Restraining the Chinese Dragon
The United States and its policy towards China and nuclear proliferation
within the paradigm of defensive realism, 1960-1965
M.G. van Santvoort Student number: 5947758 Master’s thesis University of Amsterdam Military History Supervisor: Dr. C.P.M. Klep Date: 25/11/2015
Table of contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Theoretical context 6
Chapter 2: Historical context 13
Chapter 3: Case study I - The overall response and policy of the United States 20
- Estimating the progress of the nuclear program 21
- The American assessment of the Chinese threat 23
- The American policy and action towards China 26
- The role of the Soviet-Union in exploring ways to act 30
- Analysis 31
Chapter 4: Case study II - The Limited Test Ban Treaty 35
- An overview of the treaty 36
- The motivation for the treaty 37
- Persuading China through Moscow 41
- Analysis 43
Chapter 5: Case study III - The Gilpatric Committee 47
- The origins of the committee and its working method 48
- Conclusions and recommendations of the committee 51
- Analysis 57 Conclusion 61 Epilogue 65 Bibliography 69
1
Introduction:
On October 16, 1964, somewhere between the Taklamakan and the Kumtag desert in the vast and sparsely populated region of Xinjiang, in the Northwestern part of China, the People’s Republic of China became the fifth nuclear power in the world when, around 15.00 local time, the first Chinese nuclear test, codenamed 596, was successfully conducted in a test base near Lop Nur, a former salt lake. Joining the nuclear club, which consisted until then of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great-Britain and France, the young Chinese communist state, after suffering from a brutal Japanese invasion and occupation during the Second World War, after being torn apart by a divisive civil war and during the uncertain times of the Cold War, entered the world stage, armed with the most horrendous and destructive weapon ever created by mankind, the nuclear bomb.
The same day, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States released, in response to the Chinese test, a statement to the press, proclaiming that the United States “will pursue with dedication and determination our purpose of achieving concrete, practical steps on the roads that lead away from nuclear armaments and war, and toward a world of cooperation and development and peace.”1 Johnson condemned the actions of Communist China, stating that the nuclear program
“is a tragedy for the Chinese people who have suffered so much under the Communist regime” and that the test is a “reflection of policies which do not serve the cause of peace.”2 The most important
conclusion Johnson drew for the American public was that the now nuclear China did not pose a threat to the United States and that his administration was fully aware of the impending nuclear test, stating that “this explosion comes as no surprise to the United States Government […] The nations of the free world recognize its limited significance and will persevere in their determination to preserve their independence.”3
This unflappable and collected response by Johnson was aimed at downplaying the importance of the acquisition of the nuclear bomb by China and publicly the United States indeed acted calm and passively, resulting in a policy which seemed to simply accept the Chinese membership of the nuclear club. No bombs were dropped, no embargos were enforced and no overt hostile foreign policy was formulated towards China. It seemed that the international relations were not changed, let alone disturbed: life, and the Cold War, simply went on. The prominent American historian Michael Nacht acknowledged this supposed limited impact of the Chinese nuclear bomb, stating that “the spread of nuclear weapons to Asia has only marginally affected American policy
1 Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device, October 16, 1964,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26615.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
2 toward the nuclear states in the region. […] The American policy toward China that was formulated immediately after Mao's revolutionary victory did not change with the Chinese nuclear detonation in October 1964.”4
The idea of American passivity and simple acceptance of China as a nuclear power has long prevailed within the academic studies of American foreign policy towards China. Like formulated by Nacht, it was widely accepted that the Chinese program had little influence on American policy, prompting no real response nor change. Documents, declassified and published since the end of the Cold War, however, paint a more complex picture, showing that the American reaction to the Chinese nuclear program isn’t as simplistic and limited as Nacht described it. When the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were confronted with the news of the Chinese program and the eventual detonation it did indeed ignite a debate within the American government on how to deal with not only the Chinese problem, but also with nuclear proliferation in general. Although Nacht is correct that the overt and public policy towards China was not acutely and decidedly adjusted, the Chinese nuclear program did have a profound effect on the American stance and policy towards nuclear proliferation.
In this thesis I will delve into these effects of the acquisition of the bomb by Communist China on American foreign and nuclear proliferation policy. Within this complex subject, I will focus on three concrete case studies which were consequences of, or at least heavily influenced by, the Chinese nuclear program. First of all, I will look at the overall response and policy, or better the lack of action and response, of the United States towards China when the nuclear program was discovered and the United States was first confronted with this problem. Although no military action was taken, nor any other aggressive response was formulated, many options were considered on dealing with the Chinese, inspiring a long and complex debate within the American government.5
The second case will be the influence of the Chinese nuclear program on the development and the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in October 1963. President Kennedy, who was assassinated little more than a month after the treaty went into effect, was worried about the possible destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation and was incited by the impending Chinese nuclear test to enforce the treaty, not only to halt nuclear proliferation, but also to isolate China and hinder its nuclear development.6 Finally, I will focus on a third case which was a direct consequence
from the Chinese bomb, the so-called Gilpatric Committee. This committee, led by former
4 Michael Nacht, ‘The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers ’, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 430, Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals (March 1977),
162-174, there 163.
5 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and
the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter, 2000-2001), 54-99.
6 William Burr and Hector L. Montford, editors, ‘The Making of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1958-1963’,
3 Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, was tasked by President Johnson, a couple of weeks after the Chinese test, with “re-examining every aspect of America’s nonproliferation policy and predicting how China’s test would influence international politics.”7 A subject as complex as the influence and
effects of the Chinese nuclear program on American policy, of course, has many more facets to it and many more cases can be found, but by sticking to these three specific ones, I believe I can perform a clearly defined study.
The prominent scholar on nuclear proliferation, Scott Sagan, wrote that: “Theories are lenses. They help us to focus on specific parts of a complex reality and see the casual connections between these parts.”8 I believe that Sagan is indeed correct and that a theoretical framework is
extremely relevant and important when tackling such a complex study. Within the theory of international relations, many different schools of thought and theories are found, each one offering its own ideas and explanations for historical problems. For this particular study, I will look through the theoretical lens of a school of thought which I believe to be prevalent during the bi-polar Cold War: defensive realism. The three case studies will be approached through this theoretical framework of Kenneth Waltz and, in lesser extent, his former student Stephen Walt. Although I will explain defensive realism extensively in a later chapter, it must be clear that the goal of this thesis is not to prove defensive realism as a theory of international relations, nor to defend it from its numerous critics.
Instead, from the point of view of defensive realism I will explain why the United States acted like it did. Why didn’t it carry out military strikes on Chinese test facilities? Why did Kennedy establish the LTBT as a way to counter further nuclear proliferation? And why did the Gilpatric Committee reach the conclusions and recommendations that it did? In general, I want to find a satisfactory explanation for the way the United States responded when faced with a problem, like the emergence of a nuclear armed China in this case. To do this, I have extracted four instruments, which I have found to be relevant to this end, from defensive realism to approach the cases, four instruments which play an important role in the understanding the dynamics and the reasons behind American policy. Those four being the maximization of security, the role of threat, the maintenance of international balance and the forming of alliances. I will discuss these instruments in more depth later on, but all these instruments play a vital part in the theory of defensive realism and will help me dissect and understand the three cases. I am aware that the subject is more complex and more factors are relevant and I do not pretend that using the instruments from defensive realism will
7 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell University 2012),
81.
4 paint a perfect picture. But this approach can help us to understand the behavior of the United States and will offer a valuable piece of the puzzle and an interesting point of view.
This thesis will be divided into five separate chapters, excluding the introduction, the conclusion and the epilogue. In the first chapter I will cover the theoretical context of the thesis, in which I present and will discuss defensive realism and the four instruments, and explain why I have chosen this theoretical approach. After that, I will devote a chapter to the historical context of the subject in which I briefly describe the case history, identify all the actors and present all the necessary historical processes needed to grasp the case studies. The three chapters that follow are the essence of this thesis as each one will cover one of the three case studies, beginning with the general response and policy of the United States after discovering the Chinese program, continuing with the Limited Test Ban Treaty and finishing with the Gilpatric Committee. These three chapters all follow the same composition. I begin with describing the case and then I will use the four instruments to dissect it, extracting and analyzing the reasons and motivation for the action, stance and policy of the United States. In the conclusion I will present my findings and combine them into an explanation of the American response to the emergence of nuclear China and into an answer to the question why the Western superpower acted like it did. Lastly, in the epilogue, I will put this thesis into the larger historical picture of nuclear proliferation, giving it its place in the longer process of the American proliferation policy.
This thesis will be based on a mix of academic, secondary literature and primary sources and documents. Especially for the following two chapters, those on the theoretical and historical context, I will rely mostly on academic literature, of which there is a vast collection. Considering the lengthy and still ongoing academic debate on theoretical realism within international relations, with all its variants and sub-theories, it is important that I do not get lost in the wide array of literature. That’s why I will limit myself to the works of Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and several other established authors. The same goes for the chapter on the historical context, where I will also limit myself to a selection of authoritative literature, which will be sufficient to describe the case history. The chapters on the three case studies, however, will mainly be based on primary sources and documents. Especially through the digital collections of the National Security Archive, The Foreign Relations of the United States and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, I have found a relevant and wide selection of primary sources to use during my research. Many of these collections are accompanied by specific electronic briefing books and contain recently published and declassified documents. Furthermore, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library has online archives which provided invaluable documents. In the thesis, I will refer to all the these primary documents in the footnotes and I will provide an exact location of each document and the digital collection where
5 it can be found in the bibliography. Secondary literature is sparse on two of the three case studies, the overall response of the United States and the Gilpatric Committee. Luckily, the historian William Burr, who is also attached to the National Security Archive and who edited the mentioned electronic briefing books, published a valuable article on that first case9 and the nuclear proliferation historians
Francis J. Gavin and Hall Brands did so on the Gilpatric Committee.10 These articles can provide me
with an academic point of view into the cases, although my main focus will be on the primary documents. It must be noted that during my research, I was greatly assisted by the academic research and works of Gavin, Brands and Burr, whose articles and, in the case of Burr, excellent electronic briefing books served as a practical and valuable guide through the numerous primary sources.
9 Burr and Richelson, ‘Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear
Program, 1960-64’, 54-99.
6 Chapter 1: Theoretical context
When analyzing a historical case, providing a mere description is often insufficient to grasp the complexity and entirety of the story you are trying tell. Presenting a sum of all the facts, dates and numbers can result in a nice overview and, with a talented author, even in an enjoyable and readable monograph, but it lacks the depth to fully understand why something happened. We all know that the United States became involved in the Vietnam conflict. We all know that the United States triumphed during the Cold War. We all know that Hitler invaded Poland in 1939 and that Great-Britain and France, as a response, declared war on Nazi Germany. But for a historian, these facts aren’t that interesting, far more important is to ask: why did this happen? Which is not an easy question to answer, especially in complex, historical cases. A historian needs a helping hand to really understand history. A lens, as Scott Sagan wrote, through which to look at historical cases, if one truly wants to understand them.
Theories often can help historians to understand cases and to answer the important why question. Historian Derek Beach writes that “theories provide simplified explanations of complex real world phenomena.”11 This is not only true in physics and other exact sciences, but also is
applicable to the study of history and international relations. The question why Nazi Germany invaded Poland has been the subject of numerous books and almost all the factors and aspects have been analyzed by now, and the rationale and motivation of Hitler and his cohorts are more or less clear. But it is part of a much larger issue which is not clear at all, an issue that transcends specific case studies. And that is the issue of why states in general act the way they do: what drives states to declare war? Or to sign a peace treaty? Or to join an alliance? And so on. An answer to these kind of questions, an explanation of the behavior of states, is invaluable when tackling case studies and provide an essential point of view in understanding history. And one can only answer these kind of general questions by using theories. As the historian and theorist Kenneth Waltz argued in his groundbreaking work Theory of International Politics: “One can reliably find his way among infinite materials only with the guidance of theory.”12
There is, however, not one single accepted theory to explain the behavior of states and not a single approach can capture the many factors, the complexity and the entirety of international relations, both historical and contemporary.13 In fact, within the study of international relations
theory, there has been a long and complex debate, resulting in many theories and different points of
11 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (New York 2012), 6.
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York 1979), 5.
13 Stephen Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition:
7 view, all trying to understand why states act like they do. Not all of these are influential, like Marxism (which was popular until the end of the Cold War), feminism and green political thought,14
but there are three theories which are considered dominant within the study of international relations: realism, liberalism, and the more recent constructivism.15 It is important to mention that
liberalism, which highlights the importance of economic and political considerations, and constructivism, which believes that the behavior of states is shaped by collective norms and social identities,16 can also provide an interesting approach to historical cases and international relations,
and although I will not use these theories as my guide, they should not be easily dismissed.
Probably the most dominant theory within international relations is realism, dating back to the works of Thucydides (460-406 BC), being popularized by Machiavelli (1532) and currently the leading theory used to explain the behavior of states.17 Realism, however, also has many sub-schools
of thought and has academically evolved since the Second World War, resulting in many different ideas and opinions of what drives states within the paradigm of realism. The unifying theme of realism is that the most important factor in international relations is power and that all states compete in a struggle for survival.18 But beyond these assumptions, there are many offshoots and
different takes on the realist theory. Classical realists, like Hans Morgenthau,19 argue that this quest
is inherent to the human nature: great powers, like every human individual, has an undeniable drive to dominate and to be as powerful as possible. This emphasis on human nature has its roots in the work of Hobbes and Machiavelli.20
In the 1970’s, Kenneth Waltz proposed an alternative take on realism. Instead of pointing at human nature, Waltz argued that the structure of the international system motivates and drives states to seek survival.21 This so-called structural realism, to some better known as neorealism,
assumes that states are part of a system defined by anarchy, which means that there is no greater or guiding power above the states and the structure, and that each state is ultimately on its own and condemned to the principle of self-help. These uncertain and dangerous circumstances force states to compete for power with the ultimate goal of survival. Structural realists believe that each state is essentially the same, with the same incentives for survival and that culture or ideology are inferior to
14 Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, e.a., Theories of
International Relations (New York 2005) 11.
15 Jack Snyder, ‘One World, Rival Theories’, Foreign Policy, No. 145 (November/December 2004), 52-62, there
63.
16 Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, 38.
17 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt ‘Realism’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World
Politics. An introduction to international relations (New York 2005), 161-184, there 165-166.
18 Ibid, 165.
19 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York 1948).
20 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford 2006), 71-88, there 72.
8 the inherent goal of survival. Besides this anarchical nature, the international structure is also defined by the distribution of capabilities between the units within the structure, which posits each unit and determines its power.22
Structural realists agree with each other that the structure, based on anarchy, drives states, which are viewed as rational and egoistic, to adopt survival as its main goal. There is, however, an important division within this brand of realism, and that is on the question how much power is enough to ensure the ultimate goal of a state, survival. Should a state seek out ultimate power, or is an appropriate amount of power enough to secure survival? The offensive realists, championed by historian John J. Mearsheimer, argue that survival is achieved by the maximization of power and that the anarchical nature of the system pushes states to act offensively. Due to the uncertain nature of the anarchical system, ultimate power is the best guarantee for survival, or so offensive realists conclude.23 In contrast, defensive realists, like Kenneth Waltz, argue that the way to ensure survival
of states, is for these states to maximize their security. The foremost concern of states is to maintain the status-quo and their position in the international system, and that states want to achieve an appropriate amount of power necessary to ensure survival, autonomy and to protect them from the domination of others.24
Defensive realists believe that offensive action is a threat to the system and counter-productive for the offensive state itself. Due to the believe that the offense-defense balance is tilted in favor of defensive power, meaning that defensive capabilities are more powerful than offensive ones, and since counterbalancing, especially in the nuclear age, is an effective way to restrain offensive states, defensive realists argue that aggressive policy rarely pays, that is why states are inclined to adopt a moderate and restrained policy.25 Offensive realists criticize this rationale by
stating that if every state would indeed adopt a moderate and defensive policy, with the goal of maximizing its security and maintaining its position in the system, war would not occur. Defensive realists counter this, by arguing that states can never be sure of the intention of each other, which can lead to miscalculations and suspicion, resulting in the so-called security dilemma: if one state increases its security, it will decrease the security of another state. Due to the uncertainty about the intention of a state, if one state maximizes security, this threatens the relative power of other states, forcing them to join in a competition for the most security.26
22 Dunne and Schmidt ‘Realism’, 169-170. 23 Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 42-44. 24 Ibid, 39-42.
25 Ibid.
26 Steven E. Lobell, ‘Structural Realism / Offensive and Defensive Realism’, in Robert A. Denemark, ed., The
9 The goal of this thesis is not to pick a side in the debate between offensive or defensive realism. In history, there are examples that can be used to attack and to defend both theories. To name one: the conquest by Napoleon of Europe and his strive for hegemony can be seen as an attempt towards the maximization of power. Defensive realists can respond, however, that Napoleon tried to maximize his security, because he was threatened by the other great powers of Europe and that he was forced to strike at them, to keep secure his own position and the sovereignty of the French empire. Furthermore, defensive realists can argue that since Napoleon was eventually defeated by an effective counter-balancing coalition, that offensive action is indeed futile and, in the end, a threat to the offensive state itself. Although I will not take a stance within this theoretical debate, I do believe that during the Cold War the bi-polar international framework was defined by the principles of defensive realism, the same way that the aggressive actions of Nazi Germany during the Second World War can be best explained by offensive realism.27
As I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, when analyzing a case study, a guiding theory is essential and I believe that the theory of defensive realism is most suited to this end. Like I noted before, other theoretical approaches may result in interesting and important analyses of the case studies and I do not pretend that defensive realism can produce a perfect and integral explanation of the United States behavior towards nuclear proliferation following the Chinese acquisition of the atomic bomb. Other important aspects may include domestic factors, cultural factors, social factors, and so on. In this thesis I will, however, solely focus on defensive realism. It is worth noting that some theorists do not believe that neorealism can be used to explain foreign policy of individual states, as structural realism focuses on the interaction within the system in general, rather than the actions of a single unit.28 Even Waltz himself finds a discrepancy between theories on a system level
and theories on a unit, or national, level.29 Waltz, however, continues that this is only the case when
focusing on minor powers, where using a theory on a unit level is the most effective. When concentrating on greater powers, like done in this thesis, a system level theory is to be used, as “a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.”30 It can be argued
that neoclassical realism, a theory focused on the external behavior of individual states, is better suited to use as a theory for this thesis.31 I, however, disagree. First of all, neoclassical realism has a
much wider approach, taking into account many domestic factors, something that is not in line with the approach of my thesis. Furthermore, as historian Jeffrey W. Taliaferro writes, “the distinction
27 Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 39.
28 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security,
Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000-2001), 128-161, there 132-134.
29 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71-73. 30 Ibid, 73.
10 between neorealism and neoclassical realism is best understood as a continuum, not concrete division”32 and I believe, following the line of Waltz, that the United States, as a super power during
the Cold War, is such an integral and decisive part of the system, that a system level theory is more appropriate.
As I already stated in the introduction, I have extracted four instruments from structural realism and defensive realism to help me research the three case studies. These instruments are all important and prominent parts of the theory and serve as a practical and concrete way to approach the three cases from a theoretical point of view. Of course, defensive realism has many more aspects that can be used, but not only are these four instruments the most relevant for this study, they also cover the most essential parts of defensive realism. The instruments I have selected to utilize defensive realism are the following four: the maximization of security, the maintenance of international balance, the role of threat, and the forming of alliances.
First of all the maximization of security. This is the main point of disagreement between defensive and offensive realism. According to defensive realists, the best way for states to ensure their survival is if every state maximizes its security, instead of its power. Security serves as the principal interest of a state and, therefore, a state should seek out an appropriate and requisite amount of power to ensure its security and survival within the anarchical system.33 States will not
act offensively if this means that this jeopardizes their own interests or security, as their relative security is their primary concern. When their security is in danger, states are forced to counter this threat, with the goal of maintaining their secure role in the system. On the other hand, if a state maintains an appropriate level of security, it will pursue a moderate and restrained policy.34 By using
the basic assumption that states aim to maximize their security, this can serve as a relevant instrument to analyze the behavior of the United States and to uncover its rationale, policy and actions during the cases.
The second instrument, the maintenance of the international balance, is closely related with the former. According to defensive realists, the international system, especially as was the case during the bi-polar world of the Cold War, is best served with a balance of power, which guarantees the most security and best chance for survival for all states. Structural realists make a distinction between revisionist states, which try to alter the international balance, and status-quo states, which are satisfied with the balance. When this balance is threatened by an upcoming, revisionist power, it is the logical reaction of especially great powers to try to balance this threat and to maintain the
32 Ibid.
33 Dunne and Schmidt ‘Realism’, 174.
11 status-quo, because the status-quo is the best path towards security.35 While classical realists
believe that this is the result of the role of state leaders and conscious policy, structural realists believe that maintaining the balance of power is an inherent part of the system, and thus a logical response.36 When a state gets too powerful and threatens to upset the existing balance, states have
the choice to bandwagon (to join the revisionist state) or balance it. Great powers, like the United State during the Cold War, often choose to balance the danger, since to bandwagon would weaken their own security.37 The maintenance of the international balance can, just like the former
instrument, provide an important insight into the American response. It is interesting to see if the United States saw China as a revisionist state which threatened the bi-polar balance. And if they did perceive China, or nuclear proliferation in general, as a threat, can the American policy during the three cases be seen as a form of balancing and maintaining the status-quo?
The perception of threat is the third instrument I will use. The term threat is not prominently used by Waltz, it is, however, highlighted by Stephen Walt, a former student of Kenneth Waltz himself. In his so-called balance of threat theory, which is an alternative take on Waltz’ balance of power theory, Walt attaches great importance to threats. According to Walt, states are more likely to balance a revisionist state that poses the greatest threat to its survival, and that the power of the state, which is the most important factor according to Waltz, is only one part of what defines the level of threat.38 Threat, Walt argues, is composed of a combination of relative power, geographic
proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.39 I believe that the perception of threat,
especially the emphasis on perceived intentions and offensive capabilities, plays an important role in explaining the behavior of the United States towards China. After all, the way the United States perceived a nuclear armed China and how much of a threat it would be to American security and the international status-quo, can help in analyzing the American policy. It also raises some interesting questions: what were, according the United States, the intentions of China? To upset the bi-polar balance, or would it use the atomic bomb to secure its survival? And how much did the United States fear the now nuclear offensive capabilities of China? And so on.
The final instrument, the forming of alliances, is the way states counter threats to the balance of power and their security. Instead of acting unilaterally, states often seek partners to constrain a revisionist state and to preserve the status-quo which grants both the partners most security. Waltz argues that “alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests
35 Dunne and Schmidt ‘Realism’, 175. 36 Ibid.
37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126.
38 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
43, No. 1 (1989), 1-17, there 4-5.
39 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4
12 in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states.”40 The forming of
alliances is by no means exclusive to defensive realism, as it is associated with many theories of international relations. Nevertheless, it plays an important part within defensive realism and also within the three cases studies. During the construction of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United States and the Soviet-Union partnered up to use the treaty as a means to halt nuclear proliferation. And when the American government was debating whether to carry out military strikes on the Chinese, they wanted the Soviet-Union on its side, to act bilaterally with them. And finally, the Gilpatric Committee implored Johnson to strengthen and increase the cooperation with the Soviet-Union when dealing with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With all three cases, alliance forming proved to be a popular way for the United States to act towards China and nuclear proliferation.
Although I have made a distinction between the four instruments, they are all part of the same process and intertwined with each other: to maximize its security, a state wants to maintain the international status-quo, which provides the best chance for survival, by forming alliances against the biggest perceived threat. During my analyses of the case studies, the instruments will, unavoidably, be linked with each other, sometimes overlapping. But they all serve the same purpose: to use defensive realism in a concrete way to approach historical case studies. It has to be noted one final time, my goal is not to prove defensive realism and I will only use it as a point of view, as an theoretical approach. I have deducted these four instruments from the theory to find one of the many puzzle pieces and to present a part of the answer to the question why the United States acted like it did when it was confronted by a nuclear China and nuclear proliferation in general.
13 Chapter 2: Historical context
To appropriately understand and appreciate the case studies that will be discussed and analyzed in the next three chapters, it is important to place them within a historical context. As the cases are all part of larger historical processes, it is necessary for the reader to obtain a requisite amount of knowledge of these processes, if the cases are to be correctly comprehended. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the history of the processes and cases, to identify all the actors and present the necessary historical context prior to the 1960’s. I will briefly discuss several subjects which all play a role during the cases. Those subjects are the motivation of Communist China to develop the nuclear bomb, the American non-proliferation policy, and the international relations between China and the United States, where I will also note the role of the Soviet-Union within the international system. Lastly, I will present a clear outlining of all the actors and the situation prior to the cases. This chapter is by no means a full and detailed narration and analysis of these subjects, it merely serves as a brief summary of the essential information and to present the historical processes in which the cases are to be placed.
Throughout the 20th century, many great powers decided to pursue a nuclear weapons
program. The Soviet-Union, in 1949, had to match the military strength of its American rival, while Great-Britain, in 1952, and France, in 1960, desperately tried to cling to their status as global powers, heavily damaged due to their crumbling empire, by developing nuclear weapons. In hindsight, it is logical that China, slowly entering the world stage after a communist victory during the Chinese Civil War, would also pursue the atomic bomb. However, Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and the leader of the Chinese state, initially was very critical of nuclear weapons and attached very little military value to them.41 Inspired by traditional Chinese military doctrine,
Mao downplayed the importance of technology, insisting that the outcome of a battle was determined by the masses, highlighting the human factor.42 When speaking on nuclear weapons
with an American journalist, shortly after the Second World War, Mao proclaimed that “the atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. […] The outcome of a war is decided by people, not by one or two new types of weapons.”43
Throughout the 19th century and up until the brutal Japanese occupation during the Second
World, China can be characterized as helpless and at the mercy of greater powers.44 When the
41 Shu Guan Zhan, ‘Between ‘Paper and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons’, in John Lewis Gaddis,
Phillip H. Gordon, Ernest R, May and Jonathan Rosenberg eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb.
Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (New York 1999), 194-215, there 194-197.
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid, 196.
14 Communist forces emerged victorious from the Chinese Civil War, China, with its massive population and great potential, was set to seize its position within the international system. The reality of the Cold War eventually caught up with Mao and his personal aversion towards nuclear weapons. The first incentive for China to alter its view on nuclear weapons was during the end of the Korean War, when the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the conflict on favorable terms.45
Although China did not feel forced by this threat to take part in the peace talks, in fact, China considered the end of the war as somewhat of a success, the American threat was China’s first confrontation with nuclear blackmail and opened Chinese eyes to the importance of technology in the reality of the Cold War.46 This sentiment was further strengthened during the First Taiwan Strait
Crisis in 1954-1955. During this conflict, the Eisenhower administration once again threatened China with nuclear weapons, forcing the communists to back out, giving in to nuclear blackmail.47 It was in
early 1955, during the crisis, that the communist leadership decided to pursue nuclear weapons.48
This decision must be seen against the background of an active and assertive United States policy on international affairs, that uses the threat of nuclear weapons to protect its interests in Asia. Mao was convinced that nuclear weapons were an invaluable tool to deter American interference and essential for Chinese security.49
The nuclear test of China was not the first time that the United States was confronted by a new state joining the nuclear club. In August 1949, four years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by nuclear weapons, the Soviet-Union conducted its first nuclear test. This test came as a shock for the Truman administration. Although the Americans expected the Soviets to follow suit with an own nuclear program, it came far quicker than predicted. Truman had no other choice than to accept this new reality.50 Nevertheless, the Soviet test did give more urgency to the subject of
nuclear proliferation. Already in 1945, the United States government concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons should be limited, but it found it hard to compose an effective and coherent policy.51 President Truman himself had mixed feelings about nuclear weapons. Although he was the
one who ordered the nuclear strikes in Japan, it was also under his administration that the first initiatives for arms control were undertaken.52 To prevent further proliferation, Truman explored the
possibilities for supranational institutions to control the spread of nuclear knowledge and
45 Shu Guan Zhan, ‘Between ‘Paper and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons’, 198. 46 Ibid.
47 Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict, 67. 48 Ibid.
49 Shu Guan Zhan, ‘Between ‘Paper and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons’, 205.
50 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival. Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York 1988),
197-201
51 Ibid, 513.
52 James H. Lebovic, Flawed Logics. Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (Baltimore 2013),
15 materials.53 The underlying rationale of the Truman administration was that the United States would
be more secure if no state would possess nuclear weapons, than if the weapons could spread to other states.54 The initiatives, however, did not prove successful. The Soviet-Union was unwilling to
cooperate to achieve non-proliferation before conducting its own nuclear test, as they were fearful that the United States would not give up its nuclear arms. These fears were not without reason: could the Soviet-Union indeed forgo its own nuclear program, with a mere promise that its adversary would give up its nuclear monopoly and with it a huge military advantage?55
Where Truman was ambivalent towards nuclear weapons and unsure how to appreciate them, nuclear policy took shape under the administration of his successor, Eisenhower. The former American general came to terms with the new existing balance between the United States and the Soviet-Union and included nuclear weapons in his overall foreign policy, resulting in a doctrine of brinkmanship, deterrence and massive retaliation.56 Although it was now accepted that his
communist opponent had nuclear weapons at his disposal, Eisenhower still saw the principle of disarmament and non-proliferation as a noble goal.57 Like Truman before him, Eisenhower also
launched initiatives to pursue this goal, ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Skies’. These proposal did not contribute greatly towards disarmament. As McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser to Kennedy and Johnson, wrote: “[T]he names were as striking as the results in reducing nuclear danger were small.”58 These initiatives, together with the groundwork for the test ban treaty that was laid
during the Eisenhower administration, can be seen, despite their limited result, as a genuine longing for the United States to curtail nuclear proliferation and to promote disarmament. However, the reality of the Cold War and the logic of the security dilemma dissuaded the United States and the Soviet-Union from achieving these goals.59
In 1952, the nuclear club was joined by Great-Britain. Due to the cooperation during the Second World War with the United States, the British were not opposed by the Americans in their strive for nuclear weapons. There even was, especially during the Eisenhower administration, a Anglo-American exchange of nuclear knowledge and materials. The rationale behind this was that Great-Britain could serve American interests as a deterrent factor against the Soviet-Union.60 The
53 S. David Broscious, ‘Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S. Truman’s
Approach to Nuclear Weapons’, in John Lewis Gaddis, Phillip H. Gordon, Ernest R, May and Jonathan
Rosenberg eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb. Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (New York 1999), 15-38, there 25-28.
54 Lebovic, Flawed Logics, 15. 55 Ibid, 19-20.
56 Ibid, 22-26. 57 Ibid, 26.
58 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 287. 59 Lebovic, Flawed Logics, 36-38. 60 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 463-472.
16 fourth member of the nuclear states was France, which unilaterally developed a nuclear program. Frustrated by the political and military rift with the United States, caused by President De Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO and his emphasis on an independent French self-defense force, the nuclear program of France was not welcomed by both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administration, resulting in more frustration and difficult relations between the two countries.61 When Kennedy
came to power in 1960, the world had four nuclear powers and for the United States, this situation was foreseeable and acceptable. After all, it was inevitable that the Soviet-Union would develop nuclear weapons, the British program was not only accepted, but also stimulated, and the French program was very inconvenient, but not a decisive tragedy. The United States, through the initiatives of both the Truman and the Eisenhower administration, had the idealistic goal of non-proliferation and, then more important, disarmament, but this goal was not a top priority for the Americans. As we will see in the following chapters, this changed with the discovery of the Chinese nuclear program. In the beginning of 1963, when a nuclear China was an impending reality, Kennedy was “haunted by the feeling that by 1970, […] there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.”62 The young President, who never got to see if his fears would become reality,
“[regarded] that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”63
The reason why the United States was more concerned with the Chinese acquisition of the bomb than it was when France of Great-Britain obtained it, is due to the communist nature of China and the antagonistic relationship between the two countries, which dates back to the conflict between communist and nationalist forces in China. Strengthened by the fear of expanding international communism, the United States heavily supported the nationalist forces, both before and after the Second World War, hoping this would prevent the loss of China to communism.64 In
1948, when the Chinese Civil War came to a climax, the Truman administration increased its aid for the nationalist forces, but to no avail. A year later, the whole of continental China came under communist control and the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, with the nationalist forces escaping to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China.65 The following two decades would be
defined by hostile relations between the United States and Communist China, that would last until Nixon went to China in 1972, setting the stage for rapprochement between the two states. Until that year, the United States heavily supported the Republic of China on Taiwan, while refusing to
61 Ibid, 472-487.
62 President Kennedy's News Conferences, 52, March 21, 1963,
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-52.aspx.
63 Ibid.
64 Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers (New York 1986), 66-80. 65 Ibid.
17 acknowledge the communist mainland.66 Especially during the Eisenhower years, the United States
and China clashed with each other on several occasions, like during the Korean War and the two Taiwan Strait Crises, further deteriorating the international relations between them.67 These clashes
were the result of the overall American policy during the 1950’s towards China, which had the goals of protecting the Republic of China on Taiwan and containing China and the spread of communism.68
With the loss of China to communism, which gave rise to the second great communist power of the Cold War, and with the hostile relations that followed in the 1950’s, Kennedy was particularly concerned with China, concluding in the 1963 that it was “potentially a more dangerous foe than any we faced since the end of the Second World War.”69 The Kennedy administration, when it came to
power in 1961, in general maintained the inherited policy of his predecessors, with the same goals of containing communism. But his perception of China as a danger was more stronger than before. Kennedy wholeheartedly embraced the domino theory and viewed China as an expansive menace with the goal to aggressively seize the dominant position in Asia. 70 However, in contrast to his
predecessors, Kennedy was poised to adopt a more flexible way of handling China, believing that the existence of China was now an undeniable part of the Cold War.71 During the Kennedy
administration, concerns over China would only grow with a seemingly more adventurist Chinese foreign policy, as demonstrated with the Sino-Indian War in 1962, new troubles concerning Taiwan and growing Chinese support for communist forces in North-Vietnam.72 The Chinese nuclear
program, however, would make China one of the priorities of the United States government.
Although the Sino-American relations were clearly hostile and antagonistic, they should not be seen as a pure bilateral affair. Especially during the Cold War, the international relations between China and the United States were under strong influence of a third party, the powerful Soviet-Union.73 It is no wonder that China and the Soviet-Union would early on align, as they both found in
each other a strong communist partner on the world stage, much to the frustration and concern of the United States. Directly after the Chinese Civil War, the Soviet-Union supported its newly found
66 William C. Kirby, ‘The Two Chinas in the Global Setting: Sino-Soviet and Sino-American Cooperation in the
1950’s’, in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin eds., Re-examining the Cold War. US-China Diplomacy,
1954-1973 (London 2001), 25-45.
67 Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, 80-98.
68 James Fetzer, ‘Clinging to Containment: China Policy’, in Thomas G. Paterson ed., Kennedy’s Quest for
Power. American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York 1989), 178-197, there 178-179.
69 Rosemary Foot, ‘Redefinitions: The Domestic Context of America’s China Policy in the 1960s’, in Robert S.
Ross and Jiang Changbin eds., Re-examining the Cold War. US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (London 2001), 262-287, there 281-282.
70 Fetzer, ‘Clinging to Containment: China Policy’, 179-183. 71 Ibid, 183-184.
72 Ibid, 189-196.
73 Zhang Baijia, ‘The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 1954-1970’, in
Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin eds., Re-examining the Cold War. US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (London 2001), 46-76, there 46.
18 communist ally with restoring the Chinese economy and industry, leading to many partnerships between the two states.74 The two communist powers also collaborated on the Chinese nuclear
program, with the Soviet-Union assisting China in developing the program by sharing important nuclear technologies.75 Although China proclaimed to be the eternal ally of the Soviet-Union, the
relations between the two communist states deteriorated at the end of the 1950’s, breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance. Due to the Chinese ambition on the world stage, resulting in adventurism and a strive for a more independent role, and the Chinese frustration over the revisionist agenda set in by Khrushchev, Mao grew tired of the dominant role of the Soviet-Union, while Khrushchev no longer trusted the Chinese.76 This Sino-Soviet split, arguably one of the most important events in Cold War
history, had several relevant consequences for this thesis. First of all, it broke up an alliance hostile towards the United States, prompting the United States and the Soviet-Union to grow closer together on issues like arms control.77 Second of all, it forced the Chinese to continue working on
their nuclear weapons without Soviet assistance.78 And lastly, it motivated China to reevaluate its
security policy. China not only lost the protection they enjoyed from the Soviet nuclear umbrella, they were also now confronted by a steadily more hostile growing neighbor. This also was a further incentive for China to develop its own nuclear arsenal.79
Although China was a powerful state with great potential, the international system, during the Cold War, was still dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet-Union. Throughout the 1950’s and well into the beginning of the 1960’s, these two superpowers often clashed with each other, in places like Berlin and Cuba. Nevertheless, the relations between them were slowly establishing themselves in a state of normalcy, as they both accepted the international situation. As explained, the United States was concerned with nuclear proliferation and with the rising power of China. More than his predecessors, Kennedy saw grave danger in the further spread of nuclear weapons, and also the Soviet-Union understood the consequences of proliferation.80 And
with the United States, especially during the Kennedy administration, having a hostile relation with China since the communist takeover and the Soviet-Union growing more frustrated and distressed with the Chinese since the Sino-Soviet split, the two superpowers did find some common ground and reason for more constructive cooperation. This is not to say that they were in a state of
74 Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers (New York 1986), 22-35.
75 Viktor M. Gobarev, ‘Soviet policy toward China: Developing nuclear weapons 1949–1969’, The Journal of
Slavic Military Studies, Vol 12, No. 4, (1999), 1-53, there 21-22.
76 Baijia, ‘The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 1954-1970’, 58-59. 77 Ibid, 58-59.
78 Li Jie, ‘Changes in China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations’, in Robert S. Ross and
Jiang Changbin eds., Re-examining the Cold War. US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (London 2001), 288-320, there 292-293.
79 Ibid.
19 friendship, it must be emphasized that throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet-Union still considered each other the greatest threat and adversary. But within the international system, the rise of China introduced a new player, although not a superpower, to the bi-polar Cold War, which was an issue that both the United States and the Soviet-Union had to deal with it.
To summarize, with the turn of the decennium and in the beginning of the 1960’s, China was actively trying to establish its position within the international system, forced by an insecure situation due to a hostile United States policy and a crumbling relationship with the Soviet-Union, and thus a loss of Soviet protection. The antagonistic relations between China and the United States, and the communist nature of China, resulted in grave distress with the new Kennedy administration, that, together with the Soviet-Union, recognized the danger of an expanding China for the international system. Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States have been concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and since 1949, they have not been confronted with an adversary obtaining them. When China started developing a nuclear program of its own, with the goal of seizing and maintaining a place in the international system, the United States would be faced with both problems – the growing Chinese menace and the spread of nuclear weapons.
20 Chapter 3: Case study I - The overall response and policy of the United States
"You know, it wouldn't be too hard if we could somehow get kind of an anonymous airplane to go over there, take out the Chinese facilities -they've only got a couple- and maybe we could do it, or maybe the Soviet Union could do it, rather than face the threat of a China with nuclear weapons." 81
John F. Kennedy contemplating on how to handle the Chinese nuclear program.
As I have explained in the introduction, the goal of this thesis is to present, within the paradigm of defensive realism, a satisfactory explanation for the behavior and the policy of the United States towards China and nuclear proliferation, in response to the Chinese nuclear program. To this end, I will delve into three cases which are invaluable in understanding the policy and actions, or lack thereof, of the United States. Although these cases are not demarcated of each other and on many occasions they will be intertwined and overlapping, each of the three can provide an interesting insight into the American decision-making. Later on, I will discuss the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Gilpatric Committee, but in this chapter I will focus on the overall response and policy of the United States towards China, from the discovery of the nuclear program until a short period following the Chinese test on October 16 1964. Since this is the most general case study of this thesis, it will also be the longest chapter.
I will divide this chapter into four aspects I will discuss. First of all, I will focus on the American process of estimating the progress and the date of the nuclear program and the eventual test. After that, I will discuss the American assessment of the Chinese threat and the perceived implications of a nuclear armed China. Subsequently, I will outline the governmental policy on how the United States should confront the Chinese nuclear program. And lastly, I will describe the role of the Soviet-Union within this debate. After I am done discussing these aspects, I will look at this case through the lens of defensive realism, using the four instruments to analyze this general response of the United States to the nuclear program and to define the lessons we can take from this case, which I will later combine with the lessons from the other cases studies. This chapter will almost entirely be based on primary sources from the American government originating from that period, although I will be guided through the sources by two academic articles, the already mentioned one by William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson,82 and an article by Lyle J. Goldstein.83
81 William C. Foster, recorded interview by Charles T. Morrissey, August 5, 1964, page 36, John F. Kennedy
Library Oral History Program.
82 Burr and Richelson, ‘Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese
Nuclear Program, 1960-64’.
83 Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘When China was a ‘rogue state’: the impact of China's nuclear weapons program on US–
21
Estimating the progress of the nuclear program
The United States intelligence services and the State Department encountered difficulties with two aspects of assessing the Chinese nuclear program, the first being on the question whether the nuclear test would be plutonium or uranium based and the second, far more important, was in predicting the probable date of the explosion. As we will see, these two issues would not be resolved until the actual nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964. Given the discreet nature of Communist China, these troubles were not without reason. The Chinese government prioritized the secrecy surrounding the nuclear program and was determined to keep the eventual progress and results hidden for the rest of the world, and especially the United States, which resulted in restricted possibilities for the intelligence services to collect information.84 Nevertheless, the United States,
despite limited capabilities, tried to keep close tabs on the developments in China, especially via the use of the U-2 spy planes, and these developments would be the subjects of many intelligence reports and memoranda.
Four years after Chairman Mao made the decision in 1955 to pursue a nuclear program, the United States became convinced that “Communist China has probably initiated a nuclear weapons development program.”85 In a National Intelligence Estimate report from July 1959, which had the
goal “to analyze Chinese Communist domestic developments and external relations, and to estimate probable trends during the next five years,” the first estimate on the progress of China’s nuclear program is mentioned, concluding that, despite the absence of reliable intelligence, China would “not have developed a nuclear weapons production capability of its own by 1963.” Furthermore, the report noted, although it falsely concluded that the Sin-Soviet alliance, despite predicted difficulties, would continue to stand strong, that the Soviet-Union was reluctant to see a nuclear armed China emerge.86 These predictions were further outlined more than a year later, when a report vaguely
concluded that China could “detonate a first nuclear device sometime in 1963, though it might be as late as 1964, or as early as 1962.” The report continued that the time of detonation depends on the assistance of the Soviet-Union, of which there were signs that it was diminishing, greatly hampering China’s nuclear progress.87 In response to these reports, the reality of the situation hit the American
government, with officials concluding that it was not the question whether China would develop
84 Burr and Richelson, ‘Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese
Nuclear Program, 1960-64’, 59-60.
85 Department of State, INR–NIE Files, National Intelligence Estimate, July 28, 1959, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China, Document 292.
86 Ibid.
87 Department of State, INR–NIE Files, National Intelligence Estimate December 13, 1960, Foreign Relations of
22 nuclear weapons, but rather when a nuclear test would be conducted, urging departments within the government to start thinking about the implications of a Chinese test.88
Despite the growing urgency of the concerns about the program, American intelligence services found at the end of 1962, that the Chinese program was greatly affected by the disengagement of Soviet assistance and further Chinese setback, which was a result from economic decline. Although Chinese leadership was still fixed on developing nuclear weapons, the probable date of a test was now predicted on “some years later than 1963.”89 A more detailed report, made
by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in July 1963 and mainly based on aerial photography intelligence made by Taiwanese U-2 flights, further backed up these predictions and drew false conclusions about the presumed plutonium nature of the nuclear program and the construction progress of the Chinese facilities, showing that despite genuine American efforts, the collecting of intelligence proved to be difficult.90 These difficulties, however, did not go unnoticed
and in a special National Intelligence Estimate report, it was written that the “gaps in our information remain substantial” and that it was not possible to “judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program […] with any very high degree of confidence.”91
The difficulties with correctly obtaining and assessing intelligence troubled the United States until October 1964. Two months before the nuclear detonation, the CIA concluded that the already suspected facility at Lop Nur would indeed be a nuclear test site, which would be functioning within two months. The available evidence, the agency continues, “does not permit a very confident estimate of the chance of a […] detonation” and although a test “before the end of this year cannot be ruled out, […] we believe that it will not occur until sometime after the end of 1964.”92 On
October 15, ironically a day before the actual test, a new estimate was presented, concluding that a test was imminent and could be conducted at any time, but that “we believe a test will occur sometime within the next six to eight months.”93 In a memorandum several weeks later, the
intelligence community indeed proved self-conscious about the faulty predictions concerning the
88 Memorandum from John M. Steeves, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to Roger Hilsman, Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, "National Intelligence Estimate on Implications of Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability," April 12 1961.
89 Acting Deputy Assistant Director National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to U.S. Intelligence Board,
Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-6-62 Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Program," December 14, 1962.
90 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist
Advanced Weapon Capabilities," July 10 1963.
91 Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program," July 24, 1963. 92 Special National Intelligence Estimate, "The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion"
August 26 1964.
93 Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Chamberlain) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter), October 15, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, Document 56.
23 date and the nature of the nuclear test, stating that “until the Chinese October test proved otherwise, it had been expected that the first Chicom [Chinese Communist] device would use plutonium, rather than U-235.”94 From the first assessment of the progress of the Chinese program
in 1959, American intelligence services could not penetrate the Chinese secrecy barrier, failing to give correct predictions about the nature and the date of the nuclear test.
The American assessment of the Chinese threat
Although the intelligence community could not correctly predict the date of the test, the United States was well aware that a nuclear detonation was to be expected. This sparked great concern within the Kennedy administration and later the Johnson administration, and when seen against the background of hostile Chinese-American relations and an antagonistic American perception of China, it is no wonder that the assessment of the Chinese threat and the implications of a nuclear armed China for not only the security of the United States, but for the international framework of the Cold War as well, became a prominent issue for the American government. Although it was the general consensus that the Chinese acquisition of an atomic bomb, of course, should not be welcomed, the level of distress and perceived danger varied, with some downplaying the effects of the spread of the bomb to China, while others saw many dangers, especially in the long term and for further nuclear proliferation.
An intelligence report, written in December 1960, on the probable development of China’s external relations, concluded that the leadership of China was “determined to make China a leading world power as rapidly as possible” and that the communist state acted the past year “with aggressive self-confidence towards both the West and the USSR.”95 The report continued that it was
not expected of China, whose perceived goal it was to establish Chinese hegemony in its region, to pursue overt military actions anywhere except perhaps the Taiwan Strait, but that an “arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary fervor, and distorted view of the world may lead [Beijing] to miscalculate risks,” a risk that could increase when the Chinese would obtain offensive nuclear capabilities.96 An
early concrete assessment of the risk posed by a nuclear armed China was performed by the United States Airforce, who stated that within ten years China would have the nuclear capabilities to strike
94 Thomas L. Hughes, INR to Secretary of State, "The Chinese Test," Research Memorandum RES-29, November
2, 1964.
95 Department of State, INR–NIE Files , National Intelligence Estimate, December 6 1960, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China, Document 362.
