Chinese public diplomacy as a means of advancing the Belt and Road Initiative

Universiteit Leiden

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Msc. in crisis and security management

Chinese public diplomacy as a means of advancing the

Belt and Road Initiative

Dorian Strohmeyer Master Thesis

First reader: Dr. S. D. Willmetts Second reader: Dr.mr. E. T. Aloyo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION: THE ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE ... 3

1.1

I

NTRODUCTION TO THE INITIATIVE

... 3

1.2

T

HE THESIS STRUCTURE

... 5

2. THE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY MINDSET... 6

2.1

H

ISTORICAL BACKGROUND

... 6

2.2

C

URRENT MINDSET UNDER

X

I

J

INPING

... 9

2.3

T

HE ISSUE OF PERCEPTION

... 10

3. THE APPROPIATE METHODOLOGY OF SOFT POWER ... 12

3.1

H

OW TO DEFINE SOFT POWER

... 12

3.2

T

HE MEANING OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

... 13

3.3

H

OW TO MEASURE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

... 15

4. THE OVERARCHING SPHERES OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY... 18

4.1

T

HE

U

NITED

N

ATIONS

... 18

4.2

T

HE

C

ONFUCIUS

I

NSTITUTES WITHIN THE

BRI ... 23

4.3

O

FFICIAL STATEMENTS

,

SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS

... 25

5. CASE STUDIES ... 27

5.1

C

HINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN

P

AKISTAN

... 27

5.2

C

HINESEPUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN

K

AZAKHSTAN

... 35

5.3

C

HINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN

I

NDONESIA

... 41

6. CONCLUSION ... 46

REFERENCES ... 51

1. Introduction: The One Belt One Road Initiative

1.1 Introduction to the initiative

Put simply, the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) often referred to as Belt and Road Initi-ative (BRI) (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 223) is a large-scale economic development project. The official guiding principles behind the project are to increase trade volume, improve infra-structure and enhance transnational engagement, with a focus on the geographical routes of the historical Silk Road. This thesis analyses the tools used by the Chinese government to advertise BRI participation and also considers how effective China has been in its BRI efforts.

The BRI is the flagship initiative of a current longing by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under President Xi Jinping to develop outwards and invest in stronger ties with other countries and regions on a global scale. In this context, the first remarkable issue is the mag-nitude of current Chinese ambitions. Initiatives are linked to sizeable investments in infrastruc-ture and development projects are backed by Chinese funding, such as “$50 billion for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, $41 billion for the New Development Bank, $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road. Beijing has also pledged to invest $1.25 trillion worldwide by 2025” (Shambaugh, 2015: 100).

In combination, SREB and MSRI entail the vast majority of all undertakings within the BRI. The former regards the land-based route from western China to Europe, the latter en-cases all current major sea routes within the undertaking. Based on the size of investments and the geographical magnitude of the project, it should be of little surprise that China is raising the eyebrows of both researchers and politicians abroad. Much like regional and global pow-ers, the states neighbouring China and other governments along the BRI have a vested inter-est in deciding what to make of the initiative and how to respond to it (Blanchard, 2017: 246). This is a crucial question since the way that policymakers interpret Chinese intentions sets the foundation of how they should interact with Beijing. Is it wise to participate and cooperate with China, or should states exclude themselves from the process and maybe even take counter-measures to safeguard their integrity? Is it beneficial to accept Chinese financing for infrastruc-ture projects? Does China have a coherent vision? And, if so, what does it entail for countries within the vicinity of the BRI? These are the key questions for stakeholders to consider.

In order to analyse the nature of BRI advertisement, some of the initiatives’ ground rules deserve consideration: Firstly, China must tread lightly in its efforts to achieve outside partici-pation, as Beijing would not want to be perceived as coercing or bullying smaller states into joining (Yang, 2018: 500). This would not only sour the mood for other potential participants, but it would also lead to countermeasures coming from regional and international powers in the various regions where the initiative operates. Since the initiative is based on trade, coop-eration and commerce, participation needs to happen on a voluntary basis. Thus, Beijing seeks to control the narrative of what it intends to achieve. Narratives framing Chinese intentions are multipolar, reaching from the official Chinese picture of altruistic benevolence, up to adver-saries counternarratives depicting China as an empire seeking to establish hegemony over others (Jakobson, 2013). The same applies to the question of how well the BRI is progressing, as some sources enthusiastically proclaim that the initiative is already on the verge of being a full-blown success (Sterling, 2018: 101), while others write of increasing international denega-tion (Blanchard, 2017: 258).

China needs to cultivate support in others by painting the BRI as an altruistic initiative based on win-win cooperation, thus benefiting the common good. If this is successful, other states could be more inclined to join. Beijing is aware of this, which is why it lobbies using a multitude of tools to shape other countries’ perceptions towards the initiative. As such, the methods China uses can be subsumed under the umbrella of CCP public diplomacy (Yağcı, 2018: 70). This is why Beijing’s public diplomacy is the focus of this thesis, the aim of which will be to analyse the methods China is employing within its public diplomacy (PD) toolbox to create a positive image of the BRI. Furthermore, an in-depth comparison of three countries will serve the purpose of determining how well Chinese ambitions are being received. The three countries in question are Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Indonesia, which all carry significance based largely on their geographic location. Pakistan is home to its very own part of the initiative, going by the name of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In particular, the CPEC is an initiative aiming to improve cross border connectivity, in addition to Pakistani infrastruc-ture and China–Pakistan economic cooperation. Kazakhstan and Indonesia were used as stages for Xi Jinping to announce the Maritime Silk Road Initiative and the SREB (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 223). An additional benefit to the referent objects is the fact that these countries were an early focus of the BRI, which implies that Chinese promotion efforts have already materialised and may thus be analysed. The present thesis will analyse issues surrounding Chinese foreign policy, public diplomacy and the BRI, in order to answer the following research question: Is Chinese public diplomacy successful at creating a positive perception of the BRI in the eyes of target countries?

Figure 1: China’s contemporary Maritime Silk Road and Silk Road Economic Belt initia-tives (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 226).

1.2 The thesis structure

A closer investigation of the contemporary Chinese foreign policy mindset reveals that there are pressing internal reasons for China to expand trade and safeguard supply chains. Incen-tives may stem from aspects of the Chinese self-image in combination with current trends under Xi Jinping, which are coupled with the need to advance and safeguard global trade and supply routes (Yang, 2018: 501). On the other hand, other powers’ geopolitical considerations may provide a view arguing for a zero-sum expansion, where the BRI serves as a vehicle of increasing Beijing’s power while reducing that of others (Blanchard, 2017: 246). Either per-spective may be reasonably assumed based on how well the stakeholders in question trust China to be genuine in its claims (Er, 2018: 1). Notably, there is no clear consensus on what Chinese intentions are, nor is there only one singular truth to Chinese expansionism. If there

were only one right way to look at the BRI, then factors such as perception, framing and image would not carry the relevance that they do.

After briefly focusing on the contrasting narratives and overall body of knowledge related to the BRI, the relevant methodological framing regarding the definition of soft power and PD in light of the CCP and BRI receives some consideration. Namely, soft power as a resource in international relations (Nye, 1990), the positioning of PD within international relations and all relevant aspects of conducting comparative case studies (Zartman, 2005) is elaborated upon. The following section will then introduce the different dimensions and details of Chinese PD initiatives. Thereafter, an in-depth analysis and subsequent comparison of three recipient countries is provided: Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. Comparing the three countries will facilitate an assessment of the research question and the tools falling under CCP PD for BRI promotion. Furthermore, case studies will serve the purpose of answering the second part of the research question, which relates to the reception of Chinese PD. Simply measuring how many states participate and to which degree does not answer the question of PD efficacy, as additional factors including economic viability, political system, and national politics also sig-nificantly impact BRI participation (Yang, 2018: 503). Taking an in-depth look at how specific countries perceive the BRI then leads to an analysis of potential of similarities or discrepancies; here, it will be possible to point out causalities regarding PD and BRI reception. Employing the comparative case studies will enable the identification of common features that can inductively lead to understanding the greater context. This context will lead to developing an understand-ing of the issue in general terms, as opposed to merely in relation to the cases in question. This outcome is not possible by analysing only a single case, let alone just the overall toolbox.

2. The Chinese foreign policy mindset

2.1 Historical background

In order to understand the spirit of BRI cooperation and Chinese PD, it is important to elaborate on the Chinese foreign policy mindset. Without being able to grasp the bigger picture, it is difficult to judge the CCP’s behaviour on the international stage, or how its various initiatives correlate with one another (Weissmann, 2015: 151). Unlike Western democracies, the Chinese one-party system allows for long-term planning beyond one or two legislatures, with strategies

tending to include thinking decades ahead. The establishment of the BRI in 2013 and the na-ture of foreign policy changes under Xi Jinping call for special attention. In the case of the Peoples Republic of China, foreign policy is closely linked to self-perception. Cultural questions of what it means to be Chinese and how China should develop remain highly relevant for the politicians and people of China (Liqun, 2010: 19).

Relevant parts of the current Chinese mindset already began to form after the Com-munist party came to power in 1954. During that period, China began the process of coping with a collective trauma based on the previous period of essentially being in constant turmoil, which left the country internally weak and subjected it to foreign control. Currently, this period is referred to as the “century of humiliation” (Weissmann, 2015: 152). A second historical pe-riod considerably influencing how many Chinese nationals view their place in the world is based on China’s legacy as being the “Middle Kingdom”. The “Middle Kingdom” background stems from a period starting roughly 1000 BC, where the Chinese mainland was one entity, in a position of exerting influence far beyond the reach of its borders. Therefore, Chinese self -perception is influenced by very different periods, thereby leading to a certain ambiguity. Based on the century prior to 1954, China is a strong defender of the principle of non-interference, adhering to the doctrine that countries should be able to determine their own fate. This mindset led to a Beijing that only sought to establish a limited presence in foreign politics after 1954. At the same time, China offers its model of non-interference as a competing model to the Western world order and the “unipolar hegemony of the Pax Americana” (Breslin, 2009: 825). Addition-ally, nationalism based on the legacy of having ruled as an empire remains relevant (Weiss-mann, 2015: 152).

Apart from its dual self-perception, current Chinese thinking also relates to its position as a developing country. Beijing considers itself in a leading role as a strong force for devel-oping countries in opposition to the dominant Western world. Furthermore, China is also a strong regional power and an emerging world power (Weissmann, 2015: 152). This leads to a multitude of different influences that have manifested in the current foreign policy mindset. A focus on establishing closer ties with other developing nations while also increasing the ca-pacity to reach beyond its borders as a regional force and achieve a strong place in the UN as a global power are all the result of these different claims. It is also within the UN that the CCP is advertising its own idea for a global world structure, where “all civilisations coexist harmoni-ously and accommodate each other”, as prior President Hu Jintao stated in a 2005 speech (Ding, 2008: 197).

The notion of living in harmony but independently has been at the centre of Chinese foreign policy for over 60 years now. Normatively, it hails from the “five principles of coexist-ence”. These principles include adhering to nation states’ territorial integrity, non-aggression towards one another, non-interference in the internal issues of other states, mutually beneficial equality and peaceful coexistence (United Nations, 2014: 70). The BRI’s normative realm is also based on the principles of coexistence and correlates with the CCP’s core interests, which are officially defined as 1. domestic political stability, 2. sovereign security and national reuni-fication, and 3. sustainable economic and social growth (Jakobson, 2013: 4). In comparison to the principles of coexistence, the core principles are not set in stone however, politicians may actively seek to change or develop them as the CCP does. For example, more trade based on the need for growth is increasingly pressing, as the industrial rise causes a dependency on foreign resources whose supply needs to be guaranteed (Wang, 2016: 456).

Furthermore, not all regions were able to profit equally from past decades’ rapid growth, with western territories such as Xinjiang being comparably underdeveloped, which subse-quently makes these regions a threat to stability (Yang, 2018: 501). However, Beijing seeks to strengthen its underdeveloped west through new trade routes. Most of the land-based SREB crosses through Xinjiang province and accommodates this longing for better integration of the western regions.

Therefore, the current Chinese foreign policy mindset consists of both historically grown identity and pragmatic considerations, with national stability based on non-interference and continuous growth at the centre of its contemporary strategy. However, one CCP core interest is likely to increase in relevance should China struggle to achieve its current objectives. Apart from adhering to the principle of non-interference, nationalism and a longing to follow through with “One China policy"’ remain strong. The One China policy seeks to unite all of China in an effort to bring back the “Middle Kingdom” (The Economist, 2017). Beijing currently mitigates this brand of nationalism by guaranteeing constant growth in wealth and power, which also serves to legitimise the continuation of the one-party system. Should the CCP struggle to con-tinue its ability to produce high growth rates, national stability might be under threat as a result (Weissmann, 2015: 156). An economic slowdown could lead to the need for a more assertive and potentially warlike foreign policy in order to satisfy the nationalist superiority sentiment and prevent the collapse of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from within. This would subse-quently collide with the principle of non-interference and could, amongst other issues, lead to a conflict over the sovereignty of Taiwan through a stronger focus on national reunification. Apart from these internal drivers, the global environment has also changed over the years.

2.2 Current mindset under Xi Jinping

Until the early 2000s, China moved under the doctrine of Deng Xiaoping, who led the country out of the chaos ensuing the death of Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976. Deng Xiaoping achieved this by reforming the communist system that governed China since the 1950s. Alt-hough China maintained much of its communist character, emphasising strong state control over the economy and a one-party system, it also introduced a new doctrine of economically opening to the world (Chandra, 1997: 642). This doctrine allowed China to maintain a low profile regarding geopolitics and its ambitions of political influence beyond its borders. Mean-while, the regime accomplished growth by opening its markets and directing production to-wards export-based manufacturing. This tactic paid off, as China established itself as the glob-alised world’s warehouse and factory (Sommer, 2019: 3).

It was only in the early 2000s, under the guise of Presidents Jiang Zemin and later Hu Jintao, that China began reconsidering its future and place in the world in terms of global am-bitions. The so-called “look outwards” policy initiatives were the result of China seeking to find its new place in the world. The policies remained limited at the time and did not amount to any serious notion of challenging the status quo in China’s neighbourhood or the entire world (Tel-lis, 2019: 3). This status quo was the US-led system of free trade and control by Washington, based on NATO dominance and a global framework of American military bases. As China grew within said system, it had little incentive for interfering until it eventually reached a size where sailing under the radar was hardly feasible or desirable anymore. Additionally, notions of China increasing its foreign policy ambitions were magnified by the 2008 financial crisis, as the West-ern world and Europe in particular took considerable economic hits. Consequently, the crisis in Europe weakened the EU’s standing, which prompted China to terminate its perspective on Europe as an equally strong rival. The inauguration of Donald Trump gave another boost to Chinese ambitions, as the US president declared that the United States would reconsider their global footprint and rather focus resources on internal affairs (Beckwith, 2016). However, a USA that somewhat retreats from the world stage is not bound to be entirely in Beijing’s inter-est, as the USA created and upheld the regime of global trade that the CCP is reliant upon to maintain growth, and thereby stability. On the one hand, China may see an opportunity to increase regional and global power; on the other hand, it must also incentivise global trade since weakening global growth and the reduced consumption of Chinese goods in the West may harm growth within China. Overproduction, the trade war with the United States and a lack of new markets has already caused economic growth to decline. The global economic

downturn began in 2008, which is the same year that Xi Jinping rose to the rank of vice presi-dent. Overall, 2008 can be viewed as the starting point for new Chinese assertiveness (Weiss-mann, 2015: 160). Five years later, now President Xi Jinping initialised the BRI. While Western positions often highlight the notion of a rising China as a new threat, there are reasonable internal motivations for China to pursue the BRI for the sake of increased trade, growth and consumption. Stability through growth—as opposed to having power over others—may be the driver for this initiative.

It is not far-fetched to assert that Chinese foreign policy is undergoing a change in para-digms, as brought about by Mao Zedong starting in 1954 and Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao in 1976. The former created Chinese foreign policy, while the latter was responsible for the “reforming and opening up” that caused China to fly under the radar while enabling eco-nomic growth (Economy, 2018: 61). The BRI is the flagship of the new perspective, serving as a vehicle to advance global trade with Chinese characteristics, which entails promotion via PD. The new China does not only want to play a participating role, but rather a leading role in global economy and commerce. In this context, the current doctrine leans more towards the Middle Kingdom mindset as opposed to the former school of thought under Xi Jinping’s predecessors. This can also be seen in publications close to the CCP proclaiming that China has “overcome the century of humiliation under the guise of Xi” (Sterling, 2018: 105).

In conclusion, this chapter outlines the mindset and motivations that China is adhering by. The BRI, like all aspects of Chinese PD, are going to relate to these drivers in one way or another. The principle of non-interference and the need to grow are especially relevant in this context. China must seek ways to secure more resources and increase trade volume for the sake of growth. At the same time, coercing participation would go against leading Chinese principles and cause friction with other powers, which is precisely why China needs to encour-age participation. The next chapter will illuminate why China does so via public diplomacy, while also elaborating on the understanding of PD as an element of soft power.

2.3 The issue of perception

When it comes to views opposing the BRI, some news headlines are compellingly descriptive of the underlying narrative, with titles such as “China is building a very 21st century empire— one where trade and debt lead the way, not armadas and boots on the ground” (Bloomberg News, 2018), “US goes on the offensive against China’s empire-building funding plan” (Kesling and Emont, 2019), or “The BRI is a corruption bonanza” (Doig, 2019). Headlines speaking of

Chinese imperialism can be found on the opposing side of the rhetoric and perception towards the BRI. These perspectives fall under the umbrella of the China threat theories and tend to originate from countries that are traditional adversaries of China such as The United States and India (Blanchard, 2017: 234). However, negative perceptions are not exclusive to these countries, as even close allies and major BRI recipient countries such as Pakistan have elites who paint the initiative in a one-sided and negative light. For example, Pakistani lawmakers described dedicated parts of the initiative as a new East India Company (Raza, 2016). Given the oppressive colonial character of the British and Dutch East India Companies and the im-ages evoked by readers of such statements, this is essentially the opposite of the reception China is aiming for. During the reign of the Qing Dynasty, the British East India Company coerced China to buy vast amounts of opium and subsequently defeated Chinese forces in the First Opium War (Lovell, 2011: 458). The First Opium War (1839) was also the event that set off the century of humiliation, as China lost to the British and was forced to continue its invol-untary purchasing of opium from the British East India Company. Therefore, referring to the BRI as a new East India Company evokes very negative memories in many former colonialized countries, as much as in China. Other anxieties towards Chinese growth are based on issues such as a historical anti-Chinese sentiment, which remains strong in some states that were part of the Soviet Union (Yang, 2018: 503). In general, historical sentiments remain consider-ably relevant to the perception of China, which is also going to be reflected in the case studies.

Another possible problem is simply the disparity in size. All potential participant countries are much smaller than China. This means that no matter how optimistic they might be about participation, they would continue to worry about the disparity in size affecting their own integ-rity. Even Indonesia and Pakistan, which are the fourth and fifth largest countries on earth, respectively, only have roughly one-third of China’s population.

Fears of China using its financial capital to practice predatory lending and corruption towards local officials are audible across potential participant states in all regions of the BRI. Adversaries of the BRI argue that this is done in order to establish control in the long run. Anxieties about rising influence happen in different circles, sometimes coming from intellectu-als, experts or political elites, but also from broader parts of a country’s population (Associated Press, 2016, Meyers, 2017). This leads to China having to apply a variety of different tools aimed at various audiences across the horizontal and vertical level (Lai and Lu, 2012: 28). The term horizontal relates to different countries and regions, whereas vertical means different brackets of society. As the next chapter explains, the methodology of soft power must be able to facilitate such a multi-layered reality to understand Beijing’s PD.

3. The appropriate methodology of soft power

3.1 How to define soft power

In order to further contextualise Chinese initiatives, it is wise to take a step back and concep-tualise the issue in light of international relations and countries’ decision-making processes. Put bluntly, if a state wants another state to act in its own interest, it needs power to sway the other state’s actions. Traditionally, it can do so by applying so-called hard power, which per-tains to material assets such as military might or control over critical resources and geographic regions. The higher the disparity in power between countries, the easier it will be for the country with more power to influence the other’s actions. These aspects of power are all part of hard power, as described within the framework of political realism. According to the teachings of realism, the gamble for power is a zero-sum game. Power is a finite resource, which implies that if one state gains power, another state loses it (Wilson, 2008: 114).

The entire issue of exerting influence over another state becomes more complex once soft power comes into play. Soft power, as devised by US political scientist Joseph Nye (Nye, 1990) in the late 1980s, relates to non-hard power assets with which a state can influence another state’s decision making according to its own interests. Therefore, issues such as cul-tural proximity and public opinion towards the second state come into play. State leaders will find it difficult to use hard power (and thus force) against a second state if this state is beloved by one’s own population (Nye, 1990). The principle of soft power has increased in popularity in recent decades, which also causes it too often be applied to Chinese initiatives and ambi-tions (Blanchard, 2017, Lai, 2012, Shambaugh, 2015, Yağcı, 2018). Since this thesis focuses on PD efficacy, the sphere of soft power serves as a framework to the consideration. However, there is an obstacle regarding the applicability of Nye’s concept within this thesis; namely, there is only hard and soft power. This black and white dichotomy disregards that many initia-tives may be somewhere in between or consist of a blend of both hard and soft power elements (Lai and Lu, 2012: 26). Additionally, an action undertaken by a state to influence another state may be either hard or soft, simply based on how it is perceived by the state to be influenced. Since perception is crucial to the thesis, a definition that allows for classifications beyond hard and soft power is required. This thesis does so by adapting a more fleeting definition by clas-sifying power into hard, soft and bargaining categories (Lai and Lu, 2012: 27).

3.2 The meaning of public diplomacy

CCP close sources tend to frame soft power as propaganda, implying that each state uses it as a coating to their intrinsic motivations. This paints a picture where moral values and world views decrease in value, as they are more of a pretext, than an issue for themselves. However, the CCP also views propaganda to be a channel of communication, not coming with the same negative connotations as is the case in the West (Shambaugh, 2015: 101). Being aware of this disparity in perspective is relevant, as differences between rhetoric and reality might be con-sidered more of a given from the perspective of the CCP, as opposed to a Western under-standing.

CCP close sources tend to frame soft power as propaganda, implying that each state uses it as a coating to their intrinsic motivations. This paints a picture where moral values and world views decrease in value, as they are more of a pretext, than an issue for themselves. However, the CCP also views propaganda to be a channel of communication, not coming with the same negative connotations as is the case in the West (Shambaugh, 2015: 101). Being aware of this disparity in perspective is relevant, as differences between rhetoric and reality might be considered more of a given from the perspective of the CCP, as opposed to a Western understanding.

Hard power remains unchanged. At its core lie on military resources and overall tangible capabilities to engage in armed conflict. Soft power remains the part of power that channels assets such as culture, public opinion and commonalities within statehood and mindset. So called bargaining power is introduced as a third category that includes anything in between (namely power assets, whose nature is a matter of perception). In the case of the BRI, some sources argue that Chinese harbour-building (Blanchard 2017: 259) in other countries serves the purpose of extending the reach of China’s blue water navy, thus turning the harbours into hard power assets. On the other hand, Beijing argues that larger harbours should encourage more travel, tourism and intercultural exchange; this would relate the harbours to soft power. Therefore, said harbours fall under bargaining power—as does the vast majority of BRI pro-jects.

As previously discussed, a multitude of perspectives on Chinese intentions and the na-ture of the BRI exist. Beijing needs to influence perceptions and shape them in a positive way, otherwise it may face stark resistance from various brackets within the societies of target coun-tries. According to the fleeting power definition utilized by this thesis, which was developed in relation to China (Lai and Lu, 2012: 27), this shaping of opinion is a pure example of soft power.

More to the point, China uses PD in the shape of a diverse set of institutions and initiatives to create a positive image and popularise Xi Jinping’s vision abroad. The definition of PD, as established by Edmund Guillon in 1965, is:

“[…] diplomacy […] that deals with the public attitudes towards government foreign policy and generated influence. It goes beyond the traditional diplomacy, and includes multiple di-mensions of international relations, a national government cultivates and guides public opinion to the other countries, the interaction between the interest groups of two countries, foreign affairs report and its effect in policy, communicators communication between diplomatic en-voys and foreign correspondents, cross-cultural communication etc.” (Hongxiu, 2018: 221).

This first definition of PD describes the original line of thought; however, a more concise point of view simply considers that “PD is a soft power tool that aims to win the hearts and minds of its recipients.” (Matwiczak, 2010: 11) This definition is sensible in light of China having to sell the BRI to the populous of recipient countries. The case studies to follow demonstrate that if Beijing suffers from a bad image based on a lack of soft power, this will translate into obstacles for the implementation of BRI projects. Obstacles tend to consume time and money; furthermore, they might even prevent initiatives from occurring. This highlights the relevance of PD and the reason for its focus in this thesis. Whether China is benevolent or hegemonic is not a question of this thesis. As previously argued, it may be either one or something in be-tween. China is taking a gamble regardless, considering the potential pitfalls and obstacles of establishing the BRI; simultaneously, Beijing must secure future growth and new commodity chains. Potential pitfalls relate to many of the investments being offered to countries and pro-jects whose financial viability remain uncertain. This is based issues such as regional instability and corruption of potential target countries (Wang, 2016: 460).

One final consideration of power assets and their attributes regarding the BRI relates to economic power being an asset of bargaining power, which is China’s biggest argument for others’ participation. Governments along the BRI are incentivised to participate, as it would enable them to utilise the assets Beijing provides to drive the initiative. The CCP’s promise of striving to achieve win-win outcomes and a harmonious future serves as a narrative of why China is ready to provide investment. The doctrine of non-interference supports this explana-tion, as opposed to a Chinese strive for control. Adversaries of the BRI argue that this is a false promise used to draw countries into a debt trap. In conclusion, China’s greatest asset stands to be limited in its efficiency if it comes into play with a negative soft power background. Bar-gaining power is crucial but insufficient, since it is incapable of influencing another state’s de-cision making if faced by considerably detrimental hard or soft power issues. For example, allowing for infrastructure to be built by the Chinese company Huawei might be appealing

based on the financial viability. However, Western states are concerned about the increasing Chinese influence on their infrastructure safety, which resulted in some contracts being scrapped after earlier intentions to cooperate (Edwards, 2019). On the one hand, this example could mean that the Chinese government is in fact trying to gain control over critical Western infrastructure via Chinese construction abroad, which points to detrimental hard power impli-cations. On the other hand, the CCP may have no such plans and is being targeted based on a lack of trust, which of course would infer a lack of soft power. Either way, bargaining power is not enough to overcome the obstacle.

In addition to going beyond a stringent hard and soft view related to tools of power, this thesis also considers participation to be a conditional state of affairs. As of September 2017, 74 countries and transnational organisations have signed so-called memorandums of under-standing (MoUs) signalling their willingness to participate in the BRI (Yang, 2018: 498). This paper does not share the view of some other publications that this alone would constitute par-ticipation according to China’s wishes. The MoUs alone say nothing of the magnitude of in-vestment, while several projects have also been postponed or cancelled (Yang, 2018: 515) after governments originally agreed on their execution. Furthermore, governments may change their opinions after elections take place or the sentiment within the national public changes. Therefore, the next chapter will go into detail regarding how the reception and effi-ciency of Chinese PD can be purposefully measured.

3.3 How to measure public diplomacy

Since this thesis considers soft power efficacy in the shape of PD, it is necessary to predeter-mine how to measure the efficiency of the Chinese initiatives. In part, this thesis will draw inspiration from considering the methodological framework used in the work “Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s public diplomacy and its “good neighbour” effect”, which was released in 2018 (Custer et al., 2018: 1). Said paper uses both qualitative and quantitative data to assess the effectiveness of Chinese PD in the East Asia Pacific region. According to Custer et al., this work is the most extensive attempt at measuring PD effectiveness at the time of its writing.

Custers’ research question is also similar to the approach of this thesis: “The overarching question guiding this report: How effective is China in translating upstream PD inputs into its desired ends? Specifically, we define these ends as the good neighbour effect, which com-prises two components: (1) favourable public opinion on the part of East Asia Pacific (EAP)

citizens regarding mainland China, in keeping with Beijing’s desire for greater status or admi-ration; and (2) alignment on the part of EAP leaders with Beijing’s particular foreign policy interests.” (Custer et al., 2018: 44).

In the case of the BRI, this would first lead to asking how efficient China is at creating and maintaining a positive image of its activities in BRI countries. These are officially referred to as ‘people-to-people’ bonds, which may be considered a counterpart to the “good neighbour effect”, but with a focus on the BRI not EAP. The nature of ‘people-to-people’ bonds will be further elaborated upon, as they are an essential part of the BRI. The authors on the EAP initiative proceeded to assess public opinion polls and conduct dozens of interviews with na-tional elites in three countries in order to gain an in-depth view of China’s behaviour (Custer et al., 2018: 1). The in-depth views focused on Fiji, the Philippines and Malaysia.

This thesis will also investigate three specific countries to gain an in-depth knowledge, in regards to BRI reception. The focus of this thesis is on Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Indonesia, as they carry significance in the case of the BRI. Firstly, though this work will investigate certain PD tools that are not only used in relation to one country, but rather on the international stage in general. Despite not always relating to the case studies, these tools deserve consideration since they also specifically cater towards BRI promotion. Unfortunately, measuring their effi-ciency remains barely feasible since it remains uncertain how much they influence individuals’ thinking within target countries.

Regarding PD results, this thesis also considers public opinion polls, which are certainly one of the most popular and sound indicators for measuring most soft power-related initiatives (Yang, 2018: 518). Additionally, an in-depth analysis of the specific countries also grasps the public mood by analysing whether local media or interest groups have voiced specific opinions towards China and the BRI. In that sense, successful PD results in the acceptance of invest-ment, neutral to positive public opinion and limited to no opposition towards the projects (Cus-ter et al., 2018: 2).

Once the different cases have been considered, a comparison of the results is presented in order to determine whether similarities exist in how PD is enacted and how it affects BRI perception. A comparative method is generally based on three conditions (Herbst, 2004: 80). Firstly, referent objects need to be similar enough; for example, comparing a planet with a human being seems hardly feasible. In this case, the level of comparison will be the macro dimension, as it considers entire populations, states and cultures. States are the most classical referent objects when it comes to macro-level comparisons. As is the case with any compari-son, the referent objects (cases) will be compared regarding their proprieties in relation to the ‘tertio comparatonis’. In fact, the ‘tertio comparatonis’ meaning third piece of comparison, is

the reference figure, which is crucial since it answers the question of what the analysis is look-ing for. Comparlook-ing two similar entities regardlook-ing everythlook-ing is as impractical—if not as impos-sible—as it sounds. For the present thesis, perceptions towards the BRI and CCP PD efforts to advance people-to-people bonds are the issues in question. This allows for the elimination of non-relevant factors, thus making a comparison possible. Additional framing puts the re-search into the synchronised realm, meaning that the referent objects exist at the same time. Furthermore, the comparison is going to be symmetric since the three cases in question re-ceive equal attention (Herbst, 2004: 88). That said, if PD undertakings are identical in the three case studies, then more elaboration is found in the first case as opposed to the second and third, in order to avoid redundancy. One final attribute is that this comparison aims to be en-compassing—encompassing being one out of four possible ways of conducting a comparison according to Tilly (Tilly, 1984: 116). The other three possible varieties for a comparison, are individualising, universalising and variation-finding. Individualising seeks differences within seemingly similar cases. Universalising aims to argue that all cases function in basically the same way, while variation-finding seeks to explain why cases differ in their intensity of being influenced by the ‘tertio comparatonis’. The encompassing approach “places different in-stances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining their character-istics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole” (Tilly, 1984: 83). In other words, different recipient countries within the BRI are compared to see how their recep-tion towards the BRI and CCP PD differ.

The chosen cases were selected based on their proximity to China and their relevance to the entire BRI. The reasoning behind this being that there is little use for Beijing to build new trade and infrastructure far from its own borders if it struggles to do so in its proximity. New harbours and railways in faraway countries may be of little use if there is no coherent infra-structure connecting those new projects with the Chinese mainland. The countries chosen as case studies are thus important to China’s ability to safeguard its supply chains and reach foreign markets. This reasoning also supports the argument that countries close to China are the countries where China begins its progress of working to establish the BRI or at least where it is comparably active in doing so from the start. This is relevant since the initiative is only in its emergence stage and may not be ripe for analysis when it comes to recently joining candi-dates. Further credence is given to the referent countries’ importance by the fact that they are all in the centre of specific initiatives within the BRI. Pakistan, which is the first case study, cooperates in the shape of its own sub initiative—the CPEC. The other two countries, Kazakh-stan and Indonesia, served as locations for Xi Jinping to announce the two main parts of the initiative, namely the MSRI and the SREB (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 223). In addition, all referent countries are developing countries with a majority Muslim population. However, these

countries also have dissimilarities. Kazakhstan is much less populated than the other two. Moreover, only Indonesia is predominantly maritime since it consists of thousands of islands. In addition, Pakistan is in a unique position and has its own BRI sub initiative, whereas Ka-zakhstan is similar and thereby representative of other Central Asian countries regarding the BRI and China. Overall, the three countries are neither very similar nor dissimilar; however, they are all relevant to the BRI. In addition, the three countries are currently in search for foreign investment. This is relevant since a country where the Chinese asset of investment as bargaining power carries little relevance may not be susceptible to PD as there is little need to acquire Chinese investment. However, the most relevant attribute for the case study countries is their relevance to the BRI’s success. That said, the thesis now moves on to consider the CCP’s overall methods for promoting the BRI on the international stage.

4. The overarching spheres of public diplomacy

4.1 The United Nations

Throughout the course of researching Beijing’s PD, three major spheres of Chinese BRI pro-motion were identified. Firstly, the United Nations (UN), where China is attempting to shape the meaning of human rights in a way that accommodates BRI promotion as a human rights issue (Clingendael, 2018). The vision is to change what it means to uphold and guarantee human rights standards. Furthermore, by creating a historical context for the BRI as a project serving the common good, the CCP aims to infer a unifying background. This also happens within the United Nations. Admittedly, the sphere of the UN is the least recognisable when it comes to the given case studies; however, ignoring it would lower the quality of this research. Additionally, the UN should not be ignored since Chinese efforts may not bear fruition right away but could still do so in the years to come. Should the CCP’s efforts not manage to achieve synergy between the BRI and the UN over time, they would still be PD initiatives—albeit failed ones. Contextually, China does not only hope to frame the BRI as humanitarian project but may be inclined to prevent scrutiny based on human rights violations. Individual freedoms are not exactly on the forefront of the CCP’s policy agenda. For example, a focus on the mass detention of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinyang could cause resistance from Muslim populations in other parts of the world. On the other hand, highlighting progress and growth may help to sweep human rights violations and environmental damage under the rug.

Moving on from the United Nations, it can be stated that the Chinese Confucius Institutes (CIs) have undergone somewhat of a shift towards actively promoting the BRI over the past few years. Their original purpose is to spread Chinese culture and language in foreign coun-tries and in association with the institutions which house them. CIs appear to be the most researched part of Xi Jinxing’s PD toolbox and are frequently mentioned in countless publica-tions on the China of the 21st century. Importantly, the most conventional sphere—the sphere of official political diplomacy—also serves as a major field of PD for BRI promotion. Some argue that other potential fields of PD, such as the new media or corporate relationships, are fields where China is underdeveloped (Hongxiu, 2018), (Yang, 2018). These are fields where China could potentially step up its public diplomacy initiatives. However, for the time being, there is no indication of future plans in these or other additional spheres of PD.

In relation to the greater scheme that is PD, China actively pursues increasing its influ-ence in the UN (Clingendael, 2018: 1) in order to reframe the global understanding of human rights and development goals. Whereas other UN activities accumulate around the Security Council and decision making regarding war and peace, the dimensions relevant for this thesis evolve around a variety of less prominent UN institutions, such as the United Nations Devel-opment Programme (UNDP). After all, popularising the BRI has little to do with armed conflict. Some of the entities in question are referred to as ‘orphan agencies’ (Clingendael, 2018: 11), meaning that they traditionally receive comparably little attention from Western countries. These agencies tend to circle around economic and developmental issues, which causes them to become a compelling stage upon which to advertise the BRI. The strategy is to extend in-fluence by increasing decision power when it comes budgeting, staffing and agenda setting. To that avail, the CCP has steadily increased its funding for the UN, being placed as the sixth highest contributor in 2017 (Garcés, 2018). Overall, this thesis has identified three central di-mensions of BRI PD within the UN. The first dimension being the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the second being cultural diplomacy within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and the third being the aforementioned devel-opmental agencies. These dimensions stand at the centre of a Chinese effort to “UN-ise” the BRI (Clingendael, 2018: 1), as coined by the Clingedael report. This involves the previously mentioned framing of the BRI as a human development project.

When it comes to the UNHRC, China is on a quest to challenge the prevalent Western definition of what it means to advance and uphold human rights. The Western view centres on human rights as individual freedoms, such as the freedom of free speech or religion. Chinese rhetoric attempts to move the narrative away from a focus on the individual towards a more communal approach regarding human rights (Clingendael, 2018: 11). It infuses human rights

with the Chinese foreign policy mindset, as previously discussed. This means that the empha-sis changes towards state sovereignty, with development being at the centre of what it means to strengthen, advance and uphold human rights. Simply put, “Development is the top priority for all countries”, as proclaimed by Xi Jinping during a 2017 speech at the UN Office in Geneva (Clingendael, 2018: 8). The Chinese interpretation of human rights faces backlash from the West, since it implies that development is more important than individual freedoms or minority rights. At the same time, China receives support from many developing countries for whom growth is a compelling focus. In addition, these developing countries may not have the best human rights track records themselves, which is why a refocusing towards development with-out having to address human rights violations in the process suits many of the realties on the ground. Ignoring how other countries treat their citizens is shielded by the Chinese argument of state sovereignty, degrading the Western perspective of human rights as being non-binding and a national preference. While individual rights lose their standing, the BRI is made to be a human rights project serving the harmonious goal of mutually beneficial coexistence. There-fore, the Chinese rhetoric within the HRC is utilised to frame and promote the BRI. The second area of the UN, where Beijing seeks to drive its UN-ising of the BRI is the UNESCO. It serves the purpose of highlighting the historical importance of the ancient Silk Road. The particular asset of diplomacy within can be described as heritage diplomacy (The Newsletter, 2016), which China uses to drive the previously mentioned “people-to-people bonds”. The establish-ment and improveestablish-ment of these bonds is one of the five official cornerstones of the BRI. Said cornerstones are discussed in more detail later on.

From a historical perspective, China argues for the BRI to be based on the ancient Silk Roads connecting China to Central Asia, the Near East and Europe. The maritime part of the old route began in the Chinese city of Fuzhou and went through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean, from where it proceeded to reach Egypt and cross into the Mediterranean Sea after a short land journey (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 223). One dominant land-based route ran from the inner landmass of Western China and the cities of Luoyang and Chang’An through the Central Asian step towards Tehran and onwards through the Levant, aiming for Istanbul. Throughout history, comparable projects were used to increase trade and social interactions between different cultures, regions and empires. In this manner, they came with the potential of being instruments of increasing shared wealth or tools for extending or increasing power along the geographic route. A geographic dimension comparable to that of the MSRI may be ascribed to the East India Trading Companies (Bosma, 2014: 143). The impact of the Suez Canal or the importance of the city of Baghdad are further examples closely related to the significance of the geographic routes.

Obviously, Beijing does not want to evoke remembrance of colonial empires and their trading companies, who also utilised similar routes. Many countries along the BRI, such as China itself, were victims of the companies’ actions and are remembered as foreign oppres-sors. At any rate, the CCP seeks to utilise the UNESCO by officially declaring sites along the ancient Silk Road as World Heritage Sites. Figure 2 presents a map depicting the progress in 2014 in this regard.

Figure 2: Heritage diplomacy along the Belt and Road Initiative (The Newsletter, 2016). A possible reason for the CCP using the UN in the manner it does is likely because it gives the impression of this PD hailing from within the UN, thus highlighting altruism and unity. After all, this kind of promotion is more credible when coming from a third, ostensibly neutral player. However, Beijing is not clandestine and aims to produce joint appearances between United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNSECO) and BRI officials (UN DESA, 2016). Just as with human rights, the aim is to link the MSRI to a normative dimen-sion—a commonly shared history, in this case. At the same time, the Middle Kingdom narrative is found in this historical callback, as China aims to be the Silk Road country of origin both then and now.

Just as heritage sites pertain to the land-based route, there are other efforts used to imply a common unity amongst MSRI countries:

“Crucially, however, the notion of a Maritime Silk Road flips this excavation of shipwrecks from mere evidence of historical presence towards a much larger, and more diplomatically

expedient language of region-wide trade, encounter and exchange. Belt and Road’s emphasis on maritime connections also sustains claims that China ranks alongside its European coun-terparts as one of the great naval powers in world history. One figure, Admiral Zheng He, embodies this grand narrative. A Muslim eunuch who led seven fleets across to South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and West Africa between 1405 and 1433 during the Ming dynasty, Zheng He is widely celebrated as a peaceful envoy in both China and by the overseas Chinese living in Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere. In addition to the museums, mosques, and arte-facts now appearing around the region celebrating his voyages, China has given millions of dollars to Sri Lanka and Kenya to support the search for remains of Zheng He’s fleet.” (The Newsletter, 2016)

Since one of the case studies looks at BRI promotion in Indonesia, the legacy of Zheng He and Chinese naval expeditions in the region does not end with this chapter. However, it should be noted that the BRI occurs within the historical context of an alleged shared history. A third sphere of influence within the UN exists within the aforementioned smaller UN institutions, such as the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA, which is part of the UN Secretariat), the UNDP, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) (Clingendael, 2018: 11). Although officially neutral when it comes to staffing, much of the decisions regarding hiring in UN agencies tend to be political. This is why China can influence and increase the number of Chinese officials serving in higher ranks within these various agencies. The overrepresentation of Chinese nationals with ties to the CCP can thus lead to Chinese interests being reflected in reports, agendas, and other documents that carry the label of neutral UN documents. Official get-togethers and joint statements39, (UNDP, 2016) between UN and BRI officials are also a possible result of increasing Chinese influence. The Chinese strategy certainly works on an implementation level, as can be observed based on the statement of UNIDO’s Director-General Li Yong: “At UNIDO, we strongly believe that the BRI stands to become one of the largest and most effective platforms for international cooperation of the century”. This differs from the traditionally prevalent Western views. For example, the main Dutch priorities within the UNDP include democratisation, rule of law and human rights. China emphasises infrastructure, disaster management and energy.

That is not to say that these UN institutions are corrupt or dishonest, if they cooperate with CCP officials. Often, their objectives overlap with the official targets set by BRI officials and documents (Clingendael, 2018: 18). Moreover, cooperation between BRI and UN officials only makes sense if that is the case. On the other hand, the UN risks losing face as they sign off on Beijing’s initiatives, should these turn out to harm recipient countries. Overall, China establishes direct normative correlations between advancing human rights and participating in

the BRI. Therefore, it uses UN institutions, as these are seemingly neutral and supposedly represent an outsider perspective.

4.2 The Confucius institutes within the BRI

CIs are entities co-financed and run by the CCP and the foreign educational institutions that house them. Furthermore, CIs function under the directive of their Beijing headquarters, while also being affiliated with partner institutions. Partner institutions are almost exclusively based in China and serve as a pool when it comes to the staffing of CIs and issues such as shared research. This close affiliation with other entities sets the CIs apart from similar institutions of other countries such as British Councils, Alliances Française, and German Goethe-Institutes, which tend to function as standalone institutions—in contrast to the closely-knit framework of CIs (Tao and Wang, 2018: 1). These close ties are also visible when it comes to staffing, as Hanban (The CIs headquarter) provides the staff and directors of the institutes, whereas the local educational institutions also provide a foreign director to serve as a co-head, as well as various other staff members. This framework causes the degree of independence to be rather heterogeneous and opaque, sometimes leading to the perception of CIs as tools of propa-ganda as opposed to cultural exchange. Overall, their functions are rather diverse and change according to the directive of the headquarters. Since their introduction in 2004, roughly 500 CIs, in addition over 1100 supplementing smaller Confucius Centres were constructed globally (Tao, and Wang, 2018: 1). The official purpose of these institutes and centres is to promote the learning of Chinese language and to familiarise others with Chinese culture and customs. In order to introduce the relevant cultural dimension of PD based on CIs, it is important to first highlight the special direction towards BRI promotion within the institutions. Just as is the case with the UN, a potential counter-argument to this thesis could be that the initiatives would occur in the same spirit but are not aimed at BRI promotion. However, closer investiga-tion reveals that this noinvestiga-tion does not hold up to the realities on the ground. The trend of utilising CIs for the BRI itself is quite recent and began in the mid-2010s (Shuto, 2018: 133). A good indicator for this is the annual Confucius reports, which are the official publications of the Con-fucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban). In its 2017 version, the report mentions the BRI within every chapter and directly relates the functions of the institutes to the initiative itself.

According to the document, the institutes promote the BRI in the following dimensions: 1. Language classes and test centres: “Great support has been given to Chinese teaching in countries along the ‘Belt and Road’, with 1,076 teachers dispatched. In 16 countries including

the US, the UK, Germany, 31 CIs have established Head Teacher positions, with 45 teachers recruited. A total of 117,454 people received training throughout the year… At present, there are 245 testing centres in countries along the “Belt and Road” and 475 testing centres in CIs or independent Confucius classrooms.” (Annual Development Report Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2017).

2. In the shape of a variety of BRI conferences: “The Joint Conference of Asian CIs along the Belt and Road was held in Bangkok, Thailand. More than 250 people including represent-atives from 77 CIs in 30 Asian countries and some Chinese-funded enterprises and Chinese and foreign experts attended the Conference.” (Annual Development Report Confucius Insti-tute Headquarters, 2017).

3. Publishing books on the BRI, such as “The world premiere of the multilingual book of Belt and Road: People with stories” and the award ceremony for “My Stories with Belt and Road Global Chinese Speech Contest” (Annual Development Report Confucius Institute Head-quarters, 2017).

No other initiatives, events or agendas even come close to finding a similar prominence within the document, hence the focus on CI activities. Just as with the discussed UN institu-tions, many CIs were present years before the BRI was initiated. Furthermore, they are similar in the sense that Beijing reoriented the institutions in recent years to cater to and promote the mindset and vision of the initiative (Shuto, 2018: 146). However, since China owns the CIs, it has a much easier job of doing compared their efforts within the UN.

Currently, there are roughly 530 CIs in 150 countries (Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, 2019), with a recent trend aiming to establish CIs at many institu-tions such as universities in BRI countries. Simultaneously, recent years have brought a sour-ing of the reception of CIs within several host countries. In many cases, these are increassour-ingly seen as tools of Chinese state propaganda as opposed to independent research institutions (Romei, 2019). These recent problems may relate to both the CIs reorientation and the differ-ence in understanding of propaganda. In some cases, accusations of spying are also increas-ing pressure to shut down CIs. The CCP on the other hand has compared the CIs to Western institutions such as the French ‘Alliance Française’, the Spanish ‘Institutes Cervantes’, or the German ‘Goethe-Institute’ (Tao and Wang, 2018: 1). Either way, utilising CIs as PD tools to promote the BRI is currently at the heart of CI agenda setting. The major methods for doing so include language classes, which serve as a bridgehead into the Chinese worldview, culture and vision for the future.

4.3 Official statements, speeches and documents

This dimension of PD is the most conventional and straightforward dimension in terms of fram-ing the BRI. Apart from outlinfram-ing the official narrative, it also serves as an indicator of how the traditionally more diverse foreign policy outlets have been unified and streamlined under Pres-ident Xi Jinping in recent years (Weissman, 2015: 158). This is especially accurate in light of BRI promotion, as Xi Jinping himself introduced both the MSRI and SREB in 2013. However, linking the BRI to the persona of Xi Jinping himself is more of an internal power move and intended to send the message that one strong leader is guiding a strong country into a bright future. Xi Jinping further pushed this emphasis by including BRI growth as a target in the Com-munist Party’s charter (Goh and Ruwitch, 2017). Within the newly amended charter, Xi was also mentioned by name, putting him on the same level as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, something his predecessors did not manage to accomplish.

In more general terms, Chinese leaders use high-level conferences, policy statements, new centralisation and MoUs to create closer ties with BRI countries. In order to formulate a coherent message, the committee on “Advancing the Development of the One Belt One Road” came into existence in 2015 after an establishment period of approximately one year (Yang, 2018: 500). Additionally, the National Development and Reform Commission together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) publicised a joint docu-ment outlining the official mindset and intention behind the BRI. This docudocu-ment goes by the name of “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building SREB and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” and is at the heart of official declarations of intention (National Development and Reform Com-mission et al., 2015). The first sentence, which relates to the principles themselves, highlights that Chinese PD is coherent, with major instruments overlapping with one another:

“The BRI is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015).

Therefore, the leading principles are closely linked to both the Chinese foreign policy mindset and the notion of branding the BRI as a UN human rights (for development) project. Fortunately, the document also goes into more detail, proclaiming five principles of cooperation for the BRI itself. In essence, policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, fi-nancial integration and people-to-people bonds form the backbone of the BRI vision document.

As previously mentioned, this thesis considers people-to-people bonds to be a self-subscribed soft power dimension of the initiative. According to the visions document:

“People-to-people bonds provide the public support for implementing the initiative. We should carry forward the spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road by promoting extensive cultural and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women exchanges and volunteer services to win public support for deepening bilat-eral and multilatbilat-eral cooperation.” (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015).

“We should send more students to each other's countries and promote cooperation in jointly running schools. China provides 10,000 government scholarships to countries along the Belt and Road every year. We should hold culture years, art festivals, film festivals, TV weeks and book fairs in each other's countries; cooperate on the production and translation of fine films, radio and TV programmes; and jointly apply for and protect World Cultural Heritage sites. We should also increase personnel exchange and cooperation between countries along the Belt and Road.” (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015).

The document goes on to discuss closer ties through fostering tourism and common crisis management, such as in relationships to prevent the spread of disease. Driving initiatives in the scientific field through research and development is also a desired target for bringing the Silk Road nations closer together. Further initiatives to drive cooperation mentioned in the document include the enactment of foreign state visits and cooperation forums by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. This once more displays both the importance of the BRI for China, as well as its top-down character for official promotion. The document ends with high-lighting the intention to build the project on voluntary participation and mutually beneficial out-comes.

In conclusion, this thesis has identified three major fields of PD specifically catering to BRI promotion. These fields relate to each other by attempting to instil and promote the same ideas and perspectives using a variety of outlets. Content-wise, the focus lies in attempting to create a common vision based on a shared Silk Road history, unifying ideals in line with the five principles of coexistence and the spreading of Chinese cultural heritage. Therefore, cul-tural diplomacy is the most dominant aspect of Beijing’s PD efforts. Moreover, CIs are the most persistent drivers since they serve as hubs of coordination for Chinese PD efforts. The norma-tive characteristics of the Chinese message reciprocate elements of the Chinese foreign policy mindset, such as the right to grow and the idea of mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty. Additionally, apart from attempting to spread an image via cultural mediums, individuals are

also operationalised as a resource, which may bring countries closer together—hence the no-tion of people-to-people bonds.

Since China is the BRI’s leader and initiator, Chinese nationalism, its self-perceived role as a champion of developing countries and the longing to become a counterbalance to the West further accommodates driving the initiative (Weissmann, 2015: 163). From a materialistic perspective, the CCP has every reason to bring the initiative to fruition, for the sake of better access to resources and markets, which are crucial for continued internal growth and stability. The following case studies further relate to these reoccurring themes as a means of creating more openness towards BRI investment based on the underlying vision of growing in harmony and independence. The question is whether China will succeed in creating a positive image while also defusing potential criticism and opposition. Utilising a comparative approach should be cause for additional salience, as it allows for findings that go beyond a single country and the specific cultural and geopolitical context that Chinese cultural diplomacy faces in every case. Factually, the intention is to analyse how the PD initiatives are similar or different across Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Furthermore, local attitudes towards the BRI and recep-tion of Chinese PD will be considered in detail.

5. Case studies

5.1 Chinese public diplomacy in Pakistan

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the world’s fifth most populous country and lies at the crossroads between the Indian peninsula, the Asian landmass and the Middle East. Since its independence from the UK in 1946, the country has been in an active dispute with its neighbour India. In particular, regional claims over the Kashmir region—of which both countries control parts of the territory—remain unresolved, leading to regular small-scale clashes of armed forces (CIA, 2019). Politically speaking, the military remains a very strong force and potential obstruction to its democracy. This is also why the country is labelled as a hybrid state as op-posed to a fully democratic system. Economically speaking, infighting, corruption and the inef-ficiency of the political system, combined with a lack of foreign direct investment, cause the country to lag behind others when it comes to the degree and ease of development. In this thesis, Pakistan is the least developed country of the case studies, with its human development index ranking it at place150 globally.