1st of July 2018
MA Thesis, Asian Studies: PSE Leiden University
To what extent is the CCP actively pursuing the international development of its concept of internet sovereignty through the exploitation the current internet governance debates in the West?
Joost Klarenbeek S1799541 Joostklarenbeek92@gmail.com Word count: 15.350 (including bibliography, excluding appendices)
Table of content
1. Introduction...3
2. The current internet governance debate in the
West...6
2.1 The traditional Western view on internet governance...6
2.2 Internet governance: at crossroads?...10
3. Chinese vision on the internet governance...13
4. Convergence: an opportunity for the Chinese
discourse?...17
5. Methodology: discourse development analysis
20
6. Formal Diplomacy...22
6.1 United Nations Governmental Group of Experts (UNGGE)...23
6.2 World Internet Conference...25
6.2.1 2016 World Internet Conference...26
6.2.2 2017 World Internet Conference...28
6.2.3 Concluding remarks regarding the WIC...29
6.3 Commercial tools & One Belt One Road...31
6.4 Notes on formal diplomacy...32
7 Public diplomacy...34
7.1 Results...38
7.2 Fake news as validation...40
7.3 Data security...41
7.4 National security...43
8 Concluding remarks & suggestions for further
research...44
9 Bibliography...47
Appendix I – List of results...55
Appendix II – Word frequency list...56
1.Introduction
scenario for the West and, indeed, visions could not be more contradictory: whereas free speech (on the internet) is thought of as essential to our democracy: it is considered a Human Right (UN General Assembly art. 19), a development deeper explored by de la Rue1. A statement by Ren Xianliang, the vice minister of China’s top internet authority, provides insight in regards of how the CCP thinks of internet control and exemplifies the dichotomous situation: the process [internet control] was akin to “installing brakes on a car before driving on the road” (Cadell). There have been developments that could potentially form a breeding ground for ideological convergence though.
The subject of internet governance, and the relating debate, has reached the general public recently when the West startled due to the phenomenon fake news. The discourse, which started gaining popularity around the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States2, has brought about fear in the West – it has introduced a new enemy: looking at the Netherlands the fight against fake news has taken spotlight with the minister of domestic affairs, Kasja Ollongren, headlining the most popular TV-talk show on various occasions propagating fake news detection and issuing statements such as “Russia’s intelligence services eyeing the Netherlands” in one of the countries’ biggest papers (Volkskrant 2017). The unrest is not limited to the Netherlands though, various other European nations have also been trying to manage the debate and started initiatives to fight the fake news such as news filtering on Facebook in Germany (Leswing), starting a national security unit ‘modernising defence’ in the UK (Walker) and the law against fake news in France (McAuley). Also, the European Union has started an initiative fighting fake news by the EU vs. Disinformation, a platform headlining with the frightening ‘don’t be deceived’3, a statement clearly pointing towards the idea that the general public should be protected against this enemy, against being deceived.
This development is not uncontested though: the example in France is described, by the New York Times, to be “raising fairs for freedom of speech” and the EU group is not without criticism either (Sedee), mainly from websites who’ve unrightfully been accused of 1 La Rue, Frank. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression." (2011).
2 The following link presents a graph showing popularity of the search term ‘fake news’ on Google: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=fake%20news
presenting fake news. This problem is also laid bare by Arjen Lubach in the Netherlands as well. In his show he argues, in a video that ended up going viral (exemplifying that this debate is reaching the general public) that the fight against fake news brings along dilemmas: who is to decide what is ‘the’ truth and doesn’t this hint towards the censorship, something that strongly contradicts with the Western democratic ideas? As Jon Henley argues in the Guardian: “But unlike, say, hate speech, terrorism advocacy or child pornography, fake news is a tricky area for the law: it has not, generally, been illegal – and in democracies, political speech is seen as deserving the strongest of free speech protections.” (Henley).
The criticism introduced above uncovers a challenging dilemma. It is causing tension in Western societies which are faced with the choice between the much cherished value of freedom leading to possibly being misinformed with the consequences that have already appeared and, on the other hand, any form of information control, something the West has been very critical of. With the examples of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and the European Union in mind the consensus seems to be centered around the latter option: misinformation appears to be big too big of a risk. This development is a symptom for a bigger shift in Western thought regarding internet governance: one could say it is inevitably shifting along the axis of internet, and information freedom, more towards the traditional antithesis in this regard: China.
On this other end of the spectrum, China, a country openly expressing its desire to become a bigger player worldwide, wants to be understood as it needs to gain soft power. The situation regarding president Trump and the resulting public unrest can not have passed unnoticed in Beijing and the possible shift along the axis might offer opportunities for the Chinese discourse, a discourse that has been highly criticized before. Is this an opportunity that the CCP is willing (and able) to capitalize on?
To find out whether this is the case, this work will focus on the central theme of the Chinese internet policy (and a point where it firmly contrasts with the West): the concept of cyber sovereignty. First it will map out the current situation, look into the positions of both the West and China regarding this concept. It will look at the possible ways the CCP could promote its discourse to see whether it actually uses (or exploits) the current situation to its
advantage through an analysis of the discourse the CCP presents on these channels.
2.The current internet governance debate in
the West
2.1 The traditional Western view on internet
governance.
“Almost from its inception, the internet fostered hopeful expectations that connectivity might deliver economic and political liberalization for user populations, if not the outright transformation of digital society into a cosmopolitan utopia” (Lindsay 13). This Western belief regarding the liberalization that the internet would bring along, delineated by Lindsay, is rooted in the traditional view on its governance which is clearly presented by cyber libertarian John Perry Barlow in his declaration of the independence of cyberspace which was presented in Davos in 1996:
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather (….) We must declare our virtual selves’ immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts” (Barlow). The libertarian ideas of Barlow manifest themselves in more contemporary thought as well: as mentioned before, The United Nations has taken up the right on free internet access in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the summer of 2016: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” [emphasis by author] (UDHR, Article 19). Besides the vox populi that internet should be free of frontiers thus should not be governed, it has also been a common thought that this governance is nearly impossible, something a famous quote by Bill Clinton in 2000 in which he compared it (in the Chinese context) to “nailing Jell-O to a wall”, confirms.
This statement by Clinton interrelates with the zeitgeist of the post-cold war times: that of the American Empire, evidently showing in a statement Clinton made in China three years earlier where he said that the CCP was on the “wrong side of history” (Bacevich 32). Bacevich effectively outlines the American thought on its own position: “America itself had come to define “the right side of history.” It had blazed the trail that others followed. Progressive, forward-looking, divining the spirit of the age, America epitomized the destination toward which all humanity is inevitably traveling” (Bacevich 33). This resulted in the felt need to lead the world to this inevitable destination (this intent is shown by, for instance, Condoleezza Rice who stated that the US needed to “accept responsibility for being on the right side of history” (Ibid. 34)). This end of history (or history’s intent) comprised of the blend of factors constituting the American (neo) liberalism: free speech, popular government and market economics (Ibid. 33), according to Rice part of this American responsibility of being on the ‘right side of history’ converged with the information revolution:
“The United States had “emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneous [internet] revolutions and their beneficiary.” She detected “powerful secular trends” that were “moving the world toward economic openness and—more unevenly—democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and one foot off.” Yet this much was clear: “the United States and its allies are on the right side of history.” (34).
The new system resulting from the secular trends described by Rice, Globalization, was seen as the post-cold war ideology, it was the “Age of Globalization” (Ibid. 38). Bacevich shows that the American belief that the globalization age (mainly being the internet revolution) will propagate the new system and indeed push the world towards the end of history4 in the following three ways:
4 For an ‘offline’ version of the idea, see: Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the last man. Simon and Schuster, 2006.
- In terms of political effect Clinton has argued that, “Globalization is empowering people with information, everywhere.” The inevitable result was political liberalization: “The more people know; the more opinions they’re going to have; the more democracy spreads (Bacevich 39).
- In terms of freedom (of speech) the same Clinton has stated that “They realize that if they open China’s market to global competition, they risk unleashing forces beyond their control,” including a “greater demand for freedom.” (Ibid.)
- Last but not least, in terms of economics: “If the fall of the Berlin Wall had not marked the official “end of history,” then the creation of the Internet certainly had, at least in the estimate of enthusiasts. As Thomas Friedman gushed, “Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world.” (Ibid.)
This enthusiasm regarding Globalization and its destiny - the move towards an American system stems in the belief that this move will do the United States well, as president Clinton stated “You know, we’re going to do very, very well, as the world becomes more interdependent” (Ibid. 38).
The 2010/11 Arab Spring, also called the Twitter Revolutions, seemed to serve as the perfect example of the American theory (the political effect, in particular), the internet would bring the middle east towards the (American) end of history – democratization. This strong belief was also represented in the fact that President Clinton government pledged a 25 million dollar investment for the ‘internet freedom agenda’ in January 20155. On the other hand, China took counter measures: the CCP instantly blocked search terms leading to the Arab spring but also, on a longer term it learned:
“But democratic governments aren’t the only ones reacting to the Arab Spring. Autocracies, including China, which hosts the world’s most sophisticated online control regime, are drawing their own lessons” (Fontaine and Rogers)6.
However, what started out as a perfect propagation of the American values quickly turned out to not to be as effective as imagined and theorized: the outright enthusiasm at the time of the protests (January 2011) silenced fast: at the end of the year the New York times headed “Why did the twitter revolutions fail – Social media can upend a society but it can’t build a new one” (Krastev) and the Independent concluding later on “The Arab Spring, five years on: A season that began in hope, but ended in desolation” (Cockburn). The Arab Spring did not unpack as the West, on the basis of the end of history belief, had expected: the internet, and the forth flowing freedom of expression, turned out not be the outright liberalizer it was imagined to be. It also clearly laid bare the different approaches to (social) media freedom between China and the US – investment versus censoring. Has the disappointing Arab Spring undermined the strong thought that the internet would inevitably liberalization and democratization?
2.2 Internet governance: at crossroads?
It is important to note that although a strong Western libertarian vision on internet governance dominates it does not mean that the internet has been ungoverned. Because internet governance challenges the conventional Western system: the Westphalian model in which countries exert sovereignty over their terrain because the internet is, as Wentworth argues, fundamentally borderless (1), the internet has mainly been governed by a bottom-up approach known as the multi-stakeholder approach. Liddicoat offers further explanation regarding the argumentation behind the multi stakeholder model: it offers protection against destructive interference: “The multi-stakeholder model provides important (perhaps vital) counterweight to attempts by States to interfere with freedom of expression, particularly the 6
rights to seek, receive and impart ideas and information, by giving all stakeholders equal status, the right to be heard and to shape standards creation” (Liddicoat 15) – an explanation that, indeed, very much fits in with the Western democratic values. Besides the actors involved it is also important to note that this form of governance is merely focused on what Yochai Benkler identified as the infrastructural levels, not the content level7 - the level in which governance is mainly criticized in the Chinese case.
This model is deeper explored by Wentworth as “technologists, the private sector and civil society in a bottom-up, consensus driven approach to standards setting, internet development, and management” (Ibid.). Looking at bit closer, Hill defines seven participants in the internets multi-stakeholder model: States/governments, private sector/commercial companies, civil society, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, meaning non-commercial, non-civil society, private sector organizations., academic community, technical community (29).
This multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance has not been without criticism though, IANA and ICANN have been heavily criticized (by China, amongst others) for being under U.S. control too much (Robinson 198), as Shen has identified: “With the changing geopolitics of a post-Snowden cyberspace and the emergence of substantial players in the global south, an Internet policy that was mostly established by the US for the world came into question” (Shen 319. Equally important, this criticism has not just come from ‘outside’, or the global south, though – as shown in both the previous section and the introduction of this work there have been examples showing that the internet (and the Western ideas regarding its governance) do not work as initially imagined.
Whereas the focus originally has been on the economic benefits the free internet has brought to nations (and freedom and political effects according to Bacevich) attention has shifted towards national, and other forms of, security (Broeders 9), to such a large extent that Broeders defines the securitization of the internet as one of the three main trends in 7 For more information on the three layers identified by Benkler see: Benkler, Yochai. "From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access." Federal Communications Law Journal 52.3 (2000): 561-579. Web
the field of internet governance. A shift well needed: The President of ACM, David Patterson argued, already in 2005, that in regards of internet development cybersecurity has been largely neglected: “We must protect the security and privacy of C&C users from criminals and terrorists while preventing the Orwellian vision of Big Brother. C&C in the 21st century should be as safe as 20th century banking” (Patterson). Yet, in 2017 Moshe Vardi (Patterson’s editor in chief) argues that this appeal is still relevant: whereas self driving cars, fintech (financial technology) and medtech (medical technology) are ‘hot’ “we still do not seem to know how to build secure information systems” (Vardi). Although the shift was needed it is problematic in relation to the free internet according to Vardi who argues that the libertarian mantra of “regulation stifles innovation” is dangerous because “numerous issues will have to be debated and resolved, but we must accept, I believe, that the cybersecurity problem will not be re- solved by the market” (Vardi).
This is a danger that governments have also started to recognize, according to Broeders, who argues that “states are now demanding a bigger role for themselves, putting enormous pressure on the bottom-up nature of this system” (Broeders, 16), now deeming the former laissez-faire approach inappropriate – the approach represented in the multi-stakeholder model in which governments have minimal control. This statement is supported by van den Berg: “Governments in many Western countries are grappling with ways in which they can impact cybersecurity in a positive way, predominantly through the use of regulatory interventions” (202). This also serves as an explanation for the measures governments have been taking recently, as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. This increasing governmental interest in the internet brings up certain challenges, as some authors have called it the crossroads of internet governance in which “two worlds are set to clash, the global non-territorial world of the internet versus the world of national states, with territorial sovereignty as the organizing principle of international relations” (Broeders, 17). This crossroad is also recognized by Neelie Kroes who, in a policy document for the European commission regarding internet governance, mentions “this [debate on internet governance] is often a polarized debate. Between, on the one hand, those wanting public authorities to be heavily involved; and on the other those who want a more hands-off, "laissez faire" approach” (2). The idea that this clash is happening at the moment is carried
quite broadly looking at the fact that looking at the fact that, amongst others, “Ronald Deibert’s 2013 book is entitled Black code. Inside the battle for cyberspace; the first chapter heading of Milton Mueller’s book Networks and states (2010) is ‘A battle for the soul of the Internet’; and Laura DeNardis’ latest book (2014) is titled The global war for Internet governance” (Broeders, 20) but also Darkening Web by Alexander Klimburg (2017). This clash is not just fought over cybersecurity though: whereas Patterson has been building its argument with relatively minor examples of internet’s insecurities (Smaller DDos attacks, phishing and so forth) more recent times have brought quite alarming examples in which the internet does not fulfill in regards of the proposed benefits – and even works counterproductive8. As argued in the introduction this (academic) debate has taken a place in the spotlight with the recent rise of the fake news discourse, indeed one of the symptoms. Does this broadening acknowledgement offer new opportunities for Chinese discourse development?
3.Chinese vision on the internet governance
In analysing the Chinese vision on the internet and its governance this thesis will focus on the contemporary position with the Chinese pivot in 2014, as identified by Creemers, as the starting point during which the importance of the internet and information technology has fundamentally shifted in the eyes of the Chinese leaders (13), a shift aimed at making China a cyber superpower. As mentioned in the previous section the multi-stakeholder model favoured by the West has been criticized by the Chinese on the international stage, mainly for it being under control by the West (the United States in particular). This section will go into the Chinese alternative, the CCP’s vision on the subject of internet governance by looking at CCP policy documents publicly available.Whereas the Western situation appears to be in discord, with opinions and visions being widely divided: indeed, on a crossroad, the Chinese vision remains constant. In the end of 2014 Lu Wei (the director of the Cyber administration of China at the time) could not be any clearer about the most important value in internet governance, his publication in the Huffington Post was titled “Cyber Sovereignty must rule global internet”. Interestingly one could say that in this article Wei argued for a model which hinging towards a cyber version of the Westphalian model, the one challenged by its own inventors through the multi-stakeholder model.
Later, in 2015, during the second Wuzhen Internet Conference the importance of cyber sovereignty was reaffirmed by Xi Jinping in his speech which offered very useful insight in the Chinese internet governance agenda. Xi argued for dialogue and cooperation in internet governance to tackle its challenges (such as cybercrime, but also privacy infringement and the information gap between countries). In this regard Xi has presented four principles to make progress:
I. Respect for cyber sovereignty II. Maintenance of peace and security III. Promotion of openness and cooperation IV. Cultivation of good order
Additionally, Xi has proposed five steps of action:
I. Speed up the building of global internet infrastructure and promote inter-connectivity
II. Build an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning
III. Promote innovative development of cyber economy for common prosperity IV. Maintain cyber security and promote orderly development
V. Build an internet governance system to promote equity and justice
This speech, the BBC argues, makes clear that (in line with Creemers’ argument regarding the Chinese pivot mentioned before) that “Internet security and control have been elevated to national priorities” (“China internet: Xi Jinping”), with cyber sovereignty at its core (Schia 2). The ideas underlying Xi’s speech have been worked out in more detail in the CCP’s ‘International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace’ which offers essential information in this regard as it “provides a comprehensive explanation of China’s policy and position on cyber-related international affairs as well as the basic principles, strategic goals and plan of action in its external relations on that front” (“International strategy for cooperation in cyberspace”, 1). Whereas the CCP regards the internet a platform that offers opportunities it also recognizes the challenges it brings along: “Security and stability in cyberspace has become a global concern which bears on the sovereignty, security and development interests of all countries”. Although this would be in line with the trend found in the West it does not only mention cyber crime in this regard, another important point is “interference in other countries’ internal affairs” (Ibid.). It argues that the absence of rules hampers the development and the effect of the internet. Whereas the defined principles in the international strategy for cooperation in cyberspace are about the same as in Xi’s speech this policy document closely defines the cyber sovereignty described by Lu Wei in 2014 as
“Countries should respect each other’s right to choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate
in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing. No country should pursue cyber hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, or engage in, condone or support cyber activities that undermine other countries’ national security” (Ibid. 2).
As mentioned before, this idea is very much at odds with the traditional thought of the internet as common good as the quote by Barlow in the first chapter proves (“We must declare our virtual selves’ immune to your sovereignty”), which also shown by Lindsay (13), and summarized by Kleinwachter as
“The IANA transition stands for a multistakeholder bottom up policy development process. The Chinese law stands for a top-down governmental approach. The new ICANN Bylaws are probably the most advanced version of a multistakeholder mechanism for a free, open and unfragmented Internet. The Chinese cybersecurity law is probably the most outspoken version of how a country can control the Internet within its territorial borders” (Internet governance outlook 2017).
The concept of cyber sovereignty is linked to the third principle of “shared governance” in which the CCP argues for equal footing for all states : “Countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all equal members of the international community entitled to equal participation in developing international order and rules in cyberspace through international governance mechanisms and platforms, to ensure that the future development of cyberspace is in the hands of all peoples”(International strategy for cooperation in cyberspace”, 1). Something which, again, would be strongly at odds with the current (US) centered international cyber governance through the multi-stakeholder model. Unsurprisingly this is something the United States (together with the other Anglo Saxon countries) stopped from happening when China pushed for its ideal version of internet governance: multilateral governance through the United Nations (Li Yan, 3).
The importance of the two principles mentioned above becomes clear when looking at the strategic goals mentioned in the same document of which, in particular, the first three openly argue for reforms in the current cyber governance system.
II. Developing a system of international rules III. Promoting fair internet governance
Although, as shown, the differences between the ‘Western’ and the Chinese views on internet governance are numerous, Kleinwachter has argued that in between the speech of Xi in 2015 and the document on cooperation in Cyberspace in 2017 China has moved a bit towards the multi-stakeholder model: it speaks about multi-party internet governance in which it “invites the Chinese private sector, technical community, and even civil society to participate in Internet policy making” (Kleinwachter).
To get insight in the actual ideological position of China in between these two models, and level of actual convergence, the CCP general Hao Yeli has published a helpful article in which he argues the binary opposition, between the West and China is based on perceptions: “the multi-lateral and the multi-party models are complementary rather than exclusive” (Yao 115). According to Yao both have their place in different levels of internet governance with sovereignty as the most important, fundamental, concept: “respect for cyber sovereignty is a prerequisite for international cooperation in this domain, and the basis for the construction of a beneficial cyberspace order” (Ibid.). Important to note that this does not solve the dichotomy (or binary opposition as Yao labels it): although the article indeed calls for convergence it also keeps emphasizing that cyber sovereignty should be the overarching concept in cyber governance, indeed, the concept where the US and China strongly disagree about.
4.Convergence: an opportunity for the Chinese
discourse?
The previous two sections have showed possible forms of convergence coming from both China and the West: China slowly adjusting its concept of cyber sovereignty from an autarkic concept towards a more open interpretation, as laid out by Yao. But even more so, the clash put forward by Broeders could be indicating a Western move towards the Chinese vision.
This is also identified by Demchak who has argued that both China (and other non-democratic states), through controlled internet, and the Western democracies, through internet filters, are already building up towards a new cyber Westphalia:
“Today we are seeing the beginnings of the border-making process across the world’s nations. From the Chinese intent to create their own controlled internal Internet, to increasingly controlled access to the Internet in less-democratic states, to the rise of Internet filters and rules in Western democracies, states are establishing the bounds of their sovereign control in the virtual world in the name of security and economic sustainability. The topology of the Internet, like the prairie of the 1800s’ American Midwest is about to be changed forever—rationally, conflictually, or collaterally—by the decisions of states” (Demchak 1).
The building towards a cyber Westphalia is agreed upon by Segal who identifies two main trends forming (Chinese) cyber diplomacy. The first comprises of the transactional nationalism of Trump “rooted in getting the best deals and protecting American interests, but not promoting American values”(2) (which contrasts with the idea of the American Empire laid out in previous sections), this ‘transactionalism’9 will result in less friction and criticism on Chinese ideas supplemented by the general Western “populist and anti-globalization sentiment [partly due to the insecurities on the internet funded by fake news, amongst others]”(2), a combination of which leads to data nationalism and could be exploited by the Chinese. As there appears to be academic consensus on the idea that the current dynamics surrounding the concept of internet governance offer opportunities for the development of the Chinese discourse, the question remains to be whether China indeed actively uses the current Western debate as a dystopian situation to validate its claims or if it remains in its traditional, rather defensive, position.
9 “The Trump administration will not carry forward the banner of the Internet freedom agenda. An early draft of the cybersecurity executive order contained a section on “Internet Freedom and Governance,” with a recommendation for producing a report for the president on actions supporting the multi-stakeholder process, but it was edited out of the final version”(2).
Although the CCP does not agree with the current (American) international internet
governance approach (“Overall, Beijing’s approach to the multi-stakeholder technical GIG
[Global Internet Governance] regime is dominated by its desire to reform it from a private sector-led regime to a more traditional, state-led regime” (He 90)) it is participating in international bodies regarding the governance because “To be in the game is the precondition for playing the game in China’s own favor” (Mao Wei, 2005). If the CCP is aiming to promote its discourse it is essential that China becomes more assertive in its promotion as Galloway and He argued in 2015, “its [China’s] reform efforts are unlikely to succeed based on countervailing
structural hard- and soft-power factors” (He 72). This is underlined by Zeng
et. al. argue that the discourse regarding this internet sovereignty is underdeveloped and that “This has no doubt significantly restricted China’s capacity to challenge existing cyber norms. Without a more rigorous and practical theory of Internet sovereignty and global cyber governance, China can hardly transform itself from a norm taker to a norm shaper, not to mention a norm maker” (453).
This might fundamentally change because of processes described by Demchak (the construction of a cyber Westphalia in the West). Kristin Shi-Kupfer, in the Diplomat, argues
that, more generally, “CCP propaganda strategists have also seized the opportunity to
question the stability of the United States and European countries in the wake of a populist politics and terrorist threats. They present China as a safe and stable alternative, and as capable of providing global leadership, for example by connecting Asia and Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative” (Shi-Kupfer).
This line of argument is confirmed by Xi Jinping who “declared the dawn of “a new era,” one in which China moves “closer to center stage.” He presented China as “a new option for other countries,” calling this alternative to Western democracy the zhongguo fang’an, the “Chinese solution” (Osnos). The use of Western instability for the CCP’s cause is confirmed by Schneier who argues that the Snowden revelations in 2013 have boosted the promotion of cyber sovereignty (Schia 3), can the next big symptom of the Western insecurities boost its promotion once again?
Although it seems clear cut that China will continue to push for its cyber governance agenda it is not as clear cut that the CCP will actually try to exploit the current situation and the resulting interference in democratic processes (fake news e.g.) explicitly to do so. Whereas Adam Segal argues that in the minds of some Chinese analysts the growing concern over the hacking of political parties, “fake news”, and interference with elections in the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands and other countries points to some shared interests” (Segal 11) he also points out that during informal conversations during the World Internet Conference (WIC) the CCP delegates were not impressed with the alleged Russian interference in the American elections of 2016 (Segal 2017)10
5. Methodology: discourse development analysis
The previous sections of this thesis have laid out differences between the Chinese and the ‘Western’ views on the internet and its governance but
also it has looked into the current debate in the West. As Demchak and
Shi-Kupfer propose, the debates regarding internet governance are resulting in the construction of a new cyber Westphalian system wherein borders will be constructed ‘in’ the cyberspace this would indeed offer a chance for the CCP to actively promote its discourse which, according to Shi-Kupfer the CCP is willing to do this but, as Segal presented, has to be exploited carefully.
Continuing this research, the next sections will go into the question whether (and if, how) the CCP is promoting its discourse internationally. First of all, it is of importance to identify how a China could possibly develop this a discourse. When a state wants to promote its ideas abroad this usually happens through diplomacy (“The established method of influencing the decisions and behaviour of foreign governments”11), obviously this is the most direct form of discourse development but it has, significant, downsides in regards of
10 The note by Segal offers an interesting view on events: the debate on internet governance and the use of Western uncertainties as a line of argument also affect a Chinese ally: Russia (who is, allegedly, responsible for the main events in the fake news discourse).
researching the phenomenon: whereas formal diplomacy could, ideally, yield interesting insight its delicacy makes it difficult (if not impossible) to yield proper research results. Most formal diplomacy takes place behind closed doors, therefor the closest one would get (except for actually taking place at the meetings) in this case is analyzing the media releases, although this might help to gauge intent of the diplomats (or countries) there is still a lot buried. Also, official statements will not be as outspoken – most probably the language might not be very accessible.
Besides the traditional methods of dialogue and negotiation on the highest level it is also of importance to look at the more informal form of diplomacy: public diplomacy (“any of various government-sponsored efforts aimed at communicating directly with foreign publics. Public diplomacy includes all official efforts to convince targeted sectors of foreign opinion to support or tolerate a government’-s strategic objectives”12). Looking at both forms of diplomacy is essential as they both present a different angle onto Chinese intent. Formal diplomacy, obviously, is more direct (towards the actual policymakers) but is limited in its level of directness, language wise: it could not be as offensive and direct and actual intentions could be a lot harder to distil.
Due to the fore mentioned limitations of solely researching formal diplomacy this research will look at a public symptom of the current debates: the fake news discourse (a public symptom is more likely to appear in public diplomacy – instead of academic arguments). This means that, in regards of the time frame this research will cover, it will look at the discourse created by the CCP ever since the fake news discourse became a widespread concern in the West, a phenomenon which’ occurrence coincided with the election of Donald Trump in the end of
2016, as presented in the introduction of this thesis13: it will be Q4 of 2016
until the end of Q1 of 2018. Since formal and public diplomatic material differ (diplomatic jargon is harder and more farfetched to untangle) this
12 https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-diplomacy
13 The following link presents a graph showing popularity of the search term ‘fake news’ on Google: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=fake%20news
research will combine two research methods, one for each category. First this research will be looking at the forms of formal diplomacy used to promote the concept before gauging the CCP’s intent through formal diplomacy.
6.Formal Diplomacy
Nigel Inkster has found that formal diplomacy is increasingly used by the CCP to promote its agenda: whereas the CCP’s position has previously been passive and reactive it has shifted towards a more proactive approach (109). This idea is shared by Segal: “China under President Xi Jinping has adopted a more activist cyber diplomacy” (1) as well as Evan Osnos in the New Yorker in which he argues that this is also due to the America First vision promoted by Trump (in line with Adam Segal’s argument, mentioned in previous sections): “China’s leaders predicted that a time would come—perhaps midway through this century— when it could project its own values abroad. In the age of “America First,” that time has come far sooner than expected” (Osnos). The statements by both Inkster and Osnos would strongly suggest that China is indeed trying to export its concept of internet sovereignty. Although the ‘new’ diplomacy is argued to be more assertive, the approach to the Chinese diplomacy is still centered on the traditional idea (which also very strongly linked to the concept of cyber sovereignty): “Chinese cyber diplomacy is rooted in noninterference in internal affairs, equal participation, development assistance and capacity building, and support for the United Nations and other multilateral institutions” (Segal 1).
In regards of platforms to promote the Chinese discourse through formal diplomacy Segal mentions various examples among which the United Nations Government Group of experts, commercial tools, the One Belt One Road initiative and, the most important, the World Internet Conference (5-17). Therefore, the analysis on the formal Chinese (internet)
diplomacy will mainly go into these three platforms to find what the promotion looks like and whether the fake news discourse has a significant role in this process.
6.1 United Nations Governmental Group of
Experts (UNGGE)
Regarding the platforms identified in the previous section: first of all the UNGGE is to be analyzed, of which the first successful meeting which took place in June 2013, yielded the following statement:
“The report reflects the Group’s conclusion that international law and in particular the United Nations Charter, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment. The Group also concluded that State sovereignty and the international norms and principles that flow from it apply to States’ conduct of ICT-related activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure with their territory; States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them” (Assembly, UN General).
This statement adumbrates that China has been actively involved in its creation, focusing on the rule of UN law and the inclusion of the concept of sovereignty on the internet. Also, the UNNGE has been recognized as the forum in which the CCP has tried to push for a power transfer to the ITU, something which arguably resulted in the transferring of power from IANA to ICANN (Schia 3). Although the UNGGE, being the “main international vehicle for discussions on rules of behavior for states in cyberspace” (Korzak), seems successful when looking (especially considering Chinese aims) at the first agreement it fell apart after the fifth
session in July 2017. The last meeting was on how international law applies to the use of internet technologies by states, a vital part of cyber sovereignty. The only major party involved in the UNGGE issuing a statement on the disassembly has been the US. To also include the other side of the account one can include the only statement available from a nation that usually is in line with the Chinese position on internet governance: Cuba. To gain insight in the conflict both are presented below.
United States
“Despite years of discussion and study, some participants continue to contend that is it premature to make such a determination and, in fact, seem to want to walk back progress made in previous GGE reports. I am coming to the unfortunate conclusion that those who are unwilling to affirm the applicability of these international legal rules and principles believe their States are free to act in or through cyberspace to achieve their political ends with no limits or constraints on their actions. That is a dangerous and unsupportable view, and it is one that I unequivocally reject” (Markoff).
Cuba
“I must register our serious concern over the pretension of some, reflected in paragraph 34 of the draft final report, to convert cyberspace into a theater of military operations and to legitimize, in that context, unilateral punitive force actions, including the application of sanctions and even military action by States claiming to be victims of illicit uses of ICTs” (Rodriguez).
The Cuban view, strongly conflicting with the American is, indeed, in line with what Segal has identified as the second trend shaping Chinese cyber diplomacy: “China may be worried that Russia’s hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the US response will accelerate the “militarization” of cyberspace” (2). A process the CCP is aware off which would work
counterproductive in achieving cyber sovereignty, as presented in the International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace: “No country should pursue cyber hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, or engage in, condone or support cyber activities that undermine other countries’ national security” (2).
With this dispute the initiative of the UNGGE concluded prematurely in 2017. According to Elaine Korzak, in the Diplomat, it leaves us with
“the lack of agreement on international law and its application, this and many other aspects (including norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building) remain up in the air. This could mark an end to years of slow, yet steady progress – something that is going to be more than desperately needed in light of the differences that led to the outcome of the current GGE” (Korzak).
A conclusion that implies divergence more than it indicates convergence.
6.2 World Internet Conference
The second, and arguably most important, platform mentioned by Segal is the World Internet Conference (WIC), the Chinese counterpart of the London Process, a heavily US influenced event positioned in between multilateral and multi stakeholder approaches (8). The World Internet Conference, first held in 2014 in Wuzhen, organized by the Cyber Administration of China serves to promote the Chinese vision on Internet governance. Segal’s listing of the WIC as one of the main platforms of diplomacy regarding cyber policy is underlined by the speech Xi Jinping gave during the 2015 WIC which stressed the importance of cyber security during the opening speech and a Xinhua commentary headlined “China allows no compromise on cyberspace sovereignty” (Tiezzi).
Although the first Conference ended in a disappointment regarding the final declaration (which included cyber sovereignty as a pillar), and the fact that the Western media were
predominantly focused on the banning of Twitter and Facebook and the majority of Western countries present did not send meaningful diplomats (Segal 9). Bruce McConnell argues in the Diplomat that the CCP has learned (and improved) in 2016: “Small but important shifts like these illustrate a larger reality. China is becoming a major power on the global stage. As it steps into those shoes, at least in cyber, it is paying attention to the larger implications of its words and actions. This seems to me a promising development” (McConnell), according to McConnell an example of this paying of extra attention showed through linguistics: the use of ‘national sovereignty in cyberspace’ instead of ‘cyber sovereignty which would imply that it doesn’t involve a hegemon and the use of ‘multi-party participation’ in which the CCP acknowledges that not only governments should be ruling – a shift introduced by both Kleinwachter and Yao earlier in this thesis.
To analyze the CCP discourse surrounding the two last World Internet Conferences (the other two are out of the timeframe) on whether the Western dystopia is used this research will look at the speeches and documents by Chinese delegates made public through Xinhua, as exemplified by the Diplomat in the article by Tiezzi on cyber sovereignty and the 2015 WIC, Xinhua (as official CCP mouthpiece) provides a good overview of the sentiments surrounding the World Internet Conferences. It offers complete pages’ setup for all the news/commentary and pictures of the WIC. Combination of these factors make Xinhua the best (possible), constant, platform of sourcing in this regard.
6.2.1 2016 World Internet Conference14.
On November 15th 2016 Xinhua issued an article on what to expect of that year’s WIC. According to Xinhua the conference was predominantly on the future of the global economy, hosting panel discussions with participants including Qualcomm, Microsoft, Nokia, Xiaomi, amongst others (“China Focus: what to expect”). The press release is primarily centered on the global internet economy mentioning cyber governance once: “Also invited are foreign government officials and telecom regulators, who will brainstorm ways to better govern cyberspace”, important to note is that this indicates that not just governments will be 14 for the complete overview of Xinhua publications surrounding the 2016 WIC see:
included in these discussions, hinting towards the multi-stakeholder model.
On the other hand, Xi Jinping, who addressed the conference through a video message, did emphasize the development of cyber sovereignty (in fact, this is the only subject Xinhua mentions): “Noting that Internet development has no boundaries, Xi said China is willing to work with the international community for the common welfare for all people, to uphold the concept of cyberspace sovereignty and to make the global cyberspace governance system fairer and more reasonable” (“President Xi stresses int'l cooperation”). Besides the last sentences (in which he presents the 2016 theme of innovation driven development for all) the entire video is on the cyber sovereignty and the norms presented a year before. The message by Xi on cyber sovereignty is echoed in a cartoon commentary by Zhang Maorong: “Globalization, a characteristic of the Internet, makes the international community transform into a community of common destiny with each having something for the other. To make the network more beautiful, secure, and cleaner has become a common responsibility for the international community” (“Cartoon commentary: Xi’s video speech”). An opinion piece issued at the time of WIC (and grouped in the WIC page of Xinhua), written by a British scholar known for his Marxist ideology: Heiko Khoo. He discusses the new initiatives regarding social development using the internet presented at the WIC referring to the NSA and Edward Snowden to validate the CCP’s arguments, although he does use the West as a dystopia he does not use the fake news discourse in particular though. Although this hinges more towards public diplomacy15, it is of importance due to the fact that it is grouped with the official diplomacy – the official publications surrounding the 2016 WIC. Also of importance is the fact that it is written by a foreigner which is in line with the Chinese strategy regarding the creation of soft power: In early 2009, Beijing announced that it would invest ¥45 bil- lion (roughly US$7.25 billion) into its main media outlets in order to strengthen its international news coverage and global presence” (Brady 54).
The commentary issued on the last day of the conference, again, reflects on the speech by Xi Jinping this time focusing on the widespread support for the ideas of Xi (presented at 2015’s WIC and also explored in the beginning of this thesis). Especially, according to the author, 15 a concept discussed later in this thesis
the support is in the developing countries which is due to the unfair current system (“Commentary: Int'l cooperation needed”) – strongly in line with the Chinese efforts present itself as the champion of developing nations, as presented by Xi Jinping in the 19th party congress speech: China champions the development of a community with a shared future for mankind, and has encouraged the evolution of the global governance system. With this we have seen a further rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape; and China has made great new contributions to global peace and development (Xi 2017).
6.2.2 2017 World Internet Conference 16
The 2017 Conference, taking place from 3 to 5 December, was themed “Developing digital economy for openness and shared benefits -- building a community of common future in cyberspace” (“Xi writes to congratulate opening of World Internet Conference”). In 2017 Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to celebrate the opening of the Conference stating that “China hopes to encourage countries around the world to take a ride on the express train of internet and digital economic development”. “Xi said China hopes to work with the international community to respect cyberspace sovereignty and carry forward the spirit of partnership to commonly advance development, safeguard security, participate in governance, and share the benefits” (“Xi welcomes countries to ride fast train”).
A day later Xinhua claims that “Innovation leaders and government representatives from around the world said the remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping in a congratulatory letter to the Fourth World Internet Conference were of great significance and practicality”, the article itself quotes representatives from Serbia, Thailand and Saudi Arabia (“Global delegates laud Xi's messages”).Besides this mention of cyber sovereignty, the rest of the press releases mainly comprise of short mentions of countries attending plenary sessions (without actual content) and articles on the new internet economy (like the 2016 WIC, the 2017 editions focus was on this with big company representatives present).
16 or the complete overview of Xinhua publications surrounding the 2016 WIC see: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017WIC/index.html
6.2.3 Concluding remarks regarding the WIC
Although the World Internet Conferences have been presented as a very big platform for, amongst others, cyber diplomacy, its focus has mainly (besides Xi Jinping’s opening speeches) been on the Internet economy. This might be due to the presence of international guests, as Segal marked:
“Despite a significant investment of time, money, and political capital, the reach and influence of the World Internet Conference remain limited to China’s friends. Most of the heads of government that have attended are from small states or the SCO. The United States and other Western governments have sent representatives from the embassies in Beijing, and even the tech companies, with a few exceptions, sent country heads, not CEOs or CFOs” (10).
Although later, in 2017 Tim Cook (CEO of Apple) and Sundar Pichai (CEO of Google) did actually attend the World Internet Conference their presence was mainly focused on the economic benefits the respective companies would bring to China17. Tim Culpan, in Bloomberg Business Week, went as far as stating that “Tim Cook is desperate to hold onto any remaining scraps of the China market. That's a boon for the country's model for the internet, and the local players who dominate. The Apple Inc. CEO, who last year stood up to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, took to the stage at China's annual internet conference this past weekend to kiss the ring and give his seal of approval for the way the 17 For Tim Cook’s speech see:
https://www.apple.com/cn/newsroom/2017/12/tim-cooks-remarks-at-the-4th-world-internet-c onference-in-english/
government there tightly controls the flow of information” (Culpan). It must be noted however that the fact of their presence has been a positive for the CCP: besides economic cooperation it could also boost the image of the WIC.
According to Segal this general ‘failure’ to promote the concept of Cyber Sovereignty (and the fact that the most important decision makers are not present) is also due to the, before mentioned, America First strategy of Trump. While the US is still the biggest player in the field of internet governance, the international cyber governance in general it is not a priority at the moment18:
“The most likely outcome in the near term is that cybersecurity issues remain an important issue in the bilateral agenda, but fairly low down the list. Dropping the Internet freedom agenda will reduce some of the heat in cyberspace issues, but will not open many new avenues for cooperation. China will continue to push its diplomatic agenda on cyber sovereignty, but is likely to make the most progress on shaping cyberspace through OBOR and other commercial tools” (17).
What should not be underestimated, is that the CCP is very carefully promoting the concept on this level especially since its gaffe during the WIC in 2014 during which the organizers slipped a conference declaration under the door in the hotel rooms at midnight for the participants to sign. According to the Wall Street Journal it “appeared to largely reflect a singular view: the watchful language used by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Chinese officials had argued at the two-day meeting of Chinese officials and local and foreign Internet executives that Beijing should have sovereignty over the Internet in China and must keep it under tight control” (Areddy), naturally the guests did not sign and the Conference ended without a declaration – harming the reputation of the conference ever since.
18 Also, the (looming) trade war with the United States does not offer the right circumstances for negotiations on other terrains (especially when China wants the US to give in).
6.3 Commercial tools & One Belt One Road
According to Segal, the remaining platforms in regards of cyber diplomacy are the commercial tools which are used as “indirect political tool (…) Chinese efforts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia are designed to access markets as well as create support for Beijing’s foreign policy and cyberspace norms.” (11). The problem with these commercial tools is that effect (and a causal relationship between the investment and policy choices/statements) are very hard to measure. Especially since, in opposition to Western investment and aid the Chinese investments are non-conditional (Segal 11) – although this also provides China with a unique selling point19. The examples used by Segal show investments aiming to eventually propagate the Chinese vision on the internet are part of, in particular, the Digital Silk Road, which is - exactly as it sounds - the incorporation of the promising Chinese ICT sector into the existing One Belt One Road initiative.
The Digital Silk Road is increasingly getting attention, with a separate forum called ‘The international cooperation along the digital silk road’ being held on the second day of the 2017 WIC. The centre for China and Globalization, a Beijing based think tank, issued an article that sheds light on the purpose of the Digital Silk Road in regards of Chinese ‘standardization’, more specifically Wang Huning (senior party leader) stated that "China stands ready to develop new rules and systems of internet governance to serve all parties and counteract current imbalances.” (“One Belt, One Road: China heralds ’Digital Silk Road”). The statement from Wang Huning clearly shows that Chinese aims are to push for their governance agenda to serve the current imbalances, something which undoubtedly sounds good for developing countries with non-western visions on government: this is exactly where the support regarding the Digital Silk Road was based: “At the conference, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Laos, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were among several of the countries that openly agreed to cooperate with China in the digital economy to build an interconnected Digital Silk Road” (Viney et. al.).
19 Which also provides challenges for the CCP. See: Wu, Wengyan “China’s 'Digital Silk Road': Pitfalls Among High Hopes” The Diplomat (2017).
According to the reports the eight countries will expand broadband access, promote a digital transformation, encourage e-commerce cooperation, as well as seek to enhance and encourage policy-making to create a transparent digital economy and promote cooperation in international standardization. In terms of actual results from the Digital Silk Road investments, those could possibly include (proving a causal relationship is, as mentioned before, nearly impossible) Vietnam, the Vietnamese government established a cyber command because “According to a press release from the Ministry, strong development of technology and the Internet, and the rise of the fourth industrial revolution means that cyberspace is becoming a new ‘territory’” (Bhunia), something which is similar to the CCP’s vision. Thailand intensifying its internet laws to defend the nation: “The bill is aimed at increasing national security, allowing the state to access data of anyone it suspects,” said Bhume Bhumiratana, a cyber security expert at Thai company G-Able, which provides services to businesses” (Tanakasempipat).
This is in line with the argument of Segal: “In the short term, at least, the presence on the ground of Chinese engineers, managers, and foreign ministry officials is likely to reinforce a natural tendency among developing countries, especially those with authoritarian governments, to embrace a vision of the Internet that puts states at the center. These countries often lack cybersecurity expertise, have a long history of dealing with the ITU, and see the multi-stakeholder process as expensive, opaque, and inefficient (Segal 14)”.
6.4 Notes on formal diplomacy
Of the formal diplomacy platforms for active discourse promotion identified by Segal there have been signs of the active promotion of the concept of cyber sovereignty. Of the three dealt with in this research the UNGGE laid bare the disagreement on cyber governance most obviously, even leading to a clash and the dismantling of the group. Although the exact motivations for the dismantling are unclear the declarations of Cuba and the US seem to describe a conflict regarding sovereignty in which both parties put their foot down resulting in an impasse.
During the WIC there has been some attention for the concept although the main focus has been on economic development, which could have been due to both the mistake made by the CCP during the first WIC and the range of participants at later editions of the conference. The last platform, the commercial tools of diplomacy, mainly represented by the (digital) silk road, show that the CCP indeed has the (underlying) goal of promoting its discourse. Besides these platforms mentioned by Segal there are other examples that show how China is trying to use the formal diplomacy arena to promote it concepts: the submission of a new code of conduct for information security to the UN in 2011 (“China, Russia and Other Countries Submit”) and also the proposal to give the ITU greater power, a year later (Welch).
In terms of results, there have been signs of adoption along developing countries but causal relationships are very hard to map out. More notably, the Western dystopia (or more specifically, using the fake news discourse) has not been seen in any of the formal platforms: although the promotion seems to have gotten more offensive (especially in UNGGE) it cannot be said that China criticizes the Western line of thought openly pointing at possible mistakes or experiences. This is particularly unsurprising because, as explained earlier, of formal diplomacy being a very delicate process, also language wise: any open outspoken criticism might result in counteractions from the West, or more specifically the United States with the current president already running a lex talionis trade war with China. Partly due to this most real diplomacy and negotiation happens behind closed doors. Conversely, the Western countries taking action against fake news in one way or the other, will not refer to the Chinese model or Chinese terminology doing this.
This processes (and the enormous interests linked to these cases) make it incredibly hard to research the formal diplomacy for signs of convergence, therefor it is of importance to look at the concept of public diplomacy: this might be more useful to gauge intent and opinions from policymakers, especially since they might be more outspoken – public diplomacy publications are less linked to a state (or its leaders) compared to a diplomat and the linked platforms dealt with in this section.
7
Public diplomacy
Besides the forms of formal diplomacy mentioned in the previous section, another important aspect in the Chinese discourse promotion is public diplomacy as argued by both d’Hooghe and Bradly: “Chinese leaders regard public diplomacy as a tool to strengthen China’s soft power, one of the four fundamental components of China’s Comprehensive National Power, on a par with economic, military, and political power (…) public diplomacy has become an essential part of China’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice” (4), the concept of public diplomacy is defined by Joseph Nye as the ‘wielding’ of soft power (99). Whereas diplomacy focuses on government-to-government relations public diplomacy is aimed at non-governmental actors. The proof of the perceived importance of public diplomacy in China is offered by Xi Jinping in a speech at the National Meeting on Propaganda and Thought work in 2013: “China should spread new ideas and new perspectives to emerging and developing states (…) [China needs] to strengthen media coverage (…) use innovative outreach methods (…) tell a good Chinese story, and promote China’s views internationally” (Brady 55).
In terms of approach to public diplomacy, Zaharna has argued that the cold-war approach of mass media, information based approach, is old fashioned which is mainly due to the fact that mass media is multipolar and not government owned as it was in the cold war period. Therefore, a new successful approach has risen: the network approach which is more focused on conversation instead of having one narrator in a mass media campaign: In the global communications era, a network communication approach creates communication based soft power (219). Closely related to these approaches are the three layers, as developed by Cowan and Arsenault: monologue, dialogue and collaboration (1). d’Hooghe argues that the first of these layers is closely related to the information approach of Zaharna whereas the latter two can be found in the relational network approach (37).
In terms of platforms of exercising public diplomacy d’Hooghe has identified five categories: “(1) the media, which consists of traditional media—newspapers, journals, television and radio—and social or new media such as the internet (websites, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook) and mobile phone technologies;
(2) events: small-scale and large-scale cultural and sporting events, including the Olympic Games and World Expositions;
(3) strategic communication projects, using a combination of tools including media, publications, seminars and branding activities;
(4) people and institutions: exchanges (student exchanges and visitor programs), network meetings (academic networks and epistemic communities), twinning relations and city- or provincial-level exchanges, as well as cultural exchanges and tourism and;
(5) publications/ promotional materials, such as books, brochures and video clips” (37).
Very important to note however, in regard to the five methods and the three layers, is the political system of the state in the analysis. As d’Hooghe rightfully argues: “looking at the three layers of public diplomacy, official messengers in an authoritarian system, who are not used to open and free debates with society, will be more comfortable holding a monolog than having a dialog with foreign publics” (42). Going back to the monologue layer of public diplomacy, d’Hooghe argues that this will mainly take place through mass-media and publications (38). The importance of mass media is confirmed by Edney who argues that “foreign language media is an important mechanism through which the Party-state articulates a discourse internationally.” (79).
The challenge with analyzing media in terms of public diplomacy is twofold and is presented by both Zaharna and d’Hooghe quoted above. The first is the reason that Zaharna has identified the information based approach of public diplomacy as old-fashioned, and also the easiest to tackle: Zaharna argues that media is not state owned anymore thus it might
be polluted (the stance of media might not be in line with the government’s). Needless to say, this does not go for the Chinese case20: Xi has even openly been “saying that journalists must be “disseminators of the Party’s policies and propositions” (Tiezzi 2016).
The second problem is rooted in the fact that the first usual problem does not go for China: “a wide variety of actors with varying perspectives are involved in creating public diplomacy messages, these messages are considered more legitimate and credible than those developed by state actors in the state-centered model” (d’Hooghe, 19), which would result in the opposite result for a monologue: credibility problems, as they are quite common in regards of media in authoritative states (Ibid. 41): this is also true for China. As Alvaro concludes, most of China’s English-language media are not particularly successful in terms of their reach abroad: the content remains, partly due to the use of English, a “foreign tongue” (274), this is underlined by the statistics that show the percentages of the visitor’s origin (Alvaro 272), as shown in the graph there is one explicit outlier: the Global Times with about 50% of the visitors being either Dutch or American. This high popularity amongst foreigners (especially considering the percentages for other English news platforms) is, according to Scotton et. al., due to the space reserved for commentaries and op-eds. It is argued that:
“It has become an important source for news and commentary, especially when China and another nation have strained relations. In 2007 when Germany had diplomatic problems with China, many German companies and organizations inside China turned to reports and comments in the Global Times to keep updated about Chinese government views” (Scotton et. al. 57).
Although this means that it is read this does not make the Chinese public diplomacy a successful used tool: as Creemers argues, in line with the credibility argument attached to a monologue that two main elements cause the ineffectiveness of the Chinese public diplomacy: “the appropriation of public diplomacy by the propaganda bureaucracy; and the concept of soft power as a quantifiable, absolute, and defensive concept:” (317). The fact that the policy regarding public diplomacy in China is ineffective does not mean that it is not interesting or useless to analyze: it still shows the intent of the CCP, is it trying to use the 20 For more information see, for instance,
