Explaining
public
euroscepticism
“A case study of six European Union member states
between 1973 -‐ 2012“
Ewoud D. van Vliet 10295100
January 2014 University of Amsterdam Master Thesis Political Science International Relations Nationalism & Populism Supervisor: Tjitske Akkerman
Index
Preface ... 3 1. Introduction ... 3 1.1 Sub questions ... 5 1.1.1 Historical differences ... 51.1.2 North / South division in Europe ... 6
1.1.3 Costs / benefits analyses ... 7
1.2 Relevance ... 8 1.3 Composition ... 8 2. Theoretical framework ... 9 2.1 Conceptualization ... 9 2.1.1 Euroscepticism ... 9 2.1.2 Public euroscepticism ... 11
2.1.3 The increase in public euroscepticism ... 12
2.1.4 Public euroscepticism and the euro crisis ... 14
2.2 Operationalization ... 17
3. Methodology ... 17
3.1 Country selection ... 18
4. The financial crisis ... 21
4.1 Origin ... 21
4.2 Crisis management by the EU ... 25
5.1 Research ... 26
5.1.1 Development of euroscepticism and the euro crisis ... 26
5.1.2 Countries ... 28
5.1.2.1 Germany ... 28
5.1.2.2 The United Kingdom ... 30
5.1.2.3 France ... 31
5.1.2.4 Greece ... 33
5.1.2.5 Italy ... 34
5.1.2.6 Spain ... 35
5.1.2.7 Conclusion ... 38
5.2 Historical differences of public opinion with regard to the EU ... 40
5.2.1 Countries ... 42 5.2.1.1 EU ... 42 5.2.1.2 Germany ... 43 5.2.1.3 Italy ... 47 5.2.1.4 France ... 50 5.2.1.5 Greece ... 53 5.2.1.6 United Kingdom ... 56 5.2.1.7 Spain ... 60 5.2.2.8 Conclusion ... 63
5.3 North / South comparison ... 64
5.3.1 Public opinion on the euro crisis in north – and south Europe ... 66
5.3.2 Public opinion on life in north – and south Europe. ... 68
5.4.1 How does EU budget distribution work? ... 73
5.4.2 How to calculate which country contributes how much? ... 74
5.4.3 Countries ... 77 5.4.3.1 EU ... 77 5.4.3.2 Germany ... 78 5.4.3.3 United Kingdom ... 79 5.4.3.4 France ... 80 5.4.3.5 Greece ... 81 5.4.3.6 Italy ... 83 5.4.3.7 Spain ... 84 5.4.4 Conclusion ... 85 6. Conclusion ... 86 Bibliography ... 88
Preface
1. Introduction
During the course of the past seven years one subject has dominated world news: the financial crisis. It started as a credit crisis in the United States, but has steadily evolved into a world wide financial crisis. In Europe it took on the form of a sovereign debt crisis, known as the euro crisis. While Greece went bankrupt, Italy and Spain were bailed out at the last moment in order to prevent a complete financial disaster. Together with the euro crisis, another phenomenon has gained increasingly more attention: euroscepticism. This concept has been a topic of discussion for some time now and knows various forms and shapes. After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the concept began to gain attention. (Missiroli 2011: 1). The concepts of euroscepticism, which will be defined later in this thesis, reflect a growing discontent regarding the European Union.
Today, the euro crisis is still very relevant and the results are more visible than ever before. Even in traditionally wealthy European countries, such as Germany and France the crisis have struck hard. Billions of euros have been donated to various emergency funds devised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to save the European currency and with that the financial future of its member states. Meanwhile, critics of the euro, and more broadly the EU have gained a lot of support throughout the continent as well (Torreblanca & Leonard 2013: 5).
And even though Angela Merkel got re-‐elected in Germany, anti-‐EU parties received more votes than ever before (The Guardian 24-‐04-‐2013).
There’s no denying in the fact that Europe and the EU in particular are going through a contesting phase. This is likely the result of the outbreak of the euro crisis and events that occurred preceding. Expectations of a quick economic recovery are low and thus the future doesn’t look too bright for EU supporters (CNN 5-‐11-‐2013). Needless to say, the euro crisis does seem to have played a large role in the change of public opinion about the EU. However, other, less visible factors could possibly help explain why euroscepticism and public euroscepticism in particular, has been rising even before the euro crisis began. Hence, the research question will be:
“To what extent has the euro crisis led to an increase in public euroscepticism in northern – and southern European Union member states and what is the influence of historical differences in public opinion, and costs / benefits analyses (CBA)?”
The euro crisis has had, and still has profound impact in every European country. Jobs were lost, salaries reduced, inflation rose and prices skyrocketed. As a result, citizens started losing their faith in the institutions that should have seen this crisis coming and failed to address it’s consequences properly once it hit. The enormous scale on which this crisis takes place thus has severe results for every European citizen. The collapse of the financial sector has made Europeans aware of the fact that capitalist systems are more fragile than expected (Roth 2009: 204). By looking at public euroscepticism throughout the entire EU, a significant increase is noticeable since 2007 when the global financial crisis broke out. This thesis will however research six countries individually to see to what extent public euroscepticism has increased as a result of the crisis or if there are other causes that lie at the root of this increase. Multiple factors seem
to have influence in shaping EU’s public opinion and it must be noted that after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, public euroscepticism has spread very rapidly. Even though no country can deny it’s feeling the effects of the euro crisis, some countries have been hit significantly harder than others and that should be reflected in support for the EU. By looking at the euro crisis with regard to support for the EU, the expectation is that the strongest increase in public euroscepticism happens in countries that have been hit the hardest, i.e. Greece, Spain and Italy.
There are at least three different underlying factors that could prove to have a significant impact on public euroscepticism and thus the eventual outcome of this research. Since it is highly unlikely that the euro crisis is the lone cause for the current situation, in which citizens’ support for the EU is rapidly fading; it is necessary to take other elements into account. Three different sub questions will break down the complexity of the main question in order to look at euroscepticism through different lenses.
1.1 Sub questions
1.1.1 Historical differences
Historical differences could potentially also be of great importance in order to understand the current situation in Europe. No other continent has so many different languages, cultural habits and different economies on such a small piece of land. Historical and current differences are very much likely to be of great influence on euroscepticism. Now that Europe is starting to look more like a potential political union instead of the economic one it has always strived for, these differences all of sudden become very visible. Questions arise over if Europe should aspire to unify the entire continent into a political union. This could subsequently lead to a sovereignty crisis in all European countries and thus explain why the current crisis is affecting all countries instead of just a few. In other words, is the increase in public euroscepticism new, or is it merely the result of a lingering issue. Therefore, the first sub question will be: “To what
extent do historical differences, with regard to the EU, explain current public euroscepticism in the European Union?”
Moreover, another important assumption will be tested when assessing historical differences with regard to the EU. The choice of the six countries for this thesis also allows research on public euroscepticism in relation with the time of joining the EU. In other words, are the citizens of three of the EU’s founding countries, i.e. Germany, Italy and France less Eurosceptic throughout the history of the EU than the countries that joined later, i.e. the UK, Spain and Greece?
It will thus be interesting to research if historical ties with the EU are of great influence when looking at current public euroscepticism. Assumingly, Germany, France and Italy are less eurosceptic because of their role in shaping the EU from the start. If this proves to be the case, it shows that looking at history is very useful when trying to understand current predicaments.
1.1.2 North / South division in Europe
Secondly, another important phenomenon that will be examined is a likely growing division between northern -‐ and southern member states. The countries that are being used for this thesis make that examination possible. A distinction of northern -‐ and southern member states should help to determine if the impact of the crisis has resulted in a split of the European continent in terms of public perception. For example, public euroscepticism has increased strongly in Greece, even though they have been EU supporters for most of their time as a member state. Meanwhile, northern EU countries tend to show low numbers of public euroscepticism but might have changed their opinion since the crisis.
Furthermore Serrichio et al. (2013) claimed that the countries where public euroscepticism has registered the most pronounced increase are those that have been most hard-‐hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–11. Accordingly, after the outbreak of the crisis, public euroscepticism in these countries has increased to levels that match or exceed the EU average (Serrichio et al. 2013: 58).
It will thus be fascinating to witness if the euro crisis has been dividing Europe, as expected. The second sub question will thus be: “Has the euro crisis led to north versus south division in Europe?”
Clearly, the most efficient way to look at a North/South division is to treat them as blocs in order to compare them with each other. By including broader Eurobarometer topics regarding life in the EU and feeling like a EU citizen, compared with euro crisis related questions, the impact of the euro crisis can be measured.
1.1.3 Costs / benefits analyses
Costs / benefits analyses (CBA) of all six countries should provide an insight in where lack of EU support possibly stems from. By selecting the before mentioned countries it will be interesting to see if one’s financial contribution to the EU has an effect on trust. The third sub question thus will be: “Will net contributing
countries feel more sceptical about Europe than net recipient countries?”
One would expect that countries that pay substantially more than they receive would absolutely feel more sceptical towards the EU. Assumingly, this leads to frustration in ‘contributing’ countries that will result in increased public euroscepticism.
To measure if the public feels its country has benefited from being a member of the EU, the CBA will be compared with the results of the following question that has been asked by Eurobarometer surveys since 1983:
Taking everything into account, would you say that (our country) has benefited, not benefited or don’t know, from being a member of the European Union?
After having established a possible connection between CBA and the public opinion in the examined countries, a subsequent conclusion will be drawn with regard to the increase in public euroscepticism. Net contributors – and recipients will be distinguished on basis of absolute terms of money. This comparison will ultimately determine if traditional workings of the EU such as the decision on
who pays what, has more influence on shaping public opinion than a major event such as the euro crisis.
1.2 Relevance
Since we are amidst troubled times regarding the future of the EU more research needs to be done in able to help explain the different factors that possibly have helped caused a European economic crisis. Possible explanations should help to understand the complexity of the problems Europe is facing and could be useful in order to search for solutions. The future of a united Europe looks grimmer than ever before and requires thorough but secure handling by Europe’s policy makers.
1.3 Composition
In the second chapter a theoretical framework will explain the concept of euroscepticism. Important theories and findings regarding the subject will show the need for how much there is still to be done.
Subsequently, in the third chapter a brief history of the euro crisis will be presented. This chapter covers the start of the crisis in the United States and will explain the implications it has had ever since it evolved into a euro crisis. It will determine what role the crisis has played in each country individually and will therefore help to understand the current attitude of its citizens. Furthermore, the most important examinations on the euro crisis with regard to CBA, a north/south distinction and historical differences will be highlighted and explained. In the fourth chapter, the method of research will be described and subsequently in the fifth chapter the results of the conducted research will be described and analysed. The sixth chapter will present the conclusion as well as the answer to the main question of this thesis. A bibliography and appendices will conclude this thesis.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Conceptualization
This chapter will first elaborate on the concept of euroscepticism. It will mainly depict the various definitions of euroscepticism and underpin why the chosen notion of public euroscepticism is most useful for this thesis. Since
euroscepticism can be defined and interpreted in different ways, it is important to delimit the research that will be conducted in this thesis, while simultaneously not neglecting that other possible approaches might produce differing outcomes. Furthermore, theories on the financial crisis, and the euro crisis and will map the current debate about these issues.
2.1.1 Euroscepticism
The concept of euroscepticism has many different definitions. In order to choose the most appropriate, the most common definitions will be mentioned and explained.
Taggart first introduced euroscepticism as: ‘it expresses the idea of
contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998:
366). Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak later distinguished two forms of euroscepticism namely, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ euroscepticism.
Hard euroscepticism, according to the authors, is defined as follows: “where
there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from
membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived” (Taggart &
Szczerbiak 2002: 7). This form thus opposes the EU in general. Supporters of this view feel that European integration has a negative effect on national sovereignty. The greatly reduced importance of national borders leads them to believe that Europe is slowly becoming too powerful. Examples of hard euroscepticism are for instance single issue or anti-‐EU parties.
Soft euroscepticism on the other hand is defined as: “where there is NOT a
principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ’national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 7).
Partisans of the softer form of euroscepticism are not necessarily against the EU but are concerned with specific policies and the direction in which the EU is heading.
In the article ‘The two sides of euroscepticism’ (2002) by Petr Kapecky and Cas Mudde, euroscepticism is defined as a distinction between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration. By diffuse support, they mean the general ideas of further European integration and by specific support they point to support for the general practice of European integration, meaning the EU as it is and as it is developing. According to Kapecky and Mudde, the term soft
euroscepticism presented by Taggart and Szczerbiak is defined in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 300). Furthermore, they have
developed a typology as can be seen in table 1.
Table 1: Support for European integration according to Kapecky and Mudde
Support for European integration
Europhiles Europhobes
Support for EU EU-‐optimists Euroenthousiasts Europragmatists
EU-‐pessimists Eurosceptics Eurorejects
(Source: Kapecky and Mudde 2008: 303)
In ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, Liesbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks make a distinction between economic and political euroscepticism. In the early years scepticism was merely aimed at further market integration while after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the focus was shifted to defence of the national community and thus became more political (Hooghe & Marks 2007: 121).
Finally, Leonard Ray argues that euroscepticism is “primarily a phenomenon of the political fringes” (Hooghe & Marks 2007:112). He argues that ideological extremities are key to growing euroscepticism. Radical left parties are against European integration because they view it as a capitalist project that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. Radical right parties feel that European
integration undermines national sovereignty and thus are opposed to transferring more power to Brussels.
After having distinguished the most well regarded forms of euroscepticism it becomes clear that the concept allows for many different interpretations. Scholars have focussed on different aspects of euroscepticism hereby creating a broad spectrum.
The Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES)
combines all these aspects and has created the most encompassing definition of euroscepticism thus far:
Euroscepticism is attitudes and opinions represented in discourses and behaviours (ranging from participation in
organized political action to voting in elections or referenda and responding to public opinion polls) which express doubt as to the desirability and/or benefits and/or long-‐term viability of European or/and EU integration as an objective or in the general framework created so far or in some important aspects of that framework of institutions, processes and policies and/or as it is anticipated to occur in the future (UACES 2013)
Since this thesis mainly covers public euroscepticism, the following section will narrow down the definition in order to focus more on the role of public
euroscepticism.
2.1.2 Public euroscepticism
It is important to distinguish public euroscepticism from the aforementioned examples order to make sure that the concept is evident when it’s discussed
throughout this thesis. The most common definition of public euroscepticism is:
euroscepticism is negative attitudes towards one’s country’s membership of the European Union (Eichenberg & Dalton: 1993).
This is however a very broad interpretation of the concept but nonetheless covers the main aspects of it. However, since the increase in public
euroscepticism will be measured according to the data of the Eurobarometer, a definition of public euroscepticism has a mere descriptive meaning and will therefore not be the subject of further testing. The results of the following question will determine the fluctuation of public euroscepticism in the six countries used for this thesis is:
Generally speaking do you think (our country’s) membership is: a good thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad or don’t know?
This question refers to the fact if citizens are satisfied with their country being a member of the EU. Besides that, it has been asked by the Eurobarometer survey since 1973. Its answers are therefore a reliable source in determining the state of euroscepticism in the EU. Furthermore, the answers to this question are
reflected in a statistical graph. Since this question objectively displays the state of the public opinion there is no need to collect own data.
It must be noted that the definition used in this thesis is merely
appropriate when documenting public euroscepticism. When measuring other forms of euroscepticism, different definitions might be better suited. However, by means of the exposition of the variety of shapes of euroscepticism, the logic of choice for this definition becomes more obvious.
2.1.3 The increase in public euroscepticism
Public euroscepticism; what once started as a British disease has now spread across the European continent. Support for the EU has declined tremendously since the start of the euro crisis. Fluctuation is not new, nor is public
euroscepticism but what does seem like a recent trend is the overall decline of support. Not only the debtors but also the creditors and potential member states
seem to lose faith in the future of the EU as the statistics presented later in this thesis will show.
The common and most used explanation for public euroscepticism was the presence of a democratic deficit. People felt neglected as decisions were taken in Brussels instead of their national governments and the feeling of being passed over was subsequently being translated in a decline support for the EU. The euro crisis that we are amidst of is something different. Way before the euro crisis started, the EU was seen as an institution that would safeguard the single market (as agreed upon in the Single European Act) and set new standards for the size of valve caps, brightness of headlights and shapes of bananas. National
governments would still have the power to decide over more delicate issues that need cultural understanding and should not be subjected to rules from Brussels. Assumingly, since the outbreak of the crisis, people in creditor countries have felt a strong resistance towards ‘cleaning up the mess that others left’ i.e. taking responsibility for the debts that were made in other countries without being assured that this won’t happen again. This assumption will be examined when discussing a possible north / south division. Apparently, no mechanisms were able to control spending in countries such as Greece and Spain. With demands of the European Central Bank (ECB) for structural domestic reforms many feel that EU politicians have crossed the line of national sovereignty, creating an anti-‐EU feeling throughout the continent. They seem to extend their role from debating the shape of bananas to interfering in discussions about salaries, taxes and pensions, which lies at the heart of national democracies and social welfare. Meanwhile, an increasing amount literature is related to the question if northern EU citizens feel as if the EU has failed to control the policies of its southern neighbours. It is assumed that they have a sense of victimhood, which is easy to understand. Receiving responsibility for another one’s problems rubs a lot of citizens the wrong way. In southern European countries on the other hand, the EU looks like it is taking over their national governments by implementing all kinds of new rules and policies. No matter who is chosen in government, the new rules can’t be changed or challenged. This of course leads to a loss of self-‐determination and the EU seemingly gets the blame for that. Professional services firm Ernst & Young claims that euro zone countries are
now at their most economically and politically divergent since the early 2000s, according to their "convergence indicator", which takes into account variables including gross domestic product, inflation, unemployment rates and
government balances (Ernst & Young 2013).
For the future it will be interesting to witness how this process will unfold. If economic growth picks up, public euroscepticism in the EU will probably decline. It happened in the past and even though this situation is different, a similar outcome can be expected. Since the euro crisis covers the entire continent and not just a few countries or a region it will be fascinating to see how the EU is going to deal with the waning of support and the way it will deal with its citizens. High public euroscepticism could potentially become a large problem. Not only does it undermine Europe’s unification process but it also puts pressure on national governments. Citizens of EU member states blame the outbreak and results of the financial crisis at least partially on failed policies of their national governments. In the northern European countries, growing discontent arises about the amount of money they had to donate to emergency funds in order to rescue their southern neighbours. Meanwhile, in the southern European countries, Brussels is perceived as the villain that interferes in their national politics. Both tendencies have assumingly the same cause and the same result: a strong increase in public euroscepticism. It will be however important to look at the change in percentages. The surveys of the Eurobarometer should give us more insight in the fluctuation of public euroscepticism, which could in turn be compared to the timeline of the euro crisis. It is therefore critical to also take other possible explanations into account such as historical difference and CBA. Only when looking at various explanations is it possible to draw
conclusions about the cause(s) of public euroscepticism.
2.1.4 Public euroscepticism and the euro crisis
The most likely culprit for the increase in public euroscepticism is the global financial crisis and in its wake the euro crisis. Fabio Serrichio, Myrto Tsakatika and Lucia Quaglia (2013) have conducted an exquisite research to the link between public euroscepticism and the euro crisis that will be discussed briefly.
Their main findings have led to a call for more research on this barely cultivated subject. They argue that the euro crisis did not bring back economic factors as the most important source of public euroscepticism.
According to their research, national identity and political institutions play the most important role in explaining public euroscepticism. They conclude their research by claiming that the economic explanation, in Europe’s case the euro crisis, has very limited analytical leverage. They determine that although there has been a considerable change in the level of public euroscepticism, the financial crisis is hardly the only catalyst. Based on testing the explanatory power of the main paradigms in the literature, in this case being economic crisis and its influence, turn out to have less effect on public euroscepticism than they expected. Meaning that it is highly unlikely that the financial crisis has a direct effect on the increase in public euroscepticism (Serrichio et al. 2013: 61). The deepening of the EU, meaning that Brussels acquired more competences, combined with the widening of the EU (enlargement to central and Eastern European countries) led to a fundamental shift in focus. To wit, the EU had
become not only an economic powerhouse, but also it started to look like it was a political actor. The public thus felt as if the EU was getting too powerful
compared with national governments. Serrichio et al. (2013) are emphasizing this when they conclude that there is a positive causal relationship between the exclusive national identity and euroscepticism (Serrichio et al. 2013: 51, 61). Exclusive national identity refers to citizens feeling attachment only to their nation and not to Europe and the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 120).
Interestingly, Serrichio et al. (2013) discern a trade-‐off between confidence in national institutions and confidence in EU institutions. During the first stage of the crisis, citizens merely looked at their respective national governments for solutions. However, when the financial crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis that affected many European countries severely, citizens started to look at EU. When the EU started to flex its muscles by implying harsh sanctions, eurosceptic tendencies started to rise once again (Serrichio et al. 2013: 64).
The euro crisis seems to cover a whole range of problems that are much more daunting than assumed beforehand. According to the research of Serrichio et al.
(2013), exclusive national identity is becoming an area of debate and in times of crisis people do seem to lose their faith in the European project (Serrichio et al. 2013: 62). Has the EU overplayed its hand in 1992 by aiming for a more cohesive union in the form of a shared currency and inclusiveness? The question remains if this current wave of euroscepticism is just another recrudescence or if we are facing a crucial time regarding the future of the EU.
In the article ‘The Global Economic Crisis and the Cohesion of Europe’ , Alun Jones, Julian Clark and Angus Cameron (2010) focus much more on the perception the history of Europe and the role in which crises have formed Europe to what it has now become. According to Jones et al. Europe can be understood as a creature of crisis. Therefore, the latest crisis to hit Europe is yet another test of resiliency for the continent (Jones et al. 2010: 37). The mere existence of the EU is due to the fact that European politicians were trying to protect their economies. During the most recent crisis this statement seems to be emphasized. When Greece’s
financial problems became apparent, the initial reaction of other national governments was trying to protect their banks and all of sudden Europe didn’t look as unified as it claims to be.
An obvious explanation for this kind of behaviour is that European countries are so different in culture, language and mentality that it can be debated if unifying so many different states is a desirable goal. When the ECSC was founded, economic prosperity and the prevention of another world war were the main motives. Nowadays, the possibility of another physical war on the European continent seems rather slim and cooperation between states could be continued in a more voluntary fashion (Kaldor 2012: 125). Without the risk of a looming war, countries may have lost sight of the necessity of a unified Europe and therefore turn to protectionist behaviour. Needless to say, the EU still has
relevance in today’s Europe in terms of agricultural development, redistribution of wealth and the free movement of goods and persons, but might have
overplayed its hand when aiming for a federal Europe. The goals of the Maastricht Treaty were highly ambitious and the importance of different
overlooked. The rapid unification process that he EU contemplated has possibly strengthened the case of euroscepticism while neglecting historical backgrounds 2.2 Operationalization
This thesis will cover the public side of euroscepticism and thus other interpretations and viewpoints require different approaches and research questions.
Furthermore, the research will be focussed on the role that the euro crisis plays in determining public euroscepticism. The research by Serrichio et al. (2013) has covered this topic as well but has not taken historical differences, a regional divide and costs / benefits into account. Therefore, the research conducted in this thesis will build upon the notion that the euro crisis has impacted public euroscepticism severely, but will also look further to understand public
euroscepticism more thoroughly. Taking history, costs / benefits and a north / south comparison into account, combined with the effects of the current euro crisis is unprecedented and will not only research current public euroscepticism but will also try to explain its origin and sensitivity.
The side of euroscepticism, which relates to the political aspect of the concept, such as demonstrated by Kapechky, Mudde, Sczcerbiak and Taggart, has been documented and researched frequently and thoroughly, as described above. Public euroscepticism with regard to the euro crisis has howeverl also not been documented, besides Serrichio et al., as of yet. Due to the novelty of the subject there is still plenty to be researched and as been mentioned before, this subject only covers a small part of the entire euroscepticism spectrum but nonetheless could contribute to a broader understanding of public euroscepticism.
3. Methodology
Since this thesis focuses on public euroscepticism it is necessary to use data that focuses on public opinion. Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, does not
include public opinion in its surveys and is therefore not useful for this thesis. The Eurobarometer is an official website of the EC and has been monitoring the public opinion of the EU member states since 1973. Before the Internet era the surveys were conducted by hand and have been digitalized during the 1990s. In it’s current form, surveys are conducted online.
3.1 Country selection
This thesis will consist of a case study on public euroscepticism in six EU member states, over an extended period of time. The choice of countries is based on geography, historical ties and role in the EU. By examining only one member state the outcome can’t say much about the large question of whether or in what ways public euroscepticism corresponds to a fundamental crisis for the EU. But, six member states can serve as an example of the problems of conceptualising this complex phenomenon. Six countries including Germany, Italy and France founded the precursor of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was an initiative of the French minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman as a way to prevent another war between Germany and France. The economic benefits that those three countries have yielded helped their countries tremendously and laid the foundation for other countries to join. As being among the founding countries, it made them part of the most important players in a unified Europe.
Germany and France and Italy were therefore supportive of the project from the start. Since it was mainly their merit that the ECSC came into effect in the first place, their effort in order to make it a success had to be guaranteed. Germany and France quickly took on a leadership role within Europe. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s they were regarded as Europe’s most important stakeholders, their economies were the largest and with the leadership of Helmut Kohl in Germany and Francois Mitterand, strong political support for the EU was guaranteed. The public opinion however, started to look less like each other during the development of the ECC/EU. Currently, Germany’s public opinion remains fairly supportive of the EU, while France’s on the hand has become
strongly eurosceptic. Statistics in the corresponding chapter will illustrate how two of Europe’s most influential countries have grown increasingly apart.
Italy, participant from the start in 1958 has had an interesting relationship with the EU. As one of the founding fathers, the country’s attitude has always been positive but it needs to be noted that during the course of the last ten years, Italy has looked much more like it’s southern European neighbours in terms of a strong increase in public euroscepticism. Therefore, it will be interesting to compare the current situation in Italy with it’s traditional counterparts France and Germany but also with it’s geographical neighbours Spain and Greece.
Greece and Spain both joined in 1981 after decades of totalitarian rule. Economic prosperity and the dream of democracy were the most important instigators of their surge for membership. Naturally, the first few years were seen as an immediate upgrade over the previous years and the economies in both countries grew as never before. Things began to change after 1992 when Europe made it the first steps towards becoming a political union. Even though public opinion settled down in the mid-‐nineties, Greece and Spain have endured a spectacular free fall in terms of trust in Europe largely due to economic setbacks and strong sanctions by the EU. Both countries share a similar history when it comes to the EU but that will be explained more thoroughly in the following chapter. The fact that Greece and Spain were among the first and worst countries hit by the crisis made them interesting cases for this thesis. Portugal is usually mentioned alongside Greece and Spain but has been left out of this thesis because of its close ties with Spain. The two countries are referred to as the Iberian Peninsula and in the context of diversification; the decision was made to include southern countries that are less connected in terms of demography and history.
Finally, the UK joined the European Economic Community (ECC), another precursor of the EU in 1973 after extensive negotiations. Having vetoed accession twice before, the French finally accepted the UK as the newest member of the European project. The citizens of the UK however, have always been restrained when dealing with Europe. The decision to not join the euro highlights
their turbulent relationship with the European mainland. From a historical perspective, including the UK in this research makes sense since it has never felt a strong relationship with mainland Europe and the EU. Therefore, it will be interesting to see if the UK proves to be an outlier. Examining if the euro crisis, or any other important financial or social issues in general have had an effect on the UK’s public opinion in the past will help to explain how their people perceive the EU.
The choice of countries is thus based on a combination of history regarding the EU, i.e. three founding countries versus three countries that joined the EU at various latter stages. By comparing the public opinion regarding the EU of the latter three countries with that of the Germany, France and Italy, which governments partly founded the EU, the relevance of including history in the debate about understanding current issues will be determined.
CBA have shown that Germany, France and the UK have been in the top 5 of net contributors, while Spain, Greece and Italy are among the top net recipient. As a result, by choosing these six countries, the two opposite sides of the spectrum can be compared with each other in order to determine the influence of CBA on public euroscepticism.
The north/south division will be measured according to four Eurobarometer questions. The first two questions are euro crisis related, while the other two cover broader aspects of the EU and are non-‐ euro crisis related. By grouping the questions into two separate categories, the extent to which the euro crisis has divided Europe will become visible. The two questions regarding the euro crisis are as follows: “As a consequence of the crisis, you feel closer to other EU citizens?” and “The worst of the euro crisis is still to come; do you tend to agree or disagree?” The other two questions relate to life in the EU in general and are therefore: “Do
you feel satisfied with the life you live in the EU”? And: “Do you feel like an EU citizen?” The answers to those questions will help determine the amount of influence that the euro crisis has on public opinion. Since the latter two questions reflect a much broader topic, i.e. life in the EU in general, it will be
interesting to see if there is a distinction between the public opinion in the researched countries with regard to the EU. If for example public opinion in country A is negative towards the two-‐euro crisis related questions but rather positive towards the two broader EU questions, it can be concluded that the impact of the euro crisis is severe in country A. Furthermore, when the public opinion of country B is fairly positive towards the euro crisis and also regarding life in the EU, the euro crisis probably has less impact on the public opinion in country B, hereby partly explaining behavioural patterns in terms of public euroscepticism.
The statistics of Eurostat on the euro crisis were included to provide a clear view on the development of the euro crisis and furthermore show the effects for each country individually. Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU and provide statistics that enable comparisons between countries and regions.
4. The financial crisis
In order to understand the complex predicament Europe is currently facing, it is necessary to reconstruct the facts leading up to the current state of affairs. The euro crisis, with all its implications for us as European citizens, is the result of a global financial crisis that started in the United States. A brief summary of the events leading up to the euro crisis should help grasp the complexity of the situation.
4.1 Origin
The roots of the crisis we are facing today are global in reach, various and very complex. However, researches have reached a consensus about a precipitating factor that is most likely the cause for the start of this worldwide crisis. The heavily overleveraged housing market of the United States is regarded as the main abettor (Crotty 2009: 564). As prices of property began to fall, confidence in institutions that should have intervened disappeared. During the year 2007 a sudden shortage of credit led to a strong decline of US consumer spending. As a result, large companies had to cut costs and as a result labour was being shed.
