“Modernized Visions of Islam”
The Online Visuality of Islam Nusantara: Social Media
Memories and the Promotion of Moderate, Modern
Islamic Subjectivities in Indonesia
Master Thesis
Student Number: 11256133 Supervisor: Dr. Leonie Schmidt Second Reader: Dr. David Duindam Date: June 13th, 2018
Abstract
Indonesia has become a key player in challenging the rise of the Islamic States ideology within Indonesia and abroad. This has been done through the online promotion of Islam Nusantara, a religious movement celebrated for its moderate and “modern” Islamic aims. Islam Nusantara’s online counternarratives illustrate social media memories to promote
‘technologies of the self’ that assist online users to ‘govern themselves’, whilst simultaneously contributing to the maintenance and progress of the nation-state. However, what kinds of moderate, modern Islamic subjects are
promoted through Islam Nusantara’s online images? And which constructed subjects are fit to participate in Islam Nusantara’s Islamic modernity? This thesis explores how Islam Nusantara’s online models of memory-models of Gus Dur, the Indonesian War of Independence and the schema of Islamic Humanitarianism contribute to the promotion of the governmentality of a “Social Media Muslim Soul” that are fit to contribute to an Islamically
Universalist and Humanitarian modernity. Additionally, the politics of imagining plural modernities in times of perceived threat may craft an exceptionalist, exclusive modernity. Additionally, this thesis hopes to
contribute to the intersections of research on Islamic social media, mediatized memories, governmentality and plural modernities.
.
I would like to thank Dr. Leonie Schmidt for her time and encouragement in my perusal of this topic from the very beginning, and her diligent guidance and support throughout this project. Another special thank you goes to Dr. David Kloos and Dr. Niall Martin for guiding me through my internship process at KITLV, which gave me the theory, skills and confidence to go through with this topic for my thesis. I would also like to thank my friends and family for continuous support throughout this thesis and master’s programme.
1.
Index
1. Introduction:
A profile of Islam Nusantara’s Instagram Accounts & Social Media Memories
6 2. Methodology:
Online Representations as Visual Social Media
16 3. Theoretical Chapter:
Governmentality, Memory & Islamic Modernity
18
3.1. The Mediatisation of Memory & Memory-Models 18
3.2. Governmentality & ‘Technologies of the Self’ 21
3.3. Islam Nusantara’s “Islamic Modernities” 28 4. Nostalgia for Gus Dur’s Democracy
4.1. Nostalgia as Memory-Making Practice 33 4.2. Nostalgia for a Democratic Islamic Modernity 34
4.3. Nostalgia for Indonesian Islamic Universalism 37
4.4. Plural Modernities, Plural Nostalgias 40 5. Indonesian War of Independence & Islamic
Colonial Memory
44
5. 1. Governmentalization of Islamic Colonial Memory
45
5. 2 The Historicity of an Islamic Indonesian Modernity
52
6. Islamic Humanitarian Schema 56
6.1. Mediatized Schemas 57
6.2. “Riyanto Spirit” Media Template 58 6.3. Connective Schema: Palestine and Islam
Nusantara’s Islamic Humanitarianism
63
6.4. Islam Nusantara’s Schema of Islamic Humanitarianism
69
7 Conclusion 72
7.1. The Politics of Plural Islamic Modernities 74
7.2. The Limits of Governmentality, Islam & Media 78
Works Cited 83
Introduction
A profile of Islam Nusantara’s Instagram Accounts & Social
Media Memories
Figure 1: Image posted by @kajiannusantara on April 30th 2017.
Recent events in Indonesia suggest that religious extremism is on the rise. This can be seen by the violent attacks by ISIS supporters on the Christian church in Surabaya (May 2018) and the Anti-Ahok demonstrations (November 2017). The anti-Ahok demonstrations were carried out by the FPI (the Islamic Defenders Front), a far-right Sunni Islamist Indonesian organization against former Jakarta governor Basuka Tjahaja Purnama (otherwise known as Ahok) that accused him of hate-crimes against Islam. Therefore, the threat of religious inspired violence in Indonesia is perceived as a serious threat (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 3), particularly due to Indonesia being the largest Muslim majority country in the world, which makes it a target for Islamic religious extremism. However, counter-terrorism narratives, stories and discourses that counter the public expression of extremist thought (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars”; 3) are proliferating within the country. This is particularly occurring online by ‘cyberwarriors’, who aim to counter radicalism online by advocating Islam’s tolerant and pluralistic characteristics as a true form of faith (Varagur 2016). This is targeted against ISIS’ online propaganda (Varagur 2016). Furthermore, this counter-attack online is supported by the Nahdlatul Ulama, one of Indonesia’s largest Muslim
organizations, who train these ‘cyberwarriors’ to produce counternarratives online.
Figure 1 provides an example of these online counternarratives. This Instragram post includes a cartoonized figure of Gus Dur, Indonesia’s 4th president is a symbol of moderation. The image provides a quote from Gus Dur stating: “Islam is a religion of peace and extremists twist this around”i. Today, many images similar to figure 1 can be found Indonesian social media accounts. These images are usually found on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) related accounts, as the NU is known for its anti-radicalism approach. The NU is a traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia that was established in 1926 as a response to the rise of Wahabbism in Saudi Arabia and the rise of Islamic modernism1 in Indonesia, as well as in part to resist Wahabbism’s spread within what was then the Dutch East Indies (Alford 2015). This was particularly a response to the Saudis’ conquest of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (Alford 2015).
It should be noted that the NU is the largest independent Islamic organization in the world and plays a large role in public debates due to their presence in the public sphere in spreading its Islamic ideology (Esposito 570). The NU spreads its Islamic teaching by providing educational activities through its Islamic boarding schools and universities across the country (“Islamic boarding”). Additionally, the NU launched a global campaign to fight extremism and jihadism, by building a prevention center in Indonesia that provided training for Arabic-speaking students and NU theologians to combat jihadist rhetoric (Cochrane “From Indonesia”). This prevention center includes training for online “cyber-warriors” as mentioned previously.
One of the main ways in which the NU attempts to combat jihadist rhetoric is through their “particular brand” of Islamic faith known as Islam Nusantara to counter the threat of increasing radical interpretations of ISIS militant Islam (“Threat of ISIS”). The brand of Islam Nusantara was created in 2015 as an alternative representation of global Islam that is currently dominated by Arabic or Middle Eastern perspectives. The name Islam Nusantara or “Islam of the archipelago” emphasizes the diversity and 1 Islamic modernism: Also referred to as Modernist Salafism. This is a movement, which
attempts to reconcile Islamic faith with modern Western values such as nationalism, democracy, civil rights, rationality, equality and progress (Martin 2004).
tolerance that has developed across the country or archipelago (“Threat of ISIS”). Islam Nusantara is seen as distinctive brand of Islam developed in the Indonesian archipelago (Nusantara) since the 16th century, as a result of interaction and syncretization of universal Islamic values, according to the socio-cultural context of Indonesia that is culturally and religiously diverse. This brand of Islam developed “organically” as Islam entered the country and therefore had to gradually mix with existing traditions such as Javanese mysticism, making it a “naturally” tolerant form of Islam (“Threat of ISIS”).
The NU has been promoting Islam Nusantara as a means to counter Islamic radicalism due to its “moderate” Islamic aims (Cochrane “From Indonesia”). President Joko Widodo openly expressed his support for Islam Nusantara’s moderate Islam, which he views as compatible with Indonesian cultural values. Islam Nusantara has also been celebrated and praised on a global scale (Cochrane “From Indonesia”) in light of rising Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism throughout the world with the rise of ISIS. As a result, this further propagates Indonesia to the world as a “moderate” Muslim nation that should be seen as separate from its often associated and conflated Middle Eastern form of Islam. The NU views radical Islamic thought as an external threat to the Indonesian state’s pluralism, due to ISIS originating from Wahhabi movement within the Middle East (Cochrane “From Indonesia”). Additionally, on a local scale Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists also pose a threat to the Indonesian state, due to the increased presence and dominance of Islamists in the public sphere, as illustrated by the anti-Ahok demonstrations (“Islamic Agitators”).
Islam Nusantara’s campaign of the message of tolerance against jihadism is carried out online and in conferences around the world (Cochrane “From Indonesia”). This online campaign has become widespread and popular across social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Islam Nusantara’s online messages of tolerance are often targetted towards an Indonesian audience to promote counter-terrorism narratives2.
These messages mostly do so through images of Indonesian religious scholars or authority (ulama and kyai), Indonesian heroes or authority figures, and religious quotes (Schmidt “Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 40).
2Counter-terrorism narratives or ‘counternarratives’ “are stories and disources that counter the public expression of extremist thought” (Schmidt “Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 40).
Counter-terrorism narratives are formed through images of well-respected kyai and ulama that portray them as “authentic and inspirational
‘stars’, to which one needs to listen to in troubling times” (Schmidt
“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 40). The images of religious authority include representations of Gus Dur, the former Indonesian President (1999-2001) and chairman of NU, which show him as an inspirational, authoritative figure who is missed for his promotion of tolerance. For example, figure 2 shows an image of Gus Dur wearing the peci3 and a traditional batik shirt, with
the hashtag “We Miss Gus Dur” underneath. What does it mean to invoke sentiments of loss in relation to ‘inspirational’ figures of tolerance within Indonesia’s past? How does it relate to counter-terrorism narratives?
Figure 2: Image posted on Instagram (@kajiannusantara, 28 April 2017)
The images of well-respected Kyai and Ulama are not the only images that convey memory and articulate the need to protect the Indonesian nation from harm. On Islam Nusantara accounts images of national heroes and Indonesia’s War of independence against the Dutch in 1945 to 1949, can also be seen. For example, figure 3 shows an image of the Hizbullah army or troops waving the Indonesian flag. The caption states that the students, scholars and religious leaders of the Hizbullah army were part of the Indonesian Armed Forced (TNI-TRI) during the fight for independence under Japanese occupation, in which religious leaders were asked to to be given military training for domestic defense. These kyai and ulama helped to form
an aroused fighting spirit through their religious knowledge in suggesting that “for all adult Muslims it is the Fardhu’ain4 to fight against the enemy that will
colonize Indonesia again”. The post also states that; “fighters consisting of Islamic leaders such as scholars, kyais and santris (heroes), are hardly mentioned in the historical record of this country's struggle. However, their action over the existence of the republic is still maintained until now.” Thus, it
suggests a nationalistic spirit that guards the nation against prospective outsider colonizing forces in the present as well. Therefore, the future of the Indonesian nation would also be guarded.
Figure 3: Image posted on Instagram (@kajiannusantara, 27 August 2017)
The implementation of memory through these figures and images of Indonesia for counter-terrorism and “tolerance” narratives against outsider “threats” online provoke many questions. Firstly, what kind of memories are invoked here? What kind of images of Indonesia does it portray? What kind of images of ‘moderate’ Islam does it show?
What is particularly interesting here is the way in which the online discourse of Islam Nusantara uses memory to promote notions of “tolerance” and “moderation”, which suggests ways of being both modern and “Muslim” within the world. Thus, formulating a specifically moderate, modern Muslim Indonesian subjectivity. By subjectivity here I am referring to Foucault’s conception of the subject as the “effect” of power and “disciplines” (Foucault 4The fard that is compulsory for every single Muslim to perform.
“Discipline and Punish”). This is due to the ways in which the images purport the ‘progress’ of the Indonesian nation against Islamic fundamentalism as the responsibility of Indonesian citizens.
The notion of progress and the future development of the Indonesian nation through ‘moderate’ Islam are reoccurring themes within many Instagram posts that make reference to memory-models. Memory-models are
defined as an event or figure from the past that is “used as an interpretive frame to describe, define and evaluate the present and the future” (Stahle & Wijermars 106). For example, figure 4 provides an illustration of the memory-model of Gus Dur as an exemplary figure of modern, moderate Muslim subjectivity. Figure 4 shows a cartoon image of Gus Dur wearing a peci and rowing a boat against the current of the river, away from a waterfall whilst a boat of more Arabic dressed men (as they are wearing the Taqiyah more commonly worn in Arab countries) follow the current heading towards a waterfall. The boat of Arabic men tell Gus Dur “Gus, why are you going against the current?” The caption of the image states: “Why was Gus Dur often considered quirky, controversial, strange and against the current? The answer is in this simple cartoon.”
Consequently, what can be collected from this image is that the memory of Gus Dur, as an independent and individual thinker, is representative of what an ideal Indonesian citizen should also internalize in order to avoid future destruction. This future destruction is exemplified by the image of falling down the waterfall. Gus Dur is representative of an ideal Indonesian citizen due to the distinction of his more Indonesian dress compared to that of the Arab men in the other boat.
Figure 4: Image posted on Instagram (@nuonline_id 12 November 2017)
Figure 4 counters the public expression of extremist thought by encouraging viewers not to follow Middle Eastern fundamentalist ideals as represented by the Arbic men. Thus, the articulation of counter-terrorism narratives through respected religious or Indonesian authority figures from the past suggest that these historical figures are memory-models used for the construction of Isam Nusantara’s present and future Indonesian “Islamic modenity”.
What is striking in the examples discussed here, is that the social media accounts that promote Islam Nusantara introduce memory-models that influence, govern and construct a specific moderate, modern Muslim subject, which is imagined to be part of a modern and Islamizing Indonesia. This is because posts are not aimed at “radicals” themselves, but specifically aimed at the larger moderate Muslim audience (Schmidt “Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 40). Thus, as seen in figure 4, the responsibility for the safety of the country is put in the hands of Internet users (Schmidt “Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 39). Accordingly, placing the “progress” of the Indonesian nation as an Islamically modern, moderate country as the responsibility of Indonesian citizens.
This is done through self-governing and self-disciplining strategies of ‘technologies of the self’ which is a governmental strategy that allows for “processes by which the individual acts upon himsef” (Brockling et. al. 2 ). For example, the image of Gus Dur in figure 4 as a “quirky, controversial, strange
and against the current” exemplary Indonesian citizen that saved Indonesia from the negative effects of religious fundamentalism provides the Indonesian audience with personality traits to model themselves after. The technologies in figure 4 include the ‘technologies of religious critical thinking’ and ‘technologies of reason’. These technologies assist users to ‘govern themselves’ (Rose 45) whilst simultaneously contributing to the maintenance and progress of the nation-state. Therefore, these ‘technologies of the self’ can produce a subject that is governable, responsible, self regulating and thus beneficial to the nation-state (Rimke 63).
Therefore, by drawing on Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality (“Security, Territory, Population”) this allows us to view the overarching ‘art of government’ and ways in which the state, and Islam Nusantara’s social media, excercises control over the body of its populace, particularly the “range of forms of action and fields of practice aimed in a complex way at steering individuals and collectives” (Brockling et. al. 1). I would like to propose that Islam Nusantara’s online memory-models make use of specific governmental (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population”) politics of ‘technologies of the self’ within Foucault’s larger theory of governmentality to construct moderate, modern Muslim subjects.
Therefore, this thesis will focus on Islam Nusantara’s promotion of moderate modern Muslim subjects in Indonesia through its online representations. These online images illustrate memory-models that mobilize governmental tools to promote these moderate modern Muslim subjects. This leads to my main research question(s): How do online expressions of Islam Nusantara on social media shape or imagine Islamic modernities through practices of memory-making and governmentality? Furthermore, provoking the following sub-questions: How do Islam Nusantara’s online memory-models shape, imagine and govern moderate/modern Islamic subjects? What kinds of ‘Islamic modernities’ are constructed and how are narratives of a ‘tolerant’/’moderate’ Islam articulated in/through this construction? What specific constructions of modern Islamic subjects are fit to participate in Islam Nusantara’s Indonesian Islamic modernity? What kinds of governmental strategies and memory-making practices are used to produce
social media users/citizens that are fit to participate in Indonesian Islamic modernity?
It is vital to answer these questions due to the increasing threat of radicalism and intolerance within the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. This is particularly at a time in which ISIS’ online propaganda demonstrates the power of these online platforms in spreading a global Islamic fundamentalism (Southall). Consequently, the mix of social media and Islamic identities are often framed as threatening and produce an Orientalized rhetoric about Islamic social media (Jones & Slama). These depictions suggest that Islamic social media is ‘inherently contradictory’ in employing a modern technology to serve a non-modern agenda (Jones & Slama). Thus, it is vital to analyze how Islam Nusantara’s online platforms provide a space for Islam Nusantara to spread their religious message of tolerance and counter-narratives and perhaps serve their ‘own’ Islamic modern agenda.
This thesis aims to illustrate how Islam Nusantara’s online memory-models of Gus Dur, the Indonesian War of Independence and the schema of Islamic Humanitarianism contribute to the promotion of the Governmentality of a “Social Media Muslim Soul” that are fit to contribute to an Islamically Universalist and Humanitarian modernity. The memory-models of Gus Dur and the Indonesian War of Independence promote the overarching ‘technology of Islamic Universalism’, which produces a democratic Islamic modernity. The schema of Islamic Humanitarianism promotes an overarching ‘technology of Islamic Humanitarianism’, which contributes to a missionary, humanitarian Islamic modernity. This framework of anticipation within this schema highlights the ‘double nature’ of governing through an Islamic governmentality and social media governmentality. Additionally, the plural modernities within Islam Nusantara’s online discourse highlights the politics of inclusion and exclusion in imagining modernities, specifically through the ‘strategies’ of exceptionalism.
Following these general observations of Islam Nusantara’s memory-models and the power that these social media images hold, I decided to first carry out my data collection in order to identify which posts were representative of memory-models and what the common memory themes were. This was done in order to work from the online representations of
memory-models. Therefore, the structure of this thesis will firstly start with the methodology and data collection and then move on to the theoretical background and analysis.
2. Methodology: Online Representations as Visual
Social Media
Research on social media as a form of online communication has mainly focused on the text-based component of this medium (Highfield & Leaver 3). However, visual content is a critical component of everyday social media, “particularly for platforms which are framed around the visual (such as
Instagram), or on those offering a mix of text and images (such as Facebook and Twitter), and in apps and profiles where visual presentation and provision of information are important considerations” (Highfield & Leaver 1). Highfield & Leaver (3) suggest that; “the cultural context for visual social media also highlights the need for research in this area”, this is especially in response to moral panics and faux-outrage over certain practices such as selfie-taking and selfie-shaming. Therefore, “visual content are not just social media artifacts, isolated and individual, but are surrounded by debates and discussions that take on political, legal, economic, technological and sociocultural dimensions (Highfield & Leaver 3). Thus, visual social media content has become a platform through which we can understand the political and sociocultural context within and/or around everyday communication. Visual social media allows us to look at the roles that images play in the process of shaping, establishing, governing modern, moderate Muslim subjectivities.
To analyse the use of memory in online representations of Islam Nusantara I will gather/scrape images from the social media profiles of Instagram users that represent an Islam Nusantara ideology5 that make references to historical events and political, religious or historical figures. I have decided to focus on Instagram accounts due to this platform’s focus on visual representation, which is vital for understanding the online visuality of Islam Nusantara. This platform is a photo and video-sharing social networking site service owned by Facebook. The presence and inclusion of the name ‘Islam Nusantara’ or ‘Nahdlatul Ulama’ in the social media accounts names and description will be used to determine which accounts are representative of the Islam Nusantara movement. I have decided to focus on two Instagram accounts of @kajiannusantara and @nuonline_id. @nuonline_id has 242,000
followers and the Instagram bio for the profile states; “official website of Nahdlatul Ulama”ii. @nuonline_id also has links to its other social networking websites in the bio such as Facebook and Twitter, whilst also providing an email address and telephone number. @kajiannusantara has 93,700 followers and the Instagram bio reads; “Authorized Account of Nusantara Study Since November 29th 2K14.”iii This account also provides links within its bio to a 5 I suggest social media profiles that represent an Islam Nusantara ideology as there are
many accounts/profiles dedicated to promoting the ideology that are not related to the official profile of the Nahdlatul Ulama.
related twitter account and Line account. The original sample for the data set will be limited to those posted within the last year for feasibility purposes and limited to a quantity of 50 images. After collecting this data, the data set for this thesis will be limited to a scope of 3-10 images in order to reach the appropriate depth of visual and textual analysis. The three central themes that were found within the data set were; Nostalgic representations of Gus Dur; Islamic colonial memories tied to the Indonesian War of Independence and events of Islam Nusantara’s Islamic humanitarianism (within Indonesia and abroad). This these will be structured around these themes.
A visual methodological approach will be taken to analyze visual depictions and representations. A visual methodological approach includes a qualitative analysis of images. Furthermore, this qualitative analysis will discuss what memory-models are introduced and which memories are employed in relation to promoting a moderate Islamic modernity. Textual analysis will also be used here to support analysis of visual depictions and representations of social media posts to clarify intent and context (Highfield & Leaver 3). This is in order to analyze text in terms of Instagram captions to gather how subjectivities are imagined/created through memory-models.
3. Theoretical Background: Governmentality, Memory
& Islamic Modernity
3.1. The Mediatisation of Memory & Memory-Models
It is vital to analyze the role of memory in online discourses due to the ways in which digital media is fundamentally changing the way that societies are dealing with their history and cultural memory (Uffelmann qtd. in Stahle & Wijermars 106), thus leading to the emergence of the discipline of digital
memory studies (Rutten & Zvereva 6). This thesis aims to gain insight into this changing dynamic of memory due to the importance of the online memory discourse of Islam Nusantara’s social media posts. Hoskins (“The Mediatization of Memory” 27) proposes the concept of “new memory” which is;
“both the media-affected formation and reformation of shared or
social memory in the contemporary age and the consequential reassessment of the nature and the very value of remembering (and forgetting) subject to the technology of and the discourses disseminated by the mass and other media”.
Therefore, this highlights the ‘mediatisation of memory’ at the very juncture of the shift in mediascapes (Hoskins 28). The ‘mediatisation of memory’ refers to the impact media has upon processes of social change so that everyday life is increasingly embedded in the mediascape (29). The mediatisation of memory has impacted upon the way in which we remember; changing collective memory in that digital media is subject to a different kind of ‘collective’ influence and shaping (Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 29). This is because memory studies have traditionally conceptualized collective memory based on Halbwach’s (1950) notion of it, which suggests that apart from the existence of individual memories, a society can boast a collective or group memory (Rutten & Zvereva 3). Furthermore, it has also been suggested that memory studies have defined memory to be collective only when it is institutionalized (Beim qtd. in Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 40). However, due to the Internet and other digital media, the visibility, accessibility and fluidity of the past has been significantly transformed (Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 30). Hoskin’s (“The Mediatization of Memory” 30). suggests that Web 2.0 services can contribute content as easily as they can consume. Additionally, Hoskins (“The Mediatization of Memory” 30) takes into account he rapid rise in social networking platforms in facilitating peer-directed connections and collectivities, which has the potential to present an array of new memory forms and cultures. Thus, influencing memories ‘collectivity’ in terms of sharedness as memory in this way is less a question of remembering and more a matter of where to look (Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 29).
Hoskins (“The Mediatization of Memory” 30) employs the vehicle of ‘schema’ as a useful conceptual disciplinary bridging between media and memory. He defines this as; “a kind of framework and standard that the mind
forms from past experiences and by which new experiences are expected, measured and also reflexively shaped” (“The Mediatization of Memory” 36).
An example of this are ‘media templates’ which are the “frames, images and
more broadly discourses (presumed by news editors and producers to be familiar to their audiences) that are routinely employed as often instantaneous prisms through which current and unfolding events are described, presented and contextualized” (Hoskins 37). Thus, templates can function as a kind of
mediatized schema. These schema are readily available from the local, national or global reservoir of memory, which through television’s highly selective appropriation is “self-consciously employed to shape interpretations of the present, as it in turn renews the past” (Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 37).
However, Hoskin’s definition of schema and his example of ‘media templates’ do not take into account memory ‘templates’ or schema within a post-broadcast age6 in which resources of memory-making in the form of digital data become more fluid, accessible as well as revocable and diffused. Therefore, I would like to propose Stahle & Wijermars’ (106) concept of memory-models (as defined on page 4) as a form of post-broadcast age schema. Stahle & Wijermars (2013) use this term to analyze the introduction of memory within the online memory discourse of the Russian Protest movement. However, the integration of these two concepts allows me to take into account not only how memory-models as events or figures from the past are used as interpretive frames to describe the present and future, but also how memory-models as a digitally mediatized schema may also “renew the past” in terms of creating renewed narratives and re-activating archival memories. Thus, taking into account the “reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole mass of organized past
6 Post-broadcast age: This is defined by Hoskins as being the second phase of mediatisation
which is post-mass media broadcasting. The first phase is characterized by the traditional organization of Big Media and elite institutions, whilst the second phase is characterized by the large potential of media archives in terms of images, clips and stories available for retrieval and use through Web 2.0 services.
reactions or experience” (Bartlett 213 qtd. in Hoskins “The Mediatization of Memory” 37).
Ultimately, Hoskins advocates that in order to grasp the phenomenon of new memory, it is crucial to investigate how images re-enter in new times and contexts (Meuzelaar 210). Thus, it is vital to investigate how memory-models re-renter in the context of Islam Nusantara on social media. The images of events and figures of the Indonesian past that have been repeatedly used by the Islam Nusantara movement can be seen as key “flashframes” or memory-models, such as the image of the Indonesian war of independence and Gus Dur as shown previously. Furthermore, as Islam Nusantara is a movement advocating for Indonesian Islam, many of the images include memories, sentiments, representations and practices that construct national co-belongingness following Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” (“Imagined Communities”). Thus, producing a specifically Indonesian Islamic national citizen-subject.
This highlights the relationship between memory and governmentality in the way that citizenship can be seen as a form of discipline and new governmental techniques (‘governmentality’), which activates the production of desired memories (Laikos & Salvanou 156). Laikos & Salvanou (160) suggest that “dealing with memories and giving answers to the past always
reflects upon visions of the future, or rather, the way political subjects construct themselves through their memories and the narratives built upon them”. Therefore, memory influences the construction of citizen-subjects for
the nation-state7 and can be seen as a governmental technique.
However, the construction of modern, moderate Muslim subjects through representations of Islam Nusantara occurs through the use of online memory-models, which suggests that events or figures from the past are re-invested with new meaning. It is important to consider the term ‘memorial layers’ suggested by Rigney (19), which suggest that sites of memory (whether virtual or actual) are constantly reinvested with new meanings. Memories therefore converge and conflate, as their cultural framework is recycled to deal with new memories (Rigney 19). Thus, how does the 7 It should be noted however that I do not want to explore the relationship between
nationalism and governmentality and memory, but the aspect of nationalism must be taken into consideration in how citizen-subjects are formulated.
mediatization of memory affect the governing of citizen-subjects? How do the use of these particular memory-models re-activate and re-narrativise a modern, moderate Islamic Indonesian governmentality? How does governmentality operate through memory-models to discipline and affect subjects and practices, and what are the ramifications for individuals?
3.2. Governmentality and Technologies of the Self
As stated previously, the mediatization of memory influences the construction of citizen-subjects for the nation-state and can be seen as a governmental technique. Therefore, selected images of Islam Nusantara’s social media memory-models will be analyzed through a Foucauldian framework as Foucault’s notion of governmentality and particularly his work on technologies of the self can offer a productive lens through which to understand the discursive means by which these social media posts generate modern, moderate Islamic subjects (Schmidt “Visions of the Future”; 137). Hence, this requires an understanding of the genealogy of Foucault’s concept of governmentality and an understanding of ‘technologies of the self’ as one of the technologies of governmentality.
The term ‘governmentality first appears in the Collège de France lectures of 1978 and 1979 (Brockling et. al. 1). The term is derived from the French adjective gouvernemental and stood for “the art of government” in which “a range of forms of action and fields of practice aimed in a complex way at steering individuals and collective (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 122). This included understanding what he termed the ‘rationality of government’, which is a “way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced” (Gordon 3).
Foucault’s study of government was an extensive correction and refinement of his analysis of power (Brockling et. al. 1). In Discipline and
Punish (1975), Foucault proposed a political analysis called the ‘microphysics
part of the invention of the modern penitentiary prison (Gordon 3). This suggested that modern societies could be understood only by reconstructing certain ‘techniques of power’ designed to observe, monitor, shape and control the behavior of individuals situated within a range of social and economic institutions such as the school, factory and the prison (Gordon 3). However, this analysis of power received some criticism. Firstly, Foucault’s originally conceived “micro-physics of power” was mainly focused on the individual body and its disciplinary formation, and there was “no consideration of the comprehensive processes of subjectification” (Brockling et. al. 1). Therefore, this analysis of power could not take into account the double character of subjectification as a practice of subjugation and also a form of self-constitution (Brockling et. al. 1). Additionally, Foucault’s focus on institutions were insufficient for analyzing the relation between society and the state (Brockling et. al. 2, Gordon 3). Thus, leading to a double expansion of the analytic apparatus, in order to account for both processes of subjectification and state formation (Brockling et. al. 2).
In his lecture series, Foucault considers the “genesis of a political knowledge” and suggests that the modern (Western) state is the result of a complex linkage between “political” and pastoral” power (Gordon 3). Pastoral power was based on the Christian churches modern technologies of governance (Brockling et. al. 3) and thus underpins our modern technologies of governance. Pastoral power is illustrated by the relationship between shepherd and flock and is defined by “beneficence” and “care”, with the objective being the “salvation or safety” of the multiplicity (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 126). Accordingly, this objective of mutual salvation in pastoral power constructs an individualizing power that is constituted in the preist/shepherd’s responsibilities to the flock (particularly in the knowledge and care for each individual) and simultaneously is also based on each member of the flock’s obedience to the priest/shepherd (to practice self-care, maintain self-awareness and to communicate this knowledge) (Foucalt “Security, Territory, Population” 129). Therefore, pastoral power is not characterized by the power to rule over the flock (such as sovereign power over his/her subjects), but rather by the power to affect and induce members
of the flock through certain sets of behaviors so that the objective of salvation can be achieved (Garmany 910).
Foucault’s conception of pastoral power underlies his analysis of government (i.e. governmentality) as he suggests that the secularization and expansion of pastoral techniques eventually produced forms of subjectification from which the modern states and capitalist society could in turn develop
(Brockling et. al. 3). Furthermore, the state and the Church are not the sources of governmentality but constitute the effects of ‘governmentalized’ practices, institutions and knowledges (Mitchell 1999 qtd. in Garmany 910). Therefore, we can view governmentality as a form of power that “governs souls” and induces rather than obliges its subjects as individuals are guided,
monitored and disciplined by initiations of power so that sound governance may be achieved equally across bodies and space” (2007: 115-190; 2000a:
300-311 qtd. in Brockling et. al. 3). Overall, Foucault’s analysis of government is based on the presumption that out of the expansion and secularization of pastoral techniques carried out in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, this eventually produced forms of subjectification from which the modern state and capitalist society could develop (Brockling et. al. 3).
Modern states are thus concerned with the government of ‘men in their relationships’ to a wide range of things such as their involvement with things like wealth, resources, means of sustenance (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 96). These ‘things’ are arranged to a ‘suitable end’, in which the end must be suitable for each of the things that are being governed (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 98). Foucault (“Security, Territory, Population” 99) states that;
“With government it is a question not of imposing law on men,
but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.”
Therefore, this quote implies two things. Firstly, that there is a plurality of specific ends in the government’s responsibility to produce the largest possible amount of wealth and subsistence (Foucault “Security, Territory,
Population” 98). Secondly, this quote also implies that things need to be ‘disposited’ to achieve different ends. This employs tactics rather than laws to achieve a certain number of means. This differs to sovereignty as the aim of obedience was to the law itself.
An important feature of modern government is that the instruments used to govern are inherent to the population. Therefore, these instruments work directly on the population through campaigns or indirectly through techniques that influence the population (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 105). The population is the end and the instrument of government, thus leading to new techniques of in which the needs as aspirations of people become the target and instrument of the government of populations (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 106).
The most significant aspect of Foucault’s notion of government is the way in which he mediates between power and subjectivity. Strategies of governmentality produce subjectivities in which: “to become a subjects always means actualizing certain subject positions and dispensing with others; it means being addressed in a certain way as a subject, understanding oneself as a subject and working on oneself in alignment with this self-understanding” (Brockling et. al. 11). Therefore, this highlights how governments create subjects by authorizing certain subject positions. Additionally, subjects are not dominated by power but also have self-will and freedom for their desired ‘suitable ends’ (Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” 99). Consequently, this highlights the double character of power in governmentality. Although both the individual and society at large (the state) seem to benefit and the individual may be happy in achieving certain goals, the subject becomes ever more governable due to this “internal” form of power. Thus, this form of power may be even more powerful than previous modes of power.
The freedom to affect your own ‘suitable end’, specifically where political governments provide the processes for which an individual can act upon himself, is carried out by the governmental technology of the self (Brockling et. al. 2). These technologies of the self:
“permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, and way of being, so as to transform
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality” (Foucault 1988: 18).
Thus, these technologies include acquiring certain individual skills as well as certain attitudes (Foucault 1997: 18). These technologies work by productive application that encourages citizens to “govern themselves” (Rose 45) as it is not only beneficial for themselves but also to the maintenance and progress of the nation state.
Finally, technologies of the self are not only distributed through state institutions, but also are distributed through everyday techniques through which individuals organize and govern themselves as a condition of their citizenship (Ouellette and Hay 473). Therefore, governmental technologies in the contemporary age are highly dispersed through socio-cultural intermediaries such as schools and popular media (Oullette and Hay 473). Consequently, we can look at social media as part of these socio-cultural intermediaries, which encompass technologies of the self that assist citizens.
Islamic social media, particularly in Southeast Asia, has become a site for Southeast Asian Muslims to find religious piety online (Jones & Slama). The effect of Islamic social media are personal and public; influencing personal life choices and collective institutional decisions about theology or policy (Jones & Slama). Thus, Islamic social media have become “sites for sorting out everyday dilemmas through religious community” (Jones & Slama). Positioning Islam Nusantara’s social media posts as part of Islamic social media also suggests that its users voluntarily follow the movement in the hopes of religious self-improvement and providing themselves with religious technologies to “master themselves” and “care for themselves” (Rose 45) and in this way contribute to the maintenance and progress of the nation state. This suggests that the technologies posted on Islam Nusantara’s are sought out by followers who are productively encouraged to improve their religious knowledge and identity. However, by following these religious ‘technologies of the self’ they allow themselves to be governed.
Accordingly then, we can view Islam Nusantara’s Islamic social media as a form of modern government that is produced through Islam – resulting in an ‘Islamic governmentality’. However, what are the ‘things’ that are arranged within this governmentality and what comprises the ‘suitable ends’? Islam
Nusantara’s Islamic social media posts mobilize governmental tactics to promote and construct specific modern, moderate Islamic citizen-subjects that are fit to participate in an Indonesian modern nation. Through the construction of these citizen-subjects, the social media posts seek to govern and control a larger modern nation.
Alternatively, how does Islam Nusantara’s Islamic social media also highlight the governmentality of media? Stauff suggests that we cannot view media as merely a tool for governmentality as “media can neither be reduced to having a passive role as in being controlled by the government nor be assigned a dominating role in controlling society” (Chong 177). This is due to the way that media which function as technologies of government that guide behavior are placed in interwoven relationships with social and cultural practices (Chong 160). This interwovenness with social and cultural practices problematizes the media as a self-technology that needs to be questioned, discussed, modified and regulated (Stauff 265). These self-technologies include mediation tactics and self-government (Stauff 265). Therefore, Stauff looks at the media as both an end and instrument of government (Stauff 265).
If Islamic social media are used for “sorting out everyday dilemmas through religious community” and affect personal life choices as well as institutional decisions about theology and policy (Jones & Slama 2017), this highlights the way in which media can become something that needs to be problematized, and made into self-technologies that are constantly questioned, discussed, modified and regulated. Stauff (278) states:
“We have to ask how media are made into something manageable with ‘potentials’ and ‘dangers’ whose rational management again makes practices, family conditions, subjectivities, and populations accessible for regulating and/or ruling.”
In this sense we can view social media expressions of Islam Nusantara as representative of the ‘governmentality of media’. What is the nature of the governmentality of media on Islam Nusantara accounts? And how do they overlap with ‘Islamic governmentalities’? This thesis aims to contribute to governmentality studies in expanding Foucault’s notion of governmentality to include the problematization of the medium (technology of government) and not just the content of the medium.
Additionally, by suggesting that Islam Nusantara’s Islamic social media is a form of ‘Islamic governmentality’, this allows us to theorize as to how Islam and governmentality do in fact go together. This contributes to governmentality studies, as religion has been a largely understudied topic in relation to governmentality (Schmidt “Visions of the Future” 144; Garmany). The lack of studies on governmentality and religion is significant as Foucault’s conception of pastoral power underlies his analysis of government, as suggested previously. However, Foucault’s exploration of power also places religion within the framework of governmentality (Carrette136; Garmany 910). Foucault was interested in highlighting the political techniques of religion in formulating regimes of power and technologies of the self as part of religious discourse (Carrette 136; Garmany 910). These connections between governmentality and religion lead us to question how Islam Nusantara’s governmental practices are imbued with religion, or Islamazied?
3.3. Islam Nusantara’s “Islamic Modernities”
As suggested previously, Islam Nusantara’s online memory-models mobilize governmental tactics to promote and construct specific modern, moderate Islamic citizen-subjects that are fit to participate in an Indonesian modern nation. However, what specific constructions of modern Islamic subjects are fit to participate in Indonesian Islamic modernity and what kind of Islamic modernity is imagined by Islam Nusantara’s online memory-models? Therefore, this requires an exploration into the concept of Islamic modernities as formulated by Islam Nusantara’s Islamic governmentality.
Indonesia is currently undergoing a process of modernization in the social, economical sense as the country develops - transforming traditional society into a “modern” society with a sufficient level of economic growth, advanced technology and social organization (Sairin 4). Additionally, the current middle classes’ public piety belongs to the religious renewal of ‘second wave of Islamism’ where Muslims merge with modern urban spaces, allowing for greater involvement in public debates and a public voice through global communication networks (Gole 2002; 174). Islam Nusantara is part of this ‘second wave of Islamism’ as it has been attributed with labels of being a
“modernized” vision of Islam; advocating Islamic law as in line with modern norms (Cochrane “Indonesians Seek” 2017). The simultaneous processes of modernization and Islamization occurring in the Indonesian context requires questioning into what it means to be modern and Muslim through Islam Nusantara’s online memory models. Thus, this encourages an understanding of the governmental techniques and memory-models that imagine modern Muslim subjectivities.
There are a growing number of studies on the potential for Indonesia to be an active agent in constructing its own, local interpretation of modernity (Connor & Samuel 2001). This plural modernity within Indonesia deconstructs modernity from its Western conceptualization as: “local interpretations of modernity evolve from a hybridity of meaning derived from the intersection of customary, religious, state and individual belief systems” (Herrera et al. 1998 qtd. in Bennett 5). Thus, this thesis will contribute to the conceptualisation of plural modernities, especially in relation to Islam (or more specifically Islamic visualities). This thesis aims to question the genealogy of concepts of modernity, which have often been singular and Western (Chaterjee 1997). Modernity can be defined as ‘the state or quality of being modern (Schmidt “Visions of the Future” 35).
The singularity of the term modernity brings in to question that “if modernity is a definable, delimited concept, we must identify some people or practices or concepts as nonmodern” (Chakrabarty xix). Thus, creating a binary logic that is morally problematic in defining those who count as modern or premodern. Additionally, the concept of modernity is often seen as ‘originating’ from Europe, in which Europe was the “‘sole motor’ of progessive
historical change in the world, as the unique bearer of modern civilization”
(Ang qtd. In Schmidt “Visions of the Future” 36). Therefore, positing Europe as the pinnacle of modernity to which non-Europe attempts to follow this ideal whilst never fully reaching it (Chow qtd. in Schmidt 37). Consequently, this binary logic places non-European contexts as always in a state of lacking a universalized Euro-centric modernity, thus preventing and confining the possibility for the existence of a “universal domain of free discourse,
Accordingly, this has led to the theoretical rejection of the totalizing and Eurocentric classical theories of modernization (Schmidt “Visions of the Future” 37). This led to the emergence of theories of ‘multiple’ or plural modernities (Chatterjee, Chakrabarty), which suggest that modernity, has always been a concept that has allowed for multiple forms. Chatterjee (9) states;
“there cannot be just one modernity irrespective of
geography, time, environment or social conditions. The forms of modernity will have to vary between different countries depending upon specific circumstances and social practices”.
Therefore, decentering Eurocentric theories of modernity to “clear up a space” for specifically post-colonial nations to become the creators of their own modernity (Chatterjee 14). Chatterjee emphasizes that modernities are always rooted in specific socio-cultural conditions of that time. Hence, the concept of plural modernities allows me to study specifically Islamic modernities online within the context of Indonesia.
However, most importantly this thesis aims to move beyond the observation that modernities are plural as many scholars have already discussed (Chatterjee, 1997, Chakrabarty, 2002), to thus further explore the politics of that plurality. Consequently questioning how and why is modernity plural in a specific location or on a particular platform? Where are the fault lines between modernities drawn? How is modernity plural and what kinds of ‘tolerant’ modernities can we distinguish? Where do they contradict each other and how do they form alliances? And who is included and excluded in the process of imagining modernities? Therefore, these questions express the need for understanding the powers and voices that are included (and/or excluded) in the online imagination of Islamic ‘tolerant’ modernities.
4. Nostalgia for Gus Dur’s Democracy
A recurring historical figure or memory-model that is articulated in many of Islam Nusantara’s social media accounts is that of Gus Dur. Gus Dur, (formally known as Abdurrahman Wahid) was the former Indonesian President (1999-2001) and chairman of NU. Gus Dur, “remains an enduring personality in the country’s public conscience even years after his death” (Wahid). During his chair position in the NU, he brought “the organization to its most progressive period with its trademark of inclusive Islam and support for democracy” (Wahid). He was the first president to be elected by an Indonesian parliament, after the fall of Suharto8, and consequently left a legacy of a strong democracy; due to his demilitarizing of civilian positions after the regime. Furthermore, under the Reformation9 it has been suggested that Indonesia’s democracy had become based on tolerance and a moderate interpretation of Islam (“Indonesia and the Middle East”). As a result, Gus Dur has become a symbol of moderate Islam within Indonesia (Wahid).
Gus Dur was opposed by Islamists10, with their ideals of a more “Islamic” indonesia due to his belief in Islam and democracy, particularly through the universalism of Islam (Wahid). This suggests that Islam has in its core the values of human dignity and democracy (Wahid). He suggested that; 8 The Fall of Suharto refers to the resignation of Suharto’s three-decade long presidency in
1998. Suharto was known for his authoritarian regime (also known as the New Order regime) that restricted civil liberties and strong political role of the military.
9 Reformtion: Otherwise known as the Post-Suharto era, is a period that began with the fall of
President Suharto in 1998. This period lead to a more open and liberal political-social environment in Indonesia following the resignation of the authoritarian rule of President Suharo during the New Order period.
10 Islamists are followers of Islamism, which is a term used to concieve of Islam as a political
“upholding democracy is one of the principles of Islam” and Islamist beliefs were rejected by Gus Dur, due to its threat of violation to democracy (Wahid). In light of Gus Dur’s view on Islamism it is vital to have an understanding of the current social, political and religious climate in Indonesia. Within recent times, there is growing sentiment of Islam gaining political significance in Indonesia (Chaplin 2018). This is partially due to the anti-Ahok campaign (November 2017) mentioned previously, which eventually led to his electoral defeat and subsequent conviction (Chaplin 2018).
Ahok’s defeat due to the use of religious identity for political purposes has led to increasing concern that Indonesian Islam is following a “conservative turn” (Chaplin). The process of democratization after the fall of Suharto has provided Islamists with the opportunity to influence public debate. For example, this can be seen through the increasing relationship between Islamic organizations and politicians such as Anies Baswedan, who defeated Ahok in the gubernational election (Chaplin). Chaplin suggests that these politicians “engage with such groups in order to increase their religious credentials and their “electability” among the Muslim majority population”. Therefore, we can see the “turn” towards a more Islamic democracy, which is not based on the democratic values of Islam put forward by Gus Dur or by the Indonesian constitution11.
It should be highlighted that the rise of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia is often attributed to “foreign” influences of Middle Eastern doctrines of Islam; “Islamist ideas from the Middle East have indeed been imported into Indonesia by Muslims looking for new ways of thinking about the relationship between Islam, politics and society” (Bubalow and Fealy). In the case of the anti-Ahok campaigns, the two primary organizers were both educated in Saudi Arabia, which is perceived as a drive by Middle Eastern donors and religious scholars to spread “their” version of Islam in Indonesia. Thus, representing a “rise” of global Islamic doctrines in the Indonesian political and public sphere (Chaplin 2018).
11 The Indonesian Constitution, otherwise known as Pancasila, is the official foundational
philosophical theory of the Indonesian State. One of its principles includes democracy. Although another principle is the Belief in the One and Only God, Indonesia is a democratic nation.
Additionally, as stated previously, the NU was originally formed in part to resist the spread of Wahhabism during Indonesian colonialism (Alford 2015). Nowadays, the NU continues its attempts to override the influence of Saudi-sponsored Wahabbism, which is seen as the wellspring of radicalism, particularly in being the birthplace of the Islamic State (Alford 2015). Additionally, the increase in attacks on Shias and Ahmaddis in recent years is seen as being a direct influence from the spread of Wahhabi influence within the country (Alford 2015). Consequently, this adds to the dialectical understanding of “Indonesian” vs. “foreign” or even “convservative” vs “reformist” types of Islam within the country (Chaplin 2018).
Ultimately, taking into account Gus Dur’s stance on Islam and democracy during the Reformation, it is necessary to analyze why he “remains an enduring personality in the country’s public conscience” (Wahid). Particularly in light of the anti-Ahok protests, why is Gus Dur continuously remembered by Islam Nusantara online accounts? Kyai/ulama,12 such as Gus Dur, are often posed as the only true sources of Islamic authority in NU online discourse (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 45). Many online followers formulate an “online participatory remembrance culture” through the form of fan creations on Islam Nusantara accounts that further construct kyai/ulama as exceptional authority (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 49). Adding to this, many Instagram posts of Gus Dur on Islam Nusantara’s online accounts illustrate nostalgic representations of his missed presence through fan art and cartoonized iconic images such as figure 1, 2 and 4 (as shown in the Introduction).
In this chapter I will analyze Gus Dur’s memory-model through the concept of nostalgia, due to the sentiments of longing and loss of his presence. Thus, how do Islam Nusantara’s online expressions of Gus Dur on social media shape and imagine Islamic modernities through the memory-making practice of nostalgia? What technologies of the self are created through these nostalgic expressions of Gus Dur? I will propose that restorative nostalgic representations of Gus Dur provide the ‘technology of Islamic Universalism’ and ‘technology of democracy’, which work to imagine democratic and Islamically Universalist modern citizen subjects that can re-12
establish the homeland of Indonesia as a democratic and tolerant modernity.
4.1. Nostalgia as Memory-Making Practice
The sentiment of loss of an exceptional figure arising from a sense of insecurity and anguish with present circumstances is what makes nostalgia an act of the present (Lee 162, Iwabuchi 566). Nostalgia allows for the conception of an idealized time and space in which the present can be judged, “as the sentiments of nostalgia become the norms for thoughts and behaviours, and construct images of a desirable future” (Lee 162). Thus, nostalgia allows for the past, present and the future to be combined (Lee 162). Additionally, Boym (“Nostalgia and it’s discontents” 8) emphasizes, “nostalgia is not “antimodern”” as it is in fact coeval with it. In this sense, she suggests that nostalgia is born out of the narrative of progress set out by modernism: “In a broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress” (Boym “The Future” xv). Following this, if nostalgia allows for a conception of the present and the future, and is born out of our relation with modernity; how does the politics of nostalgia work to imagine Islamic modernities and what kind of modernities does it show? What users and citizens are fit to participate in these Islamic modernities?
The concept of nostalgia can be defined as a longing for a different time, even though nostalgia is originally defined in spatial terms as a “longing for one’s homeland” (Lee 161). However, Boym (“The Future” xix) suggests that in practical terms this spatial aspect of nostalgia is often conflated with time. Thus, nostalgia can also be a longing for the past (Boym (“The Future” 8).
Figure 5: Image posted on Instagram (@lislamnusantara 24 November 2017)
The memory-model of Gus Dur creates a nostalgic desire for a democratic past, which is allegedly lost today, through the use of restorative nostalgia, which attempts to restore wholeness and continuity and tradition in an “imagined past” (Boym “The Future” 56; Iwabuchi 554). This “imagined past” is formulated by Gus Dur’s influential democratic ideology during his time of presidency.
Figure 5 shows a cartoon in which a house is burning with a woman and child inside. The woman calls out “HEELP!!”. A passerby notices her call for help and reacts by asking; “what is your religion?” Gus Dur is then seen as overhearing this event in which he interrupts and puts out the burning fire with water. Gus Dur then says: “if you want to help why are you asking about religion!?” This is followed by an image of Gus Dur and the other figures on a boat house in which he states “This is our house… that we have to take care of!”
The first three images of figure 5 provide a close-up of the “home” of the Indonesian nation that is made evident in the last frame with the image of the entire house boat that holds an Indonesian flag. Within the first two frames, the “politics of threat” of religious intolerance to the Indonesian subject is laid out. When discussing the online construction of counternarratives, Schmidt (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 10) suggests that a “politics of threat” constructs the Indonesian nation as under threat, finding itself in a state of vulnerability and disorder. Religious intolerance is
illustrated as a threat to the Indonesian nation by the insecure situation of the burning house, and is further propogated by the religiously intolerant man whose primacy concern with regards to saving the womans life is the woman’s religion. The religiously intolerant man exemplifies Islamist qualities due to his concern with the woman having Islamic values as a determinant for his course of action in saving her. Thus, the “politics of threat” here is constructed against Islamism and Islamist qualities within the Indonesian nation of that time.
The last two frames of the cartoon illustrates Gus Dur’s interference in the situation and how this has consequences on the Indonesian nation as a whole, as illustrated by the zoomed out figure of the entire Indonesian “home”. These last two frames illustrate Gus Dur as a figure of exceptional authority through which he provided stability and order to the nation of Indonesia. This is carried out by his intervention in the “Islamist” interaction between the religiously intolerant man and the woman in the burning house. Gus Dur intervenes by emphasizing the humanist value of the woman regardless of her religion and the democratic benefits this has for Indonesian society in moving forward, as illustrated by the boat that has stayed afloat and continues to move forward. Thereby, Gus Dur is illustrated as an “antidote” to the “politics of threat” set out in the first two frames of the cartoon.
Overall, Gus Dur’s inspirational qualities in figure 5 that provided an “antidote” to the “politics of threat” purports a “politics of inspiration” (Schmidt
“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 20). When discussing online images that encourage good behavior, Schmidt (“Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 20) suggests that these “politics of inspiration” foster the creation of Foucault’s ‘technologies of the self’. This is because the “politics of inspiration” operate to stimulate users and citizens to model themselves after the inspirational characteristics of religious authority figures by providing followers with governmental ‘technologies of the self’ (Schmidt “Cyberwarriors and Counterstars” 20). Consequently, figure 5 illustrates Gus Dur’s inspirational qualities of tolerance, diversity, intervention and correction that modern Muslim Indonesian subjects can model themselves after.
However, the inspirational quality of Gus Dur’s political democratic ideology seems to be the overarching ‘technology of the self’ demonstrated
