Content
THE BLACK SWAN: EU POWER IN THE ARCTIC 4
1.1 INTRODUCTION 4
1.2 THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 5
1.3 EXPLAINING DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 6
1.4 OUTLINE THESIS 7
CONCEPTUALIZING THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR 9
2.1 OPPORTUNITIES:THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 9
2.2 PRESENCE:THE VIRTUE OF EXISTENCE 11
2.3 CAPABILITY:COMPLEX NATUREEUPOLICY-MAKING 13
2.3.1 POLICY FORMULATION 13
2.3.2 AVAILABLE POLICY MECHANISMS 15
RESEARCHING THE EU AS AN ARCTIC ACTOR 17
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDY 17
3.2 DATA COLLECTION: SAMPLING AND CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS 18
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 20
IN OR OUT: THE LONG MARCH NORTH FROM BRUSSELS 22
4.1 THE FIRSTARCTIC WAVE:PRIMING THE REGION FOR COOPERATION 22 4.2 THE SECONDARCTIC WAVE: SIGNALLING SOVEREIGN RIGHTS 24
4.3 FUTURE PROSPECTS:THEARCTIC AS A MOVING TARGET 25
THE BULL IN THE CHINA SHOP: EU PRESENCE 28
5.1 ANORMATIVE CORE:CONCERNS ABOUT AEUBLOCK 28
5.2 MARKET POWER:THEEUAS A NET EXPORTER OF RULES 31
5.3 EUROPE AS AN EMPIRE:ALLEGATIONS OF IMPERIALISM 33
IN PURSUIT OF THE GOLDEN TICKET: EU CAPABILITIES 36
6.1 THE ABILITY TO FORMULATE POLICY 36
6.1.1 VERTICAL COHERENCE 37
6.1.2 HORIZONTAL COHERENCE 38
6.1.3 INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE 39
6.2 AVAILABILITY OF POLICY MECHANISMS 41
6.2.1 COERCION 41
6.2.2 MANIPULATING UTILITY CALCULATIONS 42
6.2.3 SUASION 44 CONCLUSION 47 REFERENCE LIST 50 ANNEXES 56 MAPARCTIC 57 CODING FRAME 58 TRANSCRIPTS 60
TRANSCRIPT1, 18 MARCH2014 61 TRANSCRIPT2, 20 MARCH2014 70 TRANSCRIPT3, 21 MARCH2014 73 TRANSCRIPT4, 9 APRIL2014 81 TRANSCRIPT5, 9 APRIL2014 92 TRANSCRIPT6, 14 APRIL2014 94 TRANSCRIPT7, 14 APRIL2014 100 TRANSCRIPT8, 24 APRIL2014 107 TRANSCRIPT9, 24 APRIL2014 121 TRANSCRIPT10, 29 APRIL2014 130 TRANSCRIPT11, 26 MAY2014 136
The black swan: EU power in the Arctic
Abstract:This thesis examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Arctic regime. Building on earlier assessments of the EU as a global actor, one would expect influence to be strong.Yet, the journey north has proven disproportionally long and difficult. Relying on interviews and policy documents, this thesis demonstrates that Arctic states exclude the Union from their inner circle, because it tries to address problems that are not considered particularly pressing. Consequently, EU institutions are in a weak position vis-à-vis involved member states, leaving the latter better equipped to protect national interests. In turn, the position of a demandeur is not conducive when trying to promote sustainability, as it is in fierce competition with the more immediate benefits of development and trade that are emphasized on the national and international level.
1.1 Introduction
In the Netherlands the Arctic region is subject of many Wild West stories. All of them originate from what we call ‘the Golden Age’, in which our little country was the foremost maritime and economic power in the world. The most famous story describes the last journey of polar navigators Willem Barentz and Jacob van Heemskerk, who tried to discover an Arctic passage from Europe to China. Due to sea ice, however, they and their crew were eventually stranded on the island of Nova Zembla. On this freezing cold archipelago in the Arctic Ocean they spend the entire winter in het Behouden Huys (the Safe Home). While trying to keep the polar bears at distance, they carefully watched the horizon, waiting to be rescued. Yet, not one ship passed by. When summer finally came, twelve surviving crewmembers were able to peddle back to the mainland, using small boats. Sadly, Willem Barentz1died a week before reaching shore.
Since the gruelling winter of 1596-1597 much has changed. In the year 2013 about 71 ships navigated safely through a greening Arctic (Website Council of Foreign Relations, 2014). As already recognized by the early Dutch explorers, this presents huge potential for commercial shipping as it significantly cuts journey time by 13 days (The Guardian, 18 August 2013). The intensity of interests is unlikely to change in the future, given the forecast that the volume of international trade is likely to triple by 2020, with
90 per cent of it traveling by sea (UNEP/IOC-UNESCO, 2008). Moreover, the softening of the extreme weather conditions make it possible to exploit the natural resources to be found on Nova Zembla, including copper, lead and zinc.
These prospects mark the Arctic region as being of strategic importance. As a Commission official put it: ‘We must be involved if we want to keep buying iPads, watch television and drive cars in the next five, ten to twenty years’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 21 March 2014). Given the fact that the Arctic lies in the geographical vicinity of the EU one would expect the Union to have a strong voice in shaping future prospects of development and trade. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. In consequence, this thesis asks how the EU can exert influence on the Arctic regime2, the troubles it faces when doing so and whether external governance can be viewed as having effect in relation to policy objectives. To do so, the thesis draws on actorness literature, which considers the interrelated concepts of opportunity, presence and capability (Bretherton and Vogler 2013, 376). These three dimensions help structure the argument that the execution of Arctic strategy is impeded by two factors: firstly the internal complexities of EU policy-making, and secondly the constraining factors associated with external perceptions and changes within the international system itself. To make this argument it is important to know what is happening inside the black box of Arctic politics and policies. This thesis therefore relies on twelve interviews with involved representatives, both in- and outside EU institutions, whom enable a better understanding of the Arctic game.
1.2 The need for sustainable cooperation and development
Learning the rules of the game is of crucial importance as the economic potential to be found in the Arctic might relieve the dependency on external (Russian) energy sources. To illustrate: 85 per cent of European oil and 67 per cent of its gas reserves are imported (European Commission, 2013a). Most products originate from Russia (ibid), who is not the most reliable partner as exemplified by recent events in Ukraine, where it decided to cut off the gas due to a political dispute (The Globe and Mail, 16 June 2014). To secure
2In this thesis the Arctic regime refers exclusively to members of the Arctic Council being Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden Russia, and the US. To become a full member of the Arctic Council, territory in the Arctic Ocean is a prerequisite (see map included in the Annexes). Conclusions derived from this thesis are thus geographically bound.
energy to its citizens and protect its industry from shutting down, the EU thus shows a healthy amount of self-interest when looking up North. It has been estimated that the Arctic holds around 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 per cent of its yet-to-find oil (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008). Potential drilling sites3are found in Norway and Iceland, both members of the European Economic Area (EEA), and in Greenland, which is part of Denmark and therefore indirectly linked to the EU. Lastly, Canada and the United States (US) have also discovered several new drilling sites. One would aspect that these ‘strategic partners’ (Website EEAS, 2013) are more reliable when providing energy security to European citizens.
However, oil will not drill itself. To exploit underground treasures, economic development is needed. In turn, this will not be conducive to the battle against climate change, a battle that the EU aims to lead (Website European Commission, 2014a). In this fight the Arctic, by some called the ‘world’s refrigerator’, is of crucial importance because of the role of sea ice in regulating global climate (Website Greenpeace, 2014). Sea ice reflects light, whereas the dark Arctic Ocean absorbs light. As sea ice melts, more of the ocean is exposed, meaning more sunlight is absorbed. This causes more warming, which in turn causes more sea ice to melt and continues the process (ibid). Another feedback loop is melting permafrost. Permafrost is ground that is literally frozen solid. As temperatures rise, permafrost melts, releasing trapped methane into the atmosphere. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, so as the permafrost melts and releases methane into the atmosphere, warming is exacerbated which in turn causes more permafrost to melt (ibid). The Arctic meltdown has grave consequences. There will be more forest fires and storm damage to coastal communities and it could halt the Gulf Stream, which brings warmer water and weather to the North-West of Europe (Website WWF, 2014).
1.3 Explaining different outcomes
The environmental dynamics are used to legitimize EU action ‘to help meet the challenges that now confront the region’ (European Commission and EEAS, 2012: 3). According to existing literature, the EU’s potential influence would be considerable as the Arctic is not only proximate, but scope conditions are also favourable (Börzel and Risse, 2011). Firstly, three out of eight Arctic states are EU members, while two are part of the EEA. These ‘scale-effects’ are beneficial for the Nordic states who face global
powers such as the US and Russia. In turn, this provides domestic incentives to demand increased EU involvement. Other Arctic states, large and capable enough to make their voice count, escape this form of influence, but are nevertheless sensitive as they are democracies (except Russia). Democracies are more willing to promote change as the costs of adaption are lower and likeminded forces are able to mobilize in favour of EU demands (ibid: 12). When adding up, relations should be symmetrical, maybe even leaning towards the EU as concerns about the polar bears are always shared with a segment of the population. This enhances EU’s ideational resources and complements its material bases derived from its sizeable market and regulatory capacities.
Yet, in the Arctic the EU struggles to make its voice heard regardless of close proximity and regardless of favourable scope conditions including domestic incentives, capable statehood, democracy and power asymmetries (Börzel and Risse, 2011: 14). In contrast to what is to be expected, domestic incentives to keep the EU out of the Arctic are stronger as to protect national interests. This exclusionary approach is shared with non-European countries. Outside the Union, European demands are rendered inappropriate even though Canada and the US are very much capable of implementing them. In turn, the EU is part of an unfavourable asymmetric relationship with hands tied to its back as it has no ideational resources and its material bases are ineffective. Indeed, these features did not enhance its power, but further diminished it as regulatory endeavours coupled to the internal market aggrieved third parties causing them to block EU access into the heart of the Arctic regime: the Arctic Council. It is thus useful to further specify the scope condition of proximity, in order to explain why European influence is limited in a case where it is expected to thrive.
1.4 Outline thesis
This thesis obeys to the following structure. It first conceptualizes the EU as a global actor using the analytical framework of Bretherton and Vogler (2013). It then studies how to adequately research the relationship between the EU and the Arctic, defending a critical case study design, semi-structured interviews, documents and qualitative content analysis. Lastly, it investigates the Arctic in more detail. In accordance with the themes provided by Bretherton and Vogler, the empirical part falls into three sections. Firstly, it looks at how ideas and events within the international system affect EU action. Secondly, it explores how the EU can manipulate the external environment by virtue of
existence. Thirdly, it researches how internal policy-making processes constrain or strengthen EU’s capacity to respond to its surroundings and to capitalize upon presence. These three dimensions facilitate a comprehensive assessment of the EU as an Arctic actor, which can be found in the conclusion.
Conceptualizing the EU as a global actor
The extent to which the EU is capable of functioning as an effective actor thus varies across countries, regions and policy sectors. In light of this conundrum, this theoretical chapter aims to conceptualize the Union as a global actor. To do so, this chapter draws on analytical framework of Bretherton and Vogler (2006), which studies the interrelated concepts of opportunity, presence, and capability. These overlapping dimensions enables to consider not only the internal complexities of EU policy-making, with their attendant implications for goal attainment, but also the enabling or constraining factors associated with external perceptions and expectations of the EU, and with changes in the international system itself (Bretherton and Vogler, 2012: 22). This facilitates a comprehensive assessment of actorness that focuses upon the relations aspect of external relations (ibid). The emphasis on a two-way-street is particularly appropriate when researching the EU and the Arctic regime. Here the Union faces global powers such as Canada, Russia and the US, who, in contrast to peripheral actors in the eastern and southern neighbourhood, are more capable of determining the terms of EU power.
The theoretical framework falls into three parts. It firstly explores how the external environment constrains or enables action. It then considers how the Union, by virtue of its existence, can manipulate its surroundings. Lastly, it explores how internal policy processes impede EU’s capability to capitalize upon presence. This section will pay attention to the formulation of policy and the availability of policy mechanisms.
2.1 Opportunities: the external environment
When exploring the ways in which the EU can influence the Arctic, it is first useful to note this does not occur against a blank slate. Therefore, one must take into account the environment in which these actions take place. According to Knud Erik Jørgensen, the role played by the external environment has been strangely downplayed (2007: 515). Simon Hix considers this to be a major flaw in external governance studies as Europe is more a responder to global economic and geopolitical developments than a shaper of these developments (2005: 396). As such, global developments beyond the EU’s control determine the agenda and timetable of its policies and the options available to EU policy makers (ibid). In light of this reasoning, international developments therefore should not be seen as ‘inert background’; rather it conceptualizes a dynamic process where
ideas are interpreted and events accorded meaning (Jacobsen, 2003: 56). Thus, while shared understandings constitutive of intersubjective structures shape the context of action, these understandings are not divorced from material conditions; rather they interpret (reflect/distort) them in various ways (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 22).
The emphasis on the external environment highlights the fact that the EU is dependent on a favourable structure that provides it with a window of opportunity. Opportunity denotes the external environment of ideas and events, constraining or enabling action (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 22). Following Friis and Murphy (1999), this definition of opportunity can be operationalized by the concept of boundaries. This concept enables a better understanding of the linkage between the EU and the overall order and, in turn, provides a means to delineate scope conditions in which influence is likely to occur. Boundaries are therefore central to any study of governance: not only do they establish the limits of governance by defining the formal membership of the system; they also affect the system’s capacity to govern as they determine rights of access and participation and thus have implications for policy-making (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 215). Malleability of these boundaries creates incentives and opportunities to govern beyond EU’s territorial borders (ibid: 212).
Smith (1996) differentiates four types of boundaries. The geopolitical boundary refers to the fact that geopolitics produces a dividing line between insiders and outsiders. One of the reasons for its apprehension is contained in the institutional/legal boundary referring the density of institutions and practices in the EU and its status as a community of law (ibid: 15). The resulting acquis communautaire, acquis politique cannot easily be shared with outsiders, because a dilution of that core affects the capacity of the EU to govern as it can create different categories of membership, which in turn, undermine cohesion and prejudice the implementation of agreed decisions (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 216). To govern without offering membership, the EU can maintain a transactional boundary by regulating access to its market. This boundary may be eroded by policy decisions opening EU’s market to outsiders (ibid: 217). The extent to which it is decided to make the internal market is inclusive, may involve a cultural boundary, denoting the political foundations resting on support for democracy, respect for rule of law and human rights and good governance (Smith, 1996: 17). Inasmuch as the EU is a powerful community of values, those values can be expressed in such a way as to make others a threat, or to extend to others the benefits of the EU culture (ibid).
As already implicated by Friis and Murphy, it is important to note that unlike borders, boundaries are not fixed (Smith, 1996: 13). Instead, the Union can try to maintain, strengthen or blur boundaries in order to meet objectives with respect to Arctic actors (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 212). According to Keil, the EU possesses many assets for improving the fit between the EU and the Arctic order (2010: 39). Following Allen and Smith (1990), the EU’s growing presence in international affairs can be of significance when engaging in boundary politics as to respond to opportunities.
2.2 Presence: the virtue of existence
Presence refers to the ability to exert influence by virtue of existence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 376-377). It combines understandings about the fundamental nature of the EU and the (unintended) consequences of internal priorities and policies (ibid). Thus, presence does not denote purposive external action; rather it is a consequence of being (ibid). However, to clarify the ‘nature of the beast’ (Caporaso, 1996) that provides the source of EU structural power, is a difficult task. The Union is often perceived as a peculiar global actor (Hill, 1993; Kagan, 2002), since it has no monopoly of force, enjoys limited financial resources and possesses only a small administrative capacity (Jachtenfuchs, 2006: 163). Some therefore say ‘the EU is never going to have the fleetness of foot or the fiscal base to dominate’ (Independent, 16-11-2007). Others say the EU is a civilian power, employing soft power rather than hard power to shape perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others (see Duchêne, 1972; Orbie, 2008).
Ian Manners (2002: 239) tries to augment this dichotomous debate between civilian or military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature. Normative Power Europe (NPE) is characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions (ibid). Unlike the traditional Westphalian actor, the Union is presumed to champion values such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are strongly embedded in the Treaties and practices (ibid: 242). While the projection mechanisms do not exclude coercion or a role for material incentives, NPE tends to emphasize the need for persuasion by ‘virtuous example’ (Coombes, 1998: 237-238). The emphasis arises because the projection of norms needs to be normatively justified and ‘if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of
prestige or shame’ (Manners, 2011: 235). The projection of norms is also likely to be more ‘normatively sustainable’ if it involves these three types of action ‘rather than coercion or solely material motivations’ (Manners, 2009: 792).
The depiction of Europe as a force for good has been subject to widespread criticism. It has been asserted, for example, that the concept is essentially Eurocentric as not all actors share its preferences (Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2008). Yet, Europe’s strength to deal with ‘alien values’ should not be underestimated, since it is frequently backed by the market and regulatory capacities (Laïdi, 2007: 10). Some therefore assert that EU’s core identity may follow from a different basis. Damro, for instance, argues that the Union at its core is a highly organized, affluent and attractive market (2012: 682-683). Indeed, James and Lake (1989) call market power ‘the second face of hegemony’ and argue that hegemons rely on large domestic markets to shape world market prices. Moreover, large markets have gravitational effects on producers – the larger the economy, the stronger the pull for producers to secure and exploit market access (Drezner, 2005: 843). These two notions hint that it is doubtful that market size alone accounts for observable patterns of influence. Therefore, Bach and Newman (2007: 827) argue that the market must be coupled with potent regulatory institutions in order to shape global market rules. Through regulatory capacity the EU can impose reforms upon external actors in response to internal challenges (ibid: 842) or act as gatekeepers granting or denying outsiders access to its sizeable market.
Zielonka combines elements of normative, market and regulatory power, when he argues that the Union can be best described as being an empire, trying to assert control over various peripheral actors through various forms of economic and political domination (2008: 475). It legitimizes this strategy not by ‘might is right’, but cloaks its true intentions in benevolence, exemplified in the promotion of ‘the most efficient model of economic and political integration’. Such assertions lead many to accuse the EU of Regulatory Imperialism, stating that the Union forces its norms upon the rest of the world by taking advantage of the dynamism of its internal market (Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2007). But how can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them? The interdependence upon its surroundings creates the need for a more assertive approach as compromising on basic social preferences is not an option (Zielonka, 2008: 483). Indeed, the European public is very keen to maintain its current standards of life, work
and health (ibid). In addition, failure to export the same standards to other countries puts European firms at a comparative disadvantage (ibid).
2.3 Capability: complex nature EU policy-making
Zielonka, however, overestimates the Union’s competence. To illustrate: during the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the Commission stated that it was unable to negotiate, because of internal disagreements over representation between the Council and the Commission. Such occurrences draw attention to internal dynamics that impede EU action to respond to opportunity and capitalize upon presence. To provide a conceptual bridge between the domestic and the international, this section looks at capability denoting the internal context of EU external action (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 381). This definition, touches upon governance studies, which seek to illuminate the process of policy formulation and implementation within the EU (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 32). For many commentators within this field, capability is the central component of actorness (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 381). Here, however, capability is considered to be a contributory rather than determining factor (ibid). With this distinction in mind, they consider the most important dimensions of capability to be: the ability to formulate policies and the availability to utilise policy mechanisms (ibid). First, the ability to formulate policy will be explored.
2.3.1 Policy formulation
In common with other complex policy systems, the ability of the EU to prioritise and develop policies is impeded by diverging understandings of interest. The hybrid character of the EU, however, provides particular challenges to policy formulation (Wallace, 2010: 339). Bretherton and Vogler refer (2013) to these challenges as coherence problems and distinguish three types: vertical coherence (between levels of policy-making), horizontal coherence (between policy sectors) and institutional coherence (within and between the EU institutions). In practice, these aspects are intimately connected: all three must be present if policy-making is to be effective (ibid). In particular, a heavy burden falls upon the EU level in attempting to address problems of incoherence (ibid) as the institutions are in a better position to have a helicopter overview of contradicting policies on the national level. However, success varies between policy areas, depending on factors such as the location of competence and the degree of member state sensitivity concerning policy transfer to the Union level or the
extent to which it should be involved in the policy process (ibid). ‘Sensitive’ areas are fiscal policy, energy policy and foreign and security policy (Scharpf, 2003: 85).
Here, problems of vertical coherence are most apparent, because the EU has no or little competence due to ‘legitimate differences’ (Scharpf, 2003: 80) reflecting historical traditions and commitments, such as Atlanticism, neutrality or non-alignment (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 383). In preservation of these differences, decisions usually require unanimity. In consequence, bilateral external policies of member states are not always consistent with each other and complementary of those of the EU (ibid: 381). Vertical coherence tends to improve when competence is shared. Here, the EU and the member states have equal rights, which means no party can bind the other party to a measure without the latter’s consent (Börzel, 2007: 64). The achievement of mutual agreement, however, might be quite time consuming. Therefore, hierarchical relations between ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ are most efficient to reach common positions (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010: 803-805). This is possible in areas where the Union enjoys exclusive competence such as external trade policy. Here, rules and standards are non-negotiable and legally binding as well as enforceable upon actors (ibid: 797).
Within a hierarchical relationship, however, coherence is still not evident. Indeed, horizontal coherence refers to tensions between policy sectors that impede effective policy formulation and implementation (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 838). Such tensions are evident, for example, between trade, energy and environment policy, or between agriculture, fisheries and development policy. Achievement of horizontal coherence necessitates ensuring that policies in one sector do not impede or undermine those in others, thus rendering them ineffective (ibid). However, in the multi-level EU system, with its highly complex institutional environment, horizontal coherence is particularly difficult to achieve (ibid). The EU is confronted with a bureaucratic challenge of ‘dozens of different policies scattered through all the Brussels organs’ (Keil, 2010: 39). While responsibility for establishing and maintaining horizontal coherence lies with the Union’s central institutions, it is clear that the necessary resources and mechanisms for such coordination are, as yet, unavailable (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 838). It is therefore to the role of the central institutions that we now turn.
Institutional coherence refers to the Union’s internal policy coordination procedures (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 384). Several provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) sought to address these matters. In case of the Arctic, revisions regarding foreign
policy are most important as it is here when problems of incoherence become apparent. To promote coherency in this area two new high-profile positions were created: a permanent President of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The latter is at the same time Vice President of the Commission. This dual role is intended to facilitate coordination across the former Community and Union pillars and hence to minimise turf wars between the institutions (ibid). In a further attempt to promote policy coherence, the HR/VP also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, a task previously undertaken by the Foreign Minister of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency. The Council President has a role in promoting both vertical and horizontal coherence, in that he is expected to promote agreement among heads of state/government in the Council and to liaise with the Commission President and the HR/VP on (former) cross-pillar issues (ibid).
2.3.2 Available policy mechanisms
As argued by Keil, the EU has many assets it can use to bolster its influence in the Arctic (2010: 39). The mechanisms traditionally employed in pursuit of external policy objectives include military, economic and political means. However, unlike member states, the Union has no army of its own and has limited resources. Moreover, the use of the ‘enlargement model’ as a tool to externalize the acquis has reached exhaustion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010: 792). In consequence, the traditional mechanisms need tweaking. Börzel and Risse have specified four mechanisms through which ‘Europe hits home’ (2012: 1) including legal coercion, manipulating utility calculations, socialization and persuasion. The EU has access, albeit to varying degrees, to all four mechanisms. The ability to utilise them depends, however, upon the extent to which problems of vertical coherence are overcome (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 385).
When there is vertical coherence in place, coercion as an externalization mechanism becomes an available option to the Union. In the EU context, this possibility arises under circumstances where exclusive competence exists. In turn, this obligates member states to comply with EU law. In the context of EU external relations, further qualification of coercion is required since, formally, non-member retain full sovereignty vis-à-vis the Union (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010: 797). Informally, however, certain forms of external governance come close to a hierarchical system and undermine important sections of third countries’ autonomy over their legislation (ibid). The clearest example of a quasi-hierarchical system is the EEA (ibid).
In case of symmetrical relations EU demands cannot be imposed directly, even though some regulatory aspects are hard to distinguish from law enforcement (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7). In consequence, demands are adopted through coordination (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010: 798). Internally and externally, the EU can influence this process through manipulating utility calculations by providing negative and positive incentives derived from its economic presence. To illustrate: the EU can induce third parties in the form of financial and technical assistance (Schimmelfennig, 2003), it can impose costs through sanctions or empower domestic actors who push for the adoption of the certain policies by providing political elites with incentives including electoral support and shaming campaigns. This second mechanism can be relevant particularly with regard to the European neighbourhood as well as other countries, which seek market access to the EU. The further we move away from Europe and the more the EU itself is interested in market access to other regions, the less likely this influence mechanism is to matter (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7).
In such cases the Union must rely on mechanisms of socialization and persuasion to make its case. Regarding the first, actors seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. Processes of socialization often result in complex learning by which actors redefine their interests and identities (Checkel, 2005b; Johnston, 2007). They can also work through habitualization. By talking the talk, actors may change their social practices and dispositions, finally ending up walking the walk. From this perspective, the EU can be understood as a gigantic socialization agency, which actively tries to promote rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning in the Arctic (see also Checkel, 2005a). Closely related to socialization is persuasion referring to situations in which actors try to persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement. The EU uses persuasion continuously in dealing with its external relations with third countries in general. As Judith Kelley has shown accession conditionality is always accompanied by efforts to persuade candidate countries of the normative validity and appropriateness of the EU’s institutional models (Kelley, 2004).
The next chapter outlines my research design and reviews how mechanisms of persuasion can be measured effectively.
Researching the EU as an Arctic actor
To gain a comprehensive assessment of EU’s ‘actorness’ on the global stage, the research design is build around a critical case study on the relationship between the Union and the Arctic regime. The aim is thus to complement existing research on neighbouring regions such the CEEC and the MENA. To do so, this thesis will make use of qualitative content analysis on the basis of twelve semi-structured interviews and several official documents. These include two EU Arctic Communications, founding documents and declarations of the Arctic Council and national Arctic strategies. The usage of documents will help contrasting the policy ideal, as formulated in the 2008 and 2012 EU Arctic Communication, with policy practice as identified in the interviews. In order to further detail the research design, this chapter falls into two parts. The first section will elaborate on the links between the overall research design and the research topic, question and puzzle. The second section explores the modalities and the scope of my chosen research methods and looks at the ways data has been collected.
3.1. Research design: Case study
To contribute to our understanding of the EU as a global actor, this thesis explores the relationship between the EU and the Arctic regime. Here, the Union struggles to make its voice heard regardless of the fact that five out of eight Arctic states are strongly intertwined with its institutions. To better understand where the limits of EU influence lie, a case study research design is chosen. The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case (Bryman, 2012: 66). There is a tendency to associate case studies with qualitative research, but such identification is not always appropriate (ibid: 68). Indeed, when reviewing my research question both qualitative and quantitative methods are appropriate, depending on the definition of influence. To measure influence in a quantitative way, it is possible to look at facts such military and economic investments or count the number of times EU rules have been adopted. Yet, such an approach does not explain why certain rules are chosen rather than others. These gaps draw attention to processes rather than outcomes and thus highlight the need for qualitative research. Here, explanation is based on how some situations and events influence others (Maxwell, 2012: 29). This enables a more holistic assessment, which pays attention to parts of reality that cannot or not as easily be measured.
To some, however, the term case study is an ambiguous designation covering a multitude of inferential felonies (Gerring, 2007: 93). In turn, this jeopardizes the external validity or generalizability of the research. Indeed, how can a single case possibly be representative so that it might yield findings that can be applied more generally to other cases? The answer is that they cannot (Bryman, 2012: 70). Instead, case study researchers aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which they then engage in a theoretical analysis. In consequence, the central issue of concern is the quality of the theoretical reasoning in which the researcher engages. How well do the data support the theoretical arguments that are generated? Is the theoretical analysis incisive? For example, does it demonstrate connections between different conceptual ideas that are developed out of the data? To conclude, the crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to a wider universe, but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings (ibid: 71).
Analytical generalization and thus the external validity can be enhanced through the strategic selection of contexts. In accordance, Yin (2009) distinguishes five options to choose from: the critical case, the extreme or unique case, the representative or typical case, the revelatory or explanatory case and the longitudinal case. The Arctic is a critical case in relation to conceptualizations of the EU as a global actor as the well-developed theory of Bretherton and Vogler allows me to test whether hypotheses will or will not hold (Bryman, 2012: 70). In the end, this will allow the following type of generalization: ‘If it is valid for this case, it is valid for all or many cases’. In its negative form, the generalization would be: ‘If it is not valid for this case, then it is not valid for any or valid for only few cases’. The case study is especially well suited for identifying black swans because of its in-depth approach: what appears to be white often turns out on closer examination to be black.
3.2 Data collection: Sampling and conducting interviews
To examine my swan more thoroughly, this thesis relies on interviews as a means to collect data. There are several reasons why my research aims calls for the use of interviews (see Weiss, 1995: 20-23). Firstly, a detailed description is necessary as relations between the EU and the Arctic regime are conducted behind closed doors, which means that events or developments cannot be observed without asking an on scene informant. However, as journalists say: one source is no source. Therefore,
integrating multiple perspectives is needed as no single person can observe EU-Arctic
relations in its totality. This enables to describe a process antecedent to an outcome of interest and its consequences. Usually, such descriptions are hard to find in official policy documents, where only the end result has been put down in writing, which does not always match political realities on the ground. In contrast, conducting interviews provides a holistic assessment by putting together different perceptions about how the organization works, how it moves toward goals or is paralyzed by internal friction. In turn, this will bridge intersubjectivities as the report makes it possible to grasp a situation from the inside, as a participant might.
Now I have established the reasons for an interlocutory approach, it is now time to look at the sampling of participants. I have opted for purposive selection, as my research aims require very specific knowledge to which only a hand full of people is in possession of. Moreover, participants are not interchangeable. To illustrate: Iceland and Denmark are both Arctic states, but have very different views on the same topics. To gain a balanced picture, this thesis therefore relies on twelve interviews, which include five Arctic state officials4, five EU officials from different institutions and two diplomats originating from permanent observer states5, who may provide a more neutral picture. The selection of these officials is mostly based on a sampling frame provided by the website of the Arctic Council. Here, the contact information of every Arctic state and those of European permanent observers can be found6. In case of the EU, however, it was harder to distinguish key-informants. In such events the snowball sampling technique has been employed, which contains sampled participants to propose other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012: 424). The mix of different starting points prevents the possibility of
4Officials of Arctic states originate from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Russia. 5Officials originating from permanent observer states include the Netherlands and the UK. 6Every Arctic state has been contacted. Yet, in case of Sweden, the US and Canada they were non-responsive. Given Canada’s importance, I have not only contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also CICAR, which is their research station in Oslo, their embassy in the Hague and a taskforce located in Brussels. In case of Denmark, my initial email got redirected within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, putting me in contact with someone who was either more willing or more competent to speak with me. In case of Russia, I contacted the Russian embassy in The Hague, which internally referred me the designated person.
participants directing me to people who share their own views7. In consequence, I was firstly directed towards DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries as the leading DG in the Commission and secondly towards the EEAS. Yet, in a more ambitious research, interviews with related DG’s such as Environment would be of complementing value.
After making the appointments, the actual interviews took place. The EU officials were questioned during face-to-face meetings in Brussels. The other officials8have been interviewed over the phone, because of time, distance and money issues. Nevertheless, each interview lasted around thirty minutes. Given this limited timeframe, a list of questions was needed as to make sure fairly specific topics were covered. However, at the same time, I wanted to provide the respondent with the opportunity to independently introduce themes that he or she deems important. As an outsider seeking insider knowledge this possibility is of value. In consequence, it was estimated that questions did not follow on exactly in the way outlined in the schedule. But, by and large, all the questions are asked in a similar wording. The questions are derived from official policy documents9to contrast the ideal with policy practice and concepts covered by the theoretical framework. When time progressed I also incorporated questions that I picked up during earlier interviews. As a result, the semi-structured interview guide gave me a great deal of flexibility to accumulate knowledge, which in turn improved the coherence, depth and density of the material (Weiss, 1995: 10).
3.3 Research method: Qualitative content analysis
To identify, organize and index the resulting data, this thesis relies on qualitative content analysis, which is defined as the search for ‘underlying themes’ (Bryman, 2012:
7With regard to the EU I had two different starting points. I approached two Commissioners separately, who directed me towards different people.
8The Dutch and Russian official I have interviewed face-to-face in The Hague.
9The two Communications of the European Commission formed the basis of inquiry. These documents delineate the policy objectives of the EU and are commonly viewed as the most important ones, because the Parliament only plays an advisory role in Arctic policy formulation. Therefore, the Communications of the Commission have provided the basis for the Council Conclusions. I have complemented these documents with national strategies, depending on the interviewee. Thus, if I spoke to the Finnish official, I made sure to read the Finnish strategy beforehand. An exception is Russia, which published its strategy in Russian only.
557). To do this, content analysis researchers examine artefacts of social communication. Typically, these are written documents or transcriptions of recorded verbal communications (Berg, 2006: 304). The reliance on prose, however, often results in a large and cumbersome database. In consequence, scholars including Miles (1979) have described content analysis as ‘attractive nuisance’, because of its richness, but the difficulty of finding analytic paths through that richness. To prevent ‘analytic interruptus’ (Lofland, 1971: 18) this thesis codes data in accordance with the thematic analysis research technique. This particular form of qualitative content analysis is an activity in which different themes in a text are being discovered. A theme is a category that provides the basis for a theoretical understanding that can make a contribution to the literature relating to the research focus (Bryman, 2012: 580).
I have developed my themes in accordance with concepts derived from the theoretical chapter. The coding frame, which is inspired by Bretherton and Vogler, consists of three major themes including opportunity, presence and capability. In turn, these three themes are split into several minor themes to enable a more specific analysis. To illustrate: the theme comprising opportunities is operationalized by the concept of boundaries as developed by Smith. Therefore, minor themes include geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural boundaries. The theme presence also has several minor themes, which include normative, market and regulatory power. Lastly, the theme capability is explored. This theme is divided into two minor themes and those are divided in subthemes. The minor themes include the ability to formulate policy and the availability of policy mechanisms. In turn, the first is split into three subthemes, which comprises codes concerning vertical, horizontal and institutional coherence. The second minor theme is split into the subthemes of coercion, manipulating utility calculations, socialization and persuasion. In its totality, the coding frame is included in the Annexes.
In the next few chapters, this thesis will turn to the results of this coding endeavour. Firstly, it explores opportunities, it then turns to presence and it lastly delineates how EU capabilities impede or enhance action.
In or out: The long march North from Brussels
In order for the EU to carry out its Arctic strategy a window of opportunity is needed. Opportunity denotes the external environment of ideas and events, which constrain or enable action (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 22). This chapter argues that the EU’s position in the Arctic is that of demandeur. Given the limited powers that come with such a status, the EU can be seen as highly dependent upon a favourable external environment to export internal rules, norms and standards. In light of this conundrum, this chapter aims to contribute to the understanding of whether the Arctic is in a process of ‘opening up’ for new actors, or whether developments in the region will continue to be dominated by stakeholders already part of the ‘inner circle’. To do so, it draws on the literature of boundaries as developed by Smith (1996), which considers that the malleability of geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional or cultural boundaries creates incentives and opportunities to govern beyond EU’s territorial borders.The chapter falls into three parts. It firstly considers how the collapse of the Soviet Union primed the Arctic region for international cooperation; this event is commonly referred to as the first Arctic wave. It then explores how ice melt spurred the second Arctic wave in which third parties across the world demanded access to the newly discovered resources. It lastly reflects on the Arctic region as being a moving target, possibly presenting the Union with a third window of opportunity.
4.1 The first Arctic wave: priming the region for cooperation
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created the first window of opportunity for international cooperation. In the late eighties Gorbachev launched a series of policy initiatives to transform the northern part of the globe from being a volatile sensitive military theatre to becoming an international ‘zone of peace’ (Archer, 1988: 140). This change of heart spurred the first Arctic wave and occurred in the wake of relaxed relations between the Soviet Union and the US. The blurring of the geopolitical East/West divide intensified with the end of the Cold War. According to Archer, the region was now ‘ready for some form of cross border Arctic cooperation in the humanitarian area, scientific research and environmental matters’ (ibid). Indeed, in 1991 the precursor of the Arctic Council was created, which simultaneously produced a first institutional boundary, this time between Arctic and non-Arctic states, rather than
between East and West, which resulted in the latter being depicted as outsiders. However, this boundary was far from rigid. Up until 2007 the Arctic Council remained very much inclusive. Every non-Arctic country that wished to join the newly founded organization as a permanent observer (not an actual member) could do so, without having to abide by any conditional criteria.
The heart of the Arctic regime could afford to be inclusionary, because despite high hopes for intensive regional cooperation after the end of the Cold War, the newly found organization failed to spark sustainable high-level political interest (Hønneland, 2013: xiv). Instead, global indifference in the ‘sleeping beauty’ prevailed, and the Arctic was regarded as a peripheral concern (Wegge, 2011: 13). In turn, this image did not present the European Community (EC) a clear-cut need to use the historic malleability of boundaries to its own advantage. In consequence, the Community did not apply to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council. It therefore unknowingly missed its first grand window of opportunity to gain easy access into the region.
For the ‘sleeping beauty’ and the EU to wake up, two developments were needed. Both unravelled around 2007. Firstly, climate change altered the face of the Arctic and unveiled its economic potential. Secondly, the planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed was widely perceived as a demonstration of power and caused the revival of geopolitics. The emergence of a transactional and geopolitical boundary marked a surge in political interests, which prompted the second Arctic wave. The Arctic Council witnessed both a gradual increase of high-level participation from its member states and an increase in attention originating from outside the Arctic. These outside stakeholders, which include China, South Korea, Japan, Italy and the European Commission, have sought entrance into the Arctic Council in order to shape its future prospects of development and trade (Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2013). As a Danish official put it: ‘it would be strange if the Commission did not try to become a permanent observer’, (Interview, junior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 9 April 2014) since natural resources are intimately intertwined with the European standard of living. ‘Natural resources to be found in the Arctic are of crucial importance, since countries such as China are increasingly closing off or limiting export to the EU’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 27 April 2014).
4.2 The second Arctic wave: Signalling sovereign rights
The EU’s need for scarce natural resources to be found in the external environment gave it no choice but to apply for a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. Yet, the timing of its first application in 2008 was not ideal as the second Arctic wave prompted members of the Council to close its gates. This exclusionary trend makes EU’s window of opportunity grow smaller and smaller, while highlighting its dependence upon an unwilling external governance body. Two processes triggered the strengthening of the institutional boundary, which resulted in an inward looking atmosphere with emphasis on ‘actual Arctic players’. The first process is of geopolitical nature, spurred by the planting of the Russian flag. Due to this event, Arctic countries were in a state of panic. Demarcation issues followed and in turn, spurred a military build-up initiated by Norway and Russia. Even though Norway firmly denies any ‘East-West divide’ (Interview, senior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 9 April 2014), ‘the idea of peaceful cooperation does not match the increasing tensions in reality’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 21 March 2014). In consequence, Arctic states first aim to improve the cooperation within the Council, before dealing with ‘countries outside’ (Interview, ambassador Arctic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 14 April 2014).
This signalling of sovereignty has severe implications for the EU, as relations are thus conducted vertically: ‘outside players’ are subordinate to the ‘inside players’, who decide what happens in the Arctic region. To protect this structure, the second process came into play. Indeed, the wave of applications and the challenges it presented overwhelmed the Arctic Council (Interview, policy officer Arctic and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, EEAS, 24 April 2014). In a way the situation can be compared with EU enlargement, which required a restructuring of the Union’s institutional set-up. The Arctic states, in contrast, wanted first to improve the capacity of the Council to take on new members and evaluate if certain criteria should be established (ibid). In result, the Arctic states put together the Observer Manual, making it harder for newcomers to get in. The manual delineated – what I call– the Ottawa criteria. These include the recognition of Arctic states’ sovereignty, recognition of the current legal framework applying to the Arctic Ocean, respect for the values, interests, culture and traditions of
Arctic indigenous peoples and political willingness and financial ability to contribute to the work of the Arctic Council (Website Arctic Council, Criteria for admitting observers).
With the observers being contained within this web of recognition, the Arctic Council welcomed new applicants. Indeed, the Ottawa criteria formed a more rigid institutional boundary in comparison with the old one, making sure that sovereign rights and the ‘Nordic’ culture of indigenous people remained untouched. This reassurance opened the gates and thus could be said to present a second window of opportunity. As such, the Arctic Council accepted the applications by China, India, Italy, Singapore, South Korea and Japan (Arctic Council Secretariat, Kiruna Declaration, 15 May 2013). The EU’s permanent observer status was put on hold. Commonly, this outcome is interpreted as the result of a transactional boundary that the EU put in place in 2008, when it banned seal products from its market due to concerns about animal welfare. This move was particularly contentious for Canada as this industry makes millions of dollars, which means electoral potential. The Northern vote is crucial for the current government’ re-election. Consequently, ‘they have made golden promises concerning a tough position on the EU ban, which does not cost them anything, while they have everything to gain’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 20 March 2014). This notion compels him to complain about EU’s timing, stating that ‘if it applied before 2008 it would easily have gotten in’.
4.3 Future prospects: the Arctic as a moving target
The Commission has nonetheless been attending Arctic Council meetings as an ad-hoc observer by consecutively requesting participation. In reality, the coveted position of a ‘permanent’ observer does not entail much more than a regular invitation to attend meetings and the opportunity to contribute to its working groups, an option already available to ad-hoc observers. The emphasis the EU has placed on achieving observer status is thus more symbolic than tangible in nature: being accepted as an "in-group" member confers more legitimacy as an Arctic actor than the practical outcome of the status in itself (Østhagen, Arctic Institute, 2013). To officially become part of the in-group, the EU does not necessarily have to wait for the seal issue to be resolved. At the moment, there are several developments taking place in the Arctic Council, which could present the EU with new opportunities. Indeed, the Finnish official called the Arctic a moving target, stating that the Arctic Council is currently in a phase of transition
(Interview, ambassador Arctic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 14 April 2014). However, there are diverging ideas about the outlook of the end result.
Firstly, there are two diverging ideas about how to ‘fine-tune the integration of observers’ (Interview, junior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 9 April 2014). At stake is a more inclusionary approach to the benefit of the EU. On the one hand, countries including Finland, Sweden, Iceland and to a lesser extent Denmark, are championing the idea of the Arctic being a global common. ‘The Arctic is affecting all of us, therefore we feel that the Arctic Council should engage with all legitimate stakeholders’ (Interview, ambassador Arctic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 14 April 2014). In practice, this inclusionary approach means conferring more rights to observers, enabling them to make presentations, issue statements and voice their opinion during meetings (ibid) in order to ‘tap into their potential’ (Interview, policy officer Arctic and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, EEAS, 24 April 2014). On the other hand, there are countries such as Russia and Norway, who pull towards another, more exclusionary direction. They emphasize the rights of the inner circle at the expense of those of the collective. Here the tension between the transactional and geopolitical boundary becomes evident. As a Russian official put it: ‘the idea of a global common is a misconception. Sovereigns rule the Arctic, which makes it inappropriate to differ from the current hierarchy to the benefit of observers (Interview, third secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague, 16 May 2014; see also interview, senior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 9 April 2014).
Secondly, there is internal discussion about the establishment of a more extensive regulatory framework in the Arctic to manage the increasing flow of economic activities in the region (Interview, ambassador Arctic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 14 April 2014). This framework ‘must of course be developed by Arctic states themselves in order to avoid resentment’ (ibid), but may also present the EU with a window of opportunity as it will touch upon issues where the EU enjoys exclusive competence such as fisheries and transport. In this scenario the Arctic Council would have to take note of the Union, despite its earlier exclusionary approach. Commission officials recognize this opportunity, stating that if the Arctic were to ‘change its nature, then the EU would have a much broader role of guardian of the treaties to make sure there were no overlapping or conflicting requirements the member states would be taking upon themselves’. Yet, also this idea is not widely supported, but even
controversial. ‘The Arctic is subject to national jurisdiction; therefore a new framework is unnecessary’ (Interview, senior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 9 April 2014). Given the fact that consensus within the Arctic Council is needed to create a new regulatory framework; this scenario ‘is still far away’ (Interview, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 24 April 2014).
The transition towards an inclusionary Arctic Council, however, would become a more realistic prospect with the freezing of East-West relations. Currently, Russian actions in Ukraine have their impact on the geopolitical boundary of Arctic governance and by way of consequence on its institutional boundary. Indeed, Canada refused to attend an Arctic Council meeting held in Moscow, because of the Ukrainian crisis (Barents Observer, 16 April 2014). The East-West division might make the EU a more valuable partner in order to effectively form a block towards Russia. Moreover, it is said that the EU is the only actor able to get Russia to the table (Interview, Arctic and Antarctic policy officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 April 2014), as it is a strategic counterpart of growing importance for Russia, because of its role in energy, economic relations and in the intervening ‘neighbourhood’ area, while the recently reinvigorated Northern Dimension already covers one sector of the Russia-West Arctic interface (Keil 2010: 7). The EU could therefore function as a bridge between the East and West. Either way, these prospects makes the EU better connected, enabling it to gain a more central place within the web of Arctic players as it has more leverage.
Until then, the EU functions as a demandeur in the region, dealing with rigid institutional boundaries erected by the Arctic regime. Whether a third opportunity will present itself, only time will tell as a consensus on the role of observers has yet to be reached. In the meantime, it is likely that the region will continue to be dominated by stakeholders already part of the ‘inner circle’. The emphasis on sovereign rights restricts the influence ‘outside’ actors such as the EU can exert. In turn, this highlights the importance of the external environment when assessing the Union as a global actor. The next chapter assesses if the EU has the possibility to go around unfavourable structural conditions on the international level, in order to govern outside its territory.
The bull in the china shop: EU presence
As discussed in the previous chapter, events and prevailing ideas in the external environment do not grant the EU much room to operate. Yet, in spite of an unwelcoming Arctic regime, the EU can create a window of opportunity through presence. Presence conceptualises the ability of an actor, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 376). An indication of structural power, presence combines understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity, of the EU and the (often unintended) consequences of the Union’s internal priorities and policies (ibid). Thus, presence does not denote purposive external action; rather it is the ability to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others (ibid). This chapter seeks to contribute to indications of structural power, while reviewing possible sources including normative, market and regulatory features. In the end, this chapter argues that these are intertwined and work together in enabling the Union to govern outside its territories. Yet, this ability comes with a price. It pays with political influence in the Arctic Council. The EU can therefore be viewed as a bull in a china shop, trying to break as little as possible while at the same time trying to sustain social preferences.
The chapter falls into three parts. Firstly, this chapter explores the concept of Normative Power Europe (Manners, 2002), reviewing whether the EU disregards Westphalian conventions to the benefit of attractive post-Westphalian policy objectives. Secondly, it reviews alternative concepts including Market Power Europe and Regulatory Power Europe. These consider the EU to be an attractive market (Damro, 2012: 682), coupled to potent regulatory institutions (Bach and Newman, 2008: 842). It is here, where allegations of imperialism come into play. The third part of this chapter therefore looks how the EU imposes norms by of taking advantage of its internal market.
5.1 A normative core: concerns about a EU block
When asking about structural power in the region, it becomes clear that most interviewees consider the EU to be a novel kind of actor. It is presumed that its identity originates from being a sui generis. This means it is neither a state nor an international organization and thus unique. In consequence, ‘the EU must rely on soft power’ (Interview, junior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 9 April 2014), which implies a different modus of operandi, focussing on attraction instead of coercion.
For this approach to be sustainable, different preferences and policies are required (see Manners, 2011: 235). In contrast to ‘the more traditional actors’ pursuing zero sum gains, ‘the EU chooses a responsible approach and is committed to issues regarding the environment, sustainable development and rights of indigenous peoples’10(Interview, junior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 9 April 2014). To illustrate: the EU Arctic space programme is ‘only used to monitor climate change, not for military purposes’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 21 March 2014). Moreover, these ‘strengths’ will continue to be developed regardless of an inclusionary Arctic regime (Interview, policy officer Arctic and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, EEAS, 24 April 2014). This notion indicates that the ‘responsible approach’ is not perceived solely as an instrument to gain recognition in the Arctic Council, but as an inherent part of EU’s identity.
The ‘benign’ policies that are presumed to follow are ‘not only in our interest, but ultimately in everyone’s interest’ (Interview, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 21 March 2014). What the Union considers to be in the collective interest therefore becomes increasingly important for Arctic states: ‘whenever there is an EU block, other powers are concerned about being outmuscled’ (Interview, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 24 April 2014). Indeed, three out of eight Arctic states and seven out of twelve permanent observers are members of the EU, while two Arctic states are part of the EEA. Simple math tells us that this ‘interconnected system’ (ibid) forms the majority of Arctic Council participants. This calculation makes states apprehensive about EU’s potential influence ‘as it brings together a large amount of nations’ (Interview, Arctic and Antarctic policy officer,
10This depiction resonates perfectly with EU policy objectives as outlined in the 2008 Arctic Communication. The overall aim was ‘to protect one of the most vital and vulnerable components of the Earth’s environment and climate system’ in a ‘coordinated and systematic manner’ (European Commission, 2008: 2-3). This aim is underpinned by three policy objectives: (1) enhancing Arctic multilateral governance; (2) preserving the Arctic climate; and (3) promoting the sustainable use of natural resources (ibid). In turn, these three pillars are specified into the areas of firstly environment and climate change; support to indigenous peoples and local population; research, monitoring and assessments, and secondly hydrocarbons, fisheries, transport and tourism. These emphases are also, albeit in different phrasing, the focus of the 2012 Communication.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 April 2014), who all have strong historic bonds with the US and Canada. Especially Russia seems not too keen on this plethora of possible coalitions as the ‘biggest states, have the biggest influence’ (Interview, head of Polar Affairs, Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2014). Similarly, Norway is cautious about EU’s ‘cloud’ as a policy-shaping institution: ‘we are happy with the Council as it is today’ and ‘do not want the EU to use its presence to organize an East-West division, a US-EU alliance or an EU coalition against all’ (Interview, senior Arctic official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 9 April 2014). The latter possibility is considered likely, as ‘all European member states have to do what the EU tells them to do’ (Interview, third secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague).
This doomsday scenario of EU member states being nothing more but minions within a larger EU block is problematic for some Arctic states, because ‘where the EU comes in it tends to bring with it its concerns for environment, climate change and international standards’ (Interview, policy officer DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, 24 April 2014). ‘Therefore they would rather keep us out’ (ibid as these concerns are not necessarily shared. This is illustrated when comparing the usage of the word ‘sustainable’11in Arctic strategies. The EU used the word sustainable 26 times in an 18-paged document (European Commission and EEAS, 2012). In contrast, Canada used this word 5 times in a 34-paged document (Government of Canada, 2009). The same trend can be spotted concerning the word ‘indigenous people’. Canada used it 2 times, while the EU employed it 25 times. The emphasis on the rights of indigenous people strikes a nerve with Russia (Interview, head of Polar Affairs, Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2014), who does not mention the minority living at
11The word sustainable is chosen, because it does not only denote climate change (a word that is more frequently used in Canada’s Arctic strategy: 7 times), but is also says something about what should be done to address this phenomenon. When reviewing the word climate change in Canada’s Arctic strategy, it is often linked with new opportunities in the region for example the opening up of shipping lanes and the accessibility of natural resources. Consequently, climate change requires a stricter stewardship to protect national interests (Government of Canada, 2009: 1). The EU and Canada thus have different associations when talking about climate change. To address this difference, the word sustainable is more appropriate.
their Northern borders even once in its national Arctic strategy12(Russian Federation, 2008). It is therefore said that if Canada did not veto the EU, Russia would have (ibid). Also, with countries such as China joining the Arctic Council as permanent observers, this issue might cause more friction in the future as it enjoys the same opportunities other observers have to influence Arctic states (see previous chapter).
5.2 Market power: the EU as a net exporter of rules
Even though Arctic states are not all that interested in adhering to the norms the EU promotes, they are interested in its resources. As the Russian official put it: ‘no state has the resources to develop the Arctic on its own’ (Interview, third secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague, 26 May 2014). Therefore, external funding is most welcome. Given its sheer market size, it is expected that the EU can make a considerable contribution (Interview, head of Polar Affairs, Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2014). Moreover, European companies like Shell are highly valued by Arctic states, as they possess the much needed expertise, the latest technology to cope with extreme weather conditions and the money to invest in costly economic development in the Arctic (Interview, third secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague, 26 May 2014). This notion leads an EEAS official to conclude that economic actors will drive change forward: ‘companies underpin everything. They are the ones doing the actual work (Interview, policy officer Arctic and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, EEAS, 24 April 2014). To illustrate the importance of market actors: ‘if it is cheaper to drill elsewhere, which is likely given the extreme weather conditions, companies will refrain from developing the region regardless of what governing actors want’ (Interview, head of Polar Affairs, Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2014).
However, the extent to which the EU can control economic actors in order to deal with ‘alien values’ should not be underestimated (Laïdi, 2007: 10) as rules that apply to the European single market also have external consequences. Indeed, many of its policies on biodiversity, chemicals and transboundary pollution, climate change, energy, fisheries, forestry, tourism and transport may have unintentional spillover effects in the Arctic. However, effects may also occur intentionally as the EU is a big market for products coming from this Arctic: it imports 39 per cent of Arctic fish, 24 per cent of its
12I translated the names of indigenous people living in Russia from English to Russian and then searched for this term in the policy document.
