The governance of higher
education systems and
institutions in Europe
Working paper for the international workshop
“A comparative study of university governance, institutional leaders and
leadership in East Asia”
24 February 2018 in Hiroshima, Japan.
Harry de Boer CHEPS
University of Twente, the Netherlands 1
h.f.deboer@utwente.nl
Governance reforms in Europe
Governance, a highly contested concept, concerns the exercise of collective control towards common goals (De Boer & File, 2009). It refers to ‘the formal and informal exercise of authority under laws, policies and rules that articulate the rights and responsibilities of various actors, including the rules by which they interact’ (Eurydice, 2008, 12). In the last two decades, there have been significant changes in the ‘exercise of authority’ in higher education in almost all European countries. Many new national higher education Acts that have altered the exercise of collective control, have been passed. This series of reforms have had the key objective to change the authority distribution between the state and the institutions as well as inside the institutions.
In this paper I will shortly address both changes in governance at the system and the institutional level. One has to bear in mind however, that in Europe higher education has historically been a national affair, particularly since the creation of the nation state in the nineteenth century. Consequently, there is much diversity in the governance of European higher education systems. While each country has specific institutions and is responsible for organizing its own higher education sector, it is nonetheless clearly drawing on inspirations and successes from other countries as well as from guidelines and recommendations from the European Commission1, which implies that some general tendencies can be observed. I will address these general tendencies.
This paper is structured as follows. First, I will present an overview of changes in governance in Europe at the system level (the changed relationship between the state and the higher education institutions). Next, I address the governance issues at the institutional level, discussing the implications of the changed state-institution relationship at the level of the higher education state-institutions. Finally, I will focus on one particular issue that has obtained much attention: the selection of the executive heads (rectors, presidents or vice-chancellors) at European institutions for higher education.
System-level governance in European higher education
In terms of system governance, since the 1990s one can witness growing recognition that relationships in higher education are not only more complex and dynamic but involve more actors from various levels. Authorities and powers in higher education systems have been redistributed across the various policy levels. In many countries, coordination has changed from a classical form of regulation dominated by a single actor, the state, to forms in which various actors at various system levels govern the system: ‘multi-level multi-actor governance’ (e.g. van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2001). Governance1 Europe’s modernization agenda for higher education includes a number of recommendations on governance aspects of higher education institutions in Europe. As the European Commission has no powers to impose such governance aspects on institutions, it offers countries and higher education institutions a variety of issues to consider and a range of options for reform that should to be tailored to national and institutional contexts and conditions. The reference list of this paper contains two references to Europe’s modernization agenda.
increasingly takes place through interconnected policy levels with a substantial number of actors influencing agenda setting, policy development, policy determination, policy implementation, and evaluation (de Boer, Enders & Leisyte, 2007). In such a context, the state’s role in higher education has become one of a network manager (‘steering through networks’), also referred to as network governance. In this context, the term ‘agencification’ has been coined: the governance in many European higher education systems shows a stronger role of independent or semi-independent agencies in the exercise of authority of system level (e.g. Kehm, 2014). This inclusion of an increasing number of stakeholders in the coordination of higher education, such as for example accreditation agencies, implies that the state is increasingly steering “through contract, alliance building and partnership and persuasion rather than hierarchy” (Ferlie, Musselin & Andresani, 2008, 336).
In higher education the state’s new role may be called facilitative as it creates a higher education environment in which the state controls the outcomes at system level without (too) much detailed interference. Governance moves away from the ‘interventionary state’ towards a more ‘facilitatory state’ (Neave & Van Vught, 1991) or shifts from ‘state control’ to ‘state supervision’ (Van Vught, 1997). In some European higher education systems one can speak of the state as steering higher education markets (Texeira, Jongbloed, Dill & Amaral, 2004), also known as market-based governance (de Boer & Jongbloed, 2012; Jongbloed, 2003). In this governance mode, government interventions are focused on the shaping of a level playing field, which facilitates the self-regulation capacities of higher education institutions. In other words, market-driven and network-based modes of governance have gained ground in several European higher education systems.
This shift in governance modes has often entailed the releasing of higher education institutions from detailed control through legislation by giving them the right to pass their own statutes in the broadening area over which they have autonomy. The enhancement of institutional autonomy is one of the overarching trends in European higher education governance. The prevailing policy belief is that higher education institutions in Europe should be freed from over-regulation and micro-management from the state and its agencies while accepting in return full institutional accountability to society at large for their results, as expressed for example in the European Commission’s agenda on the modernization of European higher education (European Commission, 2011). This belief is that more autonomy within the higher education institutions will improve the performance of those institutions and as the result of that of the higher education systems overall. The rationale for this belief rests on the autonomous higher education institution being able to control and steer its outcomes and performance well (e.g. see De Boer and Van Vught, 2015).
Institutional autonomy is however hard to interpret. It refers to the ability, will or capacity for independent thought and action, which means acting independent from external control and constraints (De Boer & Enders, 2017). For a useful interpretation, one must acknowledge that institutional autonomy can refer to different dimensions; it is a multidimensional concept. Therefore one has to ask with respect to what an institution has the ability to determine its own course of action (e.g. on matters of student selection, curriculum development, property
and buildings, personnel matters, tuition fees, and so on). Based on this multidimensionality of institutional autonomy we can make the following observations in European higher education (see also Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; de Boer, Enders, File & Jongbloed, 2010).
Organisational autonomy of public universities refers to the ability for institutions to decide on their own internal governance structures (their internal authority, responsibility and accountability structures) as well as to develop their own procedures to select their institutional leadership (see also next section). Across Europe, this dimension of institutional autonomy is still limited. In many European counties the organizational autonomy is restricted by national legislation, regulations and guidelines. In the other words, the state frames the organizational structure of European institutions to a large extent. Only a few countries have implemented reforms that have seriously transferred to the universities the power to decide on their internal governance structure.
A second dimension of institutional autonomy concerns the policy autonomy, which is the ability of universities to constitute themselves as academic communities in terms of student and staff selection and to determine their teaching and research programmes. Where rests for example the authority to hire and fire academic and non-academic staff, who sets the labour conditions for them, who decides on curricula, testing of students or the programming the research? Public universities in the vast majority of European countries have medium-high to high levels of policy autonomy in at least some aspects of staffing, student selection and academic affairs. Only a few countries have implemented reforms that granted universities fundamentally more autonomy in these matters. However, the European picture on this dimension of institutional autonomy is scattered.
The third dimension of institutional autonomy, financial autonomy, includes the ability to decide on the internal allocation of public and private funds, to diversify sources of income (for example through tuition fees and other private contributions), to build up reserves, and to borrow funds on the capital market. Public universities in the vast majority of European countries have rather high levels of financial autonomy. Many countries have implemented reforms that have significantly enhanced the autonomy of universities in financial matters, particularly through the introduction of lump sum budgeting. Although there are some exceptions, particularly with tuition fees, across the board European institutions are rather autonomous in deciding on how they spend their budgets. The fourth dimension of institutional autonomy, interventional autonomy, refers to the extent to which institutions are free from accountability requirements. The underlying rationale is that the more institutions must account for their activities or have to demonstrate their performances, the less autonomy they have. Mandatory quality assurance systems for teaching and research, imposed by the state, are an example of such a restriction of institutional autonomy. In several countries this autonomy is rather low, which means that reforms have increasingly obliged public universities to demonstrate their performance and to account for their activities and spending. Thus, in Europe, enhanced institutional autonomy has taken place together with higher levels of accountability, that is more stringent and detailed procedures for quality assurance at the institutional
level have been introduced (see ‘the rise of the evaluative state’; Neave, 1988). Only a few countries have not followed this trend.
Opponents of this trend speak of an audited society or evaluation disease, hinting at an overkill of monitoring and reporting requirements (for institutions as well as within institutions). Greater accountability also means that higher education institutions have to redefine the ways in which they inform their stakeholders about their performances.
While recognising that there are important differences between higher education systems in Europe, taking the four dimensions of institutional autonomy together, institutional autonomy has grown overall, creating opportunities for public higher education institutions to act as more integrated organisations and to determine their own profiles and strategies. As said however, this is not the case for all dimensions of autonomy; public institutions in many European countries (still) face limitations on their managerial flexibility particularly in terms of internal governance arrangements, staff and student selection and formal accountability requirements.
Institutional governance in European higher education
The European higher education landscape is primarily organized at the national and regional levels and is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity that is reflected in organization, governance and operating conditions, including the status and conditions of employment and recruitment of teaching staff and researchers. Despite Europe’s heterogeneity, several general observations with respect to internal higher education governance can be made.One of the consequences of enhanced institutional autonomy, as discussed in the previous section, is that higher education institutions have, or are expected to, become more tightly coupled organisations. Traditional higher education institutions have frequently been described as loosely coupled organisations. Loosely coupling means that different parts of the institutions “are somehow attached, but that each retains some identity and separateness and that their attachment may be circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant, and/or slow to respond” (Weick, 1976, 3). To overcome this internal fragmentation, which is believed to constrain the decisiveness of the institutions in a more and more competitive and global world of higher education, across European higher education institutional leadership (rectors and deans) has increasingly been empowered, particularly in those systems where traditionally the institutional top level was relatively weak (as was the case in many continental European higher education systems). A related trend in this respect is that institutional leaders are in many cases being appointed instead of elected, often making it possible for leaders to be appointed ‘from the outside’. This issue of selection institutional leadership is however highly controversial (see also the next section).
Thus, in many countries, the position of the executive head (rector, president or vice-chancellor) has itself changed significantly as a consequence of granting more autonomy to the institutions. This is particularly true for their formal powers. However, in reality executive heads do not always have the possibilities to fully exploit their enhanced powers. As Weber (2006, 72) argues “even if the
formal decision structures and processes may give a different impression, most university leaders (rectors, presidents) are hardly in the position to make repeated important decisions.” Nevertheless there is a clear general trend of strengthening the formal position of the executive head across Europe.
New demands are placed on empowered academic leadership, which in turn requires new modes of communication with and assistance from the decentralized units (faculties, schools, institutes, departments). The oversight of the higher education institution’s primary activities has increasingly been centralized within the institutions, with new lines of reporting and new rules and procedures for academics to ensure the quality of the higher education institution’s primary processes – teaching and research. In many cases this has led to a further rationalization of higher education institution’s decision-making structures and in many cases has also implied putting in place new ‘hierarchies’ in which institutional leadership (such as rectors and deans) holds a central role. For example, there has been a considerable increase in the number of mid-level management positions in European higher education institutions in the past two decades as well as the establishment of quality assurance mechanisms and systems within the higher education institutions (Kehm & Lanzendorf, 2006). Generally speaking, what one sees is the devolution of authority from the state level and at the same time centralization tendencies within higher education institutions, for instance when it comes to accountability measures such as quality assurance. In many respects deregulation has become re-regulation at another level within the higher education system.
The reshuffling of authorities and responsibilities between the various levels within the higher education systems, including the settlement of many powers at the top level of the institutions, has enabled the institutions to engage more in strategic behavior. European higher education institutions are increasingly seen engaging in different kinds of partnerships at all levels. International arrangements have proliferated over the past decades under headings such as associations, networks, alliances, consortia. Based on disciplinary, geographical, historical and institutional ties and similarities higher education institutions have grouped together under the assumption that this is the way to survive and influence the competitive higher education environment. Higher education providers also appear to move more and more into public-private partnerships with organizations outside the field of higher education. The latter has been strongly supported by the European Commission and many national governments.
The strengthening of institutional leadership has also had an impact on leadership styles within the institutions. Traditional notions of collegiality and consensus-based decision-making have come under pressure, making room for ‘business-like’ management and the ‘professionalization’ of administrative structures. Borrowing instruments from the private sector, higher education institutions in Europe have tried to enhance their possibilities to streamline the organization in order to cope with an increasingly complex environment. Developing institution-wide polices – always problematic because of higher education institutions’ fragmented character (see above) – strategic planning, and ‘identity-building’ are now regarded as essential survival strategies. Higher education institutions are increasingly seen as ‘corporate actors’ that act
strategically not only within their own organizations but also pro-actively engage with their external environment (Krücken & Meier, 2006). Although the leadership styles tend to have become more ‘business-like’, there are also indications that in practices higher education institutions continue to rely on old habits when it comes to leadership. Based on the outcomes of a representative study in the Netherlands, Huisman, De Boer and Goedegebuure (2006, 238) conclude that “the ‘decline of collegialism’ or the ‘death of participatory decision-making’ through the existence and dominance of non-approachable executives with limited knowledge and commitment as regards the actual teaching and research processes, is not a reality (…) There is little doubt that the Dutch executives have gained a more prominent role in university decision-making, but (…) this does neither mean that ‘others’ are excluded from the game nor that the ‘others’ are automatically dissatisfied with the ‘professionalised’ governing structure of the university”.
Another consequence of recalibrating institutional governance concerns the positions and roles of governing bodies of higher education institutions and the role and extent of external stakeholder representation within them. Many existing internal governing bodies have been changed, and in some higher education systems in Europe new governing bodies have been established. One of the bodies that in several European countries have been instituted rather recently in higher education institutions is the ‘supervisory board’. The composition and role of these ‘top-level bodies’ differ across the European institutions (e.g. De Boer, Huisman & Meister-Scheytt, 2010). In some countries the role of this supervisory body is clearly separated from the executive’s role, while in other countries the supervisory board has clear decision-making powers. In some countries institutions are obliged to have such boards, while in others this is not the case. The composition of these bodies ranges from external members only to a mix of internal and external members.
The general purpose of many supervisory bodies is to safeguard the interests of the institution and to ensure that the institution complies with national laws and regulations. It usually has to approve important (accountability) documents of the institution such as annual reports and financial reports. They may also have to approve the strategic plans and the budget of the institution. Frequently they are involved in appointing the executive head. However, they do not ‘lead and manage’ the institution. An example of such a supervisory board can be found in the Netherlands (introduced in 1997).
In other countries the supervisory body acts as the decision-making body and bears responsibility for institutional strategic planning (e.g. in Ireland, Cyprus, Sweden, Norway). In Austria the supervisory board shares some decision-making powers with the senate, for instance when it comes to strategic plans. Estonian, Spanish and Hungarian institutions have advisory councils at the top institutional level that serve as mechanisms of external guidance and bring external perspectives to bear on issues related to institutional governance. They should facilitate the relationship between the ministry and the institution, encourage the relationships with society and advise on strategic priorities. They do not officially monitor the institution and they do not have to approve strategic decisions. In Austria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Slovakia (amongst others) the supervisory board is composed of only external stakeholders (for example
captains of industry or former high level politicians). These governing bodies clearly indicate external guidance and external stakeholder involvement. In other countries such as Denmark, Ireland, Italy or Sweden the majority of seats in the supervisory board are taken by external stakeholders, but internal stakeholders participate as well. In Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Norway there is parity or internal stakeholder dominance. These governing boards combine an external and internal perspective.
A final general tendency associated with the strengthening of the executive positions in the institutions (executive heads at the central level and deans at the middle level) and a more important governance role for external stakeholders is that this has happened at the expense of academics and students and their representative bodies. Some of the powers that used to belong to these representative bodies have been transferred to the executive heads or supervisory bodies. This is one of the reasons why it has been argued that higher education institutions in Europe have become ‘less democratic’. In most countries institutions are legally obliged to have bodies that represent internal stakeholders (such as academics, students, non-academics). In some cases external lay members are part of such representative bodies (e.g. France and Malta). Norway is the only country in which such a representative academic body is not a mandatory part of the structure; the institution decides.
Appointment procedures for executive heads in Europe
The selection of executive leadership in higher education institutions, in Europe and beyond, is a highly contested issue. There are various models, both in theory and in practice. In principle, these models can be placed on a continuum, ranging from ‘elected leadership at different university levels (central, middle and department level)’ to ‘appointed leadership at the different levels’. Proponents of elected leadership point to the input legitimacy of elected leadership, referring to rules and procedures aiming at diversity and inclusiveness of different stakeholders. If all voices are heard the selecting of a new leader will be more widely accepted. In other words, the university community trusts their leaders because it has had the opportunity to align their interests with those of the preferred candidate. Advocates of appointed leadership argue however that it is hard for elected leaders to take tough decisions that may harm some university constituencies, particularly when these leaders return to their academic position after their term of leadership. The output legitimacy – the degree of decisiveness – of elected leadership is low compared to appointed leadership. They argue that one should not choose the most popular person but the one most suitable for the job. Where the advocates of elected leadership stress the benefits of a tight relationship between leaders and led, the opponents favour some distance between the two for the benefit of resolute decision making.In European higher education institutions these polar opposites are very uncommon, if they exist at all. Firstly, there are several mixed models where some leaders are appointed (e.g. rectors) and others are not (e.g. deans). Secondly, the selection procedures are more nuanced. In several models where leaders are appointed, several stakeholders, or their representatives, must consulted, formally or informally. In the remainder of this section, I will illustrate
this second point and demonstrate the variety of selection models that exist across Europe.2
In the previous section I reported that in some countries the appointment procedures of executive heads have been altered. There is however no general picture. There are various ways used to select executive heads. In some countries rectors are elected by internal stakeholders or their representatives. In other countries the executive head is appointed by the governing board or council. In some countries the executive head is appointed by the ministry or needs the institution’s proposed candidate ministerial approval. Clearly, different mechanisms are used to select the executive heads and different stakeholders can be involved. In this section I describe the procedures of selecting the executive head (rector, president or vice-chancellor) in a number of European countries.
In Denmark, the university board is the highest governing body of the university. Most of the seats of this governing body are hold by external members. The remaining seats are for representatives of the academic staff, the administrative staff and the students. The daily management of the university consists of a senior management team, led by the rector, and further consisting of the vice rector, deans and department heads. For the selection of a new rector the university board sets up a selection committee, consisting of representatives from the academic staff, administrative staff and students. This selection committee assesses the possible candidates and nominates a candidate for rector for the university board, which then appoints the new rector.
In Finland, most universities have three governing bodies at the central level: the university collegium, the university council and the rectorate. The university collegium exists from up to fifty members representing the university community (the factions are professors, other staff members and students). The University Council is the highest decision-making body and consists of seven up to fourteen members. This council also has representatives from the three factions (professors, staff and students), supplemented by a minimum of forty percent of external representatives. The rector is in charge of the preparation and implementation of the decisions taken by the University Council. Candidate rectors are selected by the university council. The members of the board then choose from the candidates the new rector.
Flanders (as autonomous part of Belgium) does not have a generic scheme for the internal governance of its universities. In addition to several arrangements for private institutions, the public institutions also have special regulations. Here a short explanation about the University Ghent, a traditionally highly regulated government institution. At the central level, the University Gent has three governing bodies: the board of governors, the collegium, the executive board. There is also the rectorate. The board of governors has thirty-six members and has a broad composition including executives (including rector and vice rector) and representatives of the academic staff (twelve members), assisting academic
2 This section is based on De Boer, H., R. Kolster and H. Vossensteyn (2016). "Bestuursbenoemingen over de grens. Hoe is de procedure in andere landen geregeld? [Leadership appointments across the border. What are the procedures in other countries?]" TH&MA 5-15: 81-85.
staff (three members), administrative and technical staff (three members), students (four members) and public bodies (ten members). The eight-member collegium has a comparable composition; next to the rector and vice rector, each faction of the board of governors has at least one representative in the collegium. The board of governors appoints the rector and the vice rector for a period of four years. These appointments happen on the recommendation of an electoral college, which consists of the members of the faculty councils (and equated to them councils) in which various stakeholders are represented. After internal deliberation and secret vote for every function (rector and vice rector) at least two candidates are being nominated for the board of governors. The members of the board of governors then vote on the selected candidates. The candidate with the most votes will be the new rector or new vice rector.
The public universities in France have two governing bodies at institutional level, an academic council (conseil académique) and an executive council (conseil d'administration), both chaired by the president of the uiversity. The academic council consists of eighty members, including sixteen student members. The executive council, responsible for the institutional policies, consists of twenty-four up to thirty-six members. The members of the executive councils are academics (8-16 members), external members (8 members), students (4-6 members) and administrative staff (4-6 members). The members of the executive council elect by majority vote the new president, who has to be a professor at the university concerned.
In Germany, with the necessary variety between the federal states, the senate, the university council (Hochschulrat, supervisory body) and the presidium (or rectorate) are the governing bodies at the central level. In any case in the senate academics, administrative staff and students are represented (with a large number of seats for academics). The university council consists partly of external members and partly of members of the academic community (but no students). For the appointment of the president or rector two models are common (to be defined in detail in university regulations). In the first model, the senate and the university council jointly set up a selection or search committee (for which each institution has its own election rules that determines the procedure). This selection committee nominates one or more candidates for the senate. The senate then chooses a candidate, after which approval is required from the university council, followed by a formal appointment by the minister. In the second model the order is reversed: the selection committee nominates one or more candidates for the presidency, after which the university council chooses the new president and then the senate has to approve the proposed candidate. In Italy, the state regulates the overall university management structure of the public universities. More detailed rules are laid down in university regulations. The most important governing bodies at the central level are the senate, the university council, and the rector. The senate has a broad composition. Next to the rector and the deans, the different internal university stakeholders are holding seats. The university council also has a broad composition, to be determined by the senate. The university council members are not elected but appointed under direction of the senate. As regards a new rector, a senate committee determines the procedure and lists a number of candidates. All staff
members of the university and student representatives from various administrative bodies then choose a rector from the list composed by the senate. Universities in Latvia have the following governing bodies at central level: the constitutional council, the senate, the rector and the academic arbitration board. The constitutional council may have up to three hundred members of which at least 60 percent are academic representatives, at least 20 percent are student representatives, and the others are non-academic staff representatives. Via secret ballot the constitutional council elects the rector. The outcome of the rector election is communicated to the ministry that ultimately appoints the new rector. At the biggest Latvian university, different bodies, such as faculties, institutes, senate and student council nominate candidates for the rector position. Candidates can also nominate themselves, provided they have (written) support of at least one hundred academics. Each candidate campaigns. The candidate who wins more than half of the votes in the secret constitutional council election becomes the new rector (provided that the ministry endorses it). The young university of Luxembourg has a board of governors, a rectorate and a university council. The university council, an advisory body, has six student members, six staff members and the members of the rectorate. The board of governors consists of seven external members. The rectorate (rector, vice rectors and secretary) is the executive body. With respect to a new rector position, the board of governors sets up a selection committee, who nominates a candidate for the board of governors. Next the board of governors consults the university council. A negative advice from the university council means that the whole procedure starts again. If not, the intended candidate is proposed to the ministry which then proposes the Duke of Luxembourg (head of state) to appoint the candidate as the new rector.
The governance structure of universities in the Netherlands, including the formal appointment procedure of the members of the universities’ Executive Board is enshrined in the national Act on Higher Education Act and Scientific Research (WHW). At the central level, there are three governing bodies: the supervisory board, consisting of a maximum of five external members, the executive board, consisting of a maximum of three members (including the rector), and the university council, a representative body for staff and students. The supervisory board appoints the members of the executive board and designates the chairman of the executive board. The supervisory board has to consult the university council before it appoints one of the three executives. More detailed procedures about the nomination and appointment of executives (including the rector) are laid down in university bylaws, indicating for example that the supervisory body will consults the deans before taking a decision. Ministerial consent or approval is not required.
The legislation in Portugal promulgates that every university prescribes its governing structure in a university statute. At central level, the rectorate (rector and vice rectors), the general council and, in most cases universities, the senate can be distinguished. The senate, an advisory body, has about seventy members, from the various factions of the university community. The general council has between fifteen and thirty-five members; at least 50 percent of them are professors, at least 15 percent are students and about 30 percent are external members and administrative staff. After public disclosure of the vacancy
for rector, academics from the home or another university can run for the position. These candidates campaign, unfold and advocate their plans to the university community. The general council takes a vote and the new rector will be elected by majority vote.
Scotland has a lot of variety in university governance models, partly related to the distinction between the old universities, universities established in the mid-twentieth century and new universities. The general picture is as follows. Besides a general council, an overarching advisory body, a Scottish university has a senate (also called academic board or academic council) and a university court (also called board of governors or executive board). The daily management is in the hands of a principal (or chief executive officer), often assisted by a vice principal. The principal presides over the senate, but not over the university board. The governing bodies of universities differs in composition and size. Often it has relatively large broadly composed governing bodies (with staff and student representation), as a rule with a large representation of external members. One of the tasks of the university board is appointing the principal. To this end, the university court proposes a search committee with external members and internal members (staff and student representatives). From the possible candidates the search committee will nominate a candidate for the university court. The court ratifies the candidacy and then the chairman of the general council appoints the new principal. The four old Scottish universities have a special governing position, namely that of the rector. This rector stands up for the student interests and is chairman of the university court, but mainly has a ceremonial function. The students elect the rector for a period of three years. This rector could be ‘anyone’ out of society, such as prominent politicians, business people or other public figures.
This overview of appointment procedures for selecting executive heads of universities in eleven European countries demonstrates the variety of procedures and shows that the dichotomy between elected versus appointed heads is simplistic. In most countries we see that the selecting of the executive head is primarily an institutional matter. Some governments provide guidelines or set general rules but in most cases the institutions have discretion on this matter. Only in a few countries the ministry takes the ultimate decision or require ministerial consent. Next, we see that in several countries the highest governing body – board, council or senate – appoint the new leader, almost always after having consulted internal stakeholders (or their representatives) such as staff and students. And there are a number of countries were new institutional leaders are not appointed but elected by the institutional community, usually after a campaigning process of the candidates.
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