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Refugees, Immigrants or the New Enemy?

Evolution of the Hungarian Political Discourse

Regarding Migration

Master’s Thesis

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Sociology Master - Migration and Ethnic Studies

Student Name: Dorottya Timár Student ID: 11128798

First Supervisor: Simona Vezzoli Second Supervisor: Sonja Fransen Date of submission: 30 June 2016 Word Count: 22 095

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Table of Contents

Abstract ... 3

Introduction ... 4

Theoretical Framework ... 8

Framing of Immigration ... 8

Explanations of xenophobic attitudes ... 8

Averse feelings towards foreigners in the absence of immigrants ... 11

Context ... 14

Political scene ... 15

Demographics ... 15

Legal framework ... 16

Methodology and methods ... 20

Methodology ... 20

Methods ... 21

Analysis and findings ... 23

Macroeconomic indicators ... 26

Cultural Differences ... 29

Discourse Theory ... 31

Terminology ... 31

National Consultation and Campaign ... 47

Political Power Relations ... 59

Overall crisis of the society ... 61

Conclusion ... 67

Bibliography ... 70

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Abstract

Previous studies concerning the political discourse regarding migration have shown that the shift to a more extreme right argumentation with xenophobic and anti-immigrant tone is not a new phenomenon. Such changes can be explained by factors as macro economical indicators, cultural differences, the dynamics of the power relations within politics and an overall crisis within the society. This thesis studies the evolution of the political discourse regarding migration in Hungary between January 2015 and April 2016, the period overlapping the international events of the increased arrival of refugees into the European Union. Throughout the analysis of several government documents and campaigns, actual flows of refugees, macroeconomic data (employment, housing, poverty etc.), internal political power relations and the possibility of an identity crisis within the society caused by the modernization process taking place after the end of the communist era, this study attempts to examine the potential associations between the above mentioned factors and the changes within the political discourse regarding migration. According to the findings of this study, the explicit shift to an anti-immigration discourse possibly happened due to the desire of the governing coalition to keep the current political status quo. Hence the xenophobic feeling within the public – even in the relative absence of foreigner population – is not a new phenomenon in Hungary, in order to be able to keep the existing positions of power, the opportunity of building upon the already existing averse feelings, fear and xenophobic attitudes has been used by the Hungarian government. The ultimate goal of using the increased number of asylum seekers as threat to expand political influence seems logical due to the fact that the other examined factors – the growing employment, decreasing poverty and housing data – seem not to be able to fully explain the altered xenophobic tone. Therefore, this thesis confirms the results of previous researches about the usage of a xenophobic tone for political gain.

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Introduction

Migration is a current and common phenomenon worldwide, governmental officials; academic professionals; mainstream media and almost each and every member of the society at the individual level deal with it on a nearly everyday basis. Therefore, the

”discourse on the famous stranger, who comes today and remains tomorrow”1

became a central element in politics and it receives an incredible amount of press coverage in the international mainstream media. Even though the undeniable effects of migration in the contemporary era, the enlarged media attention on the phenomenon should not mystify anyone, as the topic has a long history in sociological studies.

International agreements provide a framework for questions raised by migration, especially regarding the situation of refugees.2 However, as European nation states became rather anxious about the rising arrival of asylum seekers to the continent, radical measures and attitudes have been implemented. These include the shift to a more extreme right attitude in politics, with an increased xenophobic and anti-immigration tone and attitude. Such as migration being a worldwide phenomenon, the growing levels of xenophobia are also not limited to certain nation states, but the pattern of rising anti-foreigner sentiments can be observed all over the globe. However, the attitude towards migrants and refugees can be very different by countries and current events can easily have a huge impact on the tone of political discourse and policy decisions made by governments.

Therefore, the strengthening anti-immigration and xenophobic attitudes are not a unique feature of the Hungarian state. The growing averse feeling towards migrants within the political and public discourse is a pattern that can be observed in many European countries already for a long time.3 “Over the past two decades, immigration

has become one of the most salient and controversial political issues in Western Europe.”4

1 Wimmer (1997) cites Simmel (1987) p. 18.

2 See for example UNHCR, the UN refugee Agency, Convention and Protocol

Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 and 1967) source:

http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (accessed 22 April 2016)

3 See for example Buonfino, 2004; Caviedes, 2015; De Master and Le Roy, 2000;

Huysmans, 2000; Korkut, 2014; Messina, 2014; Thänhardt, 1995; Wimmer, 1997

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Acknowledging the fact of generally expanding intolerance towards migrants and the altered attitudes in the political discourse of many EU member states, this thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: What has been the evolution of the political discourse regarding migration in Hungary between January 2015 and April 2016? Is there an increase or decrease within the political discourse into a more xenophobic and immigrant tone? In case the discourse shifted to a more anti-foreigner tone, can immigration, macroeconomic or political factors explain the changes (such as the increased number of asylum seekers or the altered situation in the power relations within politics)?

The topic of migration is such a complex and controversial topic, that scholars cannot even agree on the fact whether it is a debated or (up-until-recently) rather neglected subject in Hungary. As Korkut (2014) argued: “Immigration has been a burning issue

in Hungary since the democratic transition started.”5 So as Gödri (2015), when she

declares that in Hungary, immigration and emigration are both triggering a widespread interest within the public, both topics are re-occurring within the discourse. She argues, that the increased number of refugees drew the attention on the topic of immigration (Gödri, 2015). On the other hand, Tóth (2013) stated that migration only occurs within decision-making as a law enforcement issue or as a duty from the EU-membership to harmonize the county’s legal regulations. Therefore, the significance of the matter is marginal. In case the attention is being pointed at migrants, it is caused by the nation-building intention of the ‘diaspora law’ or occasionally a crime report in one of the tabloids (Tóth, 2013). In any case, the specific analysis of the political discourse regarding migration in the contemporary Hungarian context is barely existent. Apart from a few articles (ex. Bernáth and Messing, 2015) or reports made by research institutes (TÁRKI’s recent report), there are barely any scientific pieces touching the topic at all. Yet, the events from last summer evolving in front of us whilst being broadcasted on a daily basis need to be theorized. Therefore, this study aspires to offer a critical interpretation of the reaction of the Hungarian government to the appearance of refugees in 2015-16.

As it is stated in the above-mentioned report by TÁRKI in 2016 (editors: Simonovits and Bernát) two surveys have been organized in Europe in 2015 concerning the

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attitudes towards migrants and the perspectives on policies addressing the issues arising from the sudden and increased number of asylum seekers. The results speak for themselves: the percentage of EU28 population who consider migration as one of

the main problems of EU has evolved as the following: 14%6 in June 2013, 24%7 in

September 2014, 38%8 in May 2015, 47%9 in September 2015. Hungary has always

belonged to the group of those countries, where a higher amount of the population

reckoned migration as one of the main problems than the EU average: 43%10 in May

2015 and 65%11 in September 2015. The proportion of the EU28 population who would sympathize with stricter measures tackling illegal migration is already quite

high (85%12), whereas the same data for Hungary is as high as 91%13. However the

amount of people who would encourage a common European policy on migration is lower (68%14) than the EU average (73%15). Moreover, the negative attitudes towards

migrants from other EU countries as well as from states outside the EU are stronger than the EU average (respectively: Hungary: 47%16, EU average: 40%17 and Hungary:

70%18, EU average: 56%19). Since 2013 the second biggest growth within

immigration-awareness happened in Hungary (+57%20).

As the data shows the amount of those people who consider migration as the biggest problem of the EU has increased by 22% in Hungary, whilst the same number for the EU average is only 9%. Even though there was an increase of migration awareness throughout the EU, such change as happened in Hungary within a relatively short period of time is quite unique for the continent. However, such changes were not limited to the awareness of the public regarding migration, but an increased focus can

6 Simonovits and Bernát (2016) citing (p.16.): Standard Eurobarometer 79.5; Summer

2013

7 Simonovits and Bernát (2016) citing (p.16.): Standard Eurobarometer 82; Autumn

2014

8 Simonovits and Bernát (2016) citing (p.16.): Standard Eurobarometer 83; Spring

2015

9 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 20. 10 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 16. 11 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 27. 12 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 17. 13 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 17. 14 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 17. 15 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 17. 16 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 19. 17 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 18. 18 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 20. 19 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 19. 20 Simonovits and Bernát (2016), p. 21.

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be detected within the political discourse as well, since the Hungarian government initiated a nation-wide campaign in April 2015 called “National Consultation on

Immigration and Terrorism”. The campaign will be analysed in this study, among

other official government documents and the media outputs of the administration’s message regarding migration. Therefore, this thesis aims to analyse the possible causes of the altered tone of the political discourse, let it be the growing number of asylum seekers; economic indicators or the desire to keep the political status quo.

Korkut (2014) suggests that the issue of immigration in Hungary needs to be framed in a socio-political context, hence despite plentiful kin living abroad, low number of foreigners residing in the country, and the multi-ethnic historical background the aversive attitudes towards foreigners, in general, are very high. He claims that in order to be able to elaborate on the issue of immigration in Hungary, an emphasis on the view of the conservative right is necessary. Korkut (2014) stresses the importance of traditional views and conservatism on boosting anti-immigration reaction in general.21 He states, that in the case of Hungary three different, but interdependent factors are responsible for anti-foreigner sentiment: firstly, the securitization of immigration in politics and posing it as a threat towards the homogeneity of the nation, secondly the aversion of anything different and the antipathy of non-natives, and thirdly the constant supposed fear, that the homeland is threatened by foreigners. Korkut (2014) adds that the conservative right party benefit from such a vision of the public, therefore using these ideas in their campaigns and politics.

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Theoretical Framework

Framing of Immigration

As argued by Helbling (2014) framing, in general, is often understood as a practice, which can be split into three stages: how the information is fabricated by political elites, the usage of different frames by the press and media and thirdly the influence of the first two categories on the frames adopted by individuals.22 Furthermore, by frame Helbling (2014) means “how political actors define a particular problem and

which justifications are related to which positions.”23 As noted by Helbling (2014)

the majority of the framing studies observe the impact of the media, therefore missing the first step of the process. Thus, this thesis will make an attempt to examine “the

role that political actors play in framing political issues and the question of how frames are constructed.”24 Moreover, the author emphasizes that the underlining

motives for certain political actors to use framing could be to justify their positions and to be able to direct the attention of the receiver audience to possible causes, and consequences, in order to be able to realize what is at stake for them (Helbling, 2014). Nationalistic arguments are most often used in the context of protecting boundaries of the state and the cultural homogeneity of the society to preserve a certain national identity (Helbling, 2014). According to Helbling (2014), examples of the nationalistic frame include xenophobic statements, which are of any harm to national traditions and values.

Explanations of xenophobic attitudes

In his article from 1997 Andreas Wimmer offered four different explanations of increased xenophobic attitudes all over Europe. The four models are the following: rational choice theory, functionalism, discourse theory and phenomenology. According to Wimmer (1997), the reason behind improved anti-foreigner sentiments is that “downwardly mobile groups appeal to the institutionalized and hegemonial

image of a national group of solidarity in order to reassure their place in the core of the social fabric. They thus perceive people outside this imagined community of destiny as competitors for state-organized promises of solidarity and security.” 25 Therefore, it can be argued that those groups within the society whose positions are weakening (or at least they perceive such a downwardly movement on the social

22 Helbling (2014) citing Matthes (2012) 23 Helbling (2014) p. 22-23.

24 Helbling (2014) p. 22. 25 Wimmer (1997), p. 19.

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scale) could turn to nationalistic ideas easier because they are awaiting the support and solidarity from the State to be able to keep their spot within the social structure. In order to justify such ‘protection’ from the State, an image of the enemy needs to be created, from which the government can defend the groups already ‘suffering’ from social deprivation.

The first model is the rational choice theory and it originates from the competition for scarce jobs and cheap housing between the natives and immigrants. The theoretical idea behind this reasoning is the rational decision making. However, as Wimmer (1997) argues, the clash between the above-mentioned two groups cannot always be explained as strengthened competition on the job or housing market (e.g. at times of economic crises). Rather, it could be described as the perception of equality and real competition. Moreover, he argues that the fear of losing social status and identity is much bigger than the anxiety caused by intensified competition on the job market (Wimmer, 1997).

The functionalist approach focuses on the cultural differences between the indigenous and migrant populations. As the theory goes, the inability of immigrants to integrate into the host society is rooting from the dissimilarities between cultural values. Thus, the marginalization of certain minorities triggers xenophobic reactions from the majority of the natives. An interesting example provided by Wimmer (1997) contradicts the perceived fear that the cultural differences result in the downgrading of migrants and generates discriminatory feelings from the side of the native-born population. After the independence of Indonesia, many people decided to migrate to the Netherlands in a relatively brief period of time. However, the official opinion of the Dutch government and the public was that due to the great differences between the two cultures the integration of the immigrants is almost impossible. Yet, these individuals could not have been stopped, hence they obtained Dutch citizenship. Nevertheless, dedicated to the overwhelming efforts of social workers, the immigrants from Indonesia became so integrated to the majority of the society, that they are not being regarded as a minority group anymore. The point of this example is that “by

defining a group of immigrants as ‘belonging’ to the national ‘we’ and therefore having a right to be cared for by the state, considerable ‘objective cultural distances’ and degrees of ‘racial distinctiveness’ can be overcome.” 26 Following this logic, the

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solution regarding the possible issues caused by immigration is not to physically stop people from entering a country, but to deal with the situation in a more humanistic way. The question is more like to what extent can the cultural disparities be blamed for intensified xenophobic attitudes. The counter argument by Wimmer (1997) speaks for itself: “discursive constructions of ‘otherness’ and the related perception of

differentness and menace are linked rather with political vested interest than with objective cultural differences.”27 According to this reasoning, in the political discourse, the emphasis on differences between migrants and the natives and the risk originating from this otherness has more connection to political motives than with the actual dissimilarities.

As stated by Wimmer (1997) discursive theory lies within the presumption that the discourse and institutionalization of immigration are created by officials or semi-officials with power. Therefore, the cultural differences between natives and immigrants already hold the responsibility of discrimination and deprivation of the minorities, whilst xenophobia is being described as a cultural clash. Moreover, elites often use the ‘immigration problem’ to explain a more general crisis within society, such as the question of political legitimation and economic hardships. Furthermore, the discourse is created in a way, which provides ground for racism, and extreme right can prosper from it. In a twisted way, even the multicultural idea can be interpreted as it allows the natives to use the argument of protecting ‘national’ territory and cultural values from the threat of becoming multicultural (Wimmer, 1997).

As van Dijk (1997) stated as well within his analysis of parliamentary debates “the

relevance of populist arguments that presuppose popular resentment against foreigners, and hence also the ways democratic principles may be argumentatively subverted.”28 This study attempts to examine these kinds of populist arguments

within the Hungarian scenario; hence the well-known circumstances – namely the xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners – are given in this case.

According to the phenomenologist approach, anti-foreigner sentiments strengthen due to an overall crisis within the society. As Wimmer (1997) states such crisis could occur within a nation after severe modernization processes. If the promises of the new model cannot be kept any longer, conflicts might arise within the society. Moreover,

27 Wimmer (1997), p. 25. 28 van Dijk (1997) p. 30.

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such tensions can result in a general identity crisis in the society, which otherwise would be able to eliminate any negative feelings towards certain social groups. Furthermore, as explained by Wimmer (1997): “xenophobia and racism are

interpreted as ways of reassuring the national self and its boundaries, as attempts at making sense of the world in times of crisis.”29

Averse feelings towards foreigners in the absence of immigrants

As stated by Korkut (2014) the xenophobic attitudes in Hungary have started rising since the Fidesz coalition has been established in 2010. However, this was just the beginning of the whole story. After the increased number of asylum seekers30 in Hungary and the reaction of the government to the altered migratory situation, the levels of xenophobia reached an all-time high in January 2016, with a practically disappeared xenophilia (Simonovits and Bernát, 2016). According to Korkut (2014) the fact that the country has reached its most extensive anti-foreigner sentiments during the governance of Fidesz, it might indicate an effect of the administration on reinforcing xenophobic thoughts. As stated by Korkut (2014) the supply-based politics could also lead to anti-immigrant feelings. Hence, Fidesz is quite a strong government, obtaining the majority (2/3) of parliamentary seats up until February 201531, this developed into “a nationalist, introvert conservatism.” 32 Moreover, as specified by Korkut (2014) Fidesz goes as far as portraying opposition or anyone not fully supporting their anti-immigration campaign as traitors or at least collaborators of the foreigners.33 However, up until the beginning of 2015, the xenophobic sentiments

were more directed at the ‘West’ by supposing the “economic colonialism”34 of

Hungary by foreign investors. This has changed to an extent, that since 2013, anyone obtaining the amount of 360 thousand Euros can buy the so-called ‘residency bond’ in Hungary, resulting in full access to Hungary’s welfare system and the right of free movement within the Schengen zone.35

29 Wimmer (1997) p. 27. 30 See Appendix 1

31 By-elections held in February 2015 lead to changes in the composition of

Parliament. (Source: http://444.hu/2015/02/22/bukta-a-fidesz-a-ketharmadot/ accessed 30 May 2016)

32 Korkut (2014) p. 621.

33 See Teun van Dijk’s (1997) ideological square on the theoretical background of this

political tactic.

34 Korkut (2014) p. 621.

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However, as noticed by Korkut (2014) the averse fact is, that the anti-immigrant attitudes are huge, regardless of the fact that Hungary is not a traditional destination country in the international migratory scene. Therefore, the number of foreigners residing in the country is very small, especially compared to Western-European countries. Thus, the author also noted that: “public rejection of all sorts of

non-nativeness and the politicians’ narration of racial, sexual and religious foreignness substantiate anti-immigration policies rather than the number of immigrants.” 36

Moreover, as stated by Korkut (2014), it is interesting to examine the surprisingly high anti-foreigner feelings given the fact that Hungary has been a migrant-sending country, or at most a transit country immigration-wise. According to him, the political unrest throughout the 20th century and later the entry into the European Union

resulted in the emigration of many Hungarians. Besides, he argues that the historical characteristic of being part of several multi-ethnic empires should have left at least a hint (if not a legacy) of multiculturalism. Though what the writer does not mention in his article is the fact, that Hungary does not have any colonial history. A typical historical background for Hungary is not the domineering, but the submissive characteristic.

However, the strengthening anti-immigration and xenophobic attitudes are not a unique feature of the Hungarian state. The growing averse feeling towards migrants within the political and public discourse is a pattern that can be observed in many European countries already for a long time.37 As Korkut (2014) argues as well, such mindset is already widespread in Turkey for a while as well. Despite the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and the current multi-ethnic and multi-cultural characteristic of the country, the opposed opinions towards foreignness remain high (Korkut, 2014). Though this fact might not be surprising if the fact that the “Turkish state does not

recognize the diverse nature of Turkish society”38 is taken into consideration. Therefore, any kinds of differences – ethnic, sexual or linguistic – stay far-off for the whole society as well (Korkut, 2014). Turkey’s immigration and refugee policies are also affected by this attitude, namely favouring migrants of Turkish origin in culture, language, and ethnicity (Korkut, 2014). Furthermore, Turkey still holds its geographical limitation regarding the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees,

36 Korkut (2014) p. 621.

37 See for example: Buonfino, 2004; Caviedes, 2015; De Master and Le Roy, 2000;

Huysmans, 2000; Korkut, 2014; Messina, 2014; Thänhardt, 1995; Wimmer, 1997

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meaning that only asylum seekers from Europe would be granted the refugee status (Korkut, 2014). This restraint might be still effective due to the fact, that Turkey is still far from the EU membership, therefore “Turkey risks becoming a buffer zone

[…] for the EU’s unwanted asylum seekers and refugees”39 if the geographical

limitation of the Convention would be eliminated. The unwelcoming policies and public attitudes might be considered strange, if the fact is taken into account that the Turkish history has observed many different forms of international movements of people, for instance the emigration of the ‘Gastarbeiter’ to German-speaking countries throughout the 1960-80s, and the immigration of people of Turkish descent from the neighbouring countries (Korkut, 2014). Moreover, recently Turkey became a significant transit country for refugees desiring to reach Western Europe. Even though the substantial changes in the recent past of Turkey’s migration history, the policies regarding immigration remained the same, keeping their selective and security-based characteristic, ignoring the human rights, demographic and economic dimensions (Korkut, 2014). Thus, handling the altered migratory situation becomes even more difficult. The fact, that the Turkish government (similarly to the Hungarian) expresses anti-immigrant opinions does not help the situation (Korkut, 2014). Furthermore, (also likewise in Hungary) the Turkish media reports on the circumstances of refugees and migrants arriving from Asia and Africa reinforce the already hostile portrayal of foreigners (Korkut, 2014 cites Eslen-Ziya and Korkut, 2013).

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Context

In Hungary, the question of migration, up until recently, has not been formulated as a problem in the political discourse, to the extent as it was already being expressed in most of the Western-European countries. The exclusion within the labour market and education, the regional segregation, the discrimination emerging from religious and cultural differences, and the racist violence were not necessarily connected to immigrants in the Hungarian context so far. Such issues did not occur in the Hungarian political scene, as problems requiring a solution. Even though, the majority of the Hungarian population has negative attitude and opinion towards migration and immigrants. Therefore, most of the foreigners residing in Hungary experience negative discrimination (Kováts, 2004). According to a report published in 2016 by TÁRKI40 (editors: Simonovits and Bernát), the atmosphere of the Hungarian public was not the most welcoming when the increased inflow of asylum seekers has started in May 2015. Hungarians, in general, had already adverse opinion towards migrants from inside and outside of the EU, whilst being in favour of measures against illegal migration and not supporting a common EU migration policy (Simonovits and Bernát, 2016). As Korkut (2014) stated as well, the general levels of xenophobia were already very excessive, way before the question of refugees became an everyday issue with enormous press coverage. The unwelcoming attitude even towards a non-existent nation called ‘Piréz’41 clearly shows the fact that majority of the Hungarians oppose any kind of difference, irrespective of how it is defined (Korkut, 2014). Moreover, as stated by the author “the tolerance of diversity is also weak regarding the internal

‘other’ concerning the Roma, Jews, and increasingly the homosexuals.” 42 With such high levels of xenophobic attitudes, the shift in the political scene to a more extreme right tone would not seem to be surprising. However, it raises the question whether the altered nature of the discourse is used for gaining political power or not.

40 TÁRKI is one of the oldest social sciences research institutes in Hungary. The

institute is independent and employee-owned and regularly carries out representative studies in various topics within social sciences. (Source:

http://www.tarki.hu/en/about/profile/index.html accessed 15 June 2016)

41 TÁRKI surveys the general xenophobic attitudes since the economic transition in

Hungary. However, the non-existent group of Piréz is a part of the questionnaire only

since 2006. (Source:

http://444.hu/2015/08/04/a-pirezek-huzzanak-vissza-oda-ahonnan-jottek-mondja-a-magyarok-fele/ accessed 30 May 2016)

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Political scene

The current government of Hungary comprises of a coalition between Fidesz (Federation of Young Democrats) and Keresztény Demokrata NépPárt (KDNP, Christian Democratic People’s Party). The opposition includes several left-wing parties: Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party), Lehet Más a Politika (LMP, Politics Can Be Different), Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition), Együtt (Together – Party for a New Era) and Párbeszéd Magyarországért (PM, Dialogue for Hungary) and one extreme right party named Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary). Fidesz won the last two elections (2010 and 2014), thus they are in the governing coalition for 6 years already. Their power became enormously huge and relatively undefeatable when a scandal broke out in 2006, in which the left side of the political scene was involved. After the 2006 election (won by the party MSZP on the left) a speech of the former (freshly elected) Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány leaked out, wherein the ex-PM stated that his party has been lying and that the party (MSZP) ruined everything (in a harsher language). After the scandal broke out protests started all over the country. Fidesz attempted to convince the Parliament regarding the need for early elections multiple times, though without any success. Therefore, they could only establish their coalition in 2010.

Demographics

As said by Várhalmi (2013) the official statistics make it almost impossible to detect how many migrants live in Hungary. He also adds that it can be declared for sure, that Hungary is not a receiving country regarding migration. According to the statistics of KSH (Central statistics Bureau), 445 thousand foreign-born people live in Hungary, the majority being born in Romania. The bulk of the foreign-born population in Hungary came from those neighbouring countries where the amount of Hungarian minority is significant, therefore it can be estimated that the composition of the groups emigrating from these countries contains mainly ‘ethnic’ Hungarians, who are very similar to the population of Hungary in their language, culture, and history. Therefore, their integration and labour market inclusion are raising total different questions than the same issues with migrants who are different in appearance and culture. Consequently, if we talk about immigrants in Hungary in general, the population born in the neighbouring countries with Hungarian origins and ancestors should determine our way of thinking (Várhalmi, 2013).

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Legal framework

From a legal point of view, the fact that Hungary is rather a transit than a destination country regarding migration requires a primarily a law enforcement approach. However, many occasions when refugees arrived in the country have proven that the state’s migration position has changed (Tóth, 2013). Hungary is a migration-sending country, having a very selective and hesitative immigration policy, based on ‘ethnic’ connections to the homeland (Tóth, 2013). In the Hungarian legal framework of migration, the legislation is emphasizing the right of controlling foreigners at the borders and in the territory of the state. Moreover, it includes the right of detention or deportation of the ‘persona non grata’. Compared to this the extent of the legislation regarding the integration of foreign employees, entrepreneurs, service providers and students seems limited. Additionally, the regulations concerning the protection of migrant children, social or health care and education of foreigners are even more restricted (Tóth, 2013).

Since 2004, when Hungary became a member of the European Union the 2004/38/EC43 directive came into force (after the temporary restrictions expired). This provides the legal framework for the rights of EU citizens and their family members regarding movement and residence within the territory of the Member States. The regulation regarding the third country nationals (TCNs) is part of the common migration policy of the EU. Therefore, Hungary is applying the common visa policy, the Schengen Border Code and the guidelines considering refugees and illegal migrants (Tóth, 2013). However, the Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals44 has framed the legal context of the immigration and integration of TCNs (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). According to Tóth (2013), the central element in the regulation considering TCNs is law enforcement and safety control and the fact, that in most cases TCNs have fewer rights, than Hungarians. In Hungary third country nationals – in case they want to settle in the country – have to prove their employment and housing status and their above-than-average income (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). In huge contrast with the tough requirements TCNs have to face when it comes to their residence, status or even naturalization in Hungary, the Status Law since 2011 provides very welcoming 43 Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:en:PDF (accessed 11 May 2016) 44 Source: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4979cae12 (accessed 04 May 2016)

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and easy prerequisites for those who have Hungarian origins, a so-called ethnic connection to Hungary. They are often being referred as ethnic Hungarians or being part of the Hungarian diaspora45. Since 2011 ethnic Hungarians are not required to have residency in Hungary or any legal connections to Hungary, when it comes to naturalization. It is sufficient if the individual speaks Hungarian, do not pose a security threat and can prove a Hungarian ascendant (Tóth, 2013). Therefore, as stated by Tóth (2013) the exception becomes mainstream in the statistics as well: 95%46 of naturalization are being provided to ethnic Hungarians, whilst the ‘other foreigners’ have to prove a residency of 10-12 years in Hungary, have to face serious checks and control by the authorities, pay the taxes and suffer the several rounds of bureaucracy until naturalization (Tóth, 2013).

Tóth (2013) argues, if citizenship is offered quickly to the majority of the applicants (‘ethnic’ Hungarians), if EU-citizens residing in Hungary are not considered to be migrants and refugees are only provided with the minimum standards of care, the legal framework does not have to ‘bother’ with such topics as the criteria of social, cultural or economic integration of foreigners. It is sufficient if the law enforcement, security checks, detention and deportation of foreigners are being regulated (Tóth, 2013). In the opinion of Tóth (2013), the harsh regulations concerning TCNs have the message that only financially stable, skilled, well-documented entrepreneurs, investors, and employees, preferably single and with knowledge of the Hungarian language are welcomed. These kinds of migrants are very rare.

According to Kováts (2004), in the European migration discourse, the focus has ben shifted to the question of integration of immigrants. Mainly the debate has been polarized on the dilemma of multiculturalism versus assimilation. On the other hand, the situation in Hungary is rather different. The issue of immigration has been concentrated in the situation of refugees (Kováts, 2004). Hungary is a transit country. This statement has formulated the directive of the policies and regulations regarding refugees (Kováts, 2004). Analysing the statistics of migration underlines the

45 The two main groups of the diaspora are the following: those who are

autochthonous to Hungary, but live in the neighboring countries due to the border changes after the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon and the emigrants, who left Hungary at different times (for instance after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956). (Source: http://vilag.transindex.ro/?cikk=11981 accessed 02 June 2016)

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mentioned declaration. The phenomenon could be possibly explained by the less-prosperous economic, labour market, social and linguistic conditions (Kováts, 2004). The legislation regarding refugees is regulated by the European Convention on

Human Rights (ECHR)47 and the Act LXXX of 20007 on Asylum48 (which is based

on the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees49) (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). However, the individual enforcement of the rules provided by the ‘humanitarian framework’ of refugee law is restricted due to the dualistic feature of the Hungarian legal system, which quite explicitly determines the differences between the international and the Hungarian legal frameworks and their enforcement (Tóth, 2013). According to Tóth (2013), this dualistic aspect especially delivers difficulties regarding international migration, hence the abstract principles; directives and restraints need to be translated into the Hungarian framework. (For instance the principle of non-refoulement.)

In Hungary, BÁH50 (Office of Immigration and Nationality) decides upon the asylum

requests ideally according to the international humanitarian legal framework determining refugee status. An individual can receive the refugee status due to several reasons. Those are entitled to receive the status, who fulfill the requirements of the Geneva Convention: “who has suffered from or has a well-founded fear of

persecution in his/her country of origin based on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.51 Those

are entitled to subsidiary protection “who do not meet the criteria of the refugee

status, but there is a reasonable risk that upon returning to the country of origin, they would suffer serious loss of interest, and who are unable to or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.”52 Both legal

statuses give the opportunity for family reunification. A third type of protection also

47 Source: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (accessed 04

May 2016)

48 Source: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4979cc072

(accessed: 04 May 2016)

49 Source: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (accessed 04 May 2016)

50 Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, source:

http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?lang=en (accessed 25 May 2016)

51 Source:

http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=521 &Itemid=728&lang=en (accessed 25 May 2016)

52 Source:

http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=521 &Itemid=728&lang=en (accessed 25 May 2016)

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exists within the Hungarian legal framework, which is the temporary protection. This

“may be granted to groups leaving their home country in masses […] fleeing from their country due to an armed conflict, civil war, ethnic conflict or the general, systematic and gross violation of human rights, in particular torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”53 In practice, the procedure is happening mostly in

the transit areas when the police gather the refugees crossing the borders (mostly undocumented). Each case is allocated to an officer within BÁH, who is entitled to interview the asylum seeker and decide upon his/her request. The interviews are crucial because the applicants need to tell the reasons why they applied for asylum. This, most of the time is not an easy thing to do: there are language and communication gaps, most of the applicants suffered from a traumatic event in their home country. Therefore, to gain their trust is essential during these hearings.

(Source: http://abcug.hu/nem-birjak-a-nyomast-a-bevandorlasi-hivatalban/ accessed

02 June 2016) There are many complaints54 about the detention of foreigners in Hungary. Whilst asylum seekers have not committed a crime, but in case their papers are missing, until deportation they can be kept (up to one year) in detention. Furthermore, the right of family reunification causes some troubles within the Hungarian framework, due to the fact that the authorities’ scope of appreciation is quite wide considering this entitlement (Tóth, 2013).

Among other reasons, the strict regulations are also possibly responsible for the fact, that the immigration to Hungary is insignificant, especially when compared to the European scale. However, the number of asylum seekers arriving in Hungary has

risen sharply during the summer of 2015.55 Before this period approximately 50% of

the refugees came from war-torn places like Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, the other half was mainly consisting of people fleeing from Kosovo. In 2015 the situation changed: the movement of refugees coming from Kosovo stopped almost entirely and the majority of asylum seekers are arriving from war zones. There is one common thing in all of these groups: primarily they want to travel through Hungary towards Western Europe (Bernáth and Messing, 2015).

53 Source:

http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=521 &Itemid=728&lang=en (accessed 25 May 2016)

54 See for example: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f9167db2.pdf or

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000056+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 23 June 2016)

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Methodology and methods

Methodology

In this research a constructivist approach is being adopted, because the terms migrant and refugee are both socially constructed concepts generated through discourse, language and meaning, formed by the continuous perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Consequently, the constructivist approach is suitable for an effective analysis of the development of the political discourse regarding migration and the way these changes shape behaviour and public opinion. Contexts and meanings are important to examine how people interpret the social world through discourses and categories. Therefore, the interpretations and meanings regarding migration need to be examined and the way they influence the responses of the government. It is especially relevant; hence immigrants are often posed as outsiders and as a threat against natives and the nation-state (which is also based on constructed identity). Therefore, an inductive approach is being used during this research, which generates theories in the process of examination. The starting point of the analysis is the unexpectedly increased arrival of refugees into Hungary as a recognizable occurrence and then the Hungarian government’s reaction triggered by these events.

As a methodology, this thesis is using political discourse analysis. However it is not entirely possible to formulate patterns regarding a whole country, but the examination of such discourse is a good starting point. Yet, the goal of this study is not to create generalizations or too broad consequences. Moreover, as Wimmer (1997) argued:

“Whoever avoids reflecting upon the factors that affect the success of different discursive strategies cannot answer the questions of how xenophobic movements develop and why they are subject to cyclic fluctuations.”56 Therefore, political

discourse analysis has been chosen as the methodology of this research, in order to be able to answer the questions raised by this thesis, namely: What has been the evolution of the political discourse regarding migration in Hungary between January 2015 and April 2016? Is there an increase or decrease within the political discourse into a more xenophobic and anti-immigrant tone? In case the discourse shifted to a more anti-foreigner tone, can immigration, macroeconomic or political factors explain the changes (such as the increased number of asylum seekers or the altered situation in the power relations within politics)?

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The contemporary starting point within the political discourse analysis scheme is the critical approach, which is trying to cope with the “reproduction of political power,

power abuse or domination […] including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance.”57 According to van Dijk, such

supremacy in power can result in social and political inequality (van Dijk, 1997). Considering the fact that democracy in Hungary is still a young establishment, it would be useful to understand the development of the political discourse regarding the question of migration.

To be able to understand the possible evolution of the political discourse it has to be determined what is considered as a part of political discourse. According to Teun van Dijk (1997), political discourse is the communication within politics and political processes, regardless of the form (written or verbal), regardless of the actor (leading politicians or opposition) and regardless of the aim (governing or protesting). As van Dijk (1997) states: “…as soon as a discourse or part of a discourse is directly or

indirectly functional in the political process […], such discourse should be categorized and analysed as being political.” 58 Therefore, the unit of analysis of this thesis is the evolution of the Hungarian political discourse. The timeframe of the dataset is January 2015 and April 2016 that is, on the one hand, has been selected

because the number of asylum seekers increased in Hungary in 2015.59 On the other

hand, the period is also applicable for research, hence the previous elections in Hungary were held in 2014 and the next will be organized in 2018 (parliamentary), therefore the findings are not distorted by campaigns (Helbling, 2014).

Methods

In order to be able to determine any changes within the discourse (if there is any) official government publications, announcements, statements, and campaigns need to be analysed in detail. Therefore the methods of this thesis comprise of interviews, speeches, news reports, parliamentary minutes, and campaign materials. The official website of the Hungarian government has an archive since 2013. This website provided access to 35 interviews and speeches by Viktor Orbán throughout the

57 van Dijk (1997) p. 11. 58 van Dijk, 1997, p.22. 59 See Appendix 1

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examined period of time.60 Moreover, the archive of MTI61 (Magyar Távirati Iroda, Hungarian Telegraphic Office) has an extensive archive of news since 198862 and the Hungarian National Television has a widespread archive of television news reports as well.63 The Hungarian Parliament funds MTI64 and the National Television65 too, thus these archives are applicable for political discourse analysis. The archive of the television news provided the dataset of this thesis with 64 broadcasts. The dates have been selected randomly, though evenly allocated through each month (4 per month) in order to have an as appropriate picture of the political discourse as possible. Additionally, the official minutes documents of each seating of the Hungarian Parliament are accessible online66. One of the sessions has been examined tremendously; hence a pre-scheduled debate of this seating was concerning the question of migration.67 Moreover, as Bernáth and Messing (2015) argued as well,

this political dispute gives a great opportunity to examine any patterns within the political discourse. Furthermore, the data comprises of outputs of the campaign funded and issued by the Hungarian government, called “National Consultation on

Immigration and Terrorism”. The following three categories of textual and visual

materials have been examined in this study: firstly, a letter signed by the Prime Minister and sent out to voting age Hungarian citizens along with a survey consisting of 12 questions. Secondly, 5 different billboards established in public spaces all over the country and thirdly, the online and television presence of the campaign, a website containing results of the survey, governmental measures, and the television advertisement of the campaign, which has been broadcasted on many channels. Given the fact, that these materials have been produced and funded by the Hungarian government they offer a representative source of the political discourse.

60 Source: http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk

(accessed 28 June 2016)

61 Source: http://www.mti.hu/mti/Default.aspx (accessed 02 June 2016)

62 Source: http://archiv1988-2005.mti.hu/Pages/HirSearch.aspx?Pmd=1 (accessed 02

June 2016)

63 Source: http://nava.hu (accessed 29 June 2016)

64 Source: http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/22853 (accessed 02 June 2016)

65 Source:

http://444.hu/2016/04/27/70-milliardot-nyomna-a-kozmediaba-a-kormany-a-2017-es-koltsegvetes-tervezete-szerint (accessed 28 June 2016)

66 Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo-elozo-ciklusbeli-adatai

(accessed 02 June 2016)

67 „Hungary does not need ’megélhetési’ immigrants.” Parliamentary debate, the

third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015) Source:

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Analysis and findings

This section of the thesis attempts to summarize and present the findings of the research in a logical order. In order to be able to understand, whether the discourse has gone through a more anti-immigrant turn or not the ideas of Wimmer (1997) explaining xenophobia will be used within the context of the Hungarian political discourse. Firstly Wimmer’s (1997) rational choice theory will be tested, according to which, besides the increased competition for scarce jobs and cheap housing, the fear of losing one’s social status and identity could trigger xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, such macroeconomic indicators have been examined as the measures of poverty and social exclusion, employment and housing data.68 Secondly, Wimmer’s (1997) functionalist approach will be studied, which is focusing on the cultural differences between the native and immigrant groups. More precisely, it declares that xenophobic attitudes could root from the marginalisation of migrant populations, which originates from the inability of integration, which could stem from the cultural differences. Therefore, this section will provide examples from the political discourse, which focus on the cultural differences between the indigenous and migrant groups. Thirdly, the most extensive section will be concentrating on Wimmer’s (1997) discourse theory. He argues, that the discourse is created in a way that extreme right can prosper from it. This section will try to underline this statement. Since the methodology of this thesis is political discourse analysis, this part of the findings is the broadest. Therefore, this segment has been divided into sub-sections, namely: terminology, the ‘National Consultation’ campaign and the altering dynamics of the political power relations. The last part of the findings will consider Wimmer’s (1997) phenomenologist idea, that points out the importance of an overall crisis within the society in the upsurge of xenophobic attitudes. Finally, a short summary of the study’s results will be presented with an attempt at answering the research questions, namely: What has been the evolution of the political discourse regarding migration in Hungary between January 2015 and April 2016? Is there an increase or decrease within the political discourse into a more xenophobic and anti-immigrant tone? In case the discourse shifted to a more anti-foreigner tone, can immigration, macroeconomic or political factors explain the changes (such as the increased number of asylum seekers or the altered situation in the power relations within politics)?

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As stated in the study of Bernáth and Messing (2015) in January 2015 two totally independent events – the terrorist attack against the editorial office of the newspaper, Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the increased number of asylum applications69 in Hungary – raised the question of immigration stronger than ever before. Even though these two events are independent of each other, the Hungarian political discourse has built up on them a whole campaign. Probably the circumstance that the research institute TÁRKI has measured a higher-than-ever70 amount of xenophobic attitudes at the beginning of 2016 is not accidental.

Despite the fact that the number of asylum applicants has increased sharply since 201271 the topic did not trigger special attention, except for the professional press and

NGOs before January 2015. The speeches and debates in the Parliament have mainly disregarded the whole topic of migration; the only exception was the Ukrainian crisis72 or the issue of the increasing emigration from Hungary73. This pattern has changed with the statement made by the Prime Minister after the attack on the editorial building of the French newspaper, Charlie Hebdo (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). As Simonovits and Bernát stated in their recent report (2016) on the migration crisis in Hungary: “the first relevant official statement related to immigration into

Hungary: Prime Minister Orbán’s speech in Paris after the commemoration ceremony of the victims of the Charlie Hebdo terror attack: economic migration is bad, Hungary will therefore not provide asylum for economic migrants.”74

“Economic migration is a bad thing in Europe, we should not view it as if it had any benefits, because it only brings trouble and peril on European people, therefore immigration has to be stopped, this is the Hungarian standpoint […] we do not want a significant minority among us, who has different cultural characteristics and

69 See Appendix 1

70 Since 2013 the second biggest growth within immigration-awareness happened in

Hungary (+57%). Source: Simonovits and Bernát (ed.), 2016, p. 21. (TÁRKI)

71 According to the statistics of the Office of Immigration and Nationality the number

of applicants is the following: 2157 in 2012, 18 900 in 2013, 42 777 in 2014 and 177 135 in 2015. Source:

http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&task=category&id =17:statisztikak&lang=hu (accessed 04 May 2016)

72 László L Simon, 16 September 2014 (Bernáth and Messing, 2015)

73 János Vollner, 15 September 2014 and Bernadett Széll 20 October 2014 (Bernáth

and Messing, 2015)

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background, we would like to keep Hungary as Hungary.”75 (Viktor Orbán, 11 January 2015)

This statement showed the main direction of the campaign – launched later during the spring of 2015 – regarding migration, a strategy built on strong emotional and associative correlations: fear and xenophobic attitudes, in which a terrorist attack – unprecedented in Hungary so far – has been interpreted as a direct threat to the country (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). A few days later migration as a danger was formulated. Lajos Kósa (MP, Leader of the Fidesz parliamentary group) stated that immigration could cause more worries than terrorism to Hungary. 76 He declared that out of the 40 thousand people seeking asylum in 2014, only 500 were actually given the refugee status, therefore, the others came to Hungary due to economic reasons.77

As it was stated by Bernáth and Messing (2015) the third seating of the Hungarian Parliament during the spring session in 2015 gave a great opportunity to examine the political discourse regarding migration in Hungary. Not only the title78 of the debate itself gives the obvious chance to examine the Hungarian political discourse on migration-related topics, but also according to Bernáth and Messing (2015), it gives a great opportunity to compare the strategies of the different parties. The title of the debate already introduces a strong characteristic of the whole campaign: terminology. The government deliberately chose a negative adjective (‘megélhetési’) to characterize the asylum seekers.79 As said by Bernáth and Messing (2015), two important characteristics of the political discourse can be observed: firstly, that the understanding and framework of the governing parties and Jobbik80 are similar and that even the left opposition was not able to stay away from the usage of the very same framework used by the government (Bernáth and Messing, 2015). An exception in this pattern is a speech by an MP from the biggest left party within the opposition:

75 Source:

http://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/11/orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_adunk_m enedeket/ (accessed 04 May 2016)

76 Source: http://archiv1988-2005.mti.hu/Pages/HirSearch.aspx?Pmd=1 (accessed 04

May 2016)

77 Source: http://archiv1988-2005.mti.hu/Pages/HirSearch.aspx?Pmd=1 (accessed 04

May 2016)

78 „Hungary does not need ’megélhetési’ immigrants.” Parliamentary debate, the

third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015) Source:

http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

79 See more on this later in this section of the study.

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“Whilst the leaders of Europe spectacularly stood up for values such as freedom, democracy, and solidarity, Viktor Orbán announced the battle against the so-called ‘megélhetési’ immigration, he wants to gain political capital from strengthening the most instinctive fear of humans.”81 (Attila Tamás dr. Harangozó, MP, MSZP) The MP also declared that Fidesz is using the increased number of asylum seekers to create hysteria, to enlarge xenophobic attitudes, their tactics are being simply political

propaganda and manipulation, with the goal of creating a common enemy82.

Macroeconomic indicators

Some studies explain the recent success of extreme right-wing parties, anti-immigration attitudes and xenophobic ideas all over Europe with the increasing frustration of the people (Kovács 2005). But what does this frustration mean exactly? In general, related to xenophobic views, it is visible that the basis of the supporters of such ideas is the socially less successful groups (Simonovits and Szalai, 2013). These groups can contain people who are excluded from the job market, people with a poor financial situation, people with a maximum of elementary education. This ‘unsuccessful situation’ can be the source of feelings of frustration.

Following the logic of Wimmer’s (1997) rational choice theory as a possible explanation of the increased xenophobic attitudes, macroeconomic indicators need to be studied such as data regarding poverty, social exclusion, employment, and housing.83 Measuring poverty, social exclusion, and the level of inequality in a

society requires a complex and multi-dimensional approach. Therefore, the indicators of such social factors are also varied; they can be material and non-material as well. However, the main markers include the risk of poverty and social exclusion84, relative poverty85, serious material deprivation86 and low work intensity87. As Appendix 3.1 shows all of the rates have been either stagnating or lowering in the past few years in Hungary. The negative effects of the financial crisis hitting Europe and the whole

81 The third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015, p. 7409.)

Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

82 The third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015, p.

7409-10.) Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

83 See Appendix 3 84 See Appendix 3.1 85 See Appendix 3.1 86 See Appendix 3.1 87 See Appendix 3.1

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world in 2008-09 have been lessening from 2012 onwards. Moreover, as the official publication of the Hungarian Statistics Bureau88 states, the rate of poverty or socially excluded has sunk to the levels before the crisis by 2014. Furthermore, the statistics regarding the situation of those living below the relative poverty rate in Hungary are below the average of the EU-27, which was at 17,2% in 2014.89

However, as Chris Hann in his blog post90 was reflecting upon the events of summer

2015 summarizes: “Perceptions of vulnerability and relative deprivation may be

more important causes of political attitudes and social behaviour than absolute poverty or inequality.”91 The social scientist is referring to the fact, that even if the

statistics and numbers show a relatively prospering economy, with growing job opportunities and lessening unemployment rates, the feeling and perception of vulnerability and deprivation on the individual level could have a bigger impact on social attitudes and political choices. The employment data also draws a relatively positive picture of the last couple of years. Both the number of economically active and employed increased, especially in the last two years. However, if we take into consideration the division of the employed population between the sectors (industry or service) we can see that more people work within the service sector, which could be more affected by increased migration, consequently tightening the competition within this sector, due to the fact that majority of the migrants find a job within this sector (Kováts, 2004). Furthermore, another critique of this argument is worth mentioning from Chris Hann “Government statistics present a positive picture for

national employment trends, but only by including workfare participants and those working outside the country.”92 It is an interesting insight, and probably reinforces

more the previous idea of the social scientist, namely the perceived feelings of one’s social status and the changes of it. Moreover, economic arguments opposing growing immigration appear within the Hungarian political discourse as well. The whole 88 Source: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/hazteletszinv/hazteletszinv14.pdf (accessed 20 June 2016) 89 Source: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/hazteletszinv/hazteletszinv14.pdf (accessed 20 June 2016)

90 Source: http://www.eth.mpg.de/3932117/blog_2015_09_07_01 (accessed 21 June

2016)

91 Source: http://www.eth.mpg.de/3932117/blog_2015_09_07_01 (accessed 21 June

2016)

92 Source: http://www.eth.mpg.de/3932117/blog_2015_09_07_01 (accessed 21 June

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‘megélhetési’93 framework refers to the presumed untrue intentions of the refugees. According to this, the majority of the asylum seekers entering Hungary have left their home countries due to economic reasons and abusing the welfare system of European countries as disguised refugees.

“Most of the refugees are not ‘genuine’ refugees, there is no war in their home country, they and their families are not being persecuted, their lives are not threatened due to their nationality, religion or political views, they came from a safe country. They left their home countries due to economic reasons; their goal is to find economically better living conditions. Therefore the ‘megélhetési’ migrants abuse the protection guaranteed by international law.”94 (Károly Kontrát, MP and Secretary of

State of the Ministry of Interior, 20 February 2015)

“We have to say it: we are not able to provide services and jobs for the ‘megélhetési’ immigrants. Therefore, we have to find an immediate solution for this problem [referring to detention].”95 (László Földi, MP, KDNP, 20 February 2015)

However, the counter-arguments also appeared in the dispute by referring to the fact that the employment data of the migration population in Hungary is better than the same data regarding the native society.

“The employment rate of those who settled here in the past 15-20 years is higher than the average Hungarian, their unemployment rate is lower, they pay more social insurance and tax. Therefore, the immigration with economic intentions brought positivity to Hungary.”96 (András dr. Schiffer MP, LMP, 20 February 2015)

According to 2008 data from the KSH (Central Statistics Bureau), the immigrants in Hungary are mainly consisting of 15-39 (48%) and 40-59 (31%) year olds.97 The overrepresentation of `economically active age` having its effects on the employment

93 See more on this later in this section of the study.

94 The third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015, p. 7399.)

Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

95 The third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015, p. 7439.)

Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

96 The third seating of the spring parliamentary session (20 February 2015, p. 7426.)

Source: http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-naplo (accessed 10 May 2016)

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