The shallowness of deep democracy? : EU democracy promotion in the MENA region after the Arab Spring

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MASTER’S THESIS

The Shallowness of Deep Democracy?

EU Democracy Promotion in the MENA Region after the Arab Spring

Candidate: Christin Knüpfer UvA ID 10239057

MSc Political Science: International Relations

Research Project: Europe, boundaries, orders – EU enlargement,

neighbourhood and foreign relations

Supervisor: dr. J.A. Jeandesboz Second Reader: dr. V. Matthies-Boon Date of Submission: 17 July 2014

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the European Union has promoted democracy in the MENA region. Even though DP has been embedded as one of the key aims in EU-MENA relations through a strong rhetoric since the inception of the Barcelona Process in 1995, DP efforts were often sidelined in favour of economic relations. As a result, the upheavals of the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia and unfolded across the MENA region in 2011 have presented the EU’s DP efforts with a challenge concerning the relevance and sincerity of EU DP. In the light of these events and the apparent shortcomings of the previous DP approach, the EU has declared to support the transformations through the promotion of deep democracy. Thus, taking conception and conduct of EU DP as the two key lines of inquiry in this research, it will be examined how the Arab Spring has led the EU to revise its conception of DP which resulted in the novel deep democracy agenda, and how this has been translated into new DP approaches and instruments for the MENA region. With the help of an extensive qualitative document analysis, expert interviews, and focused observations during a 10-day stay in Tunis, it will be examined how deep democracy reflects a changing perception of EU DP since 2011, and how is the EU’s post-Arab Spring DP engagement is reflected on the local level, exemplified through the European Endowment for Democracy and the case of Tunisia. It will be argued that the new approach to EU DP – promoting deep democracy through enhanced conditionality and the 3Ms (money, markets and mobility) – continues to make use of old priorities and conceptions of DP, yet in an enhanced and reshaped manner. Moreover, this research illustrates two narratives – the picture from Brussels and the picture from Tunis – arguing that this nuanced analysis helps to understand how the EU conceptionalises and conducts its DP efforts.

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1 Introduction

“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its

own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” (Treaty on European Union, 1992,

Art. 21(1))

Democracy promotion (DP) is deeply embedded within the EU’s treaties and is a core element of EU external relations, expressed through direct measures consisting of DP policies and instruments, and incorporated indirectly through the mainstreaming of DP across policy fields. Although DP has been actively channelled through the policy frameworks for the relations between the EU and the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) since the inception of the Barcelona Process in 1995, the political and also socio-economic situation worsened increasingly and was to some extent propelled by the EU’s inconsistent implementation of its DP mandate which in some cases rather consolidated the autocratic regimes, as in the case of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, instead of inducing and claiming democratic reforms. Despite more than 15 years of close EU-MENA relations through frameworks such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the European Neighbourhood Policy which rest on the EU’s commitment to advance democracy in its relations with third countries as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, in 2011 citizens across the MENA region took to the streets to protest against autocratic regimes and in favour of socio-economic and political reforms. The uprisings that started in Tunisia and unfolded across the MENA region in 2011 have presented the EU’s DP efforts with a challenge concerning the relevance and sincerity of EU DP.

In the light of these aforementioned events that became known as the Arab Spring, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Catherine Ashton has advocated for a deep democracy approach (European Commission, 2011d) towards the MENA. With this objective, Ashton calls on the EU’s own past of democratic change and the transformation of political systems of member states. Ashton claims that the efforts of democratic transition should go beyond the threshold of securing voting rights for democratic elections, including other democratic activities in order to guarantee sustainable and deep democracy. In accordance with these aims, EU DP in the MENA has been revisited through the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity

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Policy, and the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) to support

the MENA partners in their democratic transition.

Scholars such as Cardwell (2011), Wetzel & Orbie (2012) and Teti (2012) note that there is neither a clear conceptual definition nor a specific legal basis for the EU’s DP efforts. It is argued that, on the one hand, the “‘deep democracy’ concept has been defined in various and rather vague terms” (Wetzel and Orbie, 2012, p. 2), and on the other hand, the concept has not been mentioned in the latest EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human

Rights and Democracy. Furthermore, Teti (2012, p. 266) finds that the EU’s responses to the

Arab uprisings “repeat earlier mistakes, which resulted before 2011 in the poor reputation of the EU on democracy promotion” in the MENA region. In line with this, Burnell (2013, p. 842) argues that the EU’s actions have reinvented old DP patterns too quickly instead of adapting to the new challenges.

With this scholarly criticism in mind, this paper will look at the EU’s external relations with the MENA region, examining how the EU has pursued its aim of democracy promotion before the Arab Spring, and – in the light of the novel deep democracy agenda – how the Arab Spring has led the EU to revise its conception of DP and how this has been translated into new DP frameworks and instruments. Moreover, it will paint the picture of two different narratives that help to understand the dynamics between EU DP actors in Brussels and on the ground. Therefore, the following research questions will be posed:

RQ 1: How does the deep democracy approach reflect a changing perception of EU democracy promotion in the MENA region since 2011 and to what extent does this differ from previous engagement?

RQ 2: How is the EU’s post-Arab Spring engagement in terms DP reflected on the local level?

Since there is no clear definition of DP, neither theoretically, nor in the discourses and practices of EU institutions, this paper will not look at the effectiveness of the EU’s DP efforts, but will examine how the DP is stabilised as a policy objective at a given point (as a discourse), how it is conceived of, and how these conceptions are translated into the conduct of DP related activities. Therefore, conception and conduct will serve as the two key lines of inquiry in this research. To examine how DP is conceived of within the EU framework, the

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thesis looks at the case of the EED, that is of the most recently established instrument for EU DP.1 To examine how DP is conducted and, the thesis looks at EU DP activities in Tunisia. With the help of an extensive qualitative document analysis, interviews with representatives of the EED in Brussels and the EEAS in Tunis2, and focused observations during a 10-day stay in Tunis, the thesis will delineate how EU DP has evolved, and whether the new instrument reflects a change in the EU’s perception of DP and whether this is successfully translated into the new activities. This abductive approach (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009) will help to evaluate the EU’s engagement and put the recent developments in Tunisia and the Southern Mediterranean into perspective.

1.1 The need to study EU DP as an autonomous endeavour

The scholarly attention to EU DP mostly takes place in connection with economic and security interests. It is widely argued that democracy promotion cannot be viewed in isolation; instead, security and economic interests influence EU DP policies and external relations. Cardwell (2011, p. 39) states that the Treaty of Lisbon and Stockholm Programme have brought about an increase of security measures that conflict with the EU’s self-display as a democracy promoter. Wetzel and Orbie likewise conclude that due to these inconsistencies, the EU is not committed to its actions and instead “intends to adjust its promotion agenda to fit its own commercial or security interests” (Wetzel & Orbie, 2012, p. 3). Moreover, Pace argues that this interrelation of aims, especially regarding security, hampers the EU’s DP efforts and its role as an international actor in the MENA region (Pace, 2009, p. 45).

It is true that the post-Arab Spring DP efforts in the MENA region are and need to be seen as part of a bigger response to the uprisings of 20113, and that the demands of the protesters do not just evolve around improved democratic rights, but mostly stem from socio-economic claims in the first place. Nevertheless, this thesis will take DP as an object for its

1_{Even though the decision to establish the EED was already made in December 2011, it took until mid-2013 for}

the EU member states and the institutions to agree on its mandate, secure funding, and have it operational. Therefore, analysing the impact or effectiveness of the EED only a year after they have taken up work cannot be considered relevant as it does not provide much evidence which is why the focus will rest on the conceptual make up of the EED and how it has taken up its work.

2_{The names of the interviewees have been kept confidential. They have been made available to the supervisor}

and the second reader of this thesis.

3_{Other challenges are for example the question of political Islam and the political rise of Islamist actors,}

increased migration waves as a result of violence and instability, plummeting economic performance as a result of the Arab Spring, and overall regional instability

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own sake, initially considering DP as an endeavour in and out of itself, especially as outlined by the introductory quote of Article 21(1) TEU. This is not to dismiss the broader connections of EU interests that can be located in EU external relations, which have been unmissable in the scholarly accounts (for example Malmvig, 2006), however, this thesis argues that DP for itself is already problematic enough that it deserves to be approached as an autonomous object.

The design will adequately deal with the puzzle on how the Arab Spring and the development of the EU’s deep democracy approach towards its neighbourhood has changed the EU’s democracy promotion practices because it examines what has been criticised by the scholarly literature: (1) whether there is an inconsistency between how the EU conceives democracy promotion and how it implements it in its own policies, initiatives and in relation to the MENA region, and (2) whether democracy promotion is pursued out of a normative commitment, or influenced by underlying or expressed interests.

This thesis argues that the Arab Spring has made unmistakeably clear that what has been established as an approach to EU DP since 1995 has rather consolidated autocratic regimes, than to serve as a promoter for change and democratic reform in the region. Nevertheless, what has been framed as a new approach or even a paradigm change in EU DP in the MENA region is no more than a remapping of already existing priorities and approaches. Moreover, the impulse for the establishment of the EED and the revision of the ENP have been present before the outset of the Arab Spring and should not be understood as a direct response to the events. Instead, the EU quickly returns to old patterns of prioritising economic development as a driver for political development, leaving the claim of deep democracy as a rhetoric device for promoting democracy promotion. The findings suggest the consideration of two narratives that provide added value to the analysis of the EU’s efforts: on the one hand side there is the story of Brussels, which is expressed through official documents that often lack political foresight. On the other hand, there is the local story, which is not just about recipient governments or local initiatives but also includes international and EU stakeholder who work on the ground.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis

In order to explore this argument, the thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter (2) presents a theoretical account of democracy promotion and the aspects of DP that have attracted scholarly attention in order to better assess the EU’s engagement in DP throughout

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the thesis. With these theoretical underpinnings, it is further examined how democracy has become something to be externally promoted, before turning to the EU and how DP has been developed as a tool of EU Foreign Policy. Moreover, it is examined whether it is possible to clearly define the EU’s perception of DP.

Chapter 3 introduces the methodological framework of the thesis. It presents and discusses how the research on EU DP has been conducted, advocating for a methodological approach consisting of extensive qualitative document analysis complemented by interviews in Brussels and Tunis, therefore borrowing from multi-sited ethnography. To that end, is delineated what kind of sources were used and how the data was collected but also the limitations to the chosen approach.

Thereafter, Chapter 4 compares and contrasts how the EU has promoted democracy in the MENA region before and after the Arab Spring. It is shown how the EU has included DP in its policies and instruments towards the region, whether and how this has changed after the uprisings of the Arab Spring, and how deep democracy is conceptualised and incorporated in post-2011 engagement. Additionally, the EED is examined as a case study to test, whether this new understanding is accordingly translated into the latest innovation to EU DP.

This general regional account is complemented in Chapter 5 by a case study of Tunisia. As in the previous chapter, the EU’s engagement in terms of DP is compared before and after the Arab Spring with the help of ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports, followed by a close account on the how the EED is deployed in Tunisia and how this is reflected on the local level. With the help of this evidence, an interim conclusion attempts to summarise to what extent the post-Arab Spring perception of EU DP in the MENA region represents a changed understanding and whether and to what extent this deep democracy is operationalised in policy innovations such as the EED.

The conclusion summarises and evaluates the findings against the research interest and initial puzzle, answers the research questions, and suggest further paths of research upon the presented findings before presenting a final conclusion, which outlines the significance of the new findings.

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2 Theoretical Framework – Democracy Promotion

This chapter offers a theoretical discussion of democracy promotion (2.1) and examines how the EU has developed into a DP actor (2.2). The theoretical examination of democracy promotion falls into two parts: I first discuss the theoretical foundations of the notion, before surveying how democracy historically developed into something to be promoted. The analysis of how democracy promotion can be perceived of theoretically and how it has evolved as a matter of international relations – originating as Wilsonian ideal in the early 20th century, to “coming close to being the Grundnorm” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 1), and the “dual crisis of DP” (Kurki, 2013, p. 4 f.) – will help to assess the EU’s engagement in DP in the second part of the chapter.

2.1 The Genesis of Democracy Promotion

Since DP is neither invented nor exclusively pursued by the EU, a general historic overview of how DP came into being will be presented. Therefore, the academic struggle to theorise democracy promotion against the lack of an autonomous existing theory of DP in International Relations will be central, as well as the United States as source of first DP efforts that are relevant to the EU’s efforts and developments.

2.1.1 Underlying theoretical foundations

This subsection will present theoretical underpinnings and different concepts of understanding DP against the fact that, whereas different sub-aspects of DP such as DP actors, their motives, aims, instruments and understandings of the kind of democracy that is to be promoted have gained scholarly attention, no such thing as a grand theory of DP in IR has developed out of this (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, p. 78). The grand theories of International Relations struggle to make sense of how and why democracy and the process of democratisation has become an “object of foreign policy” (Smith, 2000, p. 3).

“[…] international democratic theory, in terms of explaining and understanding the interrelationship of democracy, democratization and the international system, does not exist.” (ibid., p. 1)

The theoretical discussion of DP constitutes a fairly novel area of International Relations and is of a complex nature, as the literature argues that there is no full-fledged theory of democracy promotion yet. DP can be considered a subcategory of democratisation, but more and more scholars have attempted to refine and theorise the increasing involvement

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of democratic regimes with external DP. In this regard, Banai (2013, p. 411) finds that there is no issue “more alluring and yet more contentious in contemporary democratic theory than that of democracy promotion.” The boundary between DP as a political endeavour and DP as a scholarly concern is porous. Making use of Cox’ (1981) distinction between a problem-solving theoretical and a critical theoretical perspective which present a useful approach can help to further illustrate this. According to these two approaches, contributions by scholars such as Carothers (1997; 1999; 2009), Youngs (2001), and McFaul (2004) present a problem-solving perspective to DP by providing a thorough description and analysis of the internal arrangement of DP. Scholars such as Guilhot (2005) and Kurki (2013) on the other hand represent the critical theory perspective upon DP by asking how the current procedures of DP came about.

2.1.1.1 Why Promote Democracy?

Within the realms of democratization strategies – the transformation toward a (more) democratic make-up of an entity or state – DP is one possible way of externally promoted, assisted or induced transformation. One theoretical underpinning of the conceptual discussion on the notion of democracy promotion is that democratic regimes externalize and promote democracy according to the Democratic or Perpetual peace proposition by Emanuel Kant (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, p. 79). This proposition has been further discussed by political theorists like Robert Dahl who have theoretically outlined how democracy and the amount of democratic states affect the international arena (McFaul, 2004, p. 148): democracies are less likely to fight each other. Wolff and Wurm (2011, p. 79) argue that this concern is backed by a threefold interest: a personal interest, a collective interest, and DP in the interest of the beneficiary country. Banai (2013, p. 413) adds that a perpetual peace is only possible by securing “three ‘definitive articles’: (1) a representative, republican form of government; (2) the liberal principle of respect manifested in a universal regime of human rights; and (3) social and economic interdependence across borders.” This finding is important because it addresses a conflict in the literature over the scope of DP, and whether DP means first and foremost the support of elections, or whether it also addresses social and economic issues.

Additionally, Wolff and Wurm (2011, p. 80 f.) present an argument that should not be forgotten as this will be relevant in the later parts of this chapter: not all democracies promote democracy because of the question of appropriateness to interfere with another sovereignty entity. Adding to this normative claim of self-determination, they also state that from a more utilitarian perspective, actors may refrain from DP if the costs of the efforts are higher than

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the benefits, which is often the case because the costs of DP occur immediately, whereas the success or failure of a democratic transition can only be seen over time.

2.1.1.2 How to conduct Democracy Promotion

Grävingholt et al. (2009) as well as Carothers (1997) present two different views to DP: (1) DP as an instrument to achieving aims for which democracy is a prerequisite, or (2) DP as a norm, implying that democracy is promoted as an aim in itself. This normative reasoning implies that a democratic actor is used to solving problems in a democratic way; promoting democracy is therefore the right thing to do as part of a liberal mission (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, p. 81). In the case of the instrumental legitimacy, Burnell (2011) states that drivers such as economic or human development – depending how strong they are – can significantly increase the commitment of the DP actor.

“The driver can exercise strong influence on the level of commitment to promoting democracy, the strategy, and the constancy over time and consistency across countries. The degree to which democracy support is mainstreamed into policy-making for the entire gamut of foreign relations, including international economic co-operation, can be critical to its chances of success.” (Burnell, 2011, p. 4)

This statement can be linked to the underlying assumptions to an instrumental understanding of DP. Banai (2013, p. 413) argues that the application of DP as an instrument for further development is based on the assumptions that “(1) democracy leads to a more peaceful international society, and (2) democracy is the best means for achieving justice in any society.”

Carothers (2009, p. 5) suggests two approaches to conducting DP: (1) on the one hand, the political approach focuses on elections and political rights, achieved through democratic forces gaining the upper hand over undemocratic forces and actors; (2) the developmental approach on the other hand, “encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments”, implying a long-term process which also addresses socio-economic development. However, the two can also be employed in parallel to each other, as shown by the following statement:

“Democratization means far more than the introduction of free and fair elections, especially in societies where institutional development in the party system and civil society has been repressed. It usually involves processes of cultural and social change involving attitudes, norms and values, as well

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as institution-building. Informal politics can be as important as the formal structures in determining where political power really lies, how it is exercised, and to what ends.” (Burnell, 2011, p. 3)

What remains unclear with problem-solving theoretical approaches like Carothers’ is that it is unclear, where it is that they speak from. As argued by Cox (1981, p. 128), a “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose”, and needs to be understood according to its “standpoint in time and space” (ibid.).

More generally, approaches of DP can be distinguished between direct measures that target political factors, and indirect measures that target the social and economic development which can be implemented through soft and hard power (ibid., p. 4). Burnell further emphasises that the strategy of DP does not only depend on the DP actor but also on the conditions of the recipient country: in cases of an already “strong momentum for reform”, assisting democracy through positive measures might be sufficient and successful, yet, in cases “where holders of power are determined to reverse recent democratic gains”, more negative and coercive means might need to be employed (ibid.).

Another possible strategy is democracy promotion through linkage or leverage of external actors, as described by Levitsky and Way (2005). This has been conceptualised as predominantly used by Western powers; yet, it has been shown that leverage is less effective than linkage, because linkage “contributed more consistently to democratization” (ibid., p. 21).

2.1.1.3 The Notions of Promoting, Assisting or Supporting Democracy

The analysis of theoretical contributions shows that differentiations between democracy promotion, support, and assistance are sometimes used to imply different actions or notions of DP, and sometimes employed interchangeably without specifying the author’s understanding or definition of the used term, which poses difficulties to a thorough understanding of the different concepts. Burnell (2011) for example makes use of democracy

assistance as a sub-approach to DP, focusing on “institutional support in political and civil

society and the state” (ibid.), addressing the political culture of a recipient country instead of “engag[ing] more directly in political struggles, taking the side of pro-reform actors” (ibid.) as done by other forms of DP. Moreover, Burnell states that democracy support is most successful “where democratic progress is occurring or is likely to happen anyway— in other words, where the momentum comes from within.” (ibid., p. 8) Nevertheless, the lines between the three remain blurred. Moreover, the introduction of good governance as part of the DP

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agenda brought about an overlap of pursuing DP or good governance because of “overlapping accounts of the meaning of democracy, ideas of human rights and the notion of (good) governance” (ibid., p. 3). However, it is important to note that these concepts are not the same even though democracy can further good governance, and likewise good governance can be included in DP measures.

Lastly, Wolff and Wurm (2011, p. 87) conclude that external DP can be identified in 7 ways in democratic foreign policies: rhetoric, instrument, secondary aim, primary aim, regulative norm, constitutive norm, hegemonic project. However, a lot of these assume that the respective entity is a nation state; NGOs and supranational entities are considered less important.

2.1.1.4 A Critical Approach to Democracy Promotion

Lastly, the struggle to theorise and make sense of DP, as well as the lessons learnt from its practice that will be described in the following subchapter, have brought about alternative understandings of how to perceive of or conduct DP which often represent the more critical theoretical perspectives upon DP. Kurki for example advocates for allowing understandings of democracy beyond liberal democracy to take foot in DP practice in order to avoid the flawed ‘one size fits all’ attitude towards recipient states. In this regard, Banai further suggests to re-think DP and promotes a shift towards democratic solidarity which is based on the principles of non-interference, inclusivity, and reflexivity (Banai, 2013, p. 416). These principles will allow the actors to respect and embrace the recipient countries’ preconditions, acknowledging “that democratic ideals are minimally shared across different societies, but are nevertheless shaped in reference to a set of socio-economic, political, cultural, and historical circumstances that are unique to each society.” (ibid.) Future developments will show to what extent these suggestions will be embraced or considered, most likely depending on the success or failure of current approaches. Moreover, while democracy promotion is now used as an analytical and indeed theoretical category, this development cannot fully be grasped without also understanding DP as a notion with a specific political history which has influenced the theoretical positions, as will be shown below.

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2.1.2 Democracy Promotion in International Politics

“While inconsistencies in democracy promotion surely persist, it would be a mistake to view democracy promotion as insignificant, as something to be seen as mere rhetorical claptrap. This is because not only is the advancement of democracy one of the most powerful international policy dynamics in the post-Cold War era, it is also now a broad-ranging, relatively well-funded and firmly institutionalised policy field.” (Kurki, 2013, p. 1)

With these theoretical starting points in mind, the following subsection will focus on how democracy has developed into something to be externally promoted, how and by whom. Usually, the standard example of a DP actor is associated with the United States. Whereas Carothers (1997) argues that the means of employed DP are often similar and do not differ widely across Western democracy promoters, Banai (2013) as well as Kurki (2013, p. 2) state that the idea of DP has reached consensus in the West, yet, the means are contested. Even though not always specified, the following account outlines the endorsement of the Western liberal model of democracy across different DP actors.

According to Banai (2013), in the beginning of the 20th century, democracy emerged as Wilsonian idealism that was turned into a strategic asset through the outbreak of the Cold War. The Cold War and the bi-polarity of international power relations, divided between the West and the Soviet Union has led to democracy being acknowledged as “an idea that must be defended and promoted through modern means of communication and propaganda, political technologies, and cultural productions” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 33). Therefore, it is important to understand that today’s practices of supporting democratic transitions have their origins in this “cultural and ideological struggle” (ibid.).

“The United States is a unique democracy promotion actor. Not only is it the first to enter the scene, and hence a trend-setter in important respects in this policy area, it is also unique in that it has been one of the only openly ideologically committed democracy promotion actors worldwide.” (Kurki, 2013,

p. 144)

During the 1970s, modernization theory and the link between economic development resulting in increased political development dominated the understanding of DP, spurred by the belief that conflict was less likely if people’s economic needs were guaranteed. The pioneer instrument of Western DP is the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), designed under US President Ronald Reagan as a tool to support democracy and democratic transitions in the light of the Cold War and the fear of a spill of communism through the Soviet Union. Its actions included, amongst others, “financing ‘democratic’

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opposition forces to translating Western political literature, training pollsters, promoting human rights education, fostering an entrepreneurial culture, easing the internationalization of neoliberal economics through symposia and textbooks, sustaining independent news reporting, and briefing government officials on media strategy” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 85 f.). With the help of the NED and its advocacy for promoting democracy and human rights abroad, the Reagan administration further developed the cause in the 80s.

“It is impossible to understand the rise of democracy and human rights as major policy issues in the 1980s without considering that what was at stake here were the views of different actors seeking to impose their own definition of human rights, or to legitimate their policies by invoking the term.”

(Guilhot, 2005, p. 74)

Despite the significance of the advancement of DP policies in the 1980s, it is important to note that in the case of the United States, there was a clear self-serving motive in these actions, as “the neoconservatives produced a theory of human rights that excluded social and economic entitlement and ensured the continued political and economic dominance of the centre over the periphery, against any challenge to the capitalist world-system.” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 77) Thus, the neoconservative approach aimed at blueprinting the American understanding and practices of democracy and human rights: “Democracy promotion is the result of this transformation of human rights into a modality of imperial control.” (ibid., 2005, p. 82) Therefore, Guilhot’s claim clearly distances his study from others that look at how DP might be the expression of a universal normative aspiration.

The approach of the United States differed from an approach promoted by the United Nations (UN) that also considered socioeconomic aspects of promoting human rights and democracy. The neoconservative agenda moved DP away from legal enforcement – as it lacked the ability to secure these rights and was limited to the endorsement of consent – towards linking DP to NGOs and human rights activists in a way that they represented the struggle and fights for human rights. Along these lines of transforming DP strategies, the NED developed into “a quasi think tank […] which provided a strong element of scientific legitimacy to its activities abroad and its role in engineering or assisting various ‘transitions to democracy’” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 86).

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2.1.2.1 Post-Cold War Democracy Promotion

Contemporary DP efforts originated as a response to the incomplete democratization processes of the 3rd wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) and the threat of instability after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the “industrialised democracies” (Youngs, 2001, p. 2). The end of the Cold War tested the perseverance of 20th century DP, as it “put an end to one of the main raisons d’être of an institution such as the National Endowment for Democracy and weakened its position in the field of foreign policy making, as the defence of democracy was an ideological issue that had arisen in the 1950s and that had been reformulated in the 1980s in the perspective of a global confrontation with Communism.” (Guilhot, 2005, p. 72) By refocusing away from primarily targeting democratic transitions in the light of anti-Communism, DP developed into a global mission, professionalised and further institutionalised. Guilhot (2005) thus notes, that the DP activities after the end of the Cold War should not be understood as a continuation of the DP strategies that were employed during the Cold War:

“Furthermore, the cold war was about maintaining stability and the status quo. To promote democracy is fundamentally about promoting change. It aims at restructuring societies from the grass-roots level of civil society to the formal structures of power, transforming their economies as well in the process. There is something intrinsically revolutionary about it.” (ibid., p. 32)

“The much-celebrated triumph of democracy at the end of the twentieth century is often presented as the victory of an idea. The spread of democracy was not the result of economic development or increased social differentiation, as suggested by the old paradigm of modernization theory, but rather a diffuse process driven by beliefs, values, and ideas.” (ibid., p. 166)

2.1.2.2 Criticism of contemporary DP and the dual crisis of DP

Since the beginnings of current DP, Carothers has described a trend – referred to as a

learning curve in his earlier works (Carothers, 1999) – away from a one-size fits all approach

towards more “varied strategies aimed at the increasingly diverse array of political contexts in the world.” (Carothers, 2009, p. 5) An important part in this learning curve is a critical turn away from what McFaul has described as democracy becoming a ‘world value’, toward questioning “[t]he entitlement of particular actors to support democratic progress abroad and the legitimacy of democracy promotion overall” (Burnell, 2011, p. 6). Therefore, democracy promotion in the 21st century can be characterised through the criticisms presented by Burnell (2011; 2013) and Kurki (2013), moving away from problem solving theoretical approaches toward critical theoretical approaches.

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“Democracy promotion, assistance, and support have been key foreign and development policy agendas for most Western governments and international organisations since the 1990s. Yet, not only has democracy promotion been surprisingly unsuccessful in many contexts in the last few decades, it has also been increasingly challenged by many political actors for breaching the right of populations to “freely” determine the shape of their own political and economic governance structures.” (Kurki,

2013, p. xii)

According to Kurki (2013, p. 125), DP has seen a dual crisis: on the one hand due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where democracy was promoted through undemocratic or illegitimate means as a security response by the United States; on the other hand, through the economic and financial crises which created a “more substantial challenge” (ibid., p. 4). These events “have demonstrated the fallibility of Western economic and political models of governance” (ibid.). She finds that the United States have lost their dominating role on the international stage, whereas the BRIC countries have gained increasing importance – also as new DP actors. Non-liberal and failed state regimes have proven to be more persistent, while Western DP continues to proceed unchanged. These developments have led Kurki (2013, p. 4f.) to ask: “To what extent should Western liberal

countries and their development organisations lead in structuring the societies elsewhere when their own political, social and politico-economic structures are failing, both in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy?” Post-Cold War DP efforts have reacted to political events

much more than they have actually influenced and shaped the developments of such (Burnell, 2013, p. 839). This has led to increased questioning of whether democracy can be exported and has affected DP’s reputation as a driver of political change. Kurki (2013, p. 139) finds that after the experiences of the dual crisis of DP, the US has shifted its DP focus towards directing its aid at civil society organisations through a bottom-up approach, how the EU reacted to these challenges will be analysed in the following sub-section.

The upheavals in the MENA region in relation to the Arab Spring have inspired both DP actors as well as scholars anew to consider perceptions of DP. In this regard, Burnell (2011, Abstract), finds that the events have “challenged international democracy support to learn from its own limitations while potentially offering exciting new opportunities. The global momentum of democratization, which had appeared to run out of steam, could be reinvigorated.

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2.2 The EU’s Involvement in Promoting Democracy

This sub-section will specifically look at how DP has developed as a tool of EU Foreign Relations – however not limited to the MENA region. Most importantly, it will delineate, how the EU conceptionalises “democracy” as well as DP. When analysing the EU’s DP efforts, it is important to keep in mind that in addition to the supranational instruments, each EU member state conducts individual, at times coordinated DP policies (Burnell, 2011, p. 5). In the light of the lack of unambiguous definitions for the terms of democracy and

democracy promotion, this thesis argues that EU DP is best studied by looking at the

meanings that are connected to democracy promotion.

Therefore, two assumptions are essential for the evaluation of the EU’s DP efforts: (1) that DP has gained certain normative importance (McFaul, 2004), and is basis of the EU’s motives for DP, yet an instrumental character remains and can be identified in issues such as regulating migration from the MENA region to the EU, and (2) that DP can take place in an expressed as well as implied fashion (Cardwell, 2011), which allows for a more comprehensive account of EU DP. Whereas Wolff and Wurm (2011) state that international and non-governmental organisation can be considered relevant, yet, assert that states are the crucial and most influential actors in DP, this thesis will argue that despite the criticism of scholars as well as practitioners, the EU has evolved as an ambitious and serious actor in DP.

2.2.1 Linking Democracy Promotion in EU-Third Country Relations

Even though active DP has only started in the early 1990s, the adherence to democratic values has been included in the EU’s foreign relations since the outset of the Rome Treaty in 1957 (Treaty of Rome, 1957). According to Kurki (2013, p. 149), the EU has already “been an important democracy promoter in its local neighbourhood” before introducing direct DP efforts by making membership to the EU “conditional upon democratic principles being practiced” (ibid.), which was also formalised later through the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Carothers (2009, p. 17) argues that the most successful EU DP strategy is the accession and membership in the EU because it makes use of a strict conditionality. Burnell (2011, p. 7) adds that mere conditionality is often not considered to be a successful political tool, unless it is used in combination with “more positive measures of engagement, notably strong incentives like EU accession (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Youngs 2010b).” In this thesis, however, it is especially interesting to examine the relations with states, where democracy is promoted in a frame without the perspective or incentive of full EU membership.

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The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have on the one hand presented the European Community with an immediate neighbourhood to the east that was facing regime change; on the other hand it was the EU’s chance to further establish itself as an international actor within the new configurations of the international community. In this regard, Kurki (2013, p. 148) states that “[i]n its search for increased legitimacy in the eyes of both the general public in EU countries and external actors, the EU started to develop a variety of policy instruments to facilitate democracy in third countries.” The 1991 Development Council Resolution (Council of the European Communities, 1991) for the first time stipulates “the commitment more systematically to encourage democratic change in other countries” with the help of “both positive and coercive tools” (Youngs, 2011, p. 30). This was further expanded through provisions under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992), introducing political aid initiatives and thereby making the Treaty the first EU document to directly address “the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as falling formally within the aims of EU development policy.” (Youngs, 2011, p. 30) Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 introduced Common

Positions, aimed at increasing the transparency of how the EU conducted its democracy

support and what was expected of third countries. From then on, these would also be included in third country relations, making the adherence to democracy and human rights of third countries a strong influencing factor of EU foreign relations. Establishing democracy and the adherence of human rights as “essential elements” (European Commission, 2001) in EU foreign relations since 1992 expresses the EU’s normative approach to DP, however, at the same time democracy promotion is also used instrumentally to support development policy aims, and shows a self-serving purpose as expressed in the 2001 Commission Communication on the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third

Countries:

“Poverty reduction, the main objective of the European Community's development policy, will only be sustainably achieved where there are functioning participatory democracies and accountable governments. [...] Democratic, pluralist governments which respect the rights of minorities are less likely to resort to nationalism, violence or aggression, either internally, against their neighbours or further afield. Conflict and instability is costly in human terms. It is also likely to bear upon the EU as the world’s largest aid donor, and a favoured destination for immigrants.” (ibid., p. 4)

Therefore, the logics of instrumental or normative DP are not easily separated, and DP is treated as a normative argument but policies and official documents also show a more instrumental understanding of DP. In that regard, Youngs (2001, p. 31) notes that “[n]either member states nor the Commission used a US-style ‘democracy assistance’ definition, but

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rather favoured broader categories combining human rights, governance, and peace-building work in different combinations”, as can be seen in the fact that there was already a strong focus on civil societies and grass-roots organisations. This is supported by Carothers (2009) who assigns EU DP a more developmental than political approach.

The EU’s commitment to promoting democracy became more outspoken through the establishment of the European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 19944. It was initially allocated a budget of EUR 59 million, which was increased to a budget of 102 million euro until 2001 (Youngs, 2001, p. 31) in order to finance aid programmes that target democracy and human rights. Central to EU-third country relations in regard to the adherence to human rights and democracy is the 1995 Human Rights and Democracy Clause which applies to all third country agreements, allowing the EU to make use of political conditionality and the restriction of relations in case of the violation of the clause (Commission of the European Communities, 1995a).

The increase of DP instruments, initiatives and budget, however, also brought about complications and criticism. Youngs (2001, p. 36) points out that the Human Rights and

Democracy Clause came without a clarification of what the EU is specifically referring to or

how the outlined political conditionality would be implemented. Further criticism stresses the EU’s “failure to establish adequate co-ordination mechanisms” (ibid., p. 32) between its institutions, member states and their national instruments, but also in terms of communicating budgets and makeup of actions. Moreover, the EU at first did not possess one designated institution responsible for democracy promotion, because the efforts were organised according to geographic regions and member states were reluctant to transfer competences during the 1990s. Some of these shortcomings were addressed through reforms in the structures of the Commission in 1999 which “create[d] a new department to oversee and co-ordinate democracy assistance work, with all responsibilities for the issues being transferred out of geographical departments.” (ibid, p. 34) The Treaty of Amsterdam states in 1999 that the EU “is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 3), therefore further foregrounding its democratic principles. In 2001, the European Aid Office was established in an attempt to provide more coherence. Moreover, the 2001

4_{It was not possible to access an official EU document referring to the establishment of the EIDHR in 1994.}

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Commission Communication on the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and

Democratisation in Third Countries (European Commission, 2001) makes clear reference to

the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms what can be regarded as an unambiguous reference point when looking for definitions of the EU’s understanding of democracy.

2.2.2 Promoting Democracy in the Neighbourhood

A significant addition to the EU’s DP profile was gained through the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a reaction to the enlargement round of 2004 (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). Within the framework of the ENP, the EU promotes democracy and human rights – amongst other objectives – in its eastern and southern periphery. The Actions Plans that document the relations with ENP partner countries include chapters on the performance in the advancement of democracy and human rights, supported by the EU. The ENP has been considered an effective way of linking states to the EU in accordance to Levitsky and Way’s (2005) concept of linkage and leverage, yet, there is leverage within linkage due to the conditionality of the relations.

This thesis argues that in order to come to grips with the instruments of and approaches to EU DP, Cardwell’s (2009) approach to distinguish between positive and negative DP instruments and measures which can be identified in expressed as well as implied ways. This conceptualisation promises to present a more nuanced but also more comprehensive account of EU DP. The EED as latest instrument of EU DP, for instance, would be categorised as a positive expressed measure.

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2.3 Criticism to EU Democracy Promotion

The above-described crisis of DP (Kurki, 2013; Burnell, 2011, 2013) has also affected the EU, but at the same time has presented opportunities for reforming apparent shortcomings. Kurki (2013, p. 146) states that “various crises in the Balkans and Iraq” have motivated the EU to strive to become a more coherent actor and “to elevate its role in global affairs across policy sectors – from military to defence policy and peacekeeping, development, human rights and democracy promotion.” (ibid.) To that end, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was introduced under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. One could argue that the EU used the opportunity to step up as a DP actor when the US lost its credibility. The literature shows, that the EU’s struggle for internal coherence is recognised. Kurki (ibid, p. 153) states that the financial and economic crisis has shifted the EU’s DP approach toward also acknowledging economic factors, and further finds that this socio-economic approach can also be found in the DP efforts in response to the Arab Spring and the EU’s latest aim of promoting deep democracy, for example through its latest instrument, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). However, acknowledging the above-presented pitfalls of recent DP, democratic records of democracy promoters, and the finding that DP has been more reactive than proactive are also very relevant, and maybe crucial for the present and future of EU DP. It needs to be asked to what extent third countries welcome DP and assistance from an actor who is fighting with a major democratic deficit itself and has suffered severely from its own structural political and economic flaws that have been revealed by the economic and financial crisis.

2.3.1 What kind of Democracy does the EU promote?

After considering the development of the EU DP instruments and policies, it is also interesting to consider what kind of democracy the EU promotes as this offers one of the foundational points of criticism to EU DP. Here, Kurki (2013) presents some valuable findings. First of all, when comparing the EU with the US, she finds that the EU pursues a more pluralistic understanding of democracy (ibid., p. 147). The term she chooses for conceptualising the EU as a democracy promoter is “a ‘fuzzy’ liberal democracy promoter” (ibid.):

“Rather than setting out a clear set of principles in terms of what kind of democracy it promotes – pluralistic or otherwise – the EU, I argue, fudges the question of what kind of democracy it promotes. […] These tendencies structure how alternative models are engaged with. Despite seeming to lean towards reform liberalism, social democracy or even participatory democracy at times, the actual

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practice of EU discourses de-radicalises such alternatives and promotes them, if it does at all, as secondary to an essentially ‘liberal’ and often technocratically neoliberal set of commitments.” (ibid.) “Fuzzy liberalism is a conceptual framing that places liberal democratic values at its core, while at the same time making unsystematic or peripheral references to other values, such as solidarity, labour rights, participation, and social welfare.” (ibid., p. 168)

It is interesting to note that Kurki argues that this fuzziness did not develop by accident but should be understood as a consequence of the structural prerequisites that EU DP was developed in: “it emerges from the context of politico-economic demands, bureaucratic complexity and political pluralism of the actor.” (ibid., p. 148)

2.3.2 To define, or not to define – the elusive notion of democracy promotion

With the help of the theoretical underpinnings that are presented above, it is possible to outline the characteristics of the EU’s DP efforts and how they have evolved and changed over time. The chapter has shown that it is a normal modus operandi for DP actors to make use of different strategies at the same time, applying them to the conditions that they face in the respective country. Moreover, the EU has established a strong link of adhering to democracy and human rights in its international relations, achieving “a rather unusual ‘mainstreaming’ of the idea of democracy across policy sectors.” (Kurki, 2013, p. 149) This can be a sign for a tailored approach to each individual case within the broader framework of the EU’s DP instruments. Whereas this might present a positive evaluation, then, the problematic aspect of EU DP is the conceptualisation of what kind of democracy the EU is promoting exactly, or what is meant when speaking of DP. It is unclear whether the EU aims at blueprinting its own democratic model of Western liberal democracy, or adapts the expectations to democratic change according to the respective case. Kurki’s (2013) conceptualisation of the EU as a fuzzy liberal democracy promoter is helpful because it implies that there is a certain behaviour, yet, not consistently employed. Nevertheless, Kurki argues that this fuzziness presents an opportunity, making the EU a currently unique actor in DP (ibid., p. 169). Not clearly stating what it understands under its own concepts may render the EU more flexible to act and interact in different contexts and might make it “more palatable for many recipients than a more hard-edged ‘ideologically clear’ discourse” (ibid.). Therefore, if one cannot present a unambiguous definition for democracy, this is equally impossible for democracy promotion.

Kurki’s findings highlight the way that this fuzziness also affects the EU’s outlining of its understanding of DP and help to examine the meaning that different actors in different

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settings attribute to the notion of EU DP. Thus, Kurki’s argument highlights the elusiveness of the notion of democracy promotion as exemplified through the ambiguous EU DP practices as well as in the scholarly accounts because the genesis of DP is closely tied to the development of subdisciplines such as transitology or democratisation studies. Therefore, it remains to be asked how to work with such a notion. This thesis suggests that, instead of taking the starting point in defining democracy and democracy promotion, it is conducive to look at how specific meanings are attached to the claim that democracy is something that is, will, and should be promoted. Taking the latter as a starting point will help to analyse how these claims empower certain actors and foreground certain meanings over others. Locating the research of this thesis within this argument, in terms of how the EU as DP actor has conceptionalised and conducted DP, the aspects of DP as an instrument or a normative endeavour in terms of perception, and further DP as developmental or political approaches are central to the further analysis.

Nevertheless, taking the opportunities of fuzziness into consideration, the EU needs to evaluate how far this game of fuzziness can be played without appearing profile-less and thereby losing credibility in the recipient countries and among other DP actors. Perhaps, if the EU’s understanding of what kind of democracy it wants to promote was clearer, this would also benefit the overall framing of its DP efforts. Ultimately, Kurki (2013, p. 172) finds that even though the EU has incorporated and stressed the importance of partnership in its foreign relations over the years, there is no genuine dialogue on how to implement DP. Thus, not having an unambiguous definition for democracy is not a problem as such, as the literature (ibid., p. 30) argues democracy is and has been a contested model, thus even within the framework of liberal democracy, variations exist. Working with an unclear concept of DP, however, is the actual problem, as the following chapters will show.

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3 Methodology

With the aim to delineate the conception and conduct of EU DP, this thesis seeks to analyse EU democracy promotion in the Middle East, in particular how the deep democracy approach has changed the EU’s agenda in the MENA region after the uprisings of the Arab Spring. In the context of the research questions, DP efforts will be analysed and compared pre- and post-2011 with the help of EU official documents and the cases of the EED and Tunisia. This will show whether the EU’s engagement in terms of DP represents continuity or change in its policies and instruments toward the Southern Mediterranean: has the EU embraced the challenges of the reform processes after the Arab Spring, or was DP shallowly used to promote an allegedly new approach to EU DP which was quickly replaced by old pre-Arab Spring interests?

3.1 Case Selection

With the help of the posed research questions, this thesis will look at both the conception, as well as implementation and conduct of DP, illustrated with the help of the two specific cases: (1) the evolution of EU DP instruments after the Arab Spring through the EU’s latest DP innovation, the EED; and (2) analysing EU DP efforts on the ground in the case of in Tunisia before and after the Jasmine Revolution. To that end, it is important to look at how the updated understanding of democracy promotion is implemented in respective policies and initiatives towards the MENA region through two exemplary cases, which are connected to the extent that the EED’s engagement in Tunisia is closely examined. The EED is especially interesting, because even though it has been envisioned already in 2010, it was established after the outset of the Arab Spring and presents a completely new tool, which allows to be analysed from its establishment and first working steps.

Given the different situations in the region, both in terms of how the events of the Arab Spring unfolded and what has happened since then – whether the autocratic regimes have been overthrown like in Libya and Tunisia, secured their rule through reforms as was the case in Morocco, or have resorted to the violent crushing of protests resulting in prolonged violent conflict as in Syria – the thesis will look at the developments of a single case because of the heterogeneity of (pre-)conditions for EU DP in the MENA region and have changed – if not even deteriorated – during the process of writing this thesis. Tunisia in this regard serves as the most likely case of countries that have been involved in the upheavals of the Arab Spring. Even though it might increase the relevance of the paper’s findings by examining less or least likely cases such as Libya or Egypt, the choice of Tunisia as a case

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study is justified. Tunisia has been the first Mediterranean partner in the MENA region that the EU has signed an Association Agreement with in 1995 and has upheld a close relationship with since. Moreover, the Arab Spring was sparked by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor, and has spread through protests and violence across North Africa and throughout the Middle East. Since the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime on 14 January 2011, Tunisia has held free, democratic elections, adopted a new constitution in January 2014, while dealing with political instability, ongoing mass protests and the assassinations of two Tunisian opposition politicians in February and July 2013. The Tunisian transition is often handled as the forerunner and success story, or maybe even all that is left of the Arab uprisings. Yet, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution has also been less violent than the revolutions in Egypt or Libya. Moreover, testing EU DP efforts with the help of the most likely case implies that if the research shows flaws or shortcomings for this case already, one can imagine how troublesome the EU’s aim of instilling democracy will be in cases where transition and reform processes prove to be (even) more difficult. Additionally, the opportunity to travel to Tunis in June 2014 has added greatly to the experience of how the reform process is taking shape.

The scope of the qualitative study will focus on the time span between 1995-2014; from the outset of the inclusion of elements of DP in EU-Mediterranean relations through the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 up until June 2014. Understanding how the EU has engaged in DP before the Arab Spring will help to put the EU’s engagement into critical perspective and evaluate the EU’s efforts of promoting deep democracy in the MENA region after the Arab Spring. Additionally, the establishment of the EED and the implementation of the latest ENP Action Plan for Tunisia both took place in November 2012, which leads to assume that the mandate of the EED could have been influenced by ideas of the new Action Plan and vice versa. And if not, it at least allows for temporal congruence.

3.2 Data Collection

For the endeavour of this thesis, a triangulation of data sources is suitable: extensive qualitative document analysis was conducted, complemented by semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in the field of EU democracy promotion and the Tunisian reform process, as well as observations during a study trip to Tunis. Official EU documents on the conception of democracy and how this is to be externalised in the immediate neighbourhood were analysed and compared as to whether and to what extent this has changed after the Arab Spring. The document analysis will also be used to examine, how democracy promotion is linked to other policy fields, especially economic relations. As argued in the introduction, the

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thesis advocates for approaching DP as an autonomous object, however, this does not exclude a possible link to other policy fields but rather to avoid establishing this link as an a priori assumption.

The diachronic approach will help to analyse the change brought about by the events of the Arab Spring, both in terms of EU policies as well as reforms in the MENA region and the Tunisian reform process since 2011. The document analysis of relevant EU documents will provide evidence for the EU’s conceptualisation of democracy and external democracy promotion, whereas the case studies and interviews will help to analyse the implementation of the latter. The document analysis is complemented by semi-structured interviews with experts who engage in EU democracy promotion or are involved in the Tunisian reform process in either Brussels or Tunis. Over the course of the research, three 45 to 60 minute recorded interviews have been conducted, whereof one took place with two interview partners: one interview with two Project Officers of the EED in Brussels in May 2014, one interview with a high-ranking member of the Delegation of the EU in Tunis, and one interview with an International Relations professor from SOAS, University of London who is currently pursuing a guest lecturer position at the University of Tunis. The interviews were on the one hand side conducted to clarify findings of the document analysis, on the other hand side, interviews were the only possibility to specifically find out about certain opinions of the interviewees, especially in the case of the representatives of the EED and the EEAS. In the case of the EED, the interview provided the opportunity to gain more in-depth insights into the very recent workings and activities of the EED and the implementation of the EU’s deep democracy approach. The interview with the EED Programme Officers helped to clarify issues that have not been shed sufficient light on by other scholars due to the EED’s novelty. The interviewees were posed similar questions to compare viewpoints between Brussels and Tunis, both on EU DP and how they see developments in Tunisia and the Southern Mediterranean overall. The interview with the representative of the EEAS in Tunis helped to identify how they see their work in Tunisia in regard to the EU’s support to the transition after the Jasmine Revolution, and how the interviewee evaluates the reforms as well as the EEAS’ contribution to it. Additionally, the interview provided information on how a member of the EEAS evaluates the change in the EU DP efforts and their cooperation and interaction with the EED in Tunisia. Thus, the interviews add the viewpoint of practitioners to the analysis of primary and scholarly literature.

The shallowness of deep democracy? : EU democracy promotion in the MENA region after the Arab Spring

MASTER’S THESIS