Dieselgate : a (deviant) case study of European environmental regulations

(1)

Dieselgate: A (Deviant) Case Study of European Environmental

Regulations

Master Thesis

Political Science

International Relations Track

June 2019

Charlotte Raimbault 11624353 Research Project: New forms of governance: from the EU to the world?

Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan Zeitlin Second Reader: Dr. Tobias Arnoldussen

(2)

Acknowledgments

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Jonathan Zeitlin for his advice, feedback, and ideas. Dr. Zeitlin helped me to stay motivated and to refocus on the relevant information for this research to be interesting and academically pertinent. Without his support and comments, I might not have been able to write this thesis entirely.

Secondly, I would like to thank Dr. Tobias Arnoldussen for taking the time to assess this research.

Thirdly, I want to thank the persons I interviewed for their valuable insights and ideas that have been very constructive for this research.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents for making my studies possible. I will not be able to thank them enough for their time and patience, for the support they showed through the thesis-writing process, and for their invaluable advice. My friends and siblings also need to be thanked for their support and helpful comments on my work.

My studies, especially this thesis, have taught me a lot about what I want to do next, my goals and my limits. I am glad I have been able to finish them.

(3)

List of abbreviations

AAQ Ambient Air Quality

ACEA European Car Manufacturers’ Association CAFE Clean Air For Europe

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union CAC Command And Control

CARB California Air Resources Board CO2 Carbon Dioxide

DG Directorate-General

ECT Emission Control Technology EEA European Environmental Agency EEB European Environmental Bureau

ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organization

EU European Union

EP European Parliament

EPA Environmental Protection Agency GOG Group of the Greens

GROW (Refers to DG) Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship & Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

ICCT International Council on Clean Transportation JRC Joint Research Center

LEZ Low Emission Zone

MEP Member of European Parliament MBI Market Based Instrument

MS Member State

NAPCP National Air Pollution Control Programme NECD National Emission Ceilings Directive NEDC New European Driving Cycle

NGO Non-Governmental Organization NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide

NOx Nitrogen Oxide

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer PM Particulate Matters

RDE Real Driving Emissions TAA Type-Approval Authority US United States

VDA German Association of the Automotive Industry WLTP Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle Test Procedure WVTA Whole Vehicle Type-Approval System

(4)

Chapter 1 - Introduction

The environment is an issue on which each and every one of us has an impact. At a time where sustainable consumerism, organic food, and alternative modes of transportation are becoming more and more prominent, we understand that European citizens think about their effect on the environment and try to reduce it as much as possible. From the local level to the European level, institutions play a significant role in that process through policies, regulations, directives, and decisions. The environment and its protection are ever-growing topics at the European level. In the context of this thesis, we will focus particularly on air quality initiatives, at the local and the European Union (EU) level, as well as the type-approval system for new vehicles.

The reason for this focus lies in the subject of this research: Dieselgate. Before clarifying further the details of the choice of air quality initiatives and type-approval system, let us briefly explain what Dieselgate is. In September 2015, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), together with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) held Volkswagen accountable for bypassing the rules regarding air pollution. Indeed, it was shown that Volkswagen had installed software in their diesel-run cars, for its brands Volkswagen and Audi, that detected when cars were being reviewed for air pollution testing. That software set off a mechanism to limit pollutant gases during the test, hence allowing the cars to stay within the range required by public regulations. Once the test was over, this mechanism stopped, which meant that the real-life emissions of these cars were considerably higher than when tested (Bovens 2016, p. 262; Gardiner 2019; Le Monde 2015), up to 15 times the limit according to an official from DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (DG GROW) (interview, April 17th, 2019). Dieselgate, therefore, refers to this emission scandal that broke out in September 2015 in the United States (US), and that was later revealed to be existent in the EU as well.

(6)

Outline of this thesis

The subject of this thesis is the change in European policies in reaction to Dieselgate. This study has two objectives. The first is to understand the impact of a European-wide environmental crisis at the EU and the local levels. The second goal is to understand whether Dieselgate is a deviant case among European environmental regulations. To do so, this research is divided into seven chapters. After this introduction, the following chapter will focus on the theoretical framework, as well as a literature review of two topics: EU environmental regulations, and lobbying in relation to European policies. The goal of this chapter is to examine how the academic literature understands EU environmental regulations in a broader manner, but also to extract findings to test further in the research. The third chapter is dedicated to the methodology and methods. We will define the concepts of case study and process-tracing and their usefulness for this thesis. The data collection strategy, as well as the analytic strategy, will also be explained in detail. The methods, such as semi-structured interviews, will be justified. In the fourth chapter, we will start using process-tracing. Indeed, this chapter is devoted to understanding the type-approval system and air quality policies in the EU before Dieselgate in 2015. We will look into the historical evolution of these two issues in order to appreciate Dieselgate in its context. The fifth chapter, the unfolding of Dieselgate, will explain the evolution of this scandal, briefly reviewing its beginning in the US, and then going on to follow its different steps in the EU. The sixth chapter, following the layout of the fourth one for continuity, will analyze the changes in the type-approval system of vehicles in the EU after Dieselgate, as well as the new air quality initiatives introduced during the same period. The goal here is to understand the impact of the scandal at the EU level. We will also analyze an initiative by the municipality of Brussels to examine the importance of local policies on the air quality question. The seventh chapter will return to the findings found in the second chapter and test them, in order to understand if air quality and type approval for vehicles are deviant cases of the global EU environmental policies and regulations. With this analysis, the goal is to show that, even if the EU is often thought of as the standard setter in terms of environmental policies, the European regulatory

(7)

framework regarding environmental policies related to the automobile industry remains weak and does not live up to these high expectations.

Research question

The main research question of this project is the following: How and why did

European regulations concerning type-approval and air quality change following Dieselgate in 2015?

The following sub-research questions will guide the intermediary steps of the research.

● What were the EU policies for testing diesel engines and their emissions before Dieselgate?

● Why were these policies relatively weak compared to other environmental regulations in the EU?

● How did Dieselgate unfold in the EU?

● What has been the EU policy response? What roles have EU and local actors played in this process?

● What is the role of lobbying of European institutions when it comes to vehicle-related policy-making?

Relevance of this research

Why is this research relevant? Its pertinence is two-fold. The socio-political relevance lies in is focus on what can be seen as an environmental crisis that affected public policies in the European Union. This subject deserves more attention because it can show the impact of different institutions and interest groups on the EU political scene. This research also aims to bring out the paradoxical relationship between the type-approval system in place for vehicles and air pollution initiatives at the EU level. The actions taken by municipalities are another way to explain the consequences of this environmental crisis. Understanding the consequences of this scandal is essential for the

(8)

general public as they have a direct impact on the citizens’ everyday life at a more global level (EU), as much as at a local level.

The scientific relevance of the research relates to the theoretical framework we will analyze this situation through. Indeed, in order to focus particularly on the most critical discussions, only the main findings of the literature on EU environmental regulations and lobbying in the EU institutions will be extracted. We apprehend the literature to show that the EU is a standard setter in the area of environmental policies. We will set this finding in contrast with the type-approval system to put forward that regulations in the automotive industry supervision are rather lax. The case of Dieselgate will allow us to show this and may reveal the sector to be a deviant case, which would be another significant addition to the scientific literature.

The approach used is also relevant to scientific research. Indeed, because the goal of this thesis is to show how Dieselgate impacted the European regulations over time, a process-tracing methodology seems the most suitable. This will help us understand how the EU reacted to Dieselgate in terms of policies, as well as the repercussions on different levels of policies. Indeed, one can expect to show through this thesis that the local level has a greater involvement concerning the outcomes of Dieselgate than the global level.

This chapter has provided us with a general overview of the goal and relevance of this thesis. In the next chapter, we will analyze the literature on EU environmental regulations as well as the literature on lobbying in EU policies in order to set the theoretical framework for this research.

(9)

Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework

In the first chapter, the context of this thesis, as well as its relevance, research questions, and goals were set out. This second chapter focuses on the theoretical framework.

In the context of this research, the theoretical framework revolves around the literature on EU environmental regulations. The literature on lobbying and interest groups in EU policies will also be analyzed. The theoretical framework of this thesis is not premade in order to use only the most relevant findings of the literature in the analysis. Therefore, this chapter will be both a literature review and a theoretical foundation.

The goal of this chapter is to build a coherent theoretical framework to work with, as well as to place the research in a broader scientific debate, and define the main concepts that will be used further. In order to build a complete framework, the causal arguments of the literature previously mentioned are the starting points of this research.

European Union environmental regulation: literature review

Firstly, let us consider the literature on EU environmental regulation and its key findings, which will be tested in the seventh chapter of this thesis: the analysis of the effects of Dieselgate on EU environmental policies.

The European Union is widely viewed as a leader when it comes to environmental regulations. Kelemen & Vogel (2010, p. 443) state that “the European Union has adopted many of the world’s strictest, most ambitious standards.” They argue that “a regulatory politics model that links the effects of domestic politics and international regulatory competition provides the most powerful explanation for shifting US and EU positions in international environmental politics” (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 451). Indeed, they explain that the EU replaced the US as an international environmental leader in the 1990s. In the last decades, the EU has been more involved than the US in the expansion of international law and has ratified more international agreements (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 428). The authors also found that the more domestic politics were influenced by

(10)

environmentalists, the more their government will support new environmental policies. Their second finding explains that: “the stronger the domestic political influence of environmentalists, the more likely that stringent domestic standards will be adopted” (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 431). This relates to the influence of environmental groups in the policy-making process. Indeed, according to this finding, if environmentalist ideas have a strong representation on the political scene, the environmental standards will be stricter.

Kelemen & Vogel (2010) also analyze how the international regulatory competition played a role in that shift of positions between the EU and the US. According to them, “where domestic environmental forces are weaker and domestic standards laxer, domestic firms and governments have an economic interest in opposing international agreements that would force them to raise domestic standards” (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 451). This means that, in the case of the EU environmental regulations, EU-based firms, as well as Member States (MS) governments, would have to raise their standards if international agreements were adopted, in a context where the environmental forces and domestic standards are weak. Therefore, they have economic interests in opposing these international agreements. The authors explain that it can also be interesting for domestic firms, in this case, firms based in the EU, to favor international agreements so that the new restrictions apply to American firms as well, making the market more competitive (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 444).

Another finding in the EU environmental regulations literature depicting the EU as a leader in these regulations is the following one: Von Homeyer (2009, p. 1) explains that the EU “has also positioned itself as the world leader in the field of international environmental policy.” The EU environmental governance is affected by four factors: 1) environmental and economic conditions; 2) international political developments and commitments; 3) major changes of the EU polity - such as major Treaty changes and enlargement - and; 4) the interests and ideological orientations of certain actors (Von Homeyer 2009). This last point converges with one of Kelemen & Vogel’s arguments: certain actors, for instance, the European Commission (the Commission), the European

(11)

Parliament (EP), business associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), influence the EU’s environmental regulations. The first factor aforementioned, environmental and economic conditions, refers to the impact of economic considerations into environmental policy-making. We will see in the later in this literature review that this was, for example, the case after the 2008 financial crisis. The second point, international political developments and commitments, involves the necessity to consider supranational responsibilities, such as UN conferences, in policy-making. The third point can be linked to the second one. Indeed, it relates to EU-wide changes that have a direct impact on EU environmental regulations. Here, we can cite the Single European Act and the accession of new countries in the EU that affect environmental policies, as examples. Finally, the last factor mentioned by Von Homeyer, the interests and ideological orientations of certain actors, is certainly a point that is interesting in the context of this research. Indeed, as we will explain further in the second section of this chapter focusing on interest groups in the EU, this research seeks to understand how different interest groups have different impacts on EU policymakers, and, in the end, regulations and directives.

However, concerning the shift of positions between the EU and the US as environmental leaders, Wiener (2013, p. 260) explains that the US shows greater precaution than the EU since 1990 regarding automobile air pollution. Weimer (2013), reviewing Wiener’s book The Reality of Precaution, summarizes his findings as follows: “While Europe has been more precautionary than the US about some risks, the US has been more precautionary about other risks. The empirical analysis emphasizes the great diversity across risks and across policy domains on both sides of the Atlantic, which is found to have existed in both recent and older times”. In an article, Wiener & Rogers (2002, p. 342) add that “contrary to the conventional wisdom (based on a narrow sample), we find that across a broader range of cases the EU is not systematically more precautionary than the US. Nor have the US and EU ‘flip-flopped’ over time.” Therefore, the reality of the principle of precaution is qualified: the US or the EU can be more precautionary than the other depending on the field analyzed.

(12)

Skeete’s (2017) article highlights the role of policy design and policy interaction in EU automotive emissions performance gaps. This article is, therefore, extremely relevant in the context of this research and its focus on Dieselgate. He argues that “‘flexibilities’ within the EU’s emissions legislative framework afforded automakers the opportunity to legally sidestep strict performance standards laid out in the law and resulted in a significant performance gap in real world driving emissions” (Skeete 2017, p. 373). Indeed, automakers chose to exploit EU emissions regulations, and this became “best practice” among them, which leads the author to conclude that “stringent EU environmental regulations, if poorly designed, will be exploited by industry stake-holders” (Skeete 2017, p. 374). This links to what Skeete seeks to show: the importance of 1) the EU regulatory design of command and control (CAC) policy on Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions; and 2) the interaction between the aforementioned CAC policy and the EU Member States’ market-based instruments (MBIs), in the EU’s failure to implement real-world emissions targets for diesel vehicles (Skeete 2017, p. 374). MBIs “provide financial incentives to private firms and consumers in exchange for shifts in their behaviour (…), for example tax reductions, exemptions and bonus payments” (Skeete 2017, p. 374). This article shows that CAC policy on NOx and CO2 set goals that could not be met by the automobile industry with existing technologies. The objective of this type of policy is to encourage the industry to invest in research and development in order to meet the goals within the set period. This type of regulation is also known as technology-forcing regulation (Nentjes et al. 2007). Indeed, it is shown that “the absence of regulation (or presence of lax regulations) hampers innovation substantially” (Skeete 2017, p. 375). Therefore, it is essential for the regulator to set difficult-to-reach with the existing technologies goals to boost innovation on the market. Indeed, lax regulations have severe consequences “not only for environmental and human health, but at the regulatory level, it encourages a type of behaviour from firms that goes beyond what has generally been discussed in environmental policy literature” (Skeete 2017, p. 378). Regarding the coherence between CAC regulations and MBIs, Skeete finds that while CAC regulations seek to lower emissions, MBIs encourage consumers to buy diesel-run cars, although they emit four times more NOx and twenty-two times more particulate soot than petrol cars. The gap between these supervisions is

(13)

a “structural failure in the policy to enforce strict adherence by OEMs [Original Equipment Manufacturers]” (Skeete 2017, p. 378).

Arnoldussen (2019) argues that national governments have an impact on EU environmental regulations. Indeed, following Börzel’s introduction of the terms “laggard” and “leader” in EU environmental policy (2002), he explains that Member States can be either leaders, meaning that countries with advanced regulations are expected to push for more ambitious policies, or laggards, which is the case of countries that have less advanced regulations and are expected to stall policy development (Arnoldussen 2019, p. 208). The author takes the example of Germany, which operates as a leader state on climate issues, but as a laggard on the subject of green mobility (Arnoldussen 2019, p. 208). This is particularly relevant for Dieselgate, as the German car industry could have influenced Germany’s stance on the European policy scene (Arnoldussen 2019, p. 220). A country can, indeed, change its position depending on national interests: “domestic trouble can cause a traditional leader state to adopt the role of laggard” (Arnoldussen 2019, p. 214). In this research, we will, therefore, analyze Germany’s influence on air pollution regulations to understand its role.

Lenschow (2015) highlights the roles of the different European institutions in environmental regulation: the Commission, the Council of the European Union (Council), the EP, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are taken into consideration. The environmental interest groups are also analyzed, but we will come back to that point in the second section of this chapter.

For the Commission, the environmental policy represents some challenges. Indeed, it can be seen as a “horizontal” policy because it affects different economic sectors, from agriculture to transportation for example, and requires coordination between numerous Directorates-General (DGs) (Lenschow 2015, p. 324). The second challenge for the Commission is to be both the “motor of integration” and responsive to the Member States. Indeed, the position of the Commission as a supranational actor during the policy-formulation stage and its promotion of tough environmental rules put it in opposition to many MS, and to the Council. The Commission then faces national resistance for the

(14)

implementation of the rules it promotes, which is a complex position to hold (Lenschow 2015, p. 325-6).

The analysis of the Council, on the one hand, shows a significant point not yet tackled in this literature review: the cleavage between northern countries of the EU which are generally wealthier than southern countries of the EU. Three main reasons explain the complexity of the situation for the Council: 1) This gap is reflected in environmental regulations: richer countries are more likely to be concerned with environmental issues than poorer countries, while still protecting their core industries at the same time; 2) MS do not have the same national standards nor the same policy instruments; and, the most relevant in this context of this research, 3) the national changes impact the position of MS regarding European environmental regulations (Lenschow 2015, p. 327-8).

The EP, on the other hand, is the “greenest” of the European institutions mentioned so far. Indeed, Lenschow (2015, p. 328) explains that “the amendments submitted by the EP since 1999 have moderated, and that by striving for agreement in first reading the EP has become more pragmatic.” The EP’s position can be seen as more moderated because of the different committees within the institution, which share responsibility in preparing the EP’s position in the policy-making process (Lenschow 2015, p. 330). The EP has then become an increasingly attractive target for environmental lobby groups (Adelle & Anderson 2013, p. 156).

Finally, the CJEU also plays an important role in the establishment of the legitimacy of environmental measures at the EU level. While different from the other institutions, the responsibilities of the CJEU are fundamental and include the implementation and the enforcement of the policies in place. This institution is allowed to impose pecuniary sanctions in case of prolonged non-compliance or poor compliance from Member States. Therefore, we understand the importance of this institution when it comes to the implementation of the EU environmental regulations in different member states (Lenschow 2015, p. 330-1).

On the role of the Commission, Knill et al. (2018, p. 2) argue that “the decoupling of talk, decisions, and actions allows the European Commission to keep up its reputation as an environmental policy entrepreneur while, at the same time, pleasing member states’

(15)

preference for economic recovery and less environmental regulation.” They find that the European Commission has kept talking about environmental matters after the financial and economic crisis of 2008; however, it hesitated in adopting more ambitious environmental policies. Moreover, the Commission has been reluctant in forcing Member states to follow the policies in place. According to Knill et al. (2018, p. 13), the Commission acts as a hypocritical policy entrepreneur, which allows it to keep its reputation as a policy entrepreneur, while actually satisfying MS by putting their economic recovery from the 2008 crisis first, and environmental regulations second. This research will consider that finding in order to understand where the Commission stands regarding the automotive industry.

The Commission can be analyzed in two different ways. On the one hand, Lenschow (2015) sees the Commission as an institution that has to take the interests of different DGs into consideration while struggling to implement its supranational rule in MS. On the other hand, Knill et al. (2018) see the Commission as an actor that is reluctant in forcing MS to implement environmental policies because it prefers to focus on the MS’ economic interests.

Considering the different positions of the EU institutions, we will examine their role from the fourth chapter on, in order to grasp the potential disparities in their action towards EU environmental regulations.

European policies and interest groups: literature review

Secondly, this research also needs a literature review on lobbying and interest groups in EU policies in order to understand the implementation of environmental policies in a broader manner. Klüver (2012, p. 1114) emphasizes the central aim of interest groups: political influence. She reports that the Commission “has engaged in participatory engineering in an effort to use interest group inclusion to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU” (Klüver 2012, p. 1114). By looking for more democratic legitimacy, the Commission allows more space for various interest groups in its decision-making process. It is also the European institution which offers the most space to interest groups (Adelle & Anderson 2013, p. 156).

(16)

In a study on the impact of interest groups in EU environmental policy, Bunea (2013) defines three approaches in this literature. We can first distinguish an approach that argues that the EU institutions empower or disenfranchise interest groups: “institutions shape the structure of ‘incentives and constraints’ for actors and determine the demands decision-makers place on interest groups in return for influence” (Bunea 2013, p. 554). The idea consists in identifying that different EU institutions have different relations with interest groups. The second approach, however, places the importance of organizational resources and structural characteristics first: financial resources, expert knowledge, and field information affect lobbying success. Therefore, the influence of interest groups on policies depends on these factors. Finally, the third approach highlights the importance of the policy environment in which issues are decided upon. In other words, this approach focuses on the impact of counter-lobbies in the policy-making process and lobbying success. Bunea defines lobbying success as preference attainment (2013, p. 554). This definition will be useful in the seventh chapter of this thesis, the analysis, to assess and determine if interest groups linked to air pollution regulations in the EU were, indeed, successful, or not. We will also determine which of these three approaches is the most used in the scope of our research topic. Bunea (2013, p. 566) also shows that “preferences for further regulation were less likely to get translated into policy proposals than preferences for preserving the status quo.” She finds that “median preferences are more likely to translate into policy outcomes for two reasons”: 1) compromise solutions are more likely to be considered legitimate by stakeholders - and median preferences are more likely to be perceived as compromise solutions; 2) decision-makers find median preferences to be more credible information (Bunea 2013, p. 556).

Dür et al. (2015, p. 952) explain that policy outcomes do not often take into consideration business actors’ interests. They clarify: “Most legislative proposals in the EU concern market regulation, which is frequently opposed by a large majority of business actors. Therefore, business routinely faces a defensive battle from the moment the European Commission puts forward a proposal for new legislation” (Dür et al. 2015, p. 952). Business interests can be taken into consideration for numerous reasons: these actors have money and expertise, which can be influential in getting access to political decision-makers, or favorable policy decisions (Dür et al. 2015, p. 955). This lines up with

(17)

the second approach identified by Bunea (2013), aforementioned. Concerning the influence of money, Dür et al. analyze that “in capitalist systems, including the EU and its member states, major investment decisions are usually private, public officials have incentives to accommodate business preferences over policy” (2015, p. 955), which explains how money from businesses can impact the EU’s regulations. However, and it is one of Dür et al.’s arguments, countervailing forces are particularly successful in contemporary EU politics (2015, p. 955). Their analysis show that the lobbying of citizen groups balances out the lobbying of business groups (Dür et al. 2015, p. 974), but also that “policy outcomes in the EU tend to be a compromise between citizen groups, the European Commission, and the European Parliament on one side and most member states and business interests on the other” (Dür et al. 2015, p. 975). In this research, we will tackle the question of the importance of business interests in European policies. To pick up on Arnoldussen’s idea (2019), set out in the first section, we will analyze the role of the car industry in influencing European environmental policies.

Skeete (2017, p. 374) explains that “firms have been known to lobby regulators in order to delay or rescind a standard because firms typically possess more ‘information’ about their own technological information asymmetry by hiding their true innovative capabilities, underinvest in R&D and claim that regulatory targets cannot be met.” The author shows here the significant impact of businesses on regulators: they influence regulations by explaining they lack the abilities to reach the regulators’ initial goals. Grant (2013, p. 176) notes that “businesses often have the resources to invest in acquiring and communicating credible information.”

Kelemen & Vogel (2010) note that the influence of environmental lobbies strengthened in the 1990s in the EU. As a result, the EU took action by establishing new pollution control laws. The citizens played a significant role in that shift: at the beginning of the 1990s, a study showed that 77.6% of citizens viewed environmental problems as “very serious,” making it one of the top-ranking political issues in all EU member states. In order to be in line with the concerns of its citizens, numerous governments started adopting stricter environmental standards and showed more commitment to international environmental cooperation (Kelemen & Vogel 2010, p. 441-2). In that sense, the citizens

(18)

of the European Union can be considered an interest group having a serious influence on the environmental policies of the EU (Dür et al. 2015, p. 952). Other significant interest groups comprise domestic green pressure groups or parties. Kelemen & Vogel find that “the more powerful the influence of domestic green pressure groups or parties, the more stringent domestic regulatory standards are likely to become, and therefore the more likely domestic firms will support comparable international standards to create a level playing field” (2010, p. 444).

Lenschow (2015, p. 332) also contributes to the literature on interest groups in the EU, especially Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs). Almost all ENGOs seek to be consulted during policy-formulation phases of environmental regulations. These organizations can bring valuable insights to the Commission: the national ENGOs inform the Commission of any gaps in implementation that are found at the MS level. Environmental lobby groups play a significant role in the policy process: they can influence standards, help select policy instruments as well as act as watchdogs in the implementation of environmental policies (Adelle & Anderson 2013, p. 165).

However, it is important to take Klüver’s (2012) findings into consideration regarding the impacts of different interest groups in the Commission’s policy-making process. While it is clear that “EU lobby groups are now thought to have an important role in linking the EU institutions to European citizens and thereby enhance their democratic credentials” (Adelle & Anderson 2013, p. 155), a significant point identified by Klüver is that companies and European groups are not necessarily more successful in lobbying the Commission than national groups (Klüver 2012, p. 1128). Moreover, no bias was found in lobbying success across interest group type: the nature of the interest and the organizational form do not influence lobbying success in the Commission policy formulation stage (Klüver 2012, p. 1130). Therefore, “different organized interests are equally able to effectively participate in European policy-making” (Klüver 2012, p. 1131). Still, it is shown that the bigger the lobbying coalition that an interest group belongs to, the higher the probability of succeeding in lobbying the Commission during the policy formulation stage (2012, p. 1128). Klüver’s findings correspond to Dür et al.’s (2015) findings presented earlier in this section. Indeed, they both agree on the fact that all

(19)

interest groups have a chance to balance each other out. This thesis will, therefore, determine how lobbying in automobile-related EU regulations stands compared to these findings.

Conclusion

To summarize, the main findings of this chapter that will be our points of focus from the fourth chapter on, are the following.

From the literature on EU environmental regulations, we understood that “the EU undoubtedly has become an important actor in international environmental policy and is able to set the agenda through ambitious internal policies” (Lenschow 2013, p. 341). We will consider Kelemen & Vogel’s finding (2010, p. 431) stating that “the stronger the domestic political influence of environmentalists, the more likely that stringent domestic standards will be adopted.” We will also test Knill et al.’s argument (2018, p. 13) that the Commission behaves as a hypocritical policy entrepreneur when it comes to environmental regulations. Arnoldussen (2019) also explained that domestic interests can influence EU’s regulations. Therefore, we will analyze the importance of the German car industry on the EU air pollution regulations.

From the literature on European policies and interest groups, we understood the importance of interest groups in policy-making at the EU-level. In this research, we will determine which of the three approaches identified by Bunea (2013) is the most relevant in the case of Dieselgate and air pollution regulations. We will also tackle the influence of the interest groups in the Commission decision-making process regarding the automobile industry and air pollution regulations in order to assess lobbying success in that area (Bunea 2013). Dür et al. (2015), as well as Skeete (2017), emphasized the role of business as an interest group. We will, therefore, establish the role of this group in air pollution regulations. Finally, Klüver (2012) argued that all interest groups have equal chances in influencing EU institutions. The crucial difference, however, is the size of the lobbying coalition to which an interest group belongs. In the context of this research, we will analyze to what extent this argument is true when it comes to air pollution regulations and Dieselgate.

(20)

The study of the importance of interest groups in this area of European policy-making is particularly adequate for which to use a process-tracing methodology.

The next chapter explains in detail the research design of this research, as well as the methodology and methods used. It will further present process-tracing, the data collection strategy, together with the analytic strategy of this thesis.

(21)

Chapter 3 - Methodology

In the previous chapter, we reviewed where the literature on European environmental regulations and the literature on lobbies in the EU stand on these topics. We extracted their main findings in order to build a theoretical framework to be tested later in this research. This chapter answers the question of how we will do so.

Indeed, this chapter on methodology and methods will go in details regarding how we will conduct this research. Firstly, we will explain what a case study is and its relevance. Secondly, we will explain what process-tracing is as a methodology. Thirdly, the focus will turn to the methods used: the data collection strategy, document analysis, and semi-structured interviews. The goal of this chapter is to explain how this research will be conducted in the following chapters.

Case study

What is a case study? According to Vennesson (2008, p. 226), “a case study is a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations.” In this research, we will focus on an interpretive case study, because the goal is to show through a theoretical framework how one specific case, Dieselgate, had an impact on EU policies (Vennesson 2008, p. 227). The specificity of an interpretive case study is that it “uses theoretical frameworks to provide an explanation of particular cases, which can lead as well to an evaluation and refinement of theories” (Vennesson 2008, p. 227), which coincides with what we aim to do. Della Porta (2008, 207; Flyvberg 2011, p. 301) explains that case-based logic implies a thick description of one case, on several dimensions. She further notes that this type of case study explores a large number of characteristics but has limited interest in generalization. However, the temporal dimension is explained to be useful in order to build narratives of processes, in a case-based logic (Della Porta 2008, p. 207). Therefore, this combines well with a process-tracing methodology. Throughout this research, only Diesel passenger cars will be investigated

(22)

as the focus of this thesis. We need to note that Della Porta (2008, p. 210) mentions that “case studies are considered useful mainly for the falsification of hypotheses or their specification through the analysis of deviant cases.”

What is a deviant case study? A deviant case study is one that shows the theory developed so far does not apply to that particular case. Flyvberg (2011, p. 305) argues that “deviant cases and the falsifications they entail are main sources of theory development, because they point to the development of new concepts, variables, and causal mechanisms, necessary in order to account for the deviant case and other cases like it.” In this research, we expect to show that Dieselgate is a deviant case in the European environmental regulatory regime, because, in contrast to the reputation of the EU as a standard-setter in that area, European emissions regulations are somewhat lax and allow the automobile industry to bypass some key rules.

Process tracing

For this research, we chose to work with a particular form of within-case analysis: process tracing. What does this consist of? George & Bennett (2005, p. 6) explain process-tracing as follows: “In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesized or implied in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case”. This same idea of examination of many different sources of qualitative data is also mentioned by Checkel. Indeed, he explains that “process tracing appears to be at odds with interpretive approaches even though it relies on similar types of qualitative data, such as historical memoirs, expert surveys, interviews, press accounts, and documents” (Checkel 2006, p. 363). As these definitions show, process tracing implies the reconstruction of a question over time.

Process tracing also consists of an in-depth description, as Collier (2011, p. 823) writes: “careful description is a foundation of process tracing (...) Process tracing inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described”. He

(23)

continues: “to characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the process” (Collier 2011, p. 824). The author shows the importance of description in this methodology; we will, therefore, have a deep understanding of the situation in chapter four to six to follow process tracing thoroughly.

Moreover, process tracing also has the goal to identify causal mechanisms. A causal mechanism is defined by Glennan (1996, p. 52) as a “complex system which produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts.” Globally, we can say that “process- tracing methods can be defined by their ambition to trace causal mechanisms” (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013, p. 2). This research does not, however, try to assess the causal mechanism behind Dieselgate: the goal is rather to understand how Dieselgate affected EU environmental policy. Consequently, we seek to understand whether this case is a focusing event. A focusing event is defined by Birkland (1998, p. 54) as “an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously”. These events attract the attention of different actors: interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the news media, and the mass public. Focusing events change dominant issues on the agenda if the policy domain is well organized. In this research, we will look for evidence showing whether Dieselgate is, indeed, a focusing event.

According to Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013, p. 11), there are three different types of process tracing: theory-testing, theory-building, and case explaining. In the first type, theory-testing, the researcher hypothesizes a causal mechanism and evaluates whether evidence shows this link in several cases. The second type, theory-building, “involves building a theory about a causal mechanism between X and Y that can be generalized to a population of a given phenomenon, starting from a situation where we are in the dark regarding the mechanism” (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013, p. 11). Finally, case explaining process-tracing seeks to explain the outcome of a case. This thesis identifies with theory-building and case explaining process-tracing because we want to understand what makes our case different.: we aim to understand the mechanism of this case.

(24)

For all of these reasons, process tracing looks like a very suitable methodology for this research. Indeed, it is relevant for this thesis because it will show, first, the existing regulations before Dieselgate. Then, it will help explain how Dieselgate unfolded, step by step. Finally, process tracing will be useful to see the policy outcomes of the Dieselgate crisis in the EU and to understand its direct impacts. Collier (2011, p. 824) explains that the evolution of events is precisely what process tracing can help achieve: “as a tool of causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events, or situations over

time [emphasis in text].” According to the aforementioned definitions, this research will

use interviewing, as well as interpretative analysis of EU policies and EU official documents. In order to triangulate the findings of this research, grey and academic literature will also be used.

To summarize, “process tracing is a fundamental element of empirical case study research because it provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them” (Vennesson 2008, p. 233).

It is important here to briefly mention confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson 1998, p. 175). In this research, even if we think beforehand that Dieselgate is a deviant case in European environmental policies, we will keep in mind throughout the process that it is possible Dieselgate is a regular case of EU policies and does not show any specific particularities. Even if concluding that Dieselgate is a typical case might make this thesis less academically relevant, it is crucial not to fall in the confirmation bias. Therefore, we will keep an open mind, notably during interviews, to make sure to take into consideration all aspects of the interviewees' opinions, and not only what goes in the direction of our hypothesis.

Methods and strategies

This section will help us determine which methods will be used in this research. These methods refer to the concrete actions in order to apply the chosen methodology:

(25)

process-tracing. First, let us consider the interviews. In this research, it is essential to conduct interviews for several reasons: it is part of process-tracing, but it is also useful to triangulate our findings. Triangulation is the practice of “using different sources of data. This includes different times for data collection, difference places from which to collect the data, and different people who could be involved in the research study” (Wilson 2014, p. 74). This prevents one source from being too prominent in the research, which could result in a significant bias. The interviews organized for this research are semi-structured, which means some questions are written before the interviews take place, but others arise as the interview is being conducted. Semi-structured interviews allow building upon an idea put forward by an interviewee. It is, for example, useful to follow up on an opinion or a concept mentioned by the interviewee, which we did not expect to be important or relevant. To make the most of the time interviewees dedicated to this research and the most relevant information, the questions are tailored to each of the interviewee’s role and background

For this research, it seemed relevant to interview experts in the field of EU environmental regulations, such as people working at the European Commission in DG environment and DG GROW. Journalists who wrote about Dieselgate can also be engaging because they are able to provide more information about which policies to look into, as well as giving more details on the unfolding of Dieselgate, the fifth chapter of this thesis. To make sure this research takes into consideration different view, we also contacted people from think tanks, and, to get more information on the role of local actors, people working at the municipality of Brussels were contacted because they took action concerning Diesel-run engines. Three interviews were conducted in the scope of this thesis.

Second, the data collection strategy needs to be explained. In the scope of this research, the data consists of academic and grey literature, EU directives and texts, interviews, and journalistic articles. The first interviews conducted helped to find relevant EU directives and texts, as well as pertinent academic literature. Some people who did not have time for an interview also recommended articles and policies to look into.

(26)

Moreover, the references used by academic articles were also considered to take into consideration all related literature that could be interesting for this research. The website of the European Commission, as well as EUR-Lex, was also extremely useful in the scope of this research.

Finally, let us take a closer look at the analytic strategy of this thesis. After defining the arguments to test in the previous chapter, we will test them all in the seventh chapter. Our goal is to define whether Dieselgate follows the findings of the literature. To do so, we will mainly focus on document analysis. Indeed, as explained by Bowen (2009, p. 29), “document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative analysis.” Documents allow us to understand the context and background but can also be useful for verification purposes (Bowen 2009, p. 30).

After analyzing the broader context of Dieselgate through the EU environmental regulations literature, we will also try to determine the role of different actors on the EU type-approval system and air quality initiatives. Throughout this research and with all the methods we will use, we will analyze the role of the car industry, MS, EU institutions, lobby groups, and NGOs to have a deeper understanding of who influenced the policy-making processes.

Conclusion

To summarize, this chapter set out the methodology that will be used in the next four chapters. The methodology chosen for this research is process tracing; it consists of analyzing different sources to possibly show a causal mechanism, or a focusing event, in a case study. It will allow us to follow thoroughly the evolution of type-approval systems, as well as air quality initiatives at the EU-level.

This research is a case study, which is an in-depth investigation of a specific example that implies a thick description of the case. We expect to show that the policies related to Dieselgate are a deviant case of environmental regulation in the EU. A deviant

(27)

case is one that shows the theory developed so far does not apply to that particular case. However, we need to be careful not to have a confirmation bias.

This chapter also explained the methods used in this research, especially: semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis of EU policies, documentary analysis of academic articles. The data collection strategy was also explained; it consists of accumulating relevant EU policies, directives, and initiatives, but also interviews. Finally, we presented the analytic strategy, that will aim to show if

The following chapter, the overview of the policies before Dieselgate, will provide us with the historical evolution of the type-approval system in the EU, as well as this same progression in air quality initiatives before 2015.

(28)

Chapter 4 - Overview of EU policies before Dieselgate

The previous chapter discussed the research design of this research, explaining in detail the process-tracing methodology used, as well as the focus on a case study. In this chapter, we start using process tracing. Indeed, we will examine the air pollution regulations before 2015, the year Dieselgate occurred.

We will first explain the historical evolution of the type-approval system for Diesel passenger cars, up until September 2015. In the second section, the focus will be on the evolution of air pollution regulation until Dieselgate occurred.

The goal of this chapter is to reach a deep understanding of the type-approval and air quality regulation in the EU before September 2015. This chapter is the first step in an approach aimed at helping us understand the impact of Dieselgate in European regulation.

Historical evolution of the type-approval system

In the first part of this chapter, we will focus on the type-approval system in the EU. Therefore, let us start by defining this term. The Commission explains it as such: “a manufacturer can obtain certification for a vehicle type in one EU country and market it EU-wide without further tests. The certification is issued by a type-approval authority and the tests are carried out by the designated technical services” (European Commission [2019c]). Therefore, when a manufacturer seeks to have a vehicle approved to run on European roads, it has to be tested in one of the EU’s Member States. The vehicle is then automatically approved in all of the EU Member States.

It is this system whose historical evolution we want to explain. The table below outlines the limits set by the different directives regulating emissions. This table shows a clear wish of the EU legislator to reduce the emission standards over the years and directives.

(29)

Emission standard Directive Implementation date Carbon monoxide (CO) mg/km Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) mg/km Particulate matters (PM) mg/km Euro 1 91/441/EEC 1992 2720-3160 - 140-180 Euro 2

94/12/EC & 96/69/EC 1996 1000 - 80-100

Euro 3

98/69/EC 2000 640 500 50

Euro 4

98/69/EC & 2002/80/EC 2005 500 250 25

Euro 5

EC No 715/2007 2009 500 180 5

Euro 6

EC No 715/2007 2014 500 80 5

Table 2: EU emission standards for Diesel passenger cars (Landgrebe 2008, p. 19). This table shows the emissions limits of emissions cars have to respect, but we need to understand how these emissions are measured. The NEDC, the New European Driving Cycle, is the test that manufacturers seeking certification for their new cars have to go through. The NEDC is “a standardised and repeatable procedure in which all new cars are subjected to an identical “test cycle” – essentially a predictable sequence of stresses placed on the vehicle's engine under fixed conditions” (Palmer & Schwanen 2019, p. 239). This test, designed in the 1980s, takes place in a laboratory. It is a single test cycle that lasts for 11 kilometers and 20 minutes, for an average speed of 34 km/h. The maximum speed tested is 120km/h. The values are collected at temperatures of 20-30°C. The test comprises two driving phases: 66% urban and 34% non-urban driving. Optional equipment and its impact on CO2 and fuel performance are not taken into

(30)

consideration, and vehicles have fixed gear shift points (ACEA n.d). This test was rather simple, straightforward, and predictable.

However, who tests the car in this procedure? “In most Member States the national type-approval authority (TAA) does not have in-house testing facilities, so it designates the technical service(s) allowed to test prototypes on its behalf” (European Commission n.d). The TAA designate technical services – laboratories – to test and inspect new car models (Europe Nu n.d). In this system, car manufacturers directly pay the technical services, which can be seen as a conflict of interest (European Commission n.d). De Carbonnel & Lewis (2016) define this system as “cosy relations between carmakers and the laboratories.” Indeed, this system could potentially lead the laboratories to overlook above-limit emissions because they are dependent on revenues from car manufacturers. Moreover, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, once a car is approved by a technical service designated by a TAA, it is automatically approved in every MS. As Teffer (2015b) notes, this system allows carmakers to choose the most lax technical services to approve their new car models. The structure of the type-approval system is, therefore, deeply flawed because it cannot guarantee the impartiality of testing services.

It is important to note that cars were not tested under any on-the-road real driving conditions. Therefore, the human factor, the fact that a human being is driving a car, was not taken into consideration during these laboratory-based tests. The accuracy of this procedure was already known by the EP to be lax:

Before September 2015 the discrepancies were generally attributed to the inadequacy of the NEDC laboratory test, which is not representative of real-world emissions, and to the optimisation strategies put in place by car manufacturers to pass the laboratory test by calibrating vehicles’ ECTs [Emission Control Technologies] so that their effectiveness is only ensured within the boundary conditions of the NEDC test. The discrepancies were generally not attributed to the possible use of prohibited defeat devices (EP 2017, 5; Degraeuwe & Weiss 2017, p. 234).

(31)

In 2007 already, the EP started discussions for real-driving emissions tests to be implemented, followed in 2010 by a presentation of the Commission’s JRC in 2010 (Teffer 2016). However, as we will see further, these tests were not implemented before 2017.

According to the EP and the Council, “the EU type-approval legal framework is appropriate for achieving the main goals of harmonisation, effective operation of the internal market and fair competition. However, it was also recognised that differences in interpretation and strictness in application of the requirements across Member States are reducing the effectiveness of the framework” (European Parliament and the Council 2016, p. 2). This point was confirmed in an interview with a DG GROW official who explained: “the rule was clear, was there. The industry chose to ignore what was written there (...), that had nothing to do with how the rules were written” (DG GROW official, interview, April 17th, 2019).

In 2013, the Commission very briefly noted that “investigation and repression of some of the possible causes of these deviations (poor maintenance, cycle beating at certification, aftermarket defeat devices that eliminate or bypass pollution reduction equipment) should also be enforced, as this would allow to reduce emissions from high emitters without waiting for a new generation of vehicles to enter into service” (European Commission 2013a, p. 3). We understand through this note in the Commission’s Communication that the possibility of car manufacturers using defeat devices was recognized, already back in 2013. In 2011, the Commission’s Joint Research Center (JRC) also emitted the idea that defeat devices were being used in cars (Weiss et al. 2011). We will come back to that point in detail in the next chapter, but this alert by the JRC shows that this EU authority also had the capacity to test vehicles for emissions. Therefore, the technical services designated by the TAA were not the only authority able to conduct these tests. This calls into question the awareness of the EU regarding defeat devices.

To summarize, the type-approval system in place when Dieselgate happened, was circumventable by the industry, even though it should not have been. The tests were not

(32)

very accurate, and the Commission knew about it. The fact that defeat devices were being used is seen as one of the options by the Commission, among other possibilities.

Historical evolution of EU air quality regulation

Before Dieselgate, the EU had put in place several measures to restrain air pollution. The goal of this section is to reach a deep understanding of the evolution of these regulations. For reasons of length, we will not explain the air quality initiatives before 2005, ten years before Dieselgate, because their explanation would be lengthy and their relevance minor, in the context of this thesis.

In 2005, the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution had the goal to attain “levels of air quality that do not give rise to significant negative impacts on, and risks to human health and the environment” (European Commission 2005, p. 4). To do so, the Strategy proposed the streamlining of existing provisions and merging of five legal instruments into a single directive, as well as the introduction of new air quality standards for fine particulate matter in the air (European Commission 2005, p. 5). It sought to lighten the administrative burden to enable MS to overcome difficulties in complying with the current rules (European Commission 2005, p. 6). This Strategy allows MS to ask for an extension to the deadline for compliance if they are able to demonstrate that they have taken all reasonable measures (European Commission 2005, p. 7). However, it also established more intensive monitoring in MS to control human exposure to fine particles (European Commission 2005, p. 7) and recognized that air quality needs to be integrated through other policy areas, like energy, transport, and agriculture (European Commission 2005, p. 8-10). This Strategy was created with the help of a Steering Group that gave a voice to countries and stakeholders in the regulatory process. It is important to note, however, that the industry was not a stakeholder in this group. The participants of the Steering Group had both a policy and expert role, which allowed the MS, for example, to give their country’s opinion before the negotiation started (Tuinstra 2007, p. 437). AirClim, a Swedish project bringing together five Swedish environmental organizations, explained that, while it saw some improvements in this Strategy, it is without a doubt that significant damage from air pollution would remain in 2020 (AirClim 2006). For these reasons, we

(33)

can think the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution was a step in the right direction in 2005, but not stringent enough to actively fight air pollution.

In 2008, the EP and the Council released the Ambient Air Quality (AAQ) Directive (2008/50/EC), which “followed a new approach by combining strictly binding environmental targets with considerable leeway for the selection of air-quality measures and for the concrete allocation of competences between different levels of government” (Lenschow 2015, p. 337). The AAQ Directive is to be taken into consideration with the Directives 2004/107/EC and 2008/1/EC, which are also related to air pollution, but not directly to the subject of this thesis as they focus more on, respectively, chemical elements in ambient air and integrated pollution in industrial production. The AAQ Directive, however, establishes “cost-effective targets for improving human health and environmental quality up to 2020” (EUR-Lex 2015). It also sets limit values for pollutants like nitrogen dioxide, NO2, which are linked to NOx. The Ambient Air Quality Directive requires MS to assess the quality of air regularly in order to adapt the MS’ activities to match the limits and targets set by the Directive; MS are responsible for monitoring, reporting and managing their national air quality (ClientEarth et al. [2018], p. 1). ClientEarth and other environmental NGOs, while being rather positive about the AAQ Directive see the implementation of this Directive as a failure. Indeed, they explain that the “failure to deliver specific expected outcomes of the AAQ Directives has mostly been due to Member States’ inabilities to properly implement and apply the Directives, rather than flaws in the Directives themselves” (ClientEarth et al. [2018], p. 1). However, it was not the case of all MS. As Arnoldussen (2019, p. 215) explains, the Netherlands, for example, realizing that it would not have enough time to comply with the standards of the new directive, lobbied to gain more time. It was successful in its strategy: “Dutch MEPs [Members of European Parliament] together with an active German Christian democrat MEP, managed to include an amendment which made sure member states could postpone compliance for another 5 years” (Arnoldussen 2019, p. 215). Despite the efforts from certain MS to attain the goals of this Directive, Wilde (2010, 2 p. 90) considers the Directive to be a “disappointment” because it does not define new ecological standards, nor does it add anything radically new to existing policies, expect concerning

(34)

microparticles. Overall, this Directive calls for reserved conclusions: the regulations on microparticles are highly relevant, but the implementation in MS is weak.

In 2013, the Commission adopted the Clean Air Policy package. It comprised three key elements (European Commission 2013b, p. 1): a revised version of the Clean Air for Europe programme (CAFE) to replace the one from 2001, a revised National Emission Ceilings Directive (NECD), and the new Directive to reduce pollution from medium-sized combustion installations. The relevance of this last component is negligible in the context of this thesis, we will, therefore, not explore it any further. However, the first two components of the 2013 Clean air policy package are extremely relevant for this research. Let us first focus on the new CAFE. The report establishing this programme states that “the ongoing substantial breaches of air quality standards can be resolved in the short to medium term by effective implementation of existing EU legislation, notably on emissions from light-duty diesels” (European Commission 2013a, p. 3). CAFE, therefore, pursues two priorities: to achieve full compliance with existing legislation by 2020 at the latest and to set a pathway for the EU to meet the long-term objective (European Commission 2013a, p. 6), up to 2030. It includes “supporting measures to improve air quality in cities, support to research and innovation, and the promoting of international cooperation” (AirClim 2018).

Secondly, the NECD needs to be considered. It “aims to limit emissions of acidifying and eutrophying pollutants and ozone precursors in order to improve the protection of human health and the environment and to achieve the prescribed ambient air quality standards” (Landgrebe 2008, p. 16). This measure is important in the context of this research because it impacts the NOx. Therefore, we understand that this pollutant is not only tackled through the emission directives, as seen in the first section of this chapter, but also through other areas of air quality regulations, which indicates a true desire from the EU to decrease the amount of this pollutant found in the air. However, the new NECD is subject to criticism. Indeed, as AirClim, ClientEarth and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) explain, this directive lacks ambition: most MS will reach the new 2020 goals simply by implementing the already existing legislation, and some

Dieselgate : a (deviant) case study of European environmental regulations