1
Is it all in the family?
A descriptive analysis of the transnational connections and
network between the radical right in Israel and the PVV.
Master Thesis Datum: 28-06-2019
Naam: E.C.Y. Hermans Student number: 4067126 MA Human Geography Radboud University Supervisor: B.A. Verbeek Word count: 22.491
2 Preface
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has fascinated me since a young aged. I was fortunate enough for this thesis, to combine my passion for the region, with my bachelor in European Studies to hopefully acquire my master’s in Human Geography, specialising in conflict territories and identities.
I would like to use the preface to thank the Centre for the study of European Politics and Society of the Ben Gurion University of the Negev, for my internship. Their knowhow and hospitality both have been incredibly valuable to this thesis and my life. Special mention goes out to Hila Zahavi, for her endless help. Additional special mention for Yonathan Herskowitz and his brother who were my 144. Additionally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the Radboud University, professor Bertjan Verbeek, for his seemingly endless patience and feedback.
3 Abstract
The central research question guiding this thesis is: how can we describe the transnational connections of radical right between the PVV and Israeli political parties in the 2005 and 2018 period. This thesis adds to the overarching theme of understanding transnational cooperation by political parties. The time frame was selected because it covers the period from the establishment of the PVV until the interviews conducted for this study.
The methodology of this thesis data uses three different methods of data collection which include a survey of newspaper articles in both Dutch and English dealing with Wilders and his ties to Israel, Semi-structured elite interviews with several actors as identified through social network analysis. In this thesis, network theory is used as a descriptive method to “connect the dots” between Wilders and his Israeli ties through a visualisation of the network using the social network visualisation program, Gephi.
Based on the findings this thesis finds that in the case of Israel, the network is incentivized not by the Israeli actors involved, but by the Knesset. Additionally, the main motivation for initiating a transnational alliance with politicians and parties Europe was not based on party or personal ideological proximity. From the Israeli perspective, politicians stated that the main reason was primarily to create a network of pro-Israeli politicians. However, opinions differed as to how to deal with alleged anti-Semites and historic opposers of Israel. Nevertheless, all the interviewed politicians saw Wilders as a special case. Therefore, the main finding of this thesis is that the concept of party family has only limited explanatory power over this specific radical right transnational connections. The classifications of the parties and politicians involved does not demonstrate a direct link.
4
Table of Content
Chapter 1 Introduction ... 6
1.1 Introduction ... 6
1.2 Defining the Research Question ... 8
1.3 Scientific and Societal Relevance ... 9
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework ... 12
2.1 Important Definitions ... 12
2.3. Why do Parties Cooperate Across Borders? ... 20
2.3.1. Examples of transnational cooperation between political parties ... 20
2.4. How does this relate to my own thesis ... 26
Chapter 3 Methodology ... 28
3.1 Data Collection ... 28
3.2. Survey of Newspaper Articles ... 29
3.3. Social Network Analysis ... 31
3.4. Elite Interviewing ... 34
Chapter 4 Results ... 37
4.1. Social network analysis: Who are the actors within this network?... 37
4.1.2. Actors in the network: From the PVV to Israeli Political parties ... 41
4.1.3. The PVV ... 41
4.1.4. Geert Wilders ... 42
4.1.5. Describing the radical right in Israel ... 43
4.1.6. Israel ... 44
4.1.7. Is the Israeli radical right different from the European radical right? ... 44
4.1.8. The interviewees and their parties, as visualized in the SNA ... 46
The Israeli politicians interviewed ... 48
4.1.9. Cooperation as seen in the SNA ... 49
4.2. Perceptions and motivations of the network by the interviewees ... 51
4.3. Other benefits of being in a network ... 57
Chapter 5 Conclusion ... 60
5.1.1. The visualization of the network ... 61
5.1.2 Perceptions and motivations ... 62
5.1.4. Research question ... 63
5.2 Future recommendations ... 64
5.3 Reflections ... 66
5
Appendices ... 73
Appendix A: Interview protocol ... 73
Appendix B: Social Network Analysis in Gephi ... 75
Appendix C: Newspaper Articles ... 82
List of figures and graphs Table 1.………...40 Table 2.………...………..41 Table 3.……….42 Figure 1……….…43 Figure 2……….49
6
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Whoever has kept abreast with the news in European countries over the last two decades will know that politics has become increasingly polarized. In effect, this polarization has led to radicalization, which has been growing on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, though it has been far more noticeable on the right. The radicalization of right-wing politics has been strongly tied to those political parties that oppose globalization and immigration, often repudiate the concept of multiculturalism and, additionally, are sceptical of or oppose the European Union. The emergence of these parties continues to change the European and national political landscapes. The rise of radical right in politics is thus a contemporary societal issue. It is also a phenomenon that involves many dimensions.
A common phenomenon in an increasingly globalised world is cooperation across national borders. In recent decades, we have seen a rise in transnational political cooperation. Such cooperation is in itself not a new phenomenon. Neither is transnational cooperation in Europe, or more specifically, that of the radical right in Europe. Like many other political doctrines, the radical right too has begun expanding beyond its own national borders (Akkerman, de Lange & Rooduijn, 2016; Caiani, 2018; Startin, 2010). Radical right political parties have been cooperating in both official (e.g., the European Freedom Alliance) and unofficial contexts in which they have been invited to attend or to speak at party conferences or at other events organised by fellow radical right politicians (DW News, 2010). Visual proof of this is easily found on YouTube. For example, in a DW News video (2010), Dutch politician Geert Wilders’ is filmed giving speeches to the Danish People’s Party (DPP) and a congress organised by René Stadtkewitz who later founded the Partei Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Krouvel (DW, 2010) of the Free University of Amsterdam in this video notes how these radical right actors are “are increasingly looking beyond national borders and trying to develop networks.” The last decade has also witnessed an increasing number of radical right European politicians working beyond the borders of the European continent. One example of this the case of Israel and Israeli radical right-wing politicians (Vossen, 2016). This is the puzzling “Israel
7
Such transnational radical-right connections with Israel are simultaneously both intuitive and counterintuitive. The European and Israeli radical right parties share a “common enemy” in the Muslim community, especially since the 9/11 attacks (Shoufri, 2015: 25). At first glance, this seems a logical connection: If you share an enemy, you are more likely to become friends.
On the other hand, however, this makes their connection perhaps less counterintuitive than is sometimes assumed. There are certain puzzles that make transnational radical right cooperation less straightforward than it might seem. This is because, according to, for example, Hafez (2014: 484), “Antisemitism has long been a central characteristic of far-right extremist parties.” For example, the Israeli foreign office has banned official visits by ChristianStrache of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Austria), though unofficial visits by European radical right politicians are common practice. Party leaders such as Filip de Winter of Vlaams
Blok (Flemish Bloc, VB, Belgium) and Geert Wilders (Freedom Party, PVV, the Netherlands)
have been on multiple visits to Israel and have been received by various Israeli politicians in an unofficial capacity. In current academic debates, little attention has been devoted to explaining the motivations of political parties in Israel for accepting these parties and their leaders as legitimate partners for cooperation.
Additionally, the nativist, anti-globalisation and anti-elitist stances that radical right parties in Europe assume directly counter the nature of the transnational actors. This is largely because these characteristics inherently mean an emphasis on the home country and exogenous influences are generally considered negatively. Additionally, the radical right parties in Europe are often highly segmented and have many different party-internal groups working together (Akçali et al., 2015).
Furthermore, as members of the European Union (EU) and often of the European Parliament, their working together with Israel is not regarded as the “proper” thing to do. The EU’s official policy is to work towards a comprehensive two-state solution for the Israeli and Palestinian populations. This is something that the Israeli radical right strongly opposes if it were to be based on disengagement from the occupied territories. Several nation-states within the EU, and the EU itself, are highly critical of a number of Israel’s policies. A tension exists between the EU’s normative political stance on these issues and the good trade and economic relations it has with Israel (Cronin, 2011; Gordon & Pardo, 2015). Because of these conflicting interests, Israel’s status within the European community is currently precarious. The EU often maintains that Israel uses excessive violence and does not do enough to obey international law and maintain human rights. However, the current Netanyahu government often refutes these
8
claims. Additionally, none of Netanyahu’s policies are aimed at a partition plan. Hence, association with the Netanyahu government is frowned upon in the European sphere. Israel’s’ public image within the EU is unfavourable and this is amplified by often negative media attention. Being associated with Israel at all in Europe at this time is not bon ton, and especially the Israeli politicians who have been linked with Europe’s radical right are largely regarded as highly controversial individuals. One can therefore see that by associating oneself with these Israeli politicians, one’s own image may be harmed.
1.2 Defining the Research Question
The central research question guiding this thesis is as follows: How can we describe the transnational connections of radical right between the PVV and Israeli political parties in the 2005 until 2018 period. This thesis adds to the overarching theme of understanding transnational cooperation by political parties. The time frame was selected because it covers the period from the establishment of the PVV until the interviews conducted for this study.
In order to answer this question, a number of terms and concepts need to be clarified. In the first section of the introduction, concepts such as populist and radical right are frequently mentioned. Although many of these concepts are used freely, there is a need to explore them in relation to this thesis. In exploring various concepts that are associated with and describe the radical right, this thesis aims to provide an overview of the current literature on these concepts. Furthermore, this thesis reviews the literature on cooperation theory to understand cooperation between political parties. It does so by looking at the literature in general, and additionally by discussing some examples of transnational cooperation. In Chapter 4, this thesis answers the questions listed below in order to answer the main research question. This thesis identifies the politicians who work together in a transnational political network by asking questions such as:
-
Who are the actors within this network (social network analysis, SNA)?-
How can the Israeli political parties to which the politicians interviewed belong be classified?-
What are the perceptions regarding the network of Israeli politicians within this network?9
1.3 Scientific and Societal Relevance
The overarching theme to which this thesis aims to contribute is an understanding of transnational cooperation between political actors. Transnational cooperation can be viewed from different perspectives: such as financially, ideologically, and organizationally. For the theoretical foundation of this thesis, this transnational cooperation needs to be examined and described.
This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge and research on how we can understand transnational coalitions or cooperation within a political context. Such connections in a transnational context are not a new phenomenon. However, they deserve further academic scrutiny.
The concepts of radical right and extremist right have captivated those involved in political and academic debates. Most research has focused on explaining the (re-)emergence of radical right populism in a national context or has focused on comparative case studies. Research by various authors predominantly focuses on the opportunities created by European integration for the transnationalization of the radical right network. Researchers have created a substantial database on radical right transnational cooperation in Europe. However, the literature on connections outside Europe is scarce.
Furthermore, this thesis describes how alliances between political parties function in general and additionally elaborates on what we know about the radical right outside of the European context. The radical right in Europe has been thoroughly researched from a multitude of perspectives. Although Israel’s radical right and coalition formation have also been extensively researched, there is little explanatory evidence for the motivations for cooperation beyond borders. The same applies to the European radical right and even, surprisingly, to the PVV.
The visits of controversial radical right European politicians has resulted in a debate within Israeli politics on how to deal with these issues. The official government policy is now that no official meetings are supposed to take place; However, Israeli politicians have been photographed with European radical right politicians and their visits been documented on, for example, YouTube (YouTube, 2010).
Although several newspaper articles have established that there is a connection between Wilders and Israel—as is elaborated upon in Chapter 2—little academic attention has been
10
devoted to the significance of these connections for understanding transnationalism in terms of existing international relations theories as they apply to the party level.
In terms of societal relevance, this thesis contributes to an understanding of the connections between political parties and those who their respective representatives associate themselves with. As stated above, such casual connections have been made by the media. As political representatives such as Wilders are dependent on their electorate and their approval, this thesis deems it important that an attempt be made, beyond popular mass media and the PVV’s official party website, to review his motivations to connect with certain individuals. The societal relevance of this paper derives from the exposure of this network in order to clarify the transnational connections between various actors.
There is an additional need to revisit the study of the relations between Israel and Europe, Even though intra-European “divisions” such as Brexit and rise of anti-migrant governments in countries such as Poland, Austria, Italy, and Hungary are currently higher up on the agenda. Additionally, “[i]ssues relating to civil wars in Libya and Syria, destabilising migration flows from north Africa, and the fight against the Islamic State group dominate many Europeans’ foreign-policy agenda, pushing the Israel-Palestine conflict further down their list of priorities” (Lovatt, 2017). While the popular media may ignore these issues, they are deserving of academic attention.
1.4 The Structure of this Thesis
In Chapter 2, first, the theoretical framework of this thesis is presented by discussing the literature on what conceptually can be defined as “the radical right.” Moreover, why certain characteristics are deemed important in defining the radical right and why other are deemed less relevant is clarified. Research by, amongst others, Mudde (2004) and Rydgren (2007) is used to outline what is currently known about the radical right in Europe and the terms associated with it. The following concepts are clarified: populist, radical, right, new radical right, and old radical right. This is undertaken in order to build on a classification in Chapter 4 to determine cooperation based on the party family level. Second, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on transnational cooperation in the light of coalition theory. Theories explaining cooperation between political parties has not been used to describe connections at the transnational level. It is important to determine the old theories remain applicable in the changing context of transnational cooperation.
11
The central research question leads to the sub-questions presented below. The first empirical research question that logically follows from the main research question is: To what extent is the political network of European and Israeli radical right politicians beneficial to the goals of both the European and Israeli radical right?
Second, how can the relations between Wilders and the Israeli radical right politicians be analysed and understood by means of SNA? With the assistance of my internship organisation (Centre for European Politics and Society (CSEPS) of the Ben GurionUniversity of the Negev) and by running statistics through Gephi, this thesis identifies politicians who could shed more light on this issue.
In Chapter 3, the methodological framework is elaborated on Newspaper articles are used to identify the relevant actors and then social network analysis is used to visualize the network. To triangulate the data, three (former) Israeli politicians associated with Wilders were interviewed in order to research their perceptions and motivations for establishing or working within this network.
Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis. Using the visualization of the network, an analysis of the Israeli radical right and a classification of the parties and politicians in involved is undertaken. Furthermore, the concept of party family is explained in terms of transnational connections in order to establish whether we can indeed speak of a radical right network based on a party family.
12
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the radical right and related concepts. This literature review also provides on overview of research on transnational cooperation in light of coalition theory. This section presents a theoretical framework for the reasons identified in the literature for why political parties cooperate and some recent examples of transnational cooperation. It additionally presents an overview of several definitions linked to the radical right and discusses the academic debate on these.
The first sections deal with defining the concepts related to radical right parties in a Western European context and briefly elaborates on the concept of the party family. The later sections, this chapter examines coalition theory. This thesis aims to understand whether we can apply existing theories of political cooperation at a party level to an international or transnational level. The chapter provides an overview of the existing literature on the topic. In the third section, the reasons for cooperation identified in the literature are discussed. In the fourth section, the contribution to this thesis is discussed.
2.1 Important Definitions
A number of terms have to be explained. The first section of this chapter focuses on what these terms are in the European context. Considering the term radical right, authors such as Muis and Immerzeel (2016) have found that terms such as “extreme right,” “far right,” and “radical right” are used interchangeably to refer to the same type of political organizations such as the Dutch PVV, the FrenchRassemblement National/Front National (RN/FN), the Austrian FPÖ, and
Vlaams Blok/Flemish Bloc. Mudde (2007, in Muis & Immerzeel, 2016) conclude that “[a]
consensus has emerged that they constitute one single family”. Although there is consensus on which parties belong to the party family, there is some ambiguity as regards the exact definition of this party family (Rydgren, 2007:242). This section aims to unpack some of these definitions.
13
Populism
The concepts of radical right politics and populism are often treated as inseparable. The consequence of this is that when one refers to the radical right, the assumption is that parties concerned are also populist parties. This circumstance, rather than referring to the populist radical right, occurs often. This subsection briefly evaluates the literature on populism being an inherent characteristic of the radical right.
The common description used is to describe populism is as follows: “[P]opulism worships the people” (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 4). Although the description might seem self-evident, there is a difficulty in using the word in various contexts. Populism has frequently been used in different political contexts, across a multitude of geographies and histories, and in different ideological contexts (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013: 3). This is despite the fact that populism in the academic literature always has to be understood within a particular context and culture—and it provides much room for interpretation and ambiguity. However, as aptly described by Mudde, (2004: 543) populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.” This results in the conflicting nature of populism: on the
one hand, it favours anything anti-establishment and, on the other, it relies on the establishment to provide a platform or forum for its ideas and stances. It is crucial to note that the anti-establishment tendencies do not mean that populism has an anti-democratic image (Rydgren, 2007: 245).
However, Gidron and Bonikowski (2013), in their overview of the literature on the term populism, have found that even though populism can be used as a political ideology, as argued by Mudde (2004), it can also be interpreted as a political style and a political tool. Though these three stances normally debate one another, Gidron and Bonikowksi (2013) state that, especially because of populism’s context (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013:17), the specificities of these different approaches may help in understanding and studying the varieties of populism. Populism is used as a tool to convey messages of the importance of nativism and nationalism. The differentiation between radical right populism and the radical right stems from Mudde’s (2007 in Bonikowski et al, 2018:62) definition: “[populism] is a form of politics predicated on a fundamental moral opposition between an irredeemably corrupt elite and a virtuous people,
14
with the latter seen as the only legitimate source of political power”. However, it is important to note populism can also be defined as a tool rather than an ideology (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2016). Hence, populism is something that politicians use, not something they are.
Some scholars, “(e.g., Betz 1993, 1994; Taggart 1996, 2000) have argued that populism is a defining characteristic of the new radical right” (Rydgren, 2007: 245). What Rydgren’s analysis found is that populism may be a characteristic of the radical right, but it is not a distinctive feature (200: 246) as the term applies to other nonradical right groups too.
It is possible to concluding from this brief overview of the literature that although populism can be attributed to the radical right in many instances, it is not necessarily a distinctive feature. The radical right’s distinctive features derive mainly from its nativist and nationalistic stances rather than from the use of populism.
This thesis treats populism not as a defining characteristic but nevertheless as one that is inherently linked to the radical right. However, it recognises that populism can also be applied to other actors that are not political parties. It is therefore less of a distinctive feature than a tool to be used. However, this thesis recognises that populism is often employed by the radical right and that although it might not be a distinctive ideological feature, it might be of interest for further research to establish whether it is a political strategy of the radical right. This thesis thus refrains from using the term “populist radical right” as this might create the assumption that the use of a political tool could be confused with an ideology that has become intrinsically linked to the radical right that we might be hesitant to characterize other political actors as populists. The radical right is not the only grouping to employ this political tool, though we would seldom refer to the “populist” Christian democrats.
The assumptions based on populism being an inherent feature of the radical right are drawn from research on European political parties, as illustrated in the remainder of this thesis. As established above, context and culture matter.
Radicalism
So which terms are appropriate to use? The far right, the radical right, and the extreme right are all terms used to describe emerging parties in a European context that lobby in favour of a nativist stance. However, when is which term appropriate? In this thesis, “radical” refers to noncentrists and the ‘right’ end of the political spectrum on issues relating to immigration and ethnic diversity (Muis & Immerzeel, 2016: 2). As for the definition of the radical right, the three most important topics that these parties are concerned with are: “ 1) nativism, 2) populism
15
and 3) authoritarianism” (Muis & Immerzeel, 2016: 2). Of these topics, nativism is by far the most common denominator.
With nativism, citizenship is regarded as exclusionary right that is based on ethnonationalistic indicators. The same, more or less, applies to explaining populism, as we established earlier in this chapter, which is defined as a style of communication that ideologically and strategically divides society into two groups: the pure people versus those
who threaten the strength of this imagined community (Muis & Immerzeel, 2016: 2).
However, what differentiates the radical right from the extreme right? Radical and extremist parties usually demand radical change in society in which either a future ideal or the past is idealized (Rydgren, 2007: 243). However, according to Rydgren (2007), whose paper on the sociology of the radical right concerns defining and explaining it in Europe, a key distinction in the use of term radical versus extreme stems from whether a party is considered extreme. As was seen when describing populism, a concept more often than not ascribed to the radical right, there is a tension between an anti-elitist stance and representing the common people. Rydgren (2007) has established that one can differentiate between extremists in a parliamentary form and in a nonparliamentary form. In the parliamentary form, the party in question is an active participant in elections in order to win representation in political institutions. In the nonparliamentary form, action is usually taken outside the parliamentary and democratic arena. According to Rydgren (2007: 243), “It is common to reserve the use of the term right-wing extremism exclusively for the nonparliamentary type.” By extension, the parliamentary variant is then most commonly referred to as the radical right. However, although the radical right might have accepted procedural democracy, this does not mean that their views necessarily differ from those of the extremists. From a political-theoretical point of view, the common goal of an ethnically homogenous society—countering ethnopluralism—is perhaps incompatible with democracy; however an extensive discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this thesis. Most importantly, the term radical is applicable to the people who fall within the scope of this thesis as they are all members of parties that actively seek parliamentary representation or have done so in the past. Therefore, the term radical right rather than extreme right seems more applicable in this context.
Although this thesis seeks to evaluate connections outside a parliamentary context, the actors in this network have all sought political representation in the form of parties in a governmental or opposition context. Although they often disagree with the current state of affairs and with the current shape of democracy, they seek parliamentary representation and do
16
not wish to forgo procedural democracy. Therefore, for the parties and actors described, the definition of radical right is more accurate than that of extreme right.
The right
This brings to the second term: the right. When it involves defining the political right, political parties are usually judged on the basis of their socioeconomic policies favoring economic liberalism and on sociocultural issues. Their stances tend to reflect authoritarianism rather than sociocultural liberalism in relation to law and order and immigration (Rydgren, 2007: 243). However, when it concerns defining the radical right in Europe, we see an overrepresentation of these sociocultural issues. The socioeconomic stance of the party is considered subordinate to its sociocultural stances when it concerns issues related to ethnonationalistic dominance instead of ethnopluralism (Rydgren, 2007: 243). Ethnopluralism would, for example, allow the doctrine of multiculturalism, according to which immigrants are allowed to keep their language, traditions, and religion when immigrating to a country when these are not the language, traditions, or religion of the majority. The radical right believes that the “[m]ixing of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction” (see Griffin, 2000, Minkenberg, 1997, Taguieff, 1988, in Rydgren, 2007). An important distinction has to be made regarding whether other ethnic groups are considered incompatible rather than inferior (Rydgren, 2007: 244). Via this ethnopluralist ideology, the radical right in Europe claims that European national cultures have “the right … to protect their cultural identity” (Rydgren, 2007: 244), to which there are considered to be a number of threats. It is thus important that the classification of “right” originates less in a socioeconomic classification and more in the socio-cultural characteristics associated with the term “right.”
New and old radical right
Distinguishing between the new radical right and the old radical right in a European context concerns the resurfacing of the radical right in the 1980s and the consequent need for reidentification (Rydgren, 2007). In Rydgren’s (2007) thesis on the identification of the party family of the radical right, he found that these parties all share an emphasis on themes discussed earlier in this chapter: ethnonationalism, with a strong glorification of the distant past. Their party programme is primarily based on strengthening the nation by making the state more
17
ethnically homogenous and doing so by returning to the traditional values from the “good old days.” In such a world, the rights of the individual are subordinate to the achievement of this ethnically homogenous nation state. These parties are mostly populist in nature, and they blame the “elite” for the multicultural “straightjacket” that has been forced upon them due to the elite’s fascination with internationalism and globalization.
Rydgren (2007) found that, at their core, most of these parties share an ideological conviction in terms of which they represent “ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism.” From this perspective, the new radical right differs from older forms of extreme right-wing political trends such a fascism. Rydgren and other researchers do not consider the aim of the new radical right as being one of replacing the democratic system; rather it wishes to use this system for its own benefit. Perhaps even more importantly, it does not share the fascists’ fascination with a greater, bigger, and better future; rather, these new parties wish to return to an imagined status quo of times gone by.
The most distinctive difference between the new and old radical right wing in Europe is thus the absence of a desire for elements of fascism, such a territorial expansion and antidemocratic and anti-establishment tendencies (Rydgren, 2007). This distinction between the old radical right, which was heavily associated with fascism and antisemitism, and the new radical right, which seeks parliamentary representation and is associated more with Islamophobia, is important for this thesis.
2.2. Theories of transnational cooperation
To explain why political actors cooperate at a transnational level, this thesis examines existing theories of why political actors cooperate in the first place. This section delves into these questions and provides an overview of the state of affairs. In research on political theory there is a need to better understand transnational cooperation between representatives of political parties as little attention has been paid to understanding why political actors seek to cooperate in the first place. Whilst politics and international relations are inherently relational, the existing theories need to be evaluated in terms of a “new” reality when it concerns transnational cooperation within the radical right.
According to Nye and Kehoane (1972), transnationalism refers to “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states.” In the 1970s these two authors already noted that there was too much emphasis on official governmental
18
representation, in the form of diplomats and soldiers, in understanding transnationalism. The body of literature on this topic has expanded enormously since then, especially that on nongovernmental groups such as those of global activists (Bennett et al., 2004; Brooks, 2005), that on the context of the EU (Kaiser & Starie, 2005), and that on the consequences thereof (Manners, 2010). Despite this, there is a gap in understanding how parties connect across the borders of the state. This thesis therefore aims to expand on our understanding of transnational coalitions and alliances between political parties in general and of the radical right party, the PVV, in particular.
One of the theories that is concerned with explaining why groups of agents work together in a politic context is coalition theory. Coalition theory asks which groups and sets of agents are working together (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008: 368). Coalition theory focuses on what groups of agents can achieve and less on individuals. It concerns how well a group can do for itself but does not explain how individuals make decisions within the coalition (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008: 368).
Currently, we know very little about transnational political cooperation. Minimal attention has been devoted to understanding and visualizing these networks. To understand and explain the phenomena described above, this thesis explores coalition theory. This theory provides insight into why political actors engage with one another and work together. However, there is a need to revaluate the manner in which the theory is used as it is usually applied only to domestic coalition-building involving opposing political actors. This thesis explores whether the theory holds any value for transnational cooperation and coalition-building.
Coalition theory has mainly been used to explain domestic coalition building political cooperation efforts (Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff, 1967; De Swaan, 1973; Gamson, 1961). In this thesis, I argue that there is a need to revisit this theory and to determine whether it is applicable in a transnational context. Coalition-building has also become increasingly important on the global stage. Coalitions are no longer exclusively formed in national parliaments by various political parties but worldwide in various contexts. As does Çamak (2007: 1), this thesis recognises that “Non-state entities … are now more inclined to develop loose alliances in an attempt to exert the maximum pressure over the states, further ensuring alignment with their positions on a particular issue under discussion.” Coalition theory is thus no longer useful only as a theory to explain cooperation in a national context; it is increasingly used as a theory to explain transnational cooperation and transnational relations (Çamak, 2007; Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010; Rose, 2000; Polanska & Piotrowski, 2015). Research on nontraditional and unconventional coalition-building is largely missing, although alliances and coalition-building
19
have been researched in the context of nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations (Çakmak, 2007) and civil society organisations (Florini, 2012) where it addresses coalition-forming in a less traditional sense. A great deal of research has focused on new social movements (Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010), such as the peace movement and environmental movement (Rose, 2000), and, for example, squatters in Poland (Polanska & Piotrowski, 2015). When it comes to researching radical right alliances, the literature is equally scarce. To understand contemporary political transnational cooperation, this chapter seeks to explore previous transnational political cooperation and to ascertain what lessons can be learned from, predominantly, the motivations for cooperation .Coalition theory is thus relevant because on the world stage coalitions are forming outside the classical state paradigm; however, we need to determine how we can explain cooperation and coalition formation at a transnational level. In order to understand the current applicability of collation theory, we must delve into its history. Debus (2014) explains that “coalitions will form that control a small or the smallest winning majority…so that all participating parties within the coalition maximize their office payoffs.” That is, within coalition theory there is an underlying assumption that there is a certain intrinsic, or forced, need to work with other parties in order for a party to maximize its own profit. It is also necessary that a parliamentary democracy has several parties. If one requires more than one party for a majority, one must construct a coalition and compromise.
Coalition theory assumes that there are at least three actors and that no optimal outcome can be achieved unless the various actors make concessions and work together (Debus, 2014). This necessity of cooperation has led to coalition theory often being described and explained as a form of game theory, as a means of explaining how these alliances emerge, the form in which they do so, how they can endure, and how they collapse.
How political actors seek to do this relies on one’s philosophical stand on how humans interact. For example, rational choice-based theorists state that coalitions are a result of political parties being faced with dilemmas. Subsequently, following rational choice, political actors weigh the consequences of cooperation and connect these options with the preferred outcome, with the strongest actor setting the tone for the “game.” Rational choice thus suggests that the coalition will seek to maximize power.
A counter movement known as the policy-seeking theory has emerged. Supporters of policy-seeking find their stance most clearly articulated by De Swaan (1973), who suggests that the theoretical approach to understanding how coalitions are built involves actors seeking out partners that are ideologically closest to them. Connecting with the strongest actor in the
20
network is not enough—the actor additionally needs to have ideological proximity to the coalition.
2.3. Why do Parties Cooperate Across Borders?
This section provides an overview of transnational cooperation between political parties. To understand the basis of transnational coalition formation, this section first presents an overview on the literature explaining cooperation in the European Parliament. Second, it provides a brief overview of cooperation outside the EU but within Europe. Third, it examines an example of radical right transnational cooperation outside Europe and the EU.
2.3.1. Examples of transnational cooperation between political parties
Transnational cooperation among the radical right within Europe: the
European parliament
In 1981, Pridham and Pridham pioneered an attempt to understand the origins and development of transnational cooperation, especially that of trans-European party federations. When, for the first time in the EU’s history, direct election to the European parliament was established, Pridham and Pridham (1981: 106) wrote that an “examination of the origins of the federations demands both an assessment of the reasons for their creation and a delineation of the main stages leading to their establishment.”
What they found was that in the case of transnational political cooperation and federation formation in European political parties, the main motivation for such cooperation was mostly of an ideological nature (Pridham & Pridham, 1981: 107). They cite three main reasons for this: “an awareness of the implications of growing politicisation in the European Community (EC); the desire to meet the argument about the ‘democratic deficit’ in the evolving system of the EC; and the very pressures exerted in favour of closer European co-operation by
21
prospective direct elections” (Pridham & Pridham, 1981: 107). These reasons differed slightly depending on the federation in question.
The politicization of the European Community deserves some additional explanation. This politicization of the EU was characterised by a growing sense of “positive integration rather than simply negative integration” (Pridham &Pridham, 1981: 107) and by the understanding that there was an increasing overlap in domestic policies in the EU arena and vice versa (Pridham & Pridham, 1981: 107). Additionally, they found that “general political events” and tensions also manifested themselves at the European level where, for example, “‘Euro-communism’ … indicated how much a sense of ideological competition was being transmitted to the European level … and [that] post-dictatorial applications for EC membership … sharpened the awareness of the political importance of the EC in terms of strengthening Western liberal democracy” (Pridham & Pridham, 1981: 107). Most importantly, they established set a basis for explaining transnational political cooperation in multifaceted ways. Here, the incentives for cooperation seemingly presented themselves as ideological manifestations of an increased incentive to cooperate.
This matters because the politically most homogenous groups are those that are most successful in pursuing a political agenda (Bari et al., 2010: 10). Bardi et al. (2010: 10) furthermore state that in the case of transnational party formation and cooperation within the EU “[o]nly homogeneous political groups can pursue a coherent political agenda,” and will be able to deliver what has been promised to their electorate in national elections. If groups are internally too divided in a transnational context, their cooperation will most likely collapse. Day and Shaw (2006) researched the relevance of “transnational European political parties to the processes of ‘making European citizen.” They found that within the European Parliament, it is customary for parties from different EU member states to form alliances; in some cases, multiple parties from one member state join the same European alliance (Day & Shaw, 2006). Ladrech (2002) describes the influences of Europeanization, a term used to describe the effect of EU integration “on the politics and policies of its member states as well as the process of enhancing European-level political institutions.” He is especially interested in the role of political parties in this dynamic. Ladrech found that “[o]rganizationally, political parties are limited in their response to the impact of the European Union on national politics and policy-making. Finances, electoral strategies, relations with government and opposition status, are all based on national considerations” (Ladrech, 2002: 400).
Considering the European Greens, Dietz (2000) found that they were a unique case in the European context due to their grassroots orientation and pan-European approach, although
22
in 2000 they still lacked organisational features. Dietz (2000) cites as the main point for cooperation their wish to create a strong green coalition in the European Parliament. In Dietz’s research, the main claim focuses on the idea that political power to enforce ideology is the main reason for cooperation. This raises an interesting question regarding whether the results found in Dietz’s research may be applicable in other cases too. For this thesis in particular, this proves as an interesting case study as their ideological connection created a political front in the European Parliament. Furthermore, Dietz’s research points to an interesting connection between power and ideology. Rather than treating them as two separate goals, he finds an interplay between these two concepts.
The formation of transnational coalitions in the EU along ideological lines instead of national lines was mainly motivated by internal facets such as the notions of the positive and negative integration of the EU and the remedying of the democratic deficit (Pridham & Pridham, 1981). Therefore were thus time sensitive and influenced by international pressure too, as ideological competition between East and West was very much at its peak at the time. The adaptation of a similarly structured Western liberal democratic parliament in the EU was deemed necessary (Pridham & Pridham, 1981). This ideologically based cooperation continues, even though strategies in current European affairs, at least, are predominantly focused on national considerations (Ladrech, 2002). This makes the complete homogeneity desired by Badi et al. (2010) increasingly difficult.
Transnational cooperation of the radical & extreme right in Europe:
Outside the European Parliament
Additional research on this topic comes from Mares, who researched thestimuli and limits of extreme right cooperation in east and central Europe and concluded that in the case of cooperation on the extreme right the “isolationistic-nationalistic characteristics” (Mares, 2006:19) represents the biggest hurdle in transnational cooperation. A logical conclusion seems to be that lessons from research on coalition-building can be used beyond the national parliamentary context. In the case of the extreme right and neo-Nazi structures, he concludes that transnational cooperation allows these parties to present themselves not as “ostracised parts of the local political spectrum, but part of a wider transnational movement” (2006: 20). This, according to Mares, boils down to a shared transnational identity, which is stronger in neo-fascist parties due to the historical tradition of cooperation.
23
When this identity is present, it provides fruitful ground for cooperation, and when it is missing, it presents a serious limitation. Mares therefore additionally puts forward the argument that cooperation is stronger on a European basis than it is on a central/east European basis. Mares’ (2006) research concludes that this transnational identity was lacking in central Europe at the time of his research, though it discovered an important feature for identifying a transnational network.
Mares’ research is complemented by that of Macklin (2013), who examined a different case study. Instead of focusing on the extreme right, Macklin focused on the transnational activism of the radical right in Britain and Germany. Macklin’s (2013) basic assumption in defending his thesis is that increased European integration has led “to the ‘Europeanisation’ of national political parties across the Continent” (Poguntke et al., in Macklin, 2013: 176). Although radical right parties in Europe adopt an ultra-nationalist and nativist standpoint, they are not immune to this process, even when they are highly Euroskeptical (Macklin, 2013:176). Most important, however, is Macklin’s central finding—in this specific case, cooperation rests mostly on the “development and diffusion of a common ideological ‘master frame’” (301: 194).
This ideological master frame is established to explain the impact of global threats to the national and local electorates (Macklin, 2013: 194). One of the most obvious examples is the invocation of Islamophobia (Macklin, 2013: 194). However, most interesting for this thesis is that Macklin’s research points out that these parties are not isolated in this effort:
[I]n this light, study of the myriad other forms of international interconnectivity within the contemporary far right and indeed “populist” radical right might perhaps illuminate much that remains obscure regarding the internal dynamics, ideology and strategy of such groups and ideologues in Europe, as they struggle to find an effective mode through which to combat the political, economic and cultural forces of globalisation to which they are implacably opposed” (Macklin, 2013: 194).
Macklin cites the fight against globalization as one of the main motivations for forming an ideological block against this common threat. When it concerns understanding the transnational cooperation of the extreme and radical right in a European context, both Macklin (2013) and Mares (2006) point to the fact that that “cooperation in western European and that successful cooperation is primarily based on a shared transnational identity”. Due to its ultra-nationalist and nativist standpoint, this form of cooperation is not to be assumed to be natural. Both authors advocate that we rather see that, because of ongoing Europeanization and globalization, the European radical and extreme right is simply immune to globalization, even though it might oppose the process.
24
Previous transnational cooperation outside the European context: The
Russian Federation
This subsection provides a brief literature review of cooperation between the Russian and European radical right. These findings about the culture of the radical right and the reasons for cooperation are elaborated on and summarised in a later section. The main aim of this subsection is to identify potential reasons for radical right cooperation outside a solely European context.
The research of Akçali et al. (2015) and (Shekhovtsov, 2017) focuses on the increased association of radical right-wing politicians in Russia with their European counterparts. In context of transnational cooperation with Russia, Laruelle’s (in Akçali et al., 2015) main claim centres on the Eurasian radical right that belongs to the same ideological strand (Akçali et al., 2015). Laruelle furthermore discusses the connections between the radical right and Putin’s Russia’s, and describes them “dangerous liaisons” (Akçali et al., 2015: 1).
The ideological origins of this cooperation and its individual paths have resulted in a somewhat semi-permanent dialogue between the radical right in Russia and Europe. As does the radical right in Europe, the radical right in Russia claims to be the new Europe. Russian identity since the death of Peter the Great until the end of the Cold War has been dependent on its being opposed to Europe. When, in the 1980s, Gorbachev put forward a more Western-oriented foreign policy and brought about a more liberal form of representation, this caused the old communists and nationalist radical right groups to form the idea that Russia should be a strong centralised state against liberal Europe, particularly after 2013 (Neuman, 2017). Russia’s radical right now believes it represents the so-called “True-Europe,” “a conservative great power that guards Europe’s true Christian heritage against the false Europe of decadence and depravity to its West. If Russia had an inferiority complex towards Europe in 1991, a quarter century down the road, that complex has been inverted into a superiority complex” (Neuman, 2017:6). Originally, according to Laruelle (Akçali, 2015: 2), there was not much support for this view other than from the political analyst, Dugin.
Laruelle (in Akçali et al., 2015) researched the culture of radical right cooperation in the context of Europe and Russia and found that the culture of the radical right tends to be highly segmented. Furthermore, in general, the radical right tends to overstate its influence; however, perhaps most importantly, overstating its connections and connectedness is a means
25
for it to position itself not as an anomaly but as part of a larger system (Akçali et al., 2015). However, its network is also notoriously difficult to analyse, as is every political network. As many open sources are lacking, meetings and discussions are not always official and rumours spread easily.
However, what Akçali et al. (2015: 2) interestingly claim is that “personal friendships can be more important than ideological commitments.” This is why researching these connections is so difficult. Though ideological commitment might be an influencer, they found that, in a Russian/European context, these personal connections with people in a certain network are far more important than ideology. According to Laruelle, her research has shown that “ideological stimuli are more often a matter of cross-pollicisation than an unidirectional influence” (in Akçali et al. 2015:2). Additionally, when it concerns evaluating motivations, the transnational connections between the European radical right and Russia seems to be “more a marriage of convenience than one of true love” (Akçali et al., 2015: xiii) Shekhovtsov (2017) furthermore found that Russia’s interest and connection with the radical right in Europe is predominantly used to legitimise the politics and actions of these political parties internationally and domestically and to create more leverage in European politics.
To explore transnational cooperation within the radical right outside a European or EU context, this thesis has thus far examined radical right cooperation between Europe and Russia. This specific cooperation, however, wants to be perceived as a strong alliance and, by overstating their connections and connectedness, its participants wish to position themselves not as an anomaly but as part of a larger system. However, their mere connection does not say anything about the nature of the connection per se (Laruelle, in Akcáli at al., 2015: 2) The research by Laruelle (as presented in Akçali et al., 2015) furthermore points to the strong role of individual politicians. These connections are used to legitimise politics and actions and are furthermore aimed at enhancing power in the European political sphere. When it concerns cooperation between the radical right in Russia and Europe, authors such as Laurelle (in Akcáli at al., 2015) have determined that the connections were made because they are convenient, provide legitimisation, and because they have ideologically similar approaches, such as the nationalist and nativist stances.
26
2.4. How does this relate to my own thesis
The theory and cases mentioned above help us to predict cooperation between political parties. The previous section examined whether existing coalition theory helps us predict and describe transnational cooperation. What becomes clear is that the transnational coalitions in the abovementioned cases and theory are formed along ideological lines and with the participants in ideological proximity to one another. One of the reasons the literature cites for this is the influence on the electorate. According to the literature, cooperation based on power may harm the support of and relations with the electorate, thus creating problems for the next elections or for coalition formation.
When this thesis examines different examples—within the EU, within Europe and outside Europe—we can see that coalition theory is useful for the purpose of predicting political cooperation. Coalition theory, is for example useful when one looks at policy-seeking theory (De Swaan, 1973). In the Policy-seeking theory cooperation and coalition formation is of parties is predicted to form along ideological lines. Coalition theory has shown how we may predict cooperation between political parties. What we can observe from the literature reviewed is that cooperation primarily concerns ideology. When we consider parties that work together based on ideology, the literature usually speaks of a party family (Rydgren, 2007). In Chapter 4, this thesis investigates whether the concept of a party family is useful to describe the transnational connections between the PVV and Israeli political parties.
A party family, as with the other definitions addressed in this chapter, is a term that is surrounded by ambiguity. In their studies examining the radical right parties in the Nordic countries, Jungar and Jupskås (2014: 217) describe the historical concept of the party family. They observe that, in the older literature (e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970; Seiler, in Jungar & Jupskås, 2014:217), parties were seen as part of a so-called “family” as they mobilised the same social group in the same historical circumstances, addressing the social cleavages that could be identified in the social groups. However, in 1998, Mair and Mudde criticised the old definition of party family as the new parties that emerged in these political systems no longer fit the traditional grievance-based model (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014: 217). Mudde and Mair (1998) therefore suggested that, instead of focusing on grievances and social cleavages, we instead focus on “(1) origins and sociology, (2) transnational links, (3) policy and ideology, and (4) party name (Mair & Mudde, as cited in Essner, 2009: 151).
27
However, what is perhaps most interesting is that having a common opponent seems to be very influential in creating connections; this can be explained as ideology to a certain extent. Working together with the radical right transnationally is expected to provide power in a political field, as can be observed in the case of transnational radical right cooperation with the Russian Federation (Akçali et al., 2015). With the literature having been reviewed, for the purposes of this thesis, it seems more relevant to hypothesize connections according to ideological proximity than according to connections to power. This does not mean that power is irrelevant when it comes to establishing connections. Power is, however, rarely considered as the main motivation for cooperation; rather, it is an interesting incentive for further cooperation along ideological lines. European cooperation is based on ideology; however, outside of the European context there are hints that the radical right is also looking for power and influence
The concept of the party family thus implies that cooperation exists because people are ideologically close to one another. Although this thesis does not deny that this might be the case, it is of interest to determine whether this is the whole story. Thus, the relevance for the concept of the party family as a means to describe the network between the PVV and Israeli political parties is discussed further in Chapter 4.
28
Chapter 3 Methodology
In this thesis, network theory is used as a descriptive method to “connect the dots” between Wilders and his Israeli ties through a visualisation of the network using the social network visualisation program, Gephi. The previous chapters have laid out the theoretical basis for this thesis. This chapter presented the methodological approach. Although politics and international relations often seem to be a dog-eats-dog world of competition, research often tends to overlook the fact that not all participants are individual competitors for influence; rather, critical questions need to be centred on explaining relationship formation when it concerns the influence and the impact of these relations (McClurg & Lazer, 2014: 2). Studying networks relies on the underlying assumption that the connections are not merely arbitrary but somehow consequential (Lazer, 2011).
In politics and international relations connections come with interdependence in both a positive and negative connection. A viable method for undertaking this is explained by McClurg and Lazer (2014) who theorise and analyse the “interdependence of political organisations” from a structural perspective (p. 2). They argue that, at their core, politics and international relations are network phenomena, and they further convincingly argue that the concept of power—which they hold to be the central construct in political science—is always relational and that understanding connections and relationships is thus key: “power [that] exists between actors and among actors in a complex, differentiated fashion” (McClurg & Lazer, 2014, p. 1).
.
3.1 Data Collection
In this thesis, a network analysis is used to analyse data that is neither uniquely qualitative nor quantitative. This thesis assumes that the world is not numerical. Rather, triangulation of different methods has been used. The triangulation of the data was necessary to eliminate some degree of bias and increase the validity of the research. This thesis builds on three research methods of different qualitative research approaches. The first method is SNA, which explores
29
the quantitative side of networks and their visualization. However, to provide more depth to the data and understand these forms of cooperation, SNA is combined with a series of elite interviews, which this chapter explains, as well as the preceding review of the relevant literature. That is, this thesis uses a mixed methods approach. In both the SNA and the elite interviewing, the perceptions of the people informing themselves about the network and the perceptions of the actors within the network are important to recognise—both as an asset and as a serious limitation.
Data collection for this thesis was undertaken using three different methods
1. A survey of newspaper articles in both Dutch and English dealing with Wilders and his ties to Israel.
2. Semi-structured elite interviews with several actors as identified belonging to the network.
3. Social network analysis of the network.
3.2. Survey of Newspaper Articles
Political networks are difficult to analyse for a number of reasons. There are clear incentives for the participants in these networks to keep their connections hidden (Smith et al., 2014). To identify the network, a preferred method such as a survey was simply not possible within the context of a master’s thesis. Therefore, the relational information was collected through an analysis of newspaper articles on the subject. The advantage of this form of data collection is that newspaper articles are now quickly accessible online and are easily kept up to date. However, it comes with the well-known downsides of not involving accurate quality checks, potentially showing bias, and a lack of academic standards and scrutiny. In addition, algorithms ensure that the articles that are read the most are the first to be found. This addresses the last problem: that the entertainment value of these articles cannot be separated from their content. The largest issue is thus whether to treat the newspaper articles as a secondary or primary source of information. In this case, because there is no analysis of the content of the articles but rather a survey of how often certain actors are mentioned, the newspaper articles are used in lieu of primary source data concerning the network as accessing that kind of information is simply not a feasible option for this thesis. The articles used can be found in Appendix C.
30
The selection of articles was limited as they had to be about both Wilders/PVV and Israeli political actors. Each of the articles concerns both topics and were sourced from respectable news sources— leading, quality Dutch newspapers and magazines with a high circulation. The Dutch articles surveyed were sourced from De Groene Amsterdammer, Vrij
Nederland, Trouw, NOS, and NRC. These were supplemented by articles in English from Haaretz, Jerusalem Post, der Spiegel International, and Foreign Policy magazine. These
newspapers and news magazines can, for the most part, be described as liberal/progressive media sources, except for Jerusalem Post, Trouw, and NOS. The articles were not coded for terms as one would see in, for example, traditional discourse analysis, but were rather surveyed for names that were consequently logged and valued by the Gephi visualization tool, which is “open source software for exploring and manipulating networks” (Bastian et al., 2009). It allows for existing models and networks to be edited and tailored to fit networks of interest to academics who are perhaps less experienced in this field. A summary of the analysis can be found in Appendix B.
As the articles are used for a network analysis by means of SNA, the self-reported form of data collection was the most dominant form. According to Lazer (2011), “any relational information may be construed as ‘network’ data, including self-report data on ... [h]istorically, the bulk of research on social networks has relied on self-report data, which, in turn, has focused on the development of analytic tools on single snapshots of small networks”.
To identify Wilders’ social or political network within a reasonable timeframe and to understand why and how often he is connected to certain actors, this thesis undertakes a media analysis of mainly Dutch newspaper articles. However, to ensure academic reliability, there is a need to visualize the network using SNA with adequate tools. For this purpose, I decided to make the data visualizable using Gephi. In the analysis of the newspaper articles, I identify the other “nodes” that Wilders has been connected to in relation to Israel and observe how these articles link these nodes with other people mentioned in the newspaper articles. By counting the names mentioned in the articles, this link is established. I weigh the edges by counting how often the edges are mentioned in their respective connections with Wilders and place them in clusters according to geographical location and party affiliation.
Furthermore, it is important that this thesis is not much interested in the content of the articles, but rather in the names mentioned therein in order to obtain an overview of the existing network. By visualising the different actors and obtaining a general overview of the actors that comprise the network, this thesis aims to show a connection between data and context and to generate a simplified overview of a complex issue.
31
3.3. Social Network Analysis
In its most basic form, SNA can be understood as a method that helps us to understand human behaviour and social interaction using analytical and statistical methods that are typically used for the visualization of such interactions (Waldstorm, 2003). Social network analysis thus does not help us determine the motivations for transnational cooperation but helps visualize the network and to identify the most relevant actors to interview. The visualization of these networks means that exploring networks can be a strong tool for understanding them. Even people who have not seen a network before can usually intuitively understand how to read otherwise complex and bulky data in an easier manner. The visualisation of networks and other data makes bulky data simple, while still allowing for a reasonable amount of detail and complexity. The visualization additionally allows the spotting of patterns—one can see which connections make sense and which appear as outliers in the network. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is important that this quantitative visualization and analysis is not all encompassing. To understand the finesse of human connections, the data presented needs to be elaborated on by actors within the network. The identification of the relevant actors was also conducted using the visualization tool.
Although SNA has been criticised because it is merely a visualization of interaction between people and provides no meaning beyond this (Mische, 2011), there is still use for this method of visualization. This because SNA recognizes that these connections are dynamic processes and that networks are constantly being established and evolve and therefore almost logically assumes that networks cannot be reduced to dyads or individuals. Logically assuming that those with many connections are the most attractive to connect to but also revealing the slightly paranoid tendency of this method of assuming that when a connection is not yet established yet, it will still occur (Smith et al., 2004). However, an actor’s position within the network is telling and describes the opportunities and constraints he or she faces at a certain time frame. Although SNA allows for a complete network analysis regardless of space, it is time sensitive as these networks most likely constantly evolve (Smith et al., 2004) To understand these networks, it therefore is essential to understand the network’s nodes and the edges between them. By identifying the nodes, one can later begin to explore the edges in terms of is the nature of the relationship they describe.
Social network analysis aids in understanding the determinants, structure, context, and consequences of relationships between the actors in a network in relation to power (Smith et al., 2004). In this respect, SNA is useful when one is interested in the political network of
