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Hungarian minority rights and inter-ethnic relations in Romania: An assessment.

Assess the development of Hungarian minority rights and inter-ethnic relations in

Romania since the end of the Second World War.

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van

Amsterdam

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Introduction

The region of Central and Eastern Europe provides for a fruitful academic case study in which to analyse issues concerning nations, states, and ethnic minorities. This is due to its multifaceted history of empires and shifting territorial borders. Throughout my thesis I will explore these concepts whilst tackling the issue of minority rights. According to Pick a state is “a territorial political community for which there is an independent organised Government”.1 This contrasts with a nation which refers to a community of peoples with a shared set of characteristic, such as culture, language, and ethnicity. 2

Due to various complex historical factors, most countries in the region do not have a perfect overlap between nations and states, meaning that most states in the region have ethnic/national minorities. Amongst these are the Hungarians, who are the predominant group in the state of Hungary, but also represent significant ethnic minorities in the neighbouring states of Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Slovenia, and Croatia.

It is important to note that there is also no consensus regarding how governments should deal with the issue of ethnic minorities within their states. Since the rise of the nation-state in the 19th century,

countries within Europe have approached the question in different ways, often depending on whether they were authoritarian regimes or democracies. The former have generally favoured the assimilation of the minority ethnic groups into the majority culture, often using repressive means, such as enacting restrictive language legislation. Most modern democratic states however have tended to favour a more pluralistic approach, respecting differences in culture, and protecting the identity of these minority groups through the framework of international and European human rights legislation. Part of my thesis will illustrate how these different approaches have been addressed by focusing on the Hungarian ethnic minority within Romania.

As a result of its history, the demographic make-up of Romania is complex, with numerous ethnic groups living within the territory, something consistent with most other nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe. These different minority groups include Hungarians, Roma, Ukrainians, and

1 Anthony C. Pick, “The Nation State: An Essay”, The Nation State (2011), 3. http://www.thenationstate.co.uk/TheNationState.pdf

26/06/2016

2 Peter Ravn Rasmussen, “"Nations" or "States" an Attempt at Definition”, Global Policy Forum (2001) https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30341.html 16/04/2016

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Germans. The most prominent ethnic minority in contemporary Romania is the ethnic Hungarian population, which consists of around 6.1% of the total population, largely concentrated in the region of Transylvania.3 However, in order to discuss the topic of Hungarian minority rights in Romania since

the Second World War, it is important to provide a brief summary of the history of the geographical territory of the country, in order to understand its multi-ethnic origins.

The territorial area of what is contemporary Romania has been inhabited by various tribes and empires throughout its turbulent history. One of the earliest groups that we have historical records about concerns the Dacians, a sub-group of an indo-European tribe known as the Thracians. Since the beginning of the second century AD, around the years 105-106, the region became a province of the Roman Empire, which led to Romanization of its inhabitants, including the introduction of a Latinized language. This intermixing formed the basis of what became the Romanian people.4 The Roman Empires occupation of the region lasted until 271 AD, after which it was invaded by numerous tribes, including the Huns, Avars, Goths, and Slavs, amongst others.5

During the Middle Ages this region was made up of three separate independent principalities: Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania. However, their independence did not last, with Transylvania being gradually conquered by the Kingdom of Hungary between the 11th and 13th century.6 Despite

this, the region of Transylvania retained a great degree of autonomy, as well as and most of its Romanian ethnic identity, preventing it from fully integrating into the kingdom.7 From the 12th

century, the Hungarian kingdom began to strengthen its rule in the Transylvanian territory, and secure its eastern border. This involved a policy of settling ethnic Hungarian in the region, as well as encouraging other ethnic groups to move there. These included the Saxons and the Szecklers.8 The

Szecklers were a sub group of the Hungarians who migrated to the Pannonian Plain of Eastern Europe at a similar time to other Hungarian tribes.9 However, despite some unique attributes, they largely share the same culture and language as the main Hungarian ethnic group. Therefore, in my thesis I will refer to the Szeckler population that still resides in Romania as part of the broader ethnic

3 Central Intelligence Agency (2016) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html 11/03/2016

4 Ioan Bolovan (et al), A history of Romania (New York, 1996), 3.

5 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 3.

6 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 51.

7 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 61.

8 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 61-2.

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Hungarian minority. However, despite the migration of these groups into the territory, ethnic Romanians were still the majority.10

Following the battle of Mohacs in 1526 Transylvania was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, yet retained its status as an autonomous principality. This lasted until the end of the seventeenth century when the territory was taken by the Habsburg Empire after the Battle of Vienna.11 Although it was under Habsburg rule, the territory retained its status as a principality. However, after the establishment on the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867, Transylvania was annexed by Hungary.12 This status quo was to exist until the end of the First World War and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary in 1918. After the war the controversial Treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920 which resulted in the territory of Transylvania being assigned to the state of Romania. As a consequence of this treaty, over 1,600,000 Hungarians became ethnic minorities in the region. With the exception of a brief period during the Second World War between 1940 and 1944 whereby Hungary occupied the region, the borders of the Romanian state have largely remained stable. Despite this, due in part to the territorial changes, tensions between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority have continued to this day.

Within my thesis I will analyse the issue of Hungarian minority rights in Romania since the end of the Second World War, up until the Romania joined the European Union in 2007. In doing so I will analyse the different factors that contributed to the protection, as well as suppression, of the Hungarian minority within this country. These factors will be addressed in four separate chapters within my thesis. Therefore it is important that I briefly provide a breakdown of each chapter.

In my first chapter I will focus on the Communist period after the Second World War, up until the fall of Ceausescu’s regime in 1989. Within this part of my thesis I will discuss the issue of minority rights by taking into account both the theoretical rights provided in the three different Constitutions that were formed during the 35 year period, as well as the practical government policies that were introduced. It is important to address the Constitutions in my analysis as they provided the

theoretical and legal framework for minority rights. By taking this approach I will be able to illustrate how legal protections in theory do not automatically mean practical application by governments,

10 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 63.

11 Bolovan, A history of Romania, 155.

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especially in authoritarian states where the rule of law is not an effective constraint on practical politics. I will organise my analysis from a chronological perspective in order to identify how the Hungarian minority issue was approached by the different heads of state. I believe it is important to address the Communist period of Romanian history in particular, as its legacy had a significant impact on the period following the collapse of the regime. I will also briefly analyse Romania’s Constitution adopted during Romania’s transition into a democracy in 1991, and the legal rights guaranteed within it.

My second chapter will focus on the period of Romanian history since the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989. In particular, I will take into account Romania’s new democratic political system, analysing how this influenced the progression of Hungarian minority rights. In doing so I will discuss the different political parties that emerged in Romania, but with a focus on the main ethnic

Hungarian minority political organisation that represented the needs of the Hungarian minority. I will therefore address this organisations contribution to the protection of minority rights, and its

effectiveness in doing so. I will also draw on previous theoretical concepts concerning the contrasting ideas about minority rights, highlighting how this organisations approach was different to that advocated by the Romanian state.

In my third chapter I will continue the focus on the period after 1989. I will analyse the EU’s influence on the advancement of minority rights protection for the Hungarian minority, particularly taking into account how the desire to gain membership of the EU impacted on Romania’s minority policy. In doing so I will address how the EU approached minority rights since the states of Central and Eastern Europe began their transition into democracies, and analyse the process by which the EU dealt with this issue. It is vital that we take into account the role of the EU with regards to ethnic minorities, as it played on important role in facilitating the democratic process of Romania, with minority rights being part of this process.

Lastly I will take into account the important factor of the Hungarian state, and how the various governments that existed after the collapse of communism approached the issue of its ethnic kin within Romania. In doing so I will address the main ideological divisions between the main parties in Hungary concerning how to approach the issue of Hungarian minority rights in its neighbouring states. It is also important to illustrate how these differing approaches benefited the Hungarian

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minority within Romania. Furthermore, I will discuss how the political and ideological division raised issues regarding how governments should approach protecting their diaspora communities within foreign states, and the impact this has on relations between states.

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Chapter 1

Analyse the approach taken by the Romanian state regarding Hungarian minority rights in since the end of the Second World War.

Within this chapter I will analyse how the Romanian government dealt with the Hungarian minority after the Second World War up until the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 and during Romania’s early transition into democracy. I will therefore focus most of this chapter on the approach taken by the Communist governments in dealing with this issue. This will help to provide historical context to the difficult situation Romania found itself in during the 1990s in terms of minority rights. In

addition, I will analyse the 1991 Romanian Constitution, which was established by the Romanian state soon after its transition into a liberal democracy, and provided the legal framework for minority protections. In doing so, I will discuss whether or not this new constitution provided adequate safeguards for the ethnic Hungarian minority.

The Romanian Communist regime came to power after the Second World War when the Soviet Union occupied the country and installed a pro-Soviet government, dominated by the Romanian Communist Party. The Communist government eventually consolidated its authority and remained in power officially until the Romanian Revolution of 1989. The enactment of minority rights concerning the ethnic Hungarians during this period can best be described as inconsistent, resulting in both a mixture of relatively liberal minority policies, particularly in the early years, to brutal assimilation later on. This can partly be attributed to the differing approaches to dealing with issues of ethnic minorities within Marxist thought. Debates surrounding minority issues and the concept of nationality have a long history within this philosophical tradition, including twentieth century debates between the Bolshevik and Austro-Marxist schools of thought. However, I will not focus on such theoretical debates within this chapter, yet it is important to be aware that different approaches existed with regards to how to deal with different nationalities within a Communist state.

During the first few years of the Communist regime in Romania, particularly under Petru Groza’s brief rule, the government was comparatively tolerant and accommodating towards the ethnic Hungarian minority. This included establishing cultural and educational institutions, such as the Hungarian Bolyai University in June 1946.13 To some extent it could be argued that this was due to the fact that

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the Romanian Communist Party at this time was itself multi-ethnic, with less than 25 % of its members being ethnic Romanians. The rest of the Party was largely composed of Hungarians and Jews.14 This highlights the internationalist orientation of the Communist movement in Romania during this period. However, a few years later, by which time the Communist regime had

consolidated its power, the ethnic composition of the party changed. This included the purging of key minority representatives in the Romanian government, such as Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca.15

Therefore, the significance of this factor has its limits.

I would argue that the main reason behind the more tolerant minority policies during this period relates to a number of international treaty obligations. These include the Armistice Agreement of September 12 1944, and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which restored the territorial borders of Romania and Hungary established in the Treaty of Trianon. One of the key conditions dictated by the Allied Commission was that the annexation of Transylvania to Romania would only go ahead if it could guarantee protection for the national minorities within the region.16 This was reflected in

Romania’s 1948 Constitution. This included Article 16 which granted legal equality regardless of nationality, as well as sex, religion, and race. Furthermore, Article 24 of the constitution granted the right of national minority’s education in their mother tongue.17 In addition, this policy of providing

national minority rights was influenced by the Stalinist National Policy.18 As a result “in 1948 the Romanian Politburo sent out a resolution on the national question, in which the Stalinist idea of ‘equality and diversity amongst nationalities liberated from the class yoke’ was promoted”.19

To a certain extent, the Romanian state continued this relatively liberal approach to minority rights when Gheorghiu-Dej became leader in 1952. This included Hungarian language education in regions of the country with a large ethnic Hungarian population.20 However, protections for the Hungarian

minority population actually went further than mere linguistic rights during this period. Not only did 14 Fiona Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity in Romania from the Treaty of Trianon to the Fall of Ceausescu, PhD Thesis, University College London, 301.

15M.M.H. Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited? : minority rights and the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania

after EU accession, MA Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 10. 16 Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity, 302.

17 Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity, 316.

18 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 10.

19 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 10.

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Romania’s new 1952 Constitution theoretically guarantee full equality to minorities similar to the previous constitution, but it also extended such rights to territorial autonomy. This relates to the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Region (HAR) under Article 19 of the constitution. 21

This was influenced by the Soviet Union, which aimed to solve the ‘national question’ in Eastern Europe with the concept of ‘‘institutionalized multinationality’”.22 The idea behind it was that “territories within states should be demarcated according to nationality, inhabitants should be counted and categorized by ethnicity and schools on ethnonational bases were promoted”. 23 Furthermore, “the bottom line was to create so much ethnic heterogeneity that socialism would in the long run become the unifying, pacifying factor”.24The HAR was created in the heart of

Transylvania, around the Mures region, which was the area inhabited by the Szekely Hungarian population, and encompassed around one third of Romania’s ethnic Hungarian inhabitants at the time. This region became a distinct administrative unit for those living within it, with its own state council.

Yet in reality the HAR was no different from the other administrative regions within the country, and was still subordinate to the authority of the central government.25 For example, in the 1952

Constitution stated that "The laws of the People's Republic of Romania and the decisions and decrees of the central bodies of state are mandatory in the territory of the HAP”.26 Furthermore the HAR was not ethnically homogenous, and consisted of around 75 % Hungarians, 20 % Romanians, with Roma, Jews, and Germans making up the remainder. The fact that around 35 per cent of the ethnic Hungarian population of Romania lived outside the HAR also limited the impact of territorial autonomy as a way of granting minority rights to the Hungarians.27 According to Dow, the creation of the HAR was a tactical manoeuvre to appease the ethnic Hungarian minority, avoiding the task of providing political representation for them, and allowing the government to proclaim that the minority situation had been solved, which it did in an issue of the Communist Party daily newspaper ‘Truth’ in January 1953.28

21 Nicole V.T. Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question in Slovakia and Romania”, Review of Applied Socio- Economic Research vol. 2 (2011), 116.

22 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 11.

23 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 11.

24 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 11.

25 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 116.

26 Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity, 318.

27 Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity, 318.

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In addition to the limitations of the HAR, the period from the mid-1950s onwards involved the Romanian government engaging in an increasingly assimilationist policy with regards to the ethnic Hungarian minority.29 This involved restricting the availability of Hungarian language education,

including reducing the amount of independent Hungarian language schools in ethnically mixed regions. This formed part of a general trend within Romania concerning schools taught in the mother tongue of the different national minorities. For example, in 1954 the number of primary and

secondary schools which had lessons in minority languages within Romania was around 2500. The following year this had reduced to 2250.30 Such actions were clearly in violation of the constitutional guarantees protecting ethnic minorities, highlighting how despite the existence of theoretical legal safeguards, in practise they were not always followed.31 Chen argues that such assimilationist policies highlight that around this period, Gheorghiu-Dej began to act more like an integral nationalist in the same fashion of Stalin had been during his rule.32

I would argue that this gradual shift in policy towards assimilation intensified after 1956, partly as a result of the Hungarian revolution of the same year. The revolution reignited ethnic nationalism amongst the Hungarians in Transylvania, and the solidarity that they expressed with the uprising concerned the Communist regime in Romania, who then reacted with suppression.33 This led to the closure of many Hungarian cultural institutes such as theatres. Furthermore, student demonstrations erupted in various cities in Transylvania.34 As a consequence, the number of schools that taught exclusively in Hungarian were reduced. Whilst at the same time there was an increase in the number of mixed bilingual schools resulting from the merger of separate Hungarian and Romanian

establishments. This included the merger of the Hungarian Bolyai University with the Romanian Babes University in 1959. This was particularly symbolic, and highlights a different approach to minority rights compared to the late 1940s when the university was established for the Romania’s Hungarian population. Furthermore, the borders of the HAR were redrawn in 1960, with the

intention of diluting the Hungarian’s dominance in the region.35 The name of the autonomous region

29 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 116.

30 Dow, (2004) Representations of Hungarian Minority Identity, 327.

31 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 116.

32 Cheng Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy”, East European

Politics & Societies vol. 17, no. 2 (2003), 183.

33 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 25. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

34 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 11.

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was also changed in 1960 to the Mures-Autonomous Hungarian Region.36 This process was

exacerbated by the fact that “Transylvanian Hungarians were forced to relocate across the country to lessen the sphere of influence and solidarity of numbers in the coveted region. The logic was that if Hungarian minorities mobilized, they may petition (successfully) for separation and reclamation of lost territory”.37

Following Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in 1965, Ceausescu became First Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, thus becoming the new ruler of the country. In the same year a new Constitution was established, which like the previous ones also theoretically guaranteed minority rights. Article 17 for example “guaranteed equal rights for all inhabitants, irrespective of nationality, race, sex or religion”.38 In the early years of Ceausescu rule, his approach to national minorities was relatively liberal, and was “based on the idea of Romania as a fatherland for all ethnic groups within its borders”.39 This period of relaxation culminated in the establishment and expansion of a Hungarian language magazines and newspapers, the establishment of a

publishing house (Kriterion), as well as minority language broadcasting on TV. The Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality was also founded during this time.40 Yet this period of tolerance towards

Romania’s national minorities did not last.

The Romanian governments approach to dealing with the ethnic Hungarian minority began to change from the late 1960s. This included the abolishment of the HAR in 1968, as part of a broad territorial reorganisation of the country.41 This change in policy towards ethnic minorities can also be

attributed to the Romanian government beginning to pursue a more independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union. In addition, the emergence of Ceausescu’s policy of National Communism

beginning in the 1970s tried to combine elements of Marxist-Leninism with far-right Romanian

36 Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania”, 184.

37 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 112.

38 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 13.

39 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 12.

40 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 12. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

41 Nuray Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality and minority rights: compliance in Bulgaria and Romania”, The International

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nationalism based on the concept of ‘Daco-Roman continuity.42 As a consequence the Romanian Communist Party began to emphasise the desire for Romania to become an ethnically homogenous state. They aimed to achieve this by a process of assimilating the minority groups in order to eradicate ethnic differences, and thus promote national unity.43 Furthermore, in asserting that “a

nation had been created by centuries of “living together,” Ceausescu refused to recognize the ethnic Hungarians and other minorities as belonging to other nations, claiming that they were all part of the Romanian nation”.44

As a consequence of this, the Romanian state under Ceausescu began a long term process of repression, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Concerning linguistic rights, nearly all television and radio broadcasts in the Hungarian language were cancelled by the mid- 1980s.45 This also extended to reducing the production of newspapers written in the Hungarian language.46 In addition,

the suppression of the Hungarian language in public places was intensified.47 Furthermore, a

prohibition of both geographical and Christian names in the Hungarian language, as well as other minority languages, was introduced.48 In the 1980s this process of forced assimilation also involved

population transfers within the country in order to dilute the ethnic makeup of the Hungarian regions.49This involved forcing Hungarians to work in factories outside the regions of Transylvania where they had traditionally inhabited. They were also prevented from working in the cities within Transylvania, thus compelling them to find work in other areas of Romania. In conjunction with this, ethnic Romanians were forced to move into those regions to work. This was achieved as part of a more general process of urbanisation and rapid industrialisation throughout the country.50 Part of this industrialisation included the demolition of villages containing the Hungarian minority.51

42 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 13.

43 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 38. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

44 Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania”, 192.

45 Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania”, 192.

46 Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality”, 354.

47 Culic, “Dilemmas of belonging”, 179-80.

48 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 12-3. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

49 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 14.

50 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 14.

51 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 12-3. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

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With regards to education specifically, numerous policies were enacted that clearly intended to assimilate the minority groups and make it more difficult for Hungarian children to learn in their mother-tongue. 52 An example of this involved the Education Act 1968, which established that “a

minimum quota had to be met in order for minority language schools to start their classes. With the dwindling minority population, the quotas were never met. In some instances, even when the quotas were met, Hungarian language classes were cancelled with no reasons given”.53 This was exacerbated

by the fact that, the minimum quota in order to allow instruction in minority languages was regularly raised.54 In addition, an oral directive made by the Ministry of Education in 1985 ordered that ethnic

Hungarian teachers and headmasters would be substituted by Romanians. This was a way of sabotaging the education system taught in the Hungarian language, and was part of the wider process of assimilation and homogenisation of education in Romania.55

In summary, ethnic Hungarians, as well as other minority groups within Romania, suffered greatly during the Communist period. This is despite the existence of formal minority rights in the constitutions that existed at the time, as well as brief phases of relatively liberal policies towards minorities. This period largely involved severe suppression and assimilation, particularly in the later periods of Ceausescu’s rule. With the downfall of the Communist regime in 1989 and Romania’s transition into a modern liberal nation-state, the question of minority rights re-emerged as a

significant issue for the new governments to deal with, but within a new framework of parliamentary democracy. When analysing the situation for the Hungarian minority in Romania after the fall of the Communist regime, it is important to take into account that at the start of the 1990s, Romania was considered one of the countries that faced the most difficult problems in terms of ethnic minorities. Yet, within a decade Romania was able to overcome obstacles that could have led to significant political instability.56 I will therefore focus on this period of time in the following chapters.

However before doing so it is important to address the difficult transition that Romania faced after the collapse of the Communist regime. In contrast to Central European states such as Hungary and Poland, the end of Ceausescu’s dictatorship was brought about with violence. However not only did

52 Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality”, 354.

53 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 26-7. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

54 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 14.

55 Eldering, (2008) Individually free yet collectively limited, 15.

56 Adrian Liviu Ivan, Claudia Anamaria Iov, “Minority Issues at the End of the 20th Century and the Beginning of the 21th Century. Case Study: The Hungarian Minority from Romania”, Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences vol. 92 (2013), 427.

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conflict arise between the state and the Romanian citizens, but also between ethnic Romanians and minority groups. The most prominent example of this took place in the multi-ethnic city of Târgu Mures in March 1990. This conflict came about partly as a consequence of ethnic Hungarians demanding the reestablishment of Hungarian language schools, as well as a commemoration of the 1848 Hungarian revolution.57 However, despite this incident, the transition to democracy in Romania resulted very few ethnic conflicts between Hungarians and Romanians specifically.58

Romania’s transition period into a democracy resulted in the establishment of a new Constitution in 1991. When taking into account this constitution we can see that in many ways it provides basic rights for minorities within the Romanian state. Lugosi highlights that the constitutions of states offer a useful insight into the values of a country, values which form the basis of its political policies. Yet, he also emphasises that such rights laid down in constitutions do not necessarily reflect government practise.59 This can be seen when taking into account the ways in which the government under the

Communist regime embarked on brutal policies against ethnic minorities, despite minority

protections being enshrined in the constitution that existed at the time. Yet this should be less of an issue within democratic societies whereby there are greater checks and balances to state power, and where the government is more accountable.

However, when addressing the extent to which minority rights are provided under the Constitution, it is important to highlight the differing liberal theories and approaches to minority rights, as this impacts our assessment of the effectiveness of the minority rights protection. The Romanian

Constitution arguably follows the Classical liberal approach, emphasising individual rights over group rights. This approach stresses “that attaching claimable rights to national identity privileges it over other identities. It is also impossible to allocate such rights consistently and coherently under the premise of liberalism”.60 This contrasts with the Liberal pluralist theory, which argues that “individual

57 Cathy O’Grady, (et al), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Hungarians of Romania”, Center for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001), 20. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Romania.html 26/06/2016

58 Iov, “Minority Issues at the End of the 20th Century and the Beginning of the 21th Century.”, 427.

59 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question in Slovakia and Romania”, 112.

60 Stephen Deets, & Sherrill Stroschein, “Dilemmas of autonomy and liberal pluralism: examples involving Hungarians in Central Europe”,

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rights are insufficient to protect minorities because they cede too much power to the majority community. In their view, some form of collective autonomy is necessary for minority cultures”.61

Taking into account the Articles it would appear that in theory at least, the Romanian Constitution provides for adequate protections for ethnic minorities within the Romanian state. For example, the Constitution also guarantees certain specific political rights for ethnic minorities. Article 62(2) states that “Organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of the electoral law. Citizens of a national minority are entitled to be represented by one organization only”.62 This provides a basic level of political participation for ethnic minorities in parliament. In later chapters I will address how this was particularly significant for the advancement of Hungarian minority rights, by analysing the contribution made by the political representatives of the Hungarian minority.

The Constitution also guarantees basic linguistic and cultural rights. Article 6(I) for example declares that the “State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity”.63 Furthermore, with regards to education rights specifically, although Article 32 emphasises that education should be taught in Romanian, ethnic minorities are guaranteed the right to be educated in their mother tongue, with the exercise of this right being regulated in law.64 Therefore, overall, the Constitution in theory guarantees linguistic and cultural rights for minorities within Romania.

Yet, it is important to take into account Article 13 of the Constitution, which grants Romanian the status of Romania’s single official language, thus emphasizing its primacy over other ethnic minority languages such as Hungarian.65 On a symbolic level we could argue that Article 13 highlights that

ethnic Romanians are first among equals within the nation-state.66 Therefore, according to Chiva the

61 Stroschein, “Dilemmas of autonomy and liberal pluralism”, 286.

62 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

63 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

64 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

65 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 117.

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“1991 Romanian Constitution affirmed that the official language of the country is Romanian, thereby curtailing the capacity of minority groups to use their own language in the administrative and judiciary systems”.67 As a consequence, despite other articles within the Constitution providing vague

notions of minority protection, we can see that there were limits to this. Therefore, at least according to Chiva, this Article theoretically restricted the ability of national minorities to use their mother tongue in certain governmental and administrative organisations.68

From a classical liberal perspective such rights could be seen as perfectly adequate protection. Yet within a liberal pluralist framework, the Romanian constitution’s protection for minorities is limited. The fact that Article 1 (1) of the Constitution stresses Romania to be a “unitary and indivisible National State”69 could be interpreted as emphasising that any form of territorial autonomy for the

Hungarian minority, or more specifically the Szekely minority within Transylvania, is out of the question. In addition, Article 2 states that “national sovereignty shall reside within the Romanian people”70. Furthermore, Article 4 proclaims that “The State foundation is laid on the unity of the

Romanian people and the solidarity of its citizens”.71This highlights a major difference between the

Romanian government, and the Hungarian minority whom favoured a collective rights approach to minority rights. These articles explain why the Hungarians actually voted against this version of the Constitution at the time.72 In the following chapter I will address this conflict further.

Despite this, I would argue that overall Romania’s 1991 Constitution provided adequate protection for ethnic minorities within Romania depending on the approach to minority protection one favours. As I have shown by taking into account Romania’s previous experience under Communist rule, regardless of what is provided in the Constitution, the action of governments in practise are arguably more significant in determining how minorities are treated. The importance of this issue is enhanced by the fact that that in many ways the language used in the Constitution is ambiguous and open to interpretation. As a consequence, this provides the potential for misuse by the state, leading to

67 Cristina Chiva, “Ethnic Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of the Hungarian ‘Status Law’”, Government and

Opposition vol. 41, no. 3 (2006), 409.

68 Chiva, “Ethnic Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe”, 409.

69 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

70 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

71 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

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discrimination.73 However Article 20 (2) states that “Where any inconsistencies exist between the

covenants and treaties on the fundamental human rights Romania is a party to, and the national laws, the international regulations shall take precedence, unless the Constitution or national laws comprise more favourable provisions”.74As I will discuss in the following chapters, the advantage of a

liberal democracy concerning minority rights is the existence of parallel international legal structures that provide further protection. This is enhanced by competing political forces within states which advocate for the rights of minority groups.

Chapter 2

To what extent have the policies and advocacy of the ethnic Hungarian party contributed to the protection of the Hungarian minority within Romania?

Within this chapter of my thesis I will discuss the extent to which the policies and advocacy of the main ethnic Hungarian party in Romania contributed to the legal protection of the Hungarian minority. In particular I will address the development of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 73 Lugosi, “The Hungarian minority question”, 116.

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Romania (DAHR) from the early 1990s to the present day. In doing so I will take into account its electoral achievements, the challenges it has had to face, as well as its effectiveness in pressuring the Romanian government into introducing favourable minority legislation, in a broad range of areas, but in particular language rights. However, before addressing this issue I will briefly outline the

institutional framework of the Romanian political system that was created after the fall of Ceausescu’ regime, as well as the main political actors that are relevant to the situation concerning Hungarian minority rights in Romania.

Before discussing the party political system in detail I will first outline the broad structure of Romania’s political system. Romania’s new democracy was created as a Republic, with the political framework enshrined in its Constitution. In addition, Romania is as a semi-presidential system with both a Prime Minister, and President, similar to many other modern European states such as France and Germany. The role of the Prime Minister is the head of government, whereas the President’s role is to be the head of state. The structure of the government also has a typical separation of powers within an executive, legislature, and judiciary. The President is chosen by elections roughly every five years, and can serve no more than two terms. As the head of state the President also appoints the Prime Minister. The parliament is based on a multi-party system, the members of which are elected by popular vote every four years. It is important to emphasise the nature of this multi-party system, as it is integral to the understanding of how the Romanian political structure impacts minority rights within Romania, and how the Hungarian minority specifically is represented politically.

In term of Romania’s multi-party system it is important to highlight that the members of parliament are chosen using the proportional representation system. As a consequence, many political parties are represented in the parliament. Currently there are five main parliamentary parties representing a variety of ideologies. In practical terms this electoral system means that governments are often made up of coalitions between different political parties, as it is very difficult for one party to achieve enough electoral success for it to gain power on its own. As we shall see this means that parties with often widely different ideological positions have to work together, which has a significant impact of government policy. In addition, the proportional system allows for smaller and more newly

established political parties to gain greater representation much more easily than in other electoral systems such as that UK’s ‘first past the post’ system. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, representatives of the ethnic minorities are guaranteed one representative in parliament each regardless of their political organisations success. This electoral system is arguably the most generous

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in Europe in terms of allowing minority groups within the nation-state to have political representation, however small the minority.75 I would argue that the existence of this political

structure within Romania contributed to the success of those political organisations that sought to represent the interests of the Hungarian minority.

I will now identify the main political actors within Romania since the revolution of 1989, paying particular attention to those organisations that impacted upon the Hungarian minority. One of the most important political parties that came out of the 1989 revolution was the National Salvation Front (FSN), which in 1992 developed into one of the largest parties in contemporary Romania, the Social Democratic Party (PSD). This political organisation traces its origins from within the Communist regime, with its members being made up of rebels within the Romanian Communist Party who were critical of Ceausescu’s rule. This political organisation took control of Romania after the overthrow of Ceausescu, forming an interim government until elections were called a few months later. One of the members was Ion Iliescu who would go on to become Romania’s first President after winning the 1990 election. Within this chapter I will pay particular attention to the policies of the FSN with regards to Hungarian minority rights in the early years of Romania’s transition to democracy.

In contemporary Romania, the second largest political party besides the centre-left Social Democratic Party (PSD) is the centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL). The PNL is actually one of the oldest political parties in Romania, having been formed in 1875, however it was dissolved after the Second World War in 1947, and did not remerge until 1990 after the collapse of Communism. Both of the large parties could be classed as relatively moderate in terms of political ideology, without any overt political philosophy underpinning their policies. In addition, both could be categorised as generally quite internationalist and pro-European in outlook, with support for free-market liberal economics to varying extents. Despite this, as we will see, even these mainstream parties were capable of using nationalism as a tool for political purposes where necessary. Although these organisations are significant in understanding the political environment in Romania and its impact on the issue of Hungarian minority rights, I would argue that other political parties should been given greater attention when understanding this issue.

75 Oleh Protsyk, “Representation of minorities in the Romanian parliament”, United Nations Development Programme (2010) http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/chiapas10/romania.pdf 26/06/2016

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A significant player that we must take into account in understanding Hungarian minority rights in Romania since the fall of the Communist regime is the Greater Romania Party (PRM), which is the main nationalist party in Romania. In terms of party politics, the PRM represented the greatest impediment to the progress of ethnic minority protection in Romania, and to some extent still does. The PRM was formed in May 1991 not long after the 1989 revolution, by Corneliu Vadim Tudor and Eugen Barbu, who came from within the old Communist regime. Although its ideology was initially based around the idea of ‘national communism’ with similarities to the ideas put forward under Ceausescu’s rule, after 1996 it developed into a standard far-right nationalist party. It is therefore important to address the PRM’s nationalism in understanding their importance.

Characteristic of the PRM’s nationalistic ideology is its glorification of the military dictatorship of Ion Antonescu, as well as the regime of Ceausescu. With regards to the latter, it is Ceausescu’s

nationalism and authoritarianism, rather than the communist elements of his legacy that have remained attractive for the PRM. It is also important to note that the PRM’s nationalism is of the ethnic variant, rather than the civic variety, which incorporates the ‘Greater Romania’ idea of uniting all ethnic Romanians within the same nation-state. Furthermore, the party strongly defends

Romania’s territorial integrity. As a consequence the ethnic Hungarian community is a regular target of the PRM.

Apart from the PRM’s clear anti-Hungarianism, the Hungarian community is a target for the PRM due to clear ideological differences between the PRM’s strong belief in the territorial unity, and the ethnic Hungarian’s desire for greater territorial and cultural autonomy.76 As a result, they have frequently called for the banning of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania.77 Furthermore, the ethnic

Hungarian community is regularly accused by the PRM of “plotting the secession of Transylvania with the cooperation (or at least connivance) of the Romanian authorities”.78 PRM was part of a political

alliance that formed the Romanian government between 1992 and 1996. This coalition also included the nationalistic Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR). Within this chapter I will explain how these

76 Radu Cinpoes, “The Extreme Right in Contemporary Romania”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012), 5. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09408.pdf 26/06/2016

77 Radu Cinpoes, “The Extreme Right in Contemporary Romania”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012), 5. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09408.pdf 26/06/2016

78 Radu Cinpoes, “The Extreme Right in Contemporary Romania”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012), 5. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09408.pdf 26/06/2016

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nationalist parties contributed to the slow progress made in terms of minority rights within Romania during this period.

The main political organisation that represents the Hungarian minority in Romania is the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). It was established after the fall of the Communist regime, during the Romanian revolution of 1989, and since then has represented ethnic Hungarians in the Romanian parliament. This representation is guaranteed in Article 62 (2) of the Romanian

Constitution whereby it states that: “Organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of the electoral law. Citizens of a national minority are entitled to be

represented by one organization only”79. Although it is technically and legally not a political party, in

reality it acts as one, taking part in elections.80 Unlike the other mainstream political parties in

Romania, however, it does not hold a specific political ideology, but incorporates a wide variety of beliefs, from conservative to liberal, as well as moderate to radical.81 Soon after it was founded it

developed into a large umbrella organisation containing within it various Hungarians parties and political organisations. These included the Party of Hungarian Smallholders, the Hungarian

Association for Natural Sciences, and the Christian Democratic Party of the Hungarians in Romania.82

Instead of having an explicit political ideology in the traditional sense of left-right politics, the DAHR seeks to represent the interests of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania specifically. Despite attempts to broaden its appeal over time by addressing issue other than minority politics, it has not gained support from ethnic Romanians. As a result, its focus remains firmly ethnically based.83

Therefore the DAHR has received the vast majority of its support from ethnic Hungarians, who have supported the party in the parliamentary elections since its founding. According to Kiss and Székely, the proportion of DAHR voter support amongst ethnic Hungarians has always been 80 % or above.84 Clearly this is a significant figure, which illustrates the importance of the DAHR to the Hungarian minority.

79 Constitution of Romania (1991) Legislationline http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 25/03/2016

80 Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (2015) http://www.dahr.ro/page/about-us 09/04/2016

81 Edwards, “Hungarian National Minorities”, 356.

82 Edwards, “Hungarian National Minorities”, 356.

83 Edwards, “Hungarian National Minorities”, 356.

84 Tamás Kiss & István Gergő Székely, “Shifting linkages in ethnic mobilization: the case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania”,

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When taking a deeper analysis of the data regarding the political party preferences of the ethnic Hungarians within Romania we can see some interesting trends. According to Kiss and Székely’s findings, in 1992 the DAHR gained 93.8 % of the ethnic Hungarian minority vote, the remaining votes were for non-ethnic based Romanian parties. In this particular year the other smaller ethnic

Hungarian groups actually received no votes from the ethnic Hungarian minority. In the 1996 election the share of votes for the non-ethnic based Romanian parties peaked at 13.4 %, yet the DAHR still made up 84.7 % of this. Furthermore, in 2012 the DAHR received 82.7 % of the share. From 1992 to 2012 the general trend has been that the DAHR has consistently received above 80 % of the vote. The share of votes from the other smaller ethnic Hungarian based parties has always remained low, however since 2000 it has slowly began to receive a larger percentage, representing 10.4 % in 2012.85 Overall however, it appears that the DAHR has dominated in terms of electoral

support amongst the ethnic Hungarians. It is difficult to pin point the reasons behind their success, however explanations ranging from long term party identification due to the DAHR’s dominance (at least until 2008), the party’s successful track record, as well as tactical voting, are persuasive.86

As mentioned previously, the DAHR does not have a solid political ideology in the usual sense, yet within its focus on the ethnic Hungarian minority within Romania it does maintain broadly consistent policies and goals. As I will discuss later in the chapter, such policies have often changed over time, yet largely for strategic reasons rather than as a matter of principle. In representing the ethnic Hungarian minority the DAHR advocates for the protection of minority rights for the ethnic

Hungarians, and also strives for both cultural and territorial autonomy.87 Furthermore, the party also

has a preference for collective rights for the Hungarian minority, as they feel this is the best way for protecting the community. This clashes with the other main party’s within Romania who favour the maintenance of classical individual rights. In addition, their policy of territorial autonomy comes into conflict with Article 1 (1) of the Romanian Constitution, which emphasizes that Romania is a unitary state.88

85 Analyzing Europe (2013) http://analyzingeurope.com/szekely-autonomy/ 05/06/2016

86 Analyzing Europe (2013) http://analyzingeurope.com/szekely-autonomy/ 05/06/2016

87 Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (2015) http://www.dahr.ro/page/about-us 09/04/2016

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Within Romania there are also smaller parties that seek to represent the interests of the ethnic Hungarian minority. These include the Hungarian Civic Party, which was formed in 2001 as the Hungarian Civic Union, but formally became a political party as recently as March 2008. This party seeks to position itself as an alternative to the DAHR, taking a more radical position, with a focus on the territorial autonomy of the Székely land. As a result of this regional focus the Hungarian Civic Party arguably does not represent significant competition for the DAHR in terms of national electoral politics. In addition there is the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania, which was formed in 2011, and which like the Hungarian Civic Party seeks autonomy for the Székely land, as well as the region of Partium, in Western Transylvania. Overall, despite the fact that these minor parties have managed to increase their support amongst the ethnic Hungarian minority by a modest amount, their support on a national level is still much lower than the DAHR, which remains the dominant force.89Therefore,

within this chapter I will largely focus on the DAHR, as this is the main party that represents the interests of the ethnic Hungarian minority on a national level, and also has a greater degree of political influence than the smaller parties, in part due to it regularly being in the government.

Before analysing the success of the DAHR however, it is important to take into account the situation that existed in Romania after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989, as this will be useful in providing context in which DAHR, as well as the nationalist Romanian parties emerged. I agree to a certain extent with Decker’s statement that “Since the end of the Ceausescu regime, the Romanian state has continued to struggle with the issue of nationalism and its multi-ethnic population. Concerning the issue of majority-minority relations, the last 15 years can be characterized as ‘two steps forward, one step back’.”90 However, as I will argue in this chapter, despite this inconsistent

level of progress, there have been improvements for the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania over the past 15 years, especially when making a comparison between the early 1990s and the present day. The first few years of democratic transition since the fall of Ceausescu’s regime were particularly unfavourable to ethnic minorities within Romania. This can partly be attributed to the rise of

nationalism that took place, which filled the vacuum left by the collapse of communism. This was the case not only in Romania, but throughout Eastern Europe.

Despite the development of a liberal democratic political system after the 1989 revolution, Romania inherited a political culture that was deeply authoritarian. This arguably had a significant impact on

89 Analyzing Europe (2013) http://analyzingeurope.com/szekely-autonomy/ 05/06/2016

90 Christopher Decker, “The Use of Cultural Autonomy to Prevent Conflict and Meet the Copenhagen Criteria: The Case of Romania”, in David J. Smith and Karl Cordell (eds), Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Europe (Abingdon 2008), 102.

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the development of Romanian politics after the collapse of the communist regime. Although this was not entirely unique to Romania, the fact that Ceausescu’s regime was much harsher than the

communist states in Central Europe such as Hungary, meant that the transition to a pluralistic democratic state was much more difficult. In particular under Romania’s communist regime, no parallel civil society or political movement was able to develop outside the hegemonic governmental structures. As a result, once communism collapsed there was no political organisation able to take power that was not connected to the communist regime. As a consequence of this, authoritarian tendencies within government and society persisted after the 1989 revolution.91 Furthermore, not only did Romania find it difficult to shed this political tradition of authoritarian and totalitarian rule, the explicit nationalism that Ceausescu embraced as part of his rule also re-emerged after 1989.92 Therefore the notion of formal rights that existed in practise, not simply on paper, was something alien to the structures of Romanian power. It is fair to say that the transition to power, and the difficult situation Romania found itself in since the revolution, meant that minority rights were of a lower priority.

These first few years after the collapse of the communist regime are illustrative of Romania’s struggle with developing a liberal pluralistic political environment. It is important to note that the FSN used nationalism to secure its position of power, and in fact helped pave the way to the founding of the nationalist PRM. This is despite the fact that the FSN was not in itself particularly nationalistic from an ideological perspective, instead representing a more moderate catch-all ideology. As we have already mentioned, the legacy of authoritarian rule, and the lack of experience with democratic instructions contributed to this. Furthermore, according to Cinpoes, this had to a significant extent to do with the political elite retaining their positions of power by resisting foreign influences such as western capital and political norms.93 The ethnic nationalistic and authoritarian traditions of Romania after 1989 would therefore clearly have an impact on relations between the majority and minority groups, as well as minority rights specifically.

In analysing ethnic minority rights in Romania after the collapse of the communist regime, I will first take into account the period between 1991 and 1996. This period after the revolution represents 91 Radu Cinpoeş, Nationalism and identity in Romania : a history of extreme politics from the birth of the state to EU accession (London, 2010), 68.

92 Cinpoeş, Nationalism and identity in Romania, 68.

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Romania’s difficult emergence into democracy up until the 1996 election whereby the DAHR became part of the government. It also embodies a period whereby Romanian politics was dominated by nationalist parties, whom emerged out of the 1992 national election, forming a coalition

government. Included within this governing coalition were nationalist PRM, the PSD, the Socialist Labour Party (PSM), as well as the other nationalist party, the PUNR. The existence of these nationalist parties within the government attributed to the introduction of legislation that was unfavourable to Romania’s ethnic Hungarian minority.

During this period, numerous pieces of legislation were introduced in violation of certain

international agreements regarding minority rights that the government had committed itself to.94

Such laws generally focused on limiting Hungarian language and culture, however political demands made by the Hungarians for greater cultural autonomy were also ignored. With regards to language, such legislation include the Law on Local Public Administration, which restricted to use of minority languages in public offices, such as courts. In addition, the 1991 Law on Education was put into force, which greatly reduced the opportunities for ethnic Hungarians to be taught in their own language.95

With regards to Hungarian culture, the Law on the Hoisting of the Flag of Romania was introduced which restricted the use of other national flags and anthems, making violation of the conditions a criminal offence. Such legislation constrained the ability of the ethnic Hungarian minority to

celebrate their national holiday.96 These laws were introduced without much difficultly, in part due to

the lack of political power available to the DAHR at this stage. Yet this began to change after the 1996 elections, which significantly changed the political landscape in Romania.

The status of Hungarian minority rights and ethnic Hungarian political representation in the early 1990s contrasts with the situation in towards the end of the decade to a large extent because of the 1996 parliamentary election results. The outcome was significant due to the success of the DAHR, who received 6.64 % of the vote, allowing them for the first time to form part of coalition

government with a number of centre-left and centre-right parties.97 Therefore the DAHR was able to

provide political representation for Hungarians in government above and beyond what they had

94 Decker, “The Use of Cultural Autonomy to Prevent Conflict and Meet the Copenhagen Criteria”, 104.

95 Chiva, “Ethnic Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe”, 409-10.

96 Decker, “The Use of Cultural Autonomy to Prevent Conflict and Meet the Copenhagen Criteria”, 104.

97 Electoral Geography https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/r/romania/romania-legislative-election-1996.html

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previously been able to with single guaranteed parliamentary seat.98 As a result of the DAHR’s

presence in this new coalition government, as well as the absence of far right nationalist parties, policies favouring the Hungarian minority began to be introduced.99 This included the establishment

of the Department for the Protection of National Minorities by government decree in 1997, which was headed by a member of the DAHR.100 Such political and institutional representation was vital to

the protection of the rights of Hungarians living within Romania.

As a consequence of DAHR being part of the governing coalition, legislation was enacted that was beneficial to the Hungarian minority. The main achievements appear to have been within the area of language rights. One important example of this relates to a 1996 agreement which allowed

Hungarian to be provided as a language of instruction at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. 101

This overturned the previous Law on Education which placed restrictions on teaching in minority languages.102 Furthermore, in 1997 amendments were made to a 1991 law which stated that the only language that could be used in public administration was Romanian. The legislation was updated to include Hungarian, amongst other minority languages. As a result, the Hungarian language could be used in public administration where at least 20 % of the population of that area are Hungarian.103

This also extended to providing information in public buildings, such as government offices in Hungarian.104 Lastly, due to pressure from the DAHR in 1999 a further law was introduced that made

it obligatory for administrative areas which contained an ethnic minority group that represented over 20 % of its inhabitants, to employ individuals who could speak that particular minority language. In addition, within the same year, a law was introduced which guaranteed Hungarian language education from primary school all the way up to university level.105 As we can see, there was

significant progress made within a short space of time concerning Hungarian language rights. The reversal and adaption of certain legislation that restricted the use of the Hungarian language prior to the DAHR attaining government office suggests the important contribution made by the party in this area.

98 Melanie H. Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, in Bernd Rechel (ed), Minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe (Abingdon 2009), 188.

99 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 182.

100 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 182.

101 Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality”, 355.

102 Andrei Marga, “Experiencing Multicultural Organization: The Case of Babes-Bolyai University”, Higher Education in Europe vol. 23, no. 1 (1998), 79.

103 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 183.

104 Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality”, 355.

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Despite the fact that the DAHR did not retain its place in the Romanian government after the 2000 general election, it was still able retain its influence. It managed this by signing a series of annual cooperation agreements with the newly formed government which guaranteed that they would implement particular legislation regarding minority rights in exchange for the DAHR’s support in parliament.106 Furthermore, despite not being of the ruling government, members of the DAHR became representatives of important institutions such as the National Council Against Discrimination establish in 2002, which was an institution set up to manage the implementation of

anti-discrimination legislation concerning ethnic minorities.107 Therefore the DAHR’s presence became

more established within official governmental institutions. In addition to this, throughout the early 2000s the DAHR continued to lobby the Romanian government concerning issue related to

Hungarian minority rights. A notable achievement during this period involves the government making an amendment to the Romanian Constitution which included reference to language rights for the Hungarian minority. This amendment made in 2003 was of symbolic importance, as by codifying language rights within the constitution it gave the existing legislation regarding such rights

constitutional status.108 All this highlights that even when not in government the DAHR was an

important fixture in Romanian politics, and was able to lobby for minority rights.

Following the 2004 election the DAHR became part of the government coalition again, enabling them to hold four ministerial posts by this time, as well as gaining the post of deputy prime minister. Members of DAHR were also represented in the Senate and Chamber of deputies.109 Such success

has continued, highlighted by the 2008 general election, in which the DAHR gained 6.17% of the vote and 22 deputies.110 Yet the DAHR actually did not initially maintain its position within government,

but became part of the governing coalition one year later due to the collapse of the existing coalition. Regardless, when we look at the overall electoral success of the DAHR we can see that since 1996 the party has been almost always been part of a governing coalition, the exceptions being between 2000 and 2004, as well as brief periods between 2008-2009 and 2012-2014.111 Therefore we can see that since the mid-1990s the DAHR has become a significant force in Romanian politics, and is reflected in their electoral success representing the interests of the Hungarian minority.112

106 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 182.

107 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 182.

108 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 183.

109 Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?”, 182.

110 Ibryamova, “European Union political conditionality”, 362.

111 Istvan Gergo Szekely, (2014) Dynamics of Party Politics, Electoral Competition and Cooperation within the Hungarian Minorities of

Romania, Serbia and Slovakia, PhD Thesis, Central European University, 109.

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