Robert Putnam meets radical right: About the decline in social engagement and the rise of populism

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ROBERT PUTNAM MEETS

RADICAL RIGHT

About the decline in social engagement and the rise

of populism

Nikki Nguyen

Student number: S1903535 E-mail: n.t.v.nguyen@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Master thesis research 2017-2019

Public Administration: International and European Governance Thesis supervisor: Mr. A. Afonso E-mail supervisor: a.afonso@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

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Foreword

When I was a kid, I thought that my identity was fixed. Both my parents were born in Vietnam, so that must make me Vietnamese. When people asked me where I’m from, I used to tell them that I am from Vietnam. As a child of first-generation immigrants, my mom used to tell me that we live on ‘somebody else’s’ soil, and that I have to show gratitude to The Netherlands and the Dutch by being a “good” citizen.

My parents raised me in a closed community of only Vietnamese friends and acquaintances. Our community didn’t engage much in politics. My parents never voted, so neither did I or my brother. As I get older, I began to question what it means to be Dutch. Even till this day, I am not sure what factors determine my identity and when I see national right-wing populist statements such as “The

Netherlands is ours”, I start to question who is actually included in the word ours?

I believe all forms of religious, ideological and political extremism starts with the identity question. It saddens me greatly, but also leaves me inquisitive that the search for identity can lead to social polarization, social exclusion, murder and warfare. My interest in the governance of these undesirable developments in society grew as the world becomes more confronted with identity politics and the undermining of the status quo.

Being convinced by the power of social engagement and the ability to build bridging ties between different social and ethnic groups, I think that encouraging high levels of social capital is one of the greatest countermeasures to radical identity politics. Therefore, I dedicated my master thesis to the study of social engagement and populism, and the correlation between them.

At the early start to the thesis writing, my immediate family got entangled in a family court case. Many thanks to Ms. Van der Zwan and my supervisor Mr. Afonso for their support during my hard times. I am grateful for their understanding. Next, I would like to thank all interviewees for their time and enlightenment.

Special thanks to my mother Thuy, brother Phong and boyfriend Melvin for believing in me and supporting me to get through this final phase of my studies. I honestly cannot wait to celebrate my graduation and stand amongst them as a Master of Science Public Administration: International and European Governance, and make them proud.

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Introduction

During the U.S. presidential election in 2016, Russia was accused of manipulating U.S. voters by creating disinformation on social media for political gain. The Russians aimed at undermining the U.S. democracy and influencing people’s vote or persuade them to not vote at all. On September 21, 2018, Steve Bannon, former campaign strategist of Donald Trump and the key architect of the American-First rhetoric, came to Italy to announce that he wants to unite all nationalist parties in Europe to form a cooperation network among all national populists.

On November 11, 2018, exactly one hundred years ago since the First World War officially ended, Emmanuel Macron issued the dangers of nationalism at a commemoration ceremony in Paris in the presence of over sixty heads of state and government, and top diplomats. Among them was Donald Trump, the US president who calls himself a nationalist. Macron’s speech was an implicit rebuke to Trump’s America-First policies. In his speech he emphasized the importance of peace, unity and international cooperation.

Anti-European Union and anti-globalization movements and sentiments continue to unfold around the world. The Euro-crisis, the refugee crisis since 2015, the rise of Muslim and right-wing extremism, the victory of the 45th_{President of the United States of America Donald Trump in 2016 and Brexit all add} up to the rise of nationalism in Europe. In March 2017, Geert Wilders became the second largest in the parliament after the Dutch general elections. The Freedom Party won 20 seats, a gain of 5 (BBC News, 2017). Trump’s victory has a strong transatlantic political impact. The European Union’s main priority now is to keep the 27-member states together by promoting inclusiveness, a sense of togetherness and unity to counter all forms of extremism and segregation.

In the year 2000, Robert Putnam published his book Bowling Alone where his main findings suggest that there is a decline in social capital or decapitalization in the United States (Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Decapitalization leads to less trust and reciprocity, estrangement and separation within the community (Putnam, 2000), which are breeding grounds for political extremism. This research involves an up-close, in-depth, and detailed examination of the Netherlands, as well as its related contextual conditions that examines whether a decline in social engagement, that causes decapitalization, correlates with the increasing success of national populism.

The main question in this research is as follows:

(Why) Are socially engaged citizens in the Netherlands less likely to vote for a right-wing populist party?

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6 The main question consists of a closed and open-ended question and is therefore answered by a mixed method research design. The closed-ended question is solved by a quantitative second survey research design to find out whether social engagement plays a significant role in determining whether a person is likely to vote for populist parties. The open-ended why question is answered by a qualitative research design by analyzing the conducted interviews to gain in-depth knowledge on why socially engaged citizens are more or less likely to vote for populist parties. The assumption or hypothesis is that socially engaged citizens are less likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

H1: Socially engaged citizens are less likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

In order to answer the main question and test the first hypothesis, this study contains sub-questions and second-order hypotheses that are presented in the literature review and theory part. The added value of this research is to complete the causal model as to why populist leaders gain more support of citizens in well-developed democracies as claimed by various academics (c.f. Inglehart, 2016; Foa and Mounk, 2016).

The chapters of this thesis are ordered as follows: first there is a literature review. Here is discussed what is already known about the causes for the rising support for populist leaders. It also defines the definitions of populism and social engagement. The second chapter presents the theory or the theoretical background of the hypothesis. It which is in this case about social capital and engagement as the main explanatory factors for the rising support for populist leaders.

Chapter 3 presents the research design. It discusses the mode and characteristics of the research. The research design consists of an operationalization and a method of analysis. Chapter 4 reports the findings of the research. The outcome and answer to the main question are presented in the conclusion.

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I

Literature review

This part will show what is already known about the research topic. It will discuss the literature on the rising support populist parties and leaders, and the decline in social capital. The first paragraph will examine what causes the rising support for authoritarian alternatives to democracy. The second paragraph will explain what populism entails according to various academics. The third paragraph will clarify the terms social engagement and social capital and discuss the main findings of Robert Putnam on social capital.

1.1 Growing preference for authoritarian alternatives

According to Foa and Mounk (2016) there is a large shift from citizens’ identification with political parties to single movement issues in the last three decades. This is because citizens become more critical about the democratic system and their influence as citizens on the government (Foa and Mounk, 2016). The number of political extremist supporters is also rising, especially under young citizens who were born after 1980 (Foa and Mounk, 2016). Due to the growing cynicism about democracy and political radicalism, there is an increasing demand for an authoritarian regime at the cost of personal freedom (Foa and Mounk, 2016). Foa and Mounk (2016) argue that young and rich citizens have become more supportive for undemocratic alternatives, which can be explained by the democratic rule redistribution of economy. However, these statements need to be nuanced. Inglehart (2016) argues that these trends that Foa and Mounk describe are more visible in the United States than in Europe, and that the trends are moderate. This is because the economic inequality among citizens is greater in the US, in which the political control increasingly becomes in the hands of billionaires (Inglehart, 2016). Also, the US government must deal with governmental stagnation at its top (Inglehart, 2016) which causes distrust by the citizenry about the effectiveness of democracy. In Europe the rising support for quasi authoritarian and non-democratic alternatives can be measured by the electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties. According to Müller (2016) the rising support for populism is due to the permanent shortcomings of democracy, which often has to do with the failure of representation. Populist believe that they are the solution to this representation crisis, because they believe that the ideas and identity of the homogeneous and true citizenry can be fully represented through direct democracy (Müller, 2016; Pauwels, 2016). More about populism and their views on society in paragraph 1.2.

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1.1.1 Changing values

Adding his contribution to the explanation to the trend towards authoritarian alternatives, Inglehart (2016) explains the trend towards more politic extremism through the theory of value change. The value concerned in his theory is the value of self-expression (Inglehart, 2016). He argues that citizens who are economically well-off and secure about their position in the society are more supportive for a democratic government than those who are insecure about their economic and social position (Inglehart, 2016). This is because well-off and secure people have a greater value for self-expression (Inglehart, 2016), which democracy is all about. In contrast, insecure people are more materialistic and care less about self-expressing values (Inglehart, 2016). Factors that cause greater insecurity among citizens are a growing unemployment rate and immigration rate, and the economic immobility (Inglehart, 2016). Consequently, these insecurities lead to a greater preference for authoritarian alternatives for governance (Inglehart, 2016). Adding to Foa and Mounk’s (2016) argument about the declining support for democracy by younger generations, Inglehart (2016) states that young people nowadays are facing more unemployment and economic and social insecurities, which made them cynical about democracy and more sympathetic for authoritarian regimes.

1.1.2 Education

According to Galston (2017) the rising support for authoritarian systems in the West has gained more strength lately, which is depicted by the number of attacks against the free market, the decreasing support for diversity and immigration, and the increasing nationalist force that influences the international agreements and institutions. Another explanation to this rising support provided by Galston (2017) concerns the increasing technological progress, which requires high educated citizens for knowledge-intensive jobs and education-based governments. Less educated citizens, who often live on the country side, then have the feeling of being left out or less valued, which forms the foundation for the support for autocratic regimes (Galston, 2017).

Building on the argument of Inglehart (2016) who argues that unemployment causes more insecurities, and thus support for autocratic alternatives, Galston (2017) adds that low educated citizens feel like they must compete for low-skilled jobs with immigrants. While the number of immigrants increases, the number of low-skilled jobs becomes smaller, and thus the unemployment rate grows (Galston,

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9 2017). Populist politicians who claim to close borders and who are against immigration, such as Donald Trump, Le Pen, and Geert Wilders, thus gain lots of support from this audience.

Combining the theories of Galston (2017), Inglehart (2016) and Foa and Mounk (2016), will result in the following causal explanation of the rising support for authoritarianism. The rising appeal of authoritarian alternatives is caused by the greater influx of immigrants that causes job scarcity. Especially the low educated citizens are disadvantaged, as this group must compete for the same low skill jobs as the immigrants. This group of low educated citizens face high unemployment which results into insecurities. They start to question democracy’s effectiveness, because they think that their voices are not heard by the government and elites. Therefore, self-expressing values become meaningless for this group and they develop a greater desire for authoritarian alternatives.

1.2 What is populism and is it rising in Western Europe?

The term populism has been mentioned a couple times in the previous paragraph in which the rise of support for authoritarian alternatives is discussed. In this section the emergence and definition of populism will be explained.

1.2.1 A brief history of populism

Populism first emerges in the 1890s as a movement of angry, racist and resentful farmers in America (Müller, 2016; Judis, 2016). This anger evolves out the ever-changing culture, in particular the endorsement of economic, social and sexual liberal values, and the changing proportions of ethnic groups, in which "the real" citizens become a minority in the country (Müller, 2016). During the Civil War of April 1861 to May 1865 in America, farmers and mineworkers became members of the People’s Party as an opposition force against the small, but dominant and powerful group of bakers and industrials (Pauwels, 2016). Populism is thus characterized by the people's struggle against the establishment and capitalism, which is at the base of the People's Party and the like (Judis, 2016). Populism in Europe became prominent in the mid-1970s when Northern Europe suffered from severe job shortages and is reinforced in recent years by the curtailment of the welfare state, increasing immigration rate and the Euro crisis (Müller, 2016). Before the 70s, populism was largely absent in Western Europe and European politics was dominated by the socialist, social democrats, labor, center and center right parties (Judis, 2016). Between 1980 and 2000 Europe struggled to cope with an

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10 immense influx of migrants originating from Africa, the Middle East and Asia (Judis, 2016). European natives' main complaints during that time were that those immigrants were responsible for a higher crime rate, that they abused the benefits available and took the jobs (Judis, 2016). However, the socialist and social democratic parties demanded the public to accept the immigrants and illegal immigrants, which gave rise to national right-wing populism and the popular disapproval of non-European immigrants in the late 1980s (Judis, 2016).

Populism in The Netherlands started as a reaction to the high immigrant influx in the 80s and 90s when Hans Janmaat, chairman and leader of the Center Democrats Party openly stated that The Netherlands is not and will not become an immigrant country, and he promised to suppress multiculturalism as soon as his party got in the government (Janmaat, n.d.; Judis, 2016). Then in 2002, the Pim Fortuyn List party was founded subsequent to the terrorist attack in the United States of September 11, 2001 (Judis, 2016). However, Pim Fortuyn, leader of the party, was assassinated by a left-wing extremist in the name of the Islam later that year (Judis, 2016), and the party dissolved soon after. In 2006 a new populist party was founded by party leader Geert Wilders, the Freedom Party, which was mainly aimed at immigration, asylum and open-borders policies. When the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 reached Europe’s soil, Europeans faced serious recession and high unemployment. The viability of the European Union and the Euro became questionable. Growing European Union and anti-immigration sentiments were key trends in Europe since the global financial crisis, which intensified populist parties’ electoral success like Ukip, Front National, Alternative for Germany, and Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party.

1.2.2 What is populism?

The section above briefly discussed the emergence of populism and how populism became a political entity in Europe. But what exactly is populism? Unlike scientific terms, populism does not have a fixed set of features that completely defines populist parties or people (Judis, 2016). Populism is a very broad concept and there is no academic consensus on what this concept entails (c.f. Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Pauwels, 2016). Müller (2016) even talks about a conceptual chaos. Also, there are different forms of populism. Pauwels (2016) distinguishes three types of populism; national radical right populism, social populism, and neoliberal populism, and he reduces the definition of populism to an organizational form, a political style and as an ideology. However, there are some features of the concept populism that always seems to reappear. Populism is about representing “the people”. Populism means for populist labelled politicians and leaders "working for the people" (Müller, 2016).

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11 Populists believe that only they represent the people. However, populists have a very clear definition of who these people are. They hold the idea that "the people" is a homogeneous group that share the same religious and cultural beliefs, and ethnicity that is identical to that of the founding fathers or the first residents of that particular nation (Müller, 2016). Pluralism therefore is not supported by the populist ideology. Populism can be defined as a form of identity politics, which has an exclusionary impact on the society (Müller, 2016), often because of their direct language and prejudices (Pauwels, 2016). Populists define the real and true people of a nation as those who are forgotten and excluded by the corrupt and immoral elites (Müller, 2016). It often concerns the hard-working and least advantaged groups in the society.

Populism is a reaction to conflicting norms between citizens and the elites, and when citizens feel they are neglected by the elite (Judis, 2016). Populists are anti-elitists. They claim that the elite is corrupt, self-serving, undemocratic, immoral and only represents the people that are better off in the liberal and capitalistic economy (Müller, 2016; Judis, 2016). Opposites of populist parties are part of the corrupt elite and illegitimate in the eyes of populist leaders (Müller, 2016). Populist parties are often internally fixed and centralized (Pauwels, 2016), powerful in the opposition, and subordinated to one leader (Müller, 2016), who acts like a unifying symbol (Judis, 2016) and whose leadership is personalized and charismatic (Pauwels, 2016). Populism therefore often gets confused with authoritarianism, however there are some big differences.

Populist governance is characterized by seizing the state apparatus, corruption and suppression of the civil society (Müller, 2016). Yet, the difference with authoritarianism is that populism claims that it represents the “true, pure and authentic” citizen (e.d. Judis, 2016; Pauwels, 2016; Müller, 2016), whereas authoritarianism represent the will of the establishment. Populism is also often referred to as the "true, authentic and pure" form of democracy, where the ordinary people get to rule through direct democracy (Müller, 2016). Populists are strong advocates of direct democracy, direct representation and referendum to give voice to the real and true interest of "the people" (Müller, 2016). Populist think of the current democratic administration as an obligation to reach consensus, and therefore political parties are forced to amend their political party program to converge (Müller, 2016). Populist parties therefore can only exist when in opposition, because once they move into the government they must be less radical and make consensus to rule in multi-party systems (Judis, 2016).

Populists are against capitalism. They argue that capitalism causes inequality between citizens where the better off exploit the common man. Populists see capitalism as a threat to solidarity and equality (Pauwels, 2016). Despite the populists' struggle against capitalism, populism is not the same as socialism, in which the government owns and distributes all resources to the people according to their

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12 needs. The difference between socialism and populism is thus that in the former the government has all the power, whereas populists want to empower the common man to have an active role in the government. Populists want to reform capitalism rather than completely eradicate it. Moreover, socialism represents the working class, it concerns the struggle between the working class and the capital class (Judis, 2016). Populism on the other hand has the people at its center and is about the struggle between the people and the elites (Judis, 2016).

As mentioned before, Judis (2016) argues that populism only exists in the opposition. In addition to this statement, Pauwels (2016) argues that populism must coexist with another ideology and depending on what the host ideology is, the type of populism (nationalistic, socialistic or neoliberalist) will be determined. Left-wing and right-wing populism differ from each other in the type of issues that they ought to be important. Social populism holds a left-wing ideology, in which public spending and ownership, equality and redistribution are central issues to be focused on (Pauwels, 2016). Social populism fights against excessive forms capitalism. Neoliberal populism on the other hand wants the individual to be completely independent and free from any form of governmental interferences. Neoliberal populists fight against the phenomenon of a big government in which the establishment interferes in all aspects of an individual’s economic and private life (Pauwels, 2016). National populism differs from the two former types of populism in that it does not focuses on how the economy should be governed, but the focus is on one's ethnic affiliation (Pauwels, 2016). National populism is the leading form of populism in Europe. Due to globalization there is an increase of nationalistic sentiments and xenophobia in Europe. National populists' viewpoint is that only the people of a certain race and with a certain religion or language should govern the state (Pauwels, 2016). This group of people is considered to be the "aboriginals" of a certain state by the populists. National populists believe that foreigners and influences from outside jeopardizes the homogenous nation state (Pauwels, 2016). National populism fights against multi-culturalism and globalization. Populists refuse to acknowledge that people live in a globalized world, in which societies are diverse and all citizens are free and equal (Müller, 2016). They refuse to put effort in finding a common and fair ground to share the same political space with the people whom they do not classify as "the true and real citizen" (Müller, 2016). Populists and their supporters believe that globalization leads to illegal immigration, job scarcity and competition (Judis, 2016). They therefore are against (further) globalization and demand the government to reduce the money spend on foreign policies to use it for national problems, such as healthcare and the homeless (Judis, 2016). They are also against trade deals, which they believe to cause unemployment (Judis, 2016). Labor shortages are an important factor for the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiments and populism in Western Europe (Judis, 2016). The success of populism in Western-Europe is by reason because of the ever-expanding European Union. Where it first started as

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13 a European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and a European Economic Community in 1957 to avoid wars, it now evolves into a supranational organization with a common currency. National populists are against further European integration and see the enlargement of the European union and its administration as a threat to the national sovereignty.

The table below shows the most important features of populism according to Judis (2016), Pauwels (2016) and Müller (2016).

Organizational style

Populism

Left wing Right wing

Social populism Neoliberalist

populism National populism

Hierarchical, members subordinated to one leader, internally fixed

Political style Direct language, work for people, exclusionary, prejudices, strong opposition

Ideology Voice should be given back to the common man

Reduce globalization and multi-culturalism to protect the homogeneous population

Reduce capitalism to minimize elite’s powers Table 1 - A summary of populism's most important features

1.3 How are social capital and social engagement defined, and (why) is it declining?

This section will be devoted to the definition of social engagement, how it differs from social capital and what the relationship is between the two terms. It will outline and discuss the findings of Robert Putnam on why social capital is declining in America.

1.3.1 Definition and difference between social engagement and social capital

Just like the term populism, the concepts social capital and social/civic engagement are just as broad and difficult to define. Therefore, there is no academic consensus about the meaning of these concepts. The definition of social capital and social engagement takes on different meanings depending on the context (National Research Council, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and

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14 Education, Committee on National Statistics, & Panel on Measuring Social and Civic Engagement and Social Cohesion in Surveys, 2014, p. 34). However, it is possible to break down the broad construction of these concepts to smaller, more narrowly defined dimensions to make it more practical to measure. Social capital and social engagement are closely related terms that are often used interchangeably, although differences do exist. The best way to describe the difference between two concepts is by looking at how those concepts are measured. Social capital is measured by the resources available that come from political participation, civic/social participation and religious participation, the size and diversity of one's formal and informal networks, mode of contact, and level of trust (Kadushin, 2012; Putnam, 2000; National Research Council et al., 2014). It concerns one's bonds with political associations, community groups, neighbors, friends and relatives, and the willingness to conform with the values and norms of these groups (National Research Council et al., 2014).

Social or civic engagement on the other hand is measured by all efforts and activities of an individual with the aim of having a positive societal impact through politics and/or non-political enterprises (National Research Council et al., 2014). Social engagement arises as a response to new societal developments, as a habit, such as voting or campaigning, or by invitation to participate in a particular affair (National Research Council et al., 2014). It differs from social capital in that it involves acting, personal investments in the community, and it can be considered as an outcome of social capital (National Research Council et al., 2014).

Acknowledging that there are many definitions of social capital in the literature and that many scholars use the term differently, for convenience reasons, social capital and engagement will be used in this thesis as described above.

1.3.2. Decline social capital in the US

Now that it has been clarified how the terms social capital and social engagement will be used in this work, this part will outline the main findings of Robert Putnam on the decline in social capital in America. However, Putnam examined the changes in social capital for the period 1940 to 1990. Therefore, his conclusions will be tested with some recent statistical numbers to assess whether his findings are still valid.

According to Robert Putnam (2000), there is a decline in social capital in the American society since 1990. Among other things, this decline in social capital is reflected by fewer club memberships, lower voting turnouts, and citizens who become more and more distrustful of fellow citizens (Putnam, 2000).

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15 Compared to the generation before World War II, people that were born after the war are less socially active (Putnam, 2000). He argues that war generates a greater sense of responsibility for one's community. Not only the absence of war has caused the generational difference in social engagement, but also the birth of the world wide web, women's labor force participation and increasing mobility have contributed to the declining trend of social engagement (Putnam, 2000). According to Putnam (2000) these generational changes explain the social engagement decline for the lion's share. Social trust, honesty and civic engagement are mutually reinforcing (Putnam, 2000). However, social trust has declined since 1985 (Putnam, 2000). People who were born after 1960 tend to trust the society less compared to the generations before, and instead of relying on reciprocity or altruism, people nowadays rely much more on law as a basis for cooperation (Putnam, 2000). In addition, he argues that crime, murder and violence rates have increased. However, statistics of the US's FBI crime reports show that violent crime rate has decreased since 1991 to 2016 (Statista, 2018). See chart below.

Figure 1 – Reported violent crime rate in the US from 1990 to 2016. Source: Statista (2018)

Other factors that have played a minor role in the decline in social capital are pressure of time and money, electronic entertainment and a population shift from central urban areas to suburbs (Putnam, 2000). The impacts of these factors on the decline in social capital will be discussed in the aforementioned order, starting with pressures of time and money.

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Time and money pressures

Putnam (2000) argues that between 1960 and 1990 the proportion of citizens who claim to be always in a hurry has increased by half. Especially in Western countries where societies are moving towards individualism which bolsters the time-is-money mindset (The Economist, 2014). Together with financial pressures, which causes the urge to use one's time wisely and productive, citizens seem to prioritize themselves and their family first (Putnam, 2000). Time poverty inhibits the one's participation in community activities and therefore the growth of one's social capital, and this time-scarcity problem is ever-growing (The Economist, 2014). The hourly wage nowadays has increased dramatically compared to a century ago. When people think of their time in terms of money, they tend to make more working hours since that is more profitable and leisure time becomes stressful (The Economist, 2014). In addition, the movement of women in the work force also reduces the overall participation in community activities (Putnam, 2000). The chart below shows the increase in US average hourly wages in manufacturing.

Figure 2 – US average hourly wages in manufacturing. Source: Tradingeconomics.com, US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Electronic entertainment

Modern technologies have tremendously impacted people's daily lives on the economic, religious and social aspect. Compared to olden days, people's lives have improved because of better facilities and comfort due to modern technologies. However, technology also has many unfavorable effects on our daily life. This section will focus on the social impact, the impact on communication and leisure, of advanced technology in societies.

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17 People's relationships nowadays have become more dominated by modern technology (Younes and Al-Zoubi, 2015). With the introduction of internet and social media, the distance between people has become smaller and the contact frequency has increased, which are positive effects of technology on social capital. However, communication through social media transmits less non-verbal information, which reduces trust and thus cooperation (Putnam, 2000). With the birth of internet and social media, people surround themselves less physically with other people and spend more time behind a screen, which causes isolation and loneliness (Putnam, 2000; Krause and Sawhill, 2016). People nowadays listen to music and look for entertainment in private, such as online movies or online video games. The formation of (small) social groups is crucial for social connectedness and social engagement (Putnam, 2000). However, as the chart below shows, the amount of time that a person spends behind a screen has increased in the US, meaning that there is less time available for other social activities (Krause and Sawhill, 2016) and the formation of social groups.

Figure 3 – How free time became screen time. Source: Brookings.edu, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Not only has the form of entertainment changed, people nowadays search for news on the internet instead of reading the local or national newspapers (Putnam, 2000). The problem with searching for news on the internet is that people tend to search for news that resonates with or confirms their own suppositions (Putnam, 2000), and therefore restricts one's mind and perspective. Moreover, the internet is full of incomplete and unauthenticated information, and helps to bolster the spread of lies,

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18 gossip, rumours and incorrect beliefs (Younes and Al-Zoubi, 2015), which causes loss in trust in such information or even withdrawal from social activities such as voting (McGreal, 2017).

Mobility and Sprawl

Another explanation for the decline in social engagement is mobility. As argued by Putnam (2000) residential mobility reduces community based social engagement and consequently neighborhood instability (Kan, 2007). When people move in and out of neighborhoods, social capital that are defined by financial and emotional support may get lost (Kan, 2007), and by changing residence on a regular base inhibits the development of attachment and a close relationship with the neighborhood or community. Therefore, people become less socially engaged. Kan (2007) explains this as follows: social capital has a spatial dimension and can be location specific. This local social capital becomes less useful when an individual move to another neighborhood, so individuals that are prone to residential mobility will invest less of their time and effort in local social capital (Kan, 2007).

Moreover, community based social engagement is lower in metropolitans compared to small and rural towns due to the neighborhood heterogeneity in metropolitans (Putnam, 2000). Compared to the larger central urban areas, every face is a familiar face in small towns which enhances local social capital and its dimensions related to trust, reciprocity, altruism, sympathy, loyalty and fellowship. The expansion of human populations away from central urban areas, i.e. rising suburbanization, increases the distance between the workplace and residence, which requires more travel-time from individuals (Putnam, 2000). The time that is spend on traveling is at the expense of time spend on social community activities. On top of that, suburbanization causes a greater class and racial segregation, which reduces bridging forms of social capital (Putnam, 2000).

1.3.3 The importance of social capital

In the previous sections, the definition of social capital and the causes of its decline in the US has been discussed. This part will stress the importance of social capital.

Social capital thus refers to the connections among individuals and groups that form a social unit, in which interactions are characterized by reciprocity, good will, sympathy, fellowship and trust (Putnam, 2000). Social capital enforces individuals to safeguard their trustworthiness and reputation for mutual benefits. These networks therefore reduce the chances of opportunism and corruption, which benefits neighborhood safety and the society. Robert Putnam (2000) defines social capital as short-term altruism, but in the long run, it turns into self-interest with the result that every participant is better

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19 off. Social capital benefits the individual's mental health and is just as important for a person's wellbeing and state of happiness as financial or human capital (Putnam, 2000). Social capital unites people with different minds and prevents them from falling pray for extremism that often target isolated people by allowing different points of view and political information to flow through the network (Putnam, 2000). Conforming to Putnam (2000) high levels of social capital will lead to more tolerance for women, racial integration and gender equality. He distinguishes four types of states which are shown in the table below.

Low social capital High social capital High tolerance Individualistic:

Being independent, no group mentality

Civic community:

Striving for common good instead of individual interest

Low tolerance Anarchic:

No leader, war of all against all

Sectarian community: Us against them mentality Table 2 – Putnam’s four types of states. Source: Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community by Robert Putnam (2000).

Putnam's (2000) argumentation is that equality and social capital are mutual reinforcing. Not only does equality engenders social capital, but it also goes the other way around. Therefore, Putnam (2000) argues that to have racial, cultural and religious solidarity in society there must be more bridging ties that cross racial, cultural and religious lines. Exposure to diversities strengthens bridging ties between different ethnic groups and therefore enhance social civility and tolerance (National Research Council et al., 2014). Bonding ties on the other hand can hinder the evolvement of racial, cultural and religious solidarity, due to in-group loyalty and group-thinking, that stimulates tunnel vision.

Social capital thus may have a negative effect on social solidarity, which then affect community cooperation and people's well-being negatively. Whether social capital has an inclusive or exclusive effect on the society or community depends on how the resources in a social network are being used (National Research Council et al., 2014; Kan, 2007). Social capital can either strengthen or weaken the social inclusiveness and coherence. This potential is best explained by the two most important dimensions of social capital, which is bonding on the one hand, and bridging on the other (Putnam, 2000). Bonding refers to the strong ties between individuals who are member of the same homogeneous group; people to whom they feel close to, and where the relationship is marked by trust, reciprocity, and emotional support (Putnam, 2000). Bridging on the other hand refers to ties between individuals or groups where communication takes place between-whiles (Putnam, 2000). Bridging ties encompass people or groups that are from different social classes and backgrounds. These people or groups don’t have much in common and their relationship is mainly based on sharing information and

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20 ideas (Putnam, 2000). In contrast to bridging ties, bonding ties produce more in-group loyalty and favoritism, but consequently it can also lead to out-group enmity, ethnocentrism (the evaluation of cultures according to preconceptions originating from one’s own culture), and social exclusion (Putnam, 2000). Negative aftermaths of social bonding are, among others, reflected by privileged access to jobs and other opportunities by a specific ethnic group (National Research Council, 2014, p.16). Therefore, in order to maintain and invigorate social support for multiculturalism and social inclusiveness, bridging ties are indispensable.

1.4 Summary and relevance to the research

Paragraph 1.1 discussed key factors that play a role in the growing support for authoritarian alternatives to democracy. These factors can be summarized as political cynicism, shortcomings of democracy, insecurity and value change, job scarcity, and economic and educational inequality. The relevance of this paragraph to the main research question is that it provides explanations for the support for nationalist populist parties. This study will examine whether social engagement also plays a role in the support for national populist parties.

Paragraph 1.2 examined the origin and definition of populism. Populism started in America in the 1890s and emerged in Europe in the mid 1970s as a reaction to the great influx of immigrants, job scarcity and curtailment of the welfare state. There is no academic consensus about the definition of populism, however, elements that always seem to return are: the empowerment of the people, anti-elitism, anti-capitalism, and anti-globalism. The relevance of this paragraph to the study is that it provides a better understanding of the concept populism and how populism emerged in Europe. Paragraph 1.3 discussed the definition of social engagement and social capital, and discussed the social capital decline in America. The definition of these terms depends on the context. Social capital concerns the recourses available in one’s network, and social engagement involves activities taken for the community. Factors that caused a decline in social capital in America are according to Putnam (2000) generational differences (including sense of responsibility and trust), time and money pressures that reduce time available for community activities, electronic entertainment that cause isolation, and mobility that reduces one’s attachment to a community. The relevance of this paragraph is that it draws the relationship between social engagement and populist voting. Low social capital is associated with less social engagement, and thus a great likelihood of populist voting due to fewer bridging ties. Bridging ties are important to counteract populist voting by amplifying racial, cultural and religious solidarity.

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II Theory

The literature review discussed the theories about populism, social capital and engagement. It also discussed explanations provided by various academics about the rising support for populist leaders and autocratic regimes. This part will focus on the theories that provide the hypothesized answer to the main research question “(Why) Are socially engaged citizens in the Netherlands less likely to vote for a populist party?”.

As discussed in paragraph 1.3.1, social engagement concerns all efforts and activities of an individual with the aim of having a positive societal impact through politics and/or non-political enterprises (National Research Council et al., 2014). Social engagement is about having good intentions for the society (Schmeets, 2015) and translate these intentions into actions. Therefore, this chapter discusses behavioral theories behind the causal relationship between social engagement and populist voting in the Netherlands. The main question and hypotheses of this research as introduced in the introduction are shown below as a reminder. This chapter will close with a summary and reflect the relevance of the discussed theory to the research. Due to the broad definition of social engagement, the summary and reflection will also provide sub-hypotheses to help test the single major hypothesis H1.

(Why) Are socially engaged citizens in the Netherlands less likely to vote for a right-wing populist party?

The hypothesis that will be tested in this research is:

H1: Socially engaged citizens are less likely to vote for right-wing populist parties

Yet, before the inquiry on behavioral theories behind social engagement, the next paragraph will outline the findings of the Central Office for Statistics in The Netherlands (CBS) on whether social capital has declined in The Netherlands in order to estimate changes in social engagement of Dutch citizens.

2.1 Is social capital declining in The Netherlands?

While Putnam (2000) argues that there is a decline in social capital in the US due to less social contacts, less solidarity and bigger gaps between citizens and the government, various researches conducted by the Central Office for Statistics in The Netherlands proved that there is no social capital decline in the country between 1997 and 2014. According to research conducted by Beuningen and Schmeets (2015)

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22 during this period informal support has slightly increased, concerning volunteering and helping others without an institutional obligation. Despite the growing individualism and digitalization, the social contact frequency on a weekly base has not declined in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2009, but it has increased (Coumans, 2015b). There was a slight decrease between 2012 and 2014, however, Coumans (2015b) concluded that the changes since 1997 are very small and therefore the social contact frequency remained stable between 1997 and 2014. This section will briefly discuss the indicators that were used by the CBS to measure social engagement in order to map the changes in social capital in The Netherlands between 1997 and 2014.

Giving support to others is an important indicator for social participation (Arends, 2015a). There are two types of support that people give or receive from their network. These are personal support and practical support. The first refers to emotional support. The latter refers to material support, such as financial support (Arends, 2015a). According to Arends (2015a), giving informal support has remained stable in The Netherlands from 2012 to 2015. However, there are group related differences that determine the amount of informal support an individual give. Women, the age group 46 to 65, Christians, the non-religious, Dutch natives, people who live in sub-urban areas and the higher educated give more informal support than other groups, such as men, the elderly, and Muslims (Arends, 2015a). As regards to men and women, there seem not to be a significant different in their social capital. Men’s social capital is slightly bigger than that of the women in The Netherlands, because men tend to distrust others less and engage more in social associations (Beuningen and Schmeets, 2015a).

Memberships at associations increase the tolerance for other people and are thus important for the social cohesion in the country (Coumans, 2015a). Between 2012 and 2014 the number of memberships has not changed significantly. However, citizens with a high income, the employed, higher educated, natives, religious citizens and those living in sub-urban areas are more likely to have memberships at one or more associations compared to Muslims, non-(western) natives, the low educated and the unemployed (Coumans, 2015a). Education, employment and social capital have a positive correlation (Beuningen and Schmeets, 2015); higher educated and employed citizens are more socially engaged and have more social capital compared to the low educated and unemployed citizen in The Netherlands.

Another important indicator for social participation and engagement is volunteering. Volunteering is defined as a somewhat organized, but unpaid and optional form of work that benefits another person or the society (Arends, 2015b). Volunteering also helps to build or expand one’s network, which benefits social cohesion and tolerance (Arends, 2015b). Volunteering in The Netherlands is often done

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23 by 35-45-year-old, Dutch native citizens, the higher educated, people with a partner and/or child, religious people, people with a high income and those who live in sub-urban areas (Arends, 2015b). According to statistics, volunteering has steadily decreased with 1% each year from 2012 to 2014 (Arends, 2015b). However, The Netherlands is still ahead of the curve in Europe concerning volunteering (Arends, 2015b).

Political participation can be divided into two types: institutional (voting, party memberships, etc.) and non-institutional participation (public demonstrations, protest groups and the like) (Schmeets, 2015b). Between 2002 and 2014, there were no major changes in political participation (Schmeets, 2015b). The voting turnouts during this period also remained stable. High educated and people with a higher income tend to participate more often, whereas people older than 55 tend to withdraw from participation (Schmeets, 2015b). Because political participation is associated

The same goes for social and institutional trust. Between 2009 and 2014 trust in others remained the same in The Netherlands (Schmeets, 2015c). Compared to 1981 and 1990 social trust has even increased from 44% to 58% in 2014 (Schmeets, 2015c). Education and trust seem to have a strong positive correlation, the higher the education level, the more social and institutional trust an individual has (Schmeets, 2015c).

So, with regards to social engagement, there are no major changes between 1997 to 2014 in The Netherlands. Social capital therefore has not declined up to 2014 in the Netherlands. The researches do present some differences between social groups with regards to gender, age, religion, education, income, residence and ethnicity. Overall, people with a high education, high income, Dutch roots, Christian denomination and residents in sub-urban areas do best in all aspects of social participation.

This paragraph discussed the main findings of the CBS on the changes of social capital in the

Netherlands. The next paragraph will examine behavioral theories that bring about social

engagement in order to distinct national right-wing voters from other party voters.

2.2 Who are the national populist party voters?

Populist party voters are according to Pauwels (2016) citizens who are dissatisfied with the functioning of the democratic system and prefer a more direct form of democracy, such as through referenda. Pauwels (2016) provides three theories of voting behavior to explain populist voting, which are the sociological, social psychological and the economic theory. These theories are explained below and used to construct the profile of a national populist party voter.

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The sociological approach

The sociological approach draws the relationship between an individual’s social environment and position with his or her voting behavior (Pauwels, 2016). Variables as social class, denomination, social relationships and residence are of great influence on one’s voting choice (Pauwels, 2016). Political parties are designed in a way that they appeal to a certain type of social group (Pauwels, 2016). Different types of political parties therefore evolve from the differences between the social groups (Pauwels, 2016). So, according to this theory, the party program represents the interest of a certain social group. The party program of the Dutch national populist party The Freedom Party (PVV) as shown below thus suggest that their voters are non-Muslims, lower-income earners, live in a rental house or in rural areas and have limited social relationships with immigrants with a Islamic denomination.

Draft party program PVV 2017 – 2021

“Millions of Dutch people are fed up with the Islamization of our country. Enough of mass immigration and asylum, terror, violence and insecurity.”

“Here is our plan: instead of financing the whole world and people we do not want here in our country, we spend the money to the ordinary Dutchman.”

“This is how the PVV will do that: 1. De-Islamize the Netherlands

- Zero asylum seekers and no more immigrants from Islamic countries: borders closed - Withdraw all already issued asylum residence permits for a certain period of time, asylum seeker centers closed

- Islamic headscarves not allowed in public functions

- Prohibition on other Islamic expressions that are contrary to public order - Preventive detention of radical Muslims

- Denaturalize and expelling criminals with dual nationalities - no longer returning Syrian citizens to the Netherlands

- Close all mosques and Muslim schools , ban Koran

2. Regain independence of The Netherlands. Exit from the EU

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25 4. Remove the own risk excess insurance completely

5. Lower rent

6. AOW age at 65, supplementary pensions indexation

7. No more money transfers to development aid, windmills, art, innovation, broadcasting, etc. 8. More money to home care, care for the elderly

9. More money to defense and police 10. Lower income tax

11. Cut motor vehicle tax by half”

Table 3 - PVV party program translated. Available at: https://www.pvv.nl/images/Conceptverkiezingsprogrammma.pdf

The social psychological theory

The social psychological theory explains one’s vote choice and political behavior through party identification (Pauwels, 2016; Bell and Kandler, 2015). Party identifications evolves over time and concerns the individual’s long-term attachment to a political party due to similar ideologies (Pauwels, 2016). As a consequence, party identification generates a feeling of belonging (Pauwels, 2016), and party loyalty. Therefore, party identification is considered to be quite stable through an individual’s lifetime (Bell and Kandler, 2015). While some academics claim that party identification is influenced by an individual’s family and social environment, Bell and Kandler (2015) found in their study that party identification is more significantly influenced by an individual’s unique experiences than a shared home environment.

However, Wolak (2009) stresses the importance of the family and social environment in shaping one’s political partisanship. Wolak (2009) argues that parents set the foundation for party affiliation of their child and are during childhood the main source of political information for the young person. The home environment shapes one’s political partisanship trough time and trust (Wolak, 2009). Therefore, the origination of party partisanship can be found in one’s childhood and household (Wolak, 2009). Yet, party identification is subjected to change. When an individual grows up, his or her political knowledge broadens and is enriched with different sources of political information, such as peers, newspapers and television (Wolak, 2009). Individuals who are more informed are therefore likelier to change from party affiliation.

Using the social psychological approach, Freedom Party voters should have relatives, most importantly their parents, that also vote for the Freedom Party. Since party identification is most often stable trough one’s lifetime, Freedom Party voters must acquire political information from a very limited number of sources. Moreover, according to the social psychological approach, Freedom Party voters

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26 should have been brought up with some patriotic or superior feelings of one’s own kind or country and these feelings are intensified or secured during their adult life by their social environment. However, taking the findings of Bell and Kandler (2015) into account, it is also plausible that a Freedom Party has experienced some incidents related to immigration, the Islam, certain social groups other than one’s own, or is facing economic challenges that cause them to vote for the Freedom Party in their later life.

The economic theory

The economic model of voting explains voting behavior from a utility perspective. According to this approach, people vote for a certain party to maximize their benefits and to achieve some further ends (Pauwels, 2016). It involves questions of ends and means, and requires purpose assessing judgements and instrumental reasons. The economic theory argues that voters hold the government responsible for economic developments (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000), such as inflation and unemployment. Voters therefore vote for a party of which they presume can influence their personal economic situation. Voters are perceived as rational individuals that weigh the pros and cons before they bring out their vote. There are many theories of voting behavior that are derived from the economic approach, such as issue voting and retrospective voting, but all are based on the same arguments. That is to say voters are rational individuals that strive for utility maximalization and they hold the government responsible for economic changes in the country (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). The Freedom Party program aims for economic reforms that benefits the citizen on an individual level, such as removing the own risk excess, lowering income and motor vehicle tax, but they also want to keep the national capital within borders. Freedom Party voters are therefore expected to be low to middle income earners, that share the opinion that The Netherlands should invest more in national matters.

Social engagement personality traits

In addition to the sociological, social psychological and economic theory, national right-wing party voters can also be identified by the so called Big Five personality traits. According to Omoto, Snyder and Hackett (2010) personality traits are good predictors for and significantly correlated with social engagement. Conforming to academics, human personality traits can be broadly divided into five big clusters which are openness to experience, emotional stability, consciousness, agreeableness and extraversion (cf. Omoto, Snyder and Hackett, 2010; Weinschenk, 2017; Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010). These personality traits are considered quite stable over life that come to the surface when dealing with opportunities and challenges in life (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012; Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010), therefore, personality traits are very useful for identifying national right-wing party voters.

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27 On top of the Big Five personality traits, Lucas, Knowles, Gardner, Molden and Jefferis (2010) distinguish two types of mind-sets, which are the prevention-focused mind-set and the promotion-focused mindset. Individuals with a prevention-promotion-focused mind-set are primarily concerned about the maintenance of security and the avoidance of losses, even at risk at of missing opportunities (Lucas, Knowles, Gardner et al., 2010). It is argued by the authors that especially individuals with a small social network have a prevention-focused mindset, because individuals with this type of mind-set share less their thoughts, are less outgoing and lack social skills due to the fear of negative feedback on their social performance and thus avoid social interaction (Lucas, Knowles, Gardner et al., 2010). Therefore, individuals with a prevention-focused mindset expose themselves less to different ideas, views and opinions.

Individuals with a promotion-based mindset on the other hand try to avoid missed opportunities. They strive for positive outcomes, even at risk of committing errors and accepting losses (Lucas, Knowles, Gardner et al., 2010). These are most often individuals with a large network and seek for social interaction eagerly and comfortably (Lucas, Knowles, Gardner et al., 2010). The following paragraphs present a brief discussion of the Big Five personality traits while combining the two types of mind-sets.

Openness to experience

Being open to experience means being open-minded, and pro-actively gathering new information and participations in new events (Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010; Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012). Individuals who are open to new experiences are more likely to participate in politics, such as voting and protesting, and they like to convince others to do so too (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012). These are creative individuals, who create new ways to participate in politics and engage with opposing ideas in order to influence politics, such as the use of social media (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012). When they encounter opposing viewpoints, they are unlikely to be offended (Weinschenk, 2017). These individuals therefore have a promotion-focused mind-set and are more liberal and left-oriented. Freedom Party voters are expected to be less open to new experiences and embrace a more conservative way of thinking and doing. The party program therefore includes measures to reduce influences of globalization on The Netherlands.

Extraversion

Extravert individuals are described as very energetically social and talkative, and they are therefore very assertive and likely to actively participate in politics (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012; Weinschenk, 2017). Extraverts also make great use of the internet as a platform to communicate their preferences to others (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012) and are engaged in many other activities to express their opinion (Weinschenk, 2017). Extraverts have a promotion-based mind-set; however they

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28 can be found on both the right and left end of the political spectrum. Extraverts are also more likely to volunteer to help those who need assistance, especially when they can fulfill their own motivations by doing so (Omoto, Snyder and Hackett, 2010).

Agreeableness

Agreeable individuals have a communal orientation, are altruistic, trustful, modest and cooperative, and are therefore often involved in volunteer work (Omoto, Snyder, and Hackett, 2010). They avoid conflict as much as possible (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012), which makes them likely to be non-voters since politics involves conflicting interests. They therefore prefer to involve in political actions that can remain anonymous to avoid confrontation and conflicts with others (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012), such as online forums and surveys. Agreeable individuals are expected to be more liberal and left-oriented. Agreeable individuals have a somewhat prevention-focused mind-set, because they try to avoid conflict as much as possible and are careful with sharing their thoughts. They are described by terms as altruistic, warm, kind and sympathetic (Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010). Agreeable individuals are expected to be non-supporters of the Freedom Party, because national right-wing populist parties provoke a lot of opposition, disagreements and hostilities between different groups in the community.

Consciousness

Conscious individuals think in terms of tasks and goals. This behavior includes norm- and rules-abiding, planning, organizing and taking responsibility (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012). Conscious people therefore likely to vote, because they see voting as a duty (Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010). Conscious individuals are also more likely to volunteer if they see volunteering as an obligation of good citizenship (Omoto, Snyder, and Hackett, 2010). Conscious individuals do not have a prevention-focused or promotion-prevention-focused mind-set, because both types of mind-sets involve careful reasoning.

Emotional stability

Emotional stable individuals have high levels of self-confidence. They are therefore less anxious, depressed and pessimistic (Quintelier and Theocharis, 2012). Individuals who are emotionally stable are more likely to have a promotion-focused mind-set because of their self-confidence, whereas anxious individuals have a prevention-focused mind-set due to their anxiety for losses. Freedom Party voters are expected to be emotionally unstable, because of their anxiety for the Islamization of The Netherlands and the large influx of asylum seekers. Instable individuals can be described as tense and nervous (Mondak, Hibbing, Anderson, 2010). This goes well along with the prevention-focused

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mind-29 set as the party program is focused around prevention of any further influences of the Islam on the Dutch society and the development towards a migrant country.

The table below summarizes the personality traits discussed above and presents an overview of a plausible character profile of a national right-wing populist party voter.

OPENNESS TO

EXPERIENCE

EMOTIONAL STABILITY

CONSCIOUSNESS AGREEABLENESS EXTRAVERSION

PROMOTION-BASED MIND SET Ö Ö Ö X Ö PREVENTION-BASED MIND SET X X Ö Ö Ö NON-NATIONAL RIGHT-WING PARTY VOTERS Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö NATIONAL RIGHT-WING PARTY VOTERS X X Ö X Ö

Table 4 – Expected personality traits of national right-wing party voters

2.3 Summary and relevance to the research

Paragraph 2.1 examined whether social capital in The Netherlands has declined. Research shows that social capital has been stable in from 1997 to 2014 The Netherlands. However, there are some group related differences related to age, gender, social class, ethnicity, education, residence and denomination. High educated, high-income earners, Dutch, Christians and those who live in the sub-urban area are most likely to participate in social and community actions. The relevance of this paragraph to the study is that gives an overview of the developments within the dimensions of social engagement of the average Dutch citizen.

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30 However, the findings of the CBS do not distinct differences in social engagement between different party voters. In this study I am interested in whether national right-wing populist party voters are less socially engaged than other party voters. Therefore, paragraph 2.2 identifies national populist party voters by using the sociological approach, the social psychological theory, the economic theory and the Big Five personality traits. This identification helps to understand why certain individuals with particular characteristics are more prone to populist voting and to create a hypothetical profile of a national right-wing populist party voter in order to test whether national right-wing populist party voters are less socially engaged than other party voters.

Robert Putnam meets radical right: About the decline in social engagement and the rise of populism