'Stuck in the middle' : a case study of the participation of inter-communal women's groups in the Cyprus peace process

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'Stuck in the middle'

A case study of the participation of inter-communal women's

groups in the Cyprus peace process

Victoria Lecomte 11173173 Word count: 22,978

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Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Assistant Professor Jana Krause from Amsterdam University’s Political Science department, for guiding me through this research process and for having aroused my curiosity on the case of Cyprus.

I would also like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement and good insights throughout the research and writing process of this thesis. I would like to thank my dear Arnaud in particular, for supporting me, always.

Last but not least, I want to thank from the bottom of my heart all my respondents for their time, kindness, generosity and welcoming. This thesis would not have been possible to write without their precious help. I would like to thank my friend Evren Inancoglu in particular for his kindness and for having showed me around his beautiful country.

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Map

(Ker-Lindsay 2011)

List of abbreviations

CSO Civil Society Organization

GAT Gender Advisory Team

H4C Home For Cooperation

HAD Hands Across the Divide

RoC Republic of Cyprus

SASG Special Adviser of the Secretary-General TCGE Technical Committee on Gender Equality TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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1 Introduction

In Cyprus, for over fifty years, in spite of great international attention, the peace negotiations have failed. Despite the United Nations' assistance to the ongoing round of peace negotiations that started in 2008, the peace talks remain elite-led and men-dominated. Indeed, women's participation in peace negotiations have been highlighted as a key priority for the United Nations with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. Furthermore, feminist researchers have highlighted the effect the inclusion of women in peace negotiations on the stability and length of peace. However, although being supported by international peacebuilders driven by international norms and standards on the participation of civil society and women in formal and informal peace processes, the participation of women in decision-making positions remain low.

The island of Cyprus is home to two main communities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, physically divided by a UN buffer zone established in 1964 which impedes their interactions. Although Cypriots are allowed to cross the buffer zone from one side to the other since the opening of the first checkpoint in 2003 in Nicosia, the level of interaction between the two communities is low. Indeed, on both sides of the island, nationalism is strongly taught in history books and is reinforced by religious leaders and military services, mandatory in the South as is the North, which fuel ethno-nationalist discourses.

However, in the 1990s, a feminist inter-communal movement emerged and stressed the need for having an inclusive peace process and for implementing the gender perspective in the negotiations, relying on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). Hands Across the Divide (HAD), created in 2001 and the Gender Advisory Team (GAT) created in 2009 are the major inter-communal women's groups aiming at a solution for the Cyprus conflict. They are supported by the United Nations Good Offices in Cyprus, who assist the peace negotiations. In spite of this international attention driven by the international

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norms and standards regarding the need for active participation of women in peace negotiations, these women's groups are not included in the Cyprus peace negotiations.

This research paper therefore aims at analyzing how inter-communal women's groups in Cyprus are participating in the peace process. It examines the priorities of women's groups active in the peace process in order to understand their strategies to implement UNSCR 1325, with the end goal of attaining a 'gender-just peace' in Cyprus. This study contributes to a larger scope in the analysis of the way international norms and standards on women's groups participation in peace processes and peace negotiations are supported by international actors. Moreover, it aims at studying the obstacles that impede women's groups to participate in peace processes, despite being supported by international actors. In this study, I will answer the following question:

How do inter-communal women's groups engage in Cyprus' ongoing peace process?

The paper starts by presenting the theoretical approaches that were used to conduct this research. Used as a theoretical background, the debate around 'liberal peacebuilding' and 'local ownership' will first be explained. Then, the debate on the implications of the concept of local ownership in peace negotiations will be treated. Indeed, we will see that the participation of civil society and women is nowadays part of the 'liberal peacebuilding' agenda. We will then turn to the theories used in this research paper to explain the non-participation of inter-communal women's groups in the formal peace process: the concept of 'normative decoupling' as developed by Gizelis and Joseph (2016) and the concept of 'Third Space of Conflict Resolution' developed by Vogel and Richmond (2014).

I then turn to the presentation of how the study was conducted, how I designed my research and operationalized the aforementioned concepts. By studying the relationship between the women's groups and the Track-I level, I argue that inter-communal women's groups have not been able to put their priorities on the leaders' agenda. Furthermore, the Cypriot population is face several obstacles that impede their interest in a solution to the Cyprus issue and to gender-related issues. I therefore argue that women's groups in the Cyprus peace process are stuck in the

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middle, between the elite-level and the population, a position which impedes them to implement their priorities for a 'gender-just peace'. Although being supported by the international norms and standards on the participation of women in peace negotiations, women's groups are not able to impact the peace negotiations.

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2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Background to the theoretical framework

2.1.1 Liberal Peacebuilding

While in 1960, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold argued that the UN was ideologically impartial (Paris 2004:16), nowadays, scholars of peace studies agree to say that the UN's peacebuilding strategy can be qualified of 'liberal' (Autesserre 2014; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Paris 2004). This evolution has been explained as been triggered by the collapse of the Western bloc's main competitor, the Soviet bloc, and thus the triumph of liberalism over communism (Paris 2002:641; Fukuyama 2004). Liberalization in the political sense means democratization, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, respect for basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly and conscience (Paris 2004:4).

By studying the fourteen major peacebuilding missions that were conducted from 1989 to 1999 in post-conflict societies, Roland Paris concluded that they were all guided by the assumption that liberalization would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace (idem:5). Furthermore, Paris argues that all the international peacebuilding agencies shared the same strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace, namely democratization and marketization1

(idem:19). It is this loose agreement on peacebuilding amongst a wide range of international actors that Richmond calls the 'Peacebuilding Consensus' (Richmond 2004:4). The latter was forged by the belief in the liberal peace thesis which supposes that liberal democracies rarely go to war against each other and what

1_{Paris analyzed the peacebuilding strategies of the UN, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAS, the IMF, the World}

Bank, major national development agencies and INGOs, and concluded that they all aimed at transforming the local state into a liberal-market democracy (Paris 2004:22-35).

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Paris calls the 'Wilsonian thinking' which consists in the belief that rapid liberalization would create conditions for stable and lasting peace in countries emerging from civil conflict (Paris 2010:642).

There are several mechanisms used by international peacebuilders to promote liberal democracy; one is the insertion of political and economic liberalism into peace settlements, by shaping the content of peace agreements while they are being drafted (ibid.). For example, at the end of the El Salvador's civil war, the UN urged the parties to include plans for free and fair elections in the peace agreements (ibid.). Another strategy to promote liberal norms is to provide expert advice during implementation conditionality attached to economic assistance and proxy governance (idem:644). In several war-shattered states such as El Salvador, Cambodia and Guatemala, the UN provided training to local human rights NGOs in order to make them adhere to liberal democratic values (ibid.). Then, several international agencies, in particular the IMF and the World Bank, constrained states to undertake liberal economic and political reforms in exchange of economic support. This was driven by the Washington Consensus of the 1990s which induced developing countries to adapt their political and economical system to the one of the western world (Fukuyama 2004). Finally, in the most obvious cases of liberal peacebuilding, international peacebuilders almost took control of the host authorities which were not able or willing to implement economic and political reforms (Paris 2002:645). An example of such 'proxy-governance' is found in Cambodia, where international peacebuilders were able to manage monetary and fiscal decisions and delve into a host of other civil administrative activities (ibid.).

Paris and most scholars of peacebuilding agree on one point: the vast majority of international peacebuilding operations has failed; tragically well illustrated by the Iraqi and Afghan quagmires (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2013:766). Although being a strong advocate of liberal peacebuilding, Paris criticizes the way in which democratization was promoted by the international peacebuilding agencies in post-conflict states (2004). Paris' critiques towards the international peacebuilding missions of the 1990s are directed against their design and practice of state-building. Indeed, he argues that peacebuilders' “desire to turn war-torn states into stable market democracies was not the problem; rather, the methods they used to

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effect this change [...] proved to be the Achilles’ heel of peacebuilding” (idem:6). Thereby, Paris argues that, instead of focussing on monitoring quick elections for example, international peacebuilders should immediately build governmental institutions which could manage political and economic reforms (idem:8).

2.1.2 Peacebuilding from below

For many critical scholars of peacebuilding, the core problem of liberal peacebuilding is not an issue of design and peacebuilding strategies but rather the fact that international peacebuilders do not take the local into account and that for a stable peace to last, the solution has to be 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down'. This vision of peacebuilding is affiliated with conflict resolution practitioner John Paul Lederach (Donais 2009:6).

Liberal peacebuilding is, as aforementioned, based on the understanding that the liberal norms and standards can be implemented anywhere (Autesserre 2014:53) and international peacebuilders “promote liberal democracy as the prevailing ‘standard of civilization’ that states must accept in order to gain full rights and recognition in the international community” (Paris 2002:650). This conservative discourse of the liberal peace as Richmond and Franks call it (2009:7), which places liberalism states as the only legitimate form of political system, forged the international peacebuilders' habits, narratives and practices, as Autesserre noted (2014). Thus, frictions between international and local actors' everyday practices may occur.

Based on a fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where she had previously worked as a peacebuilder, Autesserre argues that the international interveners, or the Peacelanders as she calls them, share personal and social practices and create boundaries between them and the local population (2014:249). An example of such a practice is the valuing of thematic expertise over local knowledge and thus placing expatriates in management positions and local staff in subordinate ones. Autesserre notes that this practice is counterproductive because it international peacebuilding is more effective when it promotes local ownership because local actors feel it is “theirs” and are thus are more likely to maintain the results than if they do not participate from the conception of a project to the implementation (idem:37). Autesserre reported how

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Congolese people referred to an international aid project as the “muzungu's [foreigners'] projects” (2014:104). The 'liberal peacebuilding' approach has thus been criticized by scholars to be counter-effective. A 'bottom-up' approach to peacebuilding and the inclusion of 'the local' in peace processes has thus been advised by critical scholars.

2.2 'Local ownership' in peace negotiations

The concept of 'local ownership' in peace processes is a broad concept which can be applied to peace negotiations. In this part, we will examine the literature on the inclusion and participation of local actors. As the focus of this study is the participation of women's groups in the Cyprus peace process, I will first present the body of literature on the arguments for and against the inclusion of civil society in peace negotiations. Then, I will present the rationales used by researchers to argue for the active participation of women in peace negotiations.

2.2.1 The inclusion of civil society in peace negotiations

Until the 1990s, wars were mainly fought between states and peace negotiations were primarily carried out between governments, making use of traditional diplomacy. The post-Cold War era witnessed a shift in the nature of conflicts which were no longer fought between states but rather between non-state actors which causes a majority civilian fatalities (Themner & Wallensteen 2014:542). These hybrid forms of conflict are thus “posing new challenges to traditional approaches to mediation and negotiation” (O'Reilly et al 2015:3).

Jarstad points out that civil society is often excluded from peace negotiations which leads to “an uneven start for parties in a democratization process” (2008:23). As put by Barnes (2002:6), peace agreements resulting of high-level talks “rarely provides opportunities for those who did not take up arms […] to have a voice in shaping the agreements or endorsing them.” Indeed, peace agreements do not only serve as ceasefire agreements but they offer opportunities for “addressing the underlying issues generating conflict and developing new

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‘rules of the game’” (ibid.). Therefore, by participating in peace negotiations, non-state actors and relevant to our study, civil society, would have the chance to transform the structural issues which led to a conflict.

Civil society can be defined as “the set of voluntary organizations and groups not created by the state” (Belloni 2008:182). Civil society comprises “organizations that take voluntary collective action around shared interests, purposes and values and that are distinct from those of the state, family and the market” (Paffenholz 2014:70). Paffenholz adds that these organizations can be divided along lines of power, hierarchy, ethnicity and gender (2010:414). In this study, I focus on peaceful civil society. Richmond and Pogodda (2016:4) calls the latter a 'peace formation' which they define as follows:

“‘Peace-formation’ processes are driven partly by local, peaceful forms of agency (though often critical and resistant). Peace formation arises through subaltern power/ agency in sectors of society where non-violent, peaceful change is sought. It aims to negate local violence and preserve and recondition local identity and political institutions. It engages with, and influences, international actors, from donors to the United Nations. It sees political subjects as formative of the state, economy, society, and the international community. Peace formation is limited in scale and scope but is often well versed in the historical, political, economic, social and cultural dynamics required in any stable and peaceful governance system in context. In other words, it comprehends the dynamics of legitimate political authority necessary to make a sustainable peace in ways which external actors cannot, rendering them reliant on extremely problematic blueprints that lack local legitimacy and any real capacity.”

The arguments for the exclusion of civil society are mainly practical in nature. Indeed, according to mediators, broadening participation in negotiations may unnecessarily complicate the process of reaching an agreement (Paffenholz 2014:72). Second, it is difficult to convince the conflicting parties to agree to include CSOs because belligerents are often unwilling to share power with

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additional groups (idem:72). Finally, identifying the appropriate groups can present a challenge for mediators (idem:73).

On the other hand, the arguments for the inclusion of civil society in peace negotiations are both normative and practical. From a normative perspective, as we have seen in the last section, international actors involved in peacebuilding are driven by the concept of 'liberal peace' or 'democratic peace' which ”requires the cultivation of a culture of democracy” (Lanz 2011:283). As public participation ”fosters the democratic education process”, international peacebuilders therefore promote the inclusion of society at large in peace negotiations and therefore the inclusion of civil society (ibid.).

From a practical perspective, qualitative and quantitative research has shown that involving CSOs in negotiations arguably has a positive effect on creating conditions for long and stable peace (Wanis-St John & Kew 2008, Zanker 2014, Nilsson 2012). As put by Paris, the participation of civil society in peace processes fosters “sustainable reconciliation in divided societies” (2004:160-161). Indeed, Wanis-St. John (2006) highlighted that the exclusion of civil society in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations in 1993 prevented “the formation of a “broad-based pro-peace constituency” (Lanz 2011:283). As a consequence, the Oslo Peace Accords failed to be implemented and undermined the whole peace process. As summed up by Lanz (ibid.): “The idea is that public participation in peace negotiations enhances the legitimacy of both the process and the outcome, effectively increasing the likelihood of durable peace.”

2.2.2 The inclusion of women in peace negotiations

The literature on the inclusion of civil society in peace negotiations appeared after the failures of numerous non-inclusive peace agreements. On the same line, researchers started examining women's participation in peace processes. This body of literature appeared after the end of the Cold War and examines the effects of armed conflicts on women and ”reflect on women as peacemakers and the nature of women organizing for peace” (Chang et al. 2015:17). Researchers in the 1990s mostly focussed on women’s participation in informal peace processes, stressing their roles as important ‘back-room’ actors, bridging divides and supporting the Track-I level (ibid.).

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The United Nations organized four world conferences on women (UN Women). The first one took place in Mexico City in 1975, the second in Copenhagen in 1980, the third in Nairobi in 1985 and the last one in Beijing in 1995 (ibid.). At the last World Conference on Women, the Platform for Action was adopted. The latter recognized that “without the active participation of women and the incorporation of women at all levels of decision-making, the goals for equality, development and peace cannot be achieved” (Chang et al. 2015:13).

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on 'Women, Peace and Security', which acknowledged the gendered aspect of conflicts and therefore stressed the importance of the gender perspective in peace negotiations and peace agreements (UN Security Council 2000; Nilsson 2011:10). The UNSCR 1325 recognized that women bear a disproportionate burden during violent conflicts and that they therefore have indispensable roles to play in peace processes (Chang et al. 2015:13).

Feminist academics and NGOs from Africa, Asia and Europe, active in the field of armed conflict, peace and security laid down the foundation work for the adoption of Resolution 1325 (GAT 2012:3). The former agreed to the creation of alliances: the ‘transnational Advocacy Network’ and the ‘Women and Armed Conflict Caucus', coordinated by WILPF (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). The WILPF oversaw the process of drafting, redrafting and finalizing the Resolution 1325 (GAT 2012:3). As put by Demetriou and Hadjipavlou (2016:92): “The strategies the women’s NGOs used were effective mostly because they exemplified a moment of global agency that was nevertheless rooted deeply in diverse local experiences.”

The resolution consists of eighteen points based on three pillars: the participation, prevention of violence against and protection of women (UN Security Council 2000). It also refers to the adoption of measures that support local women's initiatives and that involve women in all the implementation mechanisms of peace agreements (ibid.). As pointed out by Demetriou and Hadjipavlou (2016:95), the resolution is a foundational text for building locally relevant sets of measures: “the text itself is not a call to practice but a call to local application.” As UN member states continue hold the major responsibility for ensuring the respect and protection of women’s rights, they have been encouraged to develop national strategies as a form of compliance with UNSCR 1325 (WILPF

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2016). These National Action Plans (NAPs) are therefore a tool to translate UNSCR 1325 into concrete action.

The second wave of literature on women's participation in peace negotiations emerged after the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and generally analyzes the effects of the latter and the successive resolutions adopted by the UNSC recalling the importance of the three pillars (Chang et al. 2015:17). This body of literature “consists predominately of normative studies that mix research and advocacy (ibid.). Such normative arguments are Equality and Rights, Utility and Social Transformation (idem:25).

The rights-based rationale is the dominant narrative in the literature on women's participation in peace processes and lies in the argument that “women deserve a seat at the peace table because they are equal to men” (ibid.). Thereby, some researchers argue that since women constitute half of the world's population, they should have “a proportionate role in deciding plans that affect them” (Chang et al 2015:25-26).

The utility rationale is claimed by many researchers who highlight that women's inclusion is crucial for a peace process to succeed and lead to stable and lasting peace (Chang et al 2015:27). Researchers using this rationale stress the behavioral characteristics of women which allow them to be, for instance, more suited to collaboration or be more empathetic (ibid.). These claims, although being scientifically proved, can however reinforce gender stereotypes.

The social transformation rationale is used by some researchers who argue that peace processes are key moment to address structural and cultural violence against women (Chang et al 2015:27). The addressing of the gender-based structural and cultural violence is what Annika Bjorkdahl and Johanna Mannergren Selimovic named a “gender-just peace”:

”A gender-just peace is understood not as a reconstruction of the prewar situation, but as a positive peace that provides for social justice and equity. It is a peace that contributes to a fundamental shift in the provision of specific rights related to women’s gender roles, a transformation of gender relations in society, and redefinition of

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gendered hierarchies.” (Björkdahl & Mannergren Selimovic 2014:202)

Some authors argue that peace processes are opportunities for women to changes gender dynamics as they often include the signature of a constitution (O'Reilly et al 2015). In fact, contemporary peace agreements do not only serve as ceasefire but also aim at rebuilding the state and societal institutions (Anderson 2015:2). The transformative experience for gender roles of peace processes has been analyzed by a number of feminist scholars (Anderson 2015, Viterna & Fallon 2008). Anderson argues that peace processes constitute a crucial moment for social change: “Women learn political skills, develop and expand political networks and may change public perception of women's capabilities in formal political” (Anderson 2015:5).

2.3 Theoretical Principles

2.3.1 'Decoupling'

As initially developed by Clausewitz, the concept of 'friction' is what arises when one moves from planning a war to actually executing it, friction being what emerges between what was thought and the local realities (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2013:368). Bjorkdahl and Hoglund (2013) stretched this concept from classical military theory to the field of peacebuilding. They thus defined frictions as being “the unexpected and uncertain process in which global and local confluence to mediate and negotiate difference and affinity” (idem:294).

Bjorkdahl and Hoglund argue that frictions arise between actors, discourses and practices (idem:295). In the process of democratization, conflictual encounters between the international and the local actors' discourses – i.e. norms and ideas – may arise. As formulated by Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, the liberal peacebuilding discourse “regards the 'local' to lack agency and mobility, and understands post-conflict spaces to be empty spaces in need of new forms, practices and governing institutions” (idem:291). However, as we have seen, many scholars argue that the concept of 'local ownership' is nowadays used by

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most international actors supporting peace processes but most of them have argued that this concept “is vague and difficult to implement” (Richmond 2012:358).

Decoupling has been defined as by Gizelis and Joseph as “the gap between international norms and local norms and the capacity to implement policies” (2016:539-540). As the researchers argue, the concept of decoupling “provides a possible explanation for the observed challenges in peacebuilding and reconstruction” (idem:540). Decoupling occurs through different pathways, either because locals are unwilling to accept the new rules and norms or because they lack capacity to implement policies. Gizelis and Joseph argue that there are three categories of decoupling: the technical decoupling, the normative decoupling and the resource decoupling.

First, technical decoupling occurs when “the global norms are not properly configured to the local technical needs” (idem:543). Unlike the two other categories of decoupling, technical decoupling is not synonymous with a lack of compliance with international norms. Then, normative decoupling is the result of the “lack of willingness to comply with externally imposed values and norms” (ibid.). Gizelis and Joseph add that when normative decoupling occurs, there is a “public compliance to global values and practices” which does not match the “local practices, values and behavioural expectations” (ibid.) They argue that in this case, decoupling can be translated by “human rights violations, lack of implementation of gender mainstreaming policies, implementation of institutional reforms or effective taxation” (ibid.). Finally, resource decoupling is “a gap between embracing new policies and the local capacity to implement and monitor the adopted policies” (ibid.). When this form of decoupling occurs, “locals are willing to implement policies and adjust to international norms, but they do not have the capacity to do so effectively” (ibid.). In this study, the concept of normative decoupling is used to analyze why women's groups are not present at the Cyprus negotiations' table.

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2.3.2 Who is 'the local'? Who's ownership?

A major issue in international peacebuilding and state-building interventions is when frictions arise between international and local norms, which have been named 'decoupling' (Gizelis and Joseph 2016). Many scholars argue that nowadays, the concept of 'local ownership' is used by most international actors supporting peace processes. Already in 1992, the UN referred to peacebuilding as

“actions to assist the establishment of indigenous capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully and to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid the outbreak of or relapse into conflict.” (Boutros-Ghali 1992)

In this definition, then Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghali underlines the importance of the 'bottom-up' characteristic of peacebuilding for a stable and lasting peace. The inclusion of local actors is nowadays a UN norm and a component of the liberal peacebuilding strategy. As argued by Richmond and Pogodda (2016:3), “liberal peacebuilding normally occurs through the United Nations according to multilateral agreements on supporting democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, civil society, ‘good governance’ and economic liberalisation.” [my italics]. Inclusive and 'bottom-up' peace processes including civil society are therefore what the UN aims at assisting. However, in practice, most of international peacebuilders have argued that the concept of 'local ownership' “is vague and difficult to implement” (Richmond 2012:358).

2.4 The 'Third Space' of Cyprus' peace formation

2.4.1 Cyprus' peace formation

The Cyprus peace process has long been criticized for being elite-led and non-inclusive (Lordos 2009:163–179; Kaymak et al. 2008; Jarraud & Lordos 2012:271). Despite the fact that successive United Nations secretary generals have directly requested the leaders of both communities to involve civil society in the

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peace process, the latter has continued to be high-level talks between the leaders. Indeed, in 2011, the Secretary-General stated the following:

“I reiterate my call to Mr. Christofias and Mr. Eroglu to engage civil society in the task of reaching a comprehensive settlement and to take into account these and other important civil society efforts to contribute to the peace process” (UN Security Council 2011).

After the Turkish invasion of the North of the island in 1974, a few bi-communal peace initiatives emerged. A notable bi-communal initiative that emerged in the 1970s is the Nicosia Sewerage Network in 1978, assisted by the UNDP and the World Bank to create a modern sewage system for the divided city (Loizos 2006:184). This initiative still exists and is known as the Nicosia Master Plan (ibid.). At a more informal level, the de facto partition of the island prevented the formation of inter-communal groups as communication across the Green Line was almost impossible (Broome 2004:192). Indeed, from 1974 to the opening of the Green Line in 2003, Cypriots were not able to physically cross to the other side and therefore had to find alternative methods to meet, such as through meetings in the mixed-village of Pyla, Cyprus or abroad (Jarraud et al. 2013:48; Richmond & Vogel 2013:2).

Moreover, there was huge pressure on activists from ethno-nationalists on both sides as Greek Cypriot academic and activist Maria Hadjipavlou explained:

“I have been involved in bi-communal works since the 1980s. When I did my Ph.D, I was the first one to analyze the Cyprus conflict from a conflict resolution perspective which meant that you also need to include the Other's story, the Other's narrative, the Other's fears, concerns, needs and understanding of justice. That was an anathema at that time because, you know: “how could you talk about the enemy when our country is occupied, when there are 40,000 troops here, when there are violations of human rights and people are refugees?” So I had a lot of troubles, not only from the right-wing and nationalists but even from people who were at that time writing about the Cyprus conflict” (Hadjipavlou 2017).

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It was only in the 1990s that civil society activists and academics started a real dialogue on how to find a solution to the conflict (Hadjipavlou 2004:202). As put by an observer of the Cyprus peace process: “By the year 2000, a bi-communal citizen peace movement, vaguely noticeable in the early 1990s, reached maturity as it developed a recognizable voice” (Anastasiou 2009:15). This evolution in the 1990s is linked to a growing in assistance by various international actors. In fact, because of the buffer zone, bi-communal meetings in Cyprus could only take place with special authorization arranged by international third parties (Broome 2004:194). The aforementioned social pressure activists suffered from was therefore exacerbated by the contact with international actors, as participants of peace movements “were sometimes accused of being 'used' by the internal community as political pawns to promote the interests of outsiders” (ibid.). As pointed out by Richmond:

“Many in the inter-communal movement quickly came to perceive international support as both an opportunity to undercut local and regional structures (such as ethno-nationalist politicians or the power of the Turkish state and military), as as patronizing and indicative of a lack of international awareness and sensitivity about the conflict” (Richmond 2016:5).

Since 2008, the year that marked the start of the current round of peace negotiations, significant progress has been noted “in terms of an enabling legal and financial environment for civil society” (Jarraud et al 2013:53). As we will see in the next section, the peace formation has thus been able to create its own space and has offices. Moreover, an increasing international help from the United Nations Development Program and United States Agency for International Development led to a strengthening of the peace formation by supporting them financially (ibid.). This international support is driven by the fact that Cyprus' peace formation values correspond to the 'liberal peacebuilding' agenda of the international peacebuilders:

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“In the Cyprus case, “local” norms associated with progressive thinking about peace are more or less exactly in line with Western understandings of the liberal peace, human rights, minority rights, democracy, a rule of law, and the neoliberal framework for the state. Peace formation is mostly in line with external governmental forms of power, expressed through the high-level peace process, the work of the UN and the donors.” (Richmond 2016:111)

Thereby, international actors actors involved in the Cyprus peace process tend to regard Cypriot NGOs as “tools within the liberal peace framework” (Vogel & Richmond 2013:2-3). The aforementioned call from the Secretary-General to the leaders of both communities to include civil society in the solution to the Cyprus conflict illustrates the strategy of the UN to bring an “international envisioned solution” to the conflict and the Cyprus' liberalization and “Europeanization” (ibid.):

“There is a widespread feeling that a legitimate, liberal state needs such movements, even if only for symbolic reasons and as long as they do not challenge historical power structures. For this reason, the inter-communal movement treads a fine line between acceptance and sanction, impact and marginalization, and has to be extremely careful how it operates. To have political impact, it maintains a subtle profile and works very carefully over a long time frame, in ways that quietly resonate with local groups and international supporters, without raising the ire of state-level authorities.” (Richmond 2016:109)

2.4.2 The 'Third Space of Conflict resolution' in Cyprus

In May 2011, the leaders from both sides of the Green Line attended the opening ceremony of the Home for Cooperation, a building located in the UN buffer zone in Nicosia (Home For Cooperation). This space, created by Cyprus' peace formation and funded by international actors, hosts peace-related activities and is the “embodiment of inter-communal cooperation” (ibid.):

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“One of the remarkable bi-communal achievements by a group of young inspiring and committed teachers, academics and activists has been the reconstruction and renovation of a bombed building in the buffer zone into a "Home for Cooperation" with funds from Norway, Sweden, the UNDP and others.” (Hadjipavlou 2012:109)

At the Home for Cooperation, six inter-communal NGOs and think tanks have their offices: the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR), the Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), the Peace Players, the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process under the Auspices of the Embassy of Sweden, the Humanitarian Relief Mission and the Writing Room (Home For Cooperation).

According to Vogel and Richmond (2014), the location of the Home for Cooperation in the UN Buffer Zone illustrates the place where the Cypriot peace formation is situated in the society. The scholars argue that the Home for Cooperation translates the results of both peace-related activities' weak local support from the population and from the state-level on both sides of the Green Line:

“In one sense, the island’s peace movements have retreated; in another sense, they have occupied an alternative space. This space is currently isolated, but it preserves ideas deemed too subversive for the wider Cypriot society, or the two states that currently exist, and even for the internationally sponsored peace process.” (Vogel & Richmond 2014:4)

Indeed, the NGOs located in the Home for Cooperation are contained in a “small, self-enclosed” space which is the UN Buffer Zone (Vogel & Richmond 2014:271). Vogel has therefore called this a “Third Space of Conflict Resolution” (ibid.):

“Peace-related civil society is ensnared in a third space of conflict resolution, literally speaking the UN Buffer Zone, Nicosia. While this is regarded as symbolic and convenient, without relocating such peace movements from the periphery to the centre of society an

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important piece of the peace process is missing. By doing so it becomes clear where the peace process has actually been taking place.” (Vogel & Richmond 2014:267)

Cyprus' peace formation has a strong link with international actors as they are in line with liberal values but is disconnected from the local realities: they struggle to mobilize the nationalist population on both sides of the divide and also the state-level which remains inflexible on territorial sovereignty (Richmond 2016:111). The peace formation is therefore left in a 'Third Space of Conflict Resolution', illustrated by their geographical location in the no man's land which is the UN buffer zone.

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3 Research design

This thesis investigates how inter-communal women's groups in Cyprus engage in the peace process. In the last Chapter, we have discussed the theoretical debate between 'liberal peacebuilding' and 'local ownership'. We have discussed the application of 'local ownership' in peace negotiations by examining how the participation of civil society and women are supported by international peacebuilders. We have then turned to the theoretical concepts which will be used to analyze the participation of women's groups in the Cyprus peace process, namely 'normative decoupling' as developed by Gizelis and Joseph (2016) and the 'Third Space of Conflict Resolution', developed by Vogel and Richmond (2014). In this chapter, I will present how I operationalized these theoretical principles and how I conducted my research by discussing the methods I used.

3.1 Case study design

The form of the research question determines the appropriate research strategy to use. As pointed out by Yin, explanatory questions, “how” and “why” questions, are likely to lead to the use of case studies, experiments and histories (Yin 2008:18). My research will examine contemporary events but does not need control over behavioral events, so I will neither use history nor experiment (idem:17). My research question requires direct observation and systematic interviewing (idem:19). I therefore opted for conducting a case study, which can be defined as

“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple source of evidence are used” (Yin 2008:23).

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This research paper is a single-case study where I will use well-formulated theories to explain a case, namely 'normative decoupling' developed by Gizelis and Joseph (2016) and the 'Third Space of Conflict Resolution' (Vogel & Richmond 2014) (Yin 2008:47).

3.2 Operationalization

In order to conduct my research, the theoretical principles needed to be deconstructed and operationalized. In order to investigate how international actors involved in the Cyprus peace process promoted the liberal peacebuilding component of women's participation in peace negotiations, I will answer the following question: How do international actors involved in the Cyprus peace process support inter-communal women's groups?

Using the concept of 'Third Space of Conflict Resolution' developed by Vogel and Richmond (2014), I will analyze whether the phenomenon applies to the women's groups. I will therefore first investigate how women's groups reach the state-level by asking myself: How do inter-communal women's groups reach the Track-I level and how did the latter respond to their priorities? Then, I will analyze how the inter-communal women's groups demands for participation in the peace process are received by the population in Cyprus and what their strategies for reaching the population are: How do inter-communal women's groups reach the population and how does the latter respond?

Finally, by using the concept of 'normative decoupling', I will ask myself whether the Track-I level's public compliance to liberal values regarding women's participation in peace processes match the local practices, values and behavioural expectations of the Cypriot society.

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3.3 Research methods

In the research design of this case study, I used two research methods to collect data, namely qualitative interviewing and participant observation. In addition, literature research was used to understand the context of the research, i.e. the Cyprus conflict.

The qualitative interview has been defined as “a site of social interaction in which resulting account will have constructed elements even where individual, biographical accounts are sought” (Miller 2016:1). In order to collect my data, I conducted qualitative interview with members of inter-communal women's groups from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. By conducting narrative interviews, I aimed at understanding how they engaged in the Cyprus peace process. Therefore, I asked them about their priorities for a gender-just peace, the challenges that they face and how they cope with them. My aim was to understand their relationship with the Track-I level and with the population. I therefore asked my respondents about their strategies that they use to implement their priorities.

I then used the method of participant observation, which is an ethnographic method which enables the researcher to be immersed in culture and context (Parlevliet 2017). This research method combines participation in lives of people studied with careful observation and recording of data. Almost every morning, I went to the Home for Cooperation's cafe to write. There, I could observe the interactions between the visitors. I participated to several inter-communal events. On a Sunday, I participated to a hike organized by an inter-communal network composed of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots from various backgrounds. They meet once a month to visit villages in the North or in the South, on a rotating basis. This time, we went to visit a castle in the North of Cyprus and had lunch in a small village. I also participated in a demonstration organized by the Leftist parties on both sides who occupied the buffer zone to show their support for a solution. Finally, I participated at an event organized by women's groups on April 28, 2017, in South Nicosia which I will describe later.

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3.4 Research location and population

In order to conduct this research, I spent a month in Nicosia, Cyprus, in April 2017. The Cypriot capital is the largest city of the island and is cut from east to west by the Green line. Living in Nicosia for a month and talking with locals allowed me to better understand the master narratives dominant in each community. The experience of crossing the Green line and observing the physical divide of the Cypriot people gave a sense of the realities of the conflict on the ground. Furthermore, I chose the Cypriot capital as the base for my fieldwork because all the bi-communal women's groups are based there.

In order to find my respondents, I used two types of sampling: In order to find my respondents, I used two types of sampling. The first is that of convenience sampling, in which I interviewed people who were easily available to me (Bryman 2008:183). The second mode of sampling I used was snowball sampling (ibid:184).. Through talking with my respondents, I was recommended to interview other people who they thought I should interview. I conducted eleven interviews, eight of which were recorded. I interviewed four Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots, one Armenian Cypriot and three internationals. Only one of my respondents is a man: Turkish Cypriot Evren Inancoglu who is a member of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality. I conducted an interview in Swedish with Sara Brandt-Hansen, one in French with Cecile Meunier and the rest was conducted in English.

Table 1. Recapitulative table of my respondents

Family name, first name

Nationality Occupation and Organization

Bozkurt, Umut Turkish Cypriot GAT, Technical Committee on Gender Equality

Brandt-Hansen,

Sara Swedish Diplomat at the Embassy of Sweden inCyprus Çolak, Emine Turkish Cypriot Former Minister for Foreign Affairs to

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Eskidjian, Salpy Armenian Cypriot Office of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process, under the Auspices of the Embassy of Sweden Hadjipavlou, Maria Greek Cypriot GAT, HAD, Technical Committee on

Gender Equality

Inancoglu, Evren Turkish Cypriot AHDR, Technical Committee on Gender Equality

Korpela, Sanna Finnish Wellspring Association

Koukkides-Procopiou, Anna

Greek Cypriot Cyprus Women's Lobby, Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development, HAD

Meunier, Cecile French Diplomat at the Embassy of France in Cyprus

Papastravou,

Sophia Greek Cypriot World Vision, HAD

Zenon, Magda Greek Cypriot GAT, HAD

3.5 Ethical concerns

Before meeting my respondents, I made sure to obtain their informed consent (Fuji 2012:718). Thereby, I made certain that my respondents' participation was voluntary. Furthermore, the nature and aim of my research was explained to my respondents so that they could give me their full consent. During my time in the field, I kept in mind that entering the respondents' world “is a privilege, not a right” (Krause 2017). Therefore, in order to give my respondents a sense of “owning the research situation”, I let them choose the meeting place and let them set the boundaries, e.g. not insist if they did not want to share something that interested me. I respected the will of my respondents and cautiously took note of whether they agreed to be recorded and whether they accepted to let me use their names or if they preferred to stay anonymous.

As put by Fuji, the questions that social scientists raise in interviews may cause, directly or indirectly, social, psychological and/or physical harms (2012:717). The scholar recommends to check with local contacts for insight into the risks that the researcher might cause to respondents (idem:719). The questions that I raised in regards to what it was like to be a feminist activist in Cyprus may

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have caused psychological harms and brought back traumas when the respondent shared a private story that happened to her. The tensions between the communities being linked to the history of the conflict, a lot of research that I did before going to the field aimed therefore at becoming as familiar as possible with the contemporary history of Cyprus.

3.6 Methodological limitations

Prior to my arrival in Cyprus, I contacted the Embassy of Sweden to help me get contacts with members of women's groups. On my first day in Nicosia, I met the intern of the Embassy and we went to the Home for Cooperation. There, I was introduced directly to some of my respondents and continued meeting them throughout the time of my fieldwork. During my stay in Nicosia, I only had real conversations with pro-reconciliation Cypriots. I only had brief conversations with people with a nationalist discourse. The hegemonic national discourses presented in the next chapter are therefore only based on second-hand sources.

Moreover, because of a lack of time, I could not interview Cypriots who are not active in the peace process or interested in the inclusion of the gender perspective in the peace negotiations. In the last chapter, I examine the obstacles to the participation of the population in women's groups. I therefore relied on the interviews with my respondents and on the existing literature. To conclude, my whole fieldwork experience in Nicosia has taken place in the “Third Place of Conflict Resolution” which Vogel and Richmond (2013) analyzed as I was only surrounded by pro-solution and feminist Cypriots.

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4 The Cyprus peace process

4.1 The Cyprus conflict

The coexistence of several communities on the island is at the root of the current inter-ethnic character Cyprus. The Greek presence dates back to the second millennium BC. The Turkish-Ottoman presence dates back to the 16th century, since Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878 (Baider & Hadjipavlou 2008:72). In 1955, the Greek Cypriots began a guerrilla war against the colonial domination of the United Kingdom under which Cyprus was dominated since 1878. The Greek Cypriot claimed Enosis, or unification with Greece while the Turkish Cypriot minority aspired to Taksim, e.g. a partition of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece (Gavlanek 2013:68).

In 1960, Greece, Turkey and the UK organized the independence of the island, which became the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). However, the constitution they outlined strengthened the divisions (Hadjipavlou 2006). The Greek Cypriots accused the constitution of guaranteeing the Turkish Cypriot minority a significant political weight in view of its demographic weight, as well as a right of veto over the decisions of the Parliament (Baider & Hadjipavlou 2008:73). This led the Turkish Cypriot representatives to leave the government in 1963. This year was punctuated by constitutional crises and violent inter-communal clashes perpetrated by extremist militias on both sides (idem:74). Consequently, the United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution under Chapter VII and set up a peacekeeping force in 1964: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (UN Security Council 1964). This peacekeeping force is still in place today and is one of the longest-running UN peacekeeping missions (UNFICYP).

In 1974, the National Guard, headed by Greek officers launched a coup attempt to reattach Cyprus to Greece. Turkey intervened militarily to protect the

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interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and occupied the North of the island. The period which followed was marked by human losses, destruction of the cultural heritage and displacement of the population: the Greek Cypriot population was displaced to the south while the Turkish Cypriots had to exile themselves in the north. The North/South division, embodied by the the Green line1, was placed under the control of the Blue Helmets. In November 1983, the

Northern part of island was proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – a declaration considered illegal by the United Nations Security Council and recognized by Turkey only (Baider & Hadjipavlou 2008:74).

4.2 The hegemonic national discourses

The root causes of the conflict in Cyprus is perceived differently from the two conflicting parties' perspectives. Consequently, the aspirations of the two main communities regarding the future of the island are rather antagonistic. The Greek Cypriot hegemonic narrative sees the current situation as having started in 1974 with the Turkish 'invasion' and 'occupation' of the northern part of Cyprus (Anastasiou 2009:131). The Greek Cypriots generally perceive the conflict from a legalistic point of view and stress the illegality of the military invasion and occupation of a UN-recognized state by another state. The conflict is thus seen as a a “violation of the legality and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus” (ibid.). The invasion led to the forced displacement of many Greek Cypriots who had to leave their property in the North. The 'property issue' is the most contentious point for the Greek Cypriots as they have not received compensation or recovered their properties. The Greek Cypriot community ideally aims at reuniting the island to recreate a unitary state by restoring the original form of the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. prior to 1974. Therefore, they emphasize the need for all Turkish troops to withdraw from the island (Galvanek 2013:71).

While the Greek Cypriot narrative focuses on the period from 1974 to present, the Turkish Cypriots focus on the period from 1963 to 1974 (Hadjipavlou 1998:262). Indeed, the Turkish Cypriots generally argue that the other side overlooks the “injustices, indignities and deprivations” that they may have suffered before the Turkish invasion of 1974 (Stavrinides 1999:16). After the

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independence of the island, the Turkish-Cypriot community started to become marginalized within the machinery of the state and were pushed by paramilitaries into overpopulated enclaves (Demetriou 2012:57). According to Hadjipavlou, Turkish Cypriots' memories of the decade following the first clash are tainted by a feeling of being “second-class citizens”: “exclusion from opportunities to study, […] working in low-paid jobs for the Greeks, neglected villages without electricity and running water with non-asphalted roads, threats by and massacres of whole families by EOKA B, no passports to travel abroad but Turkey, economic hardships, etc.” (Hadjipavlou 1998:262).

The Turkish Cypriot community thus considered the Turkish 'invasion' as a peace intervention to protect them (Galvanek 2013:70). On the same note, the continued presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus is, according to the Turkish Cypriot community, seen as necessary for their own protection – as opposed to the Greek Cypriots to whom the Turkish army is seen as a threat (ibid.). However, as rightly pointed out by Galvanek, “the Turkish side tends to ignore the fact that both the military operation and the system of security that has been set up for the TRNC has led to massive and perpetual human rights' violations of the Greek Cypriots” (ibid.).

The Turkish Cypriots see the acceptance of the Republic of Cyprus as the only legitimate government by the international community as a major injustice that has never been addressed (Broome 2004:1). The non-recognition of the “TRNC” is indeed lived by Turkish Cypriots as hard. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs for Northern Cyprus and activist Emine Colak claimed the following:

“This is the challenge of living in our environment which is one where you think and you hope for a certain standard of civilization, human rights, economy, prospect. But at the same time, we have to establish that without any kind of international formal recognition. In many cases, we are being attacked and deliberately excluded, downgraded by the aggressive politics of the South who thinks that any kind of contact with the Turkish Cypriots would have – both with them and with everyone else – a kind of upgrading effect or a kind of recognition of the TRNC” (Colak 2017:65).

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She added that she felt that this non-recognition has a deep meaning on the everyday life of Turkish Cypriots: “they're 'first-class citizens' and we are 'second-class'. The 'called'. We are the 'called' people. 'The called police', 'the so-called ministers'. We are 'so-so-called humans'!” (Colak 2017:69).

The Turkish Cypriots aim at reaching a solution that would allow Cyprus to remain a bi-zonal and bi-communal state, as they have “little interest in re-joining a government that discriminated against them in the past and in giving up their security guarantees from Turkey” (Galvanek 2013:70). Greek Cypriot academic and activist Maria Hadjipavlou summed up the hegemonic discourses of both communities as follows:

“The Turkish Cypriot narrative was built after 1974 on the premise that: “We are so different we cannot live together so we need two separate states. We speak different languages, we have different religions, cultures, etc.” […]. The official premise on this side was not that we cannot live together, it was the opposite: “We could live together in the past, why not today?” (Hadjipavlou 2017:43).

The hegemonic narratives on both sides of the island are constructed along the ethno-nationalist lines of the two major communities living in Cyprus: the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Thereby, the stories and sufferings of the smaller communities – the Maronite, Armenian and Latin communities who constitute 2% of the population – have been excluded of the dominant narratives. As noted by Hadjipavlou (2010:5), “the decade from 1963 to 1974 was a difficult period for the Turkish Cypriot community as it was for Armenian Cypriots, but this has not been recorded.” As we will see, and important to this study, the strong ethno-nationalist narratives which dictated the design of the peace negotiations have not only overshadowed the sufferings and the stories of the smaller communities, but also those of women.

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4.3 The peace negotiations

Since 1974, the conflict's dynamics in Cyprus have survived vivid international attention: a United Nations Peacekeeping mission, peace negotiations under the UN auspices, the European Union's pressure for governance reform, etc... Indeed, from the outbreak of the conflict, there have been numerous unsuccessful rounds of negotiations which could be characterized by missed opportunities and general pessimism. However, in 2002, a glimmer of hope was felt when the UN presented a peace plan for Cyprus (Congressional Research Service 2017). The so-called 'Annan plan' envisaged a federation with two constituent parts, presided over by a rotating presidency. In April 2004, a referendum was held on whether to accept the reunification plan in order for Cyprus to enter as a united island in the European Union. The results of this referendum were quite revelatory of the positions of both communities regarding their resolution aspirations: 67% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Plan while 76% of the Greek Cypriots voted against it (Galvanek 2013:69). The Republic of Cyprus was thus one of the ten new states that joined the EU on May 1, 2004, but did so as a divided island (idem:70).

In 2008, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and leader of the Greek Cypriot community Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat (both leaders of the left-wing parties on their respective side) agreed to start working together towards a comprehensive settlement under the auspices of the United Nations (Demetriou & Hadjipavlou 2016:87). The Secretary-General therefore restored the Good Offices mission in Cyprus led by the Special Adviser of the Secretary General (SASG) “to assist the parties in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations” (UN Cyprus Talks). The Office of the Special Adviser was established to provide direct support to the talks and is therefore composed of political affairs officers and thematic experts (UNFICYPb). Since August 2014, SASG Espen Barth Seide assists the negotiators to reach a comprehensive settlement. The goal of the talks is “a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality and a single international personality” (UNFICYPc).

With the facilitation of the UN Good Offices, the leaders created six working groups, each focussing on key points of the negotiations: 'governance and power-sharing', 'European Union matters', 'security and guarantees', 'territory', 'property'

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and 'economic matters' (UNFICYPb). These key points represent the contentious issues that the leaders of both communities negotiate on in order to draft a constitution for a federal Cyprus.

Furthermore, seven technical committees were created “to work on confidence-building measures aimed not only at improving the everyday life of Cypriots, but also at encouraging and facilitating greater interaction between the two communities.” (ibid.). Over the years, additional technical committees were created and today, there are eleven technical committees focussing on culture, humanitarian matters, health, economic and commercial matters, criminal matters, culture heritage, crossing points, broadcasting, environment, education and gender equality (UN Cyprus Talks).

From 2015, the hopes for a solution for the Cyprus issue were high. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Anastasiades and Akinci met several times in Mont Pèlerin and Geneva, Switzerland, between December 2016 and January 2017, together with the European Union and the guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain (Congressional Research Service 2017). On February 13, 2017, the talks collapsed when the Greek Cypriot Parliament adopted a bill instructing schools to commemorate a referendum held in 1950 among Greek Cypriots on enosis – the union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish Cypriot leader Akinci refused to continue the talks until the legislation was reversed (ibid.). Former Minister for Foreign Affairs to Northern Cyprus explained why this bill created this reaction:

“The crisis there was such a big deal. Everybody on our side thought it was a big deal – but especially when I talked to the leader, I could see that his heart was bleeding. It was not just to commemorate this in the army's ceremonies; it was in schools. He said: 'Look, we realize that there's a problem here, on the way we are raising the young and especially how the Greek Cypriot young are not motivated enough for reunification, and what are you doing? You are taking something of a nationalist commemoration which is a kind of an admiration of the Enosis struggle, which nobody particularly supports now. It's totally unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots and it was also something that brought about the 1974 war, because there was a coup with the general from Greece to unite Cyprus with Greece... So you know,

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everything bad that happened in Cyprus can be somehow connected to that 'Enosis' word and you are now passing this decision, right in the middle of negotiations to commemorate this in schools?'” (Colak 2017).

Finally, in early April 2017, the Greek Cypriot parliament “partially reversed the enosis legislation” (Congressional Research Service 2017). Consequently, on April 11, 2017, the leaders agreed to resume the peace talks and started meeting again in May 2017 (ibid.).

In addition to have been defined as elite-led negotiations, the formal peace process is also men-dominated. Indeed, as pointed out by Anna Koukkides-Procopiou (2017), “the six critical people of the process are all men.” She continued by saying: “We've got two leaders who are men, two negotiators who are men and we have two spokesmen who are men” (ibid.). “No woman, from any of the communities in Cyprus, has to this day been part of the high-level negotiating teams that discuss the future of the island” (Demetriou & Hadjipavlou 2016:97). As specified by former Minister for Foreign Affairs to Northern Cyprus:

“The negotiating table has women but they kind of take a secondary role: they're advisers or note-takers. The presidents on both sides and the negotiators are men – always been like that. It has become like an unchanging tradition” (Colak 2017).

The absence of women in decision-making positions in the peace negotiations and the lack of gender perspective to the negotiations led to the mobilization of pro-solution Cypriot women from both sides of the divide. In the next chapter, we will present the emergence of these women's groups, the women's groups in focus in this study, their priorities and the tensions between them.

'Stuck in the middle' : a case study of the participation of inter-communal women's groups in the Cyprus peace process