consequences still felt today, or whether we can see how the regime was adapted or replaced, to overcome these path dependencies and fit within the new social-paradigm.
Finally, no national or international, legislation, or any regime for that matter, is created without external influence. Although it is impossible to account for all external influence, a manner to
compensate some is through outlining, broadly, the most financially and politically significant
elements of the EU energy regime. Although at first it might seem unrelated, many supra-national EU legislation has trickled down into national energy regulation and with that, national energy regimes. Establishing them will give further insight into the effects of external landscape pressures. Particularly since the EU, and the extent of her power, is a unique supra-national organisation who must have significant impact on its two most prominent and powerful members.
Following this will be five elements; (1) energy transitions, which is intended to illustrate the past energy transitions, preliminary information, and the unique situation our current energy transition is facing; (2) catalysing substitution, overview of the historical event that pushed both countries initially to substitute their dominant energy technologies. (3) The Nuclear Revolution of France, illustrates the conditions under which the homogenous French energy regime was shaped giving insight into which elements still affect their contemporary energy regime. (4) The Energiewende a German Evolution, illustrates the conditions under which the more heterogenous German energy regime was shaped and offers an overview and insight of it many complex elements and
characteristics. (5) The European Energy Regime, discusses the most dominant elements of the EU energy regime and how it possibly impacts the EU members and Citizens.
4.1) Energy Transitions
The transitioning of energy source is not an uncommon event throughout history. Most energy transitions occurred on a local scale determined by a local limitation. The primary energy sources tended to be biomass energy because it is both present in abundance and it is easily accessed, transported, and stored (Smil, 1983; Smil, 2010). Every energy transition resulted in access to ever denser energy sources and more efficient retrieval techniques. These energy transitions illustrate conditions that would help overcome path dependency, where the relative losses are much smaller than the gains. There are five primary reasons for transitioning to another energy source.
First, the local resource, say a forest, has been completely depleted of its trees. This pushes the local group to try and find an alternative energy source to substitute wood. Second, when markets come into play it became relevant for energy sources to make financial sense. Herding sheep and
trading them for wood with a forest-rich region might be more cost and labour effective than trying to obtain the wood locally. Third, there is an adverse effect or negative externality which accompanies the energy source which could be both environment and health related. This could make another energy source, which might cost more upfront but does not share the same negative externalities, more attractive. Fourth, a new technology, or innovation, is depending on the widespread adoption of another energy source, or a drastic altercation to the current energy extraction methods (Solomon & Krishna, 2010). These energy transitions are normally restricted in scale and occur on a very localised level. However, the fourth phase is when it starts effecting a much large group. There have been 3 primary sources of energy through which humanity transitioned: (1) wood; (2) coal; (3) oil. The latter two were propelled forward because of the new energy needs presented by the industrial revolution.
In regards to all three of these energy sources, depletion is not the primary factor that pushed nations to adopt alternatives. It was the result of an ever-growing need for lower and more dense energy sources. For instance, oil has characteristics that makes it capable of being produced in a wide array of products, from plastic to rocket fuel. This is part of the problem regarding the push for a modern global energy transition; the effects of climate change are initially small in scope and difficult to observe. Many of the energy sources and technologies we use are, to some extent, fuelled or possible through the consumption of fossil fuels. To further illustrate the symptoms of path
dependency, we currently also have very few economically attractive alternatives. Moreover, unlike was initially thought, our fossil fuel reserves are much larger than anticipated. Meaning we have far more fossil fuels than our environment could possibly handle (IER, 2012; Wolfson, 2015; Boyle et al, 2015). Thus, we need to intentionally initiated the energy transition for it will not occur on time to mitigate climate warming if we wait for the prices of fossil fuel to be no longer competitive. In this we find partially the issues of substitution and partially the problem of path dependency. The vast
capabilities dedicated to maximising the yield of fossil fuels which were developed for over a century, have now been an enormous sunken-cost for those that invested in it. The real challenge is not only that our alternative zero-emission sources need to overcome some technical limitations, they also will have to overcome the path dependency of fossil fuels and the regimes depending on them. The fossil
fuel industry has significant influence and power in both national and international politics. Merely the regimes surrounding the maintenance of uneconomic fossil fuel jobs through government subsidies and protection, illustrate the vast influence of the fossil fuel industry and workers.
The way in which one determines the size of reserves is known as the reserves/production ration (R/P). This number illustrates the amount of years production could be maintained while the utilisation stays the same as it is the day it is measured. However, this does not account for new oil wells and extraction techniques so it is not uncommon for the R/P to increase alongside production and consumption. Problematically coals, the most polluting fossil fuel, has the largest R/P ration of any fossil fuel. Currently we have an R/P of 120 years globally and the US alone has about 200 years ’ worth of currently proven oil reserves (IER, 2012; Wolfson, 2015; Boyle et al, 2015). The
inconvenient truth is that not only are we unlikely to run out of fossil fuels in the next centuries, their abundance will take decades or maybe more before pushing producers to alternatives based purely on their bottom-line. However, access to a certain resource can seriously affect a country’s trajectory in regards to their primary energy source. This is exactly what occurred within France during the 1970’s and 1980’s. This event was catalysed not by environmental concerns but by artificial resource
limitations created by the cartel Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
4.2) Catalysing Substitution
In the late 1960s, a proxy conflict was brewing between the western backed Israel and the locally backed Egypt which in June 1967 resulted in the Six Day War. During this conflict a limited embargo was enacted by OPEC against the US, UK, and West Germany. The embargo itself lasted until September of 1967. However, at the time the U.S. had such a significant domestic surplus in oil production that no one was severely affected (Yergin, 1991, P. 555-557). It was six years later when the same event would wreak havoc throughout not only the worlds energy needs but, the global economy. In October of 1973 another embargo was enacted on the US, Western-Europe, and Japan by the organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) which generally was OPEC but with Egypt and Syria included. Their inclusion is unsurprising as the primary driver of this embargo was the Yom Kippur War.
The Yom Kippur War was the latest in a series of wars between Israel backed by the west (primarily the US) and Egypt and Syria supported by the Soviet Union and other expeditionary forces of local Arab allies. This second embargo, enacted in October 1973, had disastrous consequences for the west and their individual and collective energy security.
The reasons for this are three-fold; (1) the embargo lasted 5-months which was significantly longer than the 1967 embargo; (2) It occurred after the U.S. their crude oil production had peaked three years prior in 1970; (3) the prices of exported oil were raised by 70% which would eventually lead to the price of oil quadrupling (Yergin, 1991, p. 606-607).
This event would lead some nations to attempt to become more self-sufficient in regards to their energy supply and security, France was one of these countries (Schipper et al., 1990). The French sought help from their technical elites to utilise cutting-edge technology to ensure their energy
independence. The technology chosen was nuclear energy, and within two decades the country would become self-sufficient, and one of the world’s leading experts in the field.
4.3) The Nuclear Revolution of France
Between 1971 and 2001 58 nuclear reactors were built in France (EDF, 2018), all the while, oil accounted for more than 70% of the total primary energy supply. About 71,6% of that oil
originated from Middle Eastern states (Taylor et al., 1998). This large-scale revolutionary transition to nuclear energy was initially met with some concerns about safety, radioactive impact on health, and a concern regarding broader environmental impact. Furthermore, in 1982, some of the French reactors were faulty; the retention mechanism for the fuel rods (the primary drivers of the nuclear fission) was affected by radiation embrittlement (Walgate, 1984). This could have been a fundamental flaw to the French nuclear energy transition since the strategy, unlike the US for example, focused on only two primary designs. A design flaw in either could have had disastrous economic implications for the French state.
The manner in which national politics are shaped in France offers significant decision-making power to technical elites. To ensure no public limitation or interference to the program it was decided
that the courts could only resolve procedural questions. Meaning that any case opened against the construction of a local nuclear power plant could only be regarding the procedures not the construction in and of itself. Furthermore, it was culturally common for the courts to avoid
embarrassing the sitting government (Hadjilambrinos, 2000, p. 1117). Although not initially, nuclear quickly was embraced by a significant portion of the population. It started to symbolise the French’s technological abilities and its independence from imported energy, and energy security.
It is clear that the French implementation of this technology is a socio-technical regime. It can be easily mapped according to the three key elements: emerging niches, external landscape pressures, and incumbent regime structures. The emerging niche in this case is nuclear technology, of which the technical elite and a portion of the French population, ever since the first French nuclear bomb, have always felt strong nation pride (Baldwin, 1966). The external landscape pressure is the
aforementioned 1973 oil crisis, and the incumbent regime structure is the centralised power of the national French government, increased power of technical elite, and the interconnectedness of the French judicial system and the national government. However, in spite of this the implementation of nuclear energy is a highly complex process that only few countries have done successfully. The question that remains is “how did France implement nuclear energy ‘successfully’?”
Électricité de France (EDF) is France’s main electricity generating and distributing company. EDF utilised publicity campaigns to convince the French population that an “all-electric all nuclear” society would be a positive step forward for the country. However, the most significant issue that always plagued nuclear reactors, besides the associated risks of radioactive material, is the economic element. The type of investment needed for a nuclear reactor is not inherently uneconomical.
However, there are three primary reasons why the deployment of nuclear power plants is considered uneconomical. (1) Duration of return on investment. A nuclear reactor which function normally for its life-time has significant return on investment. Nevertheless, it could take years or decades before any of that money is received by the investors. (2) Construction problems and legislation. New designs could result in improved safety, efficiency, and other desired features. This could also lead to significant problems during construction and deployment. Unlike other power stations, the upfront
cost of nuclear reactors will quickly sky-rocket if adjustment needs to be made to the design. Particularly if new legislation is introduced during construction, making it an undesirable and risky investment. The adjustment cost of a nuclear power station can sometimes double the original price. (3) abandonment through legislation is another element which makes investments in nuclear energy undesirable for most private investors (Renn & Marshall, 2016). A key contributed to this problem are states, such as Germany, who enacted laws to ensure no compensation has to be paid if they close a nuclear power station before the end of its life-cycle (Renn & Marshall, 2016).
To overcome these three issues the French government used three tools; (1) Central planning with a majority of the decision power with technical experts not politicians; (2) Utilising only a few different reactor designs, making France one of the only two nations to experience economics of scale whilst constructing nuclear power plants; (3) France builds nuclear power cores in pairs.
The first tool is self-explanatory; if the legal framework to which the nuclear plants have to comply is written by those that look at it purely from a technical perspective, it will be easier to build them. Furthermore, the facilies having the ability to limit interference from concerned members of the public make experimenting and optimising their procedures much simpler.
The second tool leads to a solution that, counter-intuitively, rarely occurs with the production of nuclear power plants, using economics of scale successfully to reduce the construction cost over time. On the opposite side of France, in this regard, is the US which has experienced a significant rise in the cost of every reactor it has built. After close examination, the key to reducing costs seems to be most achievable with a limited number of reactor designs. The US has produced over 30 different designs, whilst France focused on mostly two which results much easier into economics of scale. (Berthelemy & Rangel, 2013; Lovering et al, 2016).
The third tool is closely related to the second, because the reactor cores of the same design are always built simultaneously in pairs it is simple to standardise building methods and safety adaptions. Moreover, the personnel working on these nuclear cores constantly increase their effectiveness at building them.
These tools are all intended to overcome the safety and financial difficulties others experienced in relations to nuclear energy. However, these three elements also mirror the three elements of path dependency. Mirror in the sense that these adjustments are to create the conditions which could also lead to path dependency. However, path dependency occurs with a regime because it was initially a suitable solution. Nuclear energy is not considered the optimum solution at first examination, if it were all countries would have substituted coal, gas, or oil for nuclear energy. However, by utilising the technical elite to create a co-evolutionary dynamic between nuclear energy and dominant political regime they overcame some of nuclear energy’s shortcomings. Furthermore, they even utilised benefits of scale in two manners; by both building only two variations in reactor design and building the reactor cores in pairs. (Navarro, 1988; Loorbach et al., 2007; Berthelemy & Rangel, 2013; Lovering et al, 2016)
This has resulted in France having an almost unique energy regime. Their technical-elite created the conditions for a substitution and path dependency on nuclear technology, creating a socio-technical regime that has provided a significant energy surplus, higher energy independence, and one of the lowest energy tariffs in Europe (Solomon & Krishna, 2011). Furthermore, contrary to popular believe, nuclear is currently the safest source of energy available per terawatt/hour (Ritchie, 2017). This is on the condition that one accounts for deaths caused by air pollution. The nuclear revolution is interesting to study because it was capable of transition to another energy source through planning and not because it was merely a superior alternative. Artificially creating the conditions for some energy sources, such as wind, to gain necessary advantages over fossil fuels might imperative for reducing our collective emissions. Currently, nuclear does have a significant advantage that was not perceived as such in the 1970’s, it does not emit greenhouse gasses for energy production.
4.4) The Energiewende a German Evolution
The German energy mix has for more than a century relied heavily on Coal and Lignite which are both present in enormous quantities. However, starting in the 1960s, an ever-growing public concern developed for “Waldsterben”, or the decay of the German forests. Burning fossil fuels does not only results in carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide it is frequently accompanied by nitrate and
once a substantial amount of nitrate collects in the upper atmosphere it can induce acid rain. This acid rain in turn led to the decay of the German forests and sparked public concern (Kenk & Fischer, 1988). It is not only coal with which the German public has a troubled relationship, nuclear has historically been viewed exceptionally negatively. However, to understand the energy regime history leading up to 2011, three elements need to be discussed: (1) The National Energy of Germany; (2) Energy Security; (3) Climate Change.
The integration of Europe after world war two has had many effects on national policy including energy policy. The German energy market had historically been a nationalised affair with government controlled or government run monopolies meeting the national energy needs. During the mid-80s it was believed by the European political elite that for further economic integration some of the large nationalised companies needed to be liberalized and deregulated (Renn & Marshall, 2016). It is widely debated to this day if this change was positive or negative. Nonetheless, it occurred but it did not occur universally. Some industries enjoyed more protection than others. Especially, if these industries were large scale providers of national employment or provided other benefits such as lower emissions or higher energy security. An example of this is the nuclear industry which has frequently experienced private funding issues (Hatch, 1986). It is easy to argue that this is in part because of aforementioned German legislation that could result in the pre-mature decommissioning of a nuclear power plant without financial compensation for the investors. Furthermore, the largest current sustainable energy source in Germany is wind which also enjoys special legal protection and funding from the national government (Werner & Scholtens, 2016). Wind is the contemporary German variation of Nuclear in the 70’s for France. German has been attempting to overcome the limitations of wind through planning. However, more needs to be established regarding the history of the German energy regime to discover their methods.
The national energy of Germany, is primarily coal and lignite who both made up half of all nationally produced energy up until 2010. The German coal sector is the largest in Europe and controlled completely by one company, RAG AG. The oil sector is fully privatised and contains a plethora of companies. Besides coal, also the gas sector in German is the largest within Europe.
However, unlike its coal counterpart it is highly diverse and full of players. Some gas utility providers are owned by municipalities whilst others are fully private. The overall national energy sector is comparable to the gas sector including both private and public players. In 2014 there were more than 800 local utility providers, 120 electricity dealers, 56 regional utilities, and 4 supra-regional
companies. Those supra- regional companies are responsible for generating 80% of the total national energy production. Those four companies are: (1) EnBW; (2) E.ON; (3) RWE; (4) Vattenfal Europe AG (Renn & Marshall, 2016). This is in stark contrast with the centralised nature of the French utilities. The intended reason for diversifying the market this drastically is to create competition. However, the fact that the two largest sources of energy are controlled by few players, in the case of coal merely one, and that most of these provide their services are provided on a regional bases not on a state or national level, illustrates that these ‘liberalised ’market do not resemble anything like an normal market of another sector.
The German political system is primarily led by its federalism, in a very similar fashion to the US. Federal laws are mandatory for all but it is the responsibility of state-level governments to implement those laws (Hatch, 1986). In that sense the German state is far more driven by the procedural culture of their institutions instead of a centralised technical-elite who prescribe the solution. The independent German bundenslanden (states) do have the ability to create their own independent programs and services such as renewable energy subsidies or utility companies. This diffused character of the German state might offer serious limitations regarding mass-planning of the Energiewende. Unlike the French, with their very centralised planned attempt at making nuclear a viable alternative and succeeding, the fact that there is a higher competition of ideas could prove detrimental or essential. Essential because it offers insight into a broad number of successful strategies and programs. Detrimental because without a centralised strategy making renewable energies
artificially the optimum substitute for fossil fuels might be impossible.
On a federal level the power and responsibility over the national energy policy lies with the Federal ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) whilst the Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear safety (BMU) is in charge of environmental policy. Furthermore,
there is also the German Energy Agency (DENA) who is in charge of energy conservation and efficiency. Finally, there is also the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) who is in charge of regulating competition in the energy markets. The difference in the French and German approach to both energy policy and government is even noticeable in the procedural nature that the German Federal state does division of labour (Renn & Marshall, 2016). The vast number of different institutions which make up the executives of the German energy regime makes it share many prescribed elements of a socio-institutional regime. The fundamental outcome of the regime is far more shaped by the interaction of institutions and their cultures, not a centralised technical elite building an energy regime on one dominant technology.
The energy regime in Germany between 1945 and 1973 was reasonably liberal with minimum intervention from the government allowing the market to utilise both nuclear and coals as acceptable energy source. In the 1950’s almost 90 % of all energy was created through coal. The coal industry employed more than 500.000 people during this period (Hatch, 1986). To put that into perspective, the total population size in west Germany at the time was 51 million (Statista, 2019).
In the late 1950’s Nuclear energy seemed to start gaining traction as an alternative energy source. These aspirations were bolstered by the newly created Ministry of Atomic Affairs which would under the following coalition be renamed the Ministry of Research and Technology. The first commercial nuclear reactors, two light water reactors (LWR), were ordered in 1967 by the German utilities. In 1969 another two, and in 1971 another five. It took till 1973 until all, now ten, reactors had received their permits. In 1973, just as it was in France, the oil crisis fundamentally changed energy regime in Germany forever. As response a federal energy program was created (Renn & Marshall, 2016). During this period environmental concerns would become public concerns. The German public disliked nuclear energy and saw the risks it posed as unacceptable. Although some elements of the new environmental movement did voice concern regarding the coal industry and open pit mining, the movement collectively was far more worried about nuclear (Renn & Marshall, 2016). In 1975 the bürgerinitiativen (citizens initiatives) started to really push for ever-growing protests against the construction of nuclear power plants. The state of Baden-Wurttemberg had approved the construction
of a large plant. This was the first power plant in which the bürgerinitiativen were utilised to curb its construction. Overtime all new power plants became targets for protests (Hatch, 1986). These protests even resulted into violent outbreaks between the protesters and the police.
The federal government needed to act and therefore started the Bürgerdialog Kernenergy (Public dialogue regarding nuclear energy) which was designed to offer people insight into the specifics and safety provisions. Eventually it became clear that the dialogue only further propelled nuclear energy in the consciousness of the German public. Consequently, it became the courts in which concerns first were established regarding the storage of nuclear waste, a political problem for nuclear energy globally. Through the courts the first plant in Borkdorf, for which construction had already started, was halted (Renn & Marshall, 2016). By 1977 the movement had gained momentum, construction was halted on three of the thirteen planned plants. However, the 80’s was a relatively good time for nuclear energy in Germany. Except for the Green party all other political parties supported nuclear expansion. The second oil crisis even pushed a proportion of the German public to start outright supporting nuclear energy. Leading to a third positive revision of the nuclear program in 1981 (Renn & Marshall, 2016).
In the German energy regime of the 20th century there is a critical event that shifted everything permanently. In France it was the desire to achieve energy independency after the 1973 oil crisis. However, in Germany it is the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster that till this day affects the national energy policy. This disaster and the 2011 Fukushima disaster, both edged into the German public the ‘dangers ’of nuclear energy.1
After the Chernobyl disaster, the German Socialist Democratic party (SPD) took a far more critical stand towards nuclear energy. In turn they actively started to promote coal as safe and cheap energy source. This became apparent in evermore pro-coal legislation and subsidies. These subsidies would cost the German state 327 billion euros between 1970 and 2014 (FOS, 2015). Lignite is now
1It is completely undeniable that the environmental impact of a nuclear disaster can be almost without bounds. However,
please see attachment one to see a short overview of the simplified events that led up to both the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters. Both are caused by political malice and mismanagement on an unprecedented scale and neither is representative of the dangers a normally operated nuclear reactor represents today.
