Is the internet a liberation technology? : the role of internet in authoritarian Iran

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Is the Internet a liberation technology?

The role of Internet in authoritarian Iran

Author: Kees van der Zee Student number: 10182004

Subject: International Organizations in a Networked World Supervisors: Katja Biedenkopf, Julien Jeandesboz

Second reader: Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Date: 27-06-2014

Words: 8654

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Is the Internet a liberation technology?

The role of Internet in authoritarian Iran

Key concepts: Internet, liberation technology, state (in the Middle East), opposition groups

Abstract

Introduction

The Internet is said to have played a very important role in world politics in the last decade. It has especially played an influential role in the Middle East in the last five years. Uprisings such as the Green Movement in Iran in 2009 and the uprisings in many Middle Eastern countries in 2011, better known as the Arab Spring, were stimulated significantly by Internet technology. This has led to optimism about the Internet as a liberation technology (Castells, 2007; Howard and Hussain, 2011; Diamond, 2010; Lim, 2011; Kilroy, 2012; Poell and Darmoni, 2012). The regimes in Egypt and Tunisia did not seem to know how to undermine the communication systems of protest groups via Facebook and Twitter. States seemed to be unable to control the Internet, and unable to fight protesters and their communication system effectively (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 37). This argumentation has led some to the assumption that higher usage of Internet will lead to more freedom and democratization (Kilroy, 2012: 16).

Despite this optimism another group of scholars point to the fact that states can effectively gain control over the Internet (Baum, 2010; Erikson et. al, 2009; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; Golkar, 2011). This created a theoretical debate on the role of Internet in authoritarian societies. There are systems and surveillance technologies that can restrict online freedom. An example of a state that controls the Internet at the national level is China. The government has built a ‘Great Firewall’,

Can the Internet be seen as a liberation technology? This paper discusses the theoretical debate on the role of Internet in states in the Middle East and whether it provides its populations with more freedom. The debate can be divided in two positions: society-centered- and state-centered scholars. Society-centered scholars emphasize the liberating potential of Internet communication and news provision. State-centered scholars point to the capability of states to control the Internet. By analyzing the role that Internet played in Iran, this paper argues that states can effectively get the Internet under their control. This means that protest groups can face difficulties using the Internet to criticize the regime. States slowly gain more control over the Internet in the region, making future revolutions organized via social media unlikely.

2 thereby effectively nationalizing the Chinese corner of the Internet. This makes it very difficult for Chinese citizens to visit websites the government does not want them to see (Reporters Without Borders, 2013: 19-20). Little scholarly attention has however been paid to whether these technologies have spread to the Middle East during these last years. If the regimes in the Middle East want to survive possible future uprisings, they need to establish surveillance and censuring networks on the Internet within their borders. This need directs to a general debate on the impact of borders on Internet technology. A group of scholars called ‘Society-centered scholars’ make statements that describes the ‘decline of national borders’, because of the innovations brought by Internet. These statements were in later years debunked by more state-centered scholars, who emphasized the importance of states and government policies (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; Erikson et. al, 2009; Hintz, 2012; Golkar, 2011; Baum, 2010).

This paper will delve into the case of Iran, where the Green Movement in 2009 fused large protests throughout the country. Iran is a large state with significant influence in the region. Opposition groups have not succeeded in overthrowing the regime, while it has the most Internet users of the region (Golkar, 2009: 53). In other countries with lower Internet usage, like Tunisia and Egypt, revolutions have however succeeded (temporarily). Arguably one can consider Iran a likely state for a revolution to take place, when high use of Internet implies more freedom of expression and information. A case study investigating why a most likely case actually does not result in the most likely outcome is therefore very interesting for both the case of Iran itself and for the general debate on Internet freedom. This paper will consider several arguments for, and objections against both theoretical perspectives. There are especially some issues with the society-centered view on the Interet technology. Therefore this paper will mainly side with the more state-centered explanation of the role of Internet in the region.

The main question of this paper will be: is the Internet a liberation technology? First the state-society relationship in the region will be explained. Then the theoretical debate between society- and state-centered scholars will be discussed. Subsequently a historical overview of the position of Internet in Iran will be provided, followed by the two theoretical explanations of these events. Based on the findings in the case study, generalizations in the region will be made. Based on the cases of Iran and the region the question whether Internet liberates people will be answered.

Theoretical framework

If the central question is defined in a more analytical way, one wonders whether the state is in control of the Internet, or if groups opposed to the regime can operate independently from the state. It is therefore useful to look at the role of the state in the Middle East, how it is organized and how

3 power is structured in the domestic realm. Then the position of opposition groups in these states will be analyzed. Do these groups possess many rights and resources? Are they suppressed actively by the state? After that, the role that Internet can play will be discussed. Subsequently, the theoretical debate on the role of Internet in the struggle between state-centered and society-centered scholars will be examined in more detail.

Regimes in the Middle East

After World War II the state has become the increasingly dominant form of governance in the Middle East. This does not say that the state is very powerful in the region, but it is the most recognized system from which power is exercised (Tripp, 2001: 227). This is still the case after the uprisings of 2009 and 2011. In both cases, opposition groups wanted to control the state, not destroy it.

Most of the regimes in control of Middle Eastern states are from recent origin, established during the decolonization of the region in the 1950s and 1960s. All of these regimes except Israel and Turkey (and arguably Tunisia now) are highly authoritarian and undemocratic. These states have problems stabilizing their legitimate position (Halliday, 2005: 51). Legitimacy and stability is a big concern to many leaders, they put a lot of effort in constructing a powerful and legitimate position. Regimes try to monopolize domestic power by gaining control over national security forces. They also try to establish a state-led economy, claiming most economic resources of their country for their regime. The division of power is put into practice through a neo-patrimonial structure. Relatives and loyal people are more likely to gain a more powerful position in the political hierarchy (Tripp, 2001: 220-1). Because regimes have power over most of the economy of their state, they are not dependent on taxes and therefore not dependent on the people (Tripp, 2001: 224-5).

Beside using material power sources, regimes also try to solidify their legitimacy through ideology. Every state in the region tries to derive some legitimacy from an ideological title or goal pursued by its leaders. The most important ideologies are nationalism, Pan-Arabism and faith-based ideas. Regimes use historical events, religious titles, literature and national habits as sources to enforce their ideological argument (Halliday, 2005: 31). An example of a title that legitimizes a leader to be in power could be that he is a descendant of prophet Mohammed. This title gives him legitimacy, but leaves him free in what policies he wants to pursue (Halliday, 2005: 48). So in sum, regimes use a combination of material and idealist sources to enforce their position.

This does not mean that the regimes have firm control over their societies. In many states in the region a centralist government is not very developed. Regimes are very young and lack traditional sources of status to rule. Therefore they are pressured to improve the position of the state, for otherwise the critics will increase and uprisings become more likely (Halliday, 2005: 47). On the other hand, regimes are influenced by international forces. Western countries and international

4 organizations like the UN could impose sanctions on regimes or even intervene with a military mission in an extreme circumstance (Halliday, 2005: 72). For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 it clearly did not take the international community in consideration, with a military intervention as a consequence (BBC News, 2000).

Opposition groups

Opposition groups are mostly falling outside of the political structure of the autocratic state in the region. Because regimes pull all power towards themselves, the opposition groups have very few tools to operate with. Traditional media are censured and under state control, they are used to support government policies (Cottle, 2011: 650). Most of the economy is in the hands of the state or foreign companies. Opposition groups thus lack traditional communication, information and financial resources that can be converted to political influence (Tripp, 2001: 228). Political and human rights are not present in most countries. This means that citizens cannot make use of rights such as freedom of speech and other important rights to influence public opinion (Lotan et. al, 2011: 1376). This does not mean that the society does not influence the regime at all. Off course a state cannot effectively maintain power if it is no longer legitimate. So states have to put effort in legitimizing their rule. This might result in popular policy making in some important cases. These popular decisions are not necessarily strategic in the political arena, but enhance the popularity under the people. An example is the position of an average Arab state towards Israel. A regime cannot afford a cooperation with that country because their people do not like Israel. So by officially positioning themselves as the enemy of Israel, regimes make themselves popular. Decisions of this kind strengthen the domestic position. But they might imply high costs on the international level (Halliday, 2005: 47). In this way the state is bound to follow the will of its people.

The technologies brought by Internet have changed this disadvantage. With the help of Facebook and Twitter the opposition groups can communicate with each other in a very effective way. Networking abilities of the opposition are for example greatly improved. Originally fragmented societies can become more unified through intensified communication. This leads to more mutual understanding and the insight that the government is the common enemy (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 41). In the case of Egypt and Tunisia this meant that the large opposition groups could effectively cooperate and organize strikes and demonstrations. The regimes were unable to pursue the relevant messages posted on the Internet, it was very hard to get the information about the place and time of demonstrations in time. So opposition groups can be seen as groups which are very loosely connected. Participants are grouping together based on a common idea, for example a corrupt government. They often lack a clear political manifest (Cross, 2010: 170). They can organize large protests in a short amount of time. These opposition groups do not have a clear leader, making

5 it hard for a regime to undermine the functioning of the opposition group (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 43).

Internet as liberation technology

Three relevant political practices related to Internet technology are addressed in this section: the Internet as means of communication, as information provision and as surveillance system. As a means of communication, the Internet mainly proves useful for opposition groups. Opposition groups cannot freely discuss their goals through other communication methods, for these are often under government control (Tripp, 2001: 228). Mobile phone communication is an important communication network that extends the reach of Internet communication, and information. Internet as a source of information can be helpful for both sides. On the one hand Internet can provide essential information for opposition groups about wrongdoing by the regime, giving them sources from which to criticize their government (Castells, 2007: 254). Internet was also a major information provider when it comes to organizing protests during the Arab Spring. Most people did not have Facebook or Twitter, but they knew about the protests through news websites (Cottle, 2011: 647). On the other hand, Internet can be used as a propaganda machine against opposition. China, for example uses the Internet as a means through which they criticize democracy and opposition movements (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 95). Internet as surveillance system evidently helps the government. Because it is used on a large scale as communication tool, most important opposition leaders can be traced via the Internet (Heeks, 2013: 11).

There has been much debate on whether the Internet can give opposition groups the opportunity to challenge the state effectively. Seen from a historical perspective, society-centered arguments dominate the debate when new technologies arise and support political movements. This is followed by more state-centered scholars who emphasize the resistance of the state towards new border crossing technologies like Internet (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: VII-VIII). For example, in the nineties and early zeroes many scholars pointed to the Internet as a place that undermined national law. In the years thereafter, until 2011, a growing amount of scholars called these ideas utopian. They saw the Internet as just another means of communication, which was revolutionary for a short while, but then everyone would adapt to it (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 180). In 2011, as the ‘Facebook revolutions’ took place, the society-centered argument became popular again. Scholars called Internet and social media the new bringers of democracy and foresaw the end of autocracy in the world (Kilroy, 2012: 2). But again, when the revolutions had calmed down and the results became visible, the state-centered replies became more dominant in the debate (Golkar, 2011; Rahimi, 2011; Baum, 2010).

6 In the next two sections the theoretical standpoints will be elaborated. On the one side there are more idealistic society-centered scholars, arguing that the state is on the back foot and that opposition parties have gained a very powerful communication and information tool. On the other side are more state-centered scholars. They argue that the state is capable of controlling the Internet, and that it can maintain its position despite the Internet technology. This means that the relation between state and society barely changes with the advent of Internet technology.

Society-centered theory

Many society-centered scholars (Castells, 2007; Diamond, 2010; Howard & Hussain, 2011; ibid 2013; Poell and Darmoni, 2012) argue that the power of the state is declining with the increasing use of Internet by opposition groups. The society-centered scholars base their argumentations largely on the liberal school of International Relations(IR) theory. Liberalism is one of the most influential and popular IR theories today. The theoretical approach features four key assumptions. (1) A large range of different actors influence international politics, not only states, but NGO’s, multinationals and other actors have influence over international relations. (2) Domestic actors largely determine state behavior in the international political arena. Different groups in a society try to put their preferences on the national agenda, these domestic preferences influence the state preferences in the international arena (Putnam, 1988: 434). (3) International actors have a large influence in both international and domestic politics, for instance human rights organizations can effectively campaign against certain countries to improve people’s conditions. (4) The relations between states don not merely consist of self interest and survival, but mostly of cooperation (Erikson and Giacomello, 2006: 229).

The society-centered approach has been used extensively to explain the developments of the Internet in the past fifteen years. Society-centered scholars see the Internet as a means through which a great amount of freedom can be achieved. It is a tool through which free expression, free information and free assembly can be realized. Even in hard circumstances, because the Internet cannot be controlled by the authorities. It can be of great help for opposition parties in the struggle against repressive regimes (Golkar, 2011: 51-2). Another important argument is that the Internet is borderless. It cannot easily be subjected to a national law, for then a national law would impose rules on the global Internet. This makes it very hard for a state to demand that Internet content will be removed (Baum, 2010: 702).

Society-centered scholars mainly shed light on the positive sides of Internet freedom, while giving less attention to increased lack of (national) security. There is very little literature on state-security issues written from a society perspective. The state is still seen as the dominant actor in world politics, but they argue that other levels of governance become more significant in the political

7 arena. Domestic organizations and international NGO’s play a more important role in politics than ever. Because of the Internet, these groups can organize themselves even more easily and effectively (Erikson and Giacomello, 2006: 230-231). This increase in influence comes in practice by enhanced communication and information provision, this will be elaborated below.

Communication is a very important aspect of the innovations of the Internet. The possibilities of communication have increased as the Internet grew. This increased interconnectedness makes different social groups understand each other better. In Egypt and Tunisia this led to a unification of different isolated groups in society, giving the opportunity to forge a large and powerful protest movement (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 37). If a society communicates more and understands each other more, it is harder for a repressive regime to keep its population under control. For if minorities fight with one another they will not oppose the regime. Effective communication means that people have a much broader range of means to influence public opinion and share information. Regimes and elites face a challenge, because they cannot frame their policies just as they like anymore. They can now be criticized online (Castells, 2007: 258). This means that a government has to become more transparent in their decision-making. The elites cannot effectively influence the media anymore. Consumers have more influence on the content nowadays. If it becomes clear that the media does not cover a certain topic sufficiently, this will spread via the Internet and the media will lose credibility (Castells, 2007: 254). Moreover, the consumers and the media are much more interconnected by the Internet. Because of media reporting on websites, opposition groups and dissidents were sooner and better informed about important issues. But the media can also inform the international community much faster. This means that actors from outside the country could decide to support protest movements (Cottle, 2011: 648).

Social media like Twitter and Facebook are not the only useful online tools. Internet stimulates political Interest and mobilization through online mass media outside of the country. In many of the states where uprisings took place, few citizens used social media. But because the few users of Twitter and Facebook posted content about the protests, international mass media could write about them. These media were widely read by the people in these states themselves. So the media played an important role in informing the population (Poell and Darmoni, 2012: 28). Despite the small group of online activists, mass media and text messaging networks spread important information very fast (Conroy et. al, 2012: 1544)1_{. The mass protests started from the provision of}

information by a few social media users. This was picked up by international mass media which was widely read by the population. With the knowledge from these media and the use of mobile phone networks the population was able to organize the mass protests (Cottle, 2011: 647).

1 _{One thing to note is that this causal relationship has not been tested extensively in the Middle-East, many}

8 State-centered theory

A growing amount of scholars is more critical about the changes that Internet brings to the relation between state and society. There was a short period in which the state had been caught off guard. State leaders did not know how to fight the free flow of information that threatened their legitimacy. But after a while they reacted with effective repressive technologies that became more widely available. Regimes started to establish surveillance networks, subjected Internet content to national laws and even censured Internet content (Hintz, 2012; Golkar, 2011; Erikson et. al, 2009; Baum, 2010, Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). The state actually just continues the policy it was executing before the advent of Internet technology. They use their security forces to pursue critics on the Internet and censure critical content (Erikson et. al, 2009: 206-7). They use their status and ideological resources to promote the regime online while delegitimizing the critics (Golkar, 2011: 62). Overall: they still put a lot of effort in legitimizing their right to rule the state and take control over the sources of power.

The state-centered scholars are more pessimistic about the purported changes brought about by the availability of Internet-based technologies. Society-centered scholars are right by pointing out that Internet has helped several political groups to topple the regimes in their state. But now that it has become clear that the Internet can be a threat to the state, the regimes will make large efforts to remove that threat. They will do their best to control the online information and data flows, the final result is a nationalized Internet (Golkar, 2011: 58-9). The regime monopolizes the access to the Internet, and blocks critical websites or dissidents from the Web. They also establish surveillance networks in order to find out who is criticizing their regime. By gaining control over the Internet in this way, it will be reduced to nothing more useful than other means of opposition that have been around for a while already (Erikson et. al, 2009: 207).

The Internet might be a borderless communication and information system, but this does not say that the government has lost its legal right to impose national governance on its citizens. Internet or not, a citizen has to obey the law (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 68). States are more and more making efforts to make sure that citizens indeed obey the law. For the biggest problem of a state is that it cannot implement the laws on online content, because it is very hard to trace consumers of forbidden Internet content. But as mentioned before, the state is working on this. Particularly in the Middle-East, special ministries of Internet affairs work on subjecting their citizens to their laws online (Erikson et. al, 2009: 211).

The state has the legal right to dominate the Internet on a national basis, but one challenge for the state is the practical implementation of its laws. It is practically impossible for one actor to fully dominate the Internet. Control of the Internet can be realized in three ways, by controlling access, functionality or content one can significantly influence what happens on the Web (Erikson et.

9 al, 2009: 206). There are multiple ways to enlarge the control for states on any of these factors of control. Although it cannot dominate the Internet, it can certainly enlarge its influence on the national level. The state can for example license the access to the Internet by subjecting Internet providers to certain rules, or to nationalize providers. When the state has control over the providers, they can also influence the functionality, or quality of the Internet. The speed can for instance be lowered. Internet content can also be influenced by blocking or removing certain websites or online content (Erikson et. al, 2009: 207). This requires large scale surveillance, but these surveillance technologies are available and put in practice in the last couple of years (Reporters Without Borders, 2013: 3-4). Total control over a population is near to impossible, but total control is not the goal of a state. As long as an undesired action is effectively fought and marginalized, the policy is successful. One can for example not completely eradicate the use of cocaine in a society, but as long as it is marginalized the policy can be considered successful (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 67-68).

States have multiple methods to restrain the Internet, using legal means. Opposition groups using the Internet on the other hand has very few grounds from which to challenge the state. There have been multiple initiatives that aimed to create an organization that enforces the freedom of speech on the Internet, and to promote human rights and labor rights online. These international initiatives have however proven to be quite unsuccessful (Baum, 2010: 723-4).

This paper will argue that the Internet cannot be seen as a weapon only used by opposition groups. Many above mentioned scholars argue that the Internet will change the relation between states and opposition groups significantly and that states have lost the power of information provision (Castells, 2007; Diamond, 2010; Howard & Hussain, 2011; ibid 2013; Poell and Darmoni, 2012). This statement is questionable, for there are clear indications that governments can control the information provided via Internet. This does not mean that opposition groups gain nothing from Internet, but Internet will not make a large difference (Baum, 2010; Erikson et. al, 2009; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; Golkar, 2011). Following this argumentation one can ascertain that this paper favors the state-centered rationalist perspective. The case study below will clarify the arguments from both standpoints. It will give more practical insight in the theoretical arguments provided above, and give some empirical evidence that clarifies current contradictions.

Case study: Iran

One case that is often referred to as an example by both society- and state-centered scholars is Iran. Society-centered scholars point to the protests of the Green Movement that have taken place during the 2009 elections. These protests have been organized by using Facebook, Twitter and text messaging networks (Cross, 2010: 175-6; Kilroy, 2012: 14). The state-centered rationalists and NGO

10 reports point to the failure of the Green Movement, and to the Iranian regime as one of the most advanced regimes in controlling the Web (OpenNet Initiative, 2009; Tkacheva et. al, 2013; Reporters Without Borders, 2012; Golkar, 2011; Cross, 2010). This makes Iran a very interesting case when looking at the main question: is the Internet a liberation technology? First, a brief history on the role of the Internet in Iran will be provided. Then the explanations of both sides of the theoretical debate will be discussed. Strong and weak points of both argumentations will be addressed.

Iran has always been a country that invested much in modern communication technologies. This started already under the regime of the Shah, and has been continued by the Revolutionary Guard (Kilroy, 2012: 8). Iran was therefore the most developed country in the region on this area, with the highest number of Internet users. 33 million citizens, or 43 percent of the population had Internet access in 2010 (Golkar, 2011: 53). This modernization came to an end when the regime saw the threats that online freedom of information brought. After the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iranian regime felt threatened by the West (Golkar, 2013: 1). The regime decided to tighten its grip on the Internet and filter the content posted on it. For too much criticism on the regime might give foreign powers more reason to intervene in Iran as well. From 2003 on, Internet filtering increased. The regime relied on cooperation with the Chinese government and western companies to gain filtering technologies (Golkar, 2011: 58).

The regime did not only take measures on a technological level, they also made efforts to underpin their policies in an ideological way. This ideology intends to spread influence in the Iranian society and in the region. Propaganda is widely spread by Islamic clerics from the regime, most effectively through Basij organizations. Basij organizations are governmentally organized and sponsored organizations for a diverse number of social groups: teachers, students, women, scientists and so forth (Golkar, 2013: 5-6). In the Basij groups, a wide intelligence network is established. This intelligence network consists of clerics who both function as propagandists for the regime and as agents who provide the regime with information about possible dissidents (Golkar, 2013: 7).

One of the most important events concerning Internet policy in Iran was the opposition group called ‘the Green Movement’. In 2009, just before the presidential elections, opposition leader Hossein Mousavi created a Facebook account, drawing lots of followers in the days before the elections. The movement was symbolized by the color green, the color of the movement led by Mousavi (Rahimi, 2011: 159). The Facebook account was the online meeting point through which large gatherings were organized to support Mousavi. When Ahmedinejad came out as the winner of the elections, Mousavi’s followers were convinced that the elections were rigged. This led to massive protests, but the regime upheld the election results even after a recount of the votes (Cross, 2010: 175).

11 Followers of Mousavi did not accept the election outcome, and used Mousavi’s Facebook page to organize protests in Tehran and other cities. After the Facebook page was blocked, online activists switched to using text messaging networks and Twitter. By posting protest announcements on Twitter protesters could inform each other with text messages. In this way protests were organized very fast, making it hard for the regime to respond. The protests counted at least hundreds of thousands of people, likely even millions of people at the peak (Cross, 2010: 173-4). The use of Twitter and other social media also informed international media about what happened in Iran. Journalists were not allowed in Tehran anymore, so international media were dependent on information from posts via social media like Twitter (Heeks and Seo-Zindy, 2013: 10).

During the first protests in July the regime did not take harsh measures on a large scale. Few arrests took place, the regime waited until the biggest unrest came to an end. They did however block many social media websites, foreign TV channels, SMS services and slow down the Internet speed, which undermined the communication of the protesters (Cross, 2010: 176). Circumvention strategies were blocked relatively effectively. Proxy servers, intermediary servers that avoid regime blockades, were one of the most important ways to gain access to blocked websites. But soon after these proxy servers were made public, the regime blocked them (Christensen, 2009: 3). When protests started again in December, large groups of protesters were arrested. Dissidents and suspects were arrested just before expected protests (Cross, 2010: 175). Large scale negative propaganda about the Green Movement was spread to delegitimize the protesters. The regime posted many online news articles announcing that protesters caused trouble and vandalism. This undermined the support for the movement. There was also a large increase in the Basij presence on the Internet. Many Basij members were encouraged to start an online blog, enlarging the pro-government content online significantly (Golkar, 2011: 62-3).

There has been little scholarly attention to what has happened after the mass protests of the Green Movement. Several NGO’s have reported that the regime is continuing to tighten its grip on the Internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2013; Reporters Without Borders, 2012). The regime in Iran has monopolized the market of Internet Service Providers(ISPs). It can control what content is uploaded in the country via the ISPs. The Revolutionary Guard has extended its online policing force, which makes pro-regime propaganda and tracks online dissidents. The regime also started developing domestic filtering technology. Now that it is producing its own technology the regime is much less dependent on technology from western and other foreign companies (OpenNet Initiative, 2009: 1). The regime underpins these innovations with a legal framework. This legal framework defines what content is allowed and what content harms society in their eyes, giving the regime more legal space to restrict Internet content (OpenNet Initiative, 2009: 4-5). Therefore many dissidents criticizing the regime, Islam or providing undesired content were arrested. There have been harsh sentences for

12 these arrested dissidents. Some of them faced a long prison sentence and when they were released they had to pay enormous fines. Others faced a death penalty (Reporters Without Borders, 2012). Another measure was the establishment of a government ‘cyber army’. The main task of this army was to spread pro regime information and comments on blogs, and enlarge the support for the regime online. Although it is not sure whether the cyber army is under direct control of the regime, it has had noticeable influence on the Iranian Web (Opennet Initiative, 2013: 31-32). The regime gained a lot of attention when it announced its project to create a nationalized Intranet called ‘Halal Internet’. This nationalized Internet can be compared to the Internet in China. This Halal Internet is provided to the citizens, filtered of undesired content. The speed of this domestic Internet will be much higher than the former, international Internet. Only the government will have acces to fast international Internet, for the economy is dependent on international Web connections (Solow-Niederman, 2010: 32). The project to create a Halal Internet was already announced in 2005, and according to a development plan it should be finished in 2015 (OpenNet Initiative, 2013: 26).

In the next two sub-sections the case of Iran will be explained by both theoretical views. They discuss the trends and events of the situation in Iran in a more analytical way to elaborate more on this historical overview. At the end of each sub section the question whether the internet liberates will be addressed, followed by some critical notes on the theoretical viewpoint.

Society-centered explanation

The liberal belief in progress is clearly visible in the society-centered explanation of what happened in Iran. The protests of the Green Movement are defined as a step in the direction to a freer and more democratic Iran (Kilroy, 2012: 17). In these explanations the relatively unorganized masses play a key role. The international community and organizational structures like sports clubs are also mentioned as potential influencing factors. In the international arena the bloggers are very important in influencing the reporting about Iran, for there will be an alternative to the censured state information. Informal organizations like sports clubs are seen as important places for organizing political movements against the regime. These are the only collectivities other than Internet from which people could organize protests. The regime knows this threat and therefore puts a lot of effort in gaining control over these kinds of collectivities in Iran (Golkar, 2013: 7). The state in general merely reacts on the events that take place within the population according to the society-centered scholars. It seems always to be a step behind in its actions against the population. Society-centered scholars conclude that Internet technology can therefore be seen as a liberation technology. It enlarges influence of the population versus the regime, enlarges the freedom of information and remains a great challenge for the regime in the future (Howard and Hussain, 2013: 64).

13 The fact that international media could base their news on Twitter posts made sure that the traditional censured media in Iran have a new and strong opponent when it comes to the provision of information. There will always be tech-savvy citizens in Iran, who can surpass the boundaries of the regime and make contact with the outside world (Golkar, 2013: 14-15). This connection with the rest of the world is vital in providing information and criticism on the regime. There is no monopoly on the control of information anymore (Solow-Niederman, 2010: 36-7). The Iranian regime sees the international pressure in the region as one of the biggest threats to their survival. The regime has blocked several international media websites, like the Iranian BBC website. This illustrates the fear of losing its grip on information within the society (OpenNet Initiative, 2009: 8). As long as the bloggers keep informing the international community, the chance of a western or international military intervention will be larger (Solow-Niederman, 2010: 32).

Without Twitter and the Facebook page of Mousavi the scale of the protests would not have been as massive as it was. The rise of the Green Movement showed not the failure, but the potential of Internet communication methods (Kilroy, 2010: 2). In 2009 the regime quelled the rebellion because it was still in control of its economic resources. The oil industry, and thus the government revenues, remained untouched during the protests. This gave the government plenty of space and opportunity to react. The regime will have to reform in the future, for if protests will erupt again the regime will face a bigger challenge than in 2009 (Cross, 2010: 185-6).

There are however some problems with the conclusions that society-centered scholars draw from the events in Iran. The statement that the Green Movement protests can be seen as one event in a gradually improving and democratizing trend is questionable. For the reports from Reporters Without Borders(2012; 2013) and OpenNet Initiative(2009; 2013) point out that the regime is putting a lot of effort in restricting Internet freedom. This makes clear that the state is rapidly catching up, rather than lagging behind in the online conflict between state and opposition. There are more critics on the society-centered point of view, their arguments will be elaborated in the state-centered explanation below.

State-centered explanation

The state-centered literature has put more emphasis on explaining the strategies of the Iranian regime during and after the protests of the Green Movement. These strategies have been relatively successful so far, for the regime was not pressured enough to reform any of its policies. It has been briefly caught off-guard when the protests of the Green movement erupted. Shortly after the start of the protests the regime restricted access to key websites and blogs quite effectively (Cross, 2010: 176-7).

14 After the protests the regime took its own initiative to further bolster its online censure and restrictions. So far the policies on Internet restriction have been successful. The regimes online presence is stronger than ever, the Iranian Internet control is defined as one of the most widespread in the world (OpenNet Initiative, 2009: 1). Undesired and critical content is not available for the average citizen, a set of laws on the Internet censure has been adopted and a cyber army makes sure that the regimes presence on the Web is noticed. Together with the cyber army, the intelligence organization uses the Internet as a propaganda mechanism to spread the influence of state ideas through the Iranian society. In short, this means that lately it is not the opposition groups that take the initiative, but the regime that imposes its will on the population (Reporters Without Borders, 2012: 26).

The legal power of national states over the Internet content was already clear before massive online protests started. Before the protests of the Green movement started there were already rules stating that ‘misleading information’, which could distract citizens from the right values of the Islamic Republic is prohibited. The legal bodywork that defines what is prohibited has been extended significantly since 2009. These laws can, because of broad and vague definitions, effectively prohibit almost any undesired content in Iran (OpenNet Initiative, 2013: 19-20). Internet Service Providers need a state license, creating in fact a state monopoly not only on the content but also on the access to Internet. The legal framework enforces the states decisions on what content is allowed and what not. Surveillance technology and an intelligence network effectively track cyber activists, who are then arrested (Golkar, 2011: 58).

The economy played an important role for the outcome of the protests. The regime kept its power over the economical resources, mainly oil revenues. Thereby it maintained most of its financial independence and solid power position (Cross, 2010: 183-4). This argument is largely derived from the rentier state theory, arguing that a state is independent from its population as long as it generates plenty of income independent of the population. In the case of Iran and other states in the Middle East this income consists of oil revenues. This discourages accountability about policy towards its population (Ross, 2001: 334).

The state-centered scholars obviously analyze the state in more detail than the society-centered scholars do, and in the case of Iran this focus on the state can be justified. The state is arguably the most important actor in the case of Iran, for it is the initiator of the extensive body of Internet restrictions. It has not given in to demands from the protesters. Also, the independence of the state has only increased with respect to both the population and the international community (Cross, 2010: 185-6). The oil revenues have remained under state control, making it financially largely independent from the population. Moreover the Basij movements have enlarged the regimes grip on the population, dissidents can be traced more easily through the extensive intelligence network of

15 the state (Golkar, 2013: 10). Since the start of an Iranian cyber censuring program the dependence on western countries and companies has also declined (OpenNet Initiative, 2013: 38).

The role of the state should not be overestimated however, for it is not completely independent from the population and the international community. A regime is forced to listen to the public opinion to avoid mass protests (Halliday, 2006: 46). In the case of Iran this means that the elections are an important moment, the regime cannot just put a puppet on the stage. It has to make effort to legitimize the candidate and the elections. Otherwise mass protest groups like the Green Movement are likely to rise up again (Golkar, 2013: 16).

One could explain the latest election of Hassan Rouhani as a way of the Iranian government to seek more legitimacy. The election results were in a way unexpected, indicating that the elections were relatively ‘fair’. While the expected winner was a conservative leader, the most ‘reformist’(or least conservative) leader was chosen (Abulof, 2013: 693). This means that the regime indirectly meets the demands of the Green Movement to elect a more reformist leader. The elections were however still under firm control of the regime. Newspapers providing too reformist content were shut down, and more websites of foreign media were blocked during the election period (BBC News, 2013). This indicates that the regime still has the initiative and power, and probably meets some demands just to temper an unsatisfied population (Sherrill, 2014: 74).

A liberation technology for the region?

In this section the conclusions from the Iranian case will be compared to the situation in other states in the region. The successful overthrow of regimes in Egypt and Tunisia has been explained extensively, but states where nothing happened received little attention. Many states still have effective control over their societies despite the promising Internet innovations (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011: 136). Do these cases show any similarity with Iran? The scope of this section will not be broader than the Middle Eastern region, for the group of countries in this region is a unique group compared to the rest of the world. The lack of democracy and democratization is most prominent in this region, rentier economies also make these countries special cases (Ross, 2001: 326). Before generalizing anything, the key findings derived from the Iranian case will be summed up briefly.

In the case of Iran the state played an active role in restricting the Internet and preventing its citizens from using it as an organizational tool. These measures resulted in an extensive censuring program and a complicated surveillance network. These technical measures were supported by a legal framework, creating significant juridical space for the regime to legally restrict online activity (Cross, 2010: 185). Although the policies to restrict the Iranian Web have been relatively successful, there are still active bloggers criticizing the regime. These activist both create dissent within Iran and

16 inform the international society from another perspective on the political situation in Iran. This has not proven to be effective yet however, and it is questionable if they will ever play a decisive role in an Iranian regime change. The main reason is that the amount of dissidents and websites functioning as their medium have been marginalized by the Internet policy of the regime (Golkar, 2013: 15-6).

One country that is arguably most comparable with Iran is Syria. In Syria Internet speed is controlled by the government. Undesired content is removed or blocked. A cyber army supports the regime online and uses aggressive means like viruses against dissidents and critics (Tkacheva, 2013: 83-4). This has hindered online activists in Syria, although they represent a very small fraction of the population. There is a lot of doubt about the impact of Syrian online activists in the current conflict. The gatherings at mosques on Friday were likely more important organizing methods for protests than online social media. Although the online activity grew during the uprisings, the regime tightened its grip on the Web with relative success (Tkacheva, 2013: 90). With online surveillance and tracing systems dissidents were tracked and arrested. The regime let some dissidents speak freely online to make the regime seem tolerant, but mainly to identify the network of dissidents.

Due to low Internet usage by the population and effective online control by the regime, Internet could not play a big role as liberation tool in Syria (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011: 136). The uprisings in Syria have been larger and more radical compared to the Iranian Green Movement protests. But both cases show that Internet can be effectively made redundant by the state in the struggle for more freedom.

There is less attention for states on the Arabian peninsula, including Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates(UAE), Yemen and Oman. These countries seem to have, in varying degrees, sophisticated surveillance technology (Howard and Hussain, 2013: 54). Like in Iran and Syria, the UAE, Yemen and Oman seem to have limited Internet freedom. The regimes prohibited certain Internet content, like pornography and promotion of religions other than Islam (International Business Times, 2012; OpenNet Initiative, 2009a; OpenNet Initiative, 2009c). Saudi Arabia and Bahrain seem to go further by also filtering the Web of opposition and human rights groups. Opposition groups have used the Internet as tool of communication but several bloggers and activists have been arrested (OpenNet Initiative, 2009b; Reporters Without Borders, 2012a). A possible explanation for the lack of attention on Internet restrictions in these countries is the friendly relation with the West. In order to keep the relations good, criticisms on these regimes are milder or non-existent (Kilroy, 2012: 15).

The role of Saudi Arabia on internet policy is more complicated, for it has its own restrictions on Internet, but supports the protesters in Syria with tools to avoid regime restrictions (Hinnebusch, 2012: 107). States like Saudi Arabia can thus restrict their own Internet while supporting Internet freedom in other countries. The most likely explanation for supporting Syrian protesters is the bad

17 relations with the current Syrian regime, so by assisting Internet freedom Saudi Arabia undermines the control over Internet of the Syrian regime (OpenNet Initiative, 2009b).

This shows that states use Internet, rather than opposition groups. In the case of Saudi Arabia does the state not only use Internet to protect itself, but also to undermine other states, in this case Syria. It thus depends on who uses the internet effectively and what interests this actor has. This indicates that the Internet is not necessarily a liberation tool. It also underscores the argument that states are very important in determining the role of Internet in a society. All states on the Arabian Peninsula have to a degree subjected their Web to the national law. The restrictions range from filtering undesired content to fighting online political activism. What becomes clear from these observations is that states in the region take more and more control over their Internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Reporters Without Borders, 2012a; Hinnebusch, 2012). Although complete control over Internet is probably not possible, predominant government control over the Internet seems a more convincing reality than a free Web without state interference.

The reason for not adopting the cases of Egypt and Tunisia in this section is mainly because these cases have already been extensively explained. The general conclusion of much of the literature on these cases is that the regimes did not know or possess any equipment to control the Internet altogether. This has made it hard for them to fight opposition groups using online communication tools (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 37). The states where revolutions did not take place did however make effort to enlarge their online influence, and one can argue that until this far they have been successful in keeping their Internet under control.

The above made arguments all lead to a clear conclusion and answer on the question whether Internet is a liberation tool. As soon as a state puts effort in controlling the Internet, the chance that it will be used as an important liberation tool will be reduced significantly. This was the case in Iran, and similar trends are also visible in other countries in the region. This finding does not imply that revolutions are less likely, but that Internet does not play a decisive role in them (anymore). Another thing to note is that the measures to restrict Internet require significant government investments. The states in the region have sufficient means to realize these investments (Hinnebusch, 2012: 106). The fact that they are not dependent on their population to fund their Web control systems also makes their online control more effective (Cross, 2010: 186). This conclusion is to a great extent in line with the state-centered argument: that Internet is just another tool in the line of other ‘liberation tools’, like the fax, television, telephone, etcetera.

18 Conclusion

So is the Internet a liberation tool? According to the society-centered scholars it is, because it provides a networking tool to organize protests and an alternative information provision channel to influence public and international opinions. According to state-centered scholars the Internet has shown some potential during the Green Movement and the Arab Spring protests, but regimes have learnt their lesson from these protests and took measures. The case of Iran supports this state-centered argumentation on Internet policy. After the protests of the Green Movement, Internet restriction intensified. The regime even wants to create a national Web and cut the population off from the international Internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2013). Multiple sources indicate that similar Internet restriction measures are adopted by other states in the Middle Eastern region. These measures do not guarantee the survival of the regimes, but they disarm opposition groups from their online tools. States are capable of restricting the Internet as much as any other communication tool in the past. This was visible in the case of Iran, and evidence in other states of the region underline this conclusion. The rentier economy might play an important role in making Internet restrictions possible, for a state needs a large budget to take control over the Internet (Cross, 2010: 186). The argument that a state can take control over the Internet, and therefore make it redundant as a liberation tool, might however apply to a wider set of cases than just the Middle East. For every authoritarian country that wants to stay in power will make effort to take control over the Internet.

A suggestion for further research would be to find more evidence for (or against) the generalization made above. Is there a general trend of nationalizing the Internet? Other countries inside and outside of the region deserve more explanation: about their lack of protests, and what role the Internet played. China and Russia are for instance big players when it comes to restricting their domestic Internet freedom. The Rand Corporation report already speaks about an online confrontation between the free western Internet model and a more nationalized Internet model, based on state-sovereignty and security (Tkacheva et. al, 2013: 202). This leads to another interesting question: can one expect a clash between the free and the nationalized Internet in the future?

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