Immigration and Radical Right: The case of Greece

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Rozali Oleko

Student number: s1880551

Immigration and Radical Right

The case of Greece

MSc thesis Public Administration, 15 June 2018

Supervisor: Dr. Dimiter Toshkov

Leiden University College The Hague

Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs

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IRREGULAR MIGRATION ... 37 Hotspots ... 37 Irregular immigrants ... 37 REGULAR MIGRATION ... 38 Regular immigrants ... 38 Young immigrants ... 39 CONFOUNDING VARIABLES ... 40 ECONOMIC VARIABLES ... 40 Unemployment ... 40 GDP per capita... 41 SOCIAL VARIABLES ... 41 Population ... 41 Education ... 41

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ANALYSIS ... 44

REGIONAL ANALYSIS ... 45

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ... 45

Dependent Variables ... 45

Main Explanatory Variables... 46

Control Variables ... 48

ANALYSIS ... 49

MUNICIPAL ANALYSIS ... 59

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ... 59

Dependent Variables ... 59

Main Explanatory Variables... 60

Control Variables ... 62 ANALYSIS ... 63 RESULTS ... 72 REGIONAL ANALYSIS ... 72 MUNICIPAL ANALYSIS ... 74 Irregular migration ... 75 Regular migration ... 76

Confounding socio-economic variables ... 78

Immigration ... 79

Immigration & Controls ... 80

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ... 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 88

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Introduction

The phenomenon of immigration is one of the most multifaceted challenges that Europe has to address. In recent years, the numbers of immigrants arriving in Europe have mounted significantly. Arguably, the large influx of immigrants during the last decade heavily derives from the situation in Syria, that has led to a humanitarian disaster. According to UNHCR, there are currently 6.6 million internally displaced people in Syria and another 5.6 million have fled the country (Unhch.org). The situation in Syria, combined with conflicts, political instability and bad economic conditions in several other Asian and African nations, is translated into an unprecedented refugee crisis, underlying the necessity of an effective short-term and long-term management.

The refugee crisis is closely intertwined with the dynamics of several radical right political parties across Europe. The electoral appeal of such parties has mounted during the last years, raising concerns for the repercussions of such a reality to a united Europe. That is because radical right parties argue for protective, nationalistic theses and are usually EU-sceptical, and thus can be considered as opposite to the European Union (EU) concept. Naturally, a common denominator of such parties is a strong anti-immigrant stand. Accordingly, several member states are building walls and fences to protect themselves from the migrant influx (The Independent.co.uk, 2016). The long-term negative impact of such actions has been stressed by the EU Commission, who argued that “if a process is set in motion putting at risk the depth of economic integration, including the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, the medium-term indirect costs may be dramatically higher than direct estimates, as the impact on intra-community trade, investment and mobility would be unprecedented” (Ec.europa.eu, 2015, p.14).

Given the aforementioned, the enhanced interest of the scientific community on the causes of the radical right’s rise is not surprising. The plethora of studies substantially adds to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Accordingly, the insights that can be derived from a theoretical perspective are ample. However, empirical support for any theoretical argument is equally important and indispensable for the progress of scientific knowledge. When studying the topic, the majority of studies are based on cross-country, national-level data. Attempting to measure the impact of immigration on radical right voting based on national level data is an ecological fallacy, especially when there are strong indicators that in some regions at the subnational level the share of immigrants is considerably higher. As Walchuk (2011, p.28)

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notices, “public opinion is very rarely homogenous at the national level, but often does begin to demonstrate more convergence as the unit of analysis decreases”. Following that logic, the contribution of this paper is twofold.

Initially, regarding Greece in particular, the scarcity of empirical results is noticeable. Among the literature explored, even though there is a documented interest in the radical right rise within the country, a very limited number of studies address the phenomenon. None but the study of Hangartner et al. (2017) has directly measured the impact of immigration on the radical right’s electoral success. Accordingly, most of the country specific studies on immigration address primarily the development of the Greek immigration policy, rather than its impact on the political system. With regards to the impact of immigration on economic related factors, Fakiolas (1999) and Lianos et al. (1996) studies were issued in the 1990s, since when the immigrant flows to Greece have substantially changed.

This literature gap is surprising, given country specific considerations. The vast majority of studies regarding immigration in the EU, either on a single-country level or on an aggregate level, are based on countries that have a long history of immigration. (Baur, Green & Helbling, 2016, Halla, F. Wagner & Zweimuller, 2013, Steinmayr, 2016, Van der Brug, & Fennema, 2007, Walchuk, 2011). To that point, countries where immigration can be regarded as a relatively recent phenomenon have rarely been investigated by the scientific community. Greece was traditionally considered as an emigration country, until the change of immigrant flows approximately 30 years ago. The end of the Military Rule (1967-1974) is relevant to the question of this paper for two reasons. Firstly, it was a significant trigger for immigration, especially for the return of immigrants of Greek origin (Cholezas et al., 2009, Fakiolas, 1999). The restoration of the democratic rule gave an additional dynamic to the wave of Greek repatriates triggered by international causes. The economic stagnation that followed the oil crisis during the 1970s, had already triggered their gradual repatriation (Cavounidis, 2002, Cholezas et al., 2009). It is worth stressing the composition of the immigrant flows at the time, namely mostly of Greek origin. Therefore, the Greek case is interesting not only because the general immigrant flows changed, but also because the flows changed from repatriates of Greek origin to a substantially different cultural group. Secondly, the end of the Military Rule had several repercussions on the radical right electoral success in Greece. The two mainstream political parties, namely the socialist PASOK and the conservative ND, yet both rather situated in the center of the ideological spectrum, have been alternating in power ever since. It is worth noticing that while in general a climate of moderation existed in the political arena, ND has

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frequently included right wing radicals in its ranks (library.fes.de, 2013). Nonetheless, parties situated in the right of ND never had any worth noticing electoral success in the past (Ellinas, 2013, library.fes.de, 2013). The only exception was the National Alignment, a party primarily comprised by supporters of the previous military rule, that received a 6.82% in the first elections after the collapse of the regime in 1977 (library.fes.de, 2013). Therefore, the electoral success of radical right parties in the country, especially Golden Dawn, is of high interest. The second contribution of this paper, one that differentiates it from the majority of studies addressing Greece or other European countries, is that is considers the important distinction between regular and irregular immigration. The fact that the vast majority of studies on the topic do not engage in such a differentiation, may be attributed to the difficulties of accurately measuring the irregular immigrants within a country. Nonetheless, the difference between the two groups is noticeable. Controlling for the particular effect of each immigration type is important, as special characteristics of irregular immigrants make them substantially different from regular immigrants in terms of economic and social characteristics. More importantly, the challenges posed on the EU level derive primarily from the refugee crisis of the last decade, which can be considered as a part of the irregular migration to the continent.

In this paper, two different measures of irregular migration are included. The first results from the existence of refugee hotspots in the country. The facilities were created in order to address the escalating numbers of irregular immigrants within Greece, that result from the fact that the country is situated at the EU borders. Arguably, the pic of the crisis was documented during 2015. Being a country of first-entry, Greece has received over 50% of all immigrants that arrived in the continent that year (Hangartner et al., 2017). Given the aforementioned, the hotspots in question fall short to address the accommodation requirements of such large numbers. The pictures of people living in camping tents during the snowing winter are highly illustrative. Naturally, the country regions situated at the borders, especially the Greek islands across the Greek-Turkish borderline, are the most heavily affected. To provide an illustrative example, “[…] the island of Lesvos (with a population of about 80,000) received more than 200,000 asylum-seekers between May and September 2015.” (Hangartner et al., 2017, p.2). Given such high numbers, the hotspot-including regions will be instrumentally used to examine whether immigrant concentration, especially when sudden and in large numbers, accounts for the radical right’s electoral success.

The second measure of irregular immigration included in this paper will be the irregular immigrants identified in each region by the Hellenic Police. Many immigrants cross the country

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irregularly during their journey to western European countries, that are usually the countries of destination. Given the proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish coastline, the smuggling across the country’s borders is high. This reality, combined with the fact that even when identified, many immigrants exceed the state granted timeframe of stay, further stresses the importance of controlling for the irregular immigrants when examining the case of Greece. This study will examine the electoral success of radical right parties in Greece in a rigorous manner. Initially, a retrospective assessment on the accumulated knowledge will be performed, regarding the case of Greece in particular. I will assess previous country-specific studies that address the phenomena of the radical right rise and immigration, in combination or separately. Moving to the theorized impact of immigration, and its correlation with radical right voting behaviour, I will assess the major theoretical directions in combination with country specific considerations of the Greek reality. Specifically, I will elaborate on the perceived and actual threats that immigration poses on the nation, regarding the security, cultural and economic dimensions accordingly. Subsequently, a two-level analysis will take place. I will examine the electoral success of Golden Down and Independent Greeks both at the regional and the municipal level within the country. Such an analysis further distinguishes this paper from previous research on the country, and will allow for more profound insights on the topic. Equally important, I will examine the impact of both regular and irregular migration, along with several additional measures that tap the economic and social conditions within each area of interest. Lastly, a discussion will follow based on the insights derived from both levels of analysis. The results will be assessed in combination, to provide an overall picture for the country, as well as suggestions for further research on the topic.

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Literature Review

Focusing on Greece as the country of interest, both the phenomena of immigration and the radical right’s rise have captured the attention of the scientific community. Hence, the literature assessment revealed a plethora of studies specifically directed to the country. Given the large immigrant inflows and the electoral success of radical right parties since the beginning of the new millennium, such an enhanced interest on the topics is not surprising.

Within the literature focusing on the rise of the radical right, especially the electoral success of such parties, only 3 such studies were found measuring the effect in Greece. Hangartner, Dinas, Marbach, Matakos & Xefteris study in 2017, is the first study that aims to fill this theoretical gap regarding the country. The argumentation followed is very closely related to this paper, as their reasoning is based on the electoral impact of great immigrant concentration in a geographical area. The summer of 2015, a very large number of immigrants arrived in Greece, and the two most recent national elections instrumentally took place before and after that summer accordingly. The authors assessed the share of GD among the Aegean islands, expecting to find a difference between the islands closest to the Turkish coastline, which arguably receive the vast majority of immigrants, as compared to the remaining Aegean islands. The findings show that there was indeed a 2% increase in the GD’s share in the second round of that year’s national elections (Hangartner et al., 2017).

A second paper recently published is highly relevant to this paper as it provides additional insights. Using poll data from 2011-2014, Roumanias, Skouras & Christodoulakis in 2018 examine the electoral success of GD, taking under consideration a number of economic and social plausible explanations, like immigration density, unemployment, criminality and public opinion for instance. Regarding immigration in particular, their findings indicate that people who perceive immigration as a salient issue add significantly to the party’s success. Those results are in line with the assumption of public perceptions regarding immigration as a cause for radical right voting (Rydgren, 2008). In overall however, the authors found that immigration only partially explains GD’s electoral success, which should be rather attributed to the austerity measures that eroded public support for the two mainstream parties (Roumanias et al., 2018).

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A third study that provides additional insights is the one of Lamprianou & Ellinas, published in 2017. The authors designed and conducted a telephone survey to collect data on several plausible explanations for the party’s success, like political trust and attitudes towards political violence to name a few. Regarding immigration in particular, the respondents were asked whether it is good for the economy and whether it enriches the country’s culture. The study’s findings are in line with those of Roumanias et al. (2018), as immigration only marginally influenced GD’s electoral success.

Within the literature focusing on the phenomenon of immigration in the country, no study that specifically addresses the impact of immigration on the radical’s right electoral success was found. The majority of studies explore the political dimension of immigration, with a focus on policy developments rather than its effect on political parties. Nonetheless, the insights derived from the aforementioned studies are closely related to this paper’s quest and can be regarded as valuable contributions.

Radical Right Parties

The Radical Right Rise

Within the radicals’ right literature explored, I identified several studies addressing the Golden Dawn (GD) and the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), two of the three Greek political parties that belong to the radical right wing and are electorally successful during the last 15 years. Previous research regarding radical parties in Greece has classified the aforementioned parties as being radical right. LAOS can be classified as right wing populist party. The party supports nationalism, and is against the Greek memorandum agreements, multiculturalism and immigration. It is worth mentioning here the meaning of the LAOS acronym, which in Greek means the people, reflecting the party’s emphasis to people of Greek origin. Their difference with GD is that the latter can be classified as a right wing extremist party. GD’s party representatives officially reject the correlation with neo-Nazism, an argument made by other political representatives, the media and the scientific community. Nonetheless, the party’s use of symbols, rhetoric and practices arguably prove the truthfulness of the aforementioned allegations (Ellinas, 2013, Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017, Roumanias et al., 2018). As Arzheimer (2012) notes, “In terms of style, GD has developed a military aesthetic that appeals to young, single, moderately educated males - typical demographic characteristics of ER voters”. It is

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worth mentioning here that GD’s leading party figure, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, was a member

of the August 4th and National Alignment parties, which were nationalistic right wing parties

that favoured the Military Rule that ended in 1974 (Ellinas, 2013).

On the contrary, scientific studies addressing the party of Independent Greeks (ANEL) are nearly absent, with the exception of the study of Aslanidis & Rovira Kaltwasser in 2016. Their study is insightful for this this paper in the sense that it focuses on the inclusion of ANEL in the current coalition government with the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), and hence its distinctiveness from other radical right wing parties. Regarding ANEL’s official position on immigration, the party argues for immigrants not exceeding a maximum of 2,5% of the country’s population, with a prerequisite that such a share is financially and socially sustainable. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that the party also argues the abolition of the Dublin II treaty.

Several country-directed studies provide valuable insights on LAOS and especially GD, particularly the studies of Dalakoglou, (2012), Ellinas (2013), Lamprianou et al. (2017), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation anthology on the topic (library.fes.de, 2013), and Xenakis, S. (2012). Both parties are described as nationalist, anti-immigrant parties, given that they fiercely argue for nationalistic theses based on ethnic definitions of the Greek nation. With regards to GD in particular, “the party defines nationality in terms of “race, blood and ancestry” […]” (library.fes.de, 2013, p.88). Additionally, GD is “clearly distinguished by their bias against immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, particularly non-westerners.” (Vadlamannati, K., & Kelly, G., 2017). The authors document the political trajectory of the Party’s Members of Parliament (MEPs), especially the party’s leader Nikolas Michaloliakos, pointing to connections to radical parties of the past and the various criminal actions of the MEPs in question. Additionally, as Xenakis, S. (2012) notes, he was “[…] arrested for involvement in far-right political violence and at one point imprisoned for possession of weapons and explosives […]”. Regarding the party’s MEPs, “Half of its parliamentarians and dozens of party functionaries were imprisoned for months and, since April 2015, have been facing trial for setting up a criminal organisation” (Lamprianou et al., 2017, p.46).

Given the GD’s rhetoric and practices, it can be characterized as an extreme/far right party. The authors report the party’s connection to Nazism and Fascism, by providing illustrative examples of racist incidents and arguments. With regards to GD’s voters’ characteristics, previous research provides an illustrative picture of the profile of those most likely to vote for

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the party; being a young male with medium level of education who is unemployed. (Arzheimer, 2009, Ellinas, 2013, Koltsida, 2013, library.fes.de, 2013, Roumanias et al., 2018). With regards to LAOS, special emphasis is put on the primacy of religion. The party strongly supports the Greek Orthodox Church and the Christian Orthodox religion, the latter referring to 90% of the Greek population. Religious considerations are frequently used in the party’s nationalist and anti-immigration arguments. Nonetheless, the party’s electoral success was documented primarily within the 1990s and 2000s, as in 2012 and 2015 it failed to reach the electoral threshold in order to obtain seats in the Greek Parliament. This is the reason why the focus of this paper will be directed primarily towards GD.

As Papastathis (2015 p.226) notes, “Greece might be considered to be one of the most ‘institutionally’ religious countries in Europe, having a state Church that enjoys a legal status under public law and a number of special economic and political privileges”. The aforementioned study provides additional insights on the impact of the Greek Orthodox Church in the electoral success of the radical right parties in the country. As the authors note, “OCG played a key role during the dictatorship, i.e. the ideological and political ancestors of the GD, legitimizing the regime and generating social consensus for its actions” (Papastathis, 2015 p.233). In recent years, such indirect support for radical attitudes derives from the fact that the Church has not taken a direct stand against GD. In contrast, the authors note that “the ultimate criterion for defining an act as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ is not determined on the basis of its moral value but on its instrumental utility for the national group and the attainment of its goals. Consequently, any action is allowed in the name of the alleged national progress, even when its outcome is practically in contrast with major premises of the Church, such as non-violence or prejudice.” (Papastathis, 2015 p.237). The authors provide ample examples of the xenophobic, Islam oriented in particular, and nationalistic frames used by leading figures of the Church in public discourses over the years. More importantly, they documented the change in strategy that was applied by GD, namely a policy-shift in supporting religion, Christianity in particular, in order to capitalize from religious voters, as compared to a view of religion as a source of decadence in previous years.

Economic Considerations

Further studies examining the case of Greece provide additional insights on the radical’s right rise in Greece, though from a different perspective, one that concerns economic considerations, especially during a time of financial crisis (Cholezas & Tsakloglou, 2009, Ellinas, 2013,

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Fakiolas, 1999, Givens, 2005, Kandylis, 2012, Karamanidou, 2014, Karamanidou, 2016, Karyotis & Rüdig, 2015, Karyotis, Rüdig & Judge, 2014, Lamprianou et al., 2017, Lianos, Sarris & Katseli, 1996, library.fes.de, 2013, Maloutas & Sayas, 2012, Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón 2010, Papastathis, 2015). Poor economic performance and the application of austerity measures have an impact on voting behaviour by enhancing negative feelings, especially feelings of competition toward foreigners, and increasing nationalistic behaviours and xenophobia. As Karyotis et al. (2015 p.5) note, “attribution of responsibility has been shown to play a crucial conditioning effect in the relationship between economic evaluations and vote choice: only voters who blame the government for the economic problems are likely to vote according to their economic evaluations”. The aforementioned statement is particularly acute to Greece. The financial crisis in the country led to a regime change in the political arena. The two mainstream parties, the liberal-conservative New Democracy (ND) and the social-democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which have alternated in power since the end of the Military rule in 1974, experienced major loses in the most recent country’s national elections in 2015. The difference is that while ND managed to obtain 28,09% of the votes, PASOK completely collapsed, a fact illustrated by the 6,29% of the votes that the party obtained ("Ministry of Interior - Elections", n.d.). Given the fact that this research is oriented on the parties situated in the right side of the political spectrum, an observation regarding the conservative ND is particularly relevant to this paper. The party advocates for the acceptance of the Greek memoranda, emphasizing the importance of the country’s European orientation. (Karyotis et al., 2014). Therefore, it can be assumed that a people situated in the right angle of the ideological spectrum that are against the acceptance of the austerity measures would seek representativeness through other, ideologically conservative parties that oppose the austerity measures and the country’s European direction. Euroscepticism as a reason for the radical right rise has been argued by several other authors accordingly (Karyotis et al., 2014, Karyotis et al., 2015, library.fes.de, 2013, Lubbers & Coenders, 2016, Papastathis, 2015). In general, the aforementioned studies are in accordance that raising dissatisfaction on the Greek austerity measures and its translation into a protest vote can arguably be consider as part of the causal explanation regarding the radical’s right rise in the country. As library.fes.de (2013, p.93) notes, “the spirit of protest that aided Golden Dawn was present not only in its electoral base, but throughout the entire electorate.”.

The general dissatisfaction in Greece, followed by blame attribution regarding poor economic conditions, and the subsequent punishment of the political parties perceived as responsible, are closely related to immigration. The centrality of immigration in the political agendas of LAOS

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and GD has been noted by many authors. (Ellinas, 2013, Karamanidou, 2014, Kovras, 2010, Lamprianou et al., 2017, Papastathis, 2015, library.fes.de, 2013, Roumanias et al., 2018). As Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2010, p.581) note, “crisis may contribute to increased discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin”. Such an argument is in agreement with studies addressing specifically the Greek context, which speak of growing intolerance and rising tensions towards different social groups, especially towards Muslim immigrants (Kandylis et al., 2012, Karamanidou, 2014). Regarding ND and PASOK, “[…] the patterns of blaming (perceived) failures to the opponent party and claiming successes (however imaginary) as their own should be seen as a strategy to stress competence in controlling migration […] have persisted in the 2009–2012 period.” (Karamanidou, 2014, p.451). As Roumanias et al. (2018, p.5) note, “Mainstream parties might find it difficult to take a clear stand on thorny or controversial issues such as immigration”.

Immigration

Economic Considerations

Several studies addressing the issue of immigration in Greece rather that the rise of radical right parties provide additional insights closely related to this paper’s quest. The findings of Cholezas et al. in 2009, are highly illustrative of the effect of immigrants on the country’s economy. Taking under consideration findings from previous research on the topic, the authors assess a variety of economic indicators, namely wages, productivity, unemployment, government spending, income distribution, foreign direct investment and social security. With the exception of remittances sent by immigrants to their family members in their country of origin, the effects of immigration on the Greek economy appear to be rather positive at best or inconclusive. Those findings are in accordance with the ones reported by Fakiolas, 1999, Givens, 2005 and Lianos et al., 1996. Some of the most frequently mentioned concerns, refer to the illegal employment of immigrants and the challenges they pose to low-skilled workers. A worth noticing observation, closely related to this paper’s methodology, relates to differences between high and low-density populated regions. According to Givens (2005, p.217) “First, the inhabitants of cities are universally more tolerant of immigrants; secondly, many of the rural areas are border regions which have had mass influxes of illegal immigrants and much petty crime”. The linkage of immigration and rise of criminality and its subsequent use by GD has been documented by the library.fes.de (2013). Accordingly, the findings of a study conducted in Athens in 2012, report the growing segregation and inequality not only among

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Greeks and immigrants, but among ethnically different immigrant clusters as well (Kandylis et al., 2012). Location related factors are of high value for this study, as the paper will examine the effect of high immigrant presence, especially when sudden, on voting for radical right parties.

Cultural Considerations

A subsequent category of studies is directed towards Albanian immigrants. Such scientific focus is reasonable, given that the majority of immigrants in Greece came from the neighbouring Balkan countries, until the more recent refugee crisis changed the image of the immigrants’ composition. As Bohman & Hjerm (2016, p.30) sharply notice, “political rhetoric significantly affects how people interpret an increase in the share of immigrants. Whether or not newcomers are perceived as a threat depends on how their presence is framed in broader national discourses.”. However, “Greek nationalist discourse is based on a concept of ethnic and religious homogeneity”, as discussed in the previous section (Linos, 2001, p.13). The fact that Albania was the dominant country of origin of the immigrants arriving in Greece, and their perception as a threat by the Greek public has been documented by various researchers. (Antonopoulos &, Papadopoulou, 2004, Antonopoulos, Tierney & Webster, 2008, Balias & Passas, 2003, Cavounidis, 2002, Kandylis et al., 2012, Karamanidou, 2014, Karyotis et al., 2014, Kiprianos, Lamprianou et al., 2017, Linos, 2001, Tovima.gr, 2016, Triandafyllidou, 2014, Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002, Winterdyk, 2006, Zigoura, 2007,). Such a perception applies to several dimensions. Firstly, Albania is a neighbouring to Greece country, and was responsible for the bulk of immigration until recently, a combination particularly rare in Europe, as noted by Zigoura (2007). Another perception refers to Albanians as a threat to the ethnic composition of the nation, given the young age of those arriving in the country combined with the county’s aging population (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). Lastly, another reason relates to economic considerations, employment in particular. As Karamanidou (2014, p.444) notes, “Albanians in their majority, satisfied demands for unskilled labour in sectors such as agriculture, construction, hospitality and domestic care”.

Additionally, Albanian immigrants are perceived to be increasing criminality by the Greek society (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Triandafyllidou et al., 2002). More importantly, such a view is widely spread within one of the state’s administrative organs, namely the Greek Police. A study conducted in 2008 is highly illustrative. The study’s findings demonstrate particular xenophobic and even racist attitudes and behaviour towards this immigrant group. The Greek Police puts special emphasis on the preservation of the Greek ethnic origin, language and

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religion, which are perceived as being under threat, due to the influx of the “animals”, to note a wide-spread characterization of Albanians by the police representatives (Antonopoulos et al., 2008). Additionally, the link between the Greek Police and GD has been documented by previous research. As Xenakis (2012 p.446) notes, “Cooperation between far-right activists and elements of the police became so blatant that in October 2009, the incoming PASOK Minister of Citizen Protection, Michalis Chrysochoidis, publicly acknowledged the existence of the relationship, whilst vowing to seek an end to it and drawing attention to his efforts to see Chrysi Avgi outlawed.”. As Karamanidou (2016, p.2002) notes, “[…] there is little doubt that Golden Dawn members and supporters were responsible for the majority of attacks between 2011 and 2013[…]”. With regards to voting behaviour, Dalakoglou (2012, p.538) indicates that “[…] the close links between police and GD also became apparent in the elections of May and June 2012, when approximately half of police officers on duty in the headquarters of Athens Police voted for GD.”

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Theory

Conceptual Definitions

Radical Right

The rise of right wing political parties in Europe has triggered a voluminous amount of research attempting to understand and explain the phenomenon. Researchers have provided valuable insights on party formation and electoral success. Despite the enhanced scientific attention though, the issue of a clear definition of the concept has not been adequately addressed so far. Several authors use the concept of extremism (far right or extreme right) when referring to such parties (Arzheimer, 2009, Dalakoglou, 2012, Ellinas, 2013, Hangartner et al., 2017, Karamanidou, 2014, Karyotis et al., 2014, Mudde, 1999, Roumanias et al., 2018, Xenakis, 2012). Others, include the concept of populism (Aslanidis et al., 2016, Vadlamannati et al., 2017), or the concept of neo-Nazism (Papastathis, 2015) in their definitions. Yet others, use the terms anti-immigration or radical right, the last one being the most frequently documented in the literature explored (Baur et al., 2016, Bohman et al., 2016, Dyrbekk, 2011, Givens, 2005, Karamanidou, 2014, Lubbers and Coenders, 2016, Mudde, 2007, Rydgren, 2008, Van Der Brug et al., 2000).

In this paper I will use the term radical right wing parties to define a subgroup that entails certain points of consensus identified in the literature. The most relevant denominator is that all such parties hold nationalistic attitudes that emphasise the distinctiveness of the indigenous citizens. As Rydgren (2008) notes, “radical right-wing parties share a fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called ‘ethno-pluralist doctrine’) and anti-political-establishment populism”. Given the intensity of immigrant and refugee flows directed to Europe during the last decade, such radical ideology is not surprising. As a matter of fact, radical right parties are especially concerned with immigration and usually have strong

anti-immigrant positions. Apart from a nationalistic ideology, right wing parties’ characteristics

include their anti-establishment character, hostile attitudes toward the EU and globalization. The aforementioned definition was chosen in order facilitate the replicability of the study. A more precise definition that would include contextual elements derived from the case of Greece would probably pose additional impediments to future research.

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Migration

Migration is an umbrella concept that entails several distinct categories of non-nationals arriving to a country. According to the International Organization for Migration (2018 p.41),

migration can be defined as:

“A process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length,

composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants.”

An important distinction of migrants, particularly relevant for this study is between the concepts of regular and irregular migrants. To be precise, an irregular migrant can be defined as:

“Someone who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe a country’s admission rules

and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country (also called clandestine/ illegal/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation).” (International

Organization for Migration, 2018 p.34).

Contextual Considerations

The particularities of the Greece’s geographical position clearly point to an enhanced attention in the category of irregular immigrants. During the past decade, the problem of increasing irregular migration proved to be the most pressing. The economic deprivation and environmental degradation in many Asian and African countries fueled the amount of economic migrants trying to make their way into Europe (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Papadopoulou, 2004). Domestic conflict and political instability intensify the problem, driving their constituencies to flee their countries in order to improve their security (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). Along this journey to the promising EU, countries like Greece, Italy and Spain suffer the burden of being the first points of entry (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). Being a country of first entry, Greece has several responsibilities that derive from the Dublin Regulation, namely the authority to process asylum applications (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2013). According to Lianos et al. (1996 p.449), “most immigrants are illegal and Greece is not necessarily their final

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destination, but rather an intermediate stop on their journey to another western European country.”.

At that point, it is worth noticing the characteristics of the Greek landscape, as they heavily contribute to the the complexity of irregular migration management. Apart from being situated “[…] at the crossroads where Europe, Asia and Africa meet, […]” (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, p.447), the country has an extensive coastline that amounts to 13,676 km, most of which defines the sea borders with the neighboring Turkey ("Geography of Greece", n.d.). Moreover, a great number of the Greek islands is extremely closely situated to the Turkish shores, with people being able to see the ones across.

Given the aforementioned, the extensive operations of the smuggling networks in the area is not surprising, nor is their success. As previous research has indicated, it is extremely challenging to make accurate estimates regarding the number of irregular immigrants in the country (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Antonopoulos et al., 2008, Lianos et al. 1996). Nonetheless, the southern European countries, namely Greece Italy and Spain are the ones most heavily affected (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). The smugglers’ identity includes a variety of ethnicities, namely Albanian, Bulgarian, Iraqi, Kurdish, Pakistani, Romanian, Russian, Syrian and Turkish nationals, but Greeks are assumed to be the majority (58.4%) (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Papadopoulou, 2004). The reality in Greece has been depicted as “Boats loaded with Kurdish, Iraqi, Afghani or Pakistani migrants cross the Aegean on an almost routine basis” (Papadopoulou, 2004, p.167).

The smuggling routes pass through the mountains that are situated between Greece and Albania and Greece and Bulgaria accordingly (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). The border that divides Greece and Turkey is mainly composed by the river Evros, which is the alternative to reaching one of the numerous Greek islands via smuggling boats. Tragically, many migrants have lost their lives trying to cross the river, as many of them drown during the endeavor, and several minefields are spread along the river bank (Antonopoulos, 2006, Antonopoulos et al., 2006). The smuggling networks operating in the aforementioned routes acquire substantial financial profits from their illicit activities. The smuggling price per person ranges from 150-600$ for journeys from the neighboring Albania, to 3000-7000$ for Asian countries (Antonopoulos et al., 2006). The cost of sea passage from Turkey ranges from 100-1500$ per person (Papadopoulou, 2004). Given the fact that the most desired migrant destinations usually involve Western European countries like Germany and the UK, Greece has evolved into a

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popular transit country. Immigrants may reside for years in the country, while attempting to gather the required funds for the continuation of their journey to the north (Papadopoulou, 2004, p.174).

To conclude, while attempting to measure its impact on the electoral success of radical right parties, this study will consider all displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants, making a distinction based on regular and irregular status. Special attention will be given to

asylum seekers, defined as:

“Persons seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of

a negative decision, they must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any alien in an irregular situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related

grounds.” (International Organization for Migration, 2018, p.8).

Such a focus was chosen due to the particularities of the Greek context. To be specific, the country has a long history of restrictive immigration policies and the vast majority of economic migrants arrive at the country irregularly as described previously. Among them, those who are identified either trying to cross the country’s borders, or at a later point being already in the country, usually apply for asylum in Greece. This resort to the asylum application procedure is a means of being granted temporary permit in the country, until the final decision on the application. Given the shortcomings of the Greek bureaucracy, this process may take several months to be completed, a fact that acts as a strong motive for migrants to apply, even when not being eligible.

Immigration as a Security Threat

Nation & Demography

From the beginning of the immigrant flows during the 1990s, immigration in Greece has been identified as a security issue. Both public and media discourses framed immigrants as a threat to security and public order (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, Karamanidou, 2014, Zigoura, 2007). This kind of framing was particularly successful, as the majority of migrants at the time originated form the neighbouring Balkan countries, a region that exhibited a revised

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political sphere, the the first Law on Aliens (L. 1975/1991) and Law 2910/2001 reflected such a perception of migrants. (Et.gr, 2018). Given the fact that the bulk of migration in Greece is irregular, both laws entailed special provisions regarding border control and preventive measures, broadly reflecting the logic of a Fortress Europe. In addition, distinct categories titled as “unwanted aliens” or “risk for public security” clearly reflected the spirit of the legislators. As Bohman et al. (2016, p.31) indicate, “The frames used by the radical right primarily portray immigration and immigrant presence as a threat to the nation.”. In the case of Greece, LAOS has emphasized the demographic problem of the country and linked it to migration. As Fakiolas (1999, p.220) notes, “[…] the natural increase of the population in Greece has been roughly zero in the 1990s and the percentage of older people more than doubled over the last 40 years […]”. As a solution, the party advocated for the the deportation of all irregular migrants (library.fes.de, 2013, Triandafyllidou, 2014). GD and ANEL share similar views on immigration as a threat to the nation. The difference is that both the discourse and practices of GD are arguably much more extreme. To be specific, GD perceives immigration as a threat to the very existence of the Greek nation. The party’s open use of violence against immigrants, in combination with a strong anti-abortion law for the natives, are considered indispensable to ensure the nation’s survival (Karyotis et al., 2014, Karamanidou, 2014, library.fes.de, 2013, Papastathis, 2015).

Criminality

Accordingly, immigration has been associated with the rise of criminality in the country. For many years, the very irregular entrance in the country constituted a criminal act, therefore automatically transforming an irregular immigrant into a criminal liable to imprisonment. Public opinion surveys demonstrate that Greeks consider migrants as causes of crime and violence (Fakiolas, 1999, Linos, 2001). Cases were Greeks are the victims of the criminal acts of non-nationals are instrumentally used to reinforce such arguments (Antonopoulos et al., 2008). The findings of a previous study examining the attitudes of the Hellenic Police, clearly demonstrate that among the law enforcement organ such a viewpoint is strongly supported. To provide an illustrative example, a widely known police practice refers to the police squad “Zeus”, who performed the broadly known “sweeping operations”, aiming at irregular immigrant identification and deportation. The aforementioned activities reinforced the perceptions of regarding migrants as equals to criminals. According to Triandafyllidou (2014, p. 162), those police operations “took place under public view and people were loaded on buses and directed to Albania without sometimes even having the possibility to notify their relatives”.

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Migrants have also been associated with various criminal activities, for instance smuggling, drug trafficking and street killing to name a few (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Fakiolas, 1999). Public media came to reinforce such perceptions of insecurity just like the issue of national threat. As Linos (2001, p.17) notices, “Almost every violent crime committed by foreigners was granted prime-time coverage, complete with ominous music, re-enactments and special effects”.

Accordingly, the conservative mainstream party New Democracy has also framed immigrants a cause of criminality. With a focus on urban areas, and especially the city centre of the capital Athens, party officials have engaged in a discourse that favoured the reoccupation of ghetto areas run by migrant gangs (Karamanidou, 2014). Sadly, both political and media representatives appear to discard the fact that being irregular and therefore illegal enhances the vulnerability of the migrants in question, and thus makes them more prone to engage in illegal activities, a reality reinforced by the shortcomings of the Greek immigration policy framework. Given the aforementioned, I argue that it is logical to assume that the Greek voters are likely to hold a negative image of migrants, one that is accompanied by feelings of insecurity and threat, due to the rhetoric and practices employed within the political sphere, by the media and the state’s administrative organs over the years.

Immigration as a Cultural Threat

Origin, Language & Religion in Greece

The perception of immigrants as a cultural threat is equally widespread in the Greek society. Such a threat usually derives from different cultural characteristics that exist among various foreign ethnicities, namely beliefs and practices based on tradition, language and religion. According to Lubbers et al., 2016, Rydgren, 2008 and Walchuk, 2011, such differences are assumed to draw distinct divide-lines between the natives and the immigrants, and fortify perceptions of distinct groupings, namely an in-group and an out-group. The authors have also stressed the importance of origin regarding cultural identity, due to the role of common ancestry which clearly affects the inclusion to the in-group. Regarding the Greek context, “The boundary between insiders and outsiders is defined by a combination of ethnic and religious features.” (Triandafyllidou et al., 2002, p.198). The emphasis on the distinctiveness of Greeks as a people, is an inherent part of the Greek culture. Such an attitude has been strongly rooted in the population since the time of ancient Greece, when non-Greeks were broadly referred as

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“barbarians”. In recent years, such an attitude is confirmed by the preferential treatment of specific groups of migrants, namely Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians, due to their ethnic origin.

Public opinion surveys also demonstrate that Greeks considered the question of origin as being particularly important, along with knowledge of the Greek language and respect for the law (Lubbers et al., 2016), and that the country is “identified as the nation most resistant to multiculturalism” (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, p.165). Another illustrative example refers to the labour unions, which have been documented to “sticking to national workers’ solidarity rather than universal working class solidarity […]” (Triandafyllidou, 2014, p.164).

Likewise, populations of a different origin or religion are perceived as a threat to the Greek societal values, especially Muslims. The proximity of the neighbouring Turkey, a considerably larger to Greece nation that openly questions the status quo in the region, contributes to such perceptions. The more illustrative example is that the capital city Athens lacked until recently a mosque operating under the official permission of the state, a reality that grossly violated the freedom of religion. The decision was fiercely debated non only by the Golden Dawn, but also from the representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church (Papastathis, 2015). As Fakiolas (1999, p.214) notes, “many believe that there are too many foreigners in Greece and fear that even integration may work both ways and influence morals in the country.” This, suspicion at the best, but mostly hostility towards Muslim migrants that has been documented in Greece (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, Karamanidou, 2014, Papastathis, 2015, Triandafyllidou, 2014, Triandafyllidou et al., 2002), has been documented accordingly in several European countries

(Baur, Green & Helbling, 2016, Lubbers et al., 2016, Rydgren, 2008).

The Political Sphere

The two mainstream parties in general failed to mitigate such perceptions through policies aiming at immigrant integration to the Greek society. Only a limited number of positive actions were taken to that direction, primarily from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). For instance, the party started considering immigrant rights during the 2000s, and even advocated for a citizenship and an anti-racism law by the end of the decade. (Karamanidou, 2014). Leading party figures however have publically argued for a preferential treatment, with the Minister of Labour arguing that “Each state has the discretion of treating people of the same ethnicity in a different way [than aliens] if it wishes to do so.” (Triandafyllidou et al., 2002, p.200). Such a rhetoric certainly adds to perceptions of cultural difference and groupings based

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on origin. The positions of the conservative party ND were even more restrictive. Certainly, some initiatives were taken regarding immigrant integration, but those were mainly in the regional level, and in general, there is a vacuum of party positions on immigration (Triandafyllidou, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the party did not support neither the citizenship nor the anti-racism law advocated by PASOK (Karamanidou, 2014). Rather, it engaged in an achievement discourse, claiming ownership of the successful policies and blaming the opposition for the ample failures, a practice equally used by PASOK as well (Karyotis et al.,

2015). What is more, a strategy shift has taken place the last years within the party. As

Karamanidou (2014, p.455) notes, “the character of the policies adopted has become more restrictive and securitarian in nature in the process of attempting to recapture the ownership of the migration issue from the far right.” In sum, both parties lack a coherent policy towards immigrant integration and the political will to support such policies accordingly (Karamanidou, 2014, Kiprianos et al., 2003, Lubbers et al., 2016, Triandafyllidou, 2014).

Given the aforementioned, the success of LAOS, ANEL and GD in capitalizing the immigration issue as a cultural threat is not surprising. LAOS has given emphasis in the Christian Orthodox religion, as the party’s name indicates, and has emphasized the importance of stricter border controls and deportations to secure the nation (Karamanidou, 2014, library.fes.de, 2013). Accordingly, GD has given equal emphasis to the nation’s religion, and considers the integration of immigrants as an existential threat to the church, the latter being perceived as identical to the nation (Papastathis, 2015).

Given the aforementioned, I argue that it is logical to assume that perceptions of immigrants being a threat to the nation’s culture are widespread and generally accepted among the Greek society due to the rhetoric and practices employed within the political sphere, by the media and the state’s administrative organs over the years.

Immigration as a Threat for the Economy

Another immigrant-related discourse frequently debated in Greece, refers to the challenges immigrants pose from an economic perspective. The definition of migrants as problems, indicate the stance of political representatives and public officials, the media and the public alike (Antonopoulos et al., 2006, Antonopoulos et al., 2008). Such attitudes are particularly acute to irregular migrants, and the challenges they pose with regards to unemployment. Authors have previously argued that “prolonged periods of unemployment could lead to an

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erosion of individuals’ trust in the mainstream parties.” (Stockemer, 2015, p.1005). Accordingly, an empirical research conducted in Austria identified that “it is the proximity of low- and medium-skilled immigrants (rather than high-skilled immigration) that causes Austrian voters to turn to the far right […]” (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller, 2013, p.5).

Unemployment

According to Rydgren (2008, p.746), “immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors, pitted against ‘natives’ who are entitled to keep the entire cake for themselves.” Similarly, Vadlamannati et al. (2017 p.6) note that, "most asylum seekers are in reality economic migrants who make choices about where to seek asylum based on opportunities for employment and access to welfare benefits". The two Greek mainstream parties have contributed to the establishment of such a view. The socialist PASOK has advocated for the necessity of immigration, that derives from the unwillingness of Greek citizens to engage in certain job categories (Karamanidou, 2014). This view is in accordance with research findings indicating “that jobs held by foreign workers are quite different from those held by local ones in the cases of Greece and Spain” (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2010, p.581). Such jobs usually refer to low status ranked positions, like being a household made, household repairman, painter and gardener, workers in construction, or jobs in the fields of agriculture (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, Fakiolas, 1999). A previous research conducted by Lianos et al., during 1996 in northern Greece, found that immigrant workers are generally less paid than Greeks, and are most frequently employed as seasonal workers, mainly in the field of agriculture and construction. The findings report that the substitution amount of Greeks by migrant workers is considerably low, and primarily refers to unskilled irregular migrants. Those findings are in accordance with the fact that the Greek immigration policy clearly favoured the native workers, by making the obtainment of employment permits for regular migrants very restrictive. The most recent country study confirms that “the severity of the crisis at a local level (unemployment, GDP and bankruptcies) do not explain […] GD voting even after controlling for other factors.” (Roumanias et al., 2018, p.12). Nonetheless, the influx of migrants, “especially from former Eastern bloc countries, and their presence all over Greece as a very active labour force, has alarmed the public and become one of the most controversial, widely discussed issues” (Sitaropoulos & Skordas, 2004, p.49).

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State Expenditure & Housing Market

The economic threat does not only apply to the labour market but also to other aspects of social life, like welfare state provisions, residence and marriage (Rydgren, 2008). Equally, state expenditure is expected to be highly affected due to increased control and deportation needs posed by the irregular immigrants, while regular immigrants highly contribute to losses in foreign exchange (Fakiolas, 1999). Previous empirical findings in Greece however point to the opposite direction. Regarding accommodation, immigrants have not burdened the housing market, as they usually live in old, even abandoned houses in the villages, or small basement flat in the cities, types of accommodation not preferred by Greeks (Fakiolas, 1999, Lianos et al., 1996). Accordingly, regarding the provisions of the welfare state, immigrants do not seem to pose a considerable burden. This is due to the fact that they are usually employed in the shadow economy, and even when they are not, Greek employers usually take advantage of their social position and do not pay their fair share of social contributions (Fakiolas, 1999,

Lianos et al., 1996).The fact though that the vast majority of immigrants is usually illegally

employed, reinforces the perception of migrants as increasing criminality in the eyes of the public. Images of migrants selling various goods on the capital’s streets without permission, followed by images of police squads chancing them while they run carrying large bags with their merchandise, only reinforce the perception of them as a cause of crime.

Financial Crisis & Decline of Public Trust

The aforementioned considerations and attitudes are expected to be even more widespread when the economy worsens. (Bohman et al., 2016, Fakiolas, 1999Kandylis et al., 2012). Therefore, the state of the Greek economy is particularly relevant in the establishment of immigrant economic threat perceptions. The Greek financial austerity crisis that started in 2008 had a heavy impact on the Greek society, and its consequences regarding employment opportunities and job insecurity are still evident to the date. Authors have argued that in such times, social tension and discrimination towards migrants are particularly acute. (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2010, Kandylis et al., 2012). More importantly, given the fact that irregular migrants are usually illegally employed as mentioned before, combined with high rates of long-term unemployment following the crisis, authors have argued for the decline of public trust in political institutions and mainstream parties. (Fakiolas, 1999, Stockemer, 2015). Radical right parties in Greece have commonly supported the view of migrants being a major cause of unemployment. Migrants are framed as dangerous usurpers that fuel the job market with cheap labour and thus steal the employment opportunities of the native Greeks. As library.fes.de

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(2013, p.94) notices, “voters with precarious employment situations are more likely than the average voter to cast their ballots for parties that address their problems in a simplistic manner and systematically exploit their fears.

Theoretical Argumentation

Insights from Greece

Spatial Distribution of Immigrants

In the case of Greece, until recently there weren’t any large identifiable immigrant clusters to support such a spatial reasoning. Nonetheless, the large influx of immigrants during the last two decades has created immigrant residential patterns in locality, especially in the capital city Athens and in regions where refugee reception and accommodation units where established. A research conducted in 2012 in the city of Athens indicates the creation of identifiable immigrant clusters that cumulatively intensify the diversity and inequality among different city regions. In all such regions, the majority of residents are Greeks, a fact that is highly instrumental in my attempt to examine voting patterns (Kandylis et al., 2012). It is worth noticing though that “The absence of a widespread, spatially marginalized and ghettoized immigrant population in Athens does not mean that all immigrants in all locations have equal access to the housing market or that their residences are appropriate in terms of living space” (Kandylis et al., 2012, p.282). With regards to the housing market, the study findings are in accordance to the ones found by Fakiolas and Lianos et al., mentioned in the previous section. Even though Athens is gradually becoming more diverse and unequal, Greeks are rarely affected by the housing competition (Kandylis et al., 2012).

Political Sphere and Public Opinion

Regarding the political sphere, migration is widely considered as a problem, both by the public and the two mainstream parties. However, neither PASOK nor ND managed to effectively cope with the challenges posed by immigration, especially the irregular aspect. Rather, both parties engaged in an accountability discourse, claiming the limited successes and blaming the other party for the ample failures of immigration management in Greece (Karamanidou, 2014). To be more specific, PASOK administrations in general held a view of migrants as a temporary situation, and thus did not undertake any meaningful steps towards immigrant integration (Zigoura, 2007). Regarding ND, Karamanidou (2014, p.452) points to “the party’s conservative and nationalist values that underpin its adherence to an ethnic citizenship model.” For instance,

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party officials have argued for the reoccupation of ghetto areas run by migrant gangs (Karamanidou, 2014). Other researchers have also noticed the importance of such conservative views for the party’s survival, as they limit the risk of losing voters to radical right parties, especially the party’s secular constituencies (Papastathis, 2015, Triandafyllidou, 2014). Over two decades ago, Lianos et al. (1996, p. 463) pointed the importance of “how illegal immigrants are treated by local authorities and residents of each area, and hence obtain an idea concerning social receptivity.”. In Greece, the Greek Police is the state organ responsible for a wide range of migrant-related aspects. More importantly, the body is mandated with border control, as well as the identification of irregular migrants. The study of Antonopoulos et al., conducted in 2008, regarding police perceptions about migration, is highly illustrative. Apart from considering immigrants as a considerable threat to the country’s security, criminality and unemployment, and holding several xenophobic and even racist perceptions against specific migrant groups, Albanians in particular, Greek police officers appear to hold negative attitudes that derive from the spatial concentration of migrants. To be precise, with regards to big cities like Athens, a higher level police representative argued that “migrants can cause the “ghettoization” of some areas, especially in large cities, and can create “dangerous minorities within Greek soil” (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, p.363). To provide an illustrative example, regarding the region of Agios Panteleimonas, situated in Athens, Dalakoglou (2012, p.538) notes that “the local police station seems to systemically refuse to record or examine racist attacks”. Accordingly, with regards to non-urban regions, “The majority of the detectives made the point that in many villages the population of migrants is higher than that of Greeks, which, in their view, had created a very dangerous situation.” (Antonopoulos et al., 2008, p.362). A further area of interest refers to the immigrant populations forming identifiable communities near the country borders. Such instances are framed as particularly alarming in public discourses due to the fact that for many years, the vast majority of immigrants originated from neighbouring countries, namely Albania. Residents of the border region of Epirus have demanded stricter border control in the past, reflecting the widely spread view of migrants as a security threat (Linos, 2001). During the last year, a heated public debate refers to the rights of the Muslim minority in the region of Thrace, given the increase of the Turkish influence in the region. An incident that occurred in March 2018 in the Greek Parliament is extremely illustrative on GD’s stance on the issue. The Greek MEP Ilias Kasidiaris, a leading GD party figure, demanded the removal of the Muslim SYRIZA MEP Mustafa Mustafa from The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee’s closed door session. Kasidiaris made his demand by recalling Erdogan’s statements of Turkey having four “of her own” MEP’s in the Greek

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parliament. According to testimonies, the language used by the GD MEP was so inappropriate, and the overall tension that high, that the Parliament’s Guard was alarmed (Kathimerini.gr, 2018).

The previous section provided a brief overview of the dominant immigrant perceptions in Greece. The perception of immigrants as a national threat is widespread within the Greek society since the beginning of the transformation of Greece into an immigration country. Accordingly, the threat is associated with economic, cultural and national security aspects. While attempting to measure the actual impact of migration in radical right voting, this paper heavily lies on the hypothesis that such perceptions of threat will be more intense in areas of high immigrant concentration. Attempting to measure the impact of immigration on radical right voting based on national level data is an ecological fallacy, especially when there are strong indicators that in some regions at the subnational level the share of immigrants is considerably higher. For instance, regions may experience a greater or less number of immigrant residents based on employment opportunities (Kandylis et al., 2012), prejudices among locals (Halla et al., 2013), immigrant family members and friends (Triandafyllidou, 2014), or simply relatively large numbers of immigrant residents of the same origin already residing in the region. As Walchuk (2011, p.28) notes, “public opinion is very rarely homogenous at the national level, but often does begin to demonstrate more convergence as the unit of analysis decreases”. I argue that the proximity with migrant groups is likely to cultivate a hostile stand against them, especially when in large numbers and sudden. According to Rydgren (2008, p.740), “hostility need not be activated until ‘strangers’ come too close to the ingroup (in geographical or social space) and are believed to threaten the identity (consensual beliefs and practices, mores and traditional values) or the material”. Similarly, Walchuk (2011, p.28) adds “geography to the list of factors that can be used to draw the boundary between ingroup and outgroup”. Such arguments are particularly acute to the Greek context, especially Athens. The study of Dalakoglou (2012), provides some illustrative examples, regarding Agios Panteleimonas and Nikaia, two areas where many immigrants live. As the author notes for Agios Panteleimonas, “Patrols of neo- Nazi groups affiliated with Golden Dawn (GD) started attacking migrants in this particular area.” (Dalakoglou, 2012, p.537). The author continues by pointing that “Recent examples of the neonazi expansion outside Agios Panteleimonas can be seen in the Athenian suburb of Nikaia, where in July 2012, members of GD issued an ultimatum to foreign shopkeepers to close down their businesses and leave the area.” (Dalakoglou, 2012, p.537). This mobilization combined with the use of

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violence against immigrants has been documented by several other researchers accordingly. (Lamprianou et al., 2017, Roumanias et al., 2018, Xenakis, 2012).

In order to measure the impact of immigration on radical right voting in Greece, I will examine two competing competing hypotheses, both deriving from a relatively large concentration of immigrants in locality. The empirical results from previous studies are inconclusive. Some report that the proximity of the in-group with the outgroup raises perceptions of threat and feelings of insecurity among the former, and therefore increase the probability of voting for the radical right. Yet, other studies find that the proximity of in-group with the outgroup leads to contact and interaction, which results in stereotypes and negative perceptions minimized, and therefore decrease the probability of voting for the radical right. With regards to Greece, no previous research has measured directly the impact of immigration on radical right voting, even though GD can be considered as one of the most extreme radical right parties in Europe due to his open use of violence against immigrants (library.fes.de, 2013). The only exception is the study of Hangartner et al. described in the literature section, which however measured the electoral success of GD only among the Aegean islands and not the entire country. Given this scarcity in the literature, I will attempt to fill this gap, by examining the following hypotheses:

H.1: High levels of immigrants’ concentration in a locality pose cultural, security and economic challenges, and thus increase the vote share of radical right parties. H.2: High levels of immigrants’ concentration in a locality provide more opportunities for meaningful contact with the native residents and thus decrease the vote share of radical right

parties.

Insights from Europe

A closely related research conducted in Switzerland in 2011, studied the impact of immigration on radical right voting based on the different immigration attitudes found to exist in different Swiz cantons. The authors found that conservative public attitudes and restrictive immigration policies in a canton translate into more radical right votes (Baur et al., 2016). Two additional empirical studies recently conducted in Austria, have also explored the causal direction that links geographical concentration of migrants and radical right voting, yet reported competing results. The first, conducted in 2013, studied different Austrian neighbourhoods that varied in relation to immigrant presence, to test whether the proximity increases radical right voting. The

Immigration and Radical Right: The case of Greece

Rozali Oleko

Student number: s1880551