Astrid Zwinkels (6125182)
ah.zwinkels@gmail.com
Research Master Social Sciences
Jonathan Zeitlin (first reader)
Conny Roggeboom (second reader)
Final version 30 June 2016
U n i v e r s i t y o f A m s t e r d a m
The Feminist Sex Wars: The Battle for
Impact on European Prostitution Policy
08
Table of Contents
List of abbreviations ... 3
Abstract ... 4
1. Introduction ... 4
2. Theoretical framework ... 5
2.1 The EU institutions and reasons for interacting with academia and advocacy groups ... 5
2.3 Advocacy groups and reasons for lobbying the EU institutions ... 6
2.3 Possible factors affecting the level of influence in the EU institutions ... 8
2.4 The case study ... 10
2.4.1 Case study design and case selection ... 10
2.4.2 A pan-‐European approach to prostitution? ... 10
3. Methods ... 12
3.2 The Survey ... 12
3.3 Expert interviews ... 13
3.4 Documentary literature: Content analysis ... 13
4. Results ... 14
4.1 The EU institutions ... 14
4.1.2 Influence on the European Commission ... 14
4.1.3 Influence on the European Parliament ... 17
4.2 Influence of academics on the EU institutions ... 21
4.2.1 Preferred approach: abolitionist vs. anti-‐abolitionist ... 21
4.2.2 Advocacy and academia ... 22
4.2.4 Networks of academics: personal relations and email lists ... 22
4.3 Influence of advocacy groups on the EU institutions ... 24
4.3.1 The main advocacy groups ... 24
4.3.2 Factors of influence ... 26
5. Conclusion ... 31
5.1 Summary of findings ... 32
5.2 Recommendations for advocacy groups ... 33
5.3 Recommendations for future research ... 33
6. Discussion and reflection ... 34
6.1 Problems with generalizing from interview data ... 34
6.2 Problems with gathering respondents for survey and interviews ... 34
6.3 Practical and Theoretical Recommendations ... 35
Bibliography ... 37
List of abbreviations
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (European Parliament)
CATW Coalition Against Trafficking in Women CCME Church Commission on Migrants in Europe
DG Directorate General
DG HOME Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs DG Justice Directorate General for Justice and Consumers DG SANTE Directorate General for Health and Food Safety
EC European Commission
ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group (European
Parliament)
EFD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (European Parliament)
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addictions
EP European Parliament
EPP Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (European Parliament)
EU European Union
EWL European Women’s Lobby
FEMM Committee Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (European Commission)
Greens/EFA Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (European Parliament)
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (European Parliament)
ICRSE International Committee on the Rights of Sex workers in Europe
IDU Injecting drug uses
MEP Member of European Parliament
MSM Men having sex with men
NREM National Rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms
OHCHR United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner PICUM Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented
Migrants
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
STI Sexually Transmitted Infection
TAMPEP European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex workers
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Abstract
Based on a case study of advocacy groups that aim to influence the EU institutions in relation to prostitution or sex work policy, this study aims to explain the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences. Through the use of interviews, a qualitative survey and documentary analysis the study confirms multiple existing hypotheses. Advocacy groups are more likely to influence the EU institutions if they have access to financial and personal resources; have a physical presence in Brussels; if their position confirms the status quo in the EU institutions; if they are institutionalized; and if they are part of strong lobbying coalitions. Furthermore, two new explanations are found that explain why some advocacy groups are more influential than others in relation to a topic where the EU has no formal competences. First, successful advocacy groups seem to take a position that EU officials can express support for without much risk. Secondly, successful advocacy groups reframe their issue in such a way that it connects to a topic where the EU has official competences. By doing this, they are able to circumvent the prerequisite that advocacy groups can only lobby the EU on topics where the EU has competences and furthermore can increase their area of influence.
1. Introduction
At the beginning of 2014 The European Parliament (EP) adopted Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its influence on gender equality’. Adopting this report means that the EP advises all member states to follow the Swedish policy framework on prostitution policy and to implement the Nordic model. In the Nordic model it is legal to sell sexual services but it is illegal to buy them. The adopted report stands in sharp contrast to the position Amnesty International adopted a year later. Amnesty argues that the best policy for sex work and the one that is best suited to protect the rights of sex workers is decriminalization, in which neither selling nor buying of sexual services is illegal. They speak out against the abolitionist standpoint. Ones preference for policy is often linked to the terminology one uses (prostitution or sex work), which will be elaborated upon in section 2.4.2.1 below. At the level of international agreements and transnational advocacy networks, the abolitionist perspective has shown remarkable success, whereas at the local level of NGOs working with sex workers, the perspective of decriminalization seems to be more popular (Mattson 2015: 172-‐73).
In general, one can say that advocacy groups dealing with prostitution policy at a European level disagree about what the best prostitution policy would be. Furthermore, even among women who define themselves as feminists there exists disagreement. Since these groups are not in agreement, the question arises how the EP has been able to adopt a position that endorses so clearly one side of the debate. Especially interesting here is the fact that the EU has no official competences in relation to prostitution or sex work policy. Every member state decides by itself what legislation it feels is most appropriate. For these reasons, this study aims to explain the reasons for the success of abolitionist advocacy groups at the level of the EU institutions.
In line with Andrews and Edwards’ conceptualization of advocacy organisations, in this study these are defined as “groups and organizations that make public interest claims either promoting or resisting social change that if implemented, would conflict with the social cultural, political, or economic interests or values of other constituencies and groups” (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 485). Next to advocacy groups, it is important to take academics into account as well, as we can perceive the emergence of “small elite networks of academics, lawyers, and International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activists who use their expertise and present proposals for European action” on various issues (Guiraudon 2001: 164).
There are already a number of studies that deal with how one of the largest advocacy groups advocating for decriminalization tries to influence the EU when it comes to prostitution policy (Grundell 2015; Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015) or that try to explain the influence of one of the largest organisations in favour of the Nordic model has on the EU institutions on the topic of prostitution (Agustín 2012; Bygnes 2012; Ramot 2006). However, these studies very rarely take the perspective and preferences of the EU institutions into account. Furthermore, other studies that focus on explaining the success of advocacy groups in influencing the EU institutions normally focus on topics where the EU has official competences (Klüver 2010). In contrast to these studies, this thesis will study the popularity of the abolitionist standpoint within the EU institutions with the aim to provide more insights into factors that favour or hinder advocacy groups in general when they aim to influence the EU institutions in relation to topics where the EU has no official competences. The research question that I will aim to answer in this study is:
What explains the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying in the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences?
Since effectiveness can be measured in more than one way, this will be measured on five different dimensions: agenda setting; access to decision-‐making arenas; achieving favourable policies; monitoring and shaping implementation; and shifting the long-‐term priorities and resources of political institutions (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 492).
In the following section, the theoretical framework will be outlined. In this framework I focus on the reasons for the EU institutions and advocacy groups to interact with one another and on existing literature that aim to explain which factors affect the level of influence advocacy groups can exercise in the EU institutions. At the end of the theoretical framework the case that functions as the basis for this study is introduced in more depth. Following this section the methods of the study are discussed, after which I will outline the results of this study, focusing separately on the European Commission (EC), the EP, academia, and advocacy groups. In my conclusion, the results will be summarized and recommendations provided for advocacy groups that want to have more influence on the EU institutions. This thesis concludes by discussing and reflecting on how to overcome some of the difficulties encountered in the study in the future.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 The EU institutions and reasons for interacting with academia and advocacy groups Most people are unable to explain exactly how the European Union (EU) works. Even for experts in EU governance explaining the workings of the EU is not always an easy task. Central to the EU are the EU institutions, which are the EU’s seven principal decision-‐ making bodies. These seven bodies include the European Parliament (EP), the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission (EC), the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. If one wants to measure influence on the EU policy process, as I do, it is the influence on these institutions that one should look at. Due to the limits of a thesis study, not all institutions will be addressed. In this study I will focus on the EC and the EP, since these two institutions particularly provide advocacy groups with the opportunity to influence EU policies. The EC is the institution solely responsible for proposing legislation. Its monopoly of legislative initiative is, however, restricted by the fact that the Council (and under Codecision also the EP) has to consent to the proposed legislation. The EP is the EU’s directly elected law-‐making body. Based on proposals from the EC it passes EU laws. It
also reviews the Commission’s work programme and asks it to propose legislation (Europa.eu 2016).
There are multiple reasons for the EU institutions to actively interact with academia and advocacy groups. Some reasons are to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions and to fight against the idea of the democratic deficit; to assess interests and constraints of external parties and other EU institutions; and, most importantly, to gather (neutral) information. All three reasons will be shortly discussed below.
First of all, criticism on the EU focuses, among other things, on the complexity of its institutions and on a perceived democratic deficit. Scharpf (1999) for example argues that the EU institutions should create proper output legitimacy. Output legitimacy “requires policies to work effectively while resonating with citizens’ values and identity” (Schmidt 2013: 7). One way the EC deals with this criticism is by creating new initiatives to increase its contact with advocacy groups and academia, increasing its democratic legitimacy. Mainly advocacy groups that represent a large constituency are hereby of interest (Klüver 2010: 179). Further examples of EU initiatives in this respect are the White Paper on Governance of the Transparency Initiative (Klüver 2011: 1). The EC moreover deliberately builds up networks with the aim to enhance its own position and influence (Mak 2000: 9). Sanchez Salgado believes that the adaptation of Civil Society Organisations is mainly EU-‐driven (2014: 3). European-‐focused organisations prosper especially because “it is in the interest of the Commission that they do so, for they provide both information for policy-‐making and legitimization for the European project” (Tarrow 2001: 250).
A second reason for EU institutions to interact with advocacy groups is to assess interests and constraints of external parties and other EU institutions. This way the EU institutions can develop “win-‐win solutions” (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 49). Linked to this is the fact that creating stable relationships with advocacy groups enables the EU institutions to enhance its political effectiveness towards other EU institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 53).
The most important reason for EU institutions to interact with academia and advocacy groups is, however, because these can function as prevalent information providers. The EU institutions have to deal with a very broad scale. Drawing on academia enables the EU institutions to legitimize its autonomous basis for action “independent of national, societal and partisan interests” (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 52). Advocacy groups furthermore “dispose of specialized issue-‐relevant expertise and enjoy informational advantages vis-‐à-‐vis policy makers” (Klüver 2011: 7) and hold expert knowledge and insights of what is happening at the ground (Bouwen 2009: 22). The EU institutions can benefit from this highly specialized policy expertise in creating high quality proposals. When proposals are furthermore based on external academic expertise this strengthens the position of the EU institutions in relation to other political institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 53). A final very practical reason for the EU institutions to consult academia and advocacy groups to gather expert information is because the EU institutions are “notoriously understaffed” (Klüver 2010: 179; Klüver 2011: 7; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 59). With a staff similar in size to a large city administration (Bouwen 2009: 20), the EC is in constant need of external expertise. This is not only the case for the EC, but for the EP as well. To build their cases, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) make use of the expertise of academics and advocacy groups by inviting them to present their opinions either directly in sessions of the EP or in hearings of separate committees.
2.3 Advocacy groups and reasons for lobbying the EU institutions
When the EU institutions are the ones benefitting from contact with advocacy groups this may be termed usages by Europe (Woll and Jacquot 2009). However, it is of course possible as well for advocacy groups to make use of the possibilities that Europe
provides. This latter situation is coined usages of Europe (ibid). Scholars generally disagree on how exactly one should interpret the relationship between the European level and the level of advocacy groups. While some authors describe a kind of static relationship where they distinguish between a bottom-‐up or top-‐down approach or between ‘supply and demand’, others alternatively propose less static models and look at the relationship as a “managed multilevel process with numerous feedback loops and entry points” (Coen and Richardson 2009: 7). This multi-‐level European governance is understood by Lehmann as “a network of horizontal and vertical cooperative relationships between supranational, national, regional, and local public and private actors” (Lehmann 2009: 42).
The EU is becoming “an increasingly important arena for collective mobilisation” (Grundell 2015). The EC can be a focus of lobbying activities for advocacy groups as the EC enjoys a monopoly on legislative initiatives. Since the frames used in particular legislation can have a very large impact on the outcome of that legislation, advocacy groups and other (academic) experts are oftentimes more than happy to share their insights with the EU institutions, as this provides them with the possibility to influence the frame of the status quo (Klüver et al. 2015: 486). This accounts for both national and European advocacy groups. Furthermore, the EP has lately become an important target for the lobbying activities of lobbying groups as well. A reason for this is that since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the co-‐decision procedure has become the ordinary legislative procedure, which has increased the power of the EP quite a bit. As its power grew, the EP became of greater interest for advocacy groups. Furthermore, advocacy groups can ask MEPs to lobby for their issue at the level of the Commission.
Advocacy groups have a broad range of strategic options and tactics that they can use to advance their cause, such as institutionalized participation, bargaining, political pressure and confrontation (Rucht 2001: 128-‐29). However, “lobbying EU institutions is by far more adequate and effective than the kind of unconventional protest action that is so common at national and subnational levels” (Rucht 2001: 136). There are different reasons that explain the interest that advocacy groups have in the EU institutions. However, they can all be traced back to the same origin: lobbying the EU institutions provides advocacy groups with an opportunity to influence policy on the topic they are lobbying for.
One possible concrete reason as to why advocacy groups lobby the EU institutions is because this provides advocacy groups with new opportunities to convince political actors of the importance of their cause when lobbying at the national level turns out to be unsuccessful. This effect can be described as the Boomerang effect or as the Ping-‐Pong effect (See Figure 1). The Boomerang effect is an effect “through which weak domestic actors can use alliances with external allies, mediated through other states and international institutions, to advance their claims against their own governments” (Tarrow 2001: 245). Whereas advocacy groups mainly refrain from directly influencing the domestic level with the Boomerang effect, it is also possible that advocacy groups continue to lobby their national governments, but at the same time lobby the supranational level with the aim to influence their national governments even more. This latter effect is described as the Ping-‐Pong effect (Zippel 2006: 120). When advocacy groups turn to the European level to compensate for their lack of access at the domestic level this is called the compensation hypothesis (Klüver 2010: 176).
In conclusion one can say that the EU Institutions are mutually dependent upon one another: the EU needs information from advocacy groups and advocacy groups need to influence (national) policy through the EU institutions. Through this mutual dependency a relationship is established. The influence advocacy groups can exercise in through this relationship is the focus of this study.
Figure 1: The Boomerang effect and the Ping-‐Pong effect.
2.3 Possible factors affecting the level of influence in the EU institutions
As has now become clear, advocacy groups can aim to influence policy through lobbying the EU institutions. This study will focus on different factors that can influence the effect advocacy groups can exercise on the EU institutions to reach their desired influence on policy outcomes. Both internal as well as external factors that have been mentioned in previous studies will hereby be discussed. Different texts by Heike Klüver will form the main basis for these explanatory factors. The internal factors that will be focused upon are financial and personnel resources of advocacy groups; having a physical presence in Brussels and the resonance of the position with the status quo and with the EU frame. External factors are the complexity and salience of the topic; the degree of conflict in relation to the topic; the lobbying coalitions; the level of institutionalism of the advocacy groups; and the resonance with official EU competences of the topic. All factors will shortly be discussed below.
First of all, there are the internal factors that according to the literature can have an effect on the extent to which advocacy groups can affect the EU institutions to influence certain policy outcomes. The first internal factor is whether the advocacy groups trying to influence the EU institutions have access to financial resources. Some even argue that having money is a necessary condition for EU lobbying (Kluver 2010: 187). Advocacy groups “with a very high degree of resources at their disposal, Europeanize their lobbying activities, whereas all interest groups that possess only a very low amount of resources, do not extend their lobbying strategy to the European level” (Klüver 2010: 184). A reason for this is that advocacy groups with fewer resources need to focus their money on the places where their chances of success are the highest, which is often the national level (Dür and Mateo 2014: 6). Furthermore,
these groups have to engage in actions that are directly visible, since they need to appeal to their membership (ibid).
Closely linked to financial resources is the factor of personnel resources: to be effective in the EU one needs well-‐trained personnel to “monitor the decision-‐making process, elaborate statements and reports and participate in hearings and consultations” (Klüver 2010: 179). Finally, having a Brussels-‐based office has proved to be useful (ibid).
Further internal factors are the resonance of the position of the advocacy group with the status quo and with the EU frame. A frame is influential when it contains: “relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness, and resonance” (Schmidt 2008: 311). Since policy-‐makers in the EU do not start from scratch, it is likely that advocacy groups whose position confirms the status quo are more likely to influence the EU institutions (ibid). The EU institutions often recognize claims that fit their own frame as more valid. Some claims therefore have “higher value and greater legitimacy from the outset” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 514). Advocacy groups are often aware of this preference, as they tend to prefer to modify the dominant ideas and policies of the EU by fitting their own claims into the institutional context. Advocacy groups “must articulate their claims in accordance with the dominant discourse and the official policies of the EU institutions” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 509).
Next to these internal factors there are many external factors that affect the extent to which advocacy groups can influence EU institutions. First of all, the complexity and the salience of the topic that advocacy groups focus on plays a role. When a field deals with technical, complicated matters or has large repercussions in many fields the EU institutions are more likely to look for the external expertise provided by advocacy groups and academia. Furthermore, EU institutions are also more likely to include advocacy groups and academia when a topic gains importance among stakeholders and/or the overall public (Klüver et al 2015: 451-‐52).
A second external factor that is of interest is the degree of conflict in relation to the topic. While some topics do not cause major opposition, others divide advocacy groups into different sets of competing advocacy coalitions. It is generally assumed that advocacy groups that deal with topics without competing coalitions find it easer to influence the EU institutions (Klüver et al 2015: 452). A third external factor is the level of institutionalism of the advocacy group that tries to influence the EU institutions. In general, the EU institutions tend to be in closest contact with “the resourceful and the already recognised networks” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 514-‐15).
The fourth external factor focuses on the strength of the lobbying coalition that an advocacy group belongs to. As multiple advocacy groups often try to shift the policy outcomes to their preferred outcome at the same time, advocacy groups are often lobbying together (Klüver 2011:12). Klüver defines such lobbying coalitions as “a set of actors who share the same policy goal” (ibid). She even argues that political scientists should always study the effect of lobbying coalitions instead of studying single advocacy groups, as one individual advocacy group is not very likely to determine the outcome of the policy formulation process (ibid). She furthermore argues that strong lobbying coalitions are defined by the “sum or the characteristics of all coalition members rather than the individual properties of a few powerful interest groups” (Klüver 2011: 28). and that size and resources of the coalitions play a role here as well (Klüver et al 2015: 452).
The final external factor is the level of resonance that the topic has with official EU competences. The competences of the EU are specified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This document enumerates in which areas the EU has exclusive competences, shared competences and supporting competences. Some authors see a high resonance with a topic with exclusive or at least shared EU competences as a necessary condition for advocacy groups to lobby the EU institutions (Klüver 2010: 187). Others only state that advocacy groups that focus on policy areas in which the EU has high competences are more likely to lobby the EU institutions than
advocacy groups that deal with policy areas in which the EU has low or no competences (Dür and Mateo 2014). The idea exists that advocacy groups “active in policy areas with low EU competence, therefore, will focus their resources on national or subnational political decisions” (Dür and Mateo 2014: 6).
2.4 The case study
2.4.1 Case study design and case selection
The question to answer in this study is: What explains the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying in the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences? To answer this research question I have made use of a case study design. The aim of using a case study is to “generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which [I] then engage in a theoretical analysis” (Beyers 2012: 71). Case studies can be used for theory generation as well as theory testing. While the above literature argues that advocacy groups that focus on a topic with low EU competences are unlikely to lobby the EU institutions, this study will focus on a case of advocacy groups that deal with a topic where the EU has no official competences (prostitution policy), but where they nevertheless aim to influence the EU institutions. Furthermore, according to Yin (2003) case study designs can be useful when one wants to answer ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions. The study will then on the one hand test whether the existing ideas on which factors impact the level of influence that advocacy groups have on the EU institutions are nevertheless confirmed in this case and will on the other hand generate possible new ideas on other factors that impact the advocacy groups influence.
The case itself can be best described as a hypothesis-‐generating case study (Lijphart 1971) or an instrumental case (Stake 1995). A hypothesis-‐generating case starts out “with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt[s] to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases” (Lijphart 1971: 692). Since the aim of this study is to both build on existing findings in relation to advocacy influence in the EU and to possibly formulate new hypotheses here, this fits well within the description of a hypothesis-‐generating case. An instrumental case furthermore provides insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. “The case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the external interest. The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases” (Baxter and Jack 2008).
2.4.2 A pan-‐European approach to prostitution?
In February 2014, the EP adopted Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’ by 343 votes in favour to 139 against. Adopting this report means that the EP advises all member states to follow the Swedish example on prostitution policy and implement the Nordic model. As the EU has no competences in relation to prostitution policy, the resolution was non-‐binding. Adopting this resolution means no more than that the EP advises its member states to follow their recommendation. However, even though some people say that the report mainly has as a symbolic function, the effects of this resolution should not be underestimated.
Since the Honeyball resolution was voted on in the plenary session this area will form part of the focus on this study. Furthermore, since this Resolution originated in The Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM Committee), this Committee will also be focused upon.
Due to a lack of competences on this topic, the position of the Commission on this topic is not completely clear. Since prostitution policy is not a EU competence, prostitution or sex work is touched upon by the EU institutions through different frames where the EU does have competences: human trafficking and violence against women (shared competences under the heading of ‘the area of freedom security and justice’) and sexual health (supporting competences under the heading of ‘the protection and
improvement of human health). In relation to these EU competences the focus will mainly be on the Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the Directorate General for Justice and Consumers (DG Justice) and the Directorate General Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE).
2.4.2.1 Terminology: prostitution or sex work
Because of the sensitivity of the ‘prostitution debate’, it is important to take a moment to reflect on the different connotations of the concepts ‘prostitution’ and ‘sex work’. Even though both concepts seem to refer to the same phenomenon and are seemingly used interchangeably, whether the one or the other is used in policy or academic documents immediately reflects a certain preference for a legal framework. Since both terms are used in the literature and in policy documents both concepts will be used in this study as well. When I am referring to an abolitionist standpoint the terms ‘prostitution’ and ‘prostitute’ will be used, whereas reference to anti-‐abolitionist standpoints will make use of the terms ‘sex work’ and ‘sex worker’. Following a definition provided by Joyce Outshoorn, prostitution or sex work is in this study defined as: “the exchange of sex or sexual services for money or other material benefits” (Outshoorn 2004: 3). A prostitute or sex worker in this study refers to a person who provides sex or sexual services or money or other material benefits. These definitions are chosen to provide a definition that is as descriptive as possible.
2.4.2.2 Terminology: different prostitution policies
When one talks about advocacy work on prostitution or sex work it is furthermore important to understand the different legal frameworks that are debated. Although different terminology is used throughout the literature, four different types of policies towards prostitution or sex work are generally recognized: prohibition, abolition, legalization and decriminalization. Under prohibitionism, all prostitution is illegal and all people involved are liable to penalties. Prostitution is considered as something immoral. Under abolitionism, prostitution itself is not criminalized, but third parties (such as clients or pimps) are. Under legalization, some forms of sex work are portrayed as work. When a country has enforced this legal framework, sex workers are allowed to earn money in the sex industry under specific rules. Under decriminalization, no legislation dealing with sex work specifically exists. Sex work is perceived as a service industry and is treated as such (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015: 139; Outshoorn 2004: 8; Wagenaar and Altink 2012a: 12).
A further distinction can be drawn between prohibition and abolition on the one hand and legalization and decriminalization on the other is that the latter clearly distinguishes between voluntary and forced prostitution whereas the first does not (Soo Chon 2015). However, it must be noted that although this is an often-‐mentioned distinction, most legal frameworks that fall in the first category, such as the Swedish abolitionist framework, do not officially state anything about this in their laws. This distinction should therefore be understood as one of moral differences between radical and liberal feminists, which will be discussed below.
2.4.2.3. Diverging feminist perspectives: the Sex Wars
As the sensitivity of the concepts of prostitution and sex work shows, different groups perceive prostitution and sex work very differently and therefore have very diverging ideas of what the best prostitution or sex work policy entails. Feminists have such strong but diverging interpretations of feminist sexual morality that Ferguson (1984) coined these debates the ‘Feminist Sex Wars’. An employee of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) stated that she believed there to be no ideological clash in the organization and that there was of lot of consensus. “But when one started to talk about prostitution, there was an explosion! Women were shouting. It was chaos” (Translated from Lafon 2014).
When it comes to feminist perceptions of prostitution and sex work, two opposing positions can generally be identified: the radical feminist view and the liberal or libertarian feminist view (Ferguson 1984; Limoncelli 2009). Radical feminists see the ideal sexual relationship as one between “fully consenting, equal partners who are emotionally involved and do not participate in polarized roles” (Ferguson 1984: 108) and describe prostitution as “an exploitation of women by men and argue that certain women are forced to prostitute, making prostitution a tool for men to dominate women” (Soo Chon 2015: 378). Liberal feminists, by contrast, see the ideal sexual relationship as one between “fully consenting, equal partners who negotiate to maximize another’s sexual pleasure and satisfaction by any means they choose” (Ferguson 1984: 109) and portray prostitution as “a kind of sex work which individual women can freely choose” (Soo Chon 2015: 378).
Whether someone defines her or himself as a radical or as a liberal feminist functions as a very good predictor for their preferred policy towards prostitution or sex work. Radical feminists prefer abolition, while liberal feminists prefer legalization or decriminalization. Feminists are, however, not the only group of people who engage in these sex wars. Conservative and religious groups often side with the radical feminists in their assessment of prostitution. Furthermore, while the debate goes beyond the left-‐ right divide, nationality is also quite good indicator of one’s position in the debate. For example, Sweden is often mentioned as a country where most people favour the abolitionist model, whereas the Dutch are perceived to be anti-‐abolitionist.
3. Methods
My research question focuses on understanding why advocacy groups lobby the EU on a topic where the EU lacks competences. Qualitative methods tend to be best suited to answer this type of explanatory question. Furthermore, a case study design, like in this study, often favours qualitative methods (Bryman 2012: 68). Moreover, since academic and policy documents tend to provide very little information about tactics and strategies, the intensity of collaboration between advocacy groups and the EU institutions, or how particular policy proposals are understood by the different actors (Beyers et al. 2014: 176), it is very important to combine documentary analysis with methods that are able to answer these questions. For this reason, I used three different data gathering forms or analysis methods in this study. I made use of a qualitative survey, I conducted expert interviews with different experts and I used content analysis on both academic as well as policy documents. Each of these methods will be discussed below.
3.2 The Survey
The first method I used was a qualitative survey. Qualitative surveys are generally most appropriate for exploratory studies of small population studies and are aimed at idea generation (Researchplan 2016). I have used this survey format to collect both answers to close-‐ended questions as well as to collect verbatim statements through open-‐ended questions.
For my survey I approached two different groups of academics that either officially supported or criticized the 2014 EP resolution on Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’. The first group that I surveyed consisted of the 75 academics who signed the document ‘Submission in support of Mary Honeyball’s Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality.’ The second group consisted of the 94 academics who signed the International Committee on the Right of Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) document entitled ‘A Critique of the “Report on Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation and its Impact on Gender Equality”’. I invited all signers whose email addresses I could retrieve to participate in the survey via a personal email. After two weeks a reminder was sent to
everybody containing a similar request to fill out the survey and, as requested by some of the academics, an official ethical clearance from the University of Amsterdam.
The aim of the questionnaire was to develop a clearer picture of the way the academics who had been willing to openly voice their support for or against the abolitionist framework on prostitution organized themselves. Questions focused on the academic’s preferred prostitution approach; whether they had previously focused their advocacy activities at the political level; whether they personally had been in contact with the EU institutions; whether they thought the academic community was involved in the debates and if yes, how, and what it meant to be part of this global network of academics.
The response rates from both groups differed a lot. Whereas 30% of the academics who signed the Critique from ICRSE in the end filled out the survey, the response rate was only 7% for the academics who signed the Submission for Honeyball’s report. A likely explanation for this is that one of the people in the ‘Nordic Model Information Network’, which is a mailing list containing of all the academics who signed the submission, found an old presentation online in which I presented arguments as to why I personally believe it would not be a good idea to follow the abolitionist framework on prostitution. This person shared her concerns about the ethics of the study with this network. The Ethical Clearance of the University of Amsterdam provided for this study was unable to remove these concerns among many of the people in this network. To compensate for this low response rate, I have also used the personal email conversations with some of these academics that followed from the survey as input for this study.
3.3 Expert interviews
Regarding my expert interviews I aimed to speak with people in the EU institutions as well as with people from different advocacy groups. My aim was furthermore to cover both sides of the debate. In the end I was able to interview: representatives from different anti-‐abolitionist organisations (ICRSE, TAMPEP, La Strada); academics who signed the ICRSE’s critique; and a member of the FEMM committee of the EP. In total I conducted 6 interviews which all took place in the spring of 2016.
The aim of the interviews was to gain a better insight in what factors positively or negatively impacted advocacy groups’ level of impact on the EU institutions. They furthermore helped me to visualize the needs of the EP and the EC when it comes to expert input and to understand what the different positions within the EU institutions were and how these positions originated.
Similar to the problems encountered in the survey, it proved to be extremely difficult to come into contact with people advocating a pan-‐European abolitionist approach to prostitution. The most important advocacy group in this respect is the European Women’s Lobby. Despite repeated attempts, I have sadly been unable to receive any response from this organization, which means that my analysis of this organization is based on the views of the other experts. Similarly, my request to interview different people in the Commission was denied, based on the fact that the EC has no competences on the topic of prostitution. Input on the Commission has therefore been obtained through multiple emails from officials in DG SANTE, DG HOME and DG Justice.
The responses to the survey as well as the interview transcripts were manually coded with help of the programme ATLAS.ti. These codes formed the basis for the analysis of the survey and interviews.
3.4 Documentary literature: Content analysis
Available documentary sources are a good addition to the use of interviews, since these sources can “considerably improve the quality of the interviews and also because these help in coding, cross-‐referencing, cross-‐validating and interpreting evidence obtained
