A comparison of the different accountability mechanisms for the
British Armed Forces and UK-based Private Military and Security
Companies (PMSCs) operating abroad
Master ThesisViktor Dietrich Schick (s1723871) Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs M.Sc. Crisis and Security Management
August 2016
Supervisor: Dr. Joery Matthys
Second reader: Dr. Johan Christensen
Abstract
This master thesis provides a comparison of the different accountability mechanisms for the British Armed Forces and UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) operating abroad. The answer the question, To what extent are there different accountability mechanisms for the British Armed Forces and UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) operating abroad, and how can these differences be explained? a case study of military accountability in the UK was conducted with data from document analysis, desktop research, and open-ended unstructured questionnaires. Accountability was defined as a three-step social relationship between an actor and a forum. To measure the extent to which forums contribute to the functioning of different mechanisms of political, legal, professional, administrative, and social accountability, they were assessed with regard to these three steps. The results show that the British Armed Forces are subject to mechanisms of political, legal, administrative and social accountability while UK-based PMSCs are only subject to social accountability and to some extent to a combined voluntary framework of professional and administrative mechanisms. The lack of PMSC accountability can be explained by the absence of binding legislation on PMSCs.
Keywords
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ... 5 1.1. The Scientific and Societal Relevance ... 5 1.2. Research Question ... 6 1.3. Structure ... 7 2. Theoretical Framework ... 8 2.1. The Private Military and Security Industry ... 8 2.2. Military Provider Firms ... 8 2.3. Military Consulting Firms ... 10 2.4. Military Support Firms ... 11 2.5. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) ... 12 2.6. Accountability ... 13 2.7. Expansions of Accountability ... 14 2.8. Broad Accountability ... 17 2.9. Problems with Broad Conceptualizations of Accountability ... 19 2.10. Narrow Accountability ... 20 2.11. Forums of Accountability ... 22 3. Research Design ... 25 3.1. The Case Study Design ... 26 3.2. The Embedded Single Case Study Design ... 28 3.3. Case Selection ... 28 3.4. Validity & Reliability ... 29 3.5. Data Collection & Analysis ... 31 3.6. Operationalization ... 32
4. The British Armed Forces ... 42
4.1. Recent History ... 46
4.2. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review ... 49
5. Accountability of the British Armed Forces ... 51
5.1. Political Accountability ... 51
5.1.1. Parliament ... 51
5.1.3. Voters ... 58
5.2. Legal Accountability ... 59
5.2.1. Summary Hearing ... 60
5.2.2. Court Martial ... 62
5.2.3. International Criminal Court ... 63
5.3. Administrative Accountability ... 65
5.3.1. Permanent Under Secretary ... 65
5.3.2. Defence Audit Committee ... 66
5.3.3. National Audit Office ... 67
5.4. Professional Accountability ... 68
5.5. Social Accountability ... 70
5.5.1. Conventional Media ... 70
5.5.2. Internet & Social Media ... 72
5.5.3. NGOs, Charities, Civil Interest Groups ... 73
6. The UK and the History with PMSCs ... 76
6.1. Military Privatization in the UK ... 77 6.2. Development of the PMSC Industry ... 79 7. PMSC Accountability ... 83 7.1. A Lack of Regulation ... 83 7.2. Self-Regulation by the Industry ... 85 7.3. Political Accountability ... 86 7.3.1. Parliament ... 86 7.4. Legal Accountability ... 88 7.5. Professional Accountability ... 91
7.5.1. The International Code of Conduct Association ... 92
7.5.2. The Security in Complex Environments Group ... 95
7.6. Administrative Accountability ... 96
7.6.1. Certification Companies ... 97
7.7. Social Accountability ... 98
7.7.1. Media & Internet ... 98
7.7.2. NGOs, Charities, Civil Interest Groups ... 100
7.7.3. Clients ... 102
9. Conclusion ... 108
9.1. Limitations ... 108
9.2. Recommendations for further Research ... 109
References ... 111
1. Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to compare public and private military in the UK with regard to different accountability mechanisms. Against the backdrop of a growing number of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) (Krahmann, 2005b; Singer, 2007) and the decreasing size of the British Armed Forces (Edmunds, Dawes, Higate, Jenkings, & Woodward, 2016), in combination with an extensive policy of outsourcing of military services to the private sector (Edmonds, 1999; Hartley, 2004; McCoy, 2010) and the consequent intertwining of public and private military (Godfrey, Brewis, Grady, & Grocott, 2014), it becomes interesting to examine what mechanisms are in place to hold public and private military actors to account for their behavior. Revelations about the criminal behavior of PMSCs or their employees (Groth, 2012; Machairas, 2014) as well as investigations into alleged war crimes committed by British soldiers in Iraq (Forster, 2006) have brought questions about private and public military accountability into focus and have highlighted the importance of functioning accountability mechanisms (Groth, 2012; Leander, 2010; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). Be it to control and monitor the conduct of military actors, to prevent them from becoming too powerful, or to ensure that they will change their behavior in the future. Starting from the perspective that PMSCs are a relatively new phenomenon that has come to existence in the last twenty to thirty years of the 20th century (O'Brien, 2000), this thesis puts emphasis on understanding what these companies do and why their accountability is such a controversial issue . 1.1. The Scientific and Societal Relevance
This research contributes to the existing literature by providing a systematic assessment of PMSC and public military accountability in the UK through an analytical framework. Questions about the accountability of PMSCs permeate the literature (e.g. Bures, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2014; Leander, 2005b, 2010; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). A systematic assessment of the different types of accountability and a comparison with existing mechanisms of public military accountability therefore helps to develop a more comprehensive understanding of PMSC accountability. The comparison with public military accountability helps to localize existing shortcomings
or vantages. Although the framework is applied to the UK only in this thesis, it can help mapping the accountability of PMSCs in other countries as well.
1.2. Research Question
Following Bovens (2007) and his narrow definition of accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (p. 450), this thesis investigates the question,
To what extent are there different accountability mechanisms for the British Armed Forces and UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) operating abroad, and how can these differences be explained?
Essential for the proper functioning of mechanisms of political, legal, administrative, professional, and social accountability are the respective accountability forums like parliament, courts, financial and administrative supervisors, professional associations, and civil society organizations, where the account giving takes place in form of a process of different stages (Bovens, 2007). Key to answering the main research question is therefore the identification of the existing accountability forums and consequently mechanisms for, on the one hand, the British Armed Forces, and on the other, UK-based PMSCs operating abroad. The two sub-questions that need to be answered are,
(1) What are the accountability mechanisms that are currently in place in the UK with
regard to the British Armed Forces?
(2) What are the accountability mechanisms that are currently in place in the UK with
regard to PMSCs operating abroad?
Afterwards the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad can be compared with regard to these accountability mechanisms and explanations for existing differences in accountability mechanisms can be examined.
1.3. Structure
The thesis is structured into nine chapters, with the following second chapter being a theoretical one. The chapter first provides an overview over PMSCs and the services they sell, and then explores different conceptualizations of accountability. The third chapter elaborates upon the research design. It discusses the operationalization of the concepts and explains the methods that were used to gather the data. Chapters four to eight contain the analysis. Chapter four provides an introduction to the British Armed Forces, chapter five analyzes the existing accountability forums and mechanisms for the British Armed Forces, chapter six provides an overview of the UK’s history with PMSCs, and chapter seven analyzes the existing accountability forums and mechanisms for UK-based PMSCs operating abroad. Chapter eight compares the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad with regard to existing accountability mechanisms, and explains why differences in accountability mechanisms exist between these two types of military organizations. Chapter nine concludes the thesis. It reflects on the findings, points out limitations of the thesis, and makes recommendations for further research.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. The Private Military and Security IndustryTo provide an insight into the different functions of PMSCs this thesis draws to a large extent from the work by Singer (2007) who, with his “tip-of-the-spear typology” (p. 91), has provided an important tool for understanding the business of companies within the private military and security industry. The name tip-of-the-spear typology descends from the military where “armed forces are distinguished by their closeness to the actual fighting (the “front line”) that result in implications in their training levels, unit prestige, roles in the battle, [and] directness of impact” (Singer, 2007, p. 91). Based on their proximity to the battlefield, he divides private military organizations into three broad categories. These categories are “Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms, and Military Support Firms” (Singer, 2007, p. 91). Hereby the provider firm is closest to the actual fighting, while the support firm is farthest from it. The consultant firm is located somewhere in between (Singer, 2007). According to Singer (2007) this typology allows to “explore not only the variation within the industry but also the variation in firms’ organization, their operations, and impact” (p. 91). Although Singer (2007) uses this typology to make general statements over categories of companies, he also holds that some companies may fall into more than one category. Companies may sell services from various categories. Singer (2007) however contends that these companies are usually divided into internal divisions that then fit with the categories again. In the following the three different types of companies are described.
2.2. Military Provider Firms
Military Provider Firms are those firms that “provide services at the forefront of the battlespace, by engaging in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists (for example, combat pilots) and/or direct command and control of field units” (Singer, 2007, p. 92). That means these firms run active combat operations or provide specific military specialties on the battlefield (e.g. performing standoff military reconnaissance for the air force) (Singer, 2007). Military Provider Firms typically sell their services to clients who are facing a high, immediate threat and are unable to counter this threat due to a lack of military resources or capabilities (Singer, 2007).
Singer (2007) identifies “overall unit packages” (p. 93) and “specialized “force multipliers”” (p. 93) as the two types of contracts that are usually offered by these firms.
In the case of overall unit packages the client receives a “stand-alone tactical military unit” (Singer, 2007, p. 93) by the provider firm. These units however may vary in size quite considerably. While smaller units typically support the client’s existing forces, bigger units can be used as an alternative or replacement of existing forces (Singer, 2007). These “large-scale, combined arms units [may] operate independently on the battlefield” (Singer, 2007, p. 93). According to Singer (2007) it is however not the size that makes these units effective but rather their training, experience and oversight of the battlefield. In this regard small numbers of highly skilled military experts outperform the oftentimes only slightly trained adversaries on chaotic battlefields and thereby help to reach strategic aims (Singer, 2007).
The contract type that is however more frequently used is the force multiplier contract (Singer, 2007). In this case the employees of the provider firm work together with the forces or employees of the client. Hereby the purpose of the contract is to make this collaboration more effective (Singer, 2007). In this regard the employees of the provider firm either fulfill specific tasks that are too costly for the client (e.g. “flying advanced fighter jets or operating artillery control systems” (Singer, 2007, p. 94)) or offer their experience and general leadership (Singer, 2007). Also clients that already have a strong military may resort to hiring specialized experts from the provider firm to have the best capacities in all domains (Singer, 2007). The advantages of force multipliers hence lie in their “skills at battlefield assessment, management, and coordination” (Singer, 2007, p. 94). Small numbers of highly skilled individuals are again the key to strengthen armies that are indeed large but untrained (Singer, 2007). As Singer (2007) points out, Military Provider Firms are the most controversial sector of the private military industry. They often generate a negative public image and as the likely targets of external regulation their business is endangered of being damaged (Singer, 2007). As a consequence provider firms oftentimes portray themselves as military advisors, or as security providers or guards (Singer, 2007). In reality however this means that they are at the frontline of the battle and that they do engage in active combat as long as there is demand for their services (Singer, 2007).
2.3. Military Consulting Firms
Military Consulting Firms offer “strategic, operational, and/or organizational analysis” (Singer, 2007, p. 95) and “provide advisory and training services integral to the operation and restructuring of a client’s armed forces” (Singer, 2007, p. 95). These firms are not present on the battlefield. In contrast to the provider firm, employees of the consulting firm do not take the risks on the battlefield. Their strategic and tactical impact comes from the reorganization of a client’s forces (Singer, 2007). In this regard the application of knowledge and training by military consulting firms can have an impact that is similar to that of provider firms (generating their impact through the application of firepower) (Singer, 2007). The clients of Military Consulting Firms are typically aiming at restructuring or increasing their military capabilities. They are not in need of immediate support like the clients of provider firms. Contracts with consulting firms are of a more long-term nature and are as such more lucrative (Singer, 2007). As Singer (2007) points out, “The typical consultant contract specifies a situation facing the client – be it how to recapture a rebel province or how to restructure a military. The firm then analyzes what might be done to solve the predicament” (p. 96). Hereby the level and amount of expertise and experience that is offered by consultant firms is exceptional (Singer, 2007). This is because these firms can draw from a large pool of military experts that is usually not available to any single public military (Singer, 2007). While some firms provide a pure analysis to their clients, others go further and offer consultation and training (Singer, 2007). The implementation of this training and consulting is however what distinguishes the provider firm from the consulting firm (Singer, 2007). Singer (2007) observes that Military Consulting Firms, in their effort to build long-term relationships with their clients, tend to provide biased recommendations to ensure their employment in the future. Clients that originally hired the consulting firm to build up a strong independent military end up as being dependent on the consulting firm because they have outsourced the “critical self-evaluation tasks” (Singer, 2007, p. 96) that are essential for decision-making processes (Singer, 2007). The client does not have the chance to learn from his own experiences and his dependence on additional contracts with the consulting firm growths (Singer, 2007). Singer (2007) observes that it is not always easy to distinguish between military provider and military consulting firms. Some firms label themselves as consulting firms although they actually engage in combat. By doing this these firms benefit from the greater legitimacy and profit
margins of consulting firms (Singer, 2007). As Singer (2007) points out, soldiers who are hired solely for teaching purposes may be sometimes eager to put the training into practice if the opportunity comes along.
2.4. Military Support Firms
Military Support Firms provide “supplementary military services” (Singer, 2007, p. 97). These ‘secondary tasks’ (Singer, 2007, p. 97) include “nonlethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation” (Singer, 2007, p. 97). The advantage of support firms is that the client can outsource non-core functions to these firms that have build capabilities and efficiencies usually not sustainable by the client on his own (Singer, 2007). Contracting the support firm then allows the client to concentrate on the actual fighting as the core function of the military (Singer, 2007). The typical clients of support firms are in an immediate but long-term need of the firms’ services. This means armed forces or other organizations taking part in long-term interventions that are in need of additional capacities (Singer, 2007). The support sector as the biggest sector of the private military industry also generates the highest revenue (Singer, 2007). Although the employees of support firms do not engage in actual fighting they are nevertheless prone to combat threats because their workplace is oftentimes close to the battlefield (Singer, 2007). As Singer (2007) points out, military support firms are different from military provider and consulting firms in so far as they usually have not been established primarily as part of the military industry but have, like multinational companies that they are, expanded to the military sector at some point in time (using their experience in e.g. transport and logistics from other sectors). The quite extensive privatization of military logistics, that means, “transporting and supplying the troops on the battlefield” (Singer, 2007, p. 98) has according to Singer (2007) two reasons. On the one hand there is the increasing number of multinational operations. It is difficult to combine the equipment and procedures of different national armed forces. By hiring a support firm this problem is avoided (Singer, 2007). On the other hand many armed forces have increasingly downsized and eliminated their logistics units to make their organizations more slender (e.g. by privatizing their supply chain and maintenance support) (Singer, 2007).
As Singer (2007) points out, the latest developments in the information technologies have led to an increased number of support firms that are concentrating on private
intelligence and information warfare. In the case of private intelligence, firms collect information about opponents while preventing the opponent from receiving information about their clients. As Singer (2007) observes, the gathering of intelligence is key to military success and has previously been an exclusive domain of the state. According to him, the “commercialization of high technology” (p. 99) has made intelligence capabilities cheaper and available to everyone on the market. “For many nations and political groups, most of their intelligence analysis and operations are gradually being outsourced to private firms and consultants” (Singer, 2007, p. 99). The other domain is information warfare. Private corporations are just like governments active in an unregulated cyberspace where “politically motivated information warfare attacks” (Singer, 2007, p. 100) and “corporate-sponsored hacking” (Singer, 2007, p. 100) increasingly take place (Singer, 2007). Some Military Support Firms have specialized in the protection of communication lines off the battlefield (Singer, 2007). Although this involves mainly technical knowledge, Singer (2007) observes that military specialties and approaches are also oftentimes required. 2.5. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)
With his tip-of-the-spear typology, Singer (2007) has provided an important tool for understanding the business of companies within the private military industry. By introducing his typology he tried to overcome the lack of general definitions of these companies (Singer, 2007). Previously there was mainly a distinction between Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) (Krahmann & Abzhaparova, 2011). With regard to this distinction PMCs were defined as “incorporated firms offering military capabilities and support services” (Krahmann & Abzhaparova, 2011, p. 10) while PSCs were defined as “businesses supplying private protection and risk management” (Krahmann & Abzhaparova, 2011, p. 10). The problem with this distinction was that many firms refused to be labeled a PMC although they were providing military services. As Singer (2007) puts it, “Many firms that describe themselves as “security” companies often perform military roles, with military consequences” (p. 90). Also Krahmann and Abzhaparova (2011) observe the difficulties of a clear distinction and hold that such a distinction is not necessary because the “categories merge into one another” (p. 11). “The same firms supply a variety of functions, work for both public and private clients, and adapt their services in response to changing customer demands” (Krahmann & Abzhaparova, 2011, p.
11). The literature therefore oftentimes simply refers to Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) (see e.g. Cockayne, 2009; De Nevers, 2010; Spearin, 2011). This terminology is also used in this thesis.
2.6. Accountability
As Bovens (2007) holds, “In contemporary political and scholarly discourse ‘accountability’ often serves as a conceptual umbrella that covers various other distinct concepts, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility and integrity” (p. 449). It is therefore not easy to determine the meaning of accountability. Scholars have observed the ‘chameleon-like’ (Sinclair, 1995, p. 231) nature of the concept which makes it hard to define the concept for empirical purposes (Bovens, 2007). There seems to be no disagreement however that accountability is good, desirable, important, and needed (Koppell, 2005; Sinclair, 1995). Bovens (2007) refers to accountability as having become an “icon for good governance” (p. 449).
A starting point to explore the different meanings of the concept of accountability is offered by Mulgan (2000) who traces the current use of the term back to two fundamental debates in the domain of public administration. While in the U.S. there was a debate on the internal and external responsibility of public servants, in Europe the role of ministers in answering the actions of their departments to Parliament was debated (Mulgan, 2000). With regard to the former debate, internal responsibility means that public servants rely on their own professional standards and moral values while external responsibility means following the instructions of external political authorities (Mulgan, 2000). This debate however was primarily about responsibility and not accountability (Mulgan, 2000). The term accountability was used by Finer (as mentioned in Mulgan, 2000) to express his preference for the external type of responsibility. “First, responsibility may mean that X is accountable for Y to Z. Second, responsibility may mean an inward sense of moral obligation” (Finer, 1941, p. 336). As Mulgan (2000) however observes, nowadays this debate is commonly referred to as the debate between internal and external accountability.
According to Mulgan (2000) the external type of accountability, that means “the process of being called ‘to account’ to some authority for one’s actions” (p. 555) is commonly perceived as the core sense of accountability. The definition put forward by Mulgan (2000) states that accountability “is external, in that the account is given to
some other person or body outside the person or body being held accountable; it involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for the account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions; it implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable, including the rights to demand answers and to impose sanctions” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 555) (please note that, like Bovens (2007), also Mulgan (2000) includes the possibility of sanctions in his definition).
2.7. Expansions of Accountability
In the following, Mulgan (2000) observes an expansion of the concept of accountability. He states that accountability has expanded into areas where the above-mentioned core elements are not longer applicable. In particular he refers to four extensions of the concept of accountability. The first one, in a way similar to internal accountability, is professional or personal accountability (Mulgan, 2000). This type of accountability constitutes according to Mulgan (2000) the most significant expansion and is concerned with the “individual responsibility and concern for the public interest expected from public servants” (p. 556). Mulgan (2000) distinguishes between four different dimensions of professional accountability. Professional accountability can mean (1) that the professional’s knowledge is relied on and close control is inappropriate but external scrutiny is still involved to some extent “as the accountability of the professionals still lies in their ultimate answerability to their administrative and political superiors” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 559), (2) that a system of professional peer review exists in which the exercise of expert knowledge can only be understood by and assessed through fellow-professionals (this system still involves external scrutiny through review boards or disciplinary committees consisting of fellow-professionals) (Mulgan, 2000), (3) that the professional acts independently but follows certain professional norms or standards (also here external scrutiny is involved because it is still possible to hold the professional accountable for his actions through, for example, disciplinary investigation or legal measures) (Mulgan, 2000), and (4) “the purely personal exercise of judgment and adherence to internalized standards, regardless of any external scrutiny or sanction, actual or potential” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 560). In the last case the professional does not face external
scrutiny at all and adheres only to his own personal standards and values (Mulgan, 2000).
The second expansion is accountability as control (Mulgan, 2000). This type of accountability refers to “institutional checks and balances by which democracies seek to control the actions of the governments” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 556). Originally accountability was a mechanism of control (Mulgan, 2000). The public was able to control their representatives by making them explain their actions and consequently accept sanctions (Mulgan, 2000). Besides accountability there exist however other mechanism that allow the public to exercise control of their representatives. Mulgan (2000) for example mentions “the separation of powers, federalism, constitutionalism, judicial review, the rule of law, public service codes of conduct and so on, all of which have an effect on the control of public power” (p. 563). If accountability now becomes synonymous with control all these mechanisms become mechanism of accountability (Mulgan, 2000). In this sense ensuring accountability means appropriately designing and constructing institutions that “guarantee that public officials are appropriately constrained” (Mulgan, 2000). Mulgan (2000) however holds that institutions of accountability are ineffective “without mechanisms for demanding explanation, applying judgment and imposing sanctions” (p. 566). If institutions do not include these mechanisms they do not qualify as institutions of accountability in the core sense (Mulgan, 2000).
The third expansion is accountability as responsiveness (Mulgan, 2000). Hereby “‘accountability’ is linked with the extent to which governments pursue the wishes or needs of their citizens […] regardless of whether they are induced to do so through processes of authoritative exchange and control” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 556). Responsiveness hence focuses on the general compliance of representatives with the preferences of the public “for whatever motive” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 566). Accountability has oftentimes been perceived an important mechanism of enhancing responsiveness (Mulgan, 2000). Just as in the case with accountability being such a strong mechanism of control that it became synonymous with control, this process has also been witnessed with regard to responsiveness (Mulgan, 2000). Mulgan (2000) holds that government representatives can be directly responsive to the public or indirectly via representatives. In the latter case, making officials comply with the instructions of their political superiors is viewed as the key objective of accountability (Mulgan, 2000). Hereby the focus lies on “anticipated reactions by officials as part of
the effect of scrutiny mechanisms” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 567). Responsiveness is achieved through external scrutiny and hence equated with accountability (Mulgan, 2000). Mulgan (2000) however also argues that responsiveness of public officials can also result from other motives. Officials may for example act in accordance with the demands of their political superiors because of a belief in democratic values or out of personal career ambitions (Mulgan, 2000). These motives do not involve the exercise of external scrutiny and hence go beyond the definition of accountability in a core sense (Mulgan, 2000). Also in the former case of direct responsiveness where the objective is “to make public agencies as responsive to their clients as private sector companies are to their customers” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 568), does this involve accountability in a core sense only to some extent. Mulgan (2000) points to mechanisms of accountability such as “complaints procedures, ombudsmen and administrative tribunals” (p. 568) where people can complain and seek redress, but also to “management incentives or changes in corporate culture” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 568) that may make officials more responsive without holding them to account. With regard to the private sector, Mulgan (2000) differentiates between responsiveness and accountability and holds that “the main mechanism of responsiveness is consumer choice, the capacity of the consumer to ‘exit’ to an alternative provider” (p. 568) while accountability exists mainly in relation to company managers that can be held to account for their actions or the company’s performance by owners or shareholders of the company.
The fourth expansion is accountability as dialogue (Mulgan, 2000). Hereby “Accountability is seen to be a dialectical activity, requiring officials to answer, explain and justify, while those holding them to account engage in questioning, assessing and criticizing” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 569). According to Mulgan (2000) it is an essential element of modern deliberative democracy that rulers and officials have to engage in some form of dialogue with the public in order to explain and justify their performance publicly. Mulgan (2000) however also observes that there is a difference between a democratic debate and a dialogue of accountability. While in a democratic debate officials and citizens talk on the same level, a dialogue of accountability requires an “unequal relationship of superior and subordinate in which the latter is required to take directions from the former and to accept sanctions, if necessary, for unsatisfactory performance” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 570). A general democratic dialogue between officials and citizens therefore goes beyond the
definition of accountability in its core sense (Mulgan, 2000). 2.8. Broad Accountability
In his work Mulgan (2000), starting from a core definition of external accountability, has elaborated on the ways in which the concept of accountability has been expanded. In contrast to Bovens (2007) who adopts a narrow definition of accountability that is quite similar to the core definition of Mulgan (2000), Koppell (2005) follows the expansive path and conceptualizes accountability in broader terms. He puts forward a typology of five dimensions of accountability. These dimensions are, “transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness” (Koppell, 2005, p. 96). Hereby he introduces transparency and liability as the underlying dimensions that function as foundations for all other conceptualizations of accountability while controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness on the other hand are identified as ‘substantive’ (p. 96) dimensions that build upon the foundations of transparency and liability (Koppell, 2005).
According to Koppell (2005), “Transparency is the literal value of accountability, the idea that an accountable bureaucrat and organization must explain or account for its actions” (p. 96). He holds that an organization is accountable only if it cannot escape scrutiny over its performance. In this context he perceives transparency as the ‘critical tool’ (p. 96) required to guarantee this scrutiny. For Koppell (2005) transparency means that bureaucrats are regularly reviewed and questioned and that public organizations disclose their activities to “the public, the press, interest groups, and other parties interested” (Koppell, 2005, p. 96). He also holds that suspected failure or misconduct consequently needs to be investigated and justified. With regard to private organizations, Koppell (2005) contends that transparency “requires the presentation of truthful information to stockholders, creditors, analysts, customers, and regulators in required reports, prospectuses, and filings” (Koppell, 2005, p. 96).
The second fundamental dimension of accountability is liability. For Koppell (2005) individuals and organizations are liable if they have to face consequence for their performance. These consequences however can be positive or negative in the sense that success is rewarded and misconduct is punished (Koppell, 2005). Regarding the public sector, Koppell (2005) holds that elected officials are perceived as accountable because they can be punished by removing them from office while bureaucrats and judges may be perceived as unaccountable because the possibility for voters to punish
them by removing them from office does not exist. Other forms of punishment, also for organizations, include poor performance evaluations, budget cuts, and even criminal liability for illegal activities (Koppell, 2005). On the other hand, especially in the private sector, rewards include bonus payments or increased compensation for good performance (Koppell, 2005). According to Koppell (2005), “Consequences must be attached to performance in the form of professional rewards or setbacks, added or diminished budget authority, increased or diminished discretion, or reduced or increased monitoring” (p. 97).
The three substantive dimensions are quite similar to the expansions put forward by Mulgan (2000) in the previous section. They will hence be only briefly dealt with in this section. Controllability or simply control as the first substantive dimension is defined by Koppell (2005) in the following way, “If X can induce the behavior of Y, it is said that X controls Y—and that Y is accountable to X” (p. 97). According to this definition, an organization is accountable if it acts as commanded by its principal (e.g. parliament) (Koppell, 2005). As Koppell (2005) however also holds, citizens or their representatives may not always be able to control organizations because of they lack the knowledge or capabilities to do so. In these cases organizations may operate with relatively few constraints (Koppell, 2005) (this point is also made by Mulgan (2000) in the context of professional accountability).
The second substantive dimension of accountability put forward by Koppell (2005) is responsibility. According to the responsibility dimension, bureaucrats and organizations are accountable if they are “constrained by laws, rules, and norms” (Koppell, 2005, p. 98). Additionally it can mean that “formal and informal professional standards or behavioral norms” are used to evaluate the behavior of bureaucrats (Koppell, 2005). These standards of performance need not necessarily to be set through legislation (Koppell, 2005). In this sense accountability as responsibility however involves the danger that professionals give their self-set standards preference over public concerns (Koppell, 2005). As Koppell (2005) however observes, in the sense of accountability as responsibility, individuals and organizations are responsible if they follow the rules. Rules can however also be used as control mechanisms (Koppell, 2005). In this case the distinction between controllability and responsibility becomes blurred (Koppell, 2005).
The third substantive dimension, responsiveness, in defined by Koppell (2005) as “an organization’s attention to direct expressions of the needs and desires of an
organization’s constituents (or clients) from the orders of elected officials” (p. 98). Koppell (2005) points to two interpretations of responsiveness, namely the demands of clients on the one hand and the needs of clients on the other. Demands are especially important to private organizations aiming for profit. In order to learn about the demands they may “poll its customers to determine their preferences, solicit input through focus groups, or establish advisory councils with representation of key constituent groups” (Koppell, 2005, p. 98). If a company pays attention to the demands of its customers it is accountable in a responsive sense (Koppell, 2005). A public organization on the other hand is accountable “if it accomplishes a substantive objective or obviates a particular need” (Koppell, 2005, p. 99). Hereby for example the reduction of poverty or an increase in economic activity qualify as substantive objectives (Koppell, 2005). Hence organizations are accountable if they respond to the preferences of their clients or pursues the appropriate public policy goals (Koppell, 2005). Koppell (2005) also observes that accountability in a responsive or responsible sense may only be possible if bureaucrats enjoy a certain level of discretionary powers. Otherwise “a bureaucrat may not be responsive or responsible because she is focused on satisfying the principal” (Koppell, 2005).
2.9. Problems with Broad Conceptualizations of Accountability
Bovens (2007) identifies some problems with broad conceptualizations of accountability. He holds that, ”broad conceptualisations of the concept make it very difficult to establish empirically whether an official or organisation is subject to accountability, because each of the various elements needs extensive operationalisation itself and because the various elements cannot be measured along the same scale” (p. 450). Regarding the different dimensions of broad conceptualizations he states that they are either not constitutive of accountability or that they are evaluative and not analytical. According to him transparency is ‘instrumental’ (p. 450) to accountability because the availability of information is important to hold someone accountable, but since transparency in itself does not include some form of scrutiny by a forum it does not qualify as a form of accountability. The same lack of elements of “justification, judgement and consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 453) is also observed by him with regard to responsiveness. Bovens (2007) holds that responsiveness to the preferences of stakeholders rather points to forms of deliberation, participation, and consultation
than to a type of accountability. Regarding the control dimension, Bovens (2007), similar to Mulgan (2000), states that accountability is a form of control but that there are also other forms of control (e.g. “straight orders, directives, financial incentives or laws and regulations” (p. 454)). Control and accountability hence cannot be equated because control is a much broader concept than accountability (Bovens, 2007). According to Bovens (2007), broad conceptualization also render accountability “an essentially contested and contestable concept, because there is no general consensus about the standards for accountable behaviour, and because they differ from role to role, time to time, place to place and from speaker to speaker” (p. 450). Due to these reasons, Bovens (2007) adopts a narrow definition of accountability.
2.10. Narrow Accountability
The narrow definition of Bovens (2007) refers to accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (p. 447). In this definition four main elements are essential. These elements are the actor, the forum, the obligation, and the conduct that is to be justified (Bovens, 2007). As Bovens (2007) explains it the actor can be either an individual or an organization. In relation to European governance, for Bovens (2007) that means public officials, civil servants, public institutions, or public agencies. The forum of accountability on the other hand can be a specific person, an agency, a court, or the audit office (Bovens, 2007). Hereby superiors, ministers, or journalists qualify as specific persons while the parliament qualifies as an agency (Bovens, 2007). As Bovens (2007) points out, the forum and the actor may engage in a principal-agent relationship. For example in the case of political forms of accountability, the principal (e.g. parliament) oftentimes delegates authority to an agent (e.g. a minister). The agent is then held accountable by the principal (e.g. the minister who has to render account about his performance to the parliament) (Bovens, 2007). Bovens (2007) however holds that this is usually different for cases of legal accountability and professional accountability where courts and professional associations as accountability forums are not principals of the actors.
The obligation of an actor to give account to a forum can be formal or informal (Bovens, 2007). For example public officials can be forced to justify their performance before supervisory agencies, courts or auditors in occasions of
administrative deviance, policy failures or disasters (Bovens, 2007). In this case the obligation is formal. If public officials justify their performance in press conferences or informal briefings however, the obligation is informal (Bovens, 2007). The obligation can also be self-imposed if the account giving is of a voluntary nature (e.g. voluntary audits) (Bovens, 2007).
The actual account giving, as embodied in the relationship between the actor and the forum, is a process of at least three elements or stages (Bovens, 2007). In the first stage “the actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct, by providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes or about procedures” (p. 451). That means the actor, especially in cases of failures or incidents, justifies or explains his conduct in front of the forum (Bovens, 2007). Hereby the conduct to be explained can vary considerably among the different types of accountability (e.g. budgetary scrutiny in cases of financial accountability or administrative fairness in cases of legal accountability) (Bovens, 2007).
In the second stage, the forum may “question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct” (p. 451). Although the forum is not obliged to interrogate the actor it is important that the possibility to do so does at least exist (Bovens, 2007). In the third stage “the forum may pass judgement on the conduct of the actor. It may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the behaviour of an official or an agency” (p. 451). In case of a negative judgment the actor has to face sanctions that are imposed on him by the forum as a consequence of the negative judgment (Bovens, 2007). According to Bovens (2007), the possibility of sanctions “makes the difference between non-committal provision of information and being held to account” (p. 451).
Sanctions do not always have to be formal or legal however. Bovens (2007) holds that there are “accountability forums, such as ombudsmen, who in many countries do not have the authority to sanction formally, but who can nevertheless be very effective in securing redress or reparation” (p. 452). He also points out that the judgment of the forum can be a positive one as well. The actor may be rewarded for his performance and not sanctioned. Bovens (2007) therefore refers more neutrally to ‘consequences’ (p. 452) an actor may face in the follow up of a forum’s judgment.
In this context it has to be noted is that the forum does not necessarily need to be the one enforcing the consequences on the actor (e.g. ombudsmen or chambers of audit may scrutinize agencies or suggest improvements but depend on the parliament to put
pressure on a minister who in turn puts pressure on the leaders of the respective agency) (Bovens, 2007).
2.11. Forums of Accountability
In his framework Bovens (2007) provides a non-exhaustive list of five different types of accountability that are based on different forums of accountability. Hereby he focuses on public organizations and public officials as the actors that are to be held accountable. According to Bovens (2007) the different types of forums “demand different kinds of information and apply different criteria as to what constitutes responsible conduct” (p. 455). This means that public organizations and public officials oftentimes face different judgments by different forums for their performance (Bovens, 2007). This is problematic because organizations or officials then do not know by which criteria they have to orientate themselves (Bovens, 2007). The different types of accountability based on the forum are (1) political accountability, (2) legal accountability, (3) administrative accountability, (4) professional accountability, and (5) social accountability (Bovens, 2007).
Political accountability refers to “Elected Representatives, Political Parties, Voters, [and the] Media” (Bovens, 2007, p. 455) as forums of accountability. According to Bovens (2007), this form of accountability is of particular importance in democratic societies where, in form of principal-agent relationships, voters delegate their sovereignty to representatives (e.g. parliament) and the representatives in turn delegate it to a cabinet of ministers. The ministers then delegate it to civil servants or administrative agencies. Political accountability works the other way round. Civil servants and administrative agencies are accountable to ministers, ministers are accountable to representatives, and the representatives to their voters (Bovens, 2007). In this sense, representatives and ministers are both actors and forums of accountability (Bovens, 2007). Political parties and the media on the other hand are characterized as important informal forums of political accountability (there is no formal obligation; the account giving is of a voluntary nature) (Bovens, 2007).
Legal accountability refers to courts as forums of accountability (e.g. civil courts, administrative courts, penal courts, the EU Court of First Instance, the European Court of Justice) (Bovens, 2007). According to Bovens (2007), “legal accountability is of increasing importance to public institutions as a result of the growing formalisation of social relations, or because of the greater trust which is placed in
courts than in parliaments” (Bovens, 2007, p. 456). Legal accountability usually involves the conferral of legal or formal responsibilities upon authorities (Bovens, 2007). These authorities are then subject to legal scrutiny for their performance (Bovens, 2007). Legal scrutiny in turn is based on detailed legal standard (Bovens, 2007). Legal accountability is therefore perceived “the most unambiguous type of accountability” (Bovens, 2007, p. 456).
Administrative accountability refers to auditors, inspectors and controllers as ‘quasi-legal forums’ (Bovens, 2007, p. 456) of accountability. In particular Bovens (2007) mentions “European, national or local ombudsmen and audit offices, […] independent supervisory authorities, inspector generals, anti-fraud offices and chartered accountants” (p. 456) as entities “exercising independent and external administrative and financial supervision and control” (p. 456). The quasi-legal status of these forums originates from the “specific statutes and prescribed norms” (Bovens, 2007, p. 456) they base their scrutiny on.
Professional accountability refers to professional peers as forums of accountability (Bovens, 2007). Bovens (2007) holds that public managers oftentimes have been trained in a specific profession (e.g. “as engineers, doctors, veterinarians, teachers or police officers” (p. 456)). In this case they may be accountable to professional associations or disciplinary tribunals (Bovens, 2007). These association or tribunals specify certain standards that all their members are bound to. These standards are in turn “monitored and enforced by professional supervisory bodies on the basis of peer review” (Bovens, 2007, p. 456) (this is comparable to the first three dimensions of professional accountability put forward by (Mulgan, 2000)).
Social accountability refers to Interest Groups, Charities and other Stakeholders as forums of accountability (Bovens, 2007). It is concerned with “more direct and explicit accountability relations between public agencies, on the one hand, and clients, citizens and civil society, on the other hand” (Bovens, 2007, p. 457). The account giving hereby takes place through, for example, public reporting or public panels (Bovens, 2007). According to Bovens (2007) the internet has become especially important in this context because “results of inspections, assessments and benchmarks” (p. 457) are increasingly put online. Bovens (2007) however also holds that reporting before public panels may not be a type of accountability in the core sense because these panels may lack the authority to judge and pose sanctions. Also the forum of accountability should be “clearly demarcated, coherent and
authoritative” (Bovens, 2007, p. 457). Otherwise it may not be able to guarantee that the actor can explain his performance and that he can defend his position through debate (Bovens, 2007).
3. Research Design
The research question that is to be answered is, To what extent are there different
accountability mechanisms for the British Armed Forces and UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) operating abroad, and how can these differences be explained? Before this question can be tackled the existing
accountability mechanisms for, on the one hand, the British Armed Forces, and on the other, UK-based PMSCs operating abroad have to be identified. Consequently the two sub-questions that need to be answered are, (1) What are the accountability
mechanisms that are currently in place in the UK with regard to the British Armed Forces? , and (2) What are the accountability mechanisms that are currently in place in the UK with regard to PMSCs operating abroad? After the two sub-questions have
been answered the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad can be compared with regard to these accountability mechanisms.
The research design that has been adopted to answer the research question and the two associated sub-questions is the embedded single case study design. The case or unit of analysis that is to be investigated is the United Kingdom. Within the UK the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad serve as the two embedded units of observation. The case study is conducted within the context of accountability.
At the heart of the conducted case study lies the identification of the existing accountability mechanisms with regard to the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad. For this purpose the five different types of accountability based on the nature of the forum that have been put forward by Bovens (2007) in his analytical framework provide a starting point. They serve as the concepts that have to be measured. It will be examined to what extent the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad are subject to mechanisms of political accountability, legal accountability, administrative accountability, professional accountability and/or social accountability. The present case study is concerned with the difference of accountability mechanisms for private and public military in the UK. As a last step, after the differences in accountability mechanisms have been identified, explanations for the existence of these differences will be provided. The figure below shows the analytical framework utilized for this thesis.
Figure 1: Analytical Framework
In the following it will be explained why the case study design is the most suitable research design for the purpose of this master thesis, why it was decided to focus on a single case only, and in particular, why the United Kingdom has been selected as the single case to be investigated. Following these justifications of the chosen research design, the data collection method and the operationalization of the concepts will be explained.
3.1. The Case Study Design
According to Babbie (2010), a case study focuses on “the in-depth examination of a single instance of some social phenomenon, such as a village, a family, or a juvenile gang” (p. 309). He holds that an essential characteristic of the case study is that the focus of the study is limited to a ‘particular instance of something’ (p. 309). The single instance that is to be investigated in this thesis is the United Kingdom as the unit of analysis and consequently the British Armed Forces and UK-based PMSCs operating abroad as the two units of observation that are embedded within this single entity. The UK as the entity under study can be clearly distinguished from other cases/countries.
Similar to Babbie (2010), Yin (2009) links case study research with the “desire to understand complex social phenomena” (p. 4). The social phenomenon under study in this case is accountability. The extensiveness of accountability as a social phenomenon has already been observed in the last chapter where the various conceptualization of accountability pointed to a high level of complexity. Especially the core and narrow definitions of accountability by Mulgan (2000) and Bovens (2007) that focus on the social dimension of accountability and the social relationship
between and actor and a forum of accountability have pointed to the social nature of the phenomenon.
Another reason why the case study is the preferred design for this thesis is that the research question to be examined in this thesis is to a large extent a descriptive question. It is intended to describe the current situation in the UK with regard to the existence of accountability forums and related types of accountability for private and public military. Babbie (2010) points at the special suitability of case studies for descriptive purposes.
Yin (2009) has put forward three conditions that help to determine when a case study should be conducted. He states that “case studies are the preferred method when (a) "how" or "why" questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 2). Although the first condition put forward by Yin (2009) is somewhat contradictory to Babbie (2010) because "how" or "why" questions are usually explanatory research questions, the three conditions nevertheless provide a valuable guideline. The second part of the research question is an explanatory ‘how’ question and therefore satisfies the first condition put forward by (Yin, 2009). Since the research question posed in this thesis is both descriptive and explanatory, a case study is the appropriate design to choose for this study. Especially as also Yin (2009) points out that case studies may be applied to “illustrate certain topics within an evaluation, […] in a descriptive mode” (p. 20).
The second condition put forward by Yin (2009) is concerned with the investigators control of the studied events or his ability to manipulate certain behaviors. Since it is certainly not possible to influence the actions of PMSCs or public military in the context of this master thesis or to control for the environment in which public and private militaries operate, the second condition is fulfilled. The third condition, that the study focuses on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 2009) is also fulfilled. The focus on UK private and public militaries operating everyday in many countries all over the world (see e.g. Petersohn, 2015) certainly puts the topic in a contemporary and real-life context.
Taking the above-mentioned points into account it becomes clear that the case study design is the most suitable research design to adopt for this thesis. The research question and the associated sub-questions are answered through the in-depth analysis of accountability mechanisms that exist for private and public military in the UK. In
the following this approach is further specified. 3.2. The Embedded Single Case Study Design
Yin (2009) points to the existence of four basic case study designs. On the one hand it can be distinguished between single and multiple case studies and on the other hand between a holistic and an embedded design (Yin, 2009). Hereby a single case study concentrates on a single case while a multiple case study focuses on more than one case (Yin, 2009). A case study is holistic when there are no embedded subunits analyzed within the case. Otherwise it is an embedded case study (Yin, 2009). Consequently, the four types of design that result from this approach are “(Type 1) single-case (holistic) designs, (Type 2) single-case (embedded) designs, (Type 3) multiple-case (holistic) designs, and (Type 4) multiple-case (embedded) designs” (Yin, 2009, p. 46). In the context of this master thesis it was decided to conduct a Type 2, single embedded case study. There are two main reasons for that decision. First, due to the time and space constraints on a master thesis project it was only possible to examine one country in detail. Hence the multiple case study design was dismissed. Second, because private and public military are the two logical subunits to be analyzed, an embedded design had to be adopted.
Figure 2: Single Case Design (Embedded)
3.3. Case Selection
A case study aims to study the complexity of a selected case in detail (Kumar, 2011). The focus of a case study is therefore not the whole population of cases but a single entity or bounded system (Kumar, 2011). For this thesis the United Kingdom has been
selected as the case to be investigated. There are several reasons for this decision. Within the Western world the U.S. and the UK are probably the most important suppliers of PMSCs (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012). Groth (2012) has identified the U.S. and UK as a “significant source state[s] for PMSCs” (p. 57). Since it was only possible to select one country it had to be made a decision between those two. The UK was selected to have a European focus. UK based PMSCs did not receive much attention so far (De Nevers, 2010). Besides that the UK has a long history with PMSCs. The first modern PMSC was established in the UK in the 1960s already (O'Brien, 2000; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). After the start of the Iraq war in 2003 the private military industry in the UK expanded rapidly (De Nevers, 2010; Schreier & Caparini, 2005) and even before that the UK was next to the U.S., South Africa, and Israel among the four primary countries of origin of PMSCs (Milliard, 2003). The UK’s long history of military privatization started already in the 1980s under the Thatcher administration (Godfrey et al., 2014; Krahmann, 2005a). Before 1990 the majority of PMSCs involved in foreign military operations abroad were based in the UK (O'Brien, 2000) and in 1999 the UK was among the five leading countries in Europe regarding the private security industry (De Waard, 1999). Krahmann (2005a) observes, “many European countries have looked to the UK as a model for the outsourcing of military services” (p. 282). Another reason is that within the UK private and public military are so intertwined that the public military is not able to operate without private contractors anymore (Godfrey et al., 2014). This makes it especially interesting to examine to what extent there are differences between the accountability mechanisms regarding these two branches of the military.
According to Yin (2009), conducting a single case study is particularly useful “where the case represents (a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique circumstance, or (c) a representative or typical case, or where the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose” (p. 52). Taking the above-mentioned reasons into account it becomes clear that the UK falls under point (c). It is a unique case, not only in the Western world, but also particularly in Europe.
3.4. Validity & Reliability
Yin (2009) describes four commonly applied criteria for testing the quality of empirical social research and offers some tactics to deal with these criteria in case studies. The four criteria are construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and
reliability. Construct validity is concerned with “identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). This criterion is applied to ensure the development of a sufficiently operational set of measures and to prevent data collection based on subjective judgments (Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2009) two steps are important meet this criterion. First, it is important to define the topic “in terms of specific concepts (and relate them to the original objectives of the study)” (Yin, 2009, p. 42), and second, to “identify operational measures that match the concepts (preferably citing published studies that make the same matches)” (Yin, 2009, p. 42). For this thesis, ensuring construct validity therefore means on the one hand to define accountability of private and public military in terms of specific concepts and on the other to operationalize these concepts. Consequently the concept defined in the theoretical chapter is narrow accountability with its focus on accountability forums and the related types of accountability. The operationalization will focus on the forums of accountability. The underlying question is, how is it possible to measure if an assumed forum indeed qualifies as an accountability forum? In this regard it will be essential to examine whether the three stages of account giving that are mentioned by Bovens (2007) do all take place in front of the assumed forum. If yes, the assumed forum most likely can be considered an accountability forum. An important tactic to improve the construct validity of case studies is to collect data from multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009).
The second criterion described by Yin (2009) is internal validity. Internal validity is concerned with “seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). This criterion is especially important in explanatory studies where the researcher tries to establish a causal relationship between two variables and wants to rule out other variables as possible causes (Yin, 2009). Since the case study conducted here is in most parts of a descriptive nature the internal validity criterion will not be of too much concern. It is however important to remember that every time something observed is perceived as the result of a previous occurrence or event, it needs to be questioned whether this assumption is correct and if other possible explanations can be ruled out (Yin, 2009).
The third criterion is external validity. External validity refers to the generalizability of the results. It is about “defining the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). The external validity of case studies is typically low
because it is quite difficult to draw conclusions about other cases from just studying one case. This is also true for this study. Due to the limitation to a single country it is not possible, after identifying the existing forums and related types of accountability in the UK, to draw conclusions about existing accountability forums in other countries. The situation in other countries may or may not be totally different. One aspect of the study however that may be generalized to some extent is the methodology to identify existing accountability forums. Using the methodology of this thesis and applying it to other countries may help to identify accountability forums and types in other countries as well. Nevertheless, the most important factor is that the present study only deals with one case, the UK. To make a general statement it would have been necessary to examine the situation in other countries as well. The external validity rises with an increasing number of countries studied.
The fourth criterion described by Yin (2009) is reliability. Reliability refers to enabling a repetition of the concerned study (Yin, 2009). It is about “demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the data collection procedures – can be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Reliability can be achieved by reporting as detailed as possible about the different operations of a study (Yin, 2009). In context of this study it will be paid attention to reporting all the steps taken that lead to the findings of this study in the way the are on a step-by-step basis. Especially because case studies involve multiple ways of data collection this step is of particular importance to allow the reader to understand and reconstruct the findings of a study and how they have come to existence (Yin, 2009).
3.5. Data Collection & Analysis
According to Grinnell (as mentioned in Kumar, 2011), a case study “is characterized by a very flexible and open-ended technique of data collection and analysis” (p. 109). Information is gathered from all sources available to understand the selected case in its entirety (Kumar, 2011). In this regard it is important to use multiple methods to collect data (e.g. through “in-depth interviewing, obtaining data from secondary records, gathering data through observations, collecting information through focus groups and group interviews, etc.” (Kumar, 2011, p. 109)). Yin (2009) points to the unique strength of a case study that consists of the possibility to collect data from “documents, artifacts, interviews, and observation” (p. 11) as various sources of evidence. Hereby it is important to recognize that the case study method can draw
