Business as EUsual?
The effect of the Arab Spring on EU external migration policy
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Dieuwertje Toereppel 10001116
Main supervisor: Mw. Prof. Dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz Second supervisor: Dhr. Dr. M.E. Spiering
List of Contents
Introduction ...3
1. A European migration policy...6
Understanding migration...6
The emergence of a European migration policy...10
Externalizing migration policy...11
2. A Global Approach for Migration and Mobility...17
The Global Approach to Migration...17
Mobility Partnerships...24
From GAM to GAMM...28
3. A policy for the MENA region...33
The Barcelona Process...33
The ENP after the Arab Spring...39
4. External governance in the EU...43
EU external governance...43
Views on external governance...45
Modes of external governance...46
5. Case Study...50
A case study of Tunisia...50
EU-Tunisia relations pre-Arab Spring...50
EU-Tunisia relations post-Arab Spring...53
Conclusion...62
Introduction
On the 7th of June 2013 the European Union (EU) and Morocco signed a mobility partnership.
On the 3rd of March 2014 Tunisia signed such a partnership with the EU as well and on the 9th
of October of that same year, Jordan added its name to the list.1 A mobility partnership is in
short a partnership between the EU and a third country – a non-EU country – in which both parties promise to work together in managing the migration of people coming from the third country in question. These particular mobility partnerships are part of the new strategy on migration which the EU adopted after the uprisings in several North-African countries in 2011 – commonly called the Arab Spring.2 As a result of the turmoil created by the Arab Spring in
the Middle Eastern and North-African region (MENA-region), large amounts of economic migrants and refugees, searching for shelter and work, crossed the Mediterranean Sea in little unsafe boats to European territory, such as the Italian island Lampedusa. The Southern Member States – Italy, Spain, France, Malta, Greece – found it increasingly more difficult to manage the growing migration flows and thus called for an EU-wide policy to deal with these migrants.3
Migrants trying to enter Europe this way is a phenomenon that has existed for a long time already. As such, a European migration policy and cooperation between the EU and the MENA-region on this matter already existed before the Arab Spring.4 Migration from this
region gained more visibility however, due to the Arab Spring having increased the number of migrants coming from this region and the fact that Member States increasingly struggled to manage these migration flows. This, together with a number of factors such as the overthrow of the authoritarian leaders in for example Tunisia and Egypt; democratic reforms in other MENA-countries; and the civil wars that emerged later on in Libya and Syria, seemed to have made it clear to the EU that a new situation had emerged in the MENA-region, which amongst others asked for a new migration policy for this region as well. The EU was relatively quick to act in this regard by launching a set of documents which all had the main aim of revising the existing policies on external relations and migration policy in the MENA-1 Commission Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Southern Mediterranean’,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/southern-mediterranean/index_en.htm, visited on 04-08-2015. 2 Despite being aware of the debate on whether the term ‘Arab Spring’ is a fitting name for the democratic revolutions in the North-African region, this thesis will use this term nonetheless as the revolts are most commonly known under this name and this thesis does not concern itself with the framing of the Arab Spring. 3 Commission, Press Release, ‘Lampedusa follow up: concrete actions to prevent loss of life in the
Mediterranean and better address migratory and asylum flows’,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1199_en.htm, visited on 04-08-2015.
region. The result of these revisions were amongst others the mobility partnerships that were concluded with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.5
Yet the question is how much revision these policy documents really underwent and how much change they really brought about. Four years after the Arab Spring, the EU is still issuing similar press releases relating to migrants arriving at Lampedusa as it released in years before and right after the Arab Spring.6 This could suggest that in fact very little has changed.
Are these documents then really proof that the Arab Spring had a substantive effect on the EU’s external migration policy with regard to the MENA-region, or does its effect reach no further than the mere existence of these documents? This thesis will try to answer precisely this question. It will do so by looking in its first chapter at how the EU characterizes migration and how the competence for a European migration policy was created. In the second chapter the EU’s main document on its external migration policy, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility will be reviewed. This chapter will look at the main elements of the policy as well as at what happened to this policy after the Arab Spring. In a similar fashion, the third chapter will review the EU’s regional framework in the MENA-region, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Chapter four will try to shine light on how the EU’s external migration policy behaves by looking at EU external governance theory. Finally, the fifth chapter will present a case study on the effect of the EU’s external migration policy on Tunisia before and after the Arab Spring. The decision to choose Tunisia for this case study is based on the fact that Tunisia is the country which is seen as having set the Arab Spring in motion. The Tunisian population was the first to demand democratic reforms and to overthrow its authoritarian regime. Tunisia’s democratic transition has developed relatively successfully ever since, which has allowed EU-Tunisian relations to rebuild again relatively quickly.7 As such, Tunisia makes an interesting case because – unlike
in Syria or Libya – the situation in Tunisia has been relatively stable which fostered EU cooperation, while at the same time – unlike Algeria or Morocco – the country underwent significant reforms, which changed its political and socio-economic character and thus undoubtedly influenced EU-Tunisia relations.
It needs to be noted that in this thesis migration policy and asylum policy are treated as two separate fields. In order to maintain a reasonable scope, this thesis will not consider EU 5 Commission, ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, COM(2011) 200 final; Commission, ‘The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’, COM(2011) 743 final. 6 Commission, Press Release, ‘European Commission stands by Italy on coping with migratory pressure on Lampedusa’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4453_en.htm, visited on 04-08-2015.
7 N. Gana, ‘Tunisia’, in P. Amar and V. Prashad eds., Dispatches from the Arab Spring, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (2013), p21.
asylum policy nor the situation of refugees within this policy. For the same reason, the topic of the EU’s immediate short-term measures in dealing with irregular migrants traveling the Mediterranean Sea on their way to for example Lampedusa will not be discussed. This thesis focuses instead on the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy, on how this policy is manifested in the EU’s partnerships with third countries and on what the effect of the Arab Spring has been on this policy.
1. A European migration policy Understanding migration
Looking at the website of the EU’s Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG MHA) – more specifically, the parts on ‘legal’ and ‘irregular migration’ – one thing stands out: DG MHA does not speak of controlling migration, dealing with migration or limiting migration, it only speaks of managing migration. On the main page about irregular migration alone the word pops up five times.8 The concept of migration management thus seems to be
actively used by the EU to understand migration. For this reason it is relevant to take a closer look at this concept before discussing the emergence of an EU migration policy.
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud give a very functional and clear explanation of what migration management exactly is in their book The politics of international migration
management from 2010. Their main argument is that migration management is not a clear-cut
concept that listens to one single definition. Instead they distinguish three elements to which it can relate: actors, practices and discourse.9 Migration management is used by actors dealing
with migration to justify their involvement in the field of migration and give shape to their tasks. The concept is also used as an umbrella for a range of practices that are linked to migration – often promoted by the actors who promote migration management as well. Thirdly, migration management serves as the name for a broader discourse that helps actors frame their practices in a certain way.10
With regards to the actors of migration management, the EU is not the only organization who uses the notion. Several other intergovernmental organizations have discovered its value, such as the International Organization for Migration and the UNCHR. The expertise, approach and the degree in which migration is supranationally or intergovernmentally regulated will differ from one organization to another. When States have to decide whether and how they want to cooperate internationally in migration matters, this diversity in actors is an advantage, as it will give them the opportunity to choose the cooperation frame that corresponds best to their national policy.11 States can thus choose what
parts of migration management they want to tackle through the EU, and what parts they do not want to externalize or where they prefer cooperation through different actors. This could 8 DG Home Affairs, ‘irregular migration’, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm, visited on 18-12-2014.
9 M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, ‘The Politics of International Migration Management’, in M.Geiger and A. Pécoud eds., The Politics of Migration Management, Houndmills: Palgrave (2010), p1.
10 Ibid., pp1-2. 11 ibid., p4.
explain why the EU has received far reaching competences for regulating migration within the EU, but can regulate far less when it comes to ‘third country nationals’ who want to migrate
to the EU.12
The practices encompassed by migration management range from counter-trafficking efforts to training civil servants in migrant transit and sending States. It is unnecessary to discuss every single activity that has been classified as part of migration management at some point, but what is relevant to know for this paper is that most of these practices are focused on ‘capacity building’ in the transit and sending countries; or at least have a ‘capacity building’ component to them.13 Capacity building can be understood as efforts to help transit
and sending States to improve their ability to deal with migrants transiting through or wanting to leave their territory.14 Examples are the training of civil servants or development of
migration policies in countries whose policies are inefficient in the eyes of the EU.15
Migration management as a discourse essentially determines which policies and actions exactly fall within the scope of migration policy. It defines ‘migration’ and how it should be dealt with. The catch to framing migration policy as ‘management’ is that the notion holds a certain degree of neutrality to it. It makes migration into something ‘normal’, something that everyone can do and benefit from. The issue thus is not whether or not to
allow migration, the issue is how to manage it.16 Interpreting migration in this way thus seems
to depoliticize migration. The politicization of a topic can be said to indicate the degree to which a certain issue becomes something that in the eye of society – the population of a State, mass media – should be a matter of public policy regulated by the State authorities, after which it is also picked up on by said authorities.17 A salient and much contested topic means
the topic is highly politicized.18 Going one step further means a topic has been securitized.
This means a topic has become salient to the extent that it is presented by mass media, political parties or even the State as a real threat to society which has to be dealt with as soon as possible.19 Securitization or politicization of a topic as such thus has the advantage of
12 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p3.
13 M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, The Politics of Migration Management, pp6,7. 14 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p54. 15 M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, The Politics of Migration Management, p6. 16 Ibid., pp9,10
17 A. Buonfino, ‘Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe’, New Political Science, 26:1(2006), p37.
18 P. De Wilde, ‘No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration’, Journal of European Integration, 33:5(2011), p561.
19 J. Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38:5(2000), pp756-757.
legitimizing action in this area; or in the context of the EU; a highly politicized topic can gain the EU a competence to act. However, the salience of a politicized topic makes it at the same time harder to tackle the problem in an effective way, due to scrutiny of mass-media as well as the fact that many actors will be involved who might have conflicting interests.20 In order
therefore to have the space to effectively deal with an issue, it can be desirable to depoliticize a topic once it gained sufficient attention, through framing the topic in a less politically salient discourse. It is exactly this what the choice for migration management aims to achieve. It tries to bury the fact that different actors might have different opinions and interests and that decision making processes can be very strained and slow; and presents migration policy instead as a manageable issue which is the result of open consensual decision making processes.21 One of the most striking examples of the effect of discourse and narrative on the
depoliticization of migration policy in the EU, is the sudden shift noticeable in EU documents in addressing migrants who are not lawfully residing in the EU, or did not lawfully enter: Were these migrants still addressed as 'illegal migrants' in for example the Hague program of 2004 or the Stockholm program of 2010; one visit to the website of DG Home Affairs shows that the EU now rather seems to speak of ‘irregular’ migrants, which sounds much less negative.22
Creating the notion of migration management also contributes to the creation of the idea of one comprehensive policy for migration instead of dealing with migration in every single separate policy field, scattering the policy. It ‘re-categorizes' migration as such into one policy. However, what falls within that category and what does not is determined by the discourse that is being used. The discourse built around migration management is thus not merely descriptive, but also constitutive of what migration management is and what the problems are that need to be dealt with.23 Migration management therefore consequently also
omits certain elements; some elements of migration get priority over others.24
The discourse of migration management as used by the EU makes at its core one distinction; that between legal and irregular migrants. The two concepts are dependent on each other and therefore there is no in between: A legal migrant is a migrant who legally received their migrant status and is legally residing in the EU; is either of those two elements lacking, then the migrant is automatically an irregular – or illegal – migrant.25 At first sight
20 M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, The Politics of Migration Management, p11. 21 Ibid., p11.
22 Ibid., p82. 23 Ibid., p9. 24 Ibid., p10.
this may seem a logical distinction: if something is not one thing, it must be the other. However, upon closer look it becomes apparent that the effect of this particular narrative also presents migration as less complicated than it in fact is. Irregular migration can have many faces. Human trafficking and smuggling are just as much a part of irregular migration as a tourist or migrant respectively overstaying their visit or visa.26
Thus by using a certain discourse and by categorizing migrants, migration is given a certain meaning. As such migration management shapes its own social ‘playing field’ and thus also its own political consequences: a different discourse would possibly lead to different outcomes.27 Within this process, borders are an important element, after all, without borders
migration would not even be visible; it is the crossing of a border that makes a person into a migrant.28 This gives migration a rather prominent territorial characterization, what political
scientist William Walters calls its ‘imagined spatiality’.29 Walters describes in his contribution
to the book of Geiger and Pécoud how the EU’s migration policy claims to recognize that irregular migration is created as much due to practice from within the EU – such as overstaying a visa – as it can happen through illegal border crossing. However, Walters further notes that by looking closely at the proposed measures by the EU to deal with irregular migration, it seems that these measures rather scrutinize on the spatial element of migration by preventing irregular migrants from reaching the EU-borders, than that they also tackle the internal causes.30 This focus on the spatial element of migration tells a lot about the scope the
EU gives to its migration management. The EU partly frames migration management as something that is necessary from a humanitarian point of view. It is the responsibility of the EU to protect migrants and to develop a migration policy that saves migrants from falling prey to human smugglers or wanting to undertake the dangerous journey to the European mainland.31 The disastrous events regarding Lampedusa are a good example of this type of
‘victimization’ of migrants. However, at the same time, the Union assigns the ultimate responsibility for the causes of irregular migration to the countries of origin and transit outside of Europe. In this line of thought, not the migrants are the victims, but the Union is. The cause of irregular migration is framed as a one way street, one of which the beginning 26 Ibid., p127.
27 W. Walters, ‘Imagined Migration World: The European Union’s Anti-Illegal Immigration Discourse’, in: M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, The Politics of Migration Management, p73.
28 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p13. 29 W. Walters, The Politics of Migration Management, p84.
30 Ibid., p84.; As this thesis will show, the body of legal and political instruments to prevent irregular migrants from entering the EU is considerable. Especially compared to the occasional directive sanctioning European employers who offer work to irregular migrants.
can be found in the countries of origin and transit and which only ends in Europe. Walters gives a striking example of this way of thinking when he quotes a European Commission (Commission) report of 2001 which identifies the ‘beginning of the migration chain’ as situated in the countries of origin.32 This observation seems to imply that the EU definitely
sees a role for itself in migration management, and acknowledges it has a certain responsibility to guarantee the safety of migrants, but that this responsibility ends where the borders of Europe end. Beyond these borders, the Union is glad to give advice and tell how things should be done, but the ultimate responsibility for the wellbeing of migrants and for dealing with unwanted irregular migration lies with the sending and transit countries.
The emergence of a European migration policy
The late 1970s and early 1980s are often defined by literature on EU migration policy as the moment in which European countries started to look for a way to manage migration flows.33
However, because the measures taken by individual States proved to be counter-effective, eagerness to deal with migration on a European level grew.34 The Schengen Convention of
1985, abolishing internal borders between Member States and thus creating one single European external border, was the first step of European cooperation in the field of migration. The Convention was however concluded outside the European Community(EC) framework.35
Removing internal borders and having one shared external border pointed out the need to then also establish a shared visa and security policy. As such, a first modest competence for the EC to legislate in this area was created in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Motivation to create this competence was also triggered by a changing geopolitical environment in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. As Western-European States were afraid that not dealing with possible new migration flows from the East could be a security risk, the need for a new regime was widely recognized. This new regime would be comprehensive – encompassing all types of migrations.36 Political scientist Christina Boswell identifies two
more possible reasons that triggered a European migration policy in this period, one being the way in which national home affairs ministries had felt themselves to be limited in restricting 32 W. Walters, The Politics of Migration Management, p85.
33 Boswell, ‘The ‘external dimension’ of EU immigration and asylum policy’, International Affairs, 79:3(2003), p619; Kaunert, Léonard, ‘The European Union asylum policy after the treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm programme: towards supranational governance in a common area of protection?’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, 31:4 (2012), p3; C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p157.
34 By reducing the ways to legally enter European States, illegal migration increased, which in turn triggered a tension between the European States and the migrant-sending countries; Boswell, International Affairs, 79:3 (2003), p619.
35 Kaunert, Léonard, Refugee Survey Quarterly 31:4 (2012), p3.
migration on the national level due to public scrutiny.37 The –at the time – less transparent EU
allowed these ministries to avoid this national public scrutiny, while the intergovernmental character of decision making in the EU allowed for the perfect playing field to create the desired migration policy.38 At the same time securitization of the topic of migration due to
media and politics linking migration to terrorism and organized crime created the image of migration being a large scale problem which warranted European action and of a more rigorous character.39 The new EU policy mirrored in many ways the Member States’ domestic
policy, focusing on border controls, visa requirements and the return of asylum seekers.40 In
the Maastricht Treaty the EU competence to legislate was therefore limited. Migration was part of the intergovernmental third pillar, and the Member States, through the Justice and Home Affairs Council, were the most important actor.41
While in the same period an approach that focused on preventing migration in the first place rather than controlling it emerged, this approach did not immediately get much support. The Commission pointed out as early as 1991 already that an EU migration policy should be comprehensive by also looking at the root causes of migration; which could only be done by integrating migration in the EU’s external relations.42 But since migration policy was
dominated by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, who was still mainly focused on border control and securitization, there was little interest in tackling root causes through development assistance or foreign investment.43 Only with the introduction of the Area of
Freedom Security and Justice in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1998 and the Tampere Programme of 1999 became a more comprehensive migration policy a feasible possibility.
Externalizing migration policy
Externalization of a policy essentially means that an EU policy that up until then was concerned with regulating matters within the EU, now also receives an external dimension through incorporation in the EU’s external relations, thus concerning itself with activities outside the EU borders.44 Externalization of migration was made possible by the Amsterdam
Treaty and the Tampere Programme thanks to the boost these two documents gave to the EU 37 Boswell, International Affairs, 79:3(2003), pp 623.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pp623,624. 40 Ibid., p622.
41 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p162.
42S. Sterkx, ‘The External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expanding Fortress Europe?’, in: J.Orbie ed., Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, Farnham: Ashgate (2009), p128. 43 Boswell, International Affairs, 79:3(2003), p626.
migration policy. The Amsterdam Treaty moved migration and visa matters from the intergovernmental third pillar to the supranational first community pillar, thus giving the Commission more competences such as concluding agreements with sending and transit countries.45 Under the Amsterdam Treaty the first directives on legal migration for Students
and long term third country nationals were issued as well.46 The Tampere Programme,
concluded by the European Council at said summit in 1999, marked the start of how the EU’s migration policy would from then on be characterized: by five year working programs that specified the goals set in the treaties.47
Establishing a common EU asylum and migration policy and stronger external action were two of the main priorities in the Tampere Programme.48 The Conclusions of the summit
stated that ‘[t]he European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit’.49 Prior to the Tampere Summit, Germany and Finland in their role of President of the
Council of the EU had already emphasized that a comprehensive migration approach should be a balanced one, focusing not just on border control but also on root causes and promotion of legal ways of migration.50 Migration was thus characterized as a policy with a cross-border
element, affecting all Member States but also migrant sending and transit countries from outside the EU. The Programme therefore mentioned the establishment of partnerships with countries of origin and transit and that all ‘Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies’, hence also in the policy area of external relations.51 The Programme thus very clearly called for more active
external action for migration. This call was largely motivated by the realization of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The idea behind the AFSJ was that the EU would become a safe space without internal borders. Such a safe internal area could consequently only be maintained through a safe outside and strong external border. Giving an external dimension to migration was thus desirable from a justice and home affairs perspective as well, in order to be able to more efficiently manage who would enter the EU and thus to guarantee a safe inside.52
45 W. Walters, The Politics of Migration Management, p76.
46 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents ; Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service. 47 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p53.
48European Council, Presidency conclusions, Tampere SN200/99 15-16 Oct 1999, p1. 49 Ibid., par11.
50 S. Sterkx, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, p131. 51 European Council, Presidency conclusions, Tampere SN200/99 15-16 Oct 1999, pp3,8. 52 Kaunert, Léonard, Refugee Survey Quarterly 31:4 (2012), p9.
The next step towards realizing such an external dimension to migration was set through action plans developed by the new High Level Working Group (HLWG) in 1998. The HLWG dedicated itself to setting up a list of sending and transit countries with whom it would be beneficial to create action plans for. These action plans comprised an analysis of the causes of migration flows, support with the development of the country and proposals for a more intensive political dialogue as well as suggestions to create readmission agreements, and an analysis of the possibility for these countries to receive and protect migrants themselves and return of migrants to said region.53 What is remarkable, is that the abovementioned
measures are all of a control-orientated character, whereas the Tampere summit expressly called for a balanced approach. However, it were exactly these suggestions on capacity building and readmission that explain why this time the JHA Council was not opposed to externalization of the policy. As the benefit of an external dimension to migration for JHA lie with creating a safe inside and ‘keeping the bad out’, it were these kinds of control-based external measures that both DG JHA and the JHA Council promoted. The introduction of for example a competence to conclude readmission agreements with third countries now made an external dimension to migration interesting for a control-orientated approach as well.54 The
HLWG in this way bridged the gap between DG JHA and the externalization of migration policy. From then on migration was an element of every agreement signed with a non-EU neighboring country.55
This focus on control-oriented measures was however a major part of the criticism on the HLWG which led to plans for its reform in 2002. The other point of criticism was the lack of consultation and cooperation with the relevant third countries.56 A Commission
communication on ‘Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries’ of 2002 was the first communication that focused mainly on preventive measures in the area of development and migration. The document insisted that the ‘deep-rooted causes of illegal immigration must remain the Union’s constant objective….[P]artnership with the third countries concerned would be a key element for the success of such a policy’.57 The
communication stated that from then on, the EU would ‘systematically put the migration-53 S. Sterkx, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, p120.
54 Readmission agreements are bilateral agreements between in this case the Union and a third country, which oblige both sides to take back migrants – both those who are their nationals and those who are not but merely transited through their territory – who are illegally present on the territory of the other party. - C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p166
55Collett, ‘The Global Approach to Migration: rhetoric or reality?’, European Policy Centre, November 2007, p1.
56 S. Sterkx, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, p121.
development nexus on the agenda of its political dialogue’ and would also incorporate migration issue in the area of economic and social policy.58 As such the EU also recognized
the risk of a brain drain for sending countries, and thus the Communication suggests measures that would create job opportunities for skilled migrants back in their country of origin.59 The
European Council once more emphasized that the HLWG should focus on the connection between migration and development, yet paradoxically in the Council of Ministers of that same year, readmission agreements were once more upheld as the ‘key element’ of the external dimension.60
The EU’s comprehensive migration policy thus got a rather domestic identity. Where this might not be surprising seeing from the point of view of Migration and Home affairs, where a domestic character is almost inherent to the name of the domain; this development can be said to be paradoxical nonetheless, viewing the rhetoric of the Commission’s Communication and the European Council conclusions which emphasized this balanced approach. Yet from other DGs in this area – DG Development and the DG for External Relations (DG RELEX) – came initially little opposition to this strategy. Sterkx explains in his article on the External Dimension of EU Migration Policy that this has largely to do with the lack of coherence between the EU policies due to a different outlook.61 For DG RELEX,
Sterkx explains, the most important thing is to integrate migration policy into the external relations which the EU upholds with third countries, so that a comprehensive and coherent framework is created. For DG JHA, however the main priority is to develop a way to manage migration flows from beginning to end and to fight irregular migration.62 Therefore, for DG
RELEX the coherence of external relations policy is what is most important, of which migration would only form a small part. For DG MHA however the ultimate use of an external dimension to migration is to complement and facilitate the internal migration policy. Migration is thus not DG RELEX’s priority, and like DG Development, there also existed a certain reluctance to cooperate on migration matters, as it risks to claim funds that were initially meant for other purposes.63 As Member States tend to follow the approach set out by
DG JHA, a control-oriented approach won over a more balanced preventive approach. In 2010, DG RELEX was absorbed by the newly created European External Action Service
58 Ibid., p23. 59 Ibid., p24.
60 S. Sterkx, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, pp121-122. 61 Ibid., p126.
62 Ibid., p127.
(EEAS). The EEAS, like its predecessor continued to see migration in the context of broader foreign policy developments.64
The following summits in The Hague and Stockholm in respectively 2004 and 2010 mainly addressed the same need for a partnership but emphasized an added the necessity of making sure this partnership would be a balanced one, a fair symmetric one.65 By the time the Lisbon
Treaty entered into force in 2009, migration was a full substantive part of EU policy, dealing with border control, visa requirements, asylum and irregular migration66. The division
between preventive and control-oriented externalization of migration has remained unbalanced however. In 2005 the Global Approach to Mobility and Migration(GAMM) framework was adopted by the EU. This framework was adopted to ‘address all relevant aspects of migration in a balanced and comprehensive way, in partnership with non-EU countries’.67 The priority of the GAMM lies with preventing and reducing irregular migration,
by tackling root causes and through partnership with third countries. This program thus advocated a preventive approach.68 At the same time, however, especially the MHA
directorate still seems to mainly focus on securitizing migration. A mere look at the website of DG Home Affairs shows that a significantly larger part of the website’s page on irregular migration is reserved for explaining the EU’s measures regarding border control and return policies, compared to the small paragraph that deals with sanctioning causes for irregular migration that come from within the European Union.69 The EU’s latest document on
migration, the European Council conclusions of 25 and 26 June 2015, too spends five out of seven pages on security and border control measures.70
The partnerships with third countries are in fact also reflecting the emphasis the EU puts on securitizing measures – despite its efforts in framing migration as a comprehensive management policy. After all, as has been mentioned before, the Union seems to point at the sending and transit countries as eventually being the place where irregular migration is born. By concluding strategically geopolitical partnerships with exactly those neighboring countries 64 Carrera, Den Hertog and Parkin, ‘EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring: What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?’, MEDPRO Technical Report, No. 15/August 2012, p15.
65 C. Boswell, A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, p52. 66 Ibid., p8.
67 Commission, ‘Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)’, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/communication-global-approach-migration-and-mobility-gamm_en
68 A more detailed analysis of the GAMM will be given in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
69 DG Migration and Home Affairs, ‘irregular migration’, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm, visited on 30-12-2014.
70 European Council, ‘European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions’, EUCO 22/15 CO EUR8 CONCL3.
which are also transit countries and by cleverly including migration and readmission clauses in those partnership agreements, the EU thus effectively creates what William Walters calls ‘pre-frontier measures’.71 This thus externalizes the policy but also off-shores responsibility
for a considerable part.72 These measures are largely set on preventing irregular migrants from
reaching EU-border so that it is prevented that these migrant become a problem the EU has to deal with.
71 W. Walters, The Politics of Migration Management, pp 79,80. 72 Ibid., p80.
2. A Global Approach for Migration and Mobility The Global Approach to Migration
It took the EU three more years after its first Communication in 2002 which pressed for a more comprehensive migration policy, to indeed present a policy that was both control- and prevention-oriented.73 In 2005 British presidency pushed for a revision of the policy, which
was given attention to during the informal Hampton Court meeting of Heads of State in that same year. At this meeting, Heads of State agreed that a comprehensive approach for migration would focus both on the security aspect of migration and on its development aspect. As such it would cover all aspects of migration in a complementary way to the already existing frameworks of external relations, development and justice and home affairs.74 In a
follow-up communication the Commission recommended to focus on the African-Mediterranean area and one month later on 13 December 2005 the European Council presented its plans for a Global Approach to Migration (GAM).75 The GAM was to be three
things according to the European Council: Balanced, Global and Coherent.76 With those three
characteristics it would be able for the EU to offer a long term solution to managing migration, the GAM would be the point of departure for migration matters from then on.77
Global
The 2005 follow-up Communication of the Commission to the Hampton Court summit states the following: ‘[W]hile acknowledging that migration is a global phenomenon, three categories of actions should be envisaged’, after which it lists said categories.78 These three
categories, however, focus on only two regions outside of the EU in particular: the EU’s neighboring countries, and the African region. A few sentences later, the document acknowledges this rather regional focus when it says that ‘it is important to bear in mind that Africa and the Mediterranean countries, even though they are the main focus of this Communication, are only two of the relevant regions of origin’.79 This choice was justified by
the Commission by pointing at ‘the events of Lampedusa and Malta as reasons for concern’, 73 Commission, ‘Migration and development: some concrete orientations’, COM(2005) 390 final, p2.
74 Commission, ‘Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton
Court’, COM (2005) 621 final, p2.
75 European Council, ‘Global approach to migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the
Mediterranean’ 15744/05, 13 December 2005.
76 Collett, ‘The Global Approach to Migration: rhetoric or reality?’, European Policy Centre, November 2007, p1.
77 Ibid., p1; COM(2005)621, p2.
78 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p3. 79 Ibid.
referring to the increasing flows of irregular migrants coming from Africa arriving at these EU territories.80
The GAM was thus at the start not factually global, if global is read as meaning ‘worldwide’. When global is rather read in this context as meaning engagement with countries beyond the EU borders however, the characteristic seems to fit the GAM better. With the GAM’s priority area being Africa and the Mediterranean, the GAM’s aim was defined as forcing immediate action to reduce irregular migration, foster the return of migrants and build capacity through the creation of a genuine partnership with the relevant countries of origin and transit in the North-African and Sub-Saharan region.81 Regional networks of immigration
liaison officers (ILOs) should be set up in these GAM partner countries and technical assistance should be given to them.82 In the Commission’s policy review document of 2006,
this aim was emphasized again. The GAM was said to be built on three principles: solidarity between EU Member States, the protection of migrants and partnership with third countries.83
Kunz claims that the idea behind the emphasis on creating partnerships with third countries, is for the EU to create ‘responsible self-disciplined partners’ who can govern themselves in a way that meets with the policy standards as they have been framed by the EU.84 By using a
rhetoric that points out the mutual interests and shared benefits of the EU and the third countries in managing migration, the idea is to be created that migration is indeed manageable and will lead to a win-win situation if States cooperate.85 As such, Kunz points out how EU
documents from the Hampton Court follow-up onwards use a vocabulary that is focused on strengthening this idea. At the Hampton Court summit the EU spoke of ‘strengthening dialogue in the spirit of partnership’, and the follow-up pointed out how managing migration would be beneficial to both.86 From shared benefits it then is a small step to also point out
shared responsibilities. In the ideal situation, this rhetoric of shared benefits and responsibilities should lead to a certain peer pressure in which the EU’s partner countries would want to live up to the raised expectations, which would turn them into active participants.87 As such, migration would from then on be an integral part of political dialogue
with third countries.88
80 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p3.
81 European Council, 15744/05, 13 December 2005, p3. 82 Ibid.
83 Commission, ‘The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European
migration policy’ COM (2006) 735 final, p4.
84 Kunz, ‘Governing International Migration through Partnership’, Third World Quarterly, 34:7(2013), p1228. 85 Ibid., p1233.
86 Ibid., p1234; COM(2005) 621 final, p3.
87 Kunz, Third World Quarterly, 34:7(2013), pp1235-1237. 88 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p6.
Unfortunately however, such an ideal situation was thwarted from the beginning due to disparities in interests between the EU and its partner countries. Where partner countries were and are mainly interested in labor migration opportunities, the EU’s competence in this area to conclude any deals is limited. Rather, the EU and its Member States are interested in concluding partnerships in the area of irregular migration. On top of that, political partnerships are prone to changes in the political environment, making third countries vulnerable to this.89
Balanced
According to the Commission’s follow-up Communication, a balanced approach to migration means paying attention to security measures but also to the root causes of migration.90 This
meant that migration was being linked to the development of migrant sending and transit countries. Making such a connection was not something unique for the EU, rather the EU responded in line with an increased momentum to make this link. Before the EU released its Communication on Migration and Development in September 2005, the Global Commission on International Migration and the General Assembly of the United Nations had already put emphasis on the nexus with development.91 In the context of development, migration is
framed as something positive by the EU: migration can give migrant sending countries the opportunity to develop. Three main tools were identified in 2005 through which the EU could facilitate this and stimulate the positive effect of migration on development: remittances, mapping diasporas, and circular migration.92 Remittances are defined by the Commission as
financial transfers made by migrants to ‘beneficiaries in their countries of origin’.93 In other
words, remittances are built up from the money and other financial means that migrants send back to their family or community who remained in their country of origin, thus stimulating the development and prosperity of said family, community and country. If a country becomes more developed, less people will migrate and migration will become better manageable. As such, the EU saw a benefit on both sides in facilitating the transfer of remittances for migrants.94 This approach is closely related to the second tool in promoting development that
is defined in the communication: mapping diasporas. The Migration and Development 89Wunderlich, ‘Towards Coherence of EU External Migration Policy? Implementing a Complex Policy’,
International Migration, 51:6(2013), p33.
90 Commission, COM(2005) 621 final, p2. 91 Commission, COM(2005) 390 final, p2. 92 Ibid., pp3,6,7.
93 Ibid., p3.
Communication suggested that it would be beneficial to map the diasporas of certain countries of origin. That way, by knowing where a State’s nationals abroad are living within the EU, it would be easier to stimulate these people to contribute to their home country’s development.95
Due to the scope of this thesis a more elaborate explanation of the EU tools with regards to the nexus between migration and development will not be discussed in this chapter. The migration-development nexus is mostly focused on aiding countries of origin – e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa. Since this thesis focuses on Tunisia, and since Tunisia is mainly a country of transit, a more thorough understanding of the migration and development nexus is unnecessary. However a balanced approach means more than ‘just’ integrating migration into development policy. Despite the fact that the EU seems to aim for mainstreaming migration in all other policies, Collett notes how there is a remarkable absence of migration measures in for example the area of agriculture and trade in the 2005 GAM, whereas both policy fields can have a huge impact on the degree of migration of a developing country.96 The 2008
Commission review communication picked up on this point of criticism and stated that migration should be better mainstreamed into the EU’s existing policies. The list of policies was now extended to: agriculture, environment, trade, education, healthy, social welfare and research.97
Another characteristic of the GAM, contributing to its balance, was that the approach would cover all types of migration: legal migration, irregular migration, and refugees.98 The
main concept promoted by the EU in the area of legal migration, is that of circular migration. This concept was already mentioned in the migration and development communication in 2005, and then further developed in a policy paper on legal migration of that same year.99 The
EU promotes circular migration as a way of legal migration with great potential, thanks to the mutual benefits it would bring for both the Union and countries of origin. The idea behind circular migration is that migrants are allowed entry into the EU on a temporary basis to work as guest worker or seasonal worker, after which they will also return again. That way, they can bring financial support but also skills and knowledge back with them to the country of origin which will contribute to said State’s development and prevent a brain drain. At the same time the EU would get skilled workers that could fill the gaps in the EU labor market 95 Ibid., p6.
96 Collett, European Policy Centre, November 2007, p3.
97 Commission, ‘A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools’, COM (2008) 611 final, p12.
98 Once again, due to the scope of this thesis and its focus on migration rather than asylum, the category of refugees will not be discussed.
with the ‘coincidental’ advantage of not having to issue permanent residence permits.100 By
facilitating return and reward those migrants who indeed timely returned and did not overstay their work visas, the 2005 Communication suggested to promote circular migration.101 On the
EU side four directives were drafted in 2005 to facilitate legal migration, the two most important ones aptly reflecting the two plus points of the circular migration concept for the EU: A directive for seasonal workers – thus promoting workers who want to stay temporarily – and one for high skilled workers – thus promoting the arrival of high skilled workers to respond to EU labor market needs.102
Other measures that were suggested in the GAM for legal migration were raising awareness in migrant sending and transit countries of legal channels to migrate through, as well as facilitating the admission of certain categories of migrants, notably students, researchers and (high skilled) workers through the creation of specific migrant information centers in the partner countries.103
On the other side of the GAM scale the control-oriented measures were placed, focusing on capacity building, border management and immediate return of irregular migrants. In 2004, what is often called ‘Europe’s border watchdog’, FRONTEX had been established, which task is to aid Member States in managing the EU’s external borders.104
Unsurprisingly, FRONTEX was mentioned in the GAM paper as an agency which could assist the EU in managing its southern border in the Mediterranean. At the same time the GAM mentioned the creation of a Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network which should cooperate with FRONTEX in combating irregular migration and trafficking.105 Where circular
migration is the main concept in the EU’s legal migration policy, readmission agreements remain this equivalent in the control-oriented area. The agreements were mentioned as being a necessary tool in fighting irregular migration and as such an important part of a comprehensive approach.106 The Commission therefore called for intensified effort by the
Mediterranean region in taking back migrants. In turn, the EU would assist in managing the borders, increase capacity and provide technical experts in order to do so.107 As such the GAM
would be an approach balancing capacity building with legal migration.
100 Commission, COM(2005) 669 final, p10. 101 Commission, COM (2005) 390 final, pp7,8. 102 Commission, COM (2005) 669 final, p7. 103 Commission, COM (2006) 735 final, pp6,7.
104 Frontex, ‘Origin’, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/, visited on 20 july 2015. 105 European Council, 15744/05, 13 December 2005.
106 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p8. 107 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p8.
Coherent
Daniel Wunderlich defines the word coherent as a characteristic that guarantees that the gap between policy intent and policy outcome is reduced by using an approach and involving actors which reinforce each other in reaching the same goal.108 In the context of the GAM this
implies three things: that the GAM is consistent with other EU policies which it complements and vice versa; that the EU institutions and individual Member States agree on the approach that is to be taken; and – in the light of partnership – that the EU envisages the same approach and has the same priorities as its partner countries of origin and transit do.
Ensuring coherence between the GAM and other EU policies was taken care of by the emphasis from the start that the GAM would cover all aspects of migration within the existing
frameworks of development and external relations, more specifically: the ENP, the ASFJ and
EU employment policy.109 The GAM should thus be complementary to these policies.
A bigger challenge lies with creating a coherent policy by unifying EU institutions and Member States’ visions. In principle, in the EU system priorities for partnership cooperation or policy development are set by the Heads of States of the Member States through the European Council, after which the Commission comes with proposals or suggestions for partnerships. As such, visions should be aligned, as the Commission acts on suggestion from the European Council.110 Consequently, where the Commission has no competence but wants
to obtain one, or wants to take more action than the European Council prefers, a tension will arise. In the case of irregular migration this does not seem to cause any major problems. Even though irregular migration is a highly politicized topic, it is not very politically sensitive in the sense that the majority of the Member States agree on the policy direction to be taken, and to the fact that this matter is best tackled in an EU framework.111 The Commission and
Member States thus largely agree with each other in this area, which fosters policy coherence. The area of legal migration however, is much more politically sensitive. This means that Member States are reluctant to cooperate on a European level here, thus making it harder for the Commission to propose any measures in this area.112 Where irregular migration is mainly
considered with returning migrants or preventing migrants from reaching EU territory, legal migration is concerned with allowing migrants to enter an EU State. To the EU Member 108 Wunderlich, International Migration, 51:6(2013), p28.
109 Commission, COM (2005) 621 final, p2.
110 Wunderlich, International Migration, 51:6(2013), p28.
111 Cardwell, ‘New Modes of governance in the External Dimension of EU Migration Policy’, International
Migration 51:6 (2013), p56.
112 Cardwell, ‘New Modes of governance in the External Dimension of EU Migration Policy’, International
States this has a much more profound impact on their individual sovereignty, since legal migration will also have implications for Member States’ social- and employment policies for example.113 Member States have therefore from the start been reluctant to make use of hard
law measures (legislation). As such, a true common approach to legal migration is lacking. Initiatives for labor migration projects have to come from the Member States, the Commission has a very limited competence in this area. This has created not only a tension between the Commission and Member States, but also between the different Commission Directorate Generals.114 Notably between DGs JHA and DG RELEX, since the latter wished
to incorporate migration in broader foreign policy trends, seeing the relevance of legal migration in this context; whereas the former aligned more with Member States’ interests.115
Coherence between the policy intent and aim of the EU and that of its partner countries is not entirely in place either. Due to the Member States’ fear to hand over too much of their sovereignty to the Commission, there is made little use of hard law instruments – instruments that are legally binding on Member States – in migration policy. Instead the GAM was built up from several soft law instruments that are not legally binding, such as migration profiles, migration missions, cooperation platforms and mobility partnerships.116 That way,
Member States are not bound legally to any obligations or responsibilities, but decide themselves what parts of their migration policy – especially in the area of labor migration – they would want to externalize in a partnership. Unfortunately for the aim of coherence, third countries proved to be mainly interested in labor migration opportunities, rather than managing irregular migration – the main interest of Member States. 117 This thus created a
discrepancy between EU Member States interests, third country interests and the competences of the EU. The Commissions 2008 communication reviewing the GAM therefore stated better coordination between the EU, Member States and third countries should become a priority. The EU should, to begin with, make its political objectives more clear in its interaction with third countries. Only then transparency could be realized.118
Mobility Partnerships
113 Reslow, ‘Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility Partnerships’,
Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p225.
114 Collett, ‘The Global Approach to Migration: rhetoric or reality?’, European Policy Centre, November 2007, p2.
115 Carrera, Den Hertog and Parkin, ‘EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring: What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?’, MEDPRO Technical Report, No. 15/August 2012, pp15,16.
116 Cardwell, International Migration 51:6 (2013), p60. 117 Wunderlich, International Migration, 51:6(2013), p33. 118 Commission, COM (2008) 611 final, p11.
Mobility partnerships have been characterized by the Commission as the GAM’s ‘most innovative and sophisticated tool to date’ and fully reflecting its objectives.119 They are an
instrument used to implement the GAM and in that role they are the best representation of the GAM’s three characteristics: balanced, global and coherent. Broadly stated, mobility partnerships are agreements between the EU and third countries. In the agreement third countries commit themselves to taking action in the area of migration policy – notably the area of irregular migration – and then the EU will commit itself to certain promises in return.120 The idea of such bilateral agreements is not new, many European countries had
similar agreements with countries that were relevant for their foreign policies already. Spain, France and Italy for example concluded several bilateral mobility partnerships with North-African States.121 The idea for mobility partnerships on the European level was raised both by
the Commission in its 2006 review report on the GAM as well as by Member States.122 The
idea of – then still called - ‘mobility packages’ was raised by the European Council and picked up on by the Commission, a year later the Commission issued a document on circular migration and mobility partnership, which served as the mobility partnership’s blueprint. Natasha Reslow also mentions how an initiative by France and Germany called ‘A European migration policy’ in 2006, likely also had an impact on the Commission picking up on the idea of mobility partnerships. The Franco-German initiative too called for more opportunities to create partnerships with third countries through a comprehensive EU framework.123
Getting more into details, mobility partnerships are joint declarations, this means they are political agreements rather than legal documents, and as such they are not legally binding.124 This lack of legal character means that the European Parliament and the European
Court of Justice play no role whatsoever in these partnerships, the roles during negotiation and implementation are divided between the Council of the European Union and the Commission.125 The plus side to the non-binding character of mobility partnerships is,
according to the Commission, the degree of flexibility this brings with it.126 What the
Commission refers to with that statement is the fact that Member States are free in deciding
119 Secretary-General of the European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document – Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration’, SEC (2009) 1240 final, p4.
120 Reslow, Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p224.
121 Jelen, ‘Multifaceted migration management: bilateral mobility partnerships in the European Union’, The
George Washington International Law Review, 45(2013), pp391-393.
122 Commission, COM(2006)735 final, p7.
123 Reslow, Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p229.
124 Secretary-General of the European Commission, SEC(2009) 1240 final, p4. 125 Reslow, Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p231.
whether they want to be a party to the mobility partnership or not, participation is voluntary.127
Member States thus can also decide to join after all at a later time.128 In the mobility
partnership with Cape Verde – together with the partnership with Moldova the first one to be concluded – only France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain initially participated.129 Despite
this voluntary character for Member State participation, Member States hold a strong hold on with what countries mobility partnerships are being signed. It is the Council who gets to initially identify countries that might be interested in concluding a partnership. The Commission then gets to ‘test the waters’, by seeing what countries are indeed interested, what their preferences and potential are and which Member States in turn would be interested to participate. Negotiations by the Commission cannot start however before the Council gives the final mandate for this to start.130 The Member States thus have first and final say. This has
proved to be problematic due to the fact that the preference in States to cooperate of the Commission and the Member States seems to differ. Reslow describes how, based on interviews she held with policy officials from Cape Verde, Senegal and the EU institutions, she was able to conclude that where the Commission bases its choices on which countries are relevant when looking at migration flows, Member States rather look at what countries are ‘easy’ to cooperate with, and are more keen on keeping a balance between cooperation with the East and the South.131 The first four countries with what negotiations started were Cape
Verde, Senegal, Georgia and Moldova. The choices were a mix of Commission and Member State preferences, although negotiations were not started before the four countries themselves had confirmed that they were interested. Negotiations with Senegal failed however, which brought the Commission to write in its 2009 review report that from then on, the EU should make sure from the very start that a third country is interested. Preferably this should happen by the third country reaching out to the EU before the Commission had done so.132
This idea of the EU holding back until the non-EU State reaches out or shows interest, could be argued to be characteristic for the entire mobility partnership concept. The nature of the partnerships is conditional: only if the partner country lives up to its commitments will the EU do the same. Both the Commission, Member States and the partner country can suggest cooperation projects to be set up based on the partnership. These projects are annexed to the 127 Parkes, ´EU Mobility Partnerships: A Model of Policy Coordination?, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009), p328.
128 Secretary-General of the European Commission, SEC(2009) 1240, final, p4. 129 Parkes, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009), p329.
130 Reslow, Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p229. 131 Ibid., p230.
mobility partnerships, this way they are tailored to the specifics of each country.133
Commitments for partner countries largely consist out of taking measures to combat irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking through stepping up border controls and working together with FRONTEX.134 In turn, the EU Member States will then create a better
framework for legal migration, which is stated by the Commission as being the mobility partnerships’ main aim.135 The biggest asset to the mobility partnerships is allegedly however
the link created between readmission agreements and visa facilitation. The adoption of a readmission agreements is a sine qua non condition for the Member States to agree to a partnership.136 The added value of EU readmission agreements would be the fact that they also
oblige third countries to take back third country nationals who traveled illegally to the EU through their territory. This is also the main reason why third countries are very reluctant to agree to such agreements.137 Whether or not a partner country will agree to these
commitments thus will depend on the value and quality of the projects the Commission and Member States offer in return. Liberalization of visas would be a fair equivalent in this light. Unfortunately, the Commission does not have the competence to suggest such a thing. Article 79(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union guarantees that despite the EU’s gained competences in the area of migration policy, this does not withstand ‘the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries…in order to seek work’. This division between the competences – which aptly shows the difficulty of creating a coherent policy – are also strongly upheld in the mobility partnerships. Policy documents on the partnerships repeatedly emphasize the importance of respecting the division of power between EU and Member States.138 The Commission only
has the ability to propose visa facilitations for short-term visas, liberalization of visas is dependent on the goodwill of Member States.139 The EU States have however – as mentioned
before – proven to be reluctant when it comes to regulating legal migration on a European level. As such, visa facilitation is not something that is royally offered, let alone visa liberalization. Rather, Member States offer to help third countries with capacity building, 133 Commission, ‘On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third
Countries’ COM (2007) 248 final, pp3-4.
134 Commission, COM(2007) 248 final, p4; SEC (2009) 1240 final, p4; Reslow, Journal of European
Integration, 34:3(2011), p224.
135 Reslow, Journal of European Integration, 34:3(2011), p232.
136 Reslow, ‘The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The Mobility Partnerships’, European
Journal of Migration and Law 14(2012), p406.
137 Ibid., p407.
138 Commission, COM(2007) 248 final, p3; Secretary-General of the European Commission, SEC(2009) 1240 final, p4.
