Stop-TTIP.org:
Digital Activism in the European Union
Amsterdam
26
thJune 2017
University of Amsterdam
MA New Media and Digital Culture
Name of Student
Taylan Engin
Student Number
11307749
Taylan.engin@hotmail.de
Name of Supervisor
Robin Boast
Abstract
Since the 1990s, we are simultaneously witnessing the strengthening of
international organizations like the EU, and the increasing daily use of
the internet. These two developments shape the environment in which
social movements attempt to promote their causes. Between June 2013
and November 2016, the European Commission and the U.S. negotiated
a trade agreement that we refer to as the “Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership” (TTIP). To protest the neoliberal character of
this agreement, Stop-TTIP was founded, a social movement organization
that intended to prevent TTIP by mobilizing people and pressurizing the
EU. In this thesis, I will question, by which practices Stop-TTIP
attempted to influence the trade agreement, how the EU reacted to these
practices, and how, during this process, Stop-TTIP mobilized support for
its cause. Doing so, I intend to contribute to the academic literature
about digital activism, and more particularly, regarding collective action
repertoires. I will try to find out how powerful organizations like
Stop-TTIP are and how important the internet is to them. I conclude that the
internet plays a decisive role and that internet-based actions are the
more effective ones, but they suggest that the decision-making
procedures of the EU are somewhat overwhelmed by digital impulses
from civil society.
Keywords
TTIP, Stop-TTIP, Digital Activism, Collective Action Repertoires, Framing Tactics, Civil Society, European Union, Democratic Participation
Table of Content
1 Introduction ... 5
2 Literature Review ... 9
2.1 Case Study Comparison: Breindl, Kavada and Milan ... 10
2.2 Theoretical Background ... 14
2.2.1 Leverage and Accountability Politics ... 17
2.2.2 Information and Symbolic Politics ... 17
2.2.3 Repertoires of Collective Action ... 18
2.2.4 Framing and Mobilization Tactics ... 20
3 Stop-TTIP in the Light of Digital Activism ... 22
4 Methodology ... 24
4.1 Sources ... 25
4.2 Procedure ... 27
4.2.1 On the action repertoire of Stop-TTIP... 27
4.2.2 On the responsiveness of the EU ... 27
4.2.3 On the framing tactics of Stop-TTIP ... 28
5 Results ... 28
5.1 Stop-TTIP’s action repertoire ... 29
5.1.1 Stop-TTIP has a website ... 29
5.1.2 Online petition ... 30
5.1.3 Email bombs ... 31
5.1.4 Transnational Demonstrations ... 31
5.1.5 Legal Protest Demonstrations ... 32
5.1.6 Further means of protest ... 33
5.2 The EU’s responsiveness ... 34
5.2.1 Phase 1 (November 2011 – November 2013) ... 34
5.2.2 Phase 2 (December 2013 – March 2014) ... 35
5.2.3 Phase 3 (July 2014 – October 2014) ... 36
5.2.4 Phase 4 (October 2014 – January 2015) ... 36
5.2.5 Phase 5 (January 2015 – April 2015) ... 37
5.2.6 Phase 6 (July 2015) ... 38
5.2.7 Phase 7 (October 2015 – November 2016) ... 39
5.3 Mobilization and framing tactics ... 48
5.3.2 Rejection of the ECI (10.09.2014) ... 48
5.3.3 Publishing of the secret mandate (09.10.2014) ... 49
5.3.4 Right before the new Commission came into office (late October 2014) 50 5.3.5 Right after the new Commission came into office (November 2014) ... 50
5.3.6 One million signatures gathered (04.12.2014) ... 51
5.3.7 Results of the online consultation published (13.01.2015) ... 51
5.3.8 Closing of (s)ECI (07.10.2015) ... 52
5.3.9 Signatures were handed in (09.11.2015) ... 52
6 Conclusion ... 53
7 Bibliography ... 62
List of Figures
1. Timeline (Stop-TTIP’s Action Repertoire and EU Statements) ………..…401 Introduction
On June 17 2013, the European Commission was officially mandated to start negotiations with the U.S. in order to develop the “Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership” – we commonly refer to this as “TTIP” (Council of the EU, 2014). In simplified terms, TTIP promised to “making us all wealthier and allowing the EU and the US to set the standards of the global economy” (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 1). Arguably, the early negotiations were held in an enthusiastic and
optimistic atmosphere, because the support was huge: The Council of the European Union, representing the governments of the EU member-states, had unanimously voted in favor of negotiations (Crisp, 2014a), and the European Parliament (EP), representing the people of Europe, had welcomed the decision and “fully endorse[d] the recommendation to start negotiations” (European Parliament, 2011; European Parliament, 2013). About three years later, in November 2016, that optimism had completely disappeared: Donald Trump was elected US President after waging an openly anti-TTIP election campaign (“Trump unterschreibt Dekret gegen
Handelsabkommen TPP”). Eventually, Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Trade, who was responsible for TTIP negotiations, stated: “TTIP will probably be in the freezer for quite some time and then what will happen when it is defrosted, I think we will need to wait and see” (Euractive, 2016).
Throughout this three-year-process, the negotiations were held back by one factor: European civil society that publicly expressed opposition, discontent and mistrust to TTIP, and organized protest against it. “Stop-TTIP” was founded, an “alliance” – as it describes itself – officially composed of more than 500 civil society organizations and trade unions (“about Stop-TTIP”). In opposition to TTIP
supporters, they believe that this trade agreement must be prevented, because it poses “a threat to democracy, the rule of law, the environment, health, public services as well as consumer and labour rights” (ibid.). Therefore, Stop-TTIP ran campaigns and actions against TTIP negotiations for approximately three years.
These protests can be aligned with the “alter-globalization-movement” (also called the “anti-globalization-movement”). The term stands for different protests that took place at different times and places, which are opposed to “neo-liberal, corporate, capitalist visions of globalization” and, instead, “advance an alternative, socially centered vision (‘global justice’) that emphasizes social and political equity, fair trade,
environmental responsibility, and direct participation” (Lievrouw 164). Its first and most referred to examples are the “Zapatista Resistance” of the mid-1990s, and the “Battle in Seattle” against a conference of the World Trade Organization in 1999, where tens of thousands of people protested (Lievrouw 162-164).
In fact, social movements have been studied throughout the 20th and 21st
century so far (Tilly, 1978; Klandermans, 1991; Turner, 1996; Melucci, 1996; Tarrow & Meyer, 1998; Castells, 2009). However, in more recent years, the analysis has gained new momentum because of two developments: one political, the other technological. First, the end of the Cold War led to a massive shift in international relations. Politics moved increasingly from the national to the international sphere. In this new “post-national-constellation” (Habermas, 2001), non-state-actors like international institutions and organizations became more powerful – the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 is an important example for how this development applies to the European Union. Ever since, social movements increasingly work on the
international level as well and began to approach, for instance, the EU and its institutions, rather than national governments (Held 291-295; Kriesberg 3-19). Second, the internet entered the daily lives of Western societies. In the 1990s, Web 1.0. “opened up an imponderably large universe of documents and information on demand”, and meanwhile, Web 2.0. “links this power of global information search and retrieval with the personal involvement, interaction, and collaborative creativity of people linked to one another” (Lievrouw 177). Social movements, such as Stop-TTIP, could benefit from the internet, because it reduced the costs of communication and transcended geographical and temporal barriers (Bennet 3). Obviously, “the fluid, non-hierarchical structure of the internet and that of the international protest coalition prove[d] to be a good match” (Van Aelst and Walgrave 105).
Based on this contextualization, my purpose is to understand how an
organization like Stop-TTIP behaves on such an international and digitalized stage of politics. What interests me here is to draw conclusions on how powerful such an organization is, whether its engagement can change the outcome of a policy, and whether the internet plays a decisive role for it. Therefore, I developed three research questions each of which is linked to a number of sub-questions that serve as
orientation. (1) By which practices did Stop-TTIP attempt to influence TTIP
negotiations? And did the internet play a decisive or supplementary role here? (2) How responsive was the EU to these attempts? Did it react or ignore the protests?
Has it included the protesters to the process of negotiations? And has the stance of the institutions on TTIP changed throughout the protests? (3) Eventually, as to understand Stop-TTIP’s engagement throughout the process, how did Stop-TTIP
mobilize supporters? Or, in more detail, by using which framing tactics did it
communicate the developments of the process to its followers? Together, I believe, these three fields of questions produce a clear picture of the three years of TTIP negotiations and resistance. In fact, it is not possible to say that TTIP negotiations were paused in November 2016 because of Stop-TTIP (Donald Trump’s election probably plays the most important role), but still, looking deeper into the process, into action and reaction, I will try to disentangle the relationship between
transnational institutions, civil society protest, democratic participation and the constantly strengthening role that the internet plays in this context.
This academic field is referred to as “Digital Activism”. In simplified terms, a digital activism campaign “can be defined as an organized public effort, making collective claim(s) on a target authority(s), in which civic initiators or supporters use digital media” (Edwards, Howard and Joyce 4). The actions and campaigns that Stop-TTIP conducted, can be defined as such “public efforts”, its goal – to stop Stop-TTIP - is the “collective claim” of its members, and EU institutions are the “target authority”. Other scholars have also dealt with digital activism and in this context, I would like to highlight the work of Breindl, Kavada and Milan (Breindl and Briatte, 2010; Breindl, 2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2013; Kavada 2005; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2015; Milan, 2016). The literature on digital activism can be divided into four sub-fields. My work goes under the sub-category “repertoires of collective action” (or “collective action
repertoires”), which can be defined as the “set of means that are effectively available to a given set of people and which they use to act collectively in order to make claims on individuals and groups” (Mare 48), or, more recently, as “sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations” (Taylor and Van Dyke 268). Other sub-categories in digital activism, which I will elaborate on in my literature review, can be grouped as identity-building and movement formation; organizational structures; and networking strategies (Milan 12).
The academic literature that focuses on collective action repertoires, usually deals with these in a rather isolated way, focusing on the character of the action alone, and investigating NGOs or small groups of activists. I think that the case I am
exploring contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, I am incorporating the actions into a more dynamic view that also considers the responses by the “target authority” (the EU) and how Stop-TTIP “sells” the outcome to its supporters by using framing tactics. The three research questions have a reciprocal relationship. Thus, I hope to develop a clear picture of the entire process and be able to estimate, in the end, how much of a difference the activism actually made. Second, I make a content-wise contribution. Stop-TTIP has not been explored in the light of digital activism, yet. In short, it is worth doing so, because Stop-TTIP is an interesting case. Bearing in mind that it organized a demonstration with more than 250 000, it seems to classify much more as a ‘social movement’ than other organizations would contemporarily be able to claim. Stop-TTIP is equally controversial, because its protest addresses TTIP, a topic that has an immense, even historical and political importance for the EU. Initially, TTIP was regarded by its architects as a way out of the economic crisis that took place around 2010, and more than that, it was already being planned after the Cold War as a means to prevent the return of isolationism and nationalism in the Western World.
Following this introduction will be a literature review. Here, I will work out how other scholars have dealt with digital activism. I will mention the different
subfields, distinguish which protesting and target organizations each scholar looks at, and also, which methods they use to approach this field. I will underline what they conclude on the power of digital activism in the European Union. In the second half of the literature review, I will reflect on theoretical pieces of literature that I can use for my analysis. I will create a link between theories reflecting social movement organizations and theories that are meant to understand digital action. In the third part of this thesis, I will explain why I think it matters to deal with Stop-TTIP in the light of digital activism and provide some background information on EU institutions that is important, when dealing with the EU’s responsiveness. Fourth, I will present my methodology. Here, I will present the sources that I am using as well as the question how I am going to answer each of my research questions. Fifth, I will present the results of my study. It will be composed of three parts, one per research question: First, I will identify Stop-TTIP’s action repertoire and classify the role of the internet. Second, I will look at how the EU responded to each of these practices, having in mind whether each of them was internet-based or not. Third, I will explore what kinds of framing tactics Stop-TTIP used in key moments in order to mobilize its
followers. The “results” section also entails two figures. The first one is a timeline composed of all the practices and important EU statements divided into 7 phases. The second is a composed of six illustrations, each of which is purposed to show which of Stop-TTIP’s actions was responded in which way. Whereas the timeline is meant to show the relationship between Stop-TTIP and the EU in a purely
chronological order, the six illustrations are meant to show the causal relationship that I could find out between action and response. The sixth part of this thesis is the conclusion. Here, I will summarize my most important findings, discuss them in the light of arguments of other scholars that I worked out in the literature review and then, point at where I think further studies could be meaningful.
2 Literature Review
My literature review is composed of two parts. In the first part, I will work out how other scholars have dealt with digital activism, in order to develop a general
description of the field. More precisely, I will distinguish which protesting
organizations they explored, what (or which aspect of digital activism) they analyzed, which governments, institutions or organizations were targeted by the protest, how, speaking of methodology, they approached their case studies, and, most importantly, which arguments they developed, regarding the power of social movements and the role of the internet. I focus on the work of Breindl, Kavada and Milan, whose
approaches to case studies come closest to mine, and I have developed my own thesis in consultation with their work, and in dealing with their arguments. Closing this first part, I will also present the work of a few further scholars, who distinctively
contributed to the field. However, I will not mention their approaches, but only the arguments that they present.
In the second part of my literature review, I will present the theories that I will use to analyze my findings. Building up on the work of other scholars, I assume that social movement theory is the backbone of digital activism. I will use it as a general starting point. Then, I will link it to a concept by Keck and Sikkink (1999) called “Transnational Advocacy Networks”, because it emphasizes the internationalization of social movements. This theory, again, I will link to further theories that emphasize the digitalization of protest.
2.1 Case Study Comparison: Breindl, Kavada and
Milan
The first distinction I would like to draw, is that the case studies of Breindl, Kavada and Milan differ from each other through the object of study that they deal with. Breindl is predominantly interested in a French non-governmental-organization (NGO) called “La Quadrature du Net” (QdN) (2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b; Breindl and Briatte, 2010), which is engaged in promoting civil rights in the digital sphere (La Quadrature Du Net). In one exception, she deals with “a loose coalition of activists, rooted in the Free, Libre and Open Source Software movement (FLOSS)” (2010; 58). However, QdN is a part of that movement, too, which means that basically, her object of study does not change. Kavada deals with the European Social Forum (ESF) (2005; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2015). The ESF is a rather loosely organized network of
different groups that used to organize meetings every two years in order to bring these groups together and discuss new ideas, and can be regarded as a part of the alter-globalization-movement (European Social Forum). Milan (2016) deals in her book with “radical techies”, which she defines as “groups and networks of individuals who provide alternative communication channels on the internet to activists and citizens, on a voluntary basis and through collective organizing principles” (12). The groups of activists that Breindl and Milan chose, have one thing in common: They do not only use digital activism to promote a cause, but the goal of these organizations itself is concerned with the liberation of communication as well. In other words, digital activism, is not only the means but also the goal for those organizations.
Nevertheless, these organizations are quite different from each other, which indicates that digital activism can be observed and applied to a variety of very different cases. Contrary to my initial notion, scholars in digital activism do not usually change the object of study that they deal with. What they change – from one case study to another– is foremost the aspect of digital activism that is under analysis, which I would like to deal with in the next paragraph. Retrospectively, I find this approach more reasonable, because it allows the scholar to understand one specific
organization in more detail and build up on his or her former studies, rather than acquainting lots of little pieces of knowledge about lots of different organizations.
What makes a case study unique and distinctive, particularly from an academic point of view, is the question which aspect or sub-category of digital
activism is under analysis. In her book, Milan distinguishes four different fields that she explores and in fact, her distinction is reflected by the work of other scholars as well: these are “identity-building and movement formation; organizational forms; action repertoires and interactions with authorities, norms, and policy arenas; and networking strategies” (12). As the European Social Forum is a “forum”, which meets every two years and is purposed to bring different social movement groups together, Kavada deals with organizational forms, movement formation or networking
strategies. For example, she assesses “[t]he increasing popularity of internet tools that allow the collaborative creation of content” (2009a; 130), questions “the role of the internet in participatory decision-making” within an organization (2010; 358), or “explore[s] the role of the internet in the processes of organization and mobilization” (2005; 72). By contrast, Breindl is predominantly interested in dealing with
repertoires of collective action. What mainly changes from one of her case studies to the other, is the theories and EU legislations that she deals with, but her research questions remain always similar: “How do digital activists use the internet in order to influence European policy-making?” (2010b; 58), or, alternatively: “How, why and with what result do activists use the internet to influence European policy-making on digital rights issues” (2012; 323). I would argue that Breindl’s approach is much more political. She questions how policy-making is influenced by social movements and particularly, by their use of the internet. By contrast, the other three sub-fields rather have psychological (identity building and movement formation), sociological
(organizational structures) or communicative (networking strategies) emphasis and approaches, which suggests that digital activism is an interdisciplinary academic field that also enriches academic fields that existed long before.
Not every case study deals with a target organization or target institution – only, if it is subject to an analysis that falls under collective action repertoires. For example, if Kavada deals with organizations aspects of digital activism, her case study is likely to not mention a target authority, because that is not subject to her study. Conversely, Breindl’s work, which deals with repertoires of collective action, always do so in relation to a target authority. In fact, this is the European Union in every case (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013a; Breindl and Briatte, 2010). She deals alternatively with the EU Legislative against software patent (2010b), and the EU Telecom Package Reform (2011; 2012; 2013; Breindl and Briatte, 2010). One paper is different: For
the national level in France, which is being protested by grassroots movements (2013b). Milan deals with cases in which protest took place that targeted the EU (105), the Group of 8 (G8) (122), the WTO (122), or the World Summit on the Information Society (116). However, she underlines that digital techies are more likely to just building up their own infrastructures instead of protesting the system – and becoming part of it (136). What becomes obvious is that the focus of protesters has indeed, shifted away from the national level of decision-making to international organizations and summits. This confirms the argument that digital activists regard international organizations and institutions, particularly the European Union, as a more suitable addressee for their concerns. This again, reflects the nature of the internet, because the internet has the ability to transcend geographical and temporal barriers (Bennet 3).
In fact, Breindl, Kavada and Milan have quite identical approaches – their methodologies are very similar. Milan’s book is based on “a qualitative study
combining participant observation of activist meetings and events with in-depth face-to-face and online asynchronous interviews, both individual and collective. [She] interviewed about 40 (…) activists from 16 countries, and [she] performed participant observation in about ten activist meetings” (13). Breindl used interviews in each of her studies (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; Breindl and Briatte, 2010). In addition, her work is based on mailing lists to work out the separation of tasks, documents published as online material, and web analysis (2012; 2013; Breindl and Briatte, 2010). Kavada is no exception here. Her work is based on web analysis, interviews and email lists. In short, this field is based on different kinds of sources, some of which are more important than others. Web analysis is probably the most important method,
particularly to study mobilization, because they are a means to spread the own view or narrative on an issue. Besides, for collective action repertoires, interviews may be a supplementary source, which, however, may lead to rather subjective results. Apart from that, email lists can be very helpful, if the inner communication of an
organization or its interaction with other networks is under investigation.
Eventually, I would like to reflect on the conclusions that scholars actually draw on the power of activism and the role of the internet. Breindl has a quite
positive stance on digital activism. She believes that “the internet plays a crucial role” to “dominate the information environment […], appropriate the debate and frame it in a certain way, mobilize a larger community when needed and exert pressure on
decision-makers by providing a follow-up on their activities and declarations” (2010; 68). Furthermore, her work “suggests that digital rights activists are able to fully exploit the communicative functionalities of the internet by providing information, encouraging interaction and dialogue, mobilizing, networking, and offering spaces for creative expression” (2011; 361). In contrast to mass-media, as she points out,
“resource-poor actors can impact debates within political institutions, thus
challenging the entire policy process” (2011; 362). While praising the opportunities of new media, Breindl slightly attests a democratic deficit to the EU: Although “the bundance of information [through the internet] has led to increased openness and transparency, particularly at the European level” (2012; 329), “the role of civil society within the EU is reduced to one of functional participation” (2013; 1435).
Nevertheless, as she argues, “the EU and especially the European Parliament have proved to be quite open to citizen input, much in contrast to the French policy system” (2013; 47).
Kavada is much more reluctant to praise the internet. Concerning mobilization, she contests the “potential of the internet to mobilize politically
indifferent or marginalized individuals”, as she rather thinks that “users tended to be mobilized […] through political or voluntary organizations” (2005; 72). Pessimism also frames her conclusion on the role of new media in participatory decision-making within the ESF. Her analysis “showed that […] the main decisions were taken in face-to-face meetings, which allowed for more civil and complex negotiations” (2010; 369). On the other hand, when dealing with collective identity building, she estimates the role of the internet to be much more distinctive: “involvement in a variety of email lists may be facilitating the development of ‘multiple tolerant identities’ […], as well as the emergence of a cadre of activists defined as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’” (2009; 836).
I would like to round up the existing Literature Review on digital activism with a few further arguments, referring to scholars that also made far-reaching
contributions to the field. It becomes obvious that the international character of protest, which Breindl, Milan and Kavada underline, was not always taken for granted, but evolved over time. In 2004, Bedoyan, Van Aelst and Walgrave had a slightly different notion. They pointed towards “practical, psychological and political barriers” that hinder international protests (40). Back then, they were of the opinion that “while the barriers of participation in national protests seem to be decreasing,
[…] the barriers of international participation are still very much present” (49). The fact that they thought so less than fifteen years ago, illustrates how fast-paced this academic field is. Walgrave et al. (2011) saw that there is a “network bridging
between social movements” (326). Thereby, the internet plays an important role for such “networks”, because “multiple activists can stay in touch with the different movement organizations that they are members of and the looser activist networks with which they identify” (344). Most supportive of repertoires of collective action are Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010), who believe that “the internet has changed the action repertoire of social movements in two fundamental ways. First, by facilitating the existing action forms making it possible to reach more people, more easily, in a time-span that was unthinkable before. Second, by creating new (or adapted) tools for activism” (1163).
To sum up, digital activism is a broad and interdisciplinary field that deals with protesting groups of civil society and how the internet (re)shapes their organization, coordination, communication, inner-structure, networking, and the way they approach political authorities. A case study is mostly based on the analysis of digital media, but as supplementary sources, it can employ interviews, newspaper articles, or observation of their meetings. Among the scholars, there is apparently no clear agreement as to what the internet is doing with the protesters and in how far it is helping them. Some ascribe more importance to the internet than others, whereas this is also dependent to the aspect of digital activism that is under analysis. Over all, they do agree with each other than the internet changes and facilitates the position of social movements, but I would be skeptical to say that they evaluate this change as a revolution. Taking the development of the field into account that took place since the 2000s, scholars also seem to agree with each other that protest is increasingly
targeting international organizations/governments/institutions, and hereto, the internet certainly, plays a facilitating role.
2.2 Theoretical Background
In large part, digital activism can be regarded as an academic subfield of ‘social movement theory’. A social movement can be defined as “an instance of collective action characterized by conflict towards clearly identified targets. Social actors are
bound by solidarity ties and share a variably strong collective identity” (Milan 14). Therefore, social movement theory can be used as a starting point to understand an organization like Stop-TTIP. A brief historical overlook is helpful to have in mind as a general orientation. Lievrouw (2011) works out how this academic field evolved throughout the 20th century. The predominant theory used from the 1920s onwards,
was the Chicago School’s ‘collective behavior theory’, which pictured “movements as spontaneous, disorganized outbreaks of irrational ‘mob psychology’” (Lievrouw 46). During the 1960s, ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’ became prevailing, which
“highlighted the deliberate and strategic decisions of movement participations” (ibid.). Lievrouw points out that apparently, neither of both (American) perspectives satisfied a new generation of scholars in Europe, who starting in the 1960s, developed a number of key characteristics. We refer to the sum of their findings as New Social Movement Theory (ibid.). According to this, social movements are increasingly organized around shared identities, professions, interests, values, and experiences of individual actors (47); members are “the new middle class and […] well-educated young people” (49); concerns are more cultural than economic (51); they are organized anti-hierarchical (51); they are heterogeneous, decentralized, had a symbolic repertoire, and used new information and communication technologies (57). Lievrow sums up this evolution in one sentence as follows: “The ‘new’ social movements perspective contends that the ideologically driven, society-wide
movements of the industrial age – the labor movement, antiwar/peace movements, and civil rights, for example – gave way in the postindustrial, postmodern era of the 1960s to the 1980s to smaller-scale movements more focused on wide-ranging issues or concerns (e.g., green/environmentalism, animal rights, nuclear,
anti-globalization, consumer rights), or group identity or lifestyle (e.g., the women’s movement, gay rights, national/ethnic/language/cultural/religious identity movements)” (41).
Certainly, those characteristics are helpful as an orientation to deal with Stop-TTIP. However, what they do not fully capture, is the international character that organizations like Stop-TTIP have. A concept that covers this attribute is Keck and Sikkink’s “Transnational Advocacy Networks” (1999). The authors state that their concept draws equally on the traditions of social movement theory, and of
international relations. According to Keck and Sikkink, “World politics at the end of the twentieth century involves, alongside states, many non-state actors who interact
with each other, with states, and with international organizations” (Keck and Sikkink 89). The term can be explained as follows: Transnational advocacy networks are “networks”, because these (can) consist of several and different actors, including international and domestic NGOs, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations, parts of the executive and/or
parliamentary branches of governments (91). They are “transnational”, because they catch up with the transformational processes of world politics (89). They carry the attribute “advocacy”, because “they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to their ‘interests’” (91). According to Keck & Sikkink, their theory is meant to counter the fact that the emphasis of other scholars – who were purely concerned with social movement theory – was limited to explore “the interaction between social-structural conditions and action, on the social context of mobilization, and on the transformation of meanings among activists and among mass publics” (91).
Transnational Advocacy Networks, Keck & Sikkink acknowledge, “are not powerful in the traditional sense” - meaning: they have no official decision-making legitimacy like states or institutions -, and must therefore, use their “ideas and strategies” to influence politics (95). Distinctive for this kind of working, they
“normally involve a small number of activists in a given campaign or advocacy role” and only “rarely involve mass mobilization, except at key moments” (95). Based on these characteristics, Keck & Sikkink develop a typology of four tactics that
Transnational Advocacy Networks use: Information politics, or the ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact; Symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away;
Leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation
where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; Accountability
politics, or the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or
principles they formally endorsed (95).
I will split these four tactics into two groups, because they work into different directions. One approaches politicians (Leverage and Accountability politics) and therefore, I can use that to investigate the practices that Stop-TTIP employs (research
question 1); the other group of tactics (Information and Symbolic politics) mostly reflects how supporters are approached and therefore, I can use them in order to investigate framing tactics (research question 3). Now, I would like to further reflect on each of these two groups and then, link them to further theories that create a connection to the use of the internet.
2.2.1 Leverage and Accountability Politics
Keck and Sikkink acknowledge that “in order to bring about policy change, networks need to both persuade and pressurize more powerful actors” (97) (Leverage politics). At the same time, they have to “devote considerable energy to convincing
governments and other actors to change their positions on issues” (97) – which
mostly refers to reminding governments of values they have committed themselves to (in the case of the EU these would be for example democracy, human rights,
transparency) (Accountability politics). In this regards, we could also say that
transnational advocacy networks have a watchdog-role. Through their expertise, they watch the decisions of politicians and attempts to influence these through its own actions. In consultation with the presented case studies, these two tactics can be described as the “repertoires of collective action” that transnational advocacy networks have. In fact, Breindl, who has an emphasis on dealing with repertoires of collective action, also uses this concept as an orientation and argues that “Digital activists show striking similarities with transnational advocacy networks” (2010).
2.2.2 Information and Symbolic Politics
The two remaining tactics work collectively work into another direction – towards the supporters of the network and their mobilization. Keck and Sikkink argue that “Non-state actors gain influence by serving as alternative sources of information [they] frame issues […] because their purpose is to persuade people and stimulate them to take action” (Information politics) (96). Complementary, “Activists frame issues by identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks” (Symbolic politics) (96). This aligns very much with my purpose to analyze what I referred to as ‘framing’ tactics in the beginning. One could explain the role of these two tactics as to create an alternative narrative or interpretation of a political issue, in order to guide and
mobilize supporters and to make them think of an issue in a particular way – in other words, it deals with how to “sell” a topic to the public.
Now, I will link these two groups to further theories. Leverage and Accountability politics go under “Repertoires of Collective Action”, whereas
Information and Symbolic Politics go under “Framing and Mobilization Theories”.
2.2.3 Repertoires of Collective Action
As originally pointed out by Tilly (1978), “Repertoires of collective action” (or
“collective action repertoires”) can be defined as the “set of means that are effectively available to a given set of people and which they use to act collectively in order to make claims on individuals and groups” (Mare 48), or – more recently – as “sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations” (Taylor and Van Dyke 268). Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) deal with “action repertoires of social movements in an internet age” (1146). They point out – and this can perfectly be linked to transnational advocacy networks – that the internet “is not only said to greatly facilitate mobilization and participation in traditional forms of protest”, but also gives “these protests a more transnational character by effectively and rapidly diffusing communication and mobilization efforts” (1146). One could ask at this point whether the internet caused transnationalization or just promoted and matched with the simultaneously increasing transnational character of politics after the Cold War. For the purpose of this paper, that question will not be answered – it will only be assumed that these two developments, the internet and the increasingly transnational outlook of politics emerged (or rather intensified) more or less simultaneously in the 1990s.
Comparable to Rogers’ (2009) distinction between ‘digital’ and ‘digitized’ research methods (19), Van Laer and Van Aelst distinguish “between ‘real’ actions that are supported and facilitated by the internet, and ‘virtual’ actions that are
internet-based” (1148). As this is one of their two main points, it is helpful to employ a verbose quote: “on the one hand, internet facilitates and supports (traditional) offline collective action in terms of organization, mobilization and
transnationalization and, on the other hand, creates new modes of collective action. The internet has indeed not only supported traditional offline social movement actions such as the classical street demonstrations and made them more
transnational, but is also used to set up new forms of online protest activities and to create online modes of existing offline protest actions” (1147). In short, the internet
supports traditional actions and enables new ones. Second, Van Laer and Van Aelst distinguish, as originally developed by Marsh (1977), “social movement tactics with low thresholds (signing petitions, legal demonstrations) to high thresholds (illegal demonstrations, violent action)”, pointing out that “people engaging in […] political activity with higher intensity […] were most likely to have already participated in low-intensity forms of actions” (1150). This second distinction is important to them, because they question, whether the internet has generally lowered the threshold for people to participate in taking actions. Taken together, these two distinctions lead Van Laer and Van Aelst to classify four categories of (digital) collective action repertoires, for which they also provide examples:
I. internet-supported action with low thresholds a. Donation of money; Consumer behavior. b. Legal protest demonstrations.
II. internet-supported action with high threshold
a. Transnational demonstrations; Transnational meetings; Sit-in/occupations and more radical forms of protest.
III. internet-based action with low threshold
a. Online petition; Email bomb and virtual sit-in. IV. internet-based action with high threshold
a. Protest websites; Alternative media sites; Culture jamming. (1152 – 1162)
I would like to add a theory that can be linked to action repertoires, but will help me to link it to understanding the responsiveness of the EU (in research question 2). Milan (2016) distinguishes whether digital activists cooperate with decision-makers (Insider actions) or boycott them and remain “dancing around the institutions” (outsider tactics) (122). She elaborates that “Insiders try to exert
influence within the confines of the institutionalized political system. They pursue a strategy of active engagement in policy-making and policy reform by directly
interacting with institutions. In so doing they accept the rules of the game. They lobby institutions, or participate in consultations or multi-stakeholder processes, while at the same time deploying awareness-raising initiatives directed at the broad public” (112). By contrast, “Outsiders […] do not engage in institutional processes. They prefer to apply pressure from the outside by organizing counter-summits, rallies, and direct action. Typically, they have no access to institutions, or reject the
rules of the game, refusing to get involved. They privilege a repertoire of disruptive practices, rooted in forms of activism that are sometimes embedded within new technologies, and sometimes involve more traditional forms of street protest” (112). Milan adds that “the political, social, and cultural contexts in which activists operate influence their tactical choices”, as typically, “they deal with a complex political environment populated by institutions and social norms, in which opportunities for change might occasionally emerge” (109). I will employ this distinction to question whether there are channels by which Stop-TTIP can become a part of the making of TTIP. Is that even possible for an organization that does not want to amend but to prevent TTIP? How would EU institutions deal with it? How would they respond?
2.2.4 Framing and Mobilization Tactics
The other two tactics that transnational advocacy networks employ, Information and Symbolic politics, can also be related to the internet. Arguably, the idea behind those two tactics traces back to “framing” theory that evolved in the late 1980s and 1990s and which gains new momentum through the internet. Drawing from Goffman, Snow et al. (1986) describe framing as “’schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. […] frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (464). Accordingly, this is a means that social movements make use of in order to spread their own narrative and way of looking at a
development. Snow and Benford (1988) elaborate on this in a work published two years later: Here, they argue that framing tactics “function as carriers and
transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and ideas […] but they are also engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers (198).” More precisely, as they elaborate, framing means to “assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (198). In accordance with Klanderman (1984), they believe that “the success of any participant mobilization campaign is contingent upon its ability to affect both consensus and action mobilization. […] movements must drum up support for their views and aims and activate individuals who already agree with those views and aims” (199).
There are, in sum, “three core framing tasks: (1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action. The diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks are directed toward achieving consensus mobilization. The latter task, which concerns action mobilization, provides the motivational impetus for participation” (Snow and Benford 199). Thereby, ‘diagnostic framing” “involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (200).
‘Prognostic framing’ has the purpose to “not only suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets. What is to be done is thereby specified” (201). The third is a ‘call to arms’, or can be called ‘Motivational framing’ (200). The question how ‘frames’ can have motivational effects was elaborated on by Gamson & Meyer (1996), who refer to framing as “rhetoric of change” (285) and distinguish three kinds of motivational framing arguments.
- Urgency: “If we do not act now, the situation will not remain the same but will become more difficult”
- Agency: “While there is no guarantee of success, the present offers
opportunity enough to keep hope alive. Action now will keep the window wider […] for future victories”
- Possibility: appeals “to a vision of better policies, greater injustice, and more human social life […] which their actions can bring about” (285)
To sum up, the second part of my literature review was concerned with the
theoretical background of my study. I used new social movement theory as a starting point and summarized general characteristics that most organizations share in the postmodern age. In order to use a concept that reflects the international character of Stop-TTIP, I referred to transnational advocacy networks, which draws on social movement theory and international relations after the Cold War. I used the four tactics that these networks employ as a starting point to make use of further theories that stress the role of the internet. I distinguish based” and
“internet-supported” actions, “insider” and “outsider” organizations, and three framing tactics, namely diagnosis, solution, and mobilization framing. As far as the latter is
concerned, motivational framing, one can three kinds of arguments: urgency, agency, and possibility.
3 Stop-TTIP in the Light of Digital
Activism
In this part, I would like to explain why I have chosen TTIP and Stop-TTIP as a case study. I will bring forward four arguments. Then, I will provide some background information on EU institutions that I consider important to recall, because they relate to dealing with the EU’s responsiveness to civil society impulses.
My object of study is Stop-TTIP. As the name suggests, this “alliance”, as it calls itself, was founded against the implementation of TTIP (and later CETA). Academically speaking, “alliance” could be translated with “network”, because, in fact, Stop-TTIP classifies very much as a Transnational Advocacy Network. It is a network, because it is composed of more than 500 organizations. It is obviously transnational, because its cause is European and because it targets the European Union. Moreover, its member-organizations come from different countries (“about Stop TTIP”). It is also “advocacy”, because its goal does not necessarily reflect the economic self-interests of its members but specific values. It believes that TTIP must be stopped, because TTIP and CETA “pose a threat to democracy, the rule of law, the environment, health, public services as well as consumer and labour rights” (ibid.). In more practical terms, Stop-TTIP claims that “rather than citizens, it’s much more likely that only big corporations will benefit [from these two trade agreements]” (ibid.). On its website, Stop-TTIP lists nine particular arguments against them, which clarify that it is opposed to the economic inequality they could lead to, the dominance of businesses over the state, the undermining of worker protection, and the fact that negotiations were (initially) not transparent1.
TTIP and Stop-TTIP caused huge controversies in Europe and gained higher public attention than any other policy of the EU in recent years. In particular, I would like to name four reasons for why I think this case is interesting and worth dealing
1 These nine arguments are: Investors will be able to sue states; Corporations will be invited
to co-write new laws; Big business has excessive influence on the secret negotiations for CETA and TTIP; The negotiations are conducted in secret; Food quality standards and consumer protection could be weakened; Workers’ rights and jobs are endangered;
European countries would be falling under pressure to allow high-risk technologies such as fracking or GM technology; CETA and TTIP will further increase inequalities; Liberalization and privatization will become one-way streets (“short introduction”)
with. First, it reflects out “Zeitgeist”. We are currently witnessing a rapidly increasing mistrust in the idea of Europe that shows off in a revival of nationalist and populist movements. This closes a circle. Piper (1995) explains that, just in order to prevent a return of “nationalism” and “isolationism”, politicians and diplomats since the early 1990s, had pushed forward the idea of a “Transatlantic Free Trade Area” by which the Western World – the EU, U.S. and Canada – could further integrate with each other. Second, this case reflects a perception of many people according to which there is an increasingly opening gap between politicians and voters. Third, the protests in the context of TTIP were particularly remarkable. Their climax was a demonstration that took place in Berlin with about 250 000 participants. Protests of such a size are incredibly rare, and this may be interpreted in the way that the protests against TTIP became a symbol and representor of the general public mistrust against politicians.
The fourth reason is meant to explain not why I am generally dealing with Stop-TTIP, but particularly laying my emphasis on collective action repertoires. To recall, these can be defined as “sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in
institutionalized power relations” (Taylor and Van Dyke 268). By dealing with Stop-TTIP and its action repertoire, I can challenge two general claims. The first one, as I worked out in the literature review, is the claim that through the internet, and its potential to “transcended geographical and temporal barriers” (Bennet 3), protest has become ‘internationalized’. This means, looking at protest in any national case, would not equally allow me to extract the role of the internet. Second, this case allows me to challenge the (often quoted) claim that the EU has a “democratic deficit” (Lord, 2008). Because of this, the EU constantly reformed and renewed the channels for citizen participation and civil society to influence its policy-making procedure. Is the EU keeping this promise in such an important case as the implementation of TTIP? TTIP is not a random policy of the EU, but as just mentioned, a quite ideological concept planned (at least) since the 1990s. How would the EU react to a call from civil society to take part in this?
I would like to recall these democratic reforms that the EU underwent, because they work as an orientation. I start with the European Commission that plays the most central role, as it holds the monopole to initiate a legislation in the EU and it also held the TTIP negotiations with the U.S. Accordingly, it is one of the main targets of protest. It is directly responsible for the contents of TTIP. In 2001, the European
Commission published a White Paper, where it expressed the intention to have “a stronger interaction with regional and local governments and civil society” (European Commission, 2001). With the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, it implemented the European Citizens’ Initiative. This means, citizens can make “an invitation to the European Commission to propose legislation on matters where the EU has competence to legislate”, with the condition that it “has to be backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of 28 member states. A minimum number of signatories is required in each of those 7 member states” (“Basic facts”).
The European Parliament played a rather supplementary role during the negotiations, but in the end, its role is equally decisive. During the negotiations, it could only adopt resolutions as to express its opinion. They are not binding in any way, but in the end, the EP has the competence to approve, reject or amend TTIP, which makes its resolutions equally important. In 1979, the European Parliament was directly elected by the people for the first time and is reelected every five years. Ever since, the competences of the EP were increasingly enlarged. As it is the only EU institution that is directly elected by the people, it is an ‘appropriate’ target for protest. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can be hold accountable for their decisions by being not reelected. A purely symbolic role is played by the European Ombudsman, or, Ombudswoman as it is currently the case. Citizens, businesses or organizations can contact the Ombudsman if they want to make complaints “about maladministration in EU institutions” (“what we do”). Also, the Council of the European Union plays a passive role, but it initiated the process. Representing the member states, it actually initiated the negotiations and mandated the Commission. After the process started, it did not play a central role anymore but theoretically, it could take the mandate back if it wanted to.
4 Methodology
In this part, I will present my method, which is composed of two sections. First, I will present the three kinds of sources that I am using in detail, which are the website of Stop-TTIP, official EU documents, and, with a complementary purpose, newspaper articles. In the second section, I will explain how I am going to answer each of my three research questions.
4.1 Sources
I have two main sources and one supplementary source. My first “main” source is the Stop-TTIP website (https://stop-ttip.org/). It can be accessed in seven different languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Dutch and
Portuguese). I worked exclusively with the English version. The front page also points to the Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr accounts of Stop-TTIP. The website is divided into six sections. The first one is called “CETA CHECK!” and explains how to contact an MEP. This part – as I found out through the “Wayback Machine” – used to be called “TTIP CHECK!”, when TTIP was more contemporary. The Wayback
Machine is a tool that is being used to retrieve what a website looked like earlier. (Apart from that information, I do not employ it.) The sections “Why” and “Campaign” provide background information about Stop-TTIP, its networking
structure and on the way it generally thinks about TTIP and CETA. In the “campaign” section, there is a sub-section called “about Stop TTIP” that contains a short “TTIP timeline”, which mentions several steps in the evolution of the trade agreement – basically, these are either important reports published by EU institutions, or actions conducted by Stop-TTIP. Additional information is in a second timeline that can be found under “why”, in the subsection called “short introduction”. These two timelines summarize a few events of the three-year-process. Particularly interesting for my analysis, are the two subsequent sections: “BLOG” (https://stop-ttip.org/blog/) and “PRESS”( https://stop-ttip.org/press/). The “BLOG” sections consists of 87 blog entries. They have been published between 15th July 2014 and 14th February 2017.
They read like articles and reveal the opinion that Stop-TTIP has on the trade
negotiations. The blog entries are published irregularly. Often, several in one months, whereas it also occurs that there is no entry for a period of a few months. The “Press” section contains 24 press releases. They have been published between 15th July 2014
and 15 February 2017. One may assume that blog entries are directly addressed to supporters and followers, whereas press releases are addressed to the press as well as to political actors. In fact, the information of press releases is in almost all cases also published as blog entries. Therefore, I will work predominantly with the blog.
Eventually, there is the “CONTACT” section that contains the email and postal addresses, a phone number and bank account details for donations.
As a second “main” source, I used the official websites of the European institutions to get access to official EU documents concerning TTIP. The official
website of the EP (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en) has a search-engine-section for plenary resolutions (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/texts-adopted.html#sidesForm). Here, I searched for “TTIP” which leads to 21 findings in the parliamentary term 2014 – 2019, and 8 further findings for the parliamentary term 2009-2014. I decided to work with resolutions rather than with other kinds of documents that are published in the name of the European Parliament, because I believe that plenary resolutions reflect very well what the sum of MEPs deal with and have agreed upon. It reflects whether they feel the urge to deal with the topic or not, and thus, it reflects the visibility and pressure expressed through the activism. On the website of the European Council (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/) there is a search-engine-section for “documents and publications”. Here, I searched for “TTIP” and received 28 findings. Eventually, I used publications of the European Commission that could be retrieved from its website
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en). These are the most important sources on the EU side, because it was the European Commission that hold the negotiations. Here, I employed two kinds of sources. First, I worked with press releases. The data base for press releases (http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm) provides 303 results for the enquiry “TTIP”. Press releases are helpful because they express particularly what the Commission thinks in a certain time about the issue. Second, the negotiations were composed of 15 rounds, and each one ended with the publication of a final report and supplementary documents. They can be retrieved from the sections of the website that are subject to the Commissioner for Trade
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#_documents).
As a “supplementary” source, I used newspaper articles – mainly by
“Euractive” (http://www.euractiv.com/) (the English version), which is an online newspaper specialized on EU issues. As it is hardly possible to go every single
document I mentioned above, newspaper articles helped to know what I was looking for in the wide range of documents. I call it a ‘supplementary source’, because my main work is based upon the other two sources, whereas I am using euractive.com as an orientation or to add certain information. In addition, I used a timeline of TTIP that the German newspaper SPIEGEL ONLINE had produced. This also helped me as an orientation to find the right documents in the web archives of the EU. In the end, I
refer to even a few further EU documents that I would not have found through the enquiries named above, but through articles that address certain happenings.
4.2 Procedure
4.2.1 On the action repertoire of Stop-TTIP
In order to answer the first research question regarding the repertoire of collective action that Stop-TTIP employs, I will make use of its website. Among the different information it provides there, I will predominantly make use of its blogs and its timelines, because they report the different actions that Stop-TTIP conducted.
4.2.2 On the responsiveness of the EU
In order to answer my second research question, I will use the documents published by the different EU institutions. In particular, I consider six statements of the
European Parliament important. In fact, two of these were published very early and the others quite late during the process. In the middle, the EP did not play a major role, but I believe that comparing its statements at the beginning and towards the end make a shift obvious. Second, the European Commission and the U.S. side held
fifteen rounds of negotiations each of which ended with a joint statement on the state of the negotiations and the contents of that negotiation round. Negotiations took place alternatively in the EU or the U.S. and endured for five days. The days I will refer to are always the days at which the negotiation round ended and a joint statement was published. Among these, I will only explicitly mention those
statements that entailed new information that I believe can be linked to Stop-TTIP. Third, I am using a number of further statements or documents that the European Commission published, which show a changing stance on TTIP and the role of civil society. These can significantly contribute, because these are not joint statements with the U.S., in which the U.S. stance is being involved in any way.
I have put all these different documents into a timeline and added up the actions that Stop-TTIP conducted. In order to understand whether a certain action by Stop-TTIP led to a certain response, I will keep two questions in mind. First, how much time passed between the actions of Stop-TTIP and the EU, and second, is there a causal relationship between Stop-TTIP’s actions and the changing stance in EU
statements? These two questions are also reflected in the two figures that I have placed right after the findings for research question two. The first figure is a timeline composed of all the practices and important EU statements divided into 7 phases. The second is a composed of six illustrations, each of which is purposed to show which of Stop-TTIP’s actions was responded in which way. Whereas the timeline is meant to show the relationship between Stop-TTIP and the EU in a purely
chronological order, the six illustrations are meant to show the causal relationship that I could find out between action and response.
4.2.3 On the framing tactics of Stop-TTIP
In order to answer my third research question, I will focus completely on the blog entries of Stop-TTIP, because these are meant to express the opinion and stance that Stop-TTIP shares on events that happen during the process. I will look at the blogs that Stop-TTIP published in what I call “key moments”, meaning either ahead or right after an important happening as these are moments in which the public potentially focuses on TTIP. This will allow me to observe what kind of narrative Stop-TTIP produces out of the situation and how it “sells” it to the people who read the blog post.
5 Results
In this part, I will present my results, which I divided into three parts, one per research question. First, I will list the practices by which Stop-TTIP attempted to influence the negotiations and in doing so, I will classify the role of the internet for each action. Second, I will work out how the responsive the EU was to these actions and how the general stance on TTIP changed in the EU over time. I will close the second part with a timeline that is composed of all the EU documents and Stop-TTIP’s practices and a number of illustrations that are meant to show the relationships between particular actions by Stop-TTIP and the EU’s responses. However, not each action has a match in response. Third, I will analyze the framing tactics that Stop-TTIP used in important situations.
5.1 Stop-TTIP’s action repertoire
In the blog entries that Stop-TTIP has published over time and from the information on its website, I could identify a number of different practices, by which it has
attempted to influence the making of TTIP. Together, they constitute Stop-TTIP’s collective action repertoire. In the following, I will list these actions and for each action, I will classify the role of the internet. Hereto, as to recall, I will employ Van Laer and Van Aelst’s “typology of a new digitalized action repertoire” (1148). They distinguish, first, actions that are “’internet-based’ because they exist only because of the internet”, and “Internet-supported actions”, which “refer to the traditional tools of social movements that have become easier to organize and coordinate thanks to the internet” (1148). Second, I distinguish “between tactics with low and high threshold”, in order to “show how the internet may have lowered action-related barriers” (ibid.). I will add another category of actions: Some practices are not related in any other way to the internet than by the fact that Stop-TTIP communicates them on its website, thus, using them to spreading its own narrative.
5.1.1 Stop-TTIP has a website
The most obvious tactic that Stop-TTIP uses, is to have a website (www.stop-TTIP.org). This is the focal point to take notice of it as an organization.
Predominantly, the website fulfills a number of important tasks for Stop-TTIP: to present and explain itself, to get in touch with people, to provide background
information, to show the amount of signatures gathered so far and (I will come back to this point in research question 3) to blog and thus, spread out its narrative (more on the latter point in part three). Accordingly, Van Laer and Van Aelst are right in their observation that the main purpose of a website is to “promote social causes and chiefly mobilizes support” (1157). They categorize websites as “internet-based actions with high threshold” (1157). It is “internet-based”, because without the internet, websites do not work at all. It is an action of “high threshold”, they argue, because it is more time and money consuming than many other practices (such as writing emails etc.). Whereas a website has certainly a “higher” threshold than some other practices, it should be recalled in this point that Van Laer and Van Aelst developed this categorization in 2010. Arguably, the threshold to build up a website is lower now than it was back then. In one or the other way, all other practices of Stop-TTIP are related to its website.
5.1.2 Online petition
Stop-TTIP wanted to register a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), and invite the Commission “to recommend to the Council to repeal the negotiating mandate for […] TTIP” (“European Citizens’ Initiative Demands”). The Commission rejected this (European Commission, 2014a; European Commission, 2014b). Then, Stop-TTIP decided to found what it called a “self-organized European Citizen’s Initiative”, or (s)ECI, and apply the same procedure as official ECIs have (see page 23) (“We continue our fight”). It was very successful with this initiative. It gathered 100 000 signatures in the first few hours and about 200 000 in the first 30 hours (“About Stop TTIP”). It was the fastest “ECI” ever to gather one million signatures, as it only
needed two months (“Self-organised European Citizens’ Initiative against US and Canada trade deals tops a million signatures in record time”). Stop-TTIP officially closed its (s)ECI after one year, like normal ECIs do (03.10.2014 – 07.10.2015) (“About Stop-TTIP”). At that moment, it had gathered over three million signatures reached the minimum amount of signatures in almost each country (to recall: it is only needed to crack the country quorum in seven countries) (“ECI is closed – signature gathering continues”). Then, it continued to gathering signatures, but decided to call it an “European Initiative” (“ECI is closed – signature gathering continues”). The gathering of signatures worked (predominantly) online: People could either sign the signature through an online tool that was linked
to www.policat.org (which is for people to create online petitions) or, download the signature sheet and send it via post to the office of Stop-TTIP
(https://stop-ttip.org/sign/). According to Van Laer and Van Aelst, online petitions count as an “internet-based action with low threshold”. Although, signature gatherings existed long before the internet, they mostly work online today. In fact, it is possible to send it to Stop-TTIP via post, but still one would have to download the signature sheet online. One aspect opposes the categorization of Van Laer and Van Aelst: Stop-TTIP also gathered signatures during the protests (“short introduction”). However, this counts for “tens of thousands” (ibid.), which is a very little amount compared to more than 3 Million signatures that were gathered in sum. Thus, it may still be called an “internet-based” action. Further, it has a “low threshold”, because signing does not take any resources. It does not cost the signing person anything but a few minutes of “clicktivism” (White, 2010).
