Far right in Western Europe: From the margins to the spotlights?

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Far right in Western Europe:

From the margins to the spotlights?

An analysis of the factors influencing the public presence

of far right in Western Europe

Pieternella Jantje (Ellen) Wit, s1592548 Master thesis, final draft

Crisis and Security Management, intake February 2015 Supervisor: Dr. Joery Matthys

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List of figures and tables

Figures

Figure 1 - Far right ideological features... 19

Figure 2 - Number of forcibly displaced people worldwide ... 21

Figure 3 - The logos of National Front and National Democracy ... 31

Tables Table 1 - European Social Survey (2002), Round 1 (ed.6.4), displayed in column percentages. ... 17

Table 2 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages. ... 17

Table 3 - Operationalization ... 23

Table 4 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public statements ... 27

Table 5 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public presence ... 27

Table 6 - Belgium: National Democracy, public presence ... 29

Table 7 - Belgium: Quality of life ... 29

Table 8 - Belgium: Attitudes towards European integration... 30

Table 9 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, changing images ... 31

Table 10 - Belgium: National Democracy, changing images ... 31

Table 11 - Belgium: Overview of the findings ... 32

Table 12 - Germany: National Democratic Party, public statements ... 34

Table 13 Germany: National Democratic Party, public presence ... 34

Table 14 - Germany: The Republican, public statements ... 35

Table 15 - Germany: The Republican, public presence ... 35

Table 16 - Germany: Quality of life ... 36

Table 17 - Germany: Attitudes towards European integration ... 36

Table 18 - Germany: National Democratic Party, changing images ... 38

Table 19 - Germany: The Republican, changing images ... 38

Table 20 - Germany: Overview of the findings ... 39

Table 21 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public statements ... 40

Table 22 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public presence ... 41

Table 23 - Netherlands: Quality of life ... 42

Table 24 - Netherlands: Attitudes towards European integration ... 42

Table 25 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, changing images ... 43

Table 26 - Netherlands: Overview of the findings ... 43

Table 27 - Dependent variable: far right public presence……….. ... 45

Table 28 - Independent variables: explanatory factors + indicators ... 46

Table 29 - Independent variables: explanatory factors... 47

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1. Introduction

Recently, it seems as if increased attention is given to far right in Western European media. For example, Belgium reports extensively on Flemish Interest (FI), Germany on Pegida, and the Netherlands on the Freedom Party (FP).1_{But to what extent is far right in Western Europe moving from}

the margins to the spotlights? Is it simply the media emphasizing their every move, or has the public presence of far right in fact increased in the past years? This is the first important issue that this thesis would like to research. As such, the first part of this thesis will be in essence about fact checking. However, we do social research mainly because there is an aspect of our understanding of what goes on in society that is to some extent unresolved (Bryman, 2012). In addition to the fact checking part, this thesis would like to investigate what the explanatory factors are of an increase or decrease in public presence of far right. For example, it is suggested in the media that far right flourishes due to the contemporary migrant crisis. Recently, a variety of Dutch media quoted Frans Timmermans, the Dutch vice-president of the European Commission, warning for an ‘extreme right surge’ if no solution is found for the migrant crisis (among others: Elsevier, 24 September 2015). However, is this a valid concern? The contemporary migrant crisis will be one of the explanatory factors that this research will look into. In order to research both the alleged increase in far right public presence and the explanatory factors for a shift in this public presence, this thesis has developed the following research question:

Has the public presence of far right in Western Europe increased or decreased in the past years, and what factors can explain this shift in far right public presence?

This research has scientific and societal relevance, because it looks into the societal problem of far right, of which some aspects are to a certain extent unresolved. By doing research on this issue, this thesis would like to contribute to the debate on present day far right, and the factors explaining its degree of public presence. Aspects of this have been researched by various scholars, but not on an academic level in the light of the current migrant crisis. As such, this research can hopefully contribute to the debate on far right, and to finding a solution for this societal problem, going hand in hand with potential threats to security. Indeed, what links this issue to the study of Crisis and Security Management is the potential security risk posed by far right, due to inter alia their negative ideas about immigrants. The link with Public Administration is mainly the fact that this research investigates the role of a particular family of electoral-focused political parties, in society.

In chapter 2, the theoretical framework will be discussed. Chapter 3 will explain the methodology. Chapter 4 is home to the analysis. Both subquestions are analysed in chapter 4. As explained, the research question is twofold, since it can be divided into the following two subquestions: ‘Has the public presence of far right increased or decreased in the past years?’ and ‘What factors can explain this increase or decrease in far right public presence?’. The more descriptive part of chapter 4 is about fact checking. This part will try to examine the picture painted by the media, more or less suggesting that public presence of far right has increased. In other words, this part of the analysis will examine whether the public presence of far right has increased or decreased in the past years. The more explanatory parts of chapter 4 will look at the factors explaining far right public presence. One factor, the migrant crisis, has been derived from the media. Additional explanatory factors will be derived from literature. Chapter 4 will end with a comparison. In chapter 5, this thesis will answer the research question, and reflect on the results. Appendices and a bibliography can be found in respectively chapter 6 and 7.

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2. Theoretical framework

This chapter will explain what this thesis is going to research, by explaining the concepts and the explanatory factors. Indicators for the different variables are discussed in the operationalization (§3.4).

2.1 Concepts

In this paragraph, the concepts from the research question, far right and public presence, will be explained. Far right public presence is the dependent variable, as it is the event studied, that is expected to change (Bryman, 2012).

2.1.1 Far right

Inter-war and wartime extreme right mainly encompassed fascism (Hainsworth, 2008; Griffin, 1991). However, there is a broad consensus in scholarship, that throughout the years, far right became decreasingly associated with fascism. This thesis focusses on post-war far right. Hainsworth (2008:2) explains that ‘contemporary extreme right has emerged in socio-political and historical circumstances that are very different to the pre-war and war-time ones.’ After World War II, with the defeat of fascism and the triumph of liberal democracy, extreme right politics was marginalized (Hainsworth, 2008). In line with numerous other scholars, Mudde (2000) is of the believe that the rise of extreme right-wing parties comes in waves. The interest of this thesis goes out to the third wave of post-war right-wing extremism, which is believed to have its roots in the 1980s (Mudde, 2000). As stated by Ignazi (2003): ‘The extreme right parties of the 1980s, in fact, are no longer neo-fascist parties.’ Especially since the 1980s, extreme right and neo-fascism were no longer interchangeably connected, due to the emergence of new - and the renewal of old - extreme rights parties (Ignazi, 2003). Harrison and Bruter (2011:30) make the same distinction, by describing ‘old’ extreme right parties as focussing on neo-fascist ideology, and ‘new’ extreme right parties as building upon an anti-systemic and populist legacy.

Due to the foregoing, terminology is a major issue when researching the political family at the right-most position of the political spectrum. Ignazi (2003) explains that despite the fact that the third wave is a different type of extreme right, as they no longer have a connection with (neo-)fascism, these parties are nevertheless still grouped under extreme right as they lay outside the mainstream. The fact that they are in the right-most position of the political spectrum did not change (Hainsworth, 2008). However, due to its link with fascism, the label ‘extreme right’ is a controversial label that is generally not appreciated by (followers of) parties described as such (Hainsworth, 2008:5). Their position in the political spectrum is the same, but most extreme parties are way more moderate than the extreme parties decades ago, in the (inter-)war period. The context of time and place has a significant influence on how parties are labelled (Hainsworth, 2008:10). Eatwell (2004:14) captures the foregoing critique in his description of the term ‘extreme right’ as ‘a convenient but flawed shorthand’. Mudde (1995) explains that this is inter alia because right-wing extremism is a relatively new term, in contrast to ‘isms’ such as socialism, liberalism and communism. Nevertheless, the ‘slippery and contested label’ is used by most researches into this utmost right political family (Hainsworth, 2008: 8).

As such, various scholars argue that extreme right is a controversial concept due to its link with fascism or (Neo-)Nazism. Consequently, one might consider the term too narrow to apply to more moderate right-wing parties, or incapable of dealing with policy and ideology overlap with more mainstream political parties (Hainsworth, 2008:22). This research would like to use a more broad interpretation of the political right-wing family, and therefore prefers the term ‘far right’. This research would like to investigate parties at the utmost right, but also those parties at the right side of the spectrum that are somewhat more moderate but overlap with extreme right parties in their policy and ideology. Consequently, this research deems the term ‘far right’ more suitable for analytical -

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political - purposes. It encompasses ‘extreme right’, but also right wing parties that are not called ‘extreme’ in everyday terms. As such, it takes into account ‘the overlap between the right and the extreme right’ (Hainsworth, 2008:7). Moreover, besides the scope of the term ‘far right’, there are some additional reasons for choosing this concept. The term ‘far right’ is one of the terms originally used for the political family, and as such on of the most traditional terms. Second, the term is most self-explanatory, as it refers to the place of the political family in the political left-right spectrum. Last, the term is suitable for universal use, and already broadly applied (Harrison and Bruter, 2011: 22). This research is convinced that by looking at ideology, it can achieve a ‘distinct enough grouping of political parties’ (Hainsworth, 2008). However, it is a significant disadvantage that the term ‘extreme right’ is more discussed in literature. A very important consequence for this research is that literature on ‘extreme right’ will be applied analogously to ‘far right’ in this thesis. Needless to say, this will only be done where appropriate, and with the necessary caution. The same also applies to some other terms, that are interchangeably used with the term ‘far right’, such as ‘new populist right’ or ‘radical right wing populism’ (Harrison and Bruter, 2011:22).

Mudde (2000) goes more into depth regarding the ideology of extreme right, making use of the concept ‘party family’. According to Mudde, this so-called ‘party family’ functions as a label, under which political parties are grouped according to their ideology. Hainsworth (2008:67) defines political ideologies as ‘bodies of interconnected ideas or systems of thought that constitute a basis for political action, reflection and debate.’ As stated by Hainsworth (2008:22): ‘It is the manner in which they deal with issues, such as immigration, identity, security, culture and nation that helps to locate the extreme right.’ He asks the question: ‘Is there a magic formula whereby a party or movement can be irrefutably labelled?’ (Hainsworth, 2008:68). Unfortunately, there is no such magic formula in existing scholarship. This makes selecting cases for an extreme right study a complicated process. Or, does it? Mudde (2000:185) created a list of those parties that are ‘generally considered to be members of the extreme right party family of Western Europe’. He states that ‘we seem to know who they are even though we do not exactly know what they are’ (Mudde, 2000:7). By this, Mudde criticizes the fact that researchers never seem to have trouble selecting their cases, while the concept of ‘right-wing extremism’ is not even clearly defined (yet). Aware of this pitfall, Ignazi (2003:95) has chosen to select parties not on connotation, but based on association. As such, he does not look at explicit extreme right language, but at viewpoint on certain themes, that can lead to an association with extreme right ideology by potential voters (Ignazi, 2003;95). This is in line with a statement made by Hainsworth, 2008:23), that alleged members of the extreme right party family do not ‘have exactly the same, essential characteristics, but (…) there is enough in common to consider the phenomena in question as a collectivity of family, worthy of broad, comparative analysis’.

There is broad consensus that ideology is one of the core elements to consider, when selecting parties for the extreme right party family. For most authors, a party must fulfil several different features to reflect this ideology. However, the lists of these features vary in length, content, and (their number of) mandatory features. Similar to the list of generally selected cases, Mudde (2000) made a list of ten characteristics generally attributed to extreme right: nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, anti-democratic features, populism, anti-party sentiments, the strong state, ecologism or environmentalism, ethical outlook (for example traditional or religious), and socio-economic policy (such as socialism or (neo)-liberalism). At least half of the researched authors require ‘nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state’ (Mudde 2000:11). Mudde defines these characteristics as follows: nationalism is ‘The belief that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation or ethnic community) should be congruent’ (Mudde, 2000:187); racism/exclusionism is ‘The distinction between groups whereby one group (they) is excluded from certain aspects of the life of the other group (we)’ (Mudde, 2000:187); xenophobia is ‘Fear, hate or hostility with regard to groups that are perceived as ‘alien’ or ‘strange’, such as foreigners, immigrants, asylum-seeker, etc.’ (Mudde, 2000:188); anti-democratic features is about ‘Criticism of ‘democracy’ as a political system’ (Mudde, 2000:188); and finally, the strong state is about law-and-order (‘The belief in order and authority, accompanied by the demand for strong punishment of breach of the rules’ and ‘a strong

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police force’) and militarism (Mudde, 2000:188). However, as noted by Hainsworth (2008:68), not all of these features are (always) seen as essential for a characterization as ‘extreme right’. The ‘magic formula’ used for this thesis, is explained in the operationalization.

Taken all the foregoing into account, it is now time to formulate a definition suitable for this research. Finding an all-encompassing definition is a difficult task, as there is no consensus on such a definition among scholars. Deciding which parties belong - or not belong - to the far right political family is a challenge. For example, with regards to extreme right ‘There are as many differences as there are similarities within the (…) party family’ (Harrison and Bruter, 2011: 1; Schain et al., 2002:6). Mudde (1996) has found no less than 26 different definitions of the term ‘extreme right’, in his book on defining the extreme right party family. It is not within the scope of the thesis to discuss all possible definitions; however, it is important to find a definition suitable for this thesis and for analytical purposes. Once again, it is important to note that most parties characterized as extreme right by scholars, do not label themselves as such (Hainsworth, 2008:5). For this research, it is therefore not of relevance whether political parties consider themselves to be extreme right or far right. It is of relevance whether a party - for analytical purposes - fits within the far right corner, in its broad sense. The definition used in this research is a combination of factors used in different definitions, from inter alia Hainsworth (2008), Harrison and Bruter (2011), Ignazi (2003), and Mudde (2000), and reads as follows:

An electoral focused political party, located at the right side of the political spectrum, whose ideological identity is based on ideological features such as nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia.

2.1.2 Public presence

‘Presence’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘The state or fact of existing, occurring, or being present’. With regards to a political party, one can be present in the streets, in elections, but for example also in newspapers or on social media. ‘Public’ can be defined as ‘concerning the people as a whole’. As such, ‘public presence’ for a political party can be described as ‘being present to the people as a whole’. In the research question, ‘increase(d) or decrease(d)’ refers back to ‘public presence’. As such, a shift in public presence has to be researched. Researching a shift requires a first (before) and a second (after) measurement, performed at a different point in time. The timescope of these measurements is based on the contemporary migrant crisis, which will be explained in more detail in the operationalization (§3.4.2).

2.2 Explanatory factors

In this paragraph, the explanatory factors, or the independent variables, will be discussed. As stated by Hainsworth (2008:28), ‘various factors need to be taken into account in explaining extreme right emergence and success. Mono-causal or one-sided approaches to explaining the extreme right’s success fail to capture the complexity of the phenomenon.’ It is exactly because of this reason, that this thesis does not only look into the factor of the contemporary migrant crisis, derived from the media, but also into the most important other possible explanatory factors, derived from the literature. One can think of a large variety of different factors that can be of influence on far right public presence. However, most authors focus on terminology and ideology, and devote little attention to explanatory factors. An authors that does pay significant attention to reasons for extreme right success and decline is Hainsworth. Hainsworth (2008) comes with several factors to explain extreme right successes, ranging from broad postwar developments, to more specific issues. In general, Hainsworth (2008:25) acknowledges the potential influence of ‘significant, socio-economic, political, cultural and structural changes’. On a more specific note, Hainsworth (2008:25-27) mentions inter alia the possible role of political culture, party system, weakened voter identification, globalisation, migration, environment

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and European integration. Another factor mentioned by the author that can be of influence, is that ‘in order to enhance their appeal and benefit from available opportunities, the parties have changed their image over time’ (Hainsworth, 2008:28). In addition to immigration, this thesis has filtered three of the most important - researchable - possible explanatory factors for a shift in far right public presence out of the literature: quality of life, attitudes towards European integration and the changing image of the parties.

2.2.1 Factor 1: the migrant crisis

The contemporary migrant crisis is an important factor for this thesis. It was due to this explanatory factor, derived from the media, that the author started wondering which factors can form an explanation for a shift in far right public presence. The timescope of this thesis is based on this factor, as the timescope parallels a rise in the number of migrants. This will make it easier to see the potential influence of the migrant crisis on far right public presence. Also, the cases are selected based on inter alia this factor. In addition, the ideological features chosen to qualify as a far right party are also partially based on this factor, since ideological characteristics that (can) have a link with the migrant crisis are taken into account. This is mainly based on a negative attitude towards ‘strangers’ by political parties. This can be just an attempt to capture votes. However, more than often, a negative attitude towards immigration is part of the extreme right ideology (Hainsworth, 2008:70). Far right parties have made immigration one of the spearheads of the political debate. To a large extent, they even owe their success to this topic, as the far right stance on immigration often provokes a (disapproving) response from other political parties (Hainsworth, 2008:76). The German federal criminal investigation department argues that extreme right has always been very heterogeneous, but that the migrant crisis is uniting them in their ideologies (Elsevier, 22 October 2015). But wat is exactly the relationship between immigration and public presence of far right parties? Does it increase far right public presence? Hainsworth (2008:76) argues that ‘there is no mechanistic relationship between the number of immigrants in a given area and the number of votes for the extreme right. Often, it is the fear of outsiders rather than the reality of their actual presence that encourages a voter to opt for the extreme right.’ This theory by Hainsworth will be shortly reflected upon in the conclusion.

In 2013, the United Nations refugee agency UNHCR reported that the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people worldwide had reached 51,2 million (UNHCR, 20 June 2014b). As such, the current migrant crisis is the worst migration crisis since World War II. One year later, at the end of 2014, the number of forcibly displaced people already reached a staggering 59,5 million. This is the highest increase ever seen in a single year (UNHCR 18 June 2015). More than half of all these refugees originate from just three countries (UNHCR, 18 June 2015). The mayor increase in the number of refugees is predominantly due to the war in Syria (UNHCR, 20 June 2014b). Armed conflict in Syria has been going on for years, starting in 2011, as part of the Arab Spring movement. Pro-democracy protests led to unrest, resulting in supporters of President Bashar al-Assad getting into conflict with his opposition (BBC, 12 March 2015). The civil unrest escalated into a civil war, wherein rebels and government forces took up arms to fight each other. The fighting evolved into a conflict between the Sunni majority and the government’s Shia minority, getting even more complicated by the increasing involvement of jihadist groups such as Islamic State (IS). IS made use of the instable situation in Syria, by starting a ‘war within a war’, and conquering large amounts of Syrian territory (BBC, 12 March 2015). Meanwhile, over 200,000 Syrians have lost their lives. The UN says to have evidence that both sides of the conflict have committed war-crimes. Moreover, the OPCW has documented use of toxic chemical weapons. A large humanitarian crisis is the harrowing result: millions of people have fled Syria, and an additional 7,6 million are internally displaced (BBC, 12 March 2015; Syrian Centre for Policy Research, March 2015). So far, peace efforts made by inter alia the Arab League and the United Nations have not yet led to the desired result.

Besides Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia have the dubious honour of significantly contributing to the refugee crisis. With regards to Afghanistan, the situation has been unstable for decades. In 1996,

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the Taliban rose to power by seizing control of Kabul. A radical version of Islam entered into force, and a year later Taliban controlled about two-third of the country. The United Nations started a hunt for Osama Bin Laden - the head of al-Qaeda. However, the situation in Afghanistan further escalated after the 9/11 attacks, when Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden (BBC, 7 March 2012). As a response, the United States started bombing Afghanistan. In 2002, the NATO-led ISAF missions joined in the fight against Taliban (BBC, 30 September 2015). In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was found and killed by American soldiers in Pakistan (BBC, 7 March 2012). Meanwhile, there are still many foreign troops present in Afghanistan. However, the downscaling has begun. At the end of 2014, NATO formally ended its mission in Afghanistan. In addition, other countries are also downscaling their military presence. With regards to Somalia, after the fall of the Siad Barre-regime in 1991, the country collapsed into anarchy. This resulted in a non-resilient country, with rival warlords fighting each other. A high number of internally displaced people was the result (BBC, 5 May 2015). However, matters only got worse due to the countries lack of resiliency. Natural disasters such as droughts forced many people to flee the country, especially during the famine of 2011. This 2011 drought was said to be the worst in six decades (BBC, 5 May 2015).

Due to a high number of displaced people, a true migrant crisis has developed. While the crisis has been going on for years, it has never been more of a concern for Europe than it is now. The European Union is facing the migrant crisis more directly than ever, as refugees from countries in the European surroundings head for Europe in large numbers. As stated by the UNHCR (4 September 2015): ‘Europe is facing the biggest influx of refugees in decades. Only in this year, over 300,000 people have risked their lives by trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea’ (UNHCR, 4 September 2015). Within the EU we enjoy the free movement of persons. In 1985 and 1990 the Schengen Agreements were signed, establishing the Schengen area. 22 European Union members, as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are full members of the Schengen area. Within this area, internal border controls for all persons are abolished. To compensate for the abolishment of the internal border controls, measures were taken to strengthen and harmonise external border controls (European Parliament, June 2015). In other words, the focus in the European Union shifted from the internal borders to the external borders. External border control is more or less a common problem, whereas migration problems a currently an issue of separate European Union countries. With regards to refugees, the European Union approach is still more or less fragmented. Asylum claims for countries within the Schengen Area are arranged by the Dublin Regulation.

The Dublin Regulation contains criteria for appointing the Member State responsible for examining an asylum claim in Europe. The main criterion is based on family links, but the second most important criterion entail that responsibility is appointed to the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the Schengen Area (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The idea behind this criteria is twofold. First, it ensures that one Member State only is responsible for examining the asylum request. Second, it aims to speed up the process in appointing the responsible State, to ensure effective access to the asylum procedure. However, in practice, the Dublin Regulation has several downsides. One of these downsides clearly shows in the current refugee influx: the Dublin Regulation places a (too) heavy burden on states at some of the external borders of Europe (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). For refugees crossing the Mediterranean See, Italy and Greece are the main landing points. As described by New York Times, ‘tens of thousands of migrants and refugees are working their way north through the Balkans’ (New York Times, 26 August 2015). For example, refugees travel from Greece to Hungary, via Macedonia and Serbia. Over 40,000 refugees have crossed the border into Macedonia in the past two months (New York Times, 26 August 2015). Apart from France, none of the Western European countries have external Schengen borders.2_{Nevertheless,}

Western Europe is way more popular amongst asylum-seekers than other parts of Europe. For example, hardly any migrants are heading for Eastern Europe.

2_{There are various definitions for ‘Western Europe’ in use. This research will make use of the definition by the}

United Nations (Statistics Division, 31 October 2013), which encompasses the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

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2.2.2 Factor 2: quality of life

Quality of life is a concept that is extensively discussed in scholarship. As of 1997, more attention was devoted to the quality of life discourse in Anglo-Saxon literature. One leading author in this field is Adam Crawford, a criminal justice researcher applying the quality of life discourse to governing anti-social behaviour, focusing inter alia on the increasing criminalization of behaviour reducing the quality of life. Crawford explains that the quality of life discourse gained more interest ‘with the focus on commercial benefits and economic perspectives’ (Devroe, 2012:501). According to Crawford (2013:41,175,255), quality of life influencers are among others employment, feeling of safety, and bodily health. In addition, Crawford argues that another example of a quality of life issue is the fear of crime (2013:309). Frans Timmermans recently discussed the link between fear and the popularity of extreme right. Timmermans stated in the Europe House Lecture 2015 that the rise of the extreme right could be explained by ‘a fear of losing something’. He argued that many European citizens are afraid to lose their jobs, their feeling of security, and the benefits of their welfare state, with the extensive influx of migrants. According to Timmermans, this fear of losing things as a result of migrants is a direct effect of a lack of dialogue in society, and consequently not hearing each other’s stories (Timmermans, 9 November 2015). The fear described by Timmermans can easily result in seeking someone to blame, which can result in the ‘blaming’ of immigrants. ‘Blame’ is defined by the Oxford Learner’s Dictionary as thinking or saying that somebody (or something) is responsible for something bad. Far right parties often reflect - and contribute to - the idea that immigrants are to blame for ‘the bad’.

Hainsworth (2008:27) does not only consider fear turning into blaming, but also shame turning into blaming: ‘In this climate of change (incorporating elements such as precariousness, insecurity, skill shortage and labour mobility), extreme right parties have become attractive options for so-called ‘modernisation losers’.’ This line of thought was also followed by criminologist John Braithwaite, who wrote about the displacement of shame by blaming others (Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2011:66). Shame is known for affecting the subjective well-being, in turn having its effect on the quality of life (Sirgy, 2002:10). This thesis can agrees with the reasoning that a low quality of life can results in ‘blaming’, and as such being an important factor in explaining far right public presence.

However, besides fear and shame, there are many other factors that can influence quality of life. In literature, many definitions of quality of life can be found, differing widely per discipline. An example of a quit comprehensive definition is the following by Robert Lane (Offer, 1996:7): ‘quality of external conditions, sense of well-being, and the qualities of persons living those lives.’ As this thesis is about comparison between countries, its interest goes out to the quality of life of these separate countries. This has led the author to the indicators for quality of life set out by the European Commission: material living conditions, productive or main activity, health, education, leisure and social interactions, economic and physical safety, governance and basic rights, natural and living environment, and finally, overall experience of life (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). The ‘cocktail’ of indicators used to measure quality of life for this research will be further discussed in the operationalization (§3.4.4).

2.2.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration

Besides a negative attitude towards migrants, another spearhead of many of the far right parties is a negative attitude towards the European Union, the Euro, and/or European integration. This is clearly the case for some parties researched in this thesis. For example, the Dutch Freedom Party titled their election programme for 2012-2017 ‘Hún Brussel, óns Nederland’ (or: ‘Their Brussels, our Netherlands’) (Partij voor de Vrijheid, July 2012). A negative attitude in society towards European integration can consequently cause more people to relate to Eurosceptic far right parties.

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2.2.4 Factor 4: changing image of the parties

Parties can change their image overtime, which can have an influence on far right public presence. This changing image can be as a result of for example a change in leadership, a court ruling, or disappointing (election) results. As will be explained in the operationalization, it is important to keep in mind that if parties want to run for elections, in general they have to be more moderate, and thus be less explicit in their far right ideology. Otherwise they risk scaring off potential voters, or being banned by court. An example is the German National Democratic Party (NDP). Around 1969, the NDP suffered from disastrous losses in votes and members, which according to Mudde (2000:29) is mainly explained by the loss of their law-abiding image, for instance due to their controversial youth movement, and consequently the threat of a constitutional ban of the party due to their alleged extremist character. In addition, by being too explicit in their far right ideology, parties risk being paralyzed by a so-called ‘cordon sanitaire’ of other political parties. This is a phenomenon exclusive to Belgium, where a ‘cordon sanitaire’ was placed on Flemish Bloc after the 1991 federal elections, where the party managed to receive more than 10% of the votes in Flanders (Migration Policy Institute, 12 June 2007). In an attempt to paralyze the party, the other Belgian political parties formed an agreement to no form a coalition government with Flemish Bloc. It is clear that it can be beneficial for political parties to adapt their image. As stated by Hainsworth (2008:28): ‘in order to enhance their appeal and benefit from available opportunities, the parties have changed their image over time’. This goes in particular for parties with anti-party sentiments, as participation in elections more or less equals an acknowledgement of the political system. The time period examined in this thesis might be somewhat short for investigating a change in image of the parties, but the factor will nevertheless be researched, as it is a factor that is often mentioned in literature as a possible explanatory factor for a shift in far right public presence.

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3. Methodology

This chapter will explain how this thesis is going to find an answer to the research question.

3.1 Research design

Although the analysis contains some quantitative aspects, the research strategy of this thesis will be qualitative research. Qualitative research emphasizes words rather than numbers. This choice has been made, because the author has no experience in quantitative research, emphasizing ‘quantification in the collection and analysis of data’ (Bryman, 2012:35). This is a very practical consideration; however, keeping in mind the significant time constraint for this research, qualitative research seems to be the wiser choice. Advantages of qualitative research are, for example, that it is very suitable for issues that cannot be easily quantified. In quantitative research, gathered data is translated into numbers, and measurements are often structured and standardized. On the other hand, a consequence is that quantitative research, generally speaking, is more scientifically endorsed. Another important difference between both research strategies is the position of the researcher. In contrast to quantitative research, in qualitative research the researcher becomes part of the studied phenomenon. Proponents view researchers as part of the studied social world, whereas opponents argue that the researcher should view the social world in an external and objective manner. Consequently, a disadvantages of qualitative research is that the researcher can be seen as less objective and neutral (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative research predominantly makes use of an inductive approach, focusing on the generation of theory (Bryman, 2012). Instead of going from general to specific, or from theory to data, which is the case with a deductive approach, this research would like to move from data to theory. However, this research can be best be labelled as iterative, involving a ‘weaving back and forth between data and theory’ (Bryman, 2012:26). The research eventually makes use of a mixed inductive/deductive approach, as theory will be used before the gathering of data, but theory might also be developed in the conclusion, after the gathering of data.

With regards to the framework for the collection and analysis of data, the research design used for this thesis will be a case study design. As described by Bryman (2012: 66): ‘The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case’. This research will make use of case studies, as this allows the researcher to use the data gathering methods described in §3.3. In addition, the researcher is of the opinion that case study is a suitable way of researching a recent shift. Also, there are interesting case studies available with regards to extreme right in Western Europe. Finally, an important reason is that it allows the researcher to investigate a case thoroughly. Case study design is typically associated with qualitative research, as the goal is to understand few cases more in depth, whereas quantitative research makes use of a large N. The latter point out the disadvantage of case studies: the small number of cases taken into account makes it difficult to generalize the research results beyond the cases studied. This is the problem of external validity. External validity deals with generalization of the results. This research hopes to be generalizable to Western Europe. For this reason, the author has chosen for a multiple case study. However, generalizing the results beyond the specific context that was studied remains an issue. Nevertheless, it is a good indicator for the whole of Western Europe, and therefore this research can add to the debate on far right and immigration.

3.2 Case studies

As explained, to increase the validity of the research, three cases will be studied. Obviously, ‘the main argument in favour of the multiple-case study is that it improves theory building’ (Bryman, 2012:74). When researching multiple cases, it is easier for the researcher to investigate the possible influences

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of the independent variables on the dependent variables. The more cases are studied, the less changes are that found relationships are based on coincidence. In the case of investigating countries, as done in this research, it might be even more important to perform a multiple-case study. This is because differences between individual countries can be significant. This can be due to an extensive number of factors, such as economic circumstances, the political climate, internal conflict, a countries history, etcetera. Therefore, in this research three out of nine Western European countries are subject to research. In short: studying multiple cases improves the possibility of generalizing to the whole of Western Europe, while still enabling the author to make an extensive analysis of all the cases.

The cases chosen are Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.3_{A practical reason for choosing}

these cases is language. Furthermore, there are various additional reasons, based on the presence of far right-wing, and their public opinion on immigrants. Germany its historic links with Nazism puts far right in a special historical context. Nowadays, Germany is in the centre of attention with regards to the migrant crisis. An example is the uproar in the city of Heidenau, at the Eastern-German border, where extreme right-wing protesters started violent demonstrations as a response to the migrant influx (The Guardian, 11 September 2015). Also, more recently, a German politician running for mayor of Cologne was stabbed because of her ‘liberal stance on refugees’ (CNN, 19 October 2015). Belgium also has a history and a present with far right, where a large role is played by Flemish nationalism. The Netherlands, finally, is interesting inter alia due to their popular Freedom Party. In addition, the Netherlands recently witnessed sympathizers of the far right disturbing a consultation evening about a possible asylum seekers center in the municipality of Steenbergen. Some argue that far right sympathizers tour around the country to visit and negatively influence similar meetings, to create an atmosphere where pro-immigrants are afraid to speak up (NOS, 23 October 2015; Elsevier, 23 October 2015). The foregoing shows that all three cases have their own struggles concerning the migrants crisis.

In addition, the three cases are selected based on their difference in public opinion towards immigrants, as shown in the tables below. Data reflecting this public opinion is derived from the European Social Survey (EES). This survey has now been held 7 times, of which both the first round (2002) and the last round (2014) examined the variable ‘immigration’. For example, the question was asked whether immigrants made their country a worse or better place to live.’4_{The result of this}

question are displayed in the tables below. For 2002, it shows that Belgium has a significantly less positive attitude towards migrants then Germany. From all Belgian respondents, only 0,7% is of the opinion that immigrants make their country a better place to live, being the lowest score from all Western-European countries. The Netherlands falls in between Belgium and Germany. In 2014, again in Belgium the least people are of the opinion that immigrants make their country a better place to live (1%), whereas Germany is again the least negative (3,8%). The foregoing makes a comparison between the three cases interesting, as they are all three situated in Western Europe, but differ in opinion on immigrants.

3_{The cases are consistently mentioned and analysed in alphabetical order.}

4_{The literal question read as follows: ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live}

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Table 1 - European Social Survey (2002), Round 1 (ed.6.4), displayed in column percentages.

Table 2 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.5

3.3 Data gathering

As explained in the previous paragraph, this thesis has made use of case studies to gather data on far right public presence and its possible explanatory factors. This paragraph will provide more details on the specific methods used for the gathering of this data. A visit to the cases involved has not been considered for long. Nor the time, nor the resources for such visits were available to the researcher. It might have been feasible for one more in depth case study, but not feasible for a multiple case study. Also not part of the gathering process are interviews and survey research. Data on far right public presence is hard to gather via interviews and survey research. Furthermore, the researcher has no experience in both data gathering methods. Moreover, consideration such as the time limit have also made the researcher decide not to include interviews or survey research. The former takes up a lot of time, both in performing and processing the interviews. The same goes for the latter, while in addition, a significant amount of time has to be granted to the respondents for filling in the survey. Finally, both methods come with the necessary risks, as interviews might be cancelled or weak in content, while surveys can easily result in a lack of respondents.

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As such, this thesis has chosen for more flexible and accessible data gathering methods, where the researcher has experience with. These methods are library research and desktop research, which both have the advantage that they are not dependent on third actors, and are flexible with regards to place and time. The advantage of library research is that it provides the user with academic, trustworthy sources. However, a disadvantage of library research is that it takes a significant amount of books and articles to gather all the pieces of information needed. In addition, another disadvantage is that it is more difficult to find up to date sources. This gap is filled by desktop analysis, which is a very appropriate method to find recent data, such as information on the recently established Dutch party ‘For The Netherlands’. Desktop analysis allows the researcher to search with a more narrow focus. Furthermore, the methods chosen are very transparent, capable of replication, and suitable for a longitudinal analysis. Moreover, the methods have less ethical concerns than other research methods.

In this thesis, both methods are used interchangeably. However, as a consequence of the before mentioned advantages and disadvantages of both data gathering methods, library research is mostly used for background information, such as in the theoretical framework, and in the introductions of the case studies in the analysis. Desktop research is found mostly in the other parts of the analysis. This is mostly in the form of document analysis, involving the examination of a significant amount of written material. For this research, this entails for instance the comparing of the content of elections programmes, and the use of a variety of newspaper articles. The (online) newspapers analysed for this research are inter alia the following: BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welle, Elsevier, The Guardian, The Irish Times, Le Monde, The New Observer, New York Times, NOS, Het Nieuwsblad, NRC, De Redactie, Spiegel Online, De Standaard and Volkskrant. The newspaper content analysis has taken the form of a critical media discourse analysis, wherein a critical assessment of media language is pivotal. As explained by Teun van Dijk (2001:352), ‘Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.’ This research has made use of this method by searching newspaper articles online, and subsequently scanning them critically, by looking at both text and non-text. Looking at the text was done by either scanning or completely reading the articles, and filtering out the information (potentially) relevant for this research. Looking at non-text was done by taken into account several other factors reflecting the language of the article. For example, the tone of the articles has been taken into account, such as whether an article is critical, cynical, neutral, or otherwise. Also, the political context has been taken into account. For example, was an article written in a nation-wide or even internationally read newspaper, or perhaps in a political party newspaper? And when issued by a political party, was the newspaper meant for international or external purposes? This research has taken into account that seeing the text in the right socio-political context can shed an entirely different light on the content of a newspaper article.

In the analysis, it was first identified which parties do or do not match the definition of far right used in this thesis. After the gathering of data by use of the explained methods, library analysis and desktop analysis, this research analysed and interpreted the data. For this matter, the gathered data was written down in an explanatory context, and in a structured way by use of (sub)headings. Eventually, all the results have been presented in tables, making use of arrows to indicate a positive or negative shift in the variable. This makes an analysis possible, by comparing the cases and their results, and looking at commonalities and differences. The comparison is done at the end of the analysis. Finally, the connections found - or not found - are interpreted, and a conclusion on the gathered data is formed.

3.4 Operationalization

In this paragraph, the dependent variables (far right and public presence) and the independent variables (the explanatory factors) will be operationalized.

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3.4.1 Far right

Far right was defined by the author in the theoretical framework, as an electoral focused political party, located at the right side of the political spectrum, whose ideological identity is based on ideological features such as nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia. The indicators are as follows:

1. Political party - political group identified by official label

- placing candidates for public office through elections at federal level 2. Ideological identity - right side of the political spectrum

- two of the following characteristics: nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia

Political party

An important factor is that it concerns a political party. Heywood (2013) defines a political party as ‘a group of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power, by electoral or other means’. However, this definition is too broad for this research. Mudde (2000) defines a political party as ‘any political group identified by an official label that places candidates for public office through elections’. In line with Mudde (2000) and with Hainsworth (2008), the focus will be on those parties that have opted for electoralism. For this research, a party has opted for electoralism if it has contested elections on a federal level in the 21st_{century. Non-parliamentary movements do not fall within the}

scope of this definition (Hainsworth, 2008). Unfortunately, this means that interesting organizations such as Pegida will not be taken into account. Another disadvantage is that far right is sometimes anti-party, and therefore not always suitable to research under the definition of an electoral focused political party. Finally, it is important to keep in mind is that if parties want to run for elections, they have to be more moderate, and thus fewer of the mentioned ideological features will be (obviously) applicable to them. This definition is nevertheless chosen, to delimit the research. In addition, parties running in (federal) elections are more suitable for research on ‘public presence’.

Ideological identity

To qualify as a far right party for this research, parties must belong at the right side on the political left-right spectrum. In addition, the political party must have a certain ideological identity. As explained earlier, a wide range of ideological features can be linked to far right. For this research, the emphasis is on the possible influence of the migrant crisis. Therefore, nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia are the most relevant characteristics, as they (can) have a connection with a negative attitude towards immigrants. A commonly perceived ‘negative attitude against strangers’ is therefore a criteria in the selection of cases. Therefore, a party that is extreme or far right due to its environmental position, will not be taken into consideration if this negative attitude against strangers is not present. One out of three features is not enough to fall within the scope of this research, as this would also qualify parties such as the New-Flemish Alliance, based on their Flemish nationalism. Two out of three features is enough to be selected for the case studies of this thesis. This is legitimate inter alia due to the use of the term ‘far right’ instead of ‘extreme right’. In addition, this is legitimate because the definition used for the case selection is for analytical purposes. The figure on the left will function as a tool to locate political parties. Only parties located in the overlapping parts of the spectrum qualify for this research.

3.4.2 Public presence

Public presence was defined by the author in the theoretical framework as ‘being present to the people as a whole’. Measuring public presence can be done via multiple indicators, taking into account both what the parties say, and what the parties do: the scope of the party family, the number of votes,

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public statements, and public manifestations. Social media will be analysed where possible and relevant, for example in the search for public statements. The indicators are as follows:

1. Scope of the party family - number of parties

- number of members

2. Votes - federal elections

3. Public statements and manifestations - public statements

- public manifestations and mobilization capacity

The scope of the far right party family

By comparing the size of the far right party family in the past years, this research can investigate whether the family has grown, which is an indicator for its public presence. The scope of the far right party family requires two measurements. On the one hand, it entails the number of far right parties. On the other hand, an expansion of the number of far right parties does not automatically entail an expansion in the number of supporters. For example, a party can split in two due to internal strife, adding a new party, but not necessarily new members. The number of members of far right parties is an indication of the number of people publicly supporting these parties, and the party family as a whole, as such being an indicator for the public presence of far right. Determining the number of parties is a matter of definition, as thoroughly discussed in this research. However, even more difficult is determining the number of members of those parties. It is important to note here, that there is no official database with numbers of members of the parties. It is up to the parties themselves to publish these numbers, which decreases the reliability of these numbers, since it is in the interest of the parties to exaggerate their number of followers (Knack, 12 November 2014).

Number of votes

The number of votes concerns votes in federal elections.

Public statements and manifestations

Public statements can be spoken or written, for example in press conferences, party meetings, newspapers, on their websites or on their social media. This paper also considers election programmes as public statements. It is argued that election programmes do not show the true face of a party, out of tactical consideration (Mudde, 2000:20). However, they are nevertheless a good example of the party’s external orientation. However, they will not be used in the analysis, as election programmes are only issued prior to elections, and as such, the year of publication does not give an indication of public presence, but merely an indication of electoral focus. Party papers will also not be taken into consideration, when their primary orientation is internal (Mudde, 2000:21). Media coverage is out of this scope, as this is more about the attention that far right is getting, not about their public presence. Although these two factors often go hand in hand, this is not a given. For example, they can also be the focus of the media because of their decline, or their absence in public presence. Public manifestations mainly encompass own protests and demonstrations. Similar to public statements, manifestations with a primary internal orientation will not be taken into account. The main example of this are (national) party meetings. In order to measure increase, not only the number of public manifestations is important, but also the mobilization capacity. If more manifestations attract less supporters, one cannot righteously speak of an increase in public presence.

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3.4.3 Factor 1: the migrant crisis

The migrant crisis has been explained in §2.2.1. As mentioned, the timescope of this research is linked to the contemporary migrant crisis. As such, the indicator for the migrant crisis is the timescope. The starting point of this migrant crisis is disputable, as it can be seen from multiple perspectives and by multiple definitions. For this research, the scope will be from 2011 to 2015. This range has been chosen based on the figures of UNHCR, as displayed in figure 2 (UNHCR Global Trends 2010-2014). This figure shows the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide, including asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons. As of 2011, the number of forcibly displaced people has continuously increased. As such, this research would like to gather data as from 2011, in order to investigate whether this increase goes hand in hand with a shift in far right public presence.

Figure 2 - Number of forcibly displaced people worldwide

3.4.4 Factor 2: quality of life

The second explanatory factor is quality of life. It is used in a variety of different disciplines, and differs widely per context. For this research, quality of life refers to the general well-being of the people of case X as a whole. Quality of life is a variable that has been extensively debated in literature, yet there is no consensus on an all-encompassing way of measuring this variable. However, there is increasing agreement that quality of life encompasses more than just the narrow context of GDP figures (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). With regards to the quality of life of a country, the European Commission has its own set of nine indicators: material living conditions, productive or main activity, health, education, leisure and social interactions, economic and physical safety, governance and basic rights, natural and living environment, and finally, overall experience of life (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). The indicators used to measure quality of life for this research, are based on these nine indicators established by the European Commission. The author has used indicators from the European Social Survey, that have as much overlap as possible with the European Commission indicators. The European Social Survey was chosen as a source, as it is a large and professional database, containing data collected from a large variety of countries, over a long period of time, and about a broad range of social aspects. This makes comparison between two different years and three different countries possible in a trustworthy way. The European Social Survey has now been done seven times, and consists of core and rotating modules. Some of these core themes, such as ‘Socio-demographics’ and ‘Subjective Well-Being, Social Exclusion, Religion, National and Ethnic Identity’ provide useful data for measuring the quality of life in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands in 2011 and 2014. The following six questions of the 2010 and 2014 social survey (European Social Survey) will be used for this research:

1. Doing last 7 days: paid work?

2. Feeling about household’s income nowadays? 3. How happy are you?

4. Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark? 5. Subjective general health?

6. How satisfied with life as a whole?

3.4.5 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration

The third factor is about attitudes towards European integration. As mentioned, a negative attitude in society towards European integration can cause more people to relate to Eurosceptic far right parties. To measure attitudes towards European integration, this research selected three questions from surveys reflecting the level of trust of European citizens in the European Union, and their opinion on a

43,7 42,5

45,2

51,5

59,5

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unifying Europe. A question on specifically the European Parliament is involved, as the European Parliament is the so-called heart of democracy of the EU, or ‘The citizens voice in the EU’ (European Parliament, 2015). Below, the three questions used are listed. The first two questions are from the European Social Survey, the third question is from the Standard Eurobarometer (European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer):

1. Trust in the European Parliament

2. European Union: European unification go further or gone too far 3. Trust in the European Union

3.4.6 Factor 4: changing image of the parties

The last factor measures a change in image of the parties. A change in image between 2011 and 2015, making the party either more explicit or less explicit in their nationalist, xenophobe or exclusionist stance, can influence the public presence of far right parties. As previously mentioned, a party can change its image for multiple reasons. In addition, a party can change its image in multiple ways. The indicators used to measure this variable are based on these ‘multiple ways’. For example, a party can change its image by a change in party leader, or a change in the tone of its election programme. This research has tried to cover the most important possible changes by use of the following indicators:

1. Change in party name 2. Change in party leader 3. Change in party symbol

4. Change in party partnerships > coalition partners on a federal and European level 5. Change in election programme

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3.4.7 Operationalization table

Below, the operationalization of all different variables is schematically depicted.

Theory Concepts Definition Indicators Data sources

Media seem to suggest that the public presence of far right has increased

Far right public presence

The presence of far right to the people as a whole - number of parties - number of members - votes - public statements - public manifestations - mobilization capacity Various As of 2011 the number of forcibly displaced people has continuously increased

Migrant crisis The continuous

rise in migrants from Africa and the Middle East

- timescope 2011 - 2015 UNHCR

A low quality of life can results in ‘blaming’

Quality of life The general

well-being of the people of a country as a whole

- Doing last 7 days: paid work? - Feeling about household’s income nowadays?

- How happy are you? - Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark? - Subjective general health? - How satisfied with life as a whole? European Social Survey A negative attitude towards the European Union, the Euro, and/or European integration is a spearhead of many far right parties Attitudes towards European integration Public opinion towards European Union (integration)

- Trust in the European Parliament

- European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

- Trust in the European Union

European Social Survey, Standard Eurobarometer Parties can change their image overtime, for example to gain more popular support Changing images A change in the external image of a party

- Change in party name - Change in party leader - Change in party symbol - Change in party partnerships - Change in election

programme

Various

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4. Analysis

This chapter will measure per case study whether a shift has taken place in far right public presence in Western Europe between 2011 and 2015. In addition, a possible shift in the explanatory factors will be measured. As explained in chapter 3, the indicator for the migrant crisis is the timescope. The number of forcibly displaced people worldwide from 2011 till 2015 was explained in the graph. This thesis is of the assumption that this increase leads to an increase in migrants heading for Western Europe. In addition, this thesis presumes that this leads to an increase in immigrants for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. As such, factor 1, the migrant crisis, will not be discussed in the analysis, as an increase for all three cases is assumed. The other explanatory factors will be examined thoroughly in this chapter, in order to determine a shift in these variables between 2011 and 2015. For the figures of 2014, data from the European Social Survey over 2014 has been used. For the figures of 2011, data from the European Social Survey over 2010 and 2012 has been used (European Social Survey). Data over 2010 is used to measure ‘quality of life’, whereas data over 2012 is used to measure ‘attitudes towards European integration’. This slight inconsistency is explained by the fact that the questions asked in the survey differ per year. In addition, data is used from the 2011 and 2014 Eurobarometer for the measuring of ‘attitudes towards European integration’ (European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer). At the end of the chapter, a comparison will be made involving all variables. First, the dependent and independent variables will be discussed separately. Second, the interaction between the dependent and independent variables will be subject to comparison.

4.1 Case I: Belgium

In his book on extreme right, Hainsworth devotes a significant amount of attention to Belgium, home to a variety of extreme right groups since World War II (Hainsworth, 2008:29). Important with regards to Belgium are the internal struggles between the Dutch speaking Flanders, and the French speaking Wallonia. The Guardian describes the link as follows: ‘Flemish leaders are increasingly strident in demanding greater autonomy, while the Walloon leaders retreat to their bunkers and refuse to negotiate. Flemish separatism was once the stronghold of the extreme right: it is now much more mainstream’ (The Guardian, 9 May 2010). Both Mudde and Hainsworth devote little attention to the groups linked to French movements. The Belgian National Front (NF)6_{is briefly mentioned, as a}

French-speaking party active in Wallonia, but never achieving any significant results in elections (Hainsworth, 2008:33). The focus is mainly on Flanders. Mudde (2000) argues with respect to Flanders, that nationalism had difficulty rooting after World War II. As of 1949 Flemish nationalist parties were slowly re-established, but it was not until the 1960s that they really gained significance, due to the language dispute between Dutch and French speaking Belgians (Mudde, 2000:83). Hainsworth (2008:29) confirms, by stating that Flemish nationalism became the driving force behind extreme right in post-war Belgium. In 1979 Flemish Bloc (FB) was founded, remaining a small party for the first few years. However, perhaps inspired by the French FN, attention for the party grew with the introduction of their anti-immigrant politics, with their slogan ‘Eigen volk eerst!’, translated as ‘own people first’ (Mudde, 2000:88; Hainsworth, 2008:32; Ignazi, 2003:132). Mudde (2000:115) describes Flemish Bloc as a party revolving around nationalism, being xenophobic in the sense that they perceive foreigners as a threat, aiming at living separately in their own state with their own ethnic community. Ignazi (2003:132) agrees that Flemish Bloc added ‘nationalism’ to their ‘regionalism’, by stating that in 1984 anti-immigration became one of their central issues. They became politically significant due to their success in the 1988 elections (Hainsworth, 2008). However, their real breakthrough was in 1991, with more electoral success following in inter alia 1994 and 1999 (Mudde, 2000). They emerged as one of

Far right in Western Europe: From the margins to the spotlights?