By: Sören Schneider (12300543) Date of Submission: 21 June 2019 Supervisor: Dr Jana Krause Second Reader: Dr Mike Medeiros
The Path to Peace?
Programmes for Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration in three Latin American Countries
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Abstract
This thesis seeks to explore how the design and implementation context of programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colom-bia shaped incentives and opportunities for and against violent behaviour among ex-combat-ants. In contrast to large parts of the contemporary literature, that equate the success of DDR with the overall success of the peacebuilding process, I take DDR’s claim to contribute to se-curity at the aggregate level by incentivising the group of ex-combatants to choose a civilian life over war seriously. I argue that the DDR programmes in Latin America are structurally ill-equipped to address the multifaceted incentives that persist for ex-combatants after demobili-zation to return to violence. In the theory-guided, comparative analysis, I draw on Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) theory of recidivism, that reflects DDR’s core assumption that ex-combatants’ decisions to engage in, or refrain from violence will be informed by the conjuncture of driving forces (incentives and opportunities for violence) and restraining forces (incentives and oppor-tunities for a civilian life). Through a thorough document analysis, the identification of four driving and four restraining forces and the corresponding context- and design-level factors of DDR programmes that seek to curtail the former and promote the latter, allows me to test across cases, whether the initiatives could live up to their own aspiration of altering structures of in-centives and opportunities for former combatants in favour of a civilian life. I find that, across cases and contexts, DDR has not yet found a way to credibly address security threats for ex-combatants, to close the gap between expectations and implementation, and to effectively pro-mote economic reintegration. While this does not necessarily entail that DDR should be aban-doned, the findings point at the need for consequent adjustment of the concept and for a stronger interaction with both complementary measures for security promotion and general peacebuild-ing activities.
___________________________________________________________________________ Word Count: 23,882 (excl. references and bibliography
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Content
Abstract ... III List of Acronyms ... VI Tables and Figures ... VIII
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature Review ... 6
2.1. The Role of DDR in the Peacebuilding Process ... 6
2.2. DDR and (Post-)Conflict Violence ... 8
2.3. Design and Context of DDR Programmes ... 10
2.4. DDR Programmes in Latin America ... 11
2.5. Summary: Why another DDR study? ... 12
3. Theoretical Framework ... 14
3.1. The Security Dividend – Normative and Theoretical Underpinnings of DDR Programmes ... 14
3.2. Driving and Restraining Forces and their Link to DDR-Programmes ... 17
4. Methodology ... 20
4.1. General Approach ... 20
4.2. Operationalisation and Data Collection ... 21
4.3. Case Selection ... 24
5. Background: Civil Conflict and DDR Processes in Latin America ... 27
5.1. Nicaragua ... 27 5.2. El Salvador ... 28 5.3. Colombia ... 29 6. Analysis ... 32 6.1. Nicaragua ... 32 6.1.1. Driving Forces ... 32 6.1.2. Restraining Forces ... 37
6.1.3. Conclusion and Outlook ... 41
6.2. El Salvador ... 44
6.2.1. Driving Forces ... 44
6.2.2. Restraining Forces ... 49
6.2.3. Conclusion and Outlook ... 53
6.3. Colombia ... 55
6.3.1. Driving Forces ... 55
6.3.2. Restraining Forces ... 59
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7. Discussion ... 66
7.1. The Role of DDR Programmes in Peace Processes ... 66
7.2. The DDR Process of the FARC in Colombia ... 70
8. Conclusion ... 73
Bibliography ... 76
VI
List of Acronyms
Acronym Long Form Explanation
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Co-lombia
Umbrella organisation for right-wing par-amilitaries in Colombia (1997-2006) CEI Centro de Estudios
Internacion-ales
Nicaraguan research centre for peace and economy based in Managua
CIA Central Intelligence Agency Federal agency in the USA responsible for national security intelligence
CIAV Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación
International commission in charge of monitoring the DDR- and peace process in Nicaragua (UN+OAS)
CNRR Comisión Nacional de Repara-ción y ReconciliaRepara-ción
Colombian commission to guarantee vic-tims’ participation in the peace process COPAZ Comisión Nacional para la
Consolidación de la Paz
National commission in El Salvador, cre-ated as a multipartite institution to oversee the peace process
CVR Community-based Violence Reduction
Programme for security promotion and vi-olence reduction at the community level DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation
and Reintegration
Programme to disconnect (ex-)combatants from weapons and military structures and promote their civilian reintegration ELN Ejercito de Liberación Nacional Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group in
Co-lombia founded in 1964 and still active EPS Ejército Popular Sandinista National army of Nicaragua under the
Sandinista government (1979-1990) FAES Fuerza Armada de El Salvador National army of El Salvador FARC Fuerzas Armadas
Revoluciona-rias de Colombia
Largest guerrilla group in Colombia with socialist ideals founded in 1964 that trans-formed into a political party in 2016 FDN Fuerza Democrática
Nicara-güense
Armed opposition group (1981-1987) to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional
Marxist / socialist guerrilla group in El Salvador founded in 1980 that trans-formed into a political party in 1992 FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación
Nacional
Marxist / socialist guerrilla group in Nica-ragua founded in 1961 that transformed into a (major) political party in 1990 GAO General Accounting Office US institution for investigation and
evalu-ation to support the work of the Congress GDP Gross Domestic Product Value of services and goods produced in a
country within a specific period HRW Human Rights Watch
International non-governmental organisa-tion, founded in 1978 to promote human rights
IOM International Organization for Migration
UN-affiliated intergovernmental organi-sation for topics related to migration M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril Minor socialist guerrilla group in
VII MAPP-OEA
Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la Organi-zación de Estados Americanos
Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of Ameri-can States
OAS Organization of American States
International organisation for cooperation among the 35 independent states on the American continents
ONUCA
Grupo de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para Centroa-mérica
UN observer mission in Central America to monitor the peace processes in five countries between 1989 and 1992
ONUSAL
Misión de Observación de las Naciones Unidas en El Salva-dor
UN observer mission in El Salvador be-tween 1991 and 1995
PNC Policía Nacional Civil National Civilian Police established after the end of conflict in El Salvador
PRVC Programa de Reincorporación para la Vida Civil
Reintegration programme for demobilised combatants in Colombia until 2006 PRN Plan de Reconstrucción
Nacio-nal
National Reconstruction Plan in El Salva-dor to benefit ex-combatants and war-af-fected communities
PTT Programa de Transferencia de Tierras
Land distribution programme in El Salva-dor benefiting ex-combatants as well as ci-vilian landholders
RN Resistencia Nicaragüense Umbrella organisation for all armed oppo-sition groups in Nicaragua from 1987 on UN United Nations Intergovernmental organisation with 193
member states; founded in 1945 UN-DDR
United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegra-tion Resource Centre
Information platform of the United Na-tions Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR established in 2005
UNDP United Nations Development Program
United Nations agency to promote sus-tainable development
UNO Unión Nacional Opositora
A coalition of 14 parties that opposed and trumped the FSLN in the 1990 elections in Nicaragua
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
Office of the United Nations for the pre-vention of crime and drug trafficking
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca
Left-wing guerrilla group in Guatemala founded in 1982 that transformed into a political party in 1998
US(A) United States (of America) Political union of 50 North American states; capital: Washington D.C.
VIII
Tables and Figures
Figures
Figure 1: Normative Fundament of DDR Programmes - Contribution to an improved security
context ... 15 Figure 2: Overview of civil conflicts and DDR-programmes in three Latin American countries
... 31 Figure 3: Number of extrajudicial killings of ex-contras per month (1990-1992) ... 33 Figure 4: Number of reported land occupations in Nicaragua 1990-1993 ... 37 Figure 5: Total number of demobilised and total number of formal employees in the Nicaraguan
economy (1991) ... 39 Figure 6: Contribution of the USA and other donors to major pillars of national reconstruction (January 1994) ... 47 Figure 7: Share of Ex-Combatants with Access to Selected Provisions of the PRVC as of October 2006 ... 57 Figure 8: Economic performance after beginning of DDR programmes ... 96
Tables
Table 1: Driving Forces and their relation to DDR design and context ... 18 Table 2: Restraining forces and their relation to DDR design and context ... 19 Table 3: Indicators for persistence of driving forces and guiding questions for analysis of design and context ... 22 Table 4:Indicators for underdevelopment of restraining forces and guiding questions for analysis of design and context ... 22 Table 5: Chronological order of DDR-initiatives in Latin America ... 25 Table 6: Basic design- and context-level parameters of the three chosen DDR programmes . 26 Table 7: Eligibility in Reinsertion Programmes for Ex-Combatants of the FMLN and the FAES
... 48 Table 8: Results of the analysis I – Persistence of driving forces ... 66 Table 9: Results of the analysis II – Underdevelopment of restraining forces ... 67 Table 10: Contribution of the US and other donors major pillars of national reconstruction (January 1994). ... 97
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1. Introduction
Research Question and Argument
Latin America has experienced decades of civil conflict throughout the 20th century: The wars in Nicaragua (1979-1990), El Salvador (1979-1992), and Colombia (1964-present) left hun-dreds of thousands of people dead or displaced (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 201; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, pp. 37-48; Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). At the same time, hopes for a life without violence were spurred in these countries by peacebuilding efforts, of which programmes for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have been an important part. With the objective of “contribut[ing] to security and stability” (Capone, 2018, p. 2) by disconnecting former combatants from their weapons and promoting their socio-eco-nomic reintegration through education, housing, or job training, DDR initiatives have evolved into a standard tool at early stages of contemporary peacebuilding processes (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 2). They seek to reduce incentives and opportunities for violent behaviour among ex-combatants and, at the same time, create incentives and opportunities for a civilian life, so that “leading a civilian life becomes more appealing than resorting to violence” (van Zoonen, 2015, p. 21). However, DDR’s potential to fulfil that role has been called into question in all three countries by the participation of ex-combatants in (re-)emerging armed groups or criminal gangs, which continue to pose a threat despite the non-recurrence of full-blown con-flict. Consequently, this thesis addresses the question: How have design and implementation
context of DDR initiatives in Nicaragua (1990-1992), El Salvador (1992-1996) and Colombia (2003-2006) shaped incentives and opportunities for and against violent behaviour among ex-combatants?
I argue that DDR’s potential to deter ex-combatants from violent behaviour is limited: The programmes leave major driving forces, which have proven to contribute to ex-combatants’ re-engagement in violence, unaddressed, especially threats to their personal security. At the same time, the challenges of successful socio-economic reintegration remain underestimated. I con-cur with Colletta and Muggah (2009) in stating that “context matters” (p. 1): Where DDR has the potential to change opportunity and incentive structures, it depends crucially on a closer interaction with other peacebuilding activities whether this potential can be exploited at all. I find that across time, designs and contexts, which differ significantly among the chosen cases, DDR programmes have failed to alter preferences and the scope of action for former combatants in a way that would preclude violent behaviour during and after the programme. Especially the
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insufficient creation of job opportunities and persisting threats to personal security – in combi-nation with a lack of efficient arms control – produce a dangerous constellation. Existing liter-ature suggests that this constellation converted some ex-combatants into easy targets for the recruitment efforts of other armed groups with political or criminal intentions, that sought to benefit from their expertise and networks.
Relevance
Although a lot of research has been done on the role that DDR programmes have played in peace processes, contemporary approaches take the non-recurrence of conflict (Banholzer, 2014) as a yardstick to determine whether the individual initiative could fulfil that role or not, without asking whether peace persisted due to, or despite the DDR initiative. This thesis follows a different path: Taking DDR’s ambition serious “to contribute to security and stability” (United Nations DDR Resource Center, UN-DDR, 2019) at an aggregate-level by convincing individual combatants that it is “more attractive for them to work as civilians than to remain soldiers” (van Zoonen, 2015, p. 17), it seeks to unpack the ways in which the initiatives – in conjuncture with the context they were implemented in – could successfully remove incentives and opportunities for violent behaviour and promote a civilian lifestyle for the participants during and beyond the programme – and why, in some instances, they failed to do so. Not only is this useful to explain the shortcomings of past programmes but may also shed further light on the motives for some ex-combatants to join criminal groups or gangs that continued to shape the security context in the three countries long after the programmes had finished.
The comparative approach allows to assess where past programmes have systematically failed to address major driving forces (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018) of violence or to impose new restrain-ing forces on ex-combatants. With regard to the design, the analysis delivers startrestrain-ing points to answer the questions which factors should receive more attention when contemporary pro-grammes are designed. Despite emerging alternative or complementary activities to promote security, for example community-based violence reduction (CVR) as applied in Haiti (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, pp. 3-4), DDR programmes continue to play an important role in Latin American peacebuilding, as the programme for left-wing guerrillas in Colombia, initiated in 2017 and still ongoing, indicates. Indeed, it would be illusory to assume that the programme could for itself eradicate all potential driving forces of violence; thus, including the context into the analysis allows me to assess to what extent it makes sense to implement these programmes in unfavourable contexts in the first place.
3 Theoretical and methodological approach
To arrive at my findings, I conduct a theory-guided, comparative analysis in order to depart from “under-theorized single case studies or policy-oriented best-practice guidelines” (p. 113), which, according to Ansorg and Strasheim (2019) dominate the contemporary literature. From existing policy literature, I reconstruct the model that describes how DDR seeks to improve the overall security context by focussing on ex-combatants and the constellation of opportunities incentives for them to engage in, or refrain from violence. Taking DDR’s underlying assump-tion that decisions for or against violence will be informed by this constellaassump-tion seriously, I conceptualise changes in these opportunities and incentives in favour of a civilian life as a de-sirable outcome of DDR programmes. I apply Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) theory of recidivism and draw on their distinction between driving forces and restraining forces to analytically cat-egorise opportunities and incentives into aspects that ‘push’ ex-combatants towards violent be-haviour (driving forces) and aspects related to the attractivity of non-violent bebe-haviour (re-straining forces). Based on existing research, I identify four driving forces and four re(re-straining forces that have proven to have an impact on combatants’ decision to engage in or refrain from violence during and after demobilisation. I then reconstruct the ways in which the design of DDR programmes seeks to curtail the former and promote the latter and relevant context-level factors that can add to this trend. Reconstructing the way in which DDR programmes in com-bination with their context are meant to discourage recidivism enables me to systematically test where they empirically failed to do so.
To operationalise the elements of the model, I rely on an analysis of relevant documents: I identify a range of indicators for the persistence of driving forces or the underdevelopment of restraining forces to trace the dynamic of incentives and opportunities for and against violence throughout the research period (start of DDR programme up to five years after its conclusion). To contribute to an explanation of this dynamic, I review legal documents that outline the man-date for the programme, reports of involved agencies, media archives and interview material to discuss the persistence of driving forces and the underdevelopment of restraining forces against the background of flaws in the DDR design and unfavourable context-level factors. Beside the theoretical connection between different elements of DDR design and context on the one hand, and driving and restraining forces on the other, I also consult secondary literature and ex-post assessments by third actors (i.e. human rights agencies) to strengthen the link. However, alter-native explanations, such as unforeseeable external shocks, shall always be reflected upon. If I find that major driving forces persisted throughout the research period while restraining forces
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remained underdeveloped, and reasonably link this to design- and context-level factors, my argument is supported. If I find no evidence for persisting driving forces or restraining forces could successfully be developed, or if I find more compelling alternative explanations for changes in the opportunity and incentive structure, my argument is rejected.
Structure & Limitations
However, due to the absence of data on ex-combatants’ involvement in violence or surveys on motives for their decision for or against violence, the analysis cannot capture to what extent changes in the incentive and opportunity structure triggered by context- and design-level factors of a DDR programme were ultimately decisive for the combatants’ decision to engage in or refrain from violence. However, this limitation is mitigated in four ways: First, the analysis is informed by theories about combatant recidivism and based on literature that depicts, which factors have empirically led ex-combatants to engage in, or refrain from violence in the past and how design and context of DDR programmes seek to address these factors. Second, the assumption that ex-combatants’ decisions for or against violence in the future will be informed by the benefits that a civilian life entails and the costs for violence, is the very rationale that underlies DDR programmes. If I find that a programme, due to its design and context, was successfully able to eradicate driving forces and promote restraining forces, and recidivism was
still a major concern, I conclude that alternative explanations shaped the combatants’ decision
to return to violence, which already entails a lesson about how DDR programmes are supposed to work. Third, the technique of diverse case selection is particularly helpful to reduce the num-ber of possible explanations for a shared outcome (i.e. persistence of security threats), given that the cases share few potentially explanatory factors. Finally, in all three cases, the findings will be discussed against the background of existing literature on the role that former combat-ants played in shaping the national security context and the extent to which they were involved in crime and violence and their motives for doing so.
The thesis is structured as follows: After the introduction I review the relevant literature on the role that DDR programmes can play in peace processes; although the programmes have evolved over time, they “share the same objectives of supporting peace processes, creating political space and contributing to a secure environment” (Idris, 2016, p. 5). After a glance at the litera-ture on motives for post-demobilisation violence among ex-combatants, the design- and context level factors of DDR programmes that address these motives and the three cases, the theoretical framework will be introduced. The description of the methodological approach and the back-ground of conflict and DDR programmes in the three countries under study follow. I then
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proceed to the analysis, whose results are finally discussed against the background of the debate on the potential and limitations of DDR programmes and the prospects for the current initiative in Colombia. The thesis closes on a short resumé.
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2. Literature Review
Although research on DDR has proliferated, Ansorg and Strasheim (2019) state that “past re-search is dominated by under-theorized single case studies or policy-oriented best-practice guidelines” (p. 113). Many of these evaluate the role that DDR has played in the broader peace-building process by taking the number of participants or collected arms as a yardstick or equate DDR success with non-recurrence of conflict in the first place – without asking whether this occurred because or despite DDR. Seeking to depart from these “technocratic exercises” (Theidon, 2009, p. 3), this thesis evaluates three DDR programmes within their own conceptual framework of “contribut[ing] to security and stability” (Capone, 2018, p. 2) by convincing for-mer combatants “that it is more attractive for them to work as civilians than to remain soldiers“ (Banholzer, 2014, p. 17). Choosing three cases of DDR initiatives in Latin America does not only respond to demands for comparative studies (Seethaler, 2016) but also complements the rich body of literature on Africa (i.e. Rhea, 2016; World Bank, 1993; McMullin, 2013), where most of the DDR programmes have been conducted (Banholzer, 2014, p. 12).
2.1. The Role of DDR in the Peacebuilding Process
Due to the “increased salience of intrastate conflict” (Regan, 1996, p. 336) after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of norms like the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Bellamy, 2015), the international community has seen a proliferation of peacebuilding efforts, of which many fea-tured DDR-programmes (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 2). DDR programmes are usually conceptualised as an activity at the early stages of the peacebuilding process that – ideally – follows the cessation of violence or the conclusion of a peace agreement (Aoláin et. al., 2011, pp. 132-133). According to the DDR Resources Centre of the United Nations, “[t]he aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin” (UN-DDR, 2006, p. 4). DDR initiatives seek to achieve this aim by disconnecting combatants from their weapons (‘disarmament’) and the military structures they were a part of (‘demobilisation’), which usually takes place in designated sites or canton-ments (Capone, 2018, p. 2; Rabasa et. al., 2011, pp. 52-53). The component of ‘reintegration’ describes measures that promote the combatants’ socio-economic reintegration into civil soci-ety, for example the provision of accommodation, basic goods, job training or education (ibid.). Although the basic objective of DDR has remained the same, Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) identify two stages in the historical evolution of contemporary DDR programmes: In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, a “first wave” (p. 2) of DDR programmes focussed almost
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exclusively on ex-combatants as potential ‘spoilers’ (Stedman, 1997) in the process of civil conflict resolution (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 2). Since the turn of the millennium, a “sec-ond generation of DDR” (ibid., p. 3) has increasingly taken the communities and families of reintegrating combatants into account (ibid.). The ‘second generation’ approach, embodied in the ‘Integrated DDR Standards’ that the United Nations (UN) published in 2006 (UN-DDR, 2006), has even led to programmes being implemented before a conflict formally ended (Idris, 2016, p. 5.) However, Iffat Idris emphasises that “[s]econd generation and traditional DDR programmes share the same objectives of supporting peace processes, creating political space and contributing to a secure environment” (ibid.).
Empirically, both first- and second-generation programmes have produced a mixed record. Cambodia, where the reluctance of one party to disarm led to continuing attacks on demobilis-ing combatants, and Angola, where incomplete disarmament led to the recurrence of violence, are frequently cited examples of failed initiatives (Banholzer, 2014, p. 14; Muggah & O’Don-nell, 2015, p. 3). In more recent cases, DDR initiatives hit their limits in failed states like So-malia or Libya (ibid., pp. 4-5). On the positive side, the programmes in Sierra Leone or Bosnia Herzegovina have been cherished for their contribution to the non-recurrence of violence (Banholzer, 2014, p. 15) – however, without singling out DDR’s particular impact. Similarly, the number of demobilising soldiers has led some observers to call demobilisation in Nicaragua “one of the most dramatic in military history” (Oliver, 2000, p. 267).
What complicates the evaluation of these initiatives is the fact that “[t]here is no clear-cut def-inition of what constitutes ‘success’ for a programme” (van Zoonen, 2015, p. 16; Williams, 2014). While the number of demobilised combatants or collected arms are commonly used as yardsticks to assess the success of DDR programmes (Theidon, 2007, p. 67; van Zoonen, 2015, p. 27), this thesis follows a different approach. Taking the objective “to contribute to security and stability” (UN-DDR, 2019) seriously, it analyses the impact of design- and context-level factors of three DDR programmes on those incentive and opportunity structures they seek to alter in a way that “facilitate[s] combatants’ transition from professional fighters to civilians and to reduce their incentives to take up arms again” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 3). Beyond mere numbers that do not indicate anything about the probability that participants will in fact refrain from violence in the future, this thesis seeks to assess DDR’s impact on factors that have em-pirically proven to either ‘push’ ex-combatants back to violence or pull them toward a civilian life.
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The debate about the potential and limitations of DDR programmes is especially relevant against the background of emerging alternatives to promote security in conflictive settings, such as community-based violence reduction (CVR; World Bank Group et. al., 2018, pp. 5-8). Rather than focussing on the demobilisation and reintegration of the particular group of ex-combatants, these initiatives seek to eradicate the root causes of violence in marginalised communities and “cut the stream of new recruits from the community” to armed groups (Schuberth, 2017, p. 422) at the community level. CVR initiatives have been applied both to replace (Haiti; ibid.) and to complement DDR programmes (Central African Republic; World Bank Group et. al., 2018, p. 6). However, in addressing the socio-economic exclusion of population in marginalised com-munities and with its focus on “replacing the income-generating function” of criminal violence, these approaches are rather tailored to address problems of urban gangs or (re-)emerging crim-inal bands. They have also been criticised for undermining state-building efforts by creating alternative structures that provide state services or basic goods (Schuberth, 2017, p. 422-425), which further questions their suitability for traditional resolution of political conflict. Conse-quently, these failures and the continued implementation of DDR (i.e. in Colombia, where a DDR programme was launched for former guerrillas in 2017), demonstrate that CVR has not yet outperformed DDR or converted it into an outdated concept. Rather it points at the persisting need to refine and integrate the approaches given that their efficiency will “directly affect the level of violence prevalent within a post-conflict society and its future rate of development.” (Knight & Özerdem, 2004, p. 513).
To respond to this need, this thesis departs from “technocratic exercises concerned with tallying the number of weapons collected and combatants enrolled” (Theidon, 2009, p. 3) to assess the role that DDR can or cannot play within the peacebuilding process. Instead, it revisits three DDR initiatives and analyses them against their own claim to deliver incentives and opportuni-ties for former combatants that convince them that they “do not need to return to war in order
to survive” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 9).
2.2. DDR and (Post-)Conflict Violence
A main factor that threatens physical human security in post-conflict settings is the danger of recurring war: Quinn et. al. (2007) observe that civil conflicts occur more often in countries that have previously experienced conflict, although the effect gradually decreases over time (see also: Mason et. al., 2011 and Walter, 2004). However, the recurrence of full-blown civil war is not the only form, in which violence can (re)emerge in societies that have gone through peace- or demobilisation processes. Steenkamp (2011) shows how the distinction between
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different ideal types of violence (i.e. political, social, and economic violence) and between their traditional perpetrators is constantly blurred in these settings. Schuld (2013) demonstrates how violence persisted after conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, for example in form of violent protests, targeted assassinations or homicide – what changed was the label assigned to the vio-lence from ‘political’ to ‘criminal’ viovio-lence. In a quantitative, comparative analysis, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the occurrence of civil war raises homicide rates by about 25 percent during the first five post-war years, thus empirically supporting the impression that a peace process may transform patterns of violence but not necessarily neutralises them. However, none of these studies explores the explicit role that DDR programmes and their shortcomings may have played in this transformation.
Certainly, it would be illusory and unfair to expect that DDR could tackle root causes of conflict or eradicate all sources of violence within society (Rufer, 2005, p. 62). Instead, the programmes focus on ex-combatants due to their “access to (heavy) weaponry and the fact that they are part of organised command structure” (van Zoonen, 2015, p. 10), which might increase chances that they act as ‘spoilers’ (Stedman, 1997) to the peace process, or more broadly, (re-)engage in armed groups of any nature. A range of studies has subsequently singled out factors that con-tribute to the involvement of ex-combatants in crime and violence, such as limited access to land as an alternative form for subsistence (Collier, 1994), frustration about opportunities for reintegration (Jennings, 2007), economic hardship and poverty (Hill et. al., 2008; Mashike, 2007), security threats (Bøås and Hatløy, 2008), the presence of criminal opportunities, such as weapons or armed groups, as well as a lack of education (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018). On the other side, there are also factors that make a relapse into violence less probable: Tanner (1996) argues that additional benefits for compliance and sanction for non-compliance make combatants re-frain from violence, whereas Kaplan and Nussio (2018) stress the importance of acceptance in their new communities. In line with Mattes and Savun (2009), van Zoonen (2015) argues that channels for political participation open new non-violent ways to achieve desirable political outcomes.
However, the differences in methodology and operationalisation among many of the single-case studies complicate comparison and generalisation (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018, p. 68). More-over, none of these studies has systematically assessed how DDR programmes have shaped incentives and opportunities for violent behaviour among ex-combatants during and after their implementation. Given the susceptibility of societies that have experienced peace processes and demobilisation to renewed violence, and the fact that “all recidivists represent reintegration
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failures” (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018, p. 67), this is not only relevant to contribute to a more holistic explanation of (post-)conflict insecurity in the three cases of interest, but may also yield im-portant insights for more recent initiatives.
2.3. Design and Context of DDR Programmes
Given the frequency, with which DDR programmes are implemented, an increasing number of scholars and practitioners alike demand comparative and “systematic approach[es] that can compare the effectiveness of the same set of policies across different contexts” (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis, 2010, p. 41). According to Franziska Seethaler (2016), this demand has not yet been met. Still, there are some ‘lessons learned’ regarding design- and context-level factors that help DDR programmes to combat factors favouring recidivism and to “facilitate combat-ants’ transition from professional fighters to civilians” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 3).
Regarding the concrete design of DDR programmes, Banholzer (2013, 2014) finds that it is crucial to implement DDR programmes after the end of a conflict. She argues that turning in weapons requires a level of trust that is often absent in times of full-blown conflict (ibid., 2014, p. 31). Furthermore, to effectively reduce security threats to demobilising parties and the num-ber of arms in circulation, it is important for DDR programmes to “include all insurgent and informal formations” (Rabasa et. al., 2011, p. 51), often complemented by the separation of forces in security zones or cantonments (Tanner, 1996, p. 179). Comprehensive disarmament further requires “a great deal of weapons expertise and a continuous flow of information about the location and the status of forces, armament, and military equipment“ (ibid.). Tailored assis-tance provided during the reintegration programme should take the specific needs of demobi-lising parties into account to avoid the perception of discrimination – including gender-sensi-tivity (Aoláin et. al., 2011) and special attention to children (Rabasa et. al., 2011, pp. 62-63). Ultimately, the overall level of financial and judicial benefits for ex-combatants should be so high “that it is more attractive for them to work as civilians than to remain soldiers“ (Banholzer, 2014, p. 17). Finally, transparency – for example by spelling out the concrete terms for the initiative in a negotiated settlement (Muggah and Baaré, 2009) – and the direct involvement of former combatants in designing the programme respond to the “need to create space for partic-ipants to understand and ultimately participate in conventional security promotion” (Colletta and Muggah, 2009, p. 439) and can help to prevent frustration (Idris, 2016, p. 2).
Regarding the (inter-)national environment of implementation, a favourable economic context is depicted as important to reduce chances that ex-combatants are “reintegrated into poverty”
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(Banholzer, 2014, p. 31) or unemployment. Second, the presence of democratic institutions as a fear-reducing mechanism (Mattes and Savun, 2009; van Zoonen, 2015, p. 15) can encourage demobilisation because it convinces combatants that there are alternative ways to achieve de-sirable political outcomes or solve disputes other than armed struggle. In addition to a demo-cratic regime, other state institutions – especially in the security sector – should possess the necessary capacity “to ensure that governments are not only willing to carry out the DDR pro-cess, but also capable of fulfilling their commitments and providing security to the demobilised combatants” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 31). Where trust or state capacity are underdeveloped, the presence of a third party can help to “overcome compliance problems by monitoring, observing and in some cases even enforcing compliance” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 20, van Zoonen, 2015). International cooperation is also important to create “reliable funding streams” (Idris, 2016, p. 2), which ensure that benefits can be delivered as promised. Finally, Herz and Santos (2019) reiterate that DDR processes should be accompanied by additional measures for arms control at the (inter-)national level to effectively reduce the number of arms in circulation.
Although these factors at both macro- (context) and meso-level (design) have been among the ‘learned lessons’, it has not yet been tested in a comparative way how their constellation works in shaping the incentives and opportunities for ex-combatants to choose a civilian life over war.
2.4. DDR Programmes in Latin America
In this section, the current state of research on the DDR initiatives in Nicaragua (1990-1992), El Salvador (1992-1996) and Colombia (2003-2005) will be outlined. The programmes in Cen-tral America have been called relatively successful, “particularly if gauged by the extent to which they contributed to preventing the recurrence of armed conflict” (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 3). In both cases, the programmes collected large numbers of weapons from insurgent groups, namely the right-wing contras around the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) in Nicaragua and left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Moreover, they helped to reduce the national armies significantly (Sandinista Popular Army, EPS, in Nic-aragua and Armed Forces of El Salvador, FAES). More critical literature has pointed at two common problems: a lack of precise ex-ante estimates of the insurgents’ arsenal allowing them to retain parts of their inventory (Spencer, 1997; Chamorro, 2015) and the failure to deliver promised reintegration benefits (development poles in Nicaragua and land for agricultural pro-duction in El Salvador; Martí Puig, 2002, Segovia, 2009). In Nicaragua, the availability of arms and frustration about the reintegration process led members of both factions to rearm (Spencer, 1997, pp. 24-28; Bothmann, 2015, p. 167) and contributed to the establishment of criminal
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(youth) gangs (Rodgers, 1999). In El Salvador, violence by armed groups persisted by trans-cending the boundaries between political groups and organised crime (Joint Group for the In-vestigation of Illegal Armed Groups with political Motivation in El Salvador, 1994; Interna-tional Crisis Group, 2017). In both cases however, the analyses of DDR shortcomings remain rather descriptive and do not systematically examine the combatants’ incentives for retaining arms in the first place, which the DDR programme would ideally eradicate.
Colombia represents a somewhat different case: To reduce levels of violence in the country, President Álvaro Uribe reached an agreement with the right-wing paramilitary umbrella organ-isation United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), while the conflict with left-wing guer-rilla groups continued. While the DDR programme was indeed able to temporarily reduce rates of violent crime (Restrepo & Muggah, 2009), Theidon (2009) and Capone (2018) point at (re-)emerging criminal structures seeking to take over spaces and illicit markets formerly adminis-tered by the AUC. Kaplan and Nussio (2018) show that the presence of these structures had a direct impact on the probability of ex-combatant recidivism. Marcou (2017) further theorises that DDR has not only failed to prevent their return to criminal activities, but actively promoted the restructuration of criminal entities by enabling them to “act less visibly; get rid of their label and counterinsurgent discourse; renew their structure; change their strategy; renew their social control; and transform their relations with the State” (p. 50). Together, these studies provide valuable insights into the opportunities (Marcou, 2017) and motives (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018) for the (re)engagement of demobilised paramilitaries in armed structures; however, there is still room to integrate their findings into a consistent and comparative assessment of the entire DDR process, since they focus heavily on the post-implementation period.
2.5. Summary: Why another DDR study?
As outlined above, post-demobilisation violence continues to plague Latin America long after the DDR programmes themselves finished. Surprisingly, no study has yet systematically un-packed the ways, in which DDR initiatives have altered incentives and opportunities of ex-combatants in a way that would lead them to preclude violent behaviour after demobilisation. Although large-n studies have identified some supportive meso- and macro-level features, such as the presence of third parties or implementation before the end of a conflict, they seldom conceptualise outcomes in terms of DDR’s core objective: to incentivise former combatants to choose a civilian life over violence. Revisiting the DDR programmes in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia not only contributes to a more holistic explanation of ex-combatant involvement in organised criminal violence that is still present in these countries, but also lead to a more
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realistic formulation of preferences and expectations in more recent and future cases of DDR initiatives.
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3. Theoretical Framework
In the theory-guided analysis, I seek to assess whether context and design have allowed the three DDR programmes to shape incentives and opportunities for and against violent behaviour among ex-combatants in a way that makes it “more attractive for them to work as civilians than to remain soldiers.“ (Banholzer, 2014, p. 17). Therefore, I reconstruct the mechanism from the policy literature that describes the basic idea of DDR programmes to improve the security con-text by “facilitat[ing] combatants’ transition from professional fighters to civilians” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 3). To make the analysis more focussed and embed it in existing research, I apply Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) theory of recidivism. I use their concept of driving forces to de-scribe those factors that have proven to ‘push’ ex-combatants back to violence and restraining forces to describe aspects that ‘pull’ former fighters towards a civilian life. I then identify those features related to design and context of DDR programmes, that seek to constrain the former and to promote the formation of the latter. This provides me with a theoretical template to ana-lyse whether DDR initiatives – in conjuncture with context-level factors – have the potential to successfully eradicate driving forces and promote restraining forces and to explain why past programmes may have failed to do so.
I argue that DDR’s potential to deter ex-combatants from violent behaviour is limited, since – across time and contexts – it does not address many of these driving forces comprehensively enough, whereas often leaving major restraining forces underdeveloped. Rather than curtailing incentives and opportunities for violent behaviour, it transforms the preferences and scope of action for ex-combatants in a way that does not preclude the future use of (armed) violence. However, this violence may be perpetrated in more subtle forms, such as self-defence or crim-inal efforts for income-generation, different from open combat during wartimes. In the analysis, the model allows me to assess across cases whether context and design of the initiatives have successfully diminished driving forces of violent behaviour while effectively promoting re-straining forces.
3.1. The Security Dividend – Normative and Theoretical Underpinnings of
DDR Programmes
In (post-)conflict societies, the question why DDR processes should be justified in the first place arises, given that their “specific focus on ex-combatants” (UN-DDR, 2009, p. 7) often entails benefits for potential perpetrators of human rights violations and war crimes. The prev-alent answer lies in what Restrepo and Muggah (2009) call the “security dividend” (p. 30). The
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investment in combatant-centred DDR programmes is justified by pointing at the collective benefit of an improved security context that DDR seeks to contribute to. (Personal) Security in turn is described as the precondition “which is necessary for recovery activities to begin” (UN-DDR, 2006, p. 3). Across time and countries, Banholzer (2014) observes that ex-combatants and veterans have struggled to find employment or other meaningful activities to fill their lives with. “These unemployed ex-combatants,” she argues, “are easy targets for existing or new rebel groups or criminal gangs” (p. 5) and can become what Stephen Stedman (1997) has fa-mously called “spoilers”. Spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to under-mine attempts to achieve it” (ibid., p. 5). Hence, investing in a successful demobilisation and reintegration programme is justified to minimise the risk of former combatants becoming spoil-ers in the peace process; it aims at “creating a ‘transitional safety net’ to ensure that combatants do not need to return to war in order to survive” (Banholzer, 2014, p. 9). If this ‘transitional safety net’ in combination with the active discouragement of violence convinces former com-batants to choose a civilian life over violence, their decisions will ultimately benefit the whole society at an aggregate level in form of increased security. Figure 1 summarises the normative justification for applying DDR programmes in (post-)conflict settings.
However, this mechanism hinges on the crucial assumption that the decision of ex-combatants to return to violence or pursue a civilian lifestyle will be based – at least to a certain degree – on rational assessments of the benefits that violent struggle or crime entail vis-à-vis the benefits of reintegrating into civil society. If only the former can be reduced and the latter can “be raised Figure 1: Normative Fundament of DDR Programmes - Contribution to an improved security context
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so high that it is more attractive for them to work as civilians than to remain soldiers“ (Banholzer, 2014, p. 17), the transition from a soldier to a civilian will be successful. As de-picted in section 2.3., DDR programmes apply a variety of measures to achieve this goal, while a favourable context can reinforce this effect. For example, violence can be made less attractive by restricting the availability of arms through comprehensive disarmament – ideally accompa-nied by a third party and additional measures for arms control – and separating warring parties from each other. At the same time, providing former combatants with the means for successful socio-economic reintegration makes a civilian life more attractive. In that sense, DDR pro-grammes are explicitly “designed to affect the calculus of ex-combatants and keep them from becoming rearmed spoilers and criminals” (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018, p. 67).
This “rational choice and combatant centric approach” (Bhatia and Muggah, 2009, p. 127), in which, ultimately, “combatants are treated as rational utility maximisers” (Munive & Stepputat, 2015), has not remained uncriticised. Constructivist and feminist scholars have pointed at the importance of weapons for the construction of identity (Donkers, 2017, p. 35) and masculinity (Theidon, 2009) as alternative and complementary explanations for individual decisions to carry arms, beside mere calculations about benefits. Ideally, one could do justice to this criti-cism by focussing on the right side of the model shown in Figure 1 and assess, first, to what extent ex-combatants have returned to violence and, second, what their motives were for doing so. However, this undertaking would require a combination of extensive police data and repre-sentative surveys among ex-combatants (as in Kaplan & Nussio, 2018) – a task that is certainly important, but goes beyond the scope of this paper.
In the absence of such data, I analyse DDR programmes within their own conceptual framework of altering the incentive and opportunity structure as a necessary condition to deter ex-combat-ants from relapsing into violence – while not neglecting alternative or complementary explana-tions that might influence their decision to ultimately engage in violence or not. To make the analysis more focussed and embed it in existing findings, I consult Kaplan and Nussio’s theory of recidivism and draw on their distinction between driving and restraining forces, which I will present in more detail in the next section. This allows me to assess how design- and context-level features of DDR programmes, applied to effectively prevent recidivism, have shaped those incentives and opportunities that have proven to promote recidivism (driving forces) and those that prevent recidivism (restraining forces).
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3.2. Driving and Restraining Forces and their Link to DDR-Programmes
To categorise incentives and opportunities for violence and in favour of a civilian life, I draw on Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) distinction between driving forces and restraining forces. The concepts are part of their theory of recidivism, formulated in the context of a case study on former AUC-combatants in Colombia about the question what explains their return to criminal or violent behaviour (or the absence of such). Drawing on a synthesis of insights from crimino-logical, psychological and political research, they make a basic distinction between driving forces and restraining forces of criminal behaviour in general and – more important for the purpose of this thesis – violence in particular. Driving forces are understood as ‘push-factors’ that have empirically encouraged the return to violent behaviour, while restraining forces are those factors that ‘pull’ people away from violent behaviour. Similar to the rationale that un-derlies DDR programmes, they find “that ex-combatants’ participation in illegal or belligerent activities is the product of both driving and restraining forces” (p. 69). Among the driving forces, they list economic conditions, security context, criminal opportunities and preferences for a violent lifestyle, while restraining forces are family ties and benefits from reintegration programmes, especially formal education.
For the theory to be able to guide my analysis of DDR-programmes, I adjust the list of driving and restraining forces based on the existing literature (2.2.) and the explicit link of these aspects to design- and context-level factors of DDR programmes. Consistent with existing research on recidivism, I include ‘threats to personal security of demobilised combatants’ (Nussio, 2011, Bøås and Hatløy, 2008) and ‘criminal opportunities as the availability of arms’ (Stanley & Loosle, 2002; van Zoonen, 2015; Kaplan & Nussio, 2018) as driving forces in the analysis. The latter is important because it determines to what extent newly emerging armed groups can rely on remaining weaponry. According to Kaplan and Nussio, the presence of these potentially (re)emerging groups, even if they were not targeted by DDR in the first place, constitutes prom-ising criminal opportunities for ex-combatants skilled at using weapons. ‘Frustration about non-compliance with promised benefits for ex-combatants’ (Jennings, 2007) and ‘relative depriva-tion as disadvantage vis-à-vis other parties’ (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018; Spencer, 1997) complete the list of driving forces. ‘Relative deprivation’ in this instance also includes the extent to which a DDR programme was responsive to the concrete demands and needs of a particular demobi-lising group. I exclude the micro-level factor of individual preferences for a violent lifestyle, that Kaplan and Nussio measure through the motive for initially joining an armed group. Alt-hough – at least according to Kaplan & Nussio – a connection to the chances of recidivism is
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probable, it is impossible for DDR programmes to retrospectively change these motives. In-stead, DDR itself will seek to alter these preferences by discouraging violence and promoting a civilian lifestyle. To link these driving forces to DDR programmes, I identify those measures that DDR programmes apply to curtail each of these driving forces plus the context-level factors that can reinforce the effect (Table 1).
A similar procedure is applied to identify four relevant restraining forces and their link to DDR programmes: Based on existing literature, I include ‘sanctioning of non-compliance’ (Tanner, 1996; Banholzer, 2014), the ‘provision of alternative sources for subsistence’ (van Zoonen, 2015, Kaplan & Nussio, 2018), ‘channels for political participation’ (van Zoonen, 2015, Col-letta & Muggah, 2009) and the ‘acceptance in new communities’ (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018) as restraining forces in the analysis. Again, I exclude those micro-level factors that can hardly be changed by context or design of DDR programmes, namely strong family ties or responsibility for children, which, according to Kaplan & Nussio, significantly decrease the risk of recidivism, and gender, given that male combatants are more likely to return to crime or violence (ibid.). While, in line with Theidon (2009), the latter aspect clearly points at the need for DDR pro-grammes to engage more in the deconstruction and demilitarisation of images of masculinity, it is not unproblematic to include masculinity per se as a driving force in a comparative analysis across temporal and spatial contexts. As in case of driving forces, I identify the corresponding design- and context-level factors that help to promote restraining forces (Table 2).
Driving Force
Aspects of DDR design and context that seek to curtail driving force
Design Context
Threats to personal security of demobilised combatants1
Separation of forces and comprehensive disarmament after cessation of hostilities5
Institutional capacity and man-date to effectively guarantee security9
Criminal opportunities: Avail-ability of arms2
Comprehensive disarma-ment6
Institutional capacity and man-date to implement effective arms control10
Frustration: Non-compliance with promised benefits for ex-combatants3
Realistic objectives7 Solid mechanisms for fund-ing11
Relative deprivation: Disad-vantage vis-à-vis other parties4
Tailored and balanced assis-tance8
Dispute-solving mechanisms established by state or third-party12
Sources: 1 Nussio (2011), Bøås and Hatløy (2008) 2 Stanley & Loosle (2002), van Zoonen (2015) 3 Jennings (2007) 4 Kaplan & Nussio (2018), Spencer (1997) 5Banholzer (2013, 2014), Rabasa et. al. (2011), Tanner (1996) 6Rabasa et. al. (2011) 7 Muggah (2005), Idris (2016) 8 Idris (2016), Banholzer (2014) 9 Banholzer (2014) 10 Herz & Santos (2019) 11 Banholzer (2014), Idris (2016)
12Capone (2018)
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Together, the two main concepts of Kaplan and Nussio’s theory of recidivism on the one hand, and their link to DDR programmes on the other, provide a template to analyse the three DDR processes of interest: Where the presence of recommended design- and context-level factors was given, it allows me to assess whether they possessed the potential to effectively eradicate driving forces or promote restraining forces – without losing sight of alternative explanations. Their absence in turn may contribute to a more holistic explanation of recidivism in the respec-tive country and failures of the DDR programme. Distinguishing between programme- and context-specific aspects allows for a better assessment of endogenous and exogenous potential of DDR programmes. After introducing the general approach, I will outline the operationalisa-tion of the theoretical model’s main factors to guide the analysis.
Restraining Force
Aspects of DDR design and context that seek to promote re-straining force
Design Context
Sanctioning of non-compli-ance1
Loss of reintegration benefits in case of non-compliance5
Institutional capacity to monitor and persecute non-compliance9 Reintegration Benefits:
Provi-sion of alternative source for subsistence2
Opening of job opportunities through education and training programmes, foundation of mi-cro-enterprises or land distribu-tion6
Favourable economic situation (strong recovery performance, low levels of unemployment)10
Channels for political partici-pation3
Incorporation of armed groups into decision-making process7
Development of democratic insti-tutions11
Acceptance in new communi-ties4
Programmes for (voluntary) re-settlement8
Provision of explicit benefits for host communities12
Sources: 1 Tanner (1996), Banholzer (2014) 2 van Zoonen (2015), Kaplan & Nussio (2018) 3 Mattes & Savun (2009), van Zoonen (2015)
4
Kaplan & Nussio (2018) 5 Tanner (1996) 6 Banholzer (2014), Mashike (2007) 7 van Zoonen (2015), Colletta & Muggah (2009) 8 Sriram & Herman (2009), Collier (1994) 9 Banholzer (2014) 10 Banholzer (2014), McMullin (2013) 11 van Zoonen (2015) 12 Idris (2016)
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4. Methodology
In this section, the methodological approach will be outlined. While the comparative approach does not only respond to specific gaps in the literature, it is also applied in this study to represent three DDR programmes with differing starting points in terms of macro- and meso-level factors that accompanied their implementation. To operationalise the elements of the theoretical frame-work outlined in the previous chapter, I rely on a thorough analysis of relevant documents.
4.1. General Approach
This thesis takes the form of a theory-guided, comparative case study with the objective of testing the theoretically supposed relation between DDR initiatives (including their concrete design as well as the side-conditions of their implementation) on the one hand, and the reduction of driving forces and promotion of restraining forces among ex-combatants on the other. The analysis is conducted against the background of three cases of DDR programmes in Latin Amer-ica. Case studies allow for “the historical explanation of particular cases, that is, explanation of a sequence of events that produce a particular historical outcome in which key steps in the sequence are in turn explained with reference to theories or causal mechanisms” (Bennett, 2004, p. 21). In this thesis, the sequence of events are the DDR processes in the selected countries with the objective being the evaluation of their impact on driving and restraining forces during and up to five years after the initiatives, making use of both Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) theory of recidivism and the function of certain design- and context-level factors of DDR programmes that, according to the literature, address driving and restraining forces.
Bartlett and Vavrus (2017; 2017b) describe the competitive advantage of adding a comparative dimension to the study vis-à-vis single case studies. Comparative case studies as a process-oriented approach serve as a tool for in-depth analysis of a certain supposed phenomenon or process because rather than studying the subject of interest in isolation, comparative case stud-ies generate insights through comparison across three axes: a horizontal axis that analyses the phenomenon across different contexts (three cases of DDR initiatives), a vertical axis that ex-amines the interaction between different scales of analysis (macro-, meso- and micro level) and a transversal comparison over time (different phases of the process). As such, comparative case studies allow for “an iterative and contingent tracing of relevant factors, actors, and features” (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2017, p. 902).
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To “focus the investigation in a way that contribute[s…] to comparative consistency” (Bengts-son & Ruonavaara, 2017, p. 58), I divide the research period into three phases: First, I identify a ‘Disarmament and Demobilisation Period’ that begins with the first handover of weapons and ends when the process of demobilisation is completed. Second, I refer to the ‘Reintegration Period’ to describe the phase of humanitarian assistance, education programmes, job training and other institutionalised programmes that seeks to facilitate socio-economic reintegration. Finally, the ‘Post-Implementation Period’ describes the five years following the official end of the programmes. Although not explicitly included in the research period, I refer to the ‘Nego-tiation Period’ as the phase from the first nego‘Nego-tiations to the conclusion of the final agreement to retrospectively assess the preferences and expectations of involved parties. While the periods might empirically overlap (i.e. some combatants might already be enrolled in reintegration pro-grammes, while other are still disarming), periodisation allows me to refer across cases to dif-ferent stages of the DDR process, that usually take place in particular sites, have particular objectives, and might be susceptible to particular problems. A detailed overview of periodisa-tion for the chosen cases can be found in the appendix (1. Periodisaperiodisa-tion of DDR Programmes).
4.2. Operationalisation and Data Collection
In this section, I will show how the theoretical framework is applied to the concrete cases. First, a set of indicators was developed to trace the dynamics of the driving and restraining forces described in Table 1 and Table 2 throughout the research period. The period begins with the start of disarmament and ends five years after the end of the programme, thus reaching a com-promise between Seethaler’s (2016) demand for the assessment of long-term impact and the scope of this thesis. Second, to contribute to an explanation of the dynamics of driving and restraining forces, a set of guiding questions was developed that seeks to assess DDR’s endog-enous and exogendog-enous potential to adequately address these forces. Based on Table 1 and Table 2, depicted in the theoretical framework, both indicators for the persistence of driving forces or absence of restraining forces as well as the guiding questions are summarised in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
22 Driving Forces
Driving Force Indicator for Persistence Guiding questions for analysis of design and context
Threats to personal secu-rity of demobilised com-batants • Extrajudicial killings of ex-combatants • Complaints by (mid-/high-level) ex-combat-ants
Design: Did the programme provide security guar-antees / effective separation of forces?
Context: Did national institutions / third parties have the mandate and capacity to repel security threats?
Criminal opportunities: Availability of arms
• Ratio collected arms and estimated arsenal
• Documented use / storage of war weaponry after de-mobilisation
Design: Did the programme have the necessary mandate / information for comprehensive dis-armament?
Context: Did state / regional / third-party actors have the mandate and capacity to control (cross-border) flows of weapons?
Frustration: Non-compli-ance with promised bene-fits for ex-combatants
• Limited coverage rate of benefits
• Complaints by one party about non-compliance
Design: Did the execution of the programme ex-perience unilateral refinement of objectives? Context: Were funding mechanisms solid enough to guarantee the provision of promised benefits?
Relative deprivation: Dis-advantage vis-à-vis other parties
• Distribution of benefits • Complaints by one party
about discrimination
Design: Did the benefits match the specific de-mands of demobilising group(s)?
Context: Did national / regional / third-party ac-tors establish effective mechanisms for dispute-solving?
Table 3: Indicators for persistence of driving forces and guiding questions for analysis of design and context
Restraining Forces Restraining Force Indicator for
Underdevel-opment
Guiding questions for analysis of design and context
Sanctioning of non-com-pliance
• Complaints by enforcing agencies
Design: Did the programme envisage sanctions for non-compliance?
Context: Did national / regional / third-party actors have the capacity and mandate for effective moni-toring?
Reintegration Benefits: Provision of alternative source for subsistence
• Unemployment rate among ex-combatants • Unprofitability of micro-companies/agricultural projects • Complaints by (mid-/high-level) combatants
Design: Did the programme envisage comprehen-sive and tailored measures for job creation?
Context: Did the economic context allow for the effective reintegration of ex-combatants into the la-bour market?
Channels for political par-ticipation
• (Violent) Demonstrations • Complaints by
ex-com-batants or related associa-tions
Design: Did the programme envisage the active in-volvement of ex-combatants in shaping it?
Context: Did democratic institutions represent the interests of former combatants, i.e. through their le-galisation as a political entity?
Acceptance in new com-munities
• Complaints by (mid/high-level) ex-combatants or communal authorities
Design: Did the programme envisage resettlement into familiar / favourable contexts?
Context: Did national / regional / third party actors take additional measures to benefit host communi-ties?
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For data collection, I rely on the method of document analysis. To trace the dynamics of driving and restraining forces with the help of the chosen indicators, I review data provided by the agencies that accompanied the DDR process and its immediate aftermath, such as international third parties and donors, governmental and state agencies, human rights agencies and other non-governmental organisations. I also consult secondary literature and media archives, especially interview material with ex-combatants. When complaints by ex-combatants are used as an in-dicator, I focus on statements by mid- and high-level commanders, since they can be expected to represent at least a limited number of combatants. To identify those design- and context-level factors of DDR programmes that contribute to an explanation of changes in driving and re-straining forces I analyse the legal documents that outline the DDR procedure, reports and man-dates of third-parties or involved agencies, and secondary literature against the background of the guiding questions depicted in Tables 3 and 4. In the analysis, this procedure allows me to assess across cases whether context and design of the initiatives have successfully diminished driving forces of violent behaviour while effectively promoting restraining forces. If, however, I find no evidence for the presence or salience of major driving forces, or I do find that aspects related to design and context of the DDR initiative were effectively able to deter ex-combatants from violence, my argument that DDR is ill-equipped to deal with the multifaceted incentives and opportunities for ex-combatants to return to violence after demobilisation is rejected. Sim-ilarly, if I find that alternative motives unrelated to the DDR programme are more – or in the sense of equifinality equally – compelling to explain the decision of ex-combatants, I reject the argument.
Of course, there can be no absolute certainty that changes in driving and restraining forces can be attributed to either context- or design-level factors of the DDR programme (3.1.). However, this risk is mitigated in four ways: First, the analysis is informed by relevant theories, relying on factors that have empirically favoured or hindered recidivism on the one hand, and the causal mechanisms through which different design- and context-level factors of DDR programmes address these factors on the other. If I find that driving forces persisted throughout the period of DDR implementation, although the design contained all potential measures to diminish them, this already indicates something about the endogenous potential of DDR programmes to ad-dress these forces, regardless of whether context-level factors or alternative explanations are more compelling in accounting for the persistence. Second, alternative or – in the sense of equifinality – complementary explanations, which are unrelated to both context and design, shall always be reflected upon. A concrete example is the importation of gang-structures from the United States of America (USA) to El Salvador as a consequence of asylum policy changes