The use of sanctions for reinforcing US hegemony : the case of the Helms-Burton Act

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Eliza Feijen, 10651578

Master thesis Political Science Track: International Relations

Research Project: Contemporary global politics and the North-South divide 1st_{Supervisor: Dr. S. Rezaeiejan}

2nd_{Reader: V. Marapin, MSc}

January 25, 2019

The use of sanctions for reinforcing US hegemony

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“These are American principles, American policies (…) They are the principles of mankind and must prevail”

(Woodrow Wilson, in: E.H. Carr, 1942, p. 100)

“U.S. hegemony is everywhere: economic, technological, military, (…), political, and financial. The United States has only to lift a finger and suddenly there is no credit for

anyone. It is the world's judge.” (Fidel Castro, 1996, August 7)

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List of abbreviations

CACR Cuban Assets Control Regulations

EC European Commission

EO Executive Order

EU European Union

FAA Foreign Assistance Act

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

CDA Cuban Democracy act

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HBA Helms-Burton Act (Libertad)

HCR House Congressional record

IEEPA International Emergency Economic Powers Act

MFN Most favoured nation

NATO North Atlantic Trade Organization

US United States

OAS Organization of American States

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

SCR Senate Congressional Record

SU Soviet Union

TSREEA Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000

TWEA Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917

UN United Nations

WTO World Trade Organization

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Table of figures

Figure 1 Hypothesis of the relationship between sanctions and reinforcing hegemony ... 4

Figure 2 Relationship between hegemony and sanctions thus far ... 19

Figure 3 Purposes of the HBA as given in the initial act, pre-debate (1995, February 14th) ... 30

Figure 4 Purpose of the HBA as defined in the ratified bill ... 37

Figure 5 Relationship between hegemony and sanctions ... 44

Table of tables

Table 1 Mechanisms for implementing sanctions ... 18

Table 2 Change in trade between the US and Cuba (Schreibner, 1973, p. 395) ... 26

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Introduction

The period after the two World Wars saw the United States rise as the new world hegemon. Rapid economic growth, financial stability, a strong military power and the promotion of liberal trade ideas were among the factors that helped the US attain their new position in the World Order (Silver & Arrighi, 2003, pp. 339-340). This ‘Pax Americana’1_{is based on both economic and}

military strength (Schwartz, 1994, p. 74). On top of that, from the interbellum onwards, the US and European allies built institutions and organisations that were “governed by Western ideals and dominated by European and American power” (Steffenson, 2005, pp. 25-26). US military power and the strength of the dollar allowed American ideals to delineate these institutions and organisations, such as NATO and the WTO, while shared interests rationalized European cooperation (idem.). Such US interest-led organisations can and have been instrumentalized by the US to coerce foreign countries to adhere to their ideals. An example of this is the cooperation of NATO allies during the invasion of Iraq.

The influence on rule making, that happens as a result of influence during the creation and current influence within international organizations, has far-reaching consequences for both foreign and domestic politics. As the hegemon, the US makes the rules and shapes the institutions and organisations that facilitate trade in a way that supports their interests (Ikenberry, 1993, pp. 57-60; Norloff, 2010, pp. 16-17). Other countries have to adhere to these rules in order to maintain access to the US market and to use the US dollar (idem). This makes these rules and institutions contentious, because not all are favourable to or compatible with every state (Duke, 2010). Dependency on the US dollar and market results in actors complying anyway, but the US does not remain unchallenged, as can be seen in the current trade war between the US, China and the EU. Before the US, the United Kingdom was the hegemon (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 74-78) and scholars from different disciplines and theoretical viewpoints have long hypothesized who might become the next hegemon and when or if the ‘Pax Americana’ might end2_{. Despite the strong}

position that the US currently holds in the World Order, the US faces constant challenges to its position. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a rival, and other contenders include Japan (Nye, 1990, p. 154; Wallerstein, 2003, p. 25) and the European Union (Norloff, 2010). With its flourishing economy, military strong-arming of strategic states in the Pacific and expansion on the global market, China currently appears to be a significant contender.

Losing their hegemonic position would pose a problem to the US, since its position “allows it to gain more than others” (Norloff, 2010, p. 17). Among other benefits, hegemony and the

1_{‘Pax Americana’ (Lat.: American peace) is a term used to describe the relative world peace in the post-WW2 or post-Cold}

War period that is a result of both US-military power and intervention, and influence on international relations (Gilpin, 1981, p. 144).

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ensuing position of the dollar, allows the US to borrow on favourable terms and rates, and run a spending deficit (Norloff, 2014, pp. 1043, 1052). Therefore, the US would incur huge costs if they lose their position and it can be expected that the US is actively trying to maintain their standing in the World Order. The idea that hegemony is actively being pursued is reflected in President Trump’s promise to “make America great again” as well as in former President Obama’s effort on “refocused and reaffirmed American leadership in the world”3_{. The efforts to achieve this through}

military means have been examined to great extent4_{, but the economic side of the puzzle, and}

especially the influence of economic sanctions on retaining power, has not.

One of the benefits of power is that it can also be utilized to reinforce your position. The presence of this form of utilizing power is suggested by the increase in the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool (The Economist, 2018b) at a time when US hegemony can be seen as being in decline. According to Huntington, the US has two ways through which they can unilaterally impose their will; military intervention and the use of economic sanctions (1999, pp. 38-39). Of these options, the use of economic sanctions as a means to hold on to power remains under-examined, despite the current rise in unilateral sanctions.

The effectiveness of sanctions was seen when ZTE5_{, the second biggest Chinese telecom}

equipment company, was banned from buying American equipment after they broke an embargo on trade with Iran (Brian, 2018; Jiang & Wong, 2018). The sanction led the bank to the brink of insolvency and resulted in ZTE having to pay a billion dollar fine to lift the sanction (idem). By using a trade sanction on a company, the US shows how powerful it can be. A foreign actor breaks

the US embargo on Iran and is driven to the brink of bankruptcy. This illustrates the power and

influence the US has because access to the US market and currency can be vital for an actor in the global trade. All the while, the US has long exported the idea of ‘free trade’ though organisations such as the WTO, but this case indicates that ZTE was not free to trade with Iran. Moreover, the sanctions on Iran has resulted into foreign companies retreating from Iran in order to maintain access to the US market (Wald, 2018) and thereby they negatively impact Iran too.

More recently, Huawei Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Meng Wanzhou was arrested in Canada. She is currently on a 10 million Canadian Dollar bail and due to appear in a court to face the results of a US extradition request (Horowitz, 2018; Calvert, 2019). The US claims that Wanzhou breached the sanctions on Iran (idem.) The potential consequences of a breach of the Iran sanctions by Huawei could be of the same ilk as those faced by ZTE. Moreover, this incident occurred at a time when the US and China are in negotiations about ending their trade war and as

3_{Obamawhitehouse.gov (2018). ‘President Obama on Foreign Policy’. Accessed on September 24, 2018, via}

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/achievements/theRecord_foreig npolicy.pdf

4_{See for example Kagan (2002, pp. 3-4) or Huntington (1993).}

5_{ZTE currently trade under the name ‘ZTE corporation’. They formerly traded as ‘Zhongxing Telecommunication}

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a result it has tightened diplomatic relations between them, because Wanzhou is a Chinese resident (Horowitz, Moya & McLean, 2018).

The power that the US can exert by using sanctions might indicate that its increased use is one of the ways that US hegemony is reinforced. In this thesis this relationship between imposing sanctions and reinforcing hegemony will be examined based on the following question:

How can the use of sanctions contribute to reinforcing US hegemony in the current World Order?

The aim of answering this question is to create a theory about the way sanctions relate to maintaining or reinforcing hegemony. As a result, the question lends itself for process tracing, in which it is examined how “x [is] a cause of y in case z”. In this research, x is hegemonic power, y is the use of trade sanctions and z is the sanctions as described in the Helms-Burton Act. The answer of this question attempts to unveil a part of the scope of US hegemony. If it is true the US tries to maintain its position is through the use of trade sanctions, then this provides us with truer insight on the motivations behind US foreign policy practices. If trade sanctions are imposed for self-advancement or maintaining their position, then this indicates that the principles that the US

imposes on the world through ‘their’ international organisations and institutions only benefit US

interests, rather than being of universal benefit as they are presented. This idea echoes E.H. Carr who stated that “these principles [that are being presented as universal] are national interest, under a veil of common good” (1941, p. 101). This would mean that there are inequities in the World Order, which leave certain countries disadvantaged. Regardless of whether or not US hegemony is in decline, their actions influence global economy and politics. Considering that the US claims to advance “universal” values, it is important to examine the extent to which this is true. On top of that, the rise in the use of trade sanctions indicates a change in the kind of hegemon the US is which contributes to literature on the future of US supremacy.

The theory that arises from the answer to this question adds to existing literature and understanding of the changing position of the US. Usually the hegemon is the country that has the largest percentage of world GDP and the biggest military (strength). With China’s GDP and military strength getting bigger, the US has a less advantageous position. Scholars such as Wallerstein (2003) and Ikenberry (1989) already theorized the influence that soft-power ideological influence can have on US hegemony. However, the reinforcing quality of US hegemony through institutionalization of its rules and practices is not considered in most theories. On top of that, the “dollar-weapon6_{[is used] sparingly” (the Economist, 2018a) and research into it might uncover its}

potential. Moreover, realist theory does not explain that while research shows that sanctions are counterproductive, the use of them keeps increasing (idem).

6_{The ‘dollar-weapon’ refers to the power that can be wielded by restricting access to, and use of the dollar, which will}

have a significant impact on those the ‘dollar-weapon’ is used against because of the status of the dollar as the most common reserve currency (See also Norloff, 2010).

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Considering the scope of the research and the plethora of sanctions that the US has implemented, the main question will be answered by looking at a specific set of sanctions that have been enforced against Cuba in the Helms-Burton Act (HBA). Its objectives were security for the US and democracy for Cuba (HBA, sec 3, 1-3), by cutting tertiary actors’ access to the Cuban market off (idem, 6; Copeland, Jolly & Thompson, 2011, p. 9). This specific act lends itself well as a case, because it had major implications for both the US and Cuba, as well as international relations, due to its extraterritorial scope7_{. Moreover, the UN, of which the US is a founding}

member, established the right to self-determination, which determines that a country cannot impose laws that apply to the citizens of another country. The HBA, however, is the first economic embargo that has been codified into US law, which makes this case extra salient.

The structure of the thesis follows the hypothesis of the thesis (see Figure 1). First, an overview of the existing literature on the main concepts of the thesis is given. The concepts of World Order, hegemony and sanctions will be expanded upon, and then applied to how this relates to the US as the current hegemon. In the theoretical framework, the first four ‘steps’ of the

hypothesis are taken, and the foundation for the fourth heuristic step is laid by constructing a framework based on the concepts of hegemony and sanctions. The operationalization of this framework will be expanded upon in the chapter that follows, in which the methodology will be set out. After the operationalization of the framework and concepts, the motivation for using a case review and the case selection will be provided. What follows is the introduction to the case and historical background to the relationship between the US and Cuba and the previous economic sanctions against Cuba which serves to add context to the case and the HBA. Next, the presence of the goals as set out in the theoretical framework will be examined by looking at the debates that

7_{‘Extraterritorial scope’ means that the US does not have the right to implement laws that constrict the actions as}

codified in some UN charter.

1. US is the hegemon because of three aspects

2. The hegemon has certain benefits, such as

imposing sanctions

3. These benefits include imposing sanctions 4. These sanctions have

four different goals 5. These goals can have

an effect on aspects of hegemony 6. This effect can benefit

the three aspects of hegemony

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preceded the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act. In the subsequent chapter, the actual contents of the HBA will be analysed, in light of the framework presented in Table 1 (“step 5”). The results of this are presented in Table 3, which contains the theoretical links between hegemony and sanctions (“step 6”). In the final chapter, the period after the implementation of the HBA will be looked at, to see if the reactions and consequences of the act provides evidence that corroborates the hypothesis that sanctions can be utilized to reinforce hegemony.

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Theoretical review and framework

The theoretical section is set up as follows. The concepts of World Order and Hegemony will be expanded upon first. These concepts will subsequently be looked at in the context of the current Pax Americana; a brief overview of the US rise to hegemony will be given, and the characteristics of this hegemony and its consequences will be specified. This is followed by a brief literature review in which the scientific debates around the existence of American decline are expanded upon. Next, a summary of previous research on the methods that are utilized to reinforce US hegemony is given. Subsequently, sanctions as a foreign policy instrument will be expanded upon and conceptualized. This all culminates in the framework presented in Table 1.

1. World Order and hegemony

To understand the concept of hegemony, a definition of the term World Order has to be given first. Falk describes World Order as "the distribution of power and authority among the political actors on the global stage” (1999, p. 29). The term does not refer to a state of orderliness, but to the structure and organisation of power among states. As such, it can be seen as a level of scale within which International Relations operates. In defining ‘World Order’, Falk includes an alternative viewpoint where World Order is determined in terms of “widely shared values, such as peace, equity, rule of law, human rights (…)” (idem). This definition includes agency for the actors involved in the World Order, because the components of the definition can “can improve or deteriorate” (idem) based on real world events. Based on the notion that there is such a thing as a World Order, scholars have theorized how this order is created and how power is divided.

The current World Order can be seen as being restricted by institutions8_{and organisations.}

This entails that international law dictates certain rules that restrict the power and domination of countries over other countries and attach rules about interactions between countries. The most important of these is the United Nations Charter9_{, which prevents UN members from using force,}

unless it is “in the common interest”. More importantly, UN resolution 151410_{grants countries}

self-determination and prohibits other countries from inhibiting this (UN, 2018a; 2018b). As such, countries are prevented from gaining power through means of war, leading countries who seek power within the current World Order to do so via other means, imposing economic sanctions being one of them.

8_{The term institution, in this sense and the ensuing, refers to “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior”}

(Huntington, 2006, p. 12) which are being reproduced through social interaction while simultaneously limiting interaction. As such, this definition refers to both informal institutions such as norms, as well as formal institutions which are solidified in (international) law.

9_{See Appendix 1} 10_{See Appendix 2}

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1.1. Hegemony and power

In the current World Order the “widely shared values (…)” that Falk describes are American (idem). In the view of the US, as Woodrow Wilson stated, “[t]hey are the principles of mankind and must prevail” (in: E.H. Carr, 1942, p. 100). The shared values are American because the US is the hegemon. Within the World Order, the term hegemony generally refers to the dominance of one country over others, derived from Dahl’s relational definition of power in which “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (1957, pp. 201-202). Power in the World Order is owning certain strategic assets. As a result, in this thesis power is defined as containing three aspects: hegemonic power is having the moral ideological sway over world politics and financial capital to create independency on adherence to this ideology by other countries. This power is subsequently consolidated in both formal and informal institutions, which adds to their power. This all is backed by a strong military that can be employed in case non-violent means of coercion or deterrence are not deemed sufficient. At its core, hegemonic power consists of a combination of military, economical and ideological aspects that help the hegemon to shape the world in its interest.

The definition of power mirrors the three aspects that most definitions of hegemony have in common11_{. Depending on a scholar’s theoretical perspective, the definition, scope, causes and}

influence of hegemony differs. In general, definitions of hegemony include a strong economy which is supported by military power and which provides a country with power or dominance over others. This dominance can be in terms of military or financial capabilities or include cultural and political primacy. In the following paragraphs these main components of hegemony will be set out by briefly touching upon E.H. Carr’s three aspects of “political power in the international sphere”; military power, economic power and “power over opinion” (henceforth: ideological power) (1939, pp. 139-146) and explaining how these concepts are essential to understanding the concept of hegemony and how these concepts are connected to different strands of IR theory.

1.1.1. Military power

The realist view of World Order focuses on state security and holds that the basis of this security lies in military power. As a result of this, states are believed to be actors that pursue their own interests while disregarding those of others. Waltz poses that the influence that a country has is tied in with its economic and military power and military power is the only source of power that a country has in order to protect its position in the World Order (1979, pp. 105, 111- 114). Within a realist12_{view, influence that countries can have on others is therefore based on their military}

capacity and influence is seen as a psychological condition; the fear of military conflict.

11_{Based on definitions given by Cox (1983), Keohane (1984), Negri & Hardt (2000) , Schwarz (1994).}

12_{Within Realism a further distinction between offensive and defensive realism exists. The former stream believes that a}

state’s power will be increased and protected through pre-emptive strikes. The latter stream believes a state’s survival depends solely on defending its territory.

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An important explanation that realists give for the existence of hegemonies is the balancing of power follows from this psychological state. If power is based solely on military capacity, then this power can be used for attacking or deterring of enemies. This implies that the World Order is one of anarchy. Within this anarchic World Order processes of balancing or bandwagoning occur, whereby states group together in order to increase their collective military power in order to equalize the division of power, or to enjoy the protection of other military powers (idem, pp. 80-84). As a result of this, power becomes more and more concentrated among groups of actors. A good example of this process can be seen during the Cold War, when smaller countries allied with the US or the SU. This led to a bipolar World Order consisting of the two actors with the strongest militaries (the US and the SU), whose mutual threat of offensive action created a balance of power. In this view, actors with the strongest military become the hegemon, with their economy serving as a basis for this position.

The liberal view of the World Order sees possibilities for cooperation between countries where both countries stand to gain. What follows from this is the importance of trade, and norms and institutions to achieve these gains. Within the liberal tradition, hegemony contains a military aspect too, but it focusses on different dynamics. Here, the military is seen as serving to protect property to allow for trade, which in turn will increase trade and stabilize the economy. This view on hegemony also illustrates the way that the hegemony is a combination of military power and economic aspects that cannot be seen separately. Be it for territorial expansion or for the protection of trade, military power is needed to gain or protect economic assets that can be capitalized and utilized to increase military power. It is important to note once more, that within the current World Order offensive warfare is restricted by organisations such as the UN, which in theory means that military power can only serve a defensive purpose13_.

1.1.2. Economic power

Due to the cost of maintaining a military, or waging war, a thriving economy to provide taxes to pay for the military is needed too14_{. This results in the importance of the second component of}

hegemony. What follows is that the definition of hegemony consists of a combination of both hard (military) and soft power15_{, and is dependent upon a free trade doctrine which is thought to}

maximize economies. As trade becomes more important for increasing or maintaining power,

13 _{Offensive military actions are regulated by UN mandates which stipulates the conditions under which military}

actions can be undertaken. This is not to say that countries do no longer unilaterally choose to employ their military, as can be seen in the case of US intervention in Iraq

14_{Raising taxes is not the only way a country can pay for the military. Other ways to do this can be seen in the Middle}

East, where revenue from the sale of oil is used to fund public ventures such as the military, or through sale of merchandise of state owned enterprises (as happens under communism).

15_{Soft power “occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft}

power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (nye, 1990, p. 166) As a result, it comprises of having “the ability (…) to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own” (idem, p. 168). The use of sanctions can contain both non-coercive soft power elements as well as hard power elements.

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economic interdependence between countries increases. A Marxist view on hegemony focusses on this aspect of hegemony by looking at the globalization of capitalism and the role of imperialism (Negri & Hardt, 2000, pp. 8-9). As trade expanded at the same time states were formed, it became an essential aspect of maintaining the World Order.

The basis of power in the Marxist view, is the accumulation of wealth (idem, p. 23). This power is reproduced through networks and woven into everyday institutions and practices (idem.). Imperialism (or hegemony) is seen as an end-point of this type of power and is achieved because of the interdependence that the rise of capitalism has created (idem, pp. 24-26). As such, Negri and Hardt claim that the current World Order was actively created through interaction and that hegemony relies on consent between actors who create this World Order (idem, p. 3). This consent can be consolidated through creating organisations that serve the interests of those in power by making those who are less powerful adhere to the rules of those in power. Those less powerful are coerced into adhering by offering carrots and sticks. Organisations and institutions are needed to avoid or minimize the impact from economic shocks, since these might lead to deterioration of trade, which in turn would have a negative effect on the economy. This means that as a result of an increase in interdependence, international organisations and institutions are ‘added’ to the World Order.

Exemplary of this is the creation of the Bretton Woods system. In 1944, amidst the crisis of World War II, the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and European countries created a system that regulated trade relations among them. Prior to World War II, economic upheavals had a ripple effect among trading allies, which can be seen as one of the causes of these wars16_{. Of the things}

they agreed upon, the most important are fixing currencies to the US dollar, which in turn was fixed to the gold standard, and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The impact of this on US hegemony is significant because it allowed the US to set norms and rules for international trade to their interest at a time when they had both the biggest military and 50% of world GDP and while the ‘old’ World Order was in crisis. Possessing this ability could thus have a significant impact on the ‘new’ World Order. It is here that the influence of ideological power, which will be expanded upon in the next paragraph, becomes clear.

1.1.3. Ideological power

The institutionalization of norms of the country in power contributes to consolidating this hegemony by means of deepening interdependence and forcing or coercing other countries to adhere to the ideologies of the country that sets the norms. The latter can be done because, if both states are to gain from trade and assuming actors are rational and looking to maximize their profits, countries

16_{An example of this can be seen in the effects of the 1929 New York Stock Market Crash which meant loans to}

Germany could no longer be issued, which in turn meant that they could no longer pay World War I reparations to France. Bretton Woods organizations were in created to stabilize the world economy and mitigate the effects of economic upheaval.

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will want to cooperate with one another. Cox states that hegemony is asserted through international organisations, which spread ‘universal’ norms and as such, perform an ideological role (1983, pp. 171-172). On top of this, he poses that despite dominance being necessary for hegemony, it does not suffice as a cause for enduring hegemony. Chomsky states that the institutions and their consolidation in the organisations that the US has created have provided them with “primacy of law over force” (2003, p. 28). An example of this can be seen in the US instrumentalization of the UN in order to unilaterally start preventative wars (idem, pp. 29-30). When it was created “the world guaranteed that the UN would be virtually an instrument of US power” because of the economic and military power of the US (idem). As a result, they claim “the right to act unilaterally” when it comes to the protection of strategic resources (idem, p. 15). Interestingly, as is seen with the pre-emptive war in Iraq, when the US fails to utilize international organisations such as the UN, it dismisses it and acts unilaterally (idem, pp. 29-30).

A hegemon can shape the world order in its own interests through these organisations. Spreading ideology through institutions and organisations and making other countries adhere to these, thus helps consolidate hegemonic power. As Ikenberry and Kupchan state “rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on right” and sharing values and interests will lower economic and military costs (1990, p. 286). Through consolidation of US ideologies in organisations, the idea has arisen that their normative influence is positive and to the benefit of the World Order which results in certain negative or questionable aspects of it not being contradicted. And, as Duke states, setting global norms is an important aspect of the influence that the US currently has (2010). That the US has spread its ideas and values through international institutions has long been established and discussed17_{. In the paragraph on American hegemony, some of these norms and ideals, as well}

as the institutions the US has helped create to spread this will be touched upon.

1.2. American hegemony

The combination of having the largest economy, the biggest military allowed the US to become the hegemon in the post-world war era. Some state that the start of what is now known as “the American Century” started with the Spanish-American war in 1898, which can be seen as the first time that the ‘old’ World Order came into a military conflict with the (then) ‘new’ World Order (Ayala & Bernabe, 2009, p. 1). Interestingly too, this war was started as a result of the Cuban pursuit for independence from Spain and resulted in Cuba coming under US rule (Pérez, 2006, p. 5). One of the reasons the US fought this war, was to end the Spanish rule of its ‘neighbours’ in Latin America (Paterson, 1996, pp. 345-349). This would open the Latin American market up for trade, which the US’ economy could take advantage of (idem; Pérez, idem).

17_{See for example Ikenberry & Kupchan (1990) or Nye’s (2004) article on the importance of spreading ideas as a}

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The United Kingdom, the previous world hegemon who held the position during the 19th

century, crumbled under the economic pressures of the two World Wars. The cost of these wars and the decline in manufacturing meant that the UK could no longer retain their favourable position (Schwartz, 1994, pp 205-207; Siegfried, 1928). During World War II, however, the US economy that had previously been under great stress as a result of the 1929 Stock Market Crash, picked up because Europe needed steel and military technology. At the same time, they started to take up an ideological leadership role during the Bretton Woods conference. Moreover, the US ‘freed Europe’ through military intervention. In the years following the Second World War, the international institutions that were created to insure financial stability, peace and security, and international trade captured American power and influence since they were based on American ideals (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 214-215). During the Bretton Woods Conference (1944) a new system was created in order to ensure economic stability to avoid another World War (idem, pp. 220-221). The major organisations that are supposed to ensure this are the World Bank18_{and the IMF}19

(Hanhimäki, Schoenborn & Zanchetta, 2012, p. 10). The UN is created in order to propagate peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation (UN, 2018a; 2018b). This is achieved through preventing international conflicts and by regulating international law. Finally, GATT (1947), which was replaced by the WTO in 1995, regulates and promotes international free trade.

US economic and military strength allowed the US to consolidate their position in international organisations which simultaneously allow them to spread their ideology (and thereby their interests). Because the US has the largest economy and the largest share of world GDP, foreign countries will want to continued access the US market, which maintains their market (Posen, 2003, p. 7; Silver & Arrighi, 2003, p. 339-340; Schwartz, 1994, p. 77). On top of that, the strength and stability of the US dollar, which was an effect of these organisations, contributed to it becoming the most prevalent reserve currency (Norloff, 2014, pp. 1053-1054). These two factors combined give the US treasury department and US Federal reserve influence over a large amount of international trade, which has been instrumentalized to shape the World Order to the benefit of the US (Ikenberry, 1993, pp. 57-60). As a result of the institutionalization of the dollar as the world’s trading currency and the dependency on the US market, the US fills the position as a ‘hub’ within a ‘hub-and-spoke’ system in which most global trade can only be done through the US (The Economist, 2018a).

Secondly, the US still possesses the world’s largest military and still has the highest military spending, (Posen, 2003, p. 7; Silver & Arrighi, ibid.). A strong military is needed to provide the US economy with stability and trust, so that investments in infrastructure and technology will be made

18_{The World Bank – provides loans and financial aid to reduce poverty and help the developing world (World Bank,}

2018).

19_{The IMF was founded to “foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade,}

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(Schwartz, 1994, p. 77). This is achieved through hard power; military or economic coercion (Nye, 2008, pp. 94-95). Moreover, the institutionalization of American ideals, interests and rules in international organisations provides the US with soft power. The combination of military power and a strong economy still maintains the US’ hegemonic position in the World Order.

Finally, the spread of US values and ideas through the institutions they created, provides them with ideological power too. The US defines its strength by their ability to cooperate with other countries in order to advance “universal values” and US presidents often claim to be speaking for the entire international community and see themselves as the leaders of the free world (Huntington, 1999, pp. 38-39). Huntington describes American interests as “a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the founding documents by American leaders: liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism, limited government, private enterprise” (1997, p. 29). He continues his statement by quoting Hofstadter who underscores the perceived importance by the US to propagate their ideals: "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one (idem.; italics added). Exemplary of this notion is that when the Chinese economy propelled in the mid 1990s, President Bill Clinton said: “[i]t's important not to isolate China. The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China” (State of the Union address, 1999). The latter was managed with the strict trade standards that states have to adhere to when joining the WTO. This exemplifies the soft power influence of the US, considering even its (current) biggest adversary has to adhere by rules set by them. This spread of US values in the realm of international politics is used as justification for the unilateral actions carried out by the US, as it is believed to be for the greater good that countries believe in US’ universal values. As a result of this, ideology being used as a motive for utilizing economic sanctions is an important indicator for the consolidation of hegemonic power.

The influence that the United States had in the creation of these institution is oft discussed20_{. Reismann stated that their general goal was “to change world politics so that they take}

on the character of what Americans believe their own politics to be” (1999, p. 65), while Schwartz said that they “reflected to have their domestic cake while dining in international markets’ (1994, p. 214). What is important here, is that when negotiating the rules that these organisations impose on their members, the United States was in a very advantageous and powerful position. As a result: “the most powerful in attendance (…) dominated the negotiations” which allowed them to shape these institutions in their interests (Goldman, 2005, pp. 52-54) which has resulted in a World Order that leans towards the US. Resulting in, as Wall says, a world in which “human rights are Western standards” (1998, p. 578).

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2. American decline

In the social sciences, predicting the future is hard due to the dynamic, erratic and uncertain nature of social actors. However, predictions about the future are still made due to the potential costs of the consequences that changes in society can impose and the gains that can begotten through anticipating these changes. With regards to hegemony and hegemonic decline, this implies that the discussion surrounding when or if US hegemony will end is a contentious one. However, based historic conjectures it can be expected that US hegemony will end at one point and the debate on when that might happen, or if American hegemony is already in decline continues. Others, such as Norloff (2010) claim that specific aspects of US hegemony within the current World Order the US will maintain hegemony or alter the extent of power within it.

US hegemony was first theorized to be in decline from the late 1980’s onwards21_{. During}

the Cold War the influence that the US wielded over world politics and the global economy through setting up institutions and organisations remained significant (Ikenberry, 1989, pp. 390-391). However, the Cold War was in essence a battle in which the SU and US fought over gaining power by use of proxy wars. When the SU fell, this meant that the US was left as the unipolar power and came out as the victor. From this time onwards, multiple potential new adversaries have been written about and many scholars believe American hegemony to be in relative decline22_.

While scholars such as Norloff (2014) state that US hegemony is not in decline because their relative military and economic power is still unrivalled, the European Union was thought to be capable of taking over the role of hegemon, especially when EU member states adopted the Euro as a common currency and nowadays, the most convincing contender appears to be China (Allison; 2017; Roy, 1994; Zhiqun, 2006).

Although predictions about the future remain contentious, it seems that the US is at least in relative decline23_{. Two major indicators suggest this. First of all because the foundation of their}

economic hegemony is under strain. The clearest indicator of this is that the US share of world GDP steadily declines, whilst that of its contender China has surpassed the US in 2014 (IMF, 2018b). On top of that, China is expected to surpass the US GDP by 2032 (O’Brien, 2017). With the Chinese market and economy growing, access to their market increases in importance. This might eventually result in the focus point of international trade is moving towards China, or a decrease in the importance of access to the US market. Signs of this shift in the importance of the Chinese market can already be seen in the negative trade balance that the US has with China while China simultaneously holds 1.15trillion dollar of US public debt (Tankersley, 2018; Amadeo, 2019). The latter could provide the Chinese with influence on US fiscal policy and a loss in influence

21_{See Gilpin (1987) or Kennedy (2010)}

22_{See for example Layne (2006; 2012), Allison (2017), Roy (1994)} 23_{See Nye (2010), Agnew & Crobridge (2002, pp. 103-129).}

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from the US treasury. The growing influence of the Chinese might result in access to the US market is becoming less important for foreign exports which would decrease the influence that can be exerted by the US federal reserve and US treasury through their power over the dollar.

Secondly, both the percentage of military spending in relation to US GDP, as well as the percentage in world share of military spending decreases24_{(Tian, Fleurant, Kuimova, Wezeman &}

Wezeman, 2018). Considering that hegemony is underwritten by military power, this is another indicator of the relative decline of US hegemony. Moreover, a shift away from military intervention is taking place while cyberwarfare is on the increase. The implication of these trends and changes is that the relative strength and importance of US military power decreases.

Two of the three aspects on which US hegemony is based are contested, be it intentionally or not. The US is still the hegemon and retains an important role in the World Order, these developments suggest that US hegemony is in relative decline. Considering that relative US share in world GDP and their military power are challenged, while emerging markets such as China are taking to the stage more and more and American hegemony thus appears to be in relative decline. The fall of the US as a hegemon would be accompanied by significantly changes in the World Order. Considering the benefits that a hegemonic position encompasses, it can be expected that the US actively tries to maintain their position. As previously stated, this can be done in two ways; through military actions, and by imposing sanctions. In view of the hypothesis of this research, the latter of these options will be expanded upon in the following paragraph.

3. Sanctions

Other than capturing power and influence in institutions and organizations, the US has multiple ways to consolidate their hegemony. Previous research has indicated that, among other ways, this can be done through the securitization of international monetary policy (Higgott, 2004; Balzacq; 2005) or by preventing new powers from rising (Posen & Ross, 1997, p. 33). Sanctions, being a soft-power tool that can be instrumentalized to achieve foreign policy goals, can used to maintain hegemonic power also. The following paragraph explores what sanctions are and why they are used as a policy tool. Next, the use of sanctions within the current World Order will briefly be touched upon. To conclude, an overview of the goals of sanctions and how these can be used to gain or maintain power by the hegemon will be given.

3.1. Sanctions – use and effect

In general, three types of economic sanctions exist: export restrictions, import restrictions, and financial restrictions “such as the reduction of aid, the freezing of assets, and the denial of loans” (Stirling, 1996, p. 42). The implementation of sanctions can have far reaching consequences

24_{US world share of military spending was 39% in 2013 and dropped to 35% in 2017, while China’s world share in}

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because the US can use access to its markets and use of its currency as leverage to force states and companies to adhere to the sanctions too. This is done by blocking access to the US market to countries and companies that trade with countries upon whom a sanction has been imposed.

Hufbauer et al. (1990) and Pape (1997) have shown that the success rates of the use of economic sanctions are low25_{. Chan (2009) indicates that a part of the reason for this failure is that}

it is difficult to predict future actions of and relations with a country, despite this being important factors for decided whether or not to impose a sanction. Despite scientific proof that sanctions do not work, their use has been on the rise since the 1990s (The Economist, 2018a; Drury, 2000, p. 623). Not unsurprisingly opponents claim that sanctions are an overused and ineffective policy tool (Selden, 2010, p. 92). Proponents on the other hand, claim that sanctions are an alternative to armed conflict, because non-military intervention is deemed to be a more humane option to coerce others (idem; Pape, 1997, pp. 90-91).

“Military instruments are often thought to be the only effective means for achieving ambitious foreign policy goals like taking or defending territory, altering a state's military behavior, and changing a state's regime or internal political structure. Since World War I, however, economic sanctions have come to be viewed as the liberal alternative to war.” (idem)

This ‘alternative to war’ idea is oft discussed. Beside war being costly and a drastic and highly regulated measure, another reason for this rise is the increase in the economic interdependence as a result of globalization (Drury, idem). The latter makes the potential impact of sanctions more profound. However, the use of sanctions to further political goals is still believed to be less effective than the use of military action (Pape, 1997, p. 92). This is because states can “resist external pressure” or “mitigate the economic damage of sanctions” (idem, p. 93).

3.2. Sanctions in the current World Order

Sanctions are supposed to work by lowering the “economic aggregate of a target state in order to force a change in the behaviour of said state” (idem., pp. 94-95). The implications of lowering a country’s economic means is that it decreases military capabilities too (idem.). By lowering military capabilities, the potential for military or economic retaliation is decreased, because economic means are needed to support the military.

This utilization of sanctions stands in contrast to the US free trade ideology that has been spread across the globe through institutions such as the WTO. This ideology holds that free trade will benefit all those involved. Basic requirements for achieving free trade are open markets and

25_{Huffbaur et al. (1990) conclude that 34% of sanctions are successful, while Pape (1997) states that only 5% attain}

the intended results. When Pape revisited the Huffbauer research he concluded that ‘economic warfare’ should be excluded from the definition, as it includes military actions too. The result of using a more strict definition lowered the success rate from 34% to 5%. (The latter definition is in line with the definition of economic sanctions as is used in this research thesis.)

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little government interference. The US government using access to their market as a bargaining chip thus stands in stark contrast with what they propagate.

Huntington also claims that these actions have to be legitimized through international organisations (Huntington, 1999, pp. 38-39) in order to minimize potential negative impacts (such as war or counter sanctions). This can be done through the organisations the US is a member of (i.e. WTO, NATO), or by unilaterally using their economic might. The US treasury, US department of Commerce and the State Department monitors and executes the sanctions on foreign governments, companies and individual actors. According to the US treasury, sanctions consist of “the blocking of assets and trade restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national security goal” (US Treasury, 2018a). Moreover, the US can unilaterally impose sanctions because of its influential position; allies stand to lose from opposition to US sanctions because they depend on either or both military protection or access to the US market and it is therefore in their interest to acquiesce with the US.

3.2.1. Sanctions from international organisations

The two most important international organisations that deal with implementing economic sanctions are the WTO and the UN security council. As previously discussed, the US had a big influence in the creation of these organisations. The UN security council can adopt economic sanctions based on article 41 of the UN charter and does this in order to spread “international peace and security” (UN, 2018c). Despite having a mechanism for using military force, their preference goes to the use of trade sanctions (idem; UN Charter, 1945).

The WTO is more commonly used to impose economic sanctions. The WTO dispute settlement system allows states to enforce the obligations imposed on its members. They set the rules on trade and its members are countries. Countries do not conduct trade, only enforce trade-regulation. As a result, when ‘private economic operators’ do not adhere by WTO rules, the countries in which the ‘private economic operator’ operates in is forced to implement legislation that makes it adhere to WTO standards (WTO, 2018b). These trade dispute settlements can be initiated by member states.

3.2.2. Unilateral sanctions

The focus in this research lies with unilateral sanctions, so that the hegemonic power of the US can be examined. While the ultimate authority on deciding who is sanctioned lies with the US president, they have several federal agencies that can implement them. The most common way in which sanctions are initiated is through a presidential executive order (EO) (Masters, 2017). US law allows the President the right to initiate an economic sanction:

“Any authority granted to the President (…) may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national

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emergency with respect to such threat.” (United States Code Annotated, Title 50. War and National Defense, Chapter 35. International Emergency Economic Powers)

Although this is in conflict with international law, such as the right to self-determination, US law allows the president to initiate economic sanctions in cases of ‘national emergency’ (idem). On top of this, US Congress can initiate or modify existing sanctions (Masters, idem). The sanctions are mostly carried out and enforced by the US treasury in the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

3.3. Goals of sanctions

Masters states that economic sanctions as a policy tool are utilized in order to

“coerce, deter, punish, or shame entities that endanger their interests or violate international norms of behaviour. [In order to] (…) advance a range of foreign policy goals (…). (Masters, 2017).

As such, they are a foreign policy tool, which can be instrumentalized to achieve different goals. Lindsay (1986) gives a comprehensive summary of the goals of imposing sanctions and criteria of success. The first goal is compliance, which is successful is the sanction is the direct cause for a change in behaviour of the target country (idem, pp. 158-160). The second goal is subversion, where a change in regime as a direct result of the sanction is seen as success (idem, pp. 160-162). The third goal is deterrence, where a sanction has to result in damage which makes target change policy (idem, pp. 162-164). The fourth goal international symbolism, is harder to measure because it is influenced by many sanction-specific factors, but is used in order to send a ‘warning signal’ to tertiary countries (idem, pp. 164-166). The fifth goal is domestic symbolism, which would be explained by a rally-around-the-flag theory, but is equally difficult to measure due to average citizens’ limited knowledge about sanction (idem, pp. 166-168). By looking at success as an indicator Lyndsay’s realist conception of sanctions remains very narrow and has no eye for the influence a sanction can have and overlooks the accumulative effect of these goals and sanctions in general. However, because these goals cover all reasons for implementing sanctions, they do lend themselves well to be applied within the framework of the effect sanctions have on hegemony.

If hegemony is to be reinforced through the use of sanctions, that the goals of sanctions ought to contribute to the aspects of hegemony. Reinforcing of hegemony can be done in two ways: by eliminating your competition, or by strengthening your own relative position in the World Order and sanctions can be utilized for either of these strategies (see Table 1). By combining the aspects that have been established as being vital to establishing hegemony and the goals of sanction, the connection between the goals of sanctions and hegemony are explicated.

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Table 1 Mechanisms for implementing sanctions

4. Conclusion

This theoretical framework and review provides the first four ‘steps’ in linking the use of sanctions with hegemony (see Figure 2). Hegemonic power is having the moral ideological sway over world politics and financial capital to create independency on adherence to this ideology by other countries, while having a strong military that can protect this. Circumstances after the World War II allowed the US to rise to this position. Being the hegemon comes with specific benefits, such as borrowing against favourable terms and consolidation your ideology in institutions and organizations, as well as the option of imposing sanctions26_.

If sanctions are utilized to reinforce hegemony, then a connection between what the expected results of the sanctions and one of the three forms of power of which hegemony consists of should exist, for which the goals must be operationalized. This is done in Table 1. Sanctions can be utilized for either of these strategies, which can be seen in the third column of the table. Because Lindsay’s four27_{goals of implementing sanctions are extensive, they lend themselves well}

for the framework. In the table the connection between the goals of sanctions and the threat to hegemony are explicated.

26_{Sanctions, in theory, can be imposed by any actor. A hegemonic position might add to its effects, however.} 27_{Because this thesis concerns itself with maintaining power within the World Order, the fifth goal, domestic}

symbolism will be omitted from the framework.

Goal (in bold) means to

utilize goal (a, b, c) Mechanism indicating the presence of the goal in sanction (how is a sanction supposed to achieve the goal, based on means)

1.Deterrence If a sanction is implemented and a previous action that is to be prevented is mentioned

a) Military If sanction is a threat of a military nature (i.e. militarization or military retaliation) b) Economic If the sanction results in costs if action is repeated

c) Ideological If condemnation of the action is used to prevent repetition of action (e.g. through naming and shaming)

2.Compliance If a sanction is implemented to alter behaviour

a) Military If sanction is a threat of a military nature (i.e. militarization or military retaliation) b) Economic If the sanction leads to the target incurring costs if behaviour is not altered c) Ideological If sanction involves threat of action through international organizations

3.Subversion If there is a clear mention of changing the leadership

a) Military By changing military power

b) Economic By impacting the economy in order to subvert leadership

c) Ideological Mention of the use of media, interaction or (popular) culture for spreading desired ideology to eventually change leadership

4.Symbolism If the sanction is implemented to change the behaviour of actors at whom it is not aimed.

a) Military Sending messages that might justify the threat of military intervention b) Economic Sending messages that not adhering to sanctions will impact economy c) Ideological Sending messages that makes domestic ideology clear

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Figure 2 Relationship between hegemony and sanctions thus far

•The US has a strong and enticing economy which allows it to spread its ideology, and which is protected by its military

1. US is the hegemon because of three aspects

•It can borrow on favourable terms, consolidate its ideology in institutions and deny access to its currency

2. The hegemon has certain benefits

•The need for access to the US market and currency, provides the US wit power to unilaterally impose sanctions

3. These benefits include imposing sanctions

•These goals are deterrence, compliance, subversion and symbolism

4. These sanctions have four different goals

•The potential effect is set out in Table 1

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Method

The framework that is created in the previous chapter provides the basis for the subsequent chapters. In order to examine if hegemony is being consolidated through the use of sanctions, the presence of the goals as a motivation for the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act needs to be measured. This chapter describes how this will be done and explains how the subsequent chapters follow from the previous chapter and the main question.

In the following paragraph the method that is used to measure the goals from Table 1 and the operationalization thereof will be explained. After clarifying the overall method used to answer the main question, a step-by-step explanation of the methods for each of the subsequent chapters will be given. This explanation comprises of the data-selection, data-collection and data-analysis of each of the empirical chapters. Lastly, the case will be introduced by discussing the use of a case review and the case selection. In this, the reasons behind selecting the case as well as its limitations are looked at.

1. Methodology

1.1. Overall methodology

The character of the main question in this thesis holds that the answer will be an attempt to infer a causal mechanism between the utilization of economic sanctions and retaining hegemonic power. The main question that will be answered reads as follows:

How can the use of sanctions contribute to reinforcing US hegemony in the current World Order?

To answer this question, process tracing will be used and each of the chapters serves as a step towards the conclusion and thereby the answer to the main question. Process tracing helps “to see if what we think is true or self-evident in one context works differently in another” (Halperin, p. 203). Bennet and Checkel claim that process tracing helps understanding the processes behind human decision making (2015, p. 5). Thus, the method of process tracing lends itself to analyse whether an initial event and a subsequent outcome were related (Mahoney, 2012, p. 571). As such, it will see if “x [was] a cause of y in case z” (idem). In which x is retaining hegemonic power, y is economic sanctions and z is the case of economic sanctions as described in the Helms-Burton Act. A limitation is that process tracing, resulting in descriptive and inferential research on diagnostic evidence by nature, is that the scope of the research is difficult to define. This limitation can be mitigated by the use of a singular case, but this means that generalizability is difficult and external validity is low. However, the use of a cases does allow an in-depth internally valid discussion of the process of the implementation of the sanctions in the HBA and its potency, which adds to the broader research into the use of sanctions and might add to future research.

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1.2. Chapter structure

In the following chapters a phase of the implementation of the sanctions in the HBA will be shed light upon. In the first chapter, the relationship between the US and Cuba that preceded the HBA will be looked at, in light of the power-relationship between them and the sanctions that preceded the HBA. This is important because the previous relationship impacts the discourse surrounding the HBA and provides context to its subsequent analysis. Moreover, this chapter will serve as an introduction to the case. This overview of the relation is made by means of a literature review in order to put the HBA within the larger context in which it has been implemented. The data that is used to do this consists mainly of scientific literature describing the historical relationship between the US and Cuba, as well as US policy briefs and communiqués about the US-Cuban relationship. The sources thus cover both Cuban and American views on the relationship, in an attempt to give an objective overview of events that preceded the HBA.

In the chapter that follows, the reasons that were given for the implementation of the trade sanctions in the Helms-Burton Act are examined in light of the framework in the theoretical chapter (see Table 1). The goal of this chapter is to examine if Lindsay’s (1986) goals are present in the case. These reasons are extrapolated from speeches in debates, official policy briefs from the US house of Representatives and US Senate (i.e. the US legislature, or US Congress), an overview of which is listed Appendix 3. Analysing these debates and communiqués provides insight in the American rhetoric behind the use of sanctions as well as the extent of their power or the perceived impact that their sanctions can have. This data can be used to measure the presence of Lindsay’s goals, because these reasons that are indicate the goals of the sanctions.

The reasons are extrapolated from these documents through discourse analysis. In the analysis process broad themes (“securitization”, “ideology”) that characterized the debates were first laid out based on open coding. These themes serve as the structure of the chapter. Subsequent closed coding establishes a narrative that is utilized to measure the presence of Lindsay’s goals. The latter is done by based on Table 1 and is measured as follows. The first column lists the previously discussed sanctions, and the aspects of hegemony. In the second column, the language that indicates the presence of a goal is described, followed by a breakdown of the means through which they are intended to be achieved. For example: if a previous action is mentioned in the sanction, this indicates the presence of deterrence. If the sanction will have a negative effect on the economy of the target, then the means are economic.

In the chapter that follows, the contents of the HBA are analysed by looking at the goals it contains and the means (military, economic or ideological) through which it aims to achieve them. This chapter provides insight in the type of power the US is trying to exert with the Helms-Burton sanctions. This is needed to make the final ‘steps’ towards reinforcing hegemony, in which

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the effect of sanctions can benefit the three aspects of hegemony, which in turn can either prevent opposition to the power of the hegemon, or help it maintain its power.

The presence of the goals will also be measured based on the indicators in Table 1. By looking at the contents of the HBA an outline of what is attempted to change is given (e.g. which behaviours will be ‘deterred’). This provides insight into the way the US frames and justifies the utilization of economic sanctions, US ideology with regards to the World Order and into what they perceive to be the extent of their power (e.g. through sanctioning a behaviour, the US believes it can change it). The Helms-Burton Act itself provides the primary data. The sanctions in the act are categorized according to their goal (e.g. deterrence, compliance, etc.) followed by a categorization according to the mechanism through which it aims to achieve the goal (see Appendix 4 for an overview). This categorization is then utilized to create a framework of how these sanctions can contribute to the prevention of opposition or the maintenance of the aspects of hegemony. The analysis results in Table 3 in which the effect that sanctions can have on reinforcing hegemony.

In the final chapter, the international response to the HBA is examined. The main reason for doing this is that the framework that is created, is derived from US discourse about sanctions, which results in it being based solely on US discourse and ideology regarding sanctions and the potential effect that they can have. Looking at the response of the most important actors in this case will help triangulate the data and thereby counterbalance the results of the previous analysis by discussing and reviewing the viability of the framework. As a result, analysing the response to the HBA, will serve to refine the framework.

The actors that are analysed in the concluding chapter are Cuba, China, the European Union the WTO and the United Nations which have been chosen for their role in the HBA (Cuba being on its receiving end), the World Order (with China being a viable contender for being the next hegemon), being an ally to the US (the EU) or being tasked with overseeing trade and fairness (the WTO and UN). The chapter will be wrapped up by a brief analysis of the US response to these actors’ reactions or lack thereof. The data that is analysed consists papers and reports from the WTO, UN, think thanks, as well as speeches from Fidel Castro. The Cuban response is mostly based on speeches from Fidel Castro as well as reports on the Cuban response. Due to a lack of availability of (English language) data from China, the Chinese response is mostly based on interactions between Cuba and China that took place after the implementation of the HBA. The data from the EU, WTO and UN is based on jurisprudence and policy documents.