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ANALYSIS OF

RUSSIAN

INDEPENDENT

PRINT MEDIA

Alexey Ustiyantsev

Supervisor: Dr. Jeannette Mak

Second Reader: Adele del Sordi

Master thesis Political Science

Specialization: International Relations

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Analysis of Russian independent print media

Contents

1. Introduction 3

2. Civil-society organizations and the media 6

2.1 Non-state actors in contact with the state 6 2.2 Role of non-state actors in democratization 8

2.3 Role of media in democratization 10

3. Methodology 13

3.1 Content analysis 13

3.2 How newspapers are selected? 14

3.3 Which articles are chosen? 14

3.4 What quotes are selected? 15

3.5 How the thesis judges whether an article is critical or not? 15

3.6 Crimean conflict 15

4. History of Russian media 17

4.1 State of Russian media 17

4.2 How the Kremlin attempts to constrain and control the media 20

4.3 Unique character of Russian media 22

4.4 Unique character of Russian audience 25

4.5 Recent events in Russian media sphere 26

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5. Analysis of independent newspapers 30

5.1 «Lenta.ru» 30

5.2 End of “old” «Lenta.ru» 32

5.3 Content analysis of newspapers 34

5.4 «Novaya Gazeta» 36

5.4.1 «Novaya Gazeta» – «Lenta.ru» 37

5.4.2 «Novaya Gazeta» – Crimean conflict 38

5.5 «RBC» 42

5.5.1 «RBC» – «Lenta.ru» 43

5.5.2 «RBC» – Crimean conflict 44

5.6 «Vedomosti» 47

5.6.1 «Vedomosti» – «Lenta.ru» 47

5.6.2 «Vedomosti» – Crimean conflict 49

5.7 Summary 56

6. Conclusion 59

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Analysis of Russian independent print media

1. Introduction

The aim of this illustrative study is to provide an analysis of independent newspaper outlets in Russia. To achieve this goal, two key questions need to be answered. First, how free is the opposition media in Russia? This will be a broad macro level analysis that will provide a general picture of the environment in which Russian media, especially newspapers, exists. The second question is: what effect the closure of “old” «Lenta.ru» had on oppositional newspapers? This question will supplement the broad macro analysis with a more specific micro level analysis, that will look at three newspapers and how they reacted to the events in «Lenta.ru». The thesis will look at Russian independent media outlets, or more precisely at federal independent newspapers. The aim is to find out how free or how constrained critical Russian newspapers are. In the literature little is known about the state of Russian media and usually the analysis comes to a simple conclusion that the Russian media is controlled by the state and independent media outlets are systematically destroyed forcing Russia into an endless circle of authoritarianism. However this illustrative study will show that the situation in Russian media sphere is not that simple or linear, instead it is constantly changing as new media sources emerge, while the already existing ones, due to certain events, may become more critical, at least for a short-term period at which this dissertation looks. The thesis will demonstrate that critical newspapers and the independent media in general are constantly under pressure, as the government continuously imposes new restrictions on the media. These instances of governmental involvement in media’s work will be presented in this paper and analyzed to show the situation in the media sphere at the macro level. Additionally, the paper will look at the case of news portal «Lenta.ru» to show how the media is pressured by the government at the micro level and how different independent newspapers react to or are affected by the political pressure and dismissal of editor in chief from «Lenta.ru». This part will demonstrate that although the newspapers are allowed to be critical of

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Putin and the government in general, and are independent from the Kremlin, they are always risking becoming the “next target” of the authorities and face “legal repressions”. Several articles from chosen newspapers will be analyzed and this analysis will show that these newspapers are openly critical of the Kremlin when they report about the Crimean conflict and about the case of «Lenta.ru». Furthermore, these newspapers blame the Kremlin for closing the “old” «Lenta», and even become more critical directly after these events. This work is an illustrative study, which will help to grasp the situation in the Russian media sector and provide ideas for further research of Russian media outlets.

The thesis will be structured as follows. After this introduction, the paper moves the theoretical framework that will explain the most important theories that will be relevant for this research and around which the thesis is constructed. In this part, concepts like civil-society organizations or non-state actors will be introduced, and most importantly the role of the media in democratization will be discussed. The third part will explain the methodology of this research; it will answer questions about what content analysis is and how it will be used in this thesis to answer the set questions. The following part is the historical background chapter that has the purpose of introducing the Russian context and explains the role and the state of independent media in contemporary Russia. Apart from that, this chapter will explain how Russian journalism is different from its Western counterpart and how it has developed in the recent period since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The fifth part of the paper will move to the content analysis, look at the articles from the newspapers and analyze how critically they report international relations news1 and the events

occurring in «Lenta.ru». This part will also have a table that will put together all the important information and help to focus on the most important findings of this research. The findings demonstrate that the analyzed newspapers became more critical at least for a short-term period directly after the events in «Lenta». After that, these findings will be discussed in the context of the macro data about Russian independent media. The discussion will show that the Russian press is under significant pressure and control despite the existing freedoms for the analyzed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

1!Exclusively focusing on the conflict and the referendum in Crimea.! 2!Freedoms are in the form of the ability to write critical articles and pursue

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newspapers2

. These freedoms can easily be restricted as in the case of «Lenta.ru», and lead to dismissal of key figures and journalists, or even to destruction of independent, popular and profitable media outlet. However the overall situation should not be seen only in dark light, new news outlets emerge and develop outside of Russia or are not controlled in any way by the Kremlin, and thus cannot be easily “managed” or censored. The idea of the hegemony of the Kremlin’s media together with the “filter inside the head” will also be discussed and it will show the importance of forming the mainstream agenda for the survival of the existing regime. Finally, in the conclusion the findings of this thesis will be summarized and possible topics for further research will be highlighted.

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2!Freedoms are in the form of the ability to write critical articles and pursue independent editorial policy.!

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2. Civil-society organizations and the media

This first part of the thesis will present the theoretical framework on which this paper is based. It is first important to develop a sound framework that will help to make sense of the studied subjects. Before this chapter starts it is important to understand that different theories exist about the role of civil-society organization and the media. This part will start from a more general discussion of the relationship between authoritarian or hybrid regimes with civil-society organizations (CSOs). This part will show that this relationship is complex and can often consist of conflict and cooperation at the same time. The next paragraph talks about the different roles of non-state actors in non-democratic and democratic countries. NGOs3

are taken here as an example to demonstrate their key purpose and the purpose of non-state actors in general. The last paragraph of this part talks specifically about the media. It looks at the media more deeply and argues that media can be, on the one hand, a tool of propaganda or, on the other hand, it can become the “watchdog” that controls the government, non-governmental structures or individuals, making them accountable to the public (see Stockman 2012; Lee, Johnson and Prakash 2012).

2.1 Non-state actors in contact with the state

First, it is important to understand the relationship between the state and non-state actors. The most common depiction of relations of non-state actors4

with a state is that of a conflict or opposition, in which the state plays a role of a restrictor, whereas the non-state actors4

are self-organized, voluntary, open and independent from the state organizations (Diamond 1999, p. 221). Furthermore, theoretically these civil-society organizations “limit the power of the state“ (Diamond 1999, p. 239), “prevent tyranny” of the state (Gellner 1995, p. 42) and attempt to change the existing regime to become democratic if it is authoritarian (Grugel 2002, p. 96). However, it is important to recognize the fact that civil-society organizations depend on the state, as the state is able to regulate the legal framework of the activities of non-state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

3!This term is an older version of CSOs and it will be used whenever the authors use it in their own work.!

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organizations, and in some cases even non-democratic regimes provide financial or political support to such organizations (Perinova 2005, p. 7). But not only do the non-state actors depend on the non-state, these relations also work the other way around, in the cases when, for example, the state is unable to provide services to a vulnerable group of a society; this means that the relations between the state and civil-society organizations are more complex than simply opposition or conflict relations (Abrahamsen 1996, p. 18). The interaction between the state and non-state actors can take different forms, for example, some non-state actors may attempt to limit the existing regime or even change it, on the other hand other civil-society organizations may cooperate with a state and thus strengthen it, or instead develop a mixed compromising type of relationships. As Sjögren argues the relations between the two actors can “range from confrontational to clientilist” (Sjögren 2001, p. 40). This thesis however will exclusively focus on the events of conflict between the state and non-state actors5

that attempt to challenge or change the authoritarian regime to become democratic. Such organizations are still able to exist in authoritarian regimes despite the pressure exerted over them and despite the existence of state-led civil-society organizations, which are created to help the state to resolve rapidly emerging issues that are the product of quick changes in society and economy (Frolic 1997, p. 48). More precisely the thesis will characterize Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime, or hybrid, in which civil liberties are theoretically guaranteed and to some degree respected but can be violated at any time. As Levitsky and Way put it, the opposition can usually meet freely and protest against the regime, yet “opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human-rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and – in some cases – violent attack” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 8). The independent media faces the same issues and can be threatened, attacked or simply closed by the hybrid regime. It is quite usual when this type of regime uses the so-called “legal repressions” in which it technically applies the law correctly, however the use of the law is selective and thus it is simply an instrument of the state in repressions against the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 9). One of the most salient cases that demonstrate this is the trial

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5

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against Mikhail Khodorkovsky6

after he started to finance the opposition in 2003. The thesis will directly focus on this type of issues and study how the Russian state is able to limit activity of the media.

2.2 Role of non-state actors in democratization

From the previous part it is clear that civil-society organizations are important actors and play a significant role in relations with the state, as they are able to challenge its power or instead support it. An important role of non-state actors for democratization consists of their ability “to struggle for, support, promote and strengthen democracy and democratization” (Perinova 2005, p. 9). Diamond argues that civil-society actors promote democracy and help the transition from authoritarian regime to electoral democracy and once it is established non-state actors help to deepen and consolidate the progress achieved (Diamond 1999, p. 233). This view is supported by several other authors that claim that non-state actors support the development of democracy because they promote democratic values and norms, as they are internally democratic, and also seem to expand the involvement of a society in political decision-making (Boussard 2002, pp. 160-4; Diamond 1999, pp. 233-250; and Grugel 2002, pp. 93-5). However according to Boussard the role of non-state actors as necessary democratizing should not be taken for granted, as not every civil-society organization is internally democratic or reliable (Boussard 2002, p. 160). This means that CSOs not always are agents of democratization as this simply may not be their aim, or because they are incapable to fulfill their democratizing tasks or objectives. Additionally, in authoritarian states, especially in those that have long traditions of authoritarian rule, civil-society organizations can simply mirror the existing regime and become hierarchical, exclusive and coopt with the non-democratic state thus instead promoting values not related to democracy (Perinova 2005). Furthermore, even democratic and reliable civil-society organizations do not always have a chance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

6!Oligarch, businessmen and public figure who was imprisoned in 2005 for nonpayment of taxes and later in 2010 his incarceration was extended for

embezzlement and money laundering. Now Mikhail is released from the prison and lives in Switzerland developing his online project «Open Russia» and advocating democracy.!

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and power to promote democracy (Diamond 1999, p. 227), this might be due to many reasons, for example: lack of finances, lack of support or pressure from the top etc.

In non-democratic countries non-state actors are tightly controlled and pressured by the authoritarian government that attempts to destroy (or control) independent and self-organized civil-society actors and replace them with state-funded and highly controlled organizations with approved targets. The space for non-state actors is limited in non-democratic countries and theoretically only a few autonomous actors are tolerated by non-democratic regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The authoritarian state puts pressure and attempts to get in control of autonomous non-state actors because they might be dangerous to the stability of non-democratic regime, as they promote democratic values, which contradict the core of authoritarian rule. The thesis will focus precisely on these autonomous non-state actors that potentially challenge the existing authoritarian regime because they want to change the system and thus are limited or constrained by the government. It is important to differentiate CSOs that question the status quo of the existing elite from other non-state organizations that support the existing system, want to make a specific policy alteration or change a part of a state; these CSOs will not be discussed in this paper. CSOs have a complex effect on development of civil-society. Theoretically through participation and exposure to the democratic approach they bolster civil-society development, and thus assist the advancement of democratization (Mercer 2002, pp. 5-6). However it is vital to bear in mind that not all NGOs are democratically structured and thus do not necessary promote democratic values and ideas. This idea is supported by a recent publication of Ljubownikow et al. in which the authors argue that Russian civil-society organizations are different from those in the West: they “maintain strong and dependent relationships with the state” (Ljubownikow, Crotty and Rodgers 2013, p. 154). Additionally, they argue that Russian third sector organizations with their hierarchical structures and strong dependence on the state simply mirror the relations between the state and wider society (Ljubownikow, Crotty and Rodgers 2013, p. 164). This paternalism and hierarchy at the level of CSOs arguably makes their work useless for democratization process, as this kind of structure cannot be a democratizing agent. One of the key roles of CSOs is to teach the people that interact with this organization to do things in a democratic way,

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develop trust in others and the society in general, and learn how to be a responsible citizen. These goals are unreachable for hierarchical and state dependent CSOs.

2.3 Role of media in democratization?

The Russian hybrid regime is also characterized by the control of the media by the state. Opposition is denied access to the state-led media; independent newspapers, radio stations and TV channels still exist, however they are able to reach only a limited number of people from urban areas according to Levitsky and Way (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 11). Their influence is constantly checked by the state, preventing the “successful” opposition’s media from becoming significant players in the media market.

First, it is important to mention that the role of the media is not always and necessarily positive for the development of democracy. The function of the media might be that of propaganda7

, which often serves as an explanation of why people do support authoritarian regimes. However this view is not widely supported by scholars that research democratization and authoritarianism (Stockmann 2012, p. 23). The thesis will not research the effects of propaganda, however this “dark side” of the media and its effects need to be explained, because the research will inevitably touch this issue when it will discuss the historical development of the Russian media sphere. It is also important to notice that the media is not a simple tool and a simple exposure to news does not guarantee that a person will change its attitudes (Stockmann 2012, p. 204). This is key to understand in order to fully comprehend that control of the media by the state8

does not mean that the people will accept the information without reflection and critical thinking. Stockmann’s study shows that the people least likely to change opinions are the less informed and the most informed citizens, while the most exposed to propaganda are the moderately informed people (Stockmann 2012, p. 204).

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7!According to Zbynek Zeman there can be different types of propaganda: white, grey or black propaganda (1978 Zeman)!

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The dissertation will address the importance of the media in democratization and how the state attempts to limit or pressure the media, but to do that the framework should explain why authoritarian regimes are so keen to control the media. In democratic countries the media is one of the most important institution that helps the people to understand the society in which they live. Theoretically the media has to inform the citizens, foster debate concerning specific issues and help to make informed choices. Additionally, it has to monitor the actions of the government and business, and act as a “watchdog” in the interest of society (McConnell and Becker 2002). Thus the control of the media becomes a key instrument for non-democratic regimes as it helps the incumbent to remain in power. The messages of state-controlled media and the apathy promoted by such outlets prevent the rise of alternative candidates and help to control the elites (Walker and Orttung 2014, p. 71). They do so not only by pricing the existing regime or incumbent but also by discrediting alternative potential candidates, in other words, they marginalize potential movements or political opposition that could become prominent (Walker and Orttung 2014, p. 72). To achieve “dominance”, according to Walker and Orttung, state media targets four types of audience using different technics and strategies. These audiences, listed in order of importance for the regime, are: 1) elites of the regime; 2) wider public; 3) regular Internet users; 4) and the political opposition and independent civil-society (Walker and Orttung 2014, pp. 74-81). Authoritarian regimes need to control the media sphere, as their survival depends on their ability to do this effectively, and once the control over the media is tightened it cannot be loosened without risking the stability of the regime (Walker and Orttung 2014, p. 83). The media not only does help authoritarian states to remain in power but it can also play an important role in relations with other civil-society organizations. For example Lee et al. in their article have argued that the media helps to generate trust in NGOs in post-soviet societies (Lee, Johnson and Prakash 2012, p. 8). One of the most important roles of the media is that it can act as a “watchdog”, by monitoring the NGOs activity9

, thus making NGOs accountable and providing this information to the citizens, so they can develop trust in trustworthy NGOs and do not deal with corrupt NGOs; additionally, the media provides information about NGOs activity and develops general trust in this type of organizations (Lee, Johnson and Prakash 2012, p. 8). However to perform this role !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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effectively the authors argue that the media needs to be independent from the state. In the previous chapter of the theoretical framework the role of other non-state actors was discussed and this link between NGOs and the media allows seeing their interdependence and how one actor can assist the other in successfully fulfilling their job.

Overall there is little research that specifically looks at the role of the media in democratization process, and assesses how the media fulfills its role and contributes to construction of democratic institutions. Often the democratic qualities of the media are confused and presented as specific contributions of the media to democratization process (Jebril, Stetka and Loveless 2013). This means that it is still necessary to carry out research that will tell whether the media is an agent of democratic change or simply the follower of the trend. The same can be said about the new social media, the available data and research is still limited and the existing findings do not support the idea that social media can lead to democratic revolution or change (Jebril, Stetka and Loveless 2013).

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3. Methodology

This chapter will focus on the methods that the thesis will use in order to collect information and answer the research questions. This part will explain the methods and how they will be used in the thesis, primarily focusing on describing the steps of how the method will be applied. The main method is the content analysis, which will be supplemented by secondary data from the existing scholarly literature and other material. In the penultimate part of this chapter the thesis will explain how the newspapers, articles and the quotes form these newspapers were chosen, and how this research decides that an article is critical or not. The last part will consist of a short introduction to the events in Kiev during the “Euromaidan” and the subsequent developments in the Crimean peninsula, which will be the focus of analyzed articles.

3.1 Content analysis

The main method that will be used in this thesis is the content analysis. This method is useful for analyzing the content of any written or spoken material, in the case of this research it is a written material by newspapers. It will help to understand the content of the newspapers’ publications especially their tone, their arguments and how they represent certain events. This method will be used to evaluate the articles from these newspapers: «RBC», «Vedomosti» and «Novaya Gazeta». To do that the articles will be collected in one place and then analyzed to find the most interesting or salient parts that could demonstrate, prove or serve as evidence to one or the other point. Each article has a specific message and information, thus the aim of this method is to find this message, demonstrate it in this paper by quoting parts that can display the central message and most importantly separate it from the rest of the material, to then analyze this data and discuss this evidence in the context of this study. I will translate the quotes from the articles that will be presented in the dissertation from Russian. The thesis mainly focuses on how critical or how positive are the articles talking about the case of «Lenta.ru» and Crimean conflict together with the international relations around the peninsula. As these topics inevitably connect to the Kremlin, it is possible to discuss whether the editorial offices of the newspapers analyzed take a loyal or more critical position when reporting the news.

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This will demonstrate the degree of freedom that these newspapers have to criticize different aspects of the governmental policy in this specific time period, which was highly significant for the regime and its future. Additionally, it will show whether the newspapers were frightened or angered by the events in «Lenta.ru» and as a consequence their degree of criticism of the Kremlin started rising or lowering in the period right after the events in «Lenta». This will assist in seeing the degree of freedom or lack of it in the Russian media at the micro level. However this picture needs to be completed with wider context, at the macro level, in which Russian media exists. For this purpose the thesis will also use secondary material that shows that Russian media exists in a large field with many competitors represented by other media outlets, repressive or at least limitative government and the consumers of the media or simply the Russian people. This information together can provide an illustration of the conditions in which Russian media exists and in what state it is now.

3.2 How newspapers are selected?

First of all, it is imperative to explain why the thesis analyzes «RBC», «Vedomosti» and «Novaya Gazeta». These newspapers are independent from the Kremlin and have a reputation of being critics of the existing regime, and thus are often cited by oppositional politicians. These newspapers are specifically chosen for their independence and critical position. This research is designed as the most likely case. If the critical newspapers are discouraged by the actions of the Kremlin or by indirect pressure, then other less critical newspapers will not even consider being critical. While if the critical newspapers do not change their editorial policy this means that other newspapers may also consider not practicing self-censorship.

3.3 Which articles are chosen?

The articles that are chosen for this thesis have to be relevant to the study of this paper and have to specifically focus on one of these two issues: «Lenta.ru» or Crimean conflict. The articles that talk about the case of «Lenta.ru», explain what has happened, analyze the events, or write about their reactions, in other words everything

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that is related to the changes that took place in «Lenta.ru» after their publication of the interview with Ukrainian nationalist, will be analyzed. The second issue that will be analyzed in this thesis is the conflict in Crimea. Only articles that discuss the Crimean situation and the international conflict around this problem will be discussed. Other articles that talk about Ukraine but do not focus on Crimea or talk about international relations but are not directly linked to the Crimean issue will not be analyzed in this paper.

3.4 What quotes are selected?

An important question of this thesis is what quotes are chosen and presented in the thesis. Again they have to be linked to the subject of study, and either summarize the main idea of an article, or have a clear or not so clear positive or negative value judgment. In other words, the thesis will present phrases that characterize events and thus reveal the principal tone of an article. These phrases are chosen because they help to display and judge whether an article is critical or not.

3.5 How the thesis judges whether an article is critical or not?

In terms of judging if the article is critical, neutral or positive of the Kremlin the thesis will look specifically for words that characterize the events in a particular way and present a form of judgment. Additionally, the article can simply refer to past positive or negative experiences or events and thus indirectly imply that current developments are negative or positive hence in this way supporting or criticizing the Kremlin. Finally, the last sign of negative or positive value judgment is when an article talks about the future and draws bright prospects or instead negative expectations after an event for which the Kremlin is responsible or seen as responsible.

3.6 Crimean conflict

This section of the thesis has introduced the methodology and explained that the paper will also focus on the conflict over Crimea as this will help to demonstrate how the

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analyzed newspapers report on this extremely important issue for the Kremlin. This paragraph will shortly10

introduce the Crimean conflict and shed light on why the referendum, that took place right after the analyzed period of this work, was so important for the Kremlin. The Crimean conflict emerged after the events in “Euromaidan” and fleeing of Viktor Yanukovych to Russia. “Euromaidan” started as a peaceful protest against the suspension of Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement by Yanukovych. Ukrainian authorities reacted to the protest and violently dispersed the meeting, which as a result intensified the protest and helped to form a broader political agenda of anti-corruption, against police brutality and, due to Russian involvement into the conflict11

, against Russian foreign policy and threat of sanctions. The Crimean authorities considered these events to be a coup and did not accept the legitimacy of the new interim government, and as a result proclaimed the referendum that took place the 16th of March 2014. It is important to mention, that first, the Russian president rejected the idea that Russian soldiers were sent to Crimea and claimed that the armored people were local self-defense units, however at later stages Putin began to claim that it was his decision to send Russian troops to Crimea to safely carry out the referendum. The Crimean operation was (and still is) an extremely important event for the Russian political elite. The success12

meant a quick rise of Putin’s popularity, which reached historical heights despite the existing internal problems and continuous decline of Putin’s popularity since 2008 (Levada-Center 2015). A perceived failure, together with internal issues, rising discontent and declining of Putin’s popularity would not seem to promise anything good for the existing regime. Based on this idea the thesis argues that the survival of Putin, his regime and the elite depended on the success of the Crimean operation and hence made the Crimean issue enormously significant. This is why this paper will see the referendum, and the Crimean operation overall, as particularly important and overarching event for the Kremlin.

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10!Because it is not the main subject of investigation of the thesis.!

11!Support to Yanukovych, attempts to encourage Ukraine to become member of Customs Union, gas transit etc.!

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4. History of Russian media

This chapter will present and discuss the historical background of the most important and salient actions of the Russian government to limit the freedom of the media since 2000 till now. The actions that will be analyzed in this part are all connected to media outlets, especially, on the one hand, how the government has been limiting the activity of the media in various ways, and on the other hand, how it was supporting the free and independent media (if it did). This is done to introduce the developments in the Russian media sector, and present the wider picture and context of this research. It will help to see in what situation the Russian media was at the beginning of the century, in what direction it has been moving and possibly think where it can go now. The chapter discusses the media from different perspectives, it touches relevant legislations, popularity of specific media types and outlets, it talks about the quality of Russian journalism and compares it to Western journalism. This is supplemented by a wide historical perspective and a discussion of the specific conditions in which Russian media developed.

4.1 State of Russian media

During the growing economic stability of Russia from 1999 onwards, the financial security of the media, especially the television, has improved considerably under Putin. New media companies have emerged and developed into successful businesses. However Oates and McCormack argue that despite all these positive economic developments during which Russian economy continued to grow, the media faced a decline in diversity of opinions and objectivity (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 118)13

. After the soviet period Russian media became more professional and new sources of information have emerged, but it never became “objective” and “balanced”. This might be because politicians, the public and the journalists themselves see the media as a political actor or propaganda tool rather than a necessary democratic actor that checks political power of the politicians (Oates and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

13!This chapter relies a lot on the work of Oates and McCormack, as these authors are one of the most complete and reliable sources of information about Russian mass media.!

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McCormack 2010, p. 118). The current Russian state does not have an overt system of state imposed censorship on mass media, yet the media still cannot freely act as an actor that contributes to democracy. It is important to notice that sources of alternative information were and still are available, and, especially with the development of the Internet, can potentially become important players in the information sector (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 118). According to the authors, already in 2010 Russian mass media offers a variety of different newspapers, TV channels and radio stations, in urban areas this diversity is comparable to Western Europe and the access to this information is free (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 119).

However the authors argue that two important factors differentiate Russian media sector from Western European: first, the state controlled «Channel One» with its relatively high-quality content and its pro-Kremlin position; and second, a relatively underdeveloped online media sphere (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 119). «Channel One»14

(22.9% rating in 200515

) and «Rossiya 1» («Russia 1»)16

(22.6% rating in 2005) are the two most popular channels in Russia, which apart from entertainment programs broadcast news and analytical content. More recent information concerning popularity of TV channels is not available, however it is possible to claim that «Channel One» remains the most popular TV channel followed by «Russia 1». Oates, already in 2006, argued that these channels were not pluralistic and lacked political diversity (Oates 2006), since then the channels did not start to treat the political opposition differently. TV channels continue to marginalize the opposition with the help of talks with the so-called “political experts” that claim that Russian opposition is acting in the interest of foreign governments or in their own personal interests17,

while opposition leaders are never invited to TV programs to speak for themselves. What is also interesting about Russian TV sector is that regional TV channels were also relatively popular and take the third place with 12.3% rating in 200515

after «Channel One» and «Russia 1». Fossato explains that local TV channels address !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

14

State controlled channel. Owned by 51% by the Russian state, 24% belong to Roman Abramovich.

15

More recent data is not available.

16

Another state-owned TV channel. It directly belongs to the Government of Russia

17

For example documentary movie “Anatomy of Protest” claimed that oppositional politicians received money from foreign countries to begin protests and destabilize Russia.!

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internal sensitive issues, such as AIDS and HIV, abolition of subsidies, corruption, xenophobia etc. that are not addressed on federal channels. This might be the reason why information on federal channels like «Channel One» or «Russia 1» was quite often ignored by the public, at least in the period of 2005 (Fossato 2007). While the information about international issues provided by federal channels is trusted by the wider public. One important reason for this might be that local channels simply do not cover enough the international events and thus do not balance the federal channels (Fossato 2007). Additionally, Fossato supports the opinion that Russian journalists generally are not interested in completing their main function, which is to serve the interests of the public by providing objective information, and instead they prefer to demonstrate their dependence and loyalty to the state (Fossato 2007). In terms of newspapers18, in 2014 the most popular is «Argumenty i Facty» («Arguments and

Facts») with circulation of 2 million in 2014 (ABC 2015), in second place is «Weekly Life» (1.9 million in 2008), followed by «Komsomolskaya Pravda» 1.8 million in 2015 (ABC 2015), «TV Guide» (1.2 million in 2008), and Perm Region «Izvestiya» (1 million in 2008). It is however critical to notice that these newspapers, despite their lead in circulation numbers, have less impact than newspapers like «Kommersant».

«Kommersant» for instance is a leading business newspaper with circulation of only

96,778 copies in 2015 (ABC 2015), but according to the authors its audience includes key decision-makers (Oates and McCormack 2010, pp. 121-2). It is essential to point to the fact that Russia was a newspaper-reading country 22 years ago, however gradually the television has become more popular and turned the country into television-watching country (Pietilainen 2008, pp. 365). The newspapers were gradually losing their popularity due to the development of the television, magazines and the Internet, and partly because the newspapers were writing about topics that did not interest the wider audience. The newspapers that have been able to identify their reader, such as «Komsomolskaya Pravda», are more successful at preserving their positions, while the Internet is taking at least part of the place of newspapers for the elite and the middle class (Pietilainen 2008, pp. 383). Internet has been quickly developing in Russia at the beginning of the 21st century; in 2008 Cooper argued that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

18!Newspapers usually do not publish this information and thus data from ABC Bureau of Circulation Audit was used, which does not have information for all the newspapers mentioned in the thesis. For example, for «Vedomosti» this paper relies on information provided by «Vedomosti» on their website.!

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Russian Internet was still underdeveloped compared to other developed countries (Cooper 2008). The table below shows that since 2008 the monthly Internet audience has more than doubled from 26 percent in 2008 to 62 percent in summer 2014. While the daily percentage of users of the Internet has grown from only 14 percent in 2008 to 50 percent in 2014 (FOM 2014). This shows that Russian Internet became more accessible to the people and has greatly developed since 2008.

4.2 How the Kremlin attempts to constraint and control the media

In terms of the freedom of the media, it is clear that the Russian Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and theoretically any new law should be based on this principle and assist the development of democracy and political plurality. However Oates argues that the laws actually tend to work against the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech (Oates 2006, pp. 21-9). The government tends to apply the laws selectively, while the whole media sector lacks transparency, which as a result assists the government in limiting the development of real opposition (Oates and McCormack 2010, pp. 123).

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An important example is the case of media conglomerate «Media-Most», which included independent «NTV» channel19

, and later was closed in 2001 after it became part of «Gazprom-Media»20

through the application of financial laws (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 123). This is an example of how the law was used selectively against Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of «Media-Most», to eliminate a potential threatening and popular TV channel that criticized the Kremlin. «NTV»’s case is an important historical example of how a commercial media attempted to balance the pro-Kremlin media outlets and failed due to governmental pressure (Oates and McCormack 2010, pp. 130-1). Furthermore in 2002 an “anti-terrorist” package of laws has been passed, which allows the state officials to interpret different forms of government opposition as “extremism” and thus ban it. After that in 2007 the law was amended and now it gives even more opportunities to control the mass media by interpreting wide range of political media coverage as “extremist” (Oates and McCormack 2010, pp. 123-4). However the “legal limitations” are not the only negative factors that prevent the media from contributing to pluralism and democracy. Physical threats and violence also remain an issue; Russia was one of the most dangerous places for journalists, especially during the Chechen War (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 124). According to Committee to Protect Journalists 56 journalists were killed in Russia since 1992. In 1995 alone, during the First Chechen War, 12 journalists were murdered (CPJ 2015). The most salient case is the murder of Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, who wrote about Chechen War for liberal «Novaya

Gazeta» that will be analyzed in the next part of this thesis. President Putin said that

the work of Politkovskaya had little influence on Russian politics. The killer – Rustam Mahmudov with two accomplices were found guilty, while the person who hired Rustam is still unknown (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2014). This aura of threat and impunity of criminals undoubtedly impacts the independent journalists in a negative way.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

19

«NTV» was popular critic of the Kremlin even before Putin and during Yeltsin’s presidency, but later in 2001 it was taken over by «Gazprom-Media».

20

Is state-owned media conglomerate that, apart from the «NTV», owns several other media outlets, including the well-known and editorially independent radio station

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4.3 Unique character of Russian media

The development of Russian media in the post-Soviet Russian state should not be seen as linear, after the end of Communist Party monopoly and introduction of political freedoms the Russian media has borrowed a lot from its Western counterpart. However these transformations, Vartanova argues, were mainly “cosmetic” and visual, rather than deep and fundamental changes that rejected the old soviet-type journalistic paradigm (Vartanova 2012, p. 121). The informal rules and practices of the Russian media differed significantly from Western European and North American. This means that the process of development or transformation was not linear and did not necessary lead to the ideal Western type of media standard (Vartanova 2012, p. 121). The Russian media for a very large period was developing without market forces or economic pressure, as the economic issues were managed by the state during “Court journalism, Imperial journalism and Communist journalism”, which helped the development of paternalistic basis (Ivanitsky 2009, p. 114). During these periods Russian journalism was financially supported and thus controlled by the Tsar or the Communist Party, needless to say that critical journalism was not allowed during some periods of Russian history. In other words, history of Russian journalism, for a long period of time, even before communism, during the tsarist period, was characterized by high dependence on the state; consequently Russian journalism started and arguably got used to serving the interests of the state. As a result, when the market forces were introduced, the media faced pressure from the state, which was not prepared to limit its involvement in media’s activity (Ivanitsky 2009, p. 114). The existing media either became commercialized (tabloid style) or used by political or business elites for their own benefit, taking a risk-free strategy (Vartanova 2012, p. 127). Thus the most salient characteristics of the Russian media are its dependence on the state and growing pressure from the market economy (Nordenstreng, Vartanova and Zassoursky 2002). The state pressures the media mostly informally, by applying positive or negative measures, for example: selectively apply laws to media outlets, as in the case of «NTV»; do not allow a particular media to attend a press conference and thus collect information; take legal actions against a specific media; acquire ownership of the media; or provide exclusive information or communication networks to friendly media (Vartanova 2012, p. 135). Despite the increasing independence of

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journalists (compared to previous periods of Russian history), in other words the liberalization in the media sphere and growing autonomy from political parties and state institutions, the freedom of speech has remained low with the journalists often practicing self-censorship, and the media being used as an instrument by political and business actors (Pietilainen 2002, p. 135). Other scholars have also supported this idea that Russian media system is different from the Western European model (Becker 2004; De Smaele 1999) and that this might be due to different historical legacies, geopolitical position and overall unique character of Russia, while the authoritarian structure of the state has also clearly played a role (Vartanova 2012, p. 140). These are the differences that distinguish Russian journalism and media sector in general from its Western counterpart. However Russian journalism also shares some important features with the Western press. Russian media outlets have followed the Western commercialization patterns and enlarged the amount of commercial media (Vartanova 2012, pp. 139-40). Based on this Vartanova concludes that the Russian media sphere can be described as “statist commercialized” (Vartanova 2012, p. 142).

As a result, the most dominant idea in the scholarly literature is that the problem of the Russian media lies in the Soviet past. More precisely the journalistic norms present in the authoritarian Soviet regime seem to have changed relatively little in the current Russian state. For example, despite significant innovations in the media it is still perceived by its owners as a tool of shaping people’s opinions in a beneficial way for its owners. Furthermore, authors claim that it is clear that the power of media was used by Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to raise support for their leadership. This is different in both the US and UK, where the media at least attempts to be objective and balanced, although it usually maintains the status quo of the system by supporting dominant values and ideals of the existing state (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 126). In other words in Russia it is not widely accepted by journalists and the media, that the media is a democratic institution that acts as a watchdog and an observer that serves the interests of the people (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 126). Instead the media in Russia plays a role of political player that serves the interests of businessmen and politicians, while the Russian audience accepts this for the sake of stability (Oates 2006, pp. 44-65). As a result, the first parliamentary elections in 1993 did not receive objective and balanced coverage, while the subsequent ones steadily

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followed the same path; the pro-Kremlin parties had advantages in terms of news coverage, free time and political advertising (Oates 2006). This situation has not changed since then and arguably became even more unbalanced.

In terms of the Internet, Oates and McCormack argue that it is still underdeveloped and does not have such a large reach as the TV does, at least at the time of their publication, however previous chapters have shown that the internet has greatly developed since then. Additionally, they think that the same mainstream media dominates the Internet and most importantly the existing Russian political norms will be replicated in the Internet instead of being challenged (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 133). Finally, they argue that “Russia is shaping the Internet, rather than the Russian society being shaped by the Internet” (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 133). This argument can be supported by the coming discussion of the “Kremlin trolls” in the next part, which is a good example of how the government attempts to shape the Internet, however the effectiveness of the trolls’ work has never been measured, and most importantly Etling in the same period has argued that the Russian Internet is dominated by the opposition (Etling 2010, p. 3)21

.

Oates and McCormack in their research conclude that in general the Russian media is biased, as it clearly supports the Kremlin’s elites and helps them to remain in power, and it is not balanced because it gives more time to pro-Kremlin politicians, usually ignoring the opposition (Oates and McCormack 2010, pp. 133-4). The media uses every opportunity to support the existing incumbent elite, and present them in a more positive light, while marginalizing any opposition (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 134). In their opinion the independent media outlets exist, such as liberal «Novaya

Gazeta», however the public in general is not interested in alternative information, at

least in the period of the late 2000’s when the article was published (Oates and McCormack 2010, p. 133).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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4.4 Unique character of Russian audience

Now this thesis moves into discussing what the Russian audience thinks about the content of different newspapers, TV channels, blogs, radio stations etc. especially the young, educated and urban citizens of Russia. This work argues that their opinions and interpretations are highly segmented (Toepfl 2013). A good example, which shows that Russian society is extremely divided, is the case of Crimea. After the Crimean conflict one big group of the society became an ardent supporter of accession of Crimea, while another smaller but not less solid group became an active opponent of intervention in Ukraine. Another important characteristic of the Russian hybrid regime is the ideological diversity in the media. According to Toepfl it is more diverse than the Western media, which is characterized by liberal-democratic consensus, while Russian media includes liberal, nationalistic, communist media (Toepfl 2013, p. 249). This is backed by Becker who argued that Russian published media is “extremely diverse, exceeding that of many liberal democracies” (Becker 2004, p. 156). Toepfl goes further and claims that the existing Russian media can be separated in several types: first, the official media that supports the ideology of the existing regime, which includes state-owned TV, newspapers, radio stations, blogs and Internet websites; second, the commercial media, that is loyal to the regime but at the same time a bit more critical, for example yellow press and Internet sites; third, liberal-democratic media such as Internet TV, radio stations, newspapers, news sites and blogs of opposition’s politicians; fourth, nationalist media; and lastly, and communist media outlets (Toepfl 2013, p. 248). Undoubtedly the official media dominates in terms of audience reach (Oates 2006) and 92% of Russians mostly rely on TV for political news (FOM 2011). However what is interesting is that the Internet22

is dominated by nationalist and democratic opposition, while the pro-Kremlin bloggers were not that popular in 2010 (Etling 2010, p. 3). The pro-Kremlin reacted to this and since 2013 employed Internet users to spread propaganda in Russian and foreign Internet sectors. The most famous organization known for creating the “Kremlin trolls” is «Internet Issledovaniya» (Internet Research) based in Saint Petersburg. These Internet trolls have to create Internet content with certain key words, write fixed amount of comments pricing the work of Vladimir Putin, Sergey !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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Sobyanin23

or other politicians, and collectively attack users with oppositional views (Novaya Gazeta 2013). The effects of their activity on the public are not assessed, however it is possible to argue that they create unnecessary “noise” in the Internet and hinder normal communication between individuals.

Toepfl comes to the conclusion that the Russian public is divided into two groups, those that interpret the information exactly the way that the Kremlin wants and another large group that explicitly rejects this “official” interpretation (Toepfl 2013, p. 259). Furthermore, the best predictor of whether an individual will accept the official interpretation is if he or she does not follow the news at all or limits its sources of information to official media thus becoming a “narrowly informed” citizen, while those that are more informed interpret the information in a more critical way and take oppositional or at least controversial positions (Toepfl 2013, p. 259). Finally, Toepfl also highlights the importance of a “last filter inside the head”, which is sometimes the only filter that actually exists in contemporary hybrid Russia. To interpret the information published in democratic blogs (or any information) in the liberal-democratic way the reader has to employ the liberal-liberal-democratic decoding of information, which is not necessarily what the reader will do (Toepfl 2013, p. 262).

4.5 Recent events in Russian media sphere

In the more recent historical period since Putin’s reelection in 2014, according to Dmitriy Kazmin, director of independent charitable trust «Mediastandart»24

, the media received a lot of attention from the state. The state attempted to pressure the independent or not fully controlled media not only by using “legal” means but also by directly or indirectly pressuring the owners of media and advertising companies (Kazmin 2015). In 2014 several rules were passed or entered into force that allowed the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 23!Major of Moscow.!

24!«Mediastandard» was established in 2014 and states that its goal is to support the quality of journalism and media in Russia.!

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Mass Media or more simply Roskomnadzor25

to block websites that “called for riots” without clearly defining the difference between violent riots and peaceful protest, as a result several opposition websites were blocked along with pages of political activists26

(Kazmin 2015). Apart from limiting access to websites Roskomnadzor issued several warnings to «RBC» for publishing «Charlie Hebdo»’s caricatures, to

«Ekho Moskvy» for live discussion, and to «Lenta.ru» which was used as a reason for

dismissing the editor in chief – Galina Timchenko and change the editorial policy of «Lenta.ru» to pro-governmental (Kazmin 2015). Furthermore the limitations on the share of foreign investors in Russian media can theoretically lead to closure of authoritative and independent from the government or Russian business media outlets like «Vedomosti». TV channels are also having a hard time, for example «TV Dozhd» was excluded from packages of cable operators and is de-facto becoming Internet-TV-channel (Kazmin 2015). At the same time the government continues to support and even raise financial subsidies in times of crisis to pro-Kremlin media that practices self-censorship and thus arguably looses control over the “information field”. As a result the author argues that the Internet media receives an advantage along with the Russian media based outside Russia, which the government is unable to control (Kazmin 2015). This is because these news outlets will not ignore the real problems, which the pro-Kremlin media does not want to notice, and will be able to operate independently, theoretically improve their quality standards and eventually interest the readers with discussions of pressing issues.

4.6 Summary

This last paragraph will summarize all the key ideas of this chapter and discuss the findings. The aim of the historical background chapter was to answer the first question of the thesis, which was: how free is the opposition-oriented media? This is a broad macro question that attempted to show the environment in which the Russian media exists. To do so, this chapter started from the introduction of some of the key facts, such as the fact that Russian TV is dominated by two state-owned channels: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

25!A federal authority responsible for monitoring the media, including Internet media, send warnings and block (Internet websites) or withdraw registration from media outlets that consistently break the law.!

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«Rossiya-1» and «Channel One». The wider public does not trust the information

provided by state-controlled channels concerning internal issues, at least in 2005. The newspapers since the 90s were losing popularity and turned Russia into TV watching country. In the recent period the Internet started to develop quickly and interestingly it was, and probably still is, dominated by opposition bloggers and politicians. The case of the “Kremlin trolls” shows that the state realized the fact that the Internet helped to form the opposition in Russia, which was particularly active in the 2011 to 2013 period, and that the Kremlin needs to interfere into this “zone of freedom”. The government vigorously engaged into the limitation of the press even before the Internet started to play any role in Russia. The key example of governmental intervention into media’s affairs was the case of «Media-Most» and «NTV» channel that became state-owned in 2001. However, taking over a media outlet was not the only strategy that the government used to control the independent media, “anti-terrorist” laws, which theoretically had to fight extremism, now can be used as a tool to pressure disloyal media. Apart from the “legal repressions” journalists were sometimes threatened and 56 journalists in Russia were killed since 1992. This shows that, on the one hand, the Russian independent media is often threatened and limited by the state in an attempt to control it. While on the other hand, Russian media is under the pressure from the market forces that were introduced only recently. Russian media has a unique character that has developed over a long period of state-dependence and still remains a problem for some journalists and media outlets. This problem lays in the authoritarian past according to Oats and McCormack and, to some degree, in the hybrid present.

The Russian audience is a separate topic in this chapter and it demonstrates that the Russian society is highly divided. This part also talks about a very important concept – “filter inside the head”, it means that the individuals tend to interpret any information in a particular way. For example, two different people can interpret the same peace of information in several different ways, for example: as intended by the Kremlin, or in a liberal-democratic way etc., depending on their “filter inside the head” they will interpret the information differently. This is often the only filter in contemporary Russia, as alternatives to Kremlin’s news and information is available to the public. This concept should be supplemented by the idea of hegemony, because

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an authoritarian, hybrid or democratic regime does not need to destroy or control all the independent media to survive, what it needs, according to Antonio Gramsci is hegemony (Gramsci 1999). Cultural hegemony is the dominance of one worldview, which is imposed on the rest of the society by the ruling elite so this worldview becomes an unquestionable norm or commonsense that helps to preserve the status quo of the elite. For this research this means, that Russians are not critically different from Europeans27

and that they also do not want to be oppressed, unfairly treated or enslaved by the rulers. It means that in Russia the Kremlin with the help of the media, especially television channels, formulates the agenda and imposes its cultural hegemony, which, by the way, is not always accepted. In this case the Russian hybrid regime does not need to control or destroy all the media, it only needs to formulate the mainstream and set the agenda in all the different media types, especially on TV and, in the future, in the Internet. The independent media is able to survive under the condition of constant pressure from the state and the market, it can move to another country, like the ex-«Lenta» did, however what matters is who formulates the agenda and the mainstream. Now the state is in charge, but according to Kazmin the state looses control of the “information field” because it ignores the real problems that matter to the people and attempts to distract the public from these problems rather than inform about and debate the ways to solve them.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

27!However, it is clear that cultural differences exist and every nationality as well as every person is different.!

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5. Analysis of independent newspapers

This chapter will consist of the collected data, analysis of this data, its presentation and discussion in the light of the question, and sub-questions of the thesis. First, this part will start from the introduction of the case of «Lenta.ru». It will consist of a short historical background of this media outlet, together with general information about it, and most importantly, it will start discussing the conflict that emerged the 12th of March 2014. The next paragraph will talk specifically about the events that led to the dismissal of editor in chief Galina Timchenko and resignation of the majority of the staff of «Lenta.ru» as a sign of disagreement with such decision. After that, a table is presented that will serve as a guide and help to understand the data from the next paragraphs. This is followed by the content analysis of three independent Russian newspapers: «Novaya Gazeta», «RBC» and «Vedomosti». These newspapers are analyzed separately and their articles are divided into two categories: those related to «Lenta.ru»; and others that focus on Crimea and the international conflict around the situation. This analysis ends in a short discussion of the findings.

5.1 «Lenta.ru»

First, this chapter provides general information about Lenta.ru. Lenta.ru is an online-newspaper, based in Moscow, which was founded by Anton Nosik28

in 1999 with the assistance of the Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP) which is a Russian organization involved in developing political campaigns and political media outlets, primarily websites. «Lenta.ru» was owned by «Rambler-Afisha»29

which in 2013 united with «SUP Media», to later form a group of companies known as «Afisha-Rambler-SUP»30

later renamed and now known as «Rambler&Co» that specializes on media and information technologies. «Rambler&Co» owns, apart from «Lenta.ru», other big Internet projects, such as the social-political Internet-newspaper «Gazeta.ru», Internet-portal «Rambler», entertainment Internet-portal «Afisha», !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

28!Journalist and startup manager.!

29!Which in turn was owned by Russian entrepreneur and oligarch Vladimir Potanin through media conglomerate «ProfMedia».!

30!In 2013 50% of the conglomerate belonged to Potanin, more recent information is not available.!

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sports website «Championat.ru», blog/social network platform «LiveJournal» and other popular websites.

«Lenta.ru» is a success story in Russian Internet media sphere, the Internet-portal was the most cited Internet news webpage in the Russian blog sphere in 2010 (Etling, et.al. 2010, p. 30). Furthermore, in 2013 an USA based Internet analytics company has published a research in which «Lenta.ru» was the fifth most visited news website in Europe and first in Russia (Ria.ru 2013). Now, in May 2015, according to «Alexa.com»31

«Lenta.ru» is taking a twenty-sixth place in Russia amongst all type of websites32

, while «RBC.com»33

is ranked eighteenth overall in Russia. This means that «Lenta.ru» is now the second most popular news-website after «RBC.com» (Alexa.com 2015). This data shows that «Lenta.ru» was and remains a popular news website in Russia. It is also noteworthy that the website was a significant critic of Putin and Kremlin in general during the period when Galina Timchenko was editor-in-chief. This is the reason why it became so prominent in the Russian blog sphere, dominated mainly by liberal and nationalistic opposition (Etling, et.al. 2010). The story of “old” «Lenta.ru» ended on the 12th of March of 2014 when the General Director of «Rambler&Co» Alexander Mamut fired Galina Timchenko and replaced her with Alexey Goreslavsky after which 58 staff members out of the total of 94 decided to leave «Lenta.ru» (Povoraznyuk and Amirdzhanyan 2014). Now «Lenta.ru» continues to exist (new employees were recruited after the incident) and remains a very popular news source in the Internet. The opposition stopped quoting and citing this news outlet, the website has lost some of its popularity, however it remains one of the most dominant online news website in Russia (Alexa.com 2015). Galina Timchenko and the staff that supported her moved to Latvia and opened a new online news outlet based in Riga – «Meduza.io», and now continue reporting news to Russian citizens. The next paragraph will describe this event and explain how the situation has emerged and led to the dismissal of Galina Timchenko and thus to the change in editorial politics.

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31!Company that provides Internet traffic information.! 32!Not only news.!

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