Interreligious relations between the main religious groups and newer religious groups in Albania : influences of religious and national identity

(1)

Interreligious relations between the main religious

groups and newer religious groups in Albania:

Influences of religious and national identity

Monica Spelbrink

ID:12293873

MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance

Graduate School of Social Sciences (GSSS)

University of Amsterdam (UvA)

23.010 words

Advisor: Dr. Anja van Heelsum

Second Reader: Dr. Floris Vermeulen

(2)

(3)

1. Introduction

The main topic of this thesis is interreligious relations in Albania. Interreligious relations are high on the agenda in Europe today. In 2006 the European network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants (CLIP) was formed (Lüken-Klassen & Heckmann, 2010, p. iii). In 2010, CLIP produced a report on ‘intercultural policies in European cities’, with the aim to ‘‘identify and analyse those relations and intercultural policies that work rather successfully’’, and hereby ‘‘bridge ‘gaps’ between the different ethnic and religious groups’’ and ‘‘contribute to enhance positive intergroup relations’’ (Lüken-Klassen & Heckmann, 2010, p. 1). The report highlights that in several European cities, there have been tensions surrounding both Islamic and Christian religious buildings. Moreover, it suggests that suspicions about religious buildings being financed from abroad can influence intergroup relations. Intergroup relations involving religious groups have also been studied in non-European cities, like Hong Kong (Bouma & Singleton, 2004) and Kupang, Indonesia (Hutagalung, 2016).

1.1. Interreligious relations in Albania

Interreligious relations in Albania, which are the main focus of this thesis, appear to differ greatly from interreligious relations in the rest of the world. Whereas in many countries, like Bosnia

Hercegovina, religious differences caused tensions that resulted in violence, at first sight, in Albania there appears to be religious harmony. In 2018, the famous travel blogger Nuseir Yassin (2018) said about Albania: ‘‘See, the truth is, in many countries, religion can break people apart, and create an us versus them mentality. But I am so happy to say that I found a country where it does not!’’1

Several reports and academic articles touch upon interreligious relations in Albania. An interview study emphasizes Albanian leaders’ belief that the traditional communities in Albania are united ‘‘in one general Albanian religious community’’, by their shared ‘‘morality and monotheism’’ (Endresen, 2012, p. 244). Religious groups from abroad, however, are not part of this Albanian community; instead they are perceived as a threat to Albanian society, and a future source of conflict (Endresen, 2012, p. 247-248). Two historical analyses were also conducted. The first analysis speaks of the contribution of the birth of Albanian nationalism in the 20th_{century to religious harmony} between Sunni Muslims, Bektashi Muslims, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and of the possible threats radical Islamic groups that have been entering Albania since 1991 pose to this harmony (Elbasani & Puto, 2017). The second analysis discusses religious harmony at different levels. It outlines ‘‘relevant customs and traditions’’ that cultivate and are the result of religious tolerance and describes the establishment of the National Interreligious Council in 2016, comprised of the national representatives of Albania’s five main religious groups (Neziri, 2018, pp. 377-389). A final survey study, conducted last year among Albanian citizens, concludes that ‘‘religious affiliation is not a determinant to characterize people by qualities such as hard-working, friendly, intelligent, violent or

(6)

lazy’’, and that Albanians perceive religious tolerance as enabled by ‘‘the dominance of the national tradition’’ (Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 5).

One has to be careful, however, to make any general conclusions about interreligious relations in present-day Albania based on these findings. The previous studies appear to be either outdated (Endresen’s findings result from interviews conducted in 2005) or based on Albanian or international literature. The report by Vurmo et al. (2018) mentions that religious leaders were asked to ‘check’ the methodology used but does not quote from nor discuss the responses from the religious leaders

explicitly. Moreover, the report concludes that ‘‘religious tolerance is valued and broadly supported by Albanian citizens’’ (p. 74), which does not have to mean that interreligious relations are close. As Lüken-Klassen and Heckmann (2010) argue, religious peace does not have to mean that the quality of inter-group relations is good: Tolerance can mean segregation (p. 32). One can therefore argue that the exact interreligious relations between (leaders and members of) religious groups in Albania are not yet known.

1.2. New religious groups

The findings from these articles are primarily based on the relationships between leaders and members of Albania’s main religious groups: Albanian Sunni Islam, Bektashi Islam, and Orthodox and Catholic Christianity. However, following the opening of Albania’s borders in 19912_{‘foreign denominations’} like ‘‘Protestant, Evangelical, New Apostolic’’ and Mormons, Bahai and Jehovah’s Witnesses entered the country (Tafilica, 2017, p. 121). The Turkish Diyanet (Sunni Hanafi Islam) also gained influence in Albania. The organization is said to have financed several Albanian mosques, including the ‘biggest mosque in the Balkans’ that is now being built in Tirana. The construction of this mosque sparked a heated debate about Turkish influence (Colborne & Edwards, 2018).

The relationship between Albanian Christian Orthodox and Protestant communities and Christian communities in other countries has been researched (Prifti, 2018), and the relationship between some minorities and Albania’s main religious groups has been investigated by the UNHCR (Shaheed, 2017). No academic research has been published yet on the relationship between Albania’s main religious groups and these new post-communist religious groups. An investigation into how Albania’s main religious groups relate to these newer religious groups is therefore novel research. In this thesis, the new religious groups discussed are the Ahmadiyya Jamaat, the Baha’i, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Latter-Day Saints.

(7)

1.3. Sample of new religious groups

The Ahmadiyya Jamaat, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Church of Latter-Day Saints are either Sunni Islamic or Christian Protestant. Previous research suggests that Albanians feel most threatened by Sunni Muslims and most distressed by Protestants (Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 55). Including these groups in the analysis allows one to test if these groups’ religious identity influences how both other

organizations and religious individuals relate to them. These newer religious groups can also be considered international as they allow individuals from different countries to become a member. This international character has been criticized by Albanian researchers: Religious groups that create a ‘‘deterritorialized form of religion that is suited to globalization’’ are referred to as ‘fundamentalist’ and as difficult to ‘find common ground’ with. (Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 22-23). When an Albanian joins such an international group, he namely no longer shares ‘‘either religious practice or common values’’ with other Albanians (Roy, 2010, p. 8 as cited in Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 22). Apart from these four groups, Baha’i are included in the research, as they are the largest newer religious group in terms of membership, and also have an international character.3

While these five religious groups have established themselves as separate communities, some foreign religious groups, like Diyanet, are accused of trying to change the main Albanian groups. An Albanian newspaper published an article suspecting the current leader of the Albanian Muslim Community, Grand Mufti Bujar Spahiu, of trying to turn the AMC into a ‘branch’ of Diyanet (FX-Media, 2019), which would mean the AMC loses it autonomous status. In the 1990s, the appointment of Greek Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos as Archbishop of Tirana caused tensions; he was suspected, even by other Orthodox bishops, of turning the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church into a branch of the Greek Orthodox Church (Draper, 1997, p. 14). These fears of foreign influence on Albania’s main religious groups are also taken into account in this thesis, as specific questions on this topic were posed to the interview respondents. The research is conducted in the capital, Tirana, as here interaction between (members of) different religious groups is most likely to take place, due to

religious others living in close proximity to one another.

1.4. Research question

Many researchers use Social Identity Theory (SIT) to explain interreligious relations in different countries. Research also refers to ‘national’ and ‘religious’ identity and the hierarchy between these two to explain interreligious relations in Albania (Elbasani & Puto, 2017; Neziri, 2018). Therefore, the Research Question in this thesis is: To what extent does social identity influence interreligious

relations between the main religious groups and newer religious groups with a foreign origin in Tirana, Albania?

3_{Evangelists are still believed by many to be one of the newer communities, but in 2011 they gained the status of ‘Albanian}

religious community’, a status only preserved so far for the main communities. For this reason, in this research, Evangelists are included as ‘main religious group’.

(8)

1.5. Academic relevance

This thesis innovatively tests the applicability of Social Identity Theory for explaining religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation. Findings have the possibility to undermine common understandings about what type of social identities lead to tolerance or intolerance. For example, a strong national identity is in modern Western society often believed to be related to Islamophobia and intolerance, while in Albania, many believe national identity actually fosters religious tolerance (Vurmo et al., 2018). Through the responses to qualitative questions, this thesis can shed light onto other elements that foster tolerance or interreligious cooperation.

1.6. Societal relevance

Through the questions asked to them, the respondents in this thesis are encouraged to critically analyze their theory-in-use. In other words, by speaking about interreligious relations, they become more aware of what they think of these relations. They also may assess their attempts at fostering tolerance among their followers, and their cooperation or competition with other religious groups. This thesis provides religious leaders with insights in how their organization is perceived by leaders and followers of other religious organizations. These insights might encourage these leaders to improve their organization’s societal status and reach out to other organizations to engage in interreligious cooperation or dialogue, in order to reduce these organizations’ prejudices.

There is, however, a broader and more important impact this thesis can have. This thesis suggests that certain interpretations of religious or national identity can foster religious tolerance and/or interreligious cooperation. Policy makers, religious leaders and civil society actors can attempt to promote these identities among citizens in their respective countries. The value of such knowledge of what fosters religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation has increased in light of the recent religion-related terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand – during which a right-wing extremist killed more than 50 people in two mosques (Williams et al., 2019) – and in Utrecht, the Netherlands – during which a man who is suspected of following radical Islamic teachings killed three people in a tram (Trouw, 2019). Social identity is important to take into account, as many young people are actively searching for such a social identity, which they sometimes find in violent extremist ideologies (Holmer, 2018, p. 27). By encouraging people to embrace social identities that promote religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation, religious leaders and other societal actors can play an important role in preventing terrorist attacks like these, or even broader instances of ‘deadly conflict’ (Moix, 2006, p. 599).

(9)

2. Background

Nationalism and religion have deep roots in Albania. Their historic development, especially their formation prior to Albania’s independence in 1912, have shaped how Albanians today perceive of their religious and national identity. They have also shaped the development of interreligious relations. Therefore, this chapter outlines some key developments in Albanian history that concern nationalism and religion, and their influence on today’s interreligious relations.

2.1. The birth of Albanian nationalism: 1878-1912

The Illyrian people Albanians claim to be descendants of, already existed more than a thousand years ago. However, it was in the 19th_{century that the Albanian national identity began to develop. When,} near the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire started to lose economic and military power, it decided to enhance ties with the Western European nations. An upper-class of merchants started to form in Albania, who travelled to Western Europe for trade (Sugarman, 1999, p. 420). Here, they learned about nationalism, but also about their own region, through literature on Balkan

‘folklore’. Learning and reading about these topics, these merchants developed ‘nationalist

aspirations’ for Albania (Sugarman, 1999, p. 421). They published these inspirations in books, which were mostly read by other Albanian intelligentsia living abroad. As most Albanians were illiterate, nationalist ideas reached them through spoken poetry and songs (Sugarman, 1999).4

In Ottoman Albania, slowly but surely the nationalist ideas were picked up by other

intelligentsia, like Pashko Vasa, who started nationalist movements. One of these movements was the League of Prizrend. One of this League’s first actions was to protest against the Treaty of San Stefano, concluded in 1878, which decided that land on which many Albanian Muslims lived, was allocated to Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. The league emphasized that Albanians were different from Slavs, Greeks and Ottoman Turks and therefore deserved to be recognized as a nation. However, the Russian and Ottoman Empire disagreed, as they felt Albanians were too divided, especially in terms of religion (Guy, 2018, pp. 16-17).

In the 19th_{century, most Albanians still felt comfortable under Ottoman rule, and many} Albanian Muslims did not want to lose the privileges they enjoyed because of their religious identity (Guy, 2018, p. 20). This changed in 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution took place. A number of ‘prominent Muslim Albanians’ were selected by the Empire to implement centralization policies. However, these Albanians feared these policies would harm Albanian customs and practices (Guy, 2018, p. 20). Many of these selected young Albanians declined the position offered to them and founded nationalist movements. From 1909 onwards, there were ‘continuous revolts’ in Albania, for example by politicians who aimed to protect local rights (Guy, 2019, pp. 20-21). The armistice that

4_{In Geg or Tosk, the two most prominent Albanian dialects. These two dialects were later united to form the} modern Albanian language.

(10)

followed the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912 did not satisfy the Albanians, and nationalist groups started to unite to pursue their purpose of preserving the ‘‘rights of Albanian speaking people’’5_{. In} July and August 1912, demands of these national groups were accepted by the government of the Ottoman Empire, but not implemented (Guy, 2019, pp. 23-25). As a result, the Albanian nationalist groups started to pursue the territorial independence of their nation. On the 28th_{of November 1912, a} ‘‘congress of Albanian notables in Valona’’ proclaimed Albania independent (Guy, 2019, p. 15).

Before continuing this historical narrative, I should clarify a few points about the content of Albanian nationalism. The Albanian national identity was built on a common language and ethnicity. Feeling Albanian did not undermine the connection Albanians felt to their religion, but it increased understanding between people from different religious groups (Gjuraj, 2013, p. 97). This

understanding allowed Muslims and Christians to bind forces in their fight for Albania’s independence (Elbasani & Puto, 2017). However, the group that contributed the most to Albania’s independence movement was the Bektashi community; in 1911/1912, many Sunni Muslims were still pro-Ottoman, and Sunnis who wanted to leave the Empire often became Bektashi to show that they were not Turks. The Bektashi also mediated between different religious groups (Gjuraj, 2013, p. 94).

2.2. The institutionalization of nationalism by Ahmet Zogu: 1925-1946

Following the independence of Albania, the two Balkan wars took place, which underscored the need for Albanians to bond together on a national basis to protect their nation and themselves. In January 1925, Ahmet Zogu became the president of the new Albania, and decided to turn Pashko Vasa’s ideas ‘‘into the very identity of the state’’: Religious communities gained rights, but these communities were co-opted ‘‘to the state’s goals’’, and during his rule, state supervision over religious communities became more and more severe. The ‘‘central Sunni organization’’ installed ‘‘Albanian as official language for sermons’’, united all local Islamic schools and closed ‘‘many superfluous mosques’’. The ‘‘remaining competences of the Islamic courts’’ were also abolished (Elbasani & Puto, 2017, p. 57).

2.3. Foreign occupations and communism: 1939-1991

In 1939, when Ahmet Zogu was still in power, Albania was occupied by Italy. From 1943 until 1944, the Nazis took hold of Albania. In response to these occupations, a partisan movement developed. This movement, however, slowly started to promote communist ideas (Gjuraj, 2013, p. 98). In 1946, these communists came to power (Draper, 1997, pp. 1-2). They tried to foster a strong national identity among the Albanians, by establishing a historical link with the struggle of ‘Skanderbeg’, an Albanian Christian who fought against the Ottomans. Presenting themselves as heirs of Skanderbeg, the communists hoped to justify their right to lead the Albanians (Draper, 1997, p. 7). Whereas the nationalism promoted by the intelligentsia in the late 19th_{and early 20}th_{century was one that allowed}

5_{It was in this time, near the end of the 19}th_{, beginning of the 20}th_{century that the Albanian language as we know it today}

(11)

for religious pluralism, Albania’s communist nationalism was anti-religious: Religious buildings were demolished, religious publications were banned, and clerics faced ‘‘severe punishment including torture and executions’’ (Gjuraj, 2013, p. 98-99).

2.4. Post-communist Albania: 1991-now

The communists’ promotion of nationalism, however, backfired: Nationalism brought Albanians closer together, which enabled them to work together against the communist regime (Gjuraj, 2013, p. 100). Following the downfall of the communist regime, ‘‘freedom of religion was totally restored’’ (Gjuraj, 2013, pp. 100-101). However, the communist regime had severely damaged Albania both economically and legally. As Albania did not receive sufficient support from Western Europe nor the U.S., its newly formed government decided to reach out to Islamic countries. Albania also joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and citizens of the OIC countries were allowed visa-free travel, the Albanian government hoped they would make invest in Albania. However, the open-border policy also facilitated the entry of Islamic missionaries (Elbasani & Puto, 2017, p. 60). Some of these missionaries supported violent extremism. In 2002, the Albanian government froze the assets and confiscated the construction project of the Saudi Yassin Kadi. Kadi aimed to use the project to generate funds for Al-Qaida (Bala, 2002). In the 2003 and 2004, the government halted the activities of six NGOs in Albania which were found to have links with terrorism (Qirjazi & Shehu, 2018).

Arab countries did not just contribute to Albania’s general economy through business investments, but certain networks from these countries also began to fund the Albanian Muslim Community. Many of the organization’s mosques were built with Arab money, and many imams were, and still are, trained in Arab countries (Raxhimi, 2010). All AMC imams are obliged to preach

according to the Hanafi strand of Islam (expert on Islam in Albania from an Albanian NGO, personal communication, April 5, 2019), but several AMC imams have radicalized in the last decade, and managed to recruit youth for terrorist organizations like ISIL (Qirjazi & Shehu, 2018, p. 24). In 2015, 200 of the 727 Albanian mosques did not adhere to the AMC’s ‘legal standards’ when it comes to the interpretation of Islam (Mejdini, 2015).

In recent years, the Turkish state has also sought a stronger connection with Albania. The Turkish state bought several of Albania’s largest companies and recently bought an Albanian university through the Maarif foundation (Tirana Times, 2018; Ben-Meir, 2018). However, Turkey also attempts to influence Islam in Albania. In 2008, 60 Albanian imams visited Turkey for

‘‘educational programs and training seminars’’ (Korkut, 2010, p. 132). Currently, there are claims that Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs which is said to be linked to the Turkish state is building the largest mosque of the Balkans in Tirana. Diyanet has also paid for the renovation of the AMC’s headquarters (Raxhimi, 2010), and has called on the Albanian president Edi Rama to hand-over Gülenists who fled to Albania for protection (Erebara, 2018; Karaj, 2018). The question is what this

(12)

involvement of the Turkish state in religious affairs in Albania means for current and future interreligious or ‘interdenominational’ relations in Albania.

Following the fall of the communist regime in 1991, several newer religious communities also started to gain members in Albania. The Ahmadiyya Jamaat established its own place of worship in the 90s, in Tirana which has place for 2,500 worshippers (Ahmadiyya Mosques, 2017). Officially, there are also currently more than 10,000 Baha’i in Albania (personal communication, P. Peyman, 17 April 2019). There are also several thousands of Mormons in Albania, and their community is growing (Martinich, 2012). The number of Jehovah’s Witnesses (during communism there were only 60) also started to grow. In the 25th_{Jehovah congress in 2017, 6000 Jehovah’s Witnesses were participating} (Top Channel, 2017) and their membership grows with 5% each year (Martinich, 2012). A few years ago, an Albanian newspaper claimed that Jehovah’s Witnesses motivate young people to commit suicide (Albanian Newsroom, 2014). Consequently, many Albanians believe the state should pay more attention to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ ideology and its risks (expert on Islam in Albania from an Albanian NGO, personal communication, April 5, 2019). This gives reason to believe that interreligious relations with Jehovah’s Witnesses leave room for improvement.

(13)

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter will first define interreligious relations in general and explain how I have chosen to conceptualize it into the more specific concepts ‘religious tolerance’ and ‘interreligious cooperation’ (3.1). In section 3.2, this chapter will proceed to discuss Social Identity Theory. Then, in 3.3 I will highlight the usefulness of ‘religious identity’ and in 4.4 the usefulness of ‘national identity’ in explaining interreligious cooperation.

3.1. Definition of interreligious relations

In this thesis, interreligious relations will be defined as ‘relationships between leaders and members of different religious communities in a country (or city)’. Such relationships can be ‘‘states of friendship or hostility, cooperation or competition, dominance or subordination, alliance or enmity, peace or war between two or more (religious) groups and their members’’ (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 222 as cited in Van Heelsum, 2010, p. 3). Literature discusses different elements that affect intergroup relations. It mentions emotions and beliefs (Hogg, Abrams & Brewer, 2017, pp. 574), ingroup bias and

discrimination (Zagefka & Brown, 2002, pp. 175-177), and external factors that are less related to sentiment, like the compatibility of goals and frequency and content of intergroup contact (Richter, West, Van Dick & Dawson, 2006, p. 1258). Since this remains too vague for our purpose, in this thesis interreligious relations will be conceptualized in two more specific terms: ‘Religious tolerance’ and ‘interreligious cooperation’, as these operationalizations are most frequently used in interreligious relations research and literature. Both religious tolerance and interreligious relations can prevent violent interreligious conflict from erupting (Moix, 2006, p. 597).

3.1.1. Religious tolerance

Different definitions exist of tolerance. The term has been broadly defined as having ‘‘a fair and objective attitude towards others who are different from ourselves in any number of ways’’ (Williams, 2015, p. 2). Some literature claims that one should have this fair attitude towards ‘‘others who are different through racial characteristics, ethnicity, and nationality’’ (Witenberg, 2007, p. 435). However, this definition has been criticized by other literature, which claims that tolerance is not about these external characteristics but about showing consideration for people’s ‘beliefs and opinions’ (Furedi, 2012, pp. 31-33).

When speaking about religious tolerance, most literature takes a general definition of tolerance as starting point. Literature that does provide a conceptualization of tolerance defines it as follows: ‘‘An attitude or behavior of willingness to allow and accept religious differences to be practiced in a pluralistic society without prejudice or discrimination, even though one has the power to reject or deny it, in order to achieve well-being and a harmonious society’’ (Talib, Gill, Kawangit & Kunasekaran, 2013, p. 1383). In some literature, religious tolerance also incorporates everyday interaction between

(14)

members of different religious groups (Mana, Sagy, Srour & Mjally-Knani, 2012). This thesis also includes this interaction as measure of religious tolerance. Because of the variety in definitions and assessments of tolerance in literature, this thesis also outlines how different religious leaders define and describe religious tolerance in Albania. As the public’s perception of (interaction with) religious others is also taken into account, this thesis answers the following sub questions: SQ1a: How do

religious leaders speak about religious tolerance? And SQ1b: How tolerant are followers of the different religious groups?

3.1.2. Interreligious cooperation

Interreligious cooperation can be defined as ‘‘an organized cooperation between different religious individuals or religious organizations whose primary and manifest purpose is the interaction and mutual cooperation between persons or organizations with different religious affiliations’’ (Nordin, 2017, p. 390). In this thesis, this ‘organized interreligious cooperation’ can also be cooperation between different denominations, or ecumenism.

The cooperation between religious organizations is often established via the organizations’ leaders (Richter, West, Van Dick & Dawson, 2006, pp. 1252-1553). A primary example of

interreligious cooperation initiated by leaders is the establishment of an interreligious council (Nordin, 2017, p. 391). These councils often have one of two purposes: In the council meetings either religious beliefs are discussed and common grounds between these beliefs are found (Merdjanova, 2016, p. 27) or debates are held about matters the leaders believe are ‘‘beneficial for the society at large’’ (Nordin, 2017, p. 390). Other examples of leader organized cooperation are the presence of religious leaders at each other’s religious celebrations (Neziri, 2018, p. 388; Perica, 2001, p. 42) or a ‘common prayer’ among clergy of different religions or denominations (Perica, 2001, p. 41).

Like leaders, members of religious communities can also decide to engage in interreligious cooperation (Nordin, 2017, p. 392). Examples of such member-initiated cooperation are members of different religious groups who protect each other’s places of worship and participate in each other’s religious celebrations (Hutagalung, 2016, pp. 439, 445-454). Such interreligious cooperation at the street level, one can claim, helps to foster ‘mutual understanding’ and hereby prevents and decreases tensions between individuals who have different religious beliefs (Merdjanova, 2016, p. 27).

As interreligious cooperation can take different forms, this thesis describes what forms of interreligious cooperation take place in Albania. Since interreligious cooperation among the Albanian public is also assessed, this thesis answers the following sub-questions: SQ2a: (How) do religious

communities, both traditional and new, cooperate at the institutional level and SQ2b: To what extent do followers of Albania’s religious communities cooperate?

(15)

3.2. Social identity theory

This thesis thus concerns itself with religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation, which are instances of tolerance and intergroup cooperation. The main theory used in literature explain tolerance and intergroup cooperation is Social Identity Theory (SIT). This theory poses that the ‘social identity’ of an individual, or ‘‘those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he/she belongs’’, influences how this individual perceives of and behaves towards other groups (Hornsey, 2008, pp. 206-207).

SIT claims that individuals have a need to differentiate themselves from other individuals, to feel unique (Brown & Abrams, 1986, p. 79). At the same time, however, individuals feel a need to acquire self-esteem. They find a combination of these elements when they obtain a social identity, by becoming member of and identifying with a social group (Mana, Sagy & Srour, 2016, p. 472). This group namely gives individuals the possibility to bond with other members, but at the same time makes clear that its members differ in important ways from members of outgroups.

If individuals strongly identify with a group, they perceive and treat others according to the ideas spread within their group, meaning they no longer perceive and treat members of other groups as ‘individuals’, but in terms of their membership of the out-group (Hornsey, 2008, p. 206). For this change in perception and treatment to take place, however, several criteria must be met: The

individual should feel a member of the group, feel emotionally attached to this membership, feel that the group propagates specific values, and there should be ‘‘some outside consensus that the group exists’’ (Tajfel, 1982, pp. 1-2).

The perception and treatment of out-groups depends on value judgments made in the ingroup. In order to be able to claim it is legitimate, the ingroup must show that it is different from the

outgroups and ensure that its members favor the ingroup. To make this happen, the group must portray itself as superior to other groups (Hornsey, 2008, p. 207). Such superiority over other groups can lead to intolerance and discrimination against these other groups (Brown, 2000, p. 764; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, pp. 162-165). It is for this reason that SIT claims that strong ingroup identification, leads to less tolerance and cooperation with (members of) an outgroup. This is especially true when there is ‘‘a high degree of overlap between identities’’ (Muldoon et al., 2007, p. 100).

3.2.1. Identity and tolerance

SIT has been used by several authors to predict religious tolerance (Mana, Sagy & Srour, 2016; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016; Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Social identity appears to have a strong effect on members of minority groups; especially for them a ‘‘stronger sense of group belonging is often associated with a more negative attitude towards relevant out-groups’’. Moreover, the way in which individuals perform their social identity can influence their tolerance towards outsiders: If an individual enacts his or her social

(16)

identity, he or she makes the boundaries between his or her own identity and the social identities of others more explicit, and this realization of difference might trigger negative feelings about members of other social groups (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 3).

Individuals can have multiple social identities, as they are part of multiple groups, and among members, these identities can, but do not have to overlap. In case an individual sees his/her ‘ingroups’ as ‘‘highly overlapping and convergent’’, he or she has ‘low social identity complexity’, but when an individual sees his/her ‘ingroups’ as distinct and recognizes differences between some of his/her social identities and those of ingroup members, the individual has ‘high social identity complexity’ (Brewer & Pierce, 2005, p. 428). Individuals with such a high social identity complexity were found to be more tolerant towards outgroups than individuals with a low social identity complexity (Brewer & Pierce, 2005, pp. 433-435).

Perceived difference between one’s own social identity and that of the outgroup, however, is not necessarily sufficient to predict tolerance. For this prediction a normative evaluation of one’s social identity is needed: If one believes that one’s social identity is superior to that of others, or that one’s social identity is threatened by outgroups, this can lead to social discrimination (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, pp. 161-162). This ‘threat’ can take different forms, such as a threat to interests or social status, and can result from interreligious competition. The stronger one identifies with one’s social identity, the less tolerant one is to the group that one believes threatens one’s social identity or group (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006, p. 589). A social identity can also negatively impact tolerance if its formation is influenced by historical factors, which highlight that the social identity of the individual is dependent on denying the social identity of another individual (Pitner, 2017, p. 209).

3.2.2. Identity and intergroup cooperation

Research on social identity and intergroup cooperation mostly focuses on the effects of intergroup cooperation on identity, rather than the other way around (Tajfel, 1982; Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1990). However, one study does explore the influence of social identity on intergroup cooperation and finds that a strong identification with a social group is positively related to intergroup cooperation (Brown, Sprinkle & Way, 2017, p. 24).

The minority/majority division also plays an important role in the relation between social identity and intergroup cooperation. Groups that have a minority status feel the need to make the distinction between them and majority groups salient and are more likely than majority groups to engage in competition rather than cooperation with other groups (Espinoza & Garza, 1984, p. 382). This is especially true if this minority group is being discriminated against and deprived of social benefits by the majority group (Espinoza & Garza, 1984, p. 389).

Fairness can also play an important role: If individuals belonging to one social group feel respected and treated fairly by members of another social group within the larger social community of which both groups are part, like a city, they recognize a shared identification, and are more likely to

(17)

cooperate with this other social group (Bradford, 2014, p. 23). This is especially true when there are power differences between social groups, for example, in the UK, citizens were less likely to cooperate with police officers if they felt the officers did not respect them (Bradford, 2014, p. 39).

The superiority element also impacts the likelihood that two groups cooperate. Literature claims that for intergroup dialogue to be established, groups should attempt to rid themselves of the idea that their identity is superior and accept that none of the parties to the dialogue ‘‘has a monopoly on truth or wisdom’’. The parties should recognize that their cooperation is not an opportunity to spread their beliefs, but rather to learn about the beliefs of others (Michael, 2012, p. 17).

The most important requirement for intergroup cooperation, however, is the perception of a common goal. Different studies show that if social groups perceive a common goal, which they can only achieve if they cooperate, they are more likely to engage in cooperation with each other (Brewer, 1996; Brown, Sprinkle & Way, 2017; Pitner, 2017). In order for this cooperation to be effective, the difference in social identity between the members of the two different groups has to be taken into account, which can be done in one of two ways: Either there should be a division of roles between the members of the social groups, so these members feel their distinct social identity is still acknowledged (Brewer, 1996, p. 294-295), or a common identity should be fostered, which encompasses the

identities of the members of both groups, but on the basis of which individuals relate to each other, like common symbols in the army (Pitner, 2017, p. 216).

Concerning the topic of religion in tolerance and intergroup relations, and the importance of national identity for religious tolerance in Albania (Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 74), religious identity and national identity will be defined, and their relation to religious tolerance and interreligious relations will be discussed below.

3.3. Religious identity

Literature on religious identity often makes us of a general definition of identity. Identity can be defined as ‘‘an individuals’ sense of self, group affiliations, structural positions, and ascribed and achieved statuses’’, which ‘‘results from internal subjective perceptions, self-reflection, and external characteristics’’ (Peek, 2005, pp. 216-217). Several theories have attempted to explain the

development of a religious identity among particular individuals and groups. Some of these theories claim that people join a religious group to collect ‘benefits’ such as job offers or ‘educational resources’ (Peek, 2005, p. 219). Other theories emphasize that some people identify with a particular religion because of the ideology it promotes, while for others, their religious identity is a consequence of being born in a particular country or belonging to a specific ethnic or cultural group (Barker, 2006, pp. 206-211). A concrete conceptualization of religious identity seems to be absent in academic literature, but a definition has been provided of ‘religious identity development’: ‘‘The totality of the gradual change in the content and strength of commitments in relation to the way one looks at life and the amount of exploration in the achievement and change of these commitments’’. This definition uses

(18)

‘worldview’ as a synonym for ‘religiosity’ (Bertram-Troost, De Roos & Miedema, 2007, p. 136). Based on this definition, ‘religious identity’ can be defined as ‘the content and strength of commitments in relation to the way religion inspires one to look at life’.

3.3.1. Religious identity and religious tolerance

The relation of commitment to a religious worldview to religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation has been explored in various studies in different countries, which present different findings. There are, however, a few main theories that can be drawn from these studies. Firstly, an individual who identifies strongly with a religion is more likely to be intolerant to members of other religious groups. In the Netherlands and Germany, Sunni Muslims, who feel more connected to their religion than Alevi’s, have a less positive opinion about Jews and people who do not believe

(Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 11). In Turkey, religious tolerance levels are found to be lower among Islamist groups and religious individuals, than among non-religious individuals (Carkoglu & Toprak, 2007, p. 53).

The strength of religious identification can also influence the way this individual perceives of interaction and or engages in such interaction with religious others. In Turkey, Sunni Muslims who identify strongly with their religion are less inclined than non-devotees to ‘‘accept renting their house’’ to religious others and allow their children to marry someone who follows another religion (Altinoglu, 2018, pp. 710-711). In Malaysia, the strength of one’s religious identification does not influence the likelihood of this individual cooperating in a computer game with someone of a different religion (Chuah, Hoffman, Ramasamy & Tan, 2014, p. 41). However, the difference in findings might be due to the type of interaction included: Altinoglu (2018) speaks of personal interactions while Chuah et al. (2014) highlight a professional form of cooperation.

The content of religious commitments, or the way in which an individual engages with his or her religion also impacts his or her religious tolerance. In the Netherlands and Germany, for Sunni Muslims, the practicing of religious rituals and visiting of a public place of worship of their religion was found to have a negative effect on their religious tolerance (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 11). In the MENA region, communal attendance is also negatively related to ethno-religious tolerance (Spierings, 2018, p. 18). Both in the United States and in Turkey, scriptural literalism also makes believers less tolerant (Merino, 2010, pp. 233-234; Altinoglu, 2018, p. 715). In the MENA region, the effect of scriptural literalism depends on the country; it was found to be positively correlated to ethno-religious tolerance in Algeria, Libya and Morrocco, but negatively correlated in Bahrain, Lebanon and Sudan (Spierings, 2018, p. 17).

The influence of an identification and engagement with religion often depends on the worldview the religion provides an individual with. In other words: The content of one’s religious beliefs plays an important role in determining whether one is tolerant towards religious others. If the religious ideology of an individual promotes liberal or democratic values this individual is more likely

(19)

to be tolerant towards individuals with another religion (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 11; Barakoglu, 2006, p. 272). Of specific importance to this worldview is what the religion teaches about religious others. Broadly, religious beliefs about religious out-groups can take the form of

‘exclusivism’, ‘inclusivism’ and ‘pluralism’. Exclusivism is the belief that only what one’s own group teaches is true, and that what another group teaches can only be true if it is not incompatible with the truth of the religious in-group (Stenmark, 2006, p. 102). Inclusivism is the belief that religious out-groups know part of the truth, but that one’s in-group has the most complete idea of this truth

(Stenmark, 2006, p. 113). Pluralism is can be defined as ‘‘the view that all religions offer equally valid paths to salvation’’ and is therefore believed to be most likely to contribute to religious tolerance. However, some literature claims that pluralism can also encourage intolerance, as the ideology promotes complete loyalty to the state. As a result, pluralists could become intolerant towards groups the state criticizes (Donovan, 1993, p. 218).6

The strength of an individual’s identification with religious beliefs, the way this individual engages with these beliefs and the content of these beliefs thus influence religious tolerance. Therefore, the following sub question can be formulated: SQ3: (How) does ‘religious identity’

influence religious tolerance among members of both Albania’s ‘main religious groups’ and ‘new’ religious groups?7

3.3.2. Religious identity and interreligious cooperation

The extent to which a religious group wants to cooperate with another religious group is mainly influenced by both the religious identity of individuals in the country in which this religious group is present, the extent a religious group is under threat because of its identity, and the content of the religious beliefs of this group.

In countries where many people identify as being part of a religious group, but not many are religious practitioners, heavy competition for believers can arise between religious organizations. This is especially so when new religious groups, whose members identify strongly with this group, such as Baptists, enter a country. For these new groups, much is to gain by engaging in competition with the established groups: They can convert non-believers, but also non-practicing believers of the

established religious group(s). When these new groups gain members, this means a great loss in actual or potential members for the established groups. In this way, new religious groups can become more powerful than the established religious groups, which might lead to ‘‘the rise of intolerance and aggressiveness’’ in interreligious relations (Golovushkin, 2004, p. 103).

6_{This is assuming that in some countries, the state restricts the freedom of religion of a particular group that does not pose a}

physical threat to a country’s inhabitants but delegitimizes the government.

7_{Sub question three until six are not divided into a and b as a descriptive part is not always applicable to the topics in these}

questions, e.g. it is hard to describe ‘religious identity’ among interview respondents as they do not describe it; they only directly use it to speak about religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation.

(20)

Individuals feel the need to become member of a group to distinguish themselves from other individuals, but religious groups also have the need to distinguish themselves from other religious groups. Interreligious cooperation can help in the creation of such a distinction. In Germany, the Alevi community wanted to prove to the German government and German citizens that Alevi’s were

different from Sunni Turks and from Islamists. Consequently, the National Alevi organization of Germany ‘‘attended various initiatives organized by the Catholic Church for interfaith dialogue’’ and Alevi ‘‘activists became deeply involved in newly established interfaith groups, collaborating primarily with Christian groups […] to fight against Islamist radicalization’’ During these activities, the Alevi’s emphasized that they believe in interreligious peace (Özkul, 2019, p. 7).

Being under threat for religious reasons can also motivate a religious group to seek cooperation with other religious groups. Following the attacks on the twin towers in New York, Canadian Muslims were regarded with skepticism by the Albanian government and population. To make clear to fellow Canadians that they were not a threat to security, Canadian Muslims started to ‘‘promote inter-religious dialogues’’, turned Ottawa into ‘‘a key focal point of interfaith activities’’, and became part of the Capital Interfaith Council (Yousif, 2005, p. 56).

At times multiple religious groups are under threat because of their religious identity, this can lead to religious cooperation between these groups. In East London, for example, violent expressions of both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism triggered local cooperation between the local synagogue and mosque (Ahmed et al., 2016, p. 231). Feelings of guilt and shame over actions of other members of one’s religious group can also make one seek for interreligious cooperation. After in Amsterdam, in 2003 and 2006, Moroccan Islamic boys kicked against wreaths from the WWII monument, Jews and Moroccans established the JMNA; Jewish–Moroccan Network Amsterdam (Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2017, p. 361).

Like with religious tolerance, considering the content of religious ideas was found to be helpful in predicting whether interreligious cooperation was likely to take place. Religious groups who demand more of their members and believe only they know the truth ‘‘discourage nongroup activities and contact with nongroup members’’ (Merino, 2010, p. 233). The religious beliefs of a group must also convince this group that there is a gain from interreligious cooperation. For a religious group to engage in interreligious dialogue for example, it must ‘‘trust that the other religion addresses the same ultimate truth or fundamental questions in a mutually relevant way, and believe that one may actually understand the teachings and practices of another religion in a way that might open up one’s own religion to new insights and actions’’ (Cornille, 2013, p. 21).

Based on this literature overview, the following sub question can be formulated:

SQ4: (How) does ‘religious identity’ influence interreligious cooperation between Albania’s ‘main’ religious groups and ‘new’ religious groups?

(21)

3.4. National identity

Some research defines national identity as ‘‘the linking of the individual with a piece of land known as the homeland’’ (Al-buhouachi, 2002 in Khader, 2012, p. 175). This ‘homeland’ can also be a new homeland one has migrated to. Others speak of national identity as an identification with particular national values like democracy and gender equality (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013).

Ethnic identity is in this case something separate, as it is comprised of ‘‘claims of common shared ancestry of a similar culture, race, religion, language, kinship or place of origin within the context of a group’’ (Van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, p. 278). Other literature, however, perceives of ethnic identity as mainly a heritage in terms of DNA. This literature conceives of ‘shared heritage’, such as a particular language or a common religion as ‘national identity’ (Muller, 2008, as cited in McCargo, 2009, p. 13).

In Tirana, the relation between ethnic and national identity is likely to be different for each individual. In recent years, there has been some immigration in Tirana (Vathi, Duci & Dhembo, 2016, p. 162; Barjaba, 2004; Ministria e Punëve të Brendshme, 2015, p. 27). These immigrants are likely to be ethnically foreign but might consider themselves Albanian nationals. Albania also has ethnic minorities like Greeks and Macedonians (Draper, 1997), who might make the same distinction between ethnic and national identity. The majority of Tirana’s residents, however, is Albanian born, and has an Albanian ethnicity and nationality. For these residents, ethnic and national identity is thus likely to overlap.

Taking the different definitions of national identity and possible national identifications of citizens in Tirana into account, national identity in this thesis will be defined as an identification with some or all of the following elements: The national territory on which one lives, national civic values that are associated with this territory, and a cultural identity, such as religion, language and ethnic heritage.

3.4.1. National identity and religious tolerance

Literature has touched upon what an overlap of ethnic and national identity means for religious tolerance. Several studies show that such an overlap contributes to an evaluation of a religious group in ethnic terms. In other words, individuals who strongly identify with their ethnicity and nationality, are less likely to be tolerant towards religious outgroups if these outgroups do not share their ethnicity (Smeekes, Verkuyten & Poppe, 2012, p. 1410). In Turkey, ‘nationalist Turks and Kurds’ are less inclined to be tolerant towards religious others if these religious others have a different ethnicity (Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017, p. 210).

When national identity is defined both in religious and ethnic terms, this can lead to an even stronger intolerance against groups that are both in terms of religion and ethnicity an outgroup. Greek citizens who are relatively right-wing and define their national identity in religious and ethnic terms, are relatively intolerant towards Muslims with an immigrant background (Triandafyllidou & Kouki,

(22)

2013, p. 722). In Greece, this preference for ‘ethnic in-group members’ is even institutionalized as for immigrants who are believed to be of ‘Greek descent’ (Pontic Greeks from ex-Soviet Republics and ‘Greek’ Albanians) a ‘‘whole separate set of provisions, including administration circulars, court decisions and policy programs’’ was made. Still, Albanian Muslims are not considered to be of Greek descent and perceived ‘‘as threatening to the social and political order’’ (Triandafyllido & Veikou, 2002, pp. 202-203).

National identity often encompasses ethnic identity, but this does not mean the two are similar. As highlighted in the previous paragraph, a national identity can also encompass cultural elements. One’s level of religious tolerance in a particular situation depends on which element of national identity one believes to be the most important. For example, in the Netherlands in the 1990s, Surinamese and Antillean immigrants were perceived as ‘belonging to the Dutch nation’ more than other migrants, not only because many had a similar religion, but also because ‘‘they spoke Dutch’’ and ‘‘largely identified with the Netherlands and its royal family’’ (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 92). In 2012, Dutch individuals who perceive tolerance as a typical ‘Dutch cultural value’ and identify strongly with their national Dutch identity were found to be more tolerant towards religious others, even if these have another ethnic/national background (Smeekes, Verkuyten & Poppe, 2012).

However, many Dutch nationalists also draw on ethnic and religious elements of their national identity that make them oppose of immigrants and Muslims (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015; Weiner, 2015, p. 589)

The national values that are part of a national identity can also lead to the creation of

requirements religious individuals must adhere to. If they do not adhere to these requirements, this can lead to intolerance. For example, in Indonesia, in 1983, many people believed that an ‘Indonesian’ could become a member of any officially recognized religious group, but he had to be a member. The Wana people, however, were not member of one of these groups. Neither did they speak Indonesian, and these two elements together caused them to be perceived as ‘anti-national’ and to be excluded from the Indonesian community (Atkinson, 1983, p. 688). Following the fall of the communist regime, nationalists in the Balkans allowed new religious groups to enter their country but believed these groups should only allow fellow nationals to join their community and should pledge alliance to the state. Members of the ‘free churches’ - ‘‘Protestants (Baptists, Methodists, Nazarenes, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists) and the evangelicals’’, however, allowed individuals from all over the world to join their church and did not pledge alliance to the state. As a result, they were ‘‘persecuted and despised as “sectarians”’ (Mojzes, c.a. 2007, p. 2)

Whether one is tolerant towards ‘religious others’ thus depends on how strongly one identifies with one’s national identity, but also what elements of this national identity one draws upon in a particular situation. Therefore, the following sub-question can be formulated: SQ5: (How) does

‘national identity’ influence religious tolerance among members of both Albania’s ‘main religious groups’ and ‘new’ religious groups?

(23)

3.4.2. National identity and interreligious cooperation

Like with religious identity, the national identity of the population in a country influences cooperation between religious groups in that country. A strong national identity among inhabitants of a country (or regional identity in a city) does not have to lead to a lack of cooperation between new religious groups and established groups per-se, it can also foster interreligious cooperation. In Wales, for example, the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholic church, both new to the region, started to promote the ‘Welsh-Language Culture’; the latter also held its services in Welsh (Chambers & Thompson, 2005, pp. 342-343). To show their commitment to the region at large, however, both churches also engaged in interfaith dialogue with other religious groups, including newer Islamic groups (Ibid., p. 346).

In countries where ‘national identity’ is perceived as a negative attribute of a person or organization, interreligious cooperation can be a way for the religious organization to get rid of the national identity others associate it with. According to the communists who won the ‘ethnic war in Yugoslavia’ (1941-45), the nationalist factions, who were responsible for the killings, were enraged by religion (Perica, 2001, p. 43). Religious communities decided to prove the communists wrong and worked together to show that religion should play an important role in society. In 1966 Croatian Catholic ‘Bishop Dr Franic’ ‘‘organized the first joined ecumenical prayer between clergy representing old Yugoslav ethnic rivals: Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs’’ (Ibid., p. 41). Following this prayer, many more initiatives of interreligious cooperation between Christians, Jews and Muslims were organized in the Western Balkans. However, national identity can also be a barrier to interreligious cooperation at the interpersonal level. The Israel-Palestinian conflict has created ‘‘a phenomenon of a cultural segregation’’. Consequently, people engaging in interreligious relationships are considered traitors (Yahya, Boag, Munshi & Litvak-Hirsch, 2016, p. 277).

Interreligious cooperation can also be used by religious organizations to increase support for their national identity. According to literature, this is what the Sunni organization Diyanet, which operates under control of the Turkish is doing: It has been prioritizing ‘‘dialogue with Muslim countries’’ including ‘‘communities with historical ties to Turkey as a result of a common Ottoman history’’ to ensure that citizens in these others Muslim countries perceive positively of Turkey (Yilmaz & Barry, 2018, p. 9).

Interreligious cooperation is thus fostered as a way for new religious communities to show they that are committed to the country in which they operate, a way for religious communities to distance themselves from their national identity in case this identity is negatively perceived of, and a way for these communities to foster respect for their national identity. Therefore, the following sub question can be formulated: SQ6: (How) does ‘national identity’ influence interreligious cooperation

(24)

To summarize, the following list of sub questions will be answered in this thesis;

SQ1a: How do religious leaders speak about religious tolerance? SQ1b: How tolerant are followers of the different religious groups?

SQ2a: (How) do religious communities, both traditional and new, cooperate at the institutional level? SQ2b: To what extent do followers of Albania’s religious communities cooperate?

SQ3: (How) does ‘religious identity’ influence religious tolerance among members of both Albania’s ‘main religious groups’ and ‘new’ religious groups?

SQ4: (How) does ‘religious identity’ influence interreligious cooperation between Albania’s ‘main’ religious groups and ‘new’ religious groups?

SQ5: (How) does ‘national identity’ influence religious tolerance among members of both Albania’s ‘main religious groups’ and ‘new’ religious groups?

SQ6: (How) does ‘national identity’ influence interreligious cooperation between Albania’s ‘main’ religious groups and ‘new’ religious groups?

(25)

4. Method

The sub questions in this thesis necessitate the use of qualitative interviews combined with

quantitative surveys. This method section outlines the advantages of this combined approach (4.1), discusses, in general, the qualitative interviews conducted (4.2), mentions the operationalization of the theory into the interview and survey questions (4.3), clarifies ethical considerations (4.4) and finally, shortly elaborates on the qualitative analysis and describes the general characteristics of the survey sample (4.4).

4.1. Research design

Within this case study, ‘methodological triangulation’ is used as both semi-structured interviews with religious leaders and a survey distributed among the Albanian public are used to answer the research question (Hussein, 2009, pp. 3-4). Triangulation allows the methods to compensate each other’s weaknesses (Jick, 1979, p. 604). The surveys with members of the religious communities serve to verify if the statements of the leaders are indeed representative of those of the religious community, and hereby function to get a ‘‘deeper and more comprehensive’’ picture of interreligious relations in Albania (Jick, 1979, p. 603; Hussein, 2009, p. 8). They also help to establish causal relationships, which is troublesome with qualitative data.

A qualitative interview can be defined as ‘‘an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry including the topics to be covered, but not a set of questions that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order’’.

However, the interviewer can have some questions he/she wants have a response to (Babbie, 2014, pp. 326-327). This method can be considered appropriate for the research question, as it is concerned with the ‘meaning making’ of the religious leaders (Warren, 2001, p. 2): This method provides the religious leaders with space to define their group’s national and religious identity, and make sense of their group’s relation to other groups. However, the researcher must keep his or her own bias and the social desirability of respondents into account (Hewitt, 2007, p. 1149).

The surveys used to accompany the qualitative interviews (containing both some closed-ended and open-ended questions) can ‘compensate’ for the social desirability of the answers in the

interviews, as it is easier for these survey respondents to stay anonymous. The responses to this survey also illuminate ‘‘the diversity of some topic of interest within a given population’’ (Jansen, 2010, para. 6), as they highlight if and how Tirana’s citizens differ in their perception of and interaction with members of other religious groups, and if this is indeed dependent on their religious and national identity.

(26)

4.2. Respondents: religious leaders/representatives and followers

When it comes to the interviews, nine interviews were conducted with the following religious leaders8_:

Two other interviews were conducted with a board member of the civil society organization

Ardhmëria, and a member of the State Committee on Cults. To retrieve more background information about interreligious relations in Albania, I also interviewed three researchers. I personally contacted the secretaries of the religious leaders and a member of the State Committee on Cults by email and/or phone and was consequently invited for an interview. One of the researchers contacted the member of Ardhmëria on my behalf. The interviews were all conducted in English9_{, and lasted between 40 and} 160 minutes. Ten interviews took place in Tirana, one took place in Durres.

The surveys were first created in English (see Appendix B) and then translated into Albanian by two native speakers (see Appendix C). The Albanian translation was then checked by another native speaker with a high proficiency in English. The Albanian surveys were distributed on paper on six different days (April 6, 20, 21 and 28; May 4 and 5), in the city center of Tirana, mainly to people sitting on Skanderbeg Square and in Tirana’s main parks; Parku Rinia and Parku I Madh Kodrat e Leqinit. I could assist some people who had difficulty understanding certain survey questions using my limited knowledge of Albanian. Some people provided explanations for their answers in English, which often resulted in a short interview. The surveys were mainly handed out to people between the age of 18 and 40, as older Albanians were less interested or not able to fill in the survey. Additional surveys were distributed to the Baha’i by the national representative10_{, and Jehovah’s Witnesses and} members of the Church of Latter-Day Saints were open to small interviews on the street.

8_{Some leaders have received a draft of their quotes, and have requested amendments, which have been made to the text.}

None of the religious representatives, except for the two Jehovah’s Witnesses, objected to their name being used in this thesis.

9_{During two of the interviews, a translator was present.}

(27)

4.3. Operationalization

4.3.1. Qualitative interviews

The different hypotheses in this thesis were operationalized into starting questions that were posed to the religious representatives. The topic of the first sub-question, ‘religious tolerance’ is operationalized in questions about how the leaders define religious tolerance, if they think it is present in Albania, and if they believe all religions promote this tolerance. The second sub-question is operationalized in questions about contact with other religious organizations.

Sub-question four until six are operationalized in questions about the organization’s ‘religious’ and ‘national identity’. Examples are questions on how their holy books speak about different

religious groups, if they believe their organization is perceived as Albanian and what their

organization’s connection is to broader society. For the general questions on religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation, respondents were asked to explain their answers, and at times asked if they believed the religious or national identity of the other religious group to influence this tolerance or cooperation. The set of questions prepared for the representative of the Ardhmëria and of the State Committee on Cults different somewhat. The main set of questions can be found in Appendix A.

4.3.2. Quantitative survey

The surveys with the Albanian public also focus on religious and national identity, religious tolerance and interreligious cooperation. Respondents were requested to fill in their religion and asked to respond to statements that measure the strength of religious identification and the extent to which they actively practice their religion (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 5). The survey asks for both the respondent’s place of birth and his or her nationality. The survey also includes statements to measure the extent to which respondents identify with their country of residence, Albania, and other Albanians (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016, p. 5). Religious tolerance is assessed through the survey in two ways. First, questions are posed to measure respondents’ attitudes towards the different religious groups included in this thesis (Vurmo et al., 2018, p. 55)11_{. Then, both factual and attitude-related statements} are used to measure the extent to like to interact with religious others (Altinoglu, 2018, p. 704; Mana, Sagy, Srour & Mjally-Knani, 2012, p. 174; statements relating to the national identity of religious groups are not derived from previous research). Finally, to determine the extent to which respondents engage in interreligious cooperation, two questions are asked on attending events and buildings of religious others - instances of interreligious cooperation likely to occur among Albanians (Duijzings, 1999, p. 14)12_{(the survey can be found in Appendix B).}

11_{These questions have been posed to the Albanian public in different cities in 2018. However, in this survey, questions are}

added on the newer religious groups. By asking this question on sentiment about both the main and newer groups to the same sample, respondents’ perception of the main and newer groups can be compared.

12_{As this author describes, during the Ottoman Empire, many Albanians officially converted to Islam, but kept practicing}

their Christian rituals. Moreover, as became clear in a short interview with an Albanian on the street, Albanians often visit religious events of their spouse, who is often a religious other, to show respect.

Interreligious relations between the main religious groups and newer religious groups in Albania : influences of religious and national identity