Climate-conflict and peacebuilding in Mali : a document analysis on how climate change has been integrated into MINUSMA

Abstract - In the last decades, scholars have proposed several theories how climate change will influence conflict. It is argued that climate change can lead to volatile food prices, irregular rain-fall, droughts and forced migration, and therefore stimulate conflict. This seems especially true in vulnerable post-conflict situations where states do not have the institutions and resources to cope with these consequences of climate change. The UN has adopted new policy concerning the security aspect of climate change and has appointed an Environmental Officer in the United Na-tions Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to cope with en-vironmental issues in Mali. However, some scholars argue that the integration is still insufficient and policy concerning climate change should be integrated more thoroughly in peacebuilding processes. To research how environmental issues related to climate change have been integrated in MINUSMA, a document analysis is conducted on the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (AFPCM) benchmarks, the MINUSMA Secretary-General reports and an analysis of MI-NUSMA camps made by the International Peace Institute (IPI). Findings show that the mission manages its mission’s impact on the Malian environment, what can improve the recipiency of the mission and it limits damage to the communities local ecosystem. However, climate change is not formulated as a matter that threatens the maintenance of peace or security in Mali and no long-term objectives have been formulated related to the consequences of climate change. More integration of climate change policy in peacebuilding processes should be made, if peacebuilding missions aims to not only deter violence but also to build sustainable development of post-con-flict areas.

Climate-Conflict and Peacebuilding in Mali

A document analysis on how climate change has been integrated into MINUSMA

Thesis BSc. Political Science

June 25, 2018

7724 words

Author:

Christiaan van de Weijer

Student number:

10560505

Supervisor:

dr. Jana Krause

Second reader:

dr. Nel Vandekerckhove

Table of contents

Abstract

i

1 Introduction

1

2 Conceptual

Framework

2

3 State

of

Literature

4

3.1

Academic

Literature 4

3.2 Instutionalization of environmental issues in the UN

7

4 Choice

of

case

8

4.1 The Sahel region and MINUSMA

8

4.2

Status

quo

in

Mali

10

5 Method 12

6 Results 13

6.1

Secretary-General

reports

13

6.2

AFPCM

benchmarks

16

6.3

IPI

case

study

17

7 Discussion

18

8 Conclusion

20

Abbreviations

22

References

22

1 Introduction

Peacebuilding is a complex process where many factors have to be taken into account if a success-ful transition from conflict to peace is pursued. Not only political or military factors determine the outcome of a peacebuilding operation, but also economic, geographical and social factors can be determinant. Recently, there has emerged a fast growing bulk of literature linking peacebuild-ing to climate change. This connection may not seem self-evident, but academics are now empha-sizing that climate change can be the cause of conflict (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug & Buseth, 2012) and therefore should also be taken into account in peacebuilding processes (Matthew, 2014a; Matthew, 2014b). Due to the advocacy of these academics and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Multidimensional Inte-grated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has appointed an Environmental Officer whose task is to examine the environmental conditions in Mali, consider the mission’s impact and man-age the conditions in accordance with the UN rules and regulations. This thesis will investigate how environmental issues related to climate change have been integrated into MINUSMA. The research question thus sounds: ‘How have environmental issues related to climate change been integrated into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali?’

The motivation to study this topic is twofold. On the one hand, it has been argued that climate change can be or already is a cause of conflict, and examining this process can help peacebuilding processes. On the other hand, I believe climate change, irrespective of its political consequences, is the greatest modern challenge we face. However, it is reasonable to assume that conflicts in which climate change plays a role will rather increase than decrease. Integrating studies regarding climate change in new spheres of academic research can hopefully help raise awareness.

This analysis will be academically relevant because there is as yet a paucity of literature regarding how climate change is integrated into peacebuilding missions of the UN, and none specifically with respect to the Mali mission. Last but not least, this analysis will be relevant because the UN mission is still ongoing and evaluating the UN’s organizational innovation can foster the peace-building process and help achieve sustainable peace.

By drawing on articles on the linkage between climate change and peacebuilding, a conceptual framework will be provided. In the framework multiple pathways from climate change to con-flict are identified. Moreover, a proposal on how peacebuilding should integrate environmental issues related to climate change is examined. Hereafter, the state of literature will be revised and the thesis will be positioned in the academic debate. To answer the question how environmental issues related to climate change have been integrated into MINUSMA, a document analysis will be conducted on internal and external rapports of the mission in Mali. After presenting the re-sults, possible flaws of the thesis will be discussed and recommendations for further research will be suggested. The thesis concludes that MINUSMA solely focusses on the environmental impact of its operations in Mali. By doing this they try not to aggravate the environmental conditions and this can have positive effects for the legitimacy of the mission. However, MINUSMA does not integrate climate change in long-term peacebuilding plans and hereby does not acknowl-edge the security threat climate change can pose in Mali. More integration should be pursued in future peacebuilding missions if the UN aims to rebuild societies and build towards sustainable development in post-conflict areas. To achieve more in-depth integration of environmental issues related to climate change in peacebuilding operations, the mandate of UN peace missions should be reviewed.

2 Conceptual Framework

An increasing bulk of theories argue that climate change can have a causal effect on conflict (Ho-mer-Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Benjaminsen et al., 2012). One prominent theory argues that environmental stress, due to climate change, leads to migration and resource scarcity (Gleditsch et al., 2007). Gletditsch et al. continue by stating that migration can lead to social tension, declines in living standards and growing inequalities. These factors themselves do not necessarily lead to conflict, but they may trigger it when ‘combined with lack of representative institutions, economic redistribution mechanisms, and poor state capacity to deter violence, present the greatest risk of conflict’ (Gleditsch et al., 2007, p. 5). Unfortunately, conflict and post-conflict areas usually are deficient in state capacity or representative institutions. These areas are also more vulnerable because of their reliance on climate sensitive sectors like ag-riculture. If climate change factors hinder incomes from agriculture, this would prevent long term planning and household level provisioning. The most frequently predicted reactions of climate

change are the changes in rainfall patterns, resulting in more droughts and floods, extreme and unpredictable weather, a rise in sea-level and a temperature rise with heavy impact on the poten-tial for agriculture (Gleditsch et al., 2007, p. 2). If poor agricultural households get punished the most by climate change, this would be most problematic: ‘people and societies with poor finances and technical ability are less likely to be able to meet the challenge of climate change’ (Gleditsch et al., 2007, p. 3).

Peacebuilding is a post-conflict process and is therefore easily undermined by any destabilizing factors. This is why Matthew (2014a) argues that climate change should be integrated into peace-building, as it could be a factor determining its failure or success. He states that current UN mis-sions should not only be concerned with peacebuilding as capacity building for a state and society, but also with ‘identifying and delivering the technical and non-technical capacities that a country lacks and that are needed as the platform for recovery, stability and sustainable development’ (Matthew, 2014a, p. 85). In terms of sustainable development, it is necessary to integrate envi-ronmental policy related to climate change. Matthew points in which areas integration of climate change into peacebuilding should be done: ‘Socio-economic recovery, Politics and governance, Security and rule of law, and Human rights’ (Matthew, 2014a, p. 91). For example, peacebuild-ing should identify areas vulnerable to climate related disasters and dedicate response programs to ensure successful security and rule of law enforcement. Likewise, peacebuilding operations should asses vulnerability of agricultural livelihoods to improve socio-economic recovery.

Furthermore, Matthew argues that the post-conflict areas in Africa have little or no experience in addressing climate change (Matthew, 2014a, p. 90). Therefore it is likely that climate adoption policy will be met with skepticism and complacency of the recipient community. This is why peacebuilding programs appear to present a window of opportunity not only to address secu-rity concerns but also to raise awareness for climate change (Rüttinger, Smith, Stang, Tänzler & Vivekananda, 2015, p. 100). The latter is the reason why Rüttinger et al. argue that more resil-ient states should help fragile states with their expertise and resources. Recently, the UN and the World Bank (2018) argue that sustained investment in all risk environments is necessary to reach sustainable peace. This includes policy regarding climate change that is unlikely to be rewarding on short-term objectives, but are rewarding in the long term. To convince recipient communities

to look for long term solutions, UN peacebuilding mission should seize this window of opportu-nity to address climate change.

Thus, as argued by Gleditsch et al. (2007), climate change can lead to conflict along several path-ways. It can lead to local resource competition, livelihood insecurity, forced migration and vol-atile food prices, which can give rise to social tension, declining living standards and growing inequalities. These factors can be the direct or indirect causes of conflict, and as such undermine the process of peacebuilding. Moreover, the most frequently predicted effect of climate change is a change in the rainfall patterns, which can lead to droughts or floods. To cope with the effects of climate change, peacebuilding processes should integrate climate change policy in the four peacebuilding areas to increase the chance of success and use the window of opportunity to ad-dress these problems. This is especially valid if climate change was directly or indirectly related to the cause of the conflict, but should also be incorporated when this was not the case. With this conceptual framework the linkage between climate change and conflict is examined and rec-ommendations of Matthew are put forward in which peacebuilding areas integration should be accomplished. The current state of literature will now be discussed and thereafter will the meth-odology be introduced.

3 State of the literature

This section has been split in the academic literature concerning climate change and peacebuild-ing, and literature about the institutional attention regarding environmental issues within the UN. The latter is important to receive understanding how MINUSMA’s mandate has been developed.

3.1 Academic literature

The connection between conflict and climate change has attracted scholarly attention over the past decades (Matthew, 2014b, p. 113). Theory about climate change leading to conflict can be seen as a modern version of the Malthusian theory, where resource scarcity is caused by envi-ronmental degradation and an escalating conflict for resources (Homer-Dixon 1999). In more practical sense, ‘[a]s the quality or quantity of resources such as water or arable land decline, competition between individuals and groups is expected to increase’ (Meierding, 2013, p. 187). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a rapport stating that climate

change is a ‘threat multiplier’ and will have an increasing effect on social life, ranging from liveli-hoods and human rights to security on a local and global level (IPCC 2014). The reports from the IPCC have had a great role in setting the agenda on climate change. While full consensus has not been achieved among scientists, the majority believes climate change leads to long-term tempera-ture deviations, as shown in Figure 1. The temperatempera-ture deviations have been fluctuating since the year 1000, but just recently increased drastically with reaching +0,6 in the year 1998. Although some criticasters deny any human influence on the world temperature, scientists believe the latter is in fact very likely: ‘While there have been warm periods in previous centuries, the recent tem-perature rise is unprecedented and is hard to explain without reference to the influence of human activities’ (Gleditsch et al., 2007, p. 1).

Figure 1. Temperature Deviations from 1000 till 1998 for the Northern Hemisphere1

In response to the rapports of the IPCC, policy makers and political leaders like President Barack Obama and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon have acknowledged the security threats emerg-ing from climate change (Meierdemerg-ing, 2013, p. 185). Humanitarian institutes have been part of a global movement in the field of humanitarian action that aspires to integrate climate adaptation policy into their operations (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 3). However, while policymakers seem to be convinced, many academics are not. Meierding points out the lack of empirical studies

1 This figure was created by Theisen, O.M. at www.meteo.psu.edu/~mann/shared/research/old/mbh99.html for an article by Mann, M.E., Bradley, R.S. and Hughes, M.K. (in Geophysical Research Letters, 1999).

‘identifying consistent relationships between climate change and conflict in systematic, cross-na-tional analyses’ (Meierding, 2013, p. 185). Especially showing the importance of climate change as a driver of conflict in comparison to other factors is methodologically challenging. This explains why academics conclude that the linkage only exists under certain conditions (Nordås & Gled-itsch, 2007). The need for more empirical studies is evident since quantitative research has failed to prove a statistically significant relationship between climate change and conflict (Salehyan, 2008).

Some academics argue that the effects of climate change do pose a challenge to human security in that they result in stress on social and natural systems by threatening sustainable development and increasing the risk of violent conflict (IPCC, 2014). Moreover, Matthew notes that envi-ronmental factors are relevant to each of the three phases of conflict: pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict (Matthew, 2014b, p. 113). Especially in the conflict-prone or post-conflict phases, the risks of climate change can be particularly severe. Studies show that post-conflict countries are located in areas where the risks of extreme effects of climate change are substantial (Rüttinger et al., 2015). Meierding puts forward a conceptualization of climate change as climate uncertainty (2013, p. 197). She argues that uncertainty could have implications for security: ‘The more unpre-dictable the system becomes, the greater the perceived insecurity’ (Meierding, 2013, p. 200). This is especially relevant for farmers since successive harvesting failures in combination with incapa-ble state institutions can exacerbate the sense of insecurity (Raleigh, 2010).

Less attention has been paid to the relationship between climate change and peacebuilding. So far the literature on integration of climate change and peacebuilding remains mostly theoretical. For example, Levy and Webersik (2016) point out that environmental policy and climate adoption could foster sustainable peace, but there are few empirical studies to support this claim. Nicoson utters an explicit call for more research in this area: ‘There is a need for greater theoretical and empirical research on climate change and peace processes’ (2017, p. 9). The number of studies is growing, since the United Nations Environment Programme has formed partnerships with several universities to establish more research on post-conflict peacebuilding and environmental issues. As a result, there are new studies showing how environmental assessment could be a tool for peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (Thummarukudy, Brown & Moosa, 2012) and what challenges

there are in mainstreaming environmental policy in post-conflict settings (Bouma, 2012).

Furthermore, Matthew demonstrates the negative impact of failing to integrate climate change in peacebuilding (Matthew 2014a). He shows how migration of refugees to an area with easy avail-able natural resources was an effective short-term solution, but contradicted long-term environ-mental interests (Matthew, 2014a, p. 89). The resettlement lead to a decline in climate adaptation, environmental degradation and deforestation. Hammill and Matthew point out that similar de-cisions may directly conflict with peacebuilding initiatives in the future (Hammill and Matthew, 2012).

Overall, we see that on the one hand, policy makers have adopted climate adoption policy in their operations and advocate more awareness for climate change as security threat. New empirical studies supported by UNEP have emerged to support this claim. On the other hand, some aca-demics argue that the link between climate change and conflict has not been sufficiently proved and point out the lack of cross-national analyses. While proving a systematic link between climate change and conflict goes beyond the scope of the present thesis, researching how UN peace mis-sions try to integrate these spheres with each other is a valuable endeavor. So far no analysis has been made concerning the integration of environmental issues and peacebuilding in MINUSMA. This thesis will contribute to the state of literature by examining the link the UN makes between peacebuilding and environmental issues with the new Environmental Officer.

3.2 Institutionalization of environmental issues in the UN

The attention for environmental concerns in UN peacekeeping mission commenced with the UN mission in Cambodia, where the role of timber was an important factor in financing the conflict (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 3). This awareness increased with new UN missions in areas like Darfur, Haiti and Sudan, where bigger groups of personnel were deployed to countries without basic infrastructure. As result, the local environment is often overwhelmed by the demands of UN operations. Furthermore, supply routes can be hard to access in these areas and UN operations can take place in landlocked countries. Maertens and Shoshan state that ‘protracted conflicts, long periods of drought, and rapid population growth, as well as a lack of local expertise, result in a massive influx of materials and know-how into peacekeeping area’ (2018, p. 5). Such past

experi-ences established more awareness in the UN of the environmental footprint of their operations. Furthermore, if the UN neglects their environmental imprint, they put the operations’ success at risk in three ways. First, neglecting their environmental footprint can spark tension between the UN and the local communities, jeopardizing the mission’s legitimacy. Secondly, damaging the environment can lead to more environmental stress, which can lead to potential conflict. Final-ly, ecological damage can hinder long-term sustainable peace if agriculture and food prices are threatened (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 6).

With this new awareness, the UN Security Council has acknowledged climate change and its envi-ronmental consequences as a potential conflict triggering factor. Consensus on how to cope with these problems, however, has not been reached. The first step regarding the environmental foot-step of UN peace missions has been reached in 2013, when MINUSMA received mandate to take environmental concerns into account. The Environmental Officer of MINUSMA has to monitor the implementation of the environmental policy, symbolically demonstrate that the Department of Field Support (DFS) takes the environmental impact of their missions seriously, facilitate the environmental policy and ensure its visibility. The mandate regarding environmental concerns is not yet systematically incorporated, but since then, four other missions have been requested to manage their environmental footprint: UNAMID, UNSOS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA (idem: 8). Now the institutionalization of environmental issues in the UN have been reviewed, the thesis moves on to clarifying the choice of case.

4 Choice of case

Firstly, the choice of case will be explained and hereafter general information of MINUSMA will provided. The section ends with an overview of the status quo in Mali.

4.1 The Sahel region and MINUSMA

There seems to be a consensus that the Sahel region is the most representative example of prob-lems related to climate change. The Sahel region is the climatic and geographic zone that includes 14 African countries and covers the central part of Mali. In 2007 there were referrals to ‘climate wars’, when herders and sedentary farmers in this region clashed (Mjøs, 2007). In a case study of the inland Niger river in the Mopti region in Mali, Benjamin et al. state that conflicts emerge

from concerns around access to water for livestock, irrigation, fishing grounds or access to a plot of land for farming or grazing (Benjaminsen et al., 2012, p. 98). The area in Mopti is also ‘gen-erally considered highly vulnerable to climatic fluctuations due to the strong dependence of its population on rain-fed agriculture and livestock keeping’ (Benjaminsen et al., 2012, p. 99). Since the Sahel region covers a substantial part of Mali, MINUSMA is a relevant case to study the envi-ronmental issues within the process of peacebuilding.

Furthermore, the resolution 2100 initiating MINUSMA acknowledges sensitive environmental conditions in Mali by ‘request[ing] the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, encour-ages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites’ (UNSC, 2013, p. 11). This means MINUSMA is mandated to be aware of the environmental footprint of their operations and also to manage them in accordance with applicant and relevant General Assembly and UN resolutions. An example of a relevant resolution is Resolution 63/281 which concerns the possible security implications of climate change. It states the UN is deeply concerned with adverse impacts of climate change that could have possible security implications (UNGA, 2013, p. 2). It also emphasizes the responsibil-ity of UN organs to pursue maintenance of international peace and sustainable development is-sues, including climate change (UNGA, 2013, p. 1). It is noteworthy to mention that no reference is made to ‘climate change’ in resolution 2100 initiating MINUSMA, while previous resolutions have acknowledges the security implications of climate change. The document analysis will an-alyze further examine how environmental issues related to climate change have been integrated into MINUSMA.

MINUSMA was initiated as a response to an uprising from a Berber ethnic confederation, the Tuareg, which can be seen as a military coup and Islamist takeover of the Northern cities (Chau-zal & Van Damme, 2015, p. 8). Earlier in 2012 the Tuareg already declared the northern part of Mali independent and named the area Azawad. The unrecognized proto-state had a short lifetime and the Malian army rejoined the area in 2013. A new crisis emerged in Mali, which can be seen as the reason for international intervention by the French army, later handed over to the UN.

However, there is a consensus that the crisis has been the result of Mali’s political history and the long-standing distrust between different ethnic communities as well as of environmental degra-dation, climate change and economic shocks (Lotze, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, ‘[e]conomic frustra-tion, political resentment and strategic opportunity-taking, all of them rooted in the fragmented nature of the country, played a significant role in the crisis’ (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015, p. 10). The long-standing distrust is seen as a consequence of how Mali was led after the end of the French rule and in the decolonization period. The approach taken at that time increased tensions between the inhabitants of the northern part of Mali and the government as well as the political and economic marginalization of the north (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015, p. 17). The focus laid on the ‘useful’ southern part of Mali while the north was perceived as less worthy of attention, partly due to the harsh climatic conditions. This situation was worsened by the fact that Tuareg and Arab communities in the north directly challenged the authority of the new government. Before the UN intervened there are records of Arab and Tuareg uprisings in 1963, 1991 and 2006 (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015, p. 8). Chauzal and Van Damme state that counter-insurgent tac-tics from officials in Bamako, Mali’s capital, have been counterproductive for any sort of peace: ‘The direct and long-term consequences of this counter-insurgency strategy were deep animosity between northern populations, fierce resentment by communities towards the central state, and a very heterogeneous distribution of needs and demands that made inclusive peace talks and agree-ments far harder to reach’ (2015, p. 8). The growing divide between intra-Malian communities has been aggravated by multiple national and international factors, and it is now one of the greatest challenges in working towards peace in Mali.

4.2 Status quo in Mali

After organizing elections in 2013, MINUSMA has set to support new presidential elections in 2018 scheduled 29 July and 12 August and legislative elections in November and December. The UN mission has been asked to facilitate these elections in a technical and logistical way, but also to be wary of potential violence: ‘In line with its mandate, MINUSMA has started to lend technical and logistical support, including the distribution of election materials and deployment of elector-al personnel, while elector-also preparing for any potentielector-al violence’ (UN News, 2018). This is in line with the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process (AFPCM) that was the result of negotiations in Algiers in 2014. Led by the African Union, the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and regional governments, the military groups of the Northern part of Mali met with the Bamako government and coordinated their actions in search for a negotiated settlement. The goals formulated in the agreement are still the core task MINUSMA focuses on. As stated in article 56, ‘[t]he defining role and important contributions expected from MINUSMA, the Agencies and programmes of the United Nations and all other international structures and organizations to achieve the objective of the present Agreement re-late to the mandates granted by their competent bodies’ (AFPCM, 2014, p. 13). The goals differ in political, security, cultural, socio-economic and humanitarian objectives and the agreement was officially signed on the 20th of June 2015.

However, by 2018, the parties that signed the agreement have made limited progress in imple-menting the agreement despite 2017 being the original target for its completion. The extremist groups outside the peace process are seen as one of the biggest hindering factors (The World Factbook, 2018). The expansion of these radicals groups has resulted in increased intimidation, kidnappings and assassinations in the last few months. This deters the peace process as it sparks tension and conflict between communities. Moreover, attacks from radical groups against nation-al and internationnation-al military nation-also caused a high level of civilian fatnation-alities (The World Factbook, 2018). The radical groups seem to have improved their operational capacity and expanded in the regions of Mopti and Ségou.

To tackle the ongoing threats of radical groups, a joint force has been created with personnel of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) consisting of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. In order to set up this joint force a conference was held in Brussels on 23 February 2018, where 400 million euros have been pledged (MINUSMA 19, p. 1). This joint force will conduct military operations against terrorist networks and organized criminals, such as drug traf-fickers and people smugglers. The UN Secretary General also expresses his support and urges the Member States to contribute to the force’s full operationalization (MINUSMA 19, p. 16). More-over, with the new presidential elections in Mali coming this year, MINUSMA is reviewing its role in the peace process. This review is ‘to reassess United Nations engagement in the post-election environment in Mali’ and is scheduled to be announced in June this year (MINUSMA 19, p. 11). The factsheet of MINUSMA shows that 99 MINUSMA uniformed personnel have been killed

and 358 have been seriously injured in hostile incidents since July 2013, confirming the hostile dimension of the mission (MINUSMA, 2018a).

5 Method

To answer how environmental issues related to climate change have been integrated into MI-NUSMA, a document analysis will be conducted on three types of documents. Firstly, the official Secretary-General reports will be examined. Secondly, the benchmarks of the AFPCM will be reviewed. Finally, an analysis on the environmental policy of MINUSMA made by the Interna-tional Peace Institute (IPI) will be examined. Such an analysis will make it possible to examine the integration because it will reveal the way MINUSMA views and communicates regarding environmental issues and compare that with an external evaluation by the IPI. This implies an inductive research method, with using firstly quantitative analysis and hereafter close reading. When examining official documents of MINUSMA, it is assumed that what is declared in their documents adequately reflects their actions in Mali.

My empirical analysis will mainly focus on all reports of the Secretary-General on the situation of MINUSMA, dating from March 2013 to March 2018 as shown in the appendix. The reasons behind the choice of these documents are twofold. Firstly, the documents are the official reports of the situation in Mali and should provide reliable and valid information on the mission: ‘In particular, the Council asked me to report every three months, from 1 July 2013, with updates on the security situation, the priority political elements of the transitional road map and the electoral process, as well as relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, I was asked to include in my reports a review of troop levels, force generation and deployment of all constituent elements of MINUSMA’ (MINUSMA 3). The fact that the documents are easily accessible enhances the feasibility of the present research. Secondly, according to the UN Charter article 99, the Secretary-General has the responsibility to ‘bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN Charter art. 99). In that sense, the Secretary-General reports to the General Assembly resemble the framing of which as-pects of the conflict and peacebuilding are important.

Aside the Secretary General reports, an analysis of the implementation of environmental policy in Mali will be presented. The IPI has conducted a case study of the MINUSMA camps to assess the environmental challenges the mission faces. This study was conducted from 2014 to 2016 and focused on Camp Castor in Gao and the operational base in Bamako (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 23). The analysis of these documents allows me to make a comparison between the statements in the official MINUSMA documents and the findings of an external office outside the UN. This makes the analysis less vulnerable for a document bias.

The literature states climate change, with droughts and irregular rainfall as effects, can provoke conflict by effecting the agricultural sector of an area. It can also force migration and create vola-tile food prices. Therefore the communication in these documents will also be analyzed for these aspects. If environmental policy is found, the framework provided by Matthew can be used to distinguish in what area this is done. This way it can be examined if, but also how, environmental issues have been integrated and find out if any one dimension has received more priority than another.

6 Results

In this section, the results of the document analysis will be presented. Firstly, the Secretary-Gen-eral reports and secondly the AFPCM benchmarks will be analyzed. Lastly, the IPI case study will be examined.

6.1 Secretary-General reports

When examining 19 Secretary-General reports ranging from March 2013 till March 2018, first a quantitative analysis has been done before close-reading the documents. The documents have been merged using Atlas Ti.8, a software used for qualitative data analysis. Firstly, there has been looked for words directly linked to climate change as ‘climate’, ‘climate change’ and ‘environment*’. Because the literature states that rainfall, drought and migration are pointed out as consequences of climate change in the Sahel region, the documents have also been analyzed for these terms. Lastly, in order to provide a better comprehension of these numbers, the document has been searched for the occurrences of other topics that MINUSMA also received mandate for. Topics as sexual violence and gender-based violence have not always been taken into account when UN

peacebuilding missions drafted their mandate. Similar to environmental issues, there has been an emerging bulk on literature and increasing institutional attention for integrating these prob-lems with peacebuilding missions (Solhjell, 2010; UNSC, 2008). Table 1 provides a first insight in the way environmental issues are communicated in the Secretary-General reports. To provide a perspective for the data below: the total number of words identified is 101556 and 7364 distinct words are distinguished.

However, a closer reading reveals that numbers only can be misleading because certain words have multiple meaning depending on the context, as illustrated below.

- Climate

The documents speak mostly of a social climate, the climate of fear or the political climate, rather than environmental climate. The latter is meant in the following quote, but there it simply refers to the climatic conditions of northern Mali: ‘Construction efforts in northern Mali are hindered by security and climate conditions, which limit the capacity of key enablers and contractors’ (MI-NUSMA 7). This shows MI(MI-NUSMA is aware of the more troublesome conditions of the climate in Mali.

- Climate change

In the reports of the Secretary-General, no references to climate change have been found. As Ta-ble 1 shows, references to climate are not associated with climate change. This is in line with the mandate of MINUSMA, where neither references to climate change have been made.

Table 1. Terms Occurrences Climate 13 Climate change 0 Environment*1 ₁₀₆ Rainfall 1 Drought 2 Migration 15 Sexual violence 146 Gender-based violence 18

- Environment*

A quantitative analysis for the word ‘environment’ is problematic due to the word’s broad seman-tic scope. In the data we find that it mostly refers to a ‘hostile environment’ (MINUSMA 11), ‘security environment’ (MINUSMA 16) or ‘political environment’ (MINUSMA 4).

However, the north of Mali is being recognized as ‘one of the most challenging logistical and climatic environments in the world’ (MINUSMA 8). A later report shows the first sign of envi-ronmental policy reported in the Secretary-General reports when the training of 756 personnel on environmental management is reported (MINUSMA 12). Also the impact of environmental stress is acknowledged and, with the assistance of the World Food Programme [WFP] analysis, the Secretary General informs that over 2 million Malian people will be in need of immediate food assistance (MINUSMA 10). Other environmental policy mentioned in the Secretary-Gener-al report shows the mission: ‘adopted new waste management measures to enforce requirements on waste segregation, recycling and volume reduction, in accordance with the provisions of the environmental policy of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for United Nations field missions’ (MINUSMA 13). Moreover, the Secretary General does note that in September 2017 the Mission-Wide environmental action plan was finalized, regional environmental committees were established, waste focal points identified and environ-mental awareness session was included in the mission’s mandatory induction training (MINUS-MA 18).

Results further show how MINUSMA monitors their environmental footprint. In MINUSMA 19, the latest report, examples of policy are introduced: ‘As part of the implementation of its en-vironmental action plan, MINUSMA ensured the proper collection and treatment of solid and biomedical waste in all deployment sites’ (MINUSMA 19). Also environmental inspections are conducted in the camps in Gao, Bamako, Kidal and Aguelhok.

- Rainfall

MINUSMA states that the economic development in Mali declined with a drop in agricultural production caused by low rainfall (MINUSMA 19, p. 11). No further policy actions or

recom-mendations are formulated to cope with this problem. If climate change should lead to more irregular rainfall and more droughts in Mali, it could hinder economic development.

- Drought

In 2017, 3.8 million people suffered from food due to ‘localized floods, drought and increased in-security’ (MINUSMA 17, p. 8). Droughts are not a new phenomenon in Mali, but they can occur more frequently with overall world temperature rising.

- Migration

Since it has been pointed out in the literature that migration will likely increase tremendously due to climate change, it is worth looking into the documents for any linkages. In the Secretary-Gen-eral reports we see mostly references to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) but also to the statement of the Group of Five for the Sahel Summit according to which increased migration is a challenge for the region (MINUSMA 12).

Overall, limited findings can be presented from the analysis of the Secretary-General reports. ‘Climate change’ is not mentioned once in all Secretary-General reports. It is noteworthy to see that the earliest reports acknowledge the vulnerable situation of the environment in Mali and later reports state that policies are now being implemented. This could mean the missions operations did not have the ability to implement environmental policies in an earlier stadium of the mission.

6.2 AFPCM benchmarks

Aside the Secretary-General reports, it is worthwhile to examine the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process. As explained earlier, the agreement was a result of negotiations in Algiers between the stakeholders under accompaniment of the UN to reach a definitive solution to the crisis in Northern Mali. As an extension of the negotiations, MINUSMA presented a benchmark matrix to categorize the objectives, progress indicators, state of implementation and their deadlines (MINUSMA, 2018b). This matrix provides a clear im-age of what MINUSMA has been trying to achieve and what benchmarks they have to evaluate their success. A quick read reveals that the objectives have been categorized as: ‘Political and institutional matters, Defence and security aspects, Humanitarian assistance, Socioeconomic and

cultural development and the provision of basic social services, and Justice and reconciliation’ (MINUSMA, 2018b). There is attention given to themes linked to climate change problematics as stated in the conceptual framework, such as forced migration and refugees, volatile food prices and socioeconomic reintegration. However, no policy or objectives regarding tackling environ-mental issues related to climate change have been integrated in the AFPCM benchmarks.

As the AFPCM is result of negotiations between the Malian and Tuareg-led forces, one may ar-gue it is not surprising climate adoption policy is not integrated in the agreement. However, as the agreement was drafted under accompaniment of the UN mission, it appears to have created a window of opportunity to address climate change issues in Mali. Awareness could have been raised concerning the security dimensions of the climate change in the Sahel region and over-come possible skepticism and complacency in Malian societies. The fact that climate change has neither been mentioned a single time in the Secretary-General reports, leads to doubt to what degree environmental issues have been are integrated into the mission. To broaden the scope of this thesis, an external case study of the IPI will be examined.

6.3 IPI case study

In the section below the analysis of the IPI is summarized. In this way a comparison can be made between the statements in the MINUSMA reports and the actual implementation of environ-mental policy. The IPI is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. It specializes in peace and security issues and works closely with the UN. The analysis in Mali has focused on Camp Castor in Gao and the operational base in Bamako.

The study reports that Camp Castor in Gao entails 800,000 square meters, lies close to local hous-ing and is about one-third in size compared to the city itself (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 25). The design of the camp was isolated and unconnected from the city for security reasons. Elec-tricity was first provided only by oil and gas generators, but later a set of solar panels has been added to increase the use of renewable energy (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 25). In regard to water management, Dutch engineers have installed water filters to treat wastewater. The study also shows that the peacekeepers’ water consumption is 100 liters of water per person per day, which is 20 liters over the UN official limit. Efforts are made to reduce the use of air conditioning

by using locally produced compressed red bricks that improve the thermal insulation in the camp. Hereby the camp also contributes to local employment and capacity building. Overall, the analy-sis concludes that the design of Camp Castor is only based on military functionality. The analyanaly-sis underlines this with stating that ‘the brief timeline, security concerns, and political framework limited the possibility of including other consideration’ (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 25).

The analysis of the operational base in Bamako is more brief. The study shows that the base lies close to the local population with the nearest farm only 100 meters away. The area entails 36 hectares and is mostly constructed from prefabricated structures and containers. This explains the excessive use of energy for cooling and heating, due to the fact that standard materials such as wood and metal have to be adopted to the local climate (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 26). The IPI case study concludes that both the operational base in Bamako and Camp Castor in Gao have a significant impact on the Malian environment. By adopting a strategy of regenerative sustain-ability, the UN bases could contribute to the lasting sustainability for cities like Gao and ¬¬Bama-ko that struggle with rapidly growing population, adequate urban expansion and infrastructure (Maertens & Shoshan, 2018, p. 26).

Overall, the document analysis of the AFPCM benchmarks, Secretary-General reports and the IPI case study presents mixed findings. There are no benchmarks integrated in the AFPCM re-lated to climate change, climate change is not mentioned once in the Secretary-General reports and the analysis of the IPI shows how environmental policy has been adopted in the UN bases in Mali. Furthermore, the Secretary-General reports do show that UN personnel is trained to act environmentally aware, points out environmentally vulnerable areas in Mali and the threat of environmental stress is acknowledged. Finally, the IPI case study underlines that the political framework did limit the design of UN bases to solely focus on the military functionality. Before presenting a conclusion, possible flaws of the thesis will be discussed in the next section.

7 Discussion

Peacebuilding missions face many unprecedented challenges and it would be unfair to place em-phasis exclusively on environmental issues as a determinant of their success. Like the IPCC states, climate change is seen as a threat multiplier and this means isolating and researching its

imme-diate effects is challenging (IPCC, 2014). Therefore a discussion of the pathways between climate change and conflict is mostly theoretical and one needs to be cautious when making any concrete claims. Reflecting on the presented findings, there are several factors to keep in mind which can shed a different light on the results. First of all, MINUSMA is still ongoing. The mission’s opera-tions might be more focused on short-term goals until more stable political leadership is estab-lished. There might be more attention for environmental issues in a later stadium of the mission when more political stability in Mali is achieved.

The fact that the Secretary General reports contain little reference to climate change or environ-mental issues could also be the result of communication priorities and problems between the UN headquarters and the MINUSMA personnel. The UN headquarters can have difficulty main-taining oversight of the mission’s operations and assessing its performance. In contact with the personnel, problems or concerns related to climate change can be overshadowed by immediate security or terrorism considerations.

Moreover, it is possible that UN peace missions do not have the necessary resources to deal with the primary mandates as well as new dimensions such as climate change. The approved budget for UN peacekeeping operations between the 1th of July 2017 and the 30th of June 2018 is 6.8 billion dollars (UNGA, 2017). To put this number in perspective: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated the world military expenditure to reach 1739 billion dollars in 2017 (Tian, Fleurant, Kuimova, Wezeman, P. & Wezeman, S., 2018). This makes the UN peacekeeping budget less than 0.5% of the world military budget.

Furthermore, the document analysis was conducted on data that was freely accessible from the MINUSMA and the IPI website. Request for further information or reports from the UN have not been successful, but it is possible that the MINUSMA headquarters have confidential security analyses concerning the possible threats of climate change in Mali. Therefore, this thesis could have a document bias and it is possible that other documents could shed a different light on the situation. However, by not exclaiming threats of climate change in the official Secretary-General reports the UN suggests that it does not perceive climate change as major security threat in Mali.

8

Conclusion

Based on the findings of the document analysis, a conclusion will now be presented. The findings show that on the one hand, environmental issues are being integrated into MINUSMA as far as the mission’s environmental footprint is concerned. Both according to the Secretary-General re-ports and the IPI analysis, multiple policies have been adopted to minimize water and energy con-sumption. Solar panels have been installed, water filters treat wastewater and the personnel have also received training concerning environmental issues. In a sense, this is in line with the new appointment of an environmental officer in MINUSMA staff. By conducting these new policies, MINUSMA acknowledges environmental vulnerability of Mali and considers its impact. This is underlined by the statements in the Secretary-General reports that show that they acknowledge how rainfall, droughts and floods can hinder food security and force migration. In sum, the mis-sion does consider the environmental impacts of its operations of MINUSMA, just as stated in the mission’s mandate.

As shown in the state of literature, the institutional attention for environmental issues has devel-oped gradually in the UN over the past peacebuilding missions. This awareness can have three positive consequences. Firstly, it can enhance the organizations legitimacy as the local communi-ties are less affected by the activicommuni-ties. Secondly, it could improve the security of the mission, since environmental damage and stress would build tension between MINUSMA and Mali recipients. This tension could hinder trust and thus policy implementation. Lastly, the environmental foot-print and possible damage of the UN mission could hinder long-term development for ecosys-tems and communities.

On the other hand, however, the results show that the environmental awareness remains limit-ed to the environmental footprint in the mission. First of all, there are no references to climate change in the mission’s mandate and in the Secretary General reports of MINUSMA. This implies that climate change is not seen as a factor of the security situation or, as a matter, as a factor that may threaten the maintenance of peace. This confirms Matthew’s (2014a, 2014b) argument that environmental long-term challenges are being neglected in UN missions. The risk remains that long-term environmental threats are being marginalized in favor of short-term solutions. This

idea is strengthened by the fact no long-term objectives related to environmental issues have been set down in the AFPCM.

Furthermore, MINUSMA does not use the window of opportunity to bring environmental issues to the attention of the recipient society. Neither in the case-study nor the reports of the Secre-tary-General a link can be found between environmental learning and the local population or political leaders. It appears the mission is self-centered when it comes to climate adaption policy. If the MINUSMA invests more time in addressing, the skepticism and complacency of recipient societies could be marginalized. Some even argue that if climate change is being framed as the enemy of all actors, possible cooperation between competing actors is possible (Klein, 2014). This positive effect of ‘fighting climate change’ could foster negotiations between competing actors in peacebuilding operations. Also, interacting more with the local population can foster the percip-ience of the UN mission.

Although this research pertains to only one specific mission, the findings will be of general in-terest and relevance, and can offer lessons to other future peacebuilding missions. Moreover, MI-NUSMA has been the first mission that received formal mandate to take environmental issues into account with an official Environmental Officer. But its ambitions solely focus on the missions own environmental footprint, not on long-term objectives. If UN peace missions truly aim to not only deter violence in an area, but also support rebuilding societies and working towards sustain-able peace, more long-term objectives related to climate change should be integrated into their mission. To act in accordance with previous UN regulations that acknowledge the security aspect of climate change, the role of the mandate and the role of the Environmental Officer should be critically reviewed.

By conducting interviews and surveys among UN personnel, deeper understanding could be achieved of the role of the Environmental Officer and the way environmental issues related to cli-mate change are integrated into UN peace missions. Furthermore, comparative analysis between older UN peace missions and MINUSMA documents could show how MINUSMA’s mandate has changed the role of environmental issues. Maintaining a critical view on UN peace missions can hopefully enhance their effectiveness and thus lead to more peace around the globe.

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Appendix

MINUSMA 1: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 26/3/13’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1326964_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 2: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 10/6/13’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1335298_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 3: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 1/10/13’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1348635_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 4: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 2/1/14’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1363510_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 5: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 28/3/14’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1427549_eng.pdf.

https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1441729_eng_0.pdf.

MINUSMA 7: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 22/9/14’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1453676_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 8: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali- 23/12/14’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1508173.pdf.

MINUSMA 9: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali 27/03/15’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1508173.pdf.

MINUSMA 10: ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1517249_eng.pdf.

MINUSMA 11: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali – 22/09/15’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/150928_sg_report_sept_2015_en.pdf. MINUSMA 12: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali - 24/12/15’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/160328_sg_report_mali_english.pdf. MINUSMA 13: ‘ Report of the SG on the situation in Mali - 28/03/16’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/160328_sg_report_mali_english.pdf. MINUSMA 14: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali - 31/05/16’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1614458-en.pdf.

MINUSMA 15: ‘Report of the SG on the situation in Mali - 29/06/16’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1629765.pdf.

MINUSMA 16: ‘SG report on the situation in Mali December 2016’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_the_situation_in_mali_de-cember_2016.pdf.

MINUSMA 17: ‘SG report on the situation in Mali June 2017’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_mali_june_2017.pdf.

MINUSMA 18: ‘SG report on the situation in Mali September 2017’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170928_sg_report_on_mali_september_eng. pdf.

MINUSMA 19: ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali - March 2018’. Retrieved 15 May, 2018 from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_secre-tary-general_on_the_situation_in_mali_-_29_march_.pdf.