Stepping out from the nuclear shadow
a historical and international sociology approach to Iranian foreign policy
Krisztian Vagner (10601910)
Master's Political Science: International Relations
Research Project IR: Power & Resistance in the Middle East
First Supervisor: Dr. Anne de Jong
Second Supervisor: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon
June 2014
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Abstract
This research examined in what way can a historical and international sociology approach can offer a more in-depth analysis of the foreign policy of Iran. By looking at mainstream security theories, it became evident that the nuclear programme of Iran dominates the analysis of the country's foreign policy. Moreover, realist theories also ignored domestic factors that could potentially influence Iranian foreign policy-making. To offer a more detailed account, a historical and international sociology approach was used to analyse Iranian foreign policy. This included looking at both the domestic composition and main foreign policy goals of the Islamic Republic. This allowed identifying parts of Iranian domestic politics that influence the foreign policy-making. The research found out that domestic politics are played out on two complex levels in Iran. On one hand the constitutional system of Iran provides the official framework for the distribution of power in Iran. On the other, there is the vast informal system of networks where four fluid Iranian factions compete for power. These are the reformists, the pragmatic conservatives, the traditional conservatives and the principlists. At the apex of both systems stands the Supreme Leader, who has the final say on the most important issues. This duality and multifaceted complexity is also evident in the foreign decision-making of the country, with different foreign policy positions often having persons of different factional background in charge, leading to contradictory messages to the outside world. The most important security issues of Iran were found to be Iran's role in the Persian Gulf, Iran's role in the wider Middle East (including both Iraq and Syria), their connections to Hezbollah and Hamas and the nuclear programme. Despite sharing a minimum consensus on these issues, the factions have differing policies on implementation. Moreover, these factions tend to use foreign policy means to discredit each other and to gain domestic gains. Consequently, when a new faction rises to prominence, the foreign policy trajectory of the country often takes a significant turn. To reach a more detailed understanding of Iranian foreign policy, therefore, an analysis of the domestic environment is necessary, as this approach can offer an explanation of foreign policy changes caused by domestic factors.
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank Anne for her help in writing this thesis. I want to give her extra credit for helping me finally crack the problem of the proper phrasing of my research question as that peculiar part of the process proved to be the most difficult. Just as you said it would. Once again, I offer my thankful words to my dear friend Sam, who put up with reading all of my work for the second time in a little more than a year. I also feel obliged to thank Julien for introducing me to the concepts that ended up being the core of this thesis. Finally, I would hate to fall out of line without adding the following clichéd part. I need to thank the support from home, as without you I couldn't have done this. You know who you are; there is no need for names this time.
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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
... ivList of Figures
... ivIntroduction: The Nuclear Shadow
... 1The nuclear background ... 3
Theoretical framework ... 5
Methodology ... 7
Chapter outline ... 10
Chapter I: The Iranian Domestic Political System
... 12The formal structures ... 13
The institutional complexity's significance ... 17
Informal networks and their figures ... 18
Factionalised Iran ... 21
Implications for foreign policy ... 23
Chapter II: The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic
... 25The stakeholders ... 25
Foreign policy areas ... 27
2013 and onwards ... 30
A multifaceted foreign policy ... 33
Chapter III: The Influencing Domestic Factors
... 35Domestic factors for historical and international sociology ... 36
Different processes and configurations of the decision-making ... 39
The significance of domestic politics in Iranian foreign policy-making ... 40
Domestics matter... 44
Conclusion
... 46Main findings ... 46
Reflections and transferability ... 49
Contribution to existing knowledge ... 51
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List of Abbreviations
EAS European External Action Service
EU European Union
E3/EU+3 The joined diplomatic effort of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and the United States that was formed to negotiate with Iran over the Iranian nuclear programme
FPA Foreign policy analysis
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IRGC Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
LEF Law Enforcement Forces
MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement
p/r Processual Relationalism
SNSC Supreme National Security Council
List of Figures
2.1: Constitutional Distribution of Power in Iran
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Introduction: The Nuclear Shadow
On the 15th of June 2013, it was revealed that Hassan Rouhani had won the presidential elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His election and subsequent inauguration – so far – marked a departure from previous President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's policies. For the international community this became most visible by a seeming U-turn in Iranian approach to the negotiations with the grouping consisting of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and the United States (E3/EU+3). On the 20th of January 2014, '[…] Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures' and the European Union (EU) adopted legislation to suspend some of the previously imposed sanctions, as agreed between the E3/EU+3 and Iran in a Joint Plan of Action adopted earlier (European Union, 2014a). However, while the interim agreement is a significant breakthrough, it has to be regarded cautiously. On one hand, this deal does not constitute the end of all sanctions imposed. As a first step, it eases unilateral sanctions against Iran, 'accounting for approximately seven billion dollars in sanctions relief' (Boon, 2013 as cited in Vágner, 2014). Second, the six months allowed to negotiate a further comprehensive agreement 'might not be enough to overcome Iran's hardliners and sway skeptics on Capitol Hill, all while maintaining the unity of the countries involved in talk' (Omestad, 2014).
'As the West's nuclear dispute with Iran continues to dominate world head-lines, it is easy to forget that Iran's relations with the world are multifaceted and complex' (Perthes, 2010: 95). Here, Volker Perthes summed up the situation quite aptly. For example, take the available documents on the European Union External Action's website. Through the period between 11/01/2013 and 09/03/2014 there are 50 documents available with references to Iran. Six of these are concerned with human rights, one reports on the release of prisoners of conscience, two reports on Iranian earthquakes and two additional documents are about the SESAME facility (Vágner, 2014). Thirty-five documents had references to the nuclear issue, with seventeen of these documents having direct references towards the abundant E3+3 negotiations. Additionally, remarks on the EU-China Strategic dialogue refer to the E3+3. Finally, there is a press release reporting on the High Representative visiting Iran; connected to this there are two documents detailing the remarks of the High Representative about the visits.
While it is a European example, the EAS' case shows how the nuclear issue generally dominates narratives on Iran. On the 31st 2013 Catherine Ashton, who currently holds the EU position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, started her speech in the following way: 'On Iran, the issues that we've been seeking to address with Iran you know very well and we'll continue to try and persuade Iran that it needs to discuss the issues of the nuclear
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programme and our concerns about that' (European Union, 2013b as cited in Vágner, 2014). This remark shows that by that point the nuclear programme had '[...] reached a de facto self-evident status when talking about the Islamic Republic' (Vágner, 2014: 4). Despite observers cautioning that the interim deal is only a step towards a comprehensive solution, the fact that there has been a constructive step towards one could dilute the focus on Iran almost solely through its nuclear programme. Bearing this in mind, it is worthwhile to look at the High Representative's remarks on the state visit that came roughly a month and a half after the implementation of the interim agreement was agreed upon. A common understanding between Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif can be seen, as they acknowledge that their meeting was the first occasion when they met 'in the bilateral capacity of the High Representative of the European Union and the Foreign Minister of Iran' (European Union, 2014b: 1). It was noted that through these bilateral meetings Syria, Afghanistan and a potential human rights dialogue were discussed (European Union, 2014b: 1). Consequently, one can argue that there are other important issues concerning Iran's foreign policy, which, by breaking with the current nuclear-exclusive approach, could be given more attention. The current focus on the nuclear programme is by no means limited to the political domain, it is also evident in academia. Eventually, after the discovery of the hidden nuclear facilities and Iran announcing its intentions to further expand its nuclear infrastructure, this issue turned into the main question of interest about Iran in security theories (Dryburgh, 2009: 259; Clarke, 2013: 494).
To many, Rouhani's election came as surprise. The previous stalemate in negotiations, and the apparent determination of the Iranian regime combined with Ahmadinejad's aggressive rhetoric on the international field led to a situation where security theories have predominantly focused on its nuclear programme. However, by doing so, it can be argued that other aspects of its foreign policy became overshadowed by this focus. This can easily lead to the formulation of an incomplete picture about Iran. To offer a more in-depth approach to Iranian foreign policy, that includes the system's domestic aspects as well, the following research question is proposed:
How can a historical and international sociology approach offer a more in-depth analysis of Iranian foreign policy, that goes beyond the seemingly exclusive nuclear focus that is prevalent in mainstream security theories?
To answer this question, there are a number of sub-questions that need to be approached. These are the following:
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2. How is the Iranian state made up and what are its main institutions and characteristics of the Iranian system?
3. What else is there to Iranian foreign policy than the nuclear programme? 4. How does the domestic domain influence the foreign sphere?
5. In what way do Iranian domestics influence the foreign policy-making of the country? Identifying the mainstream views in security theories on Iran is important because the overlaying assumption of the thesis is that the majority of these theories focus on the nuclear programme, and that a good portion of them minimises the role of domestic politics. In contrast, a historical and international sociology approach does not dismiss the importance of the internal factors of a state. By approaching the issue in this manner, the questions of how the Iranian state is made up and what the main institutions and characteristics of the system are must be asked. Furthermore, to reach a more in-depth view that moves beyond the nuclear issue, other aspects of Iranian foreign policy has to be analysed. The question of how the domestic domain influences the foreign must also be answered, since doing so can account for the importance of domestic politics. And finally, to relate back to the central question, the influencing nature of Iranian domestics has to be accounted for. An overview of this provides an answer for the central question as well, because if domestic mechanics are important in foreign decision-making, then including them in an analysis of the foreign politics of Iran leads to a more in-depth approach, than one without an account of domestic politics.
The Nuclear Background
Following the 2001 attacks on the United States, it seemed that the United States and the EU were positioned towards some form of rapprochement with Iran. The EU stepped up negotiations on a trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) with Iran with the idea of stabilising the region close to Afghanistan (Dryburgh, 2009: 259). Moreover, in the early phases of the United States' operations in Afghanistan, the US and Iran cooperated against Al-Qaeda (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013: 137). However, the gradually improving situation was rather short-lived. The Bush administration's decision to include Iran in its so-called 'axis of evil' cut cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the Untied States short (Filkins, 2013). Negotiations on the TCA with Iran began in December 2002; these were overshadowed by the National Council of Resistance on Iran revealing the existence of the uranium enrichment facility located in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak in August earlier that year (Dryburgh, 2009: 259; Clarke, 2013: 494). While Iranian officials announced their intention to construct additional nuclear power plants in September, the previously unannounced expansion of their nuclear programme raised suspicions, especially as Iran had an
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obligation to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This resulted in the eventual suspension of the TCA negotiations in 2003 (Dryburgh, 2009: 259). Initially, after the revelations of 2002, the EU sought to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear programme. The Paris Agreement was negotiated under the condition that the TCA negotiations would continue if Iran suspended their nuclear programme (Drybourgh, 2009: 259). However, Iran failed to live up to the agreement, and after the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 the EU adopted a harder line with Iran (Dryburgh, 2009: 259). While there was a long history of US unilateral sanctions against Iran ever since the 1979 revolution, the first round of multilateral sanctions started after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 in 2006 (Moran and Hobbs, 2012: 205). The implementation of the sanctions lacked coherence at first, but gradually the 'cumulative effect of successive rounds of multilateral sanctions, combined with the unilateral sanctions already in place' began affecting Iranian economy (Moran and Hobbs, 2012: 205). Officially, a dual strategy of sanctions and negotiations was planned, in which sanctions were supposed to encourage negotiations. However, the failure of negotiations meant that only a strategy of sanctions was actively pursued (Vágner, 2014).
The E3+3 attempted to negotiate with Iran repeatedly, for example, in November 2009 offering to have the Iranian low-enriched uranium fuel stocks transferred to Russia and France for conversion into fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. This proposal was rejected by Tehran (Clarke, 2013: 492). Similarly, despite the first round of E3+3 negotiations with Iran in 2012 being described as a 'turning point in the Iran-West dialogue' by former Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi, Saeed Jalili commented that the follow-up round of talks in Baghdad deteriorated to 'intensive and long' and 'left unfinished' (Moran and Hobbs, 2012: 210). Following the next meeting of the E3+3 and Iranian delegates the negotiations were agreed to follow on a technical rather than a political basis (Barry and Gladstone, 2012). This meant that instead of pursuing a solution to the political deadlock, the negotiations were concerned about the technical implementation of a future successful deal. The last round of E3+3 negotiations with Iran before the 2013 Iranian presidential elections ended in a stalemate as well, offering little to no solution (International Crisis Group, 2013: 3).
This situation changed considerably after Rouhani's election. Already during his electoral campaign, his featured policies included Iran engaging in 'serious negotiation with the Western world', reducing 'regional conflict', and prioritizing its 'economic recovery and general well-being of its people above its nuclear programme' (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013: 133). While there are a number of sceptics who welcomed Rouhani's election as only “[...] the softer face of a regime determined to acquire a nuclear weapon” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 9), a clear shift from Ahmadinejad's policies could be observed, prompting many to adopt a stance of cautious optimism
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(International Crisis Group, 2013 as cited in Vágner 2014). The series of negotiations held in Geneva in late 2013, contrary to previous E3+3 meetings, led to an agreement on the future implementation of a Joint Plan of Action (European Union, 2013a). This would eventually lead to the Joint Plan of Action coming into force on 20 January 2014.
Theoretical framework
While security theories on Iran mostly dealt with the country's nuclear programme, the approach to the question itself is not homogeneous. Kroenig (2012), for example, went as far as advocating military action against Iran. He argued that a pre-emptive strike would be the least bad option when compared with the possibility of Iran using a nuclear bomb and that the dual track policy of sanctions and negotiations failed. According to him, it is a faulty assumption that war would be worse than Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. He calculates that a 'carefully managed' military strike could '[…] spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States' (Kroenig, 2012: 77). Moreover, Kroenig states that Iran would not respond with its worst forms of retaliation unless its elite felt that the regime's existence was threatened (Kroenig, 2012: 82). The other end of the spectrum is represented by Waltz. Waltz (2012: 2) argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would probably be the best result for the situation in the Middle East. The example of North Korea is used in his argument to show the limits of the sanctions regime, stating that if a state is completely determined on acquiring nuclear weapons it can do so despite the existence of crippling sanctions. Furthermore, he argued that 'in no other region of the world does a lone unchecked nuclear state exist' in stating that power needs to be balanced (Waltz, 2012: 3). Finally, he questioned the irrational perception of the Iranian elite, stating that 'inflammatory language' does not equal a propensity for self-destruction (Waltz, 2013: 4).
Kahl (2012a: 157) criticized both Kroenig and Waltz, arguing that a nuclear weapon should be seen as an offensive tool that can be used to pressure and intimidate other states, which would indirectly expand Iran's influence. For Kahl, even if Iran is a rational state, it is still a dangerous one, that could become even more dangerous if it were to cross the nuclear threshold. It is also argued that while the 'threat from a nuclear-armed Iran might not be as grave as some suggest', it would still make the Middle East more conflict-prone. Therefore, preventing the Islamic Republic from crossing the nuclear threshold should still be the United States' top priority (Kahl, 2012a: 160). On the other hand, Kahl also argued that a realistic assessment of Iran's nuclear progress and the likely outcome of a potential conflict could only lead to one conclusion: that it is not time to attack Iran (Kahl, 2012b: 166). Kahl pointed out that Kroenig's argument that Iran wouldn't retaliate to a strike
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with its full might, unless the regime's existence was threatened, understates the importance of the nuclear programme for Iran. He argued that 'Iranian leaders have staked their domestic legitimacy on resisting international pressure to halt the nuclear programme' (Kahl, 2012b: 167), making it likely that an attack would be viewed as an attack on the regime itself. Moreover, he criticizes Kroenig on the grounds that Kroenig assumes that Iran would be clear-eyed after a US strike and would avoid escalating a conflict that it could not win, while at the same time arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran should be attacked as it is an irrational actor (Kahl, 2012b: 168). Finally, Kahl highlights that in Kroenig taking the dual track policy as failed, Kroenig ignored the 'severe economic strain, isolation and technical challenges Iran is experiencing' (Kahl, 2012b: 173).
Clarke (2013) argues that the current strategies which 'focus exclusively on Iran's security motivations or on a heightened regime of sanctions are fundamentally flawed' because '[…] they fail to recognise the mutually reinforcing dynamic between Iran's security and normative/status-derived nuclear motivations' (Clarke, 2013: 491). He subscribes to Betts' (1977) pariah states model that suggests that there are 'states that are opposed to, and isolated from, existing regional or international orders' (Clarke, 2013: 493). Clarke supports this by arguing that Iran's desire for a nuclear programme is driven by a 'potent combination of security, normative an domestic motivations' (Clarke, 2013: 493). He argues that despite the complexity of the Iranian factionalised domestic system, security, normative and domestic political motivations came together to produce a 'cross-factional commitment' leading to all Iranian factions holding a minimum consensus that '[…] Iran must have an indigenous uranium enrichment programme' (Clarke, 2013: 501). Furthermore, he argues that a 'grand bargain' strategy is likely to fail because it doesn't take Iran's '[…] desire not to be in the position of either victim or supplicant' (Clarke, 2013: 502). He also points out the differences between the Iraqi and Syrian and the Iranian nuclear programmes in arguing against a regime change – military action scenario, concluding that the situations are widely different thus making a military strike not viable. Finally, Clarke argues that despite Iran enduring long standing sanctions without significantly changing its behaviour, so at the time of his writing he concluded that it was unclear 'how more sanctions can sway the regime to change track' (Clarke, 2013: 503). Moran and Hobbs (2012) point out that for the Iranian elite, and for a long time the population, the bid for a nuclear programme was seen as a struggle to secure Iranian sovereign rights in a hostile environment. Taking the same position as Kahl, they argued that because the nuclear programme became a source of political legitimacy, little room to compromise is available as giving up even smaller aspects of the nuclear programme would have '[…] implications for the continuation of the regime' (Moran and Hobbs, 2012: 203). Because the regime 'considers itself a key international player' and has Iran's foreign policy guided by this belief, the nuclear issue can be seen as a
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metaphor for 'Iran's quest for greater respect'. Consequently, they argue that 'any concessions on the nuclear issue must occur in a context where the regime is able to save face domestically and maintain consistency with the narrative' (Moran and Hobbs, 2012: 211). Moran and Hobbs also pointed out that as the long-running support for the regime got mixed up with the effects of the sanctions, the function of the nuclear programme as a means of providing support and legitimacy for the regime came to be challenged. Jones (2012: 202) added to the debate that Iran's nuclear programme had its twists and turns from the beginning - it was not just a straight path towards the current stage. It thus can be argued that there are probably other drivers behind Iran's nuclear programme than classic security assumptions, namely internal political pressures and domestic politics.
Outside of the nuclear-focused debate, Torabi (2012) looks at the Arab uprisings' security consequences for Iran. The spreading of a Western model, the consequent decline of Iranian influence and the decline of the Iranian-backed resistance movements in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria are pointed out as security concerns, resulting from the uprisings, for Iran. It is striking to see, that next to these developments – or concerns from the Iranian side outside of the nuclear issue – most of the security theories still focus solely on the nuclear programme.
Methodology
These examples, apart from Torabi's, are concerned about the Iranian nuclear programme and the potential use. This parallels the focus on the nuclear aspect outside of academia as well. This constitutes a gap, as focusing overwhelmingly on one aspect inevitably leaves other factors overshadowed. This, in turn, runs the risk of formulating theories that disregard certain aspects of Iranian foreign policy. However, this gap could be addressed. Clarke (2013) and Jones (2012), for example, look at the domestic influences on Iranian foreign policy-making, thus giving a more detailed account than Waltz (2012) or Kroenig (2012). Although their focus is limited to issues related to the nuclear programme, by extending this practice to other aspects of Iranian foreign policy, a similarly wider analysis could be given. For that, this thesis will mainly rely on Halliday's (2005) understanding of historical and international sociology.
While historical and international sociology gives prominence to the state like realist approaches, it is different from them because it does not neglect the domestic context. On the other hand, it does not go as far to claim that the state is just 'the sum of myriad decisions' (Halliday, 2005 as cited in Vágner, 2014). Moreover, 'state' is defined as an institution of coercion and appropriation. It operates on the internal state-society dimension and the external state-state dimension (ibid. : 8). It is also stated that foreign policy 'is not just formulated through the personal and bureaucratic
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processes within the state', the interactions of state and class have to be taken into account as well (Halliday, 2005 as cited in Vágner, 2014). In addition, states are not free in pursuing either domestic or foreign policies completely freely, despite 'enjoying considerable autonomy' (ibid. : 8). Consequently, foreign policy choices are framed and limited by domestic and international contexts (ibid. : 8). By adhering to this approach, it becomes possible to see 'how different factions or power centres inside the state affect policy' (Halliday, 2005: 46). In sum, because domestic politics inevitably affect foreign policy-making, it is needed to include them while analysing a country's security and foreign policy. For this reason, both Jones (2012) and Clarke (2013) offered a more adequate approach towards understanding the Iranian nuclear dilemma. In extending this theory to other aspects of Iranian foreign policy, this thesis thus aims to contribute to the debate by offering an analysis from a different perspective.
The objective of this research is to contribute to security theories in general and on Iran in particular. To do so, historical and international sociology will be used in order to map out relevant aspects of Iranian foreign policy that go beyond the mere nuclear perspective. Some security theories address the importance of Iran's domestic aspects as an influencing and important factor with regards to the trajectory of the Iranian nuclear programme. At the same time most of them focus on the nuclear programme. Therefore, applying the already existing practice of analysing foreign policy, without either leaving out relevant domestic aspects or focusing solely on the nuclear programme, will take place within this thesis.
This research is relevant because it seeks to address the gap arising from looking at Iran almost exclusively through its nuclear programme, or worse, through only the nuclear crisis that revolved around Iran. As seen by the EAS example provided earlier, the nuclear issue became the 'obvious' while talking about Iran. While the aforementioned attention given to the nuclear issue in the international sphere has made it the most visible aspect of Iranian foreign policy, that is by no means the only aspect of it.. Therefore, to avoid thinking about Iran in a limited sense in security theories, other components of its foreign policy should be looked at alongside the nuclear programme.
This thesis adopts a qualitative research strategy on the usage of historical and international sociology. It features a case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy and the relevant domestic aspects of the country that influence its foreign policy. The reason for selecting Iran as the case is based on three reasons. First, there is a disproportionate focus on one aspect of the country in security theories as well as in media coverage. Second, Iran has a 'clear but complex' formal structure of power but also a complex and 'anything but clear' informal structure of power (Jones, 2012: 199). Third, its foreign policy-making is multifaceted, featuring many of the domestic
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stakeholders, both formal and informal (Beehner, 2006). Consequently, it can be argued that to get a more in-depth assessment of Iran, one has to look at the underlying domestics that influence their foreign policy. Thus, Iran's multifaceted foreign policy-making makes it an excellent case for historical and international sociology. The findings of this research can contribute to security theories by offering a picture that involves aspects beyond the nuclear programme of Iran.
Because this thesis poses a critique towards the existing body of knowledge, it features a theoretic analysis through literature research. Literature on the nuclear issue, on the foreign decision-making process, on the relevant domestics of Iran and the foreign policy goals outside of the nuclear will be incorporated. In addition to academic sources, an interview conducted with President Rouhani by the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a recent article written by Iranian foreign minister Zarif serve as sources of Iranian foreign goals after the 2013 elections. Historical and international sociology is going to be used to give a theoretical background. Beyond this, certain aspects of processual relationalism (p/r) will be used. Briefly, relationalism takes 'configuration of ties […] between social aggregates of various sorts and their components parts as the building blocks of social analysis' (Tilly, 1996 as cited in Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 292). As these ties are dynamic as opposed to static, Jackson and Nexon use the term processual to address them (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 292). Jackson and Nexon's approach to p/r is based on the four concepts of processes, configurations, projects and yoking (ibid. : 302). For this thesis, the concepts of processes and configurations is used. Process is defined as a 'causally or functionally linked set of occurrences of events which produce a change in the complexion of reality' (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 302). Configurations can be understood as 'pattern[s] of ties and/or processes' – aggregations of processes (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 304). If different institutions and power centres are identified as processes within a state, then decision-making can be understood as the power centres relating to each other, thus a possible outcome forms a configuration. As it has been argued before, Iran's domestic politics is fragmented and factionalised. Moreover, its foreign decision-making is multifaceted. If there is a different configuration of processes, or in other words, the foreign policy stakeholders' relations change over a specific matter, a new configuration – that is policy – is formulated (Vágner, 2014: 9).
Foreign policy is understood here as 'the sum of official external relations by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations' (Hill, 2003: 3). The thesis will follow this definition, albeit with certain restrictions. Assessing the total matrix of Iranian foreign relations is not only infeasible for the topic of this thesis, but it is also beyond its abilities. However, Clarke (2013) designates six major foreign policy issues debated by Iranian factions. These are 'Iraq, Iran's role in the Persian Gulf, Iran's role in the wider Middle East, Iran's relations with Hezbollah and Hamas,
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Iran's relations with the USA and the nuclear program'. Moreover, further limiting the selection from these topics is that certain aspects relevant to security theories will be analysed. These issues are inevitably intertwined as their agglomeration constitutes Iran's regional conduct. Admittedly, this is still a broad selection of topics, but as these are mainly concerned with Iran's immediate region – and with the US because of their presence in the region – inevitably many of the important foreign policy decisions that concern the paper will be related to one or more of these fields.
'Relevant' domestic politics must also be narrowed down. The criterion here is that it has to play a role in foreign policy-making. For this, the thesis will look at Beehner's (2006) and Jones' (2012) assessment of relevant Iranian stakeholders. Beehner (2006) specifies the Supreme National Security Council, the Parliament, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council and the Revolutionary Guard. Jones (2012: 199-200) highlights the role of the Bonyads and the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, he mentions the factions whose members make up the governmental and non-governmental bodies on Beehner's list. These are Traditional Conservatives, the Principalists, the Reformists and the Pragmatic Conservatives (although others may use different names for different factions). Finally, the voting population should not be disregarded either, as proved by the last presidential elections. Monshipouri and Dorraj (2013) go as far as saying that Supreme Leader Khamenei '[…] had to bow before the popular will' (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013: 134) in allowing Rouhani's election.
Chapter outline
So far, this thesis gave an overview of the mainstream views in security theories about Iran. The theories analysed suggest that there is a disproportionate focus on the Iranian nuclear programme when looking at the country's foreign policy. Moreover, the influence of the Iranian domestic environment is often ignored. For this reason, this thesis proposed a historical and international sociology approach, to offer a more in-depth account of Iranian foreign policy-making that includes the domestic domain's influences as well. This thesis is structured as follows. First, Chapter I looks at the Iranian domestic political system. Starting off with the formal structures, it proceeds with an analysis of both the important informal networks and the factionalised nature of Iranian politics. Following this, in Chapter II the thesis turns towards the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. After providing an account of the different stakeholders present in foreign decision-making, Chapter II turns towards traditionally important foreign policy areas for Iran. Moreover, it offers an overview of recent changes in Iranian foreign policy trajectory, introduced after the 2013 presidential elections. The importance of factors domestic to foreign decision-making is provided by Chapter III. Here, historical and international sociology's contributions to the understanding of
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foreign policy are introduced. With such an account as a background, Chapter III then looks at ways Iranian domestic factors can influence foreign policy-making. Finally, the thesis concludes with emphasising on its main findings and offering reflections on the research and the transferability of the method used, as well as its contribution to existing knowledge.
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Chapter I: The Iranian Domestic Political System
Having established the importance of the domestic environment, this chapter will now turn to the domestic political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of both the formal and informal power structures that constitute the Iranian political matrix. Such an overview can help to understand the influencing factors competing in the background behind Iranian foreign policy decision-making. The Islamic Republic itself is based upon the concept of 'velayat-e faqih' (rule of the jurisprudent), developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder and first Supreme Leader of Iran, who held his position until his death in 1989 (Jones, 2011: 105). The velayat-e faqih is based on Ayatollah Khomeini's belief that the state is to '[…] prepare the Islamic world for the reappearance of the 12th imam' (Jones, 2011: 105). The Supreme Leader's position, as a specially selected religious leader, fulfils the need for the state's decisions and policies to be aligned with the maintenance of 'the umma (the nation) in a fit condition to hasten the reappearance of the mahdi' (Jones, 2011: 105).
The concept of the velayat-e faqih provides the base of the theocratic aspect of modern Iran. These theocratic elements are intertwined with the republican aspects of the country through '[…] a series of institutions and bodies which are supposed to produce a government both adapted to the needs of the modern world and fully grounded in religious doctrines' (Jones, 2011: 106). This duality is partly responsible for the complexity of the Iranian system. A number of appointed institutions' power to '[…] challenge, undermine and override' elected institutions' decisions is derived from the country's institution (Thaler et al, 2010: 22). These unelected bodies are not only capable to circumscribe the authorities of the elected legislative and executive branches, but some appointed institutions vet the candidates eligible for elected offices (Thaler et al, 2010: 22). Despite this, the unelected institutions are not in a completely dominant position. This becomes clear when analysing the domestics of Iran, as the '…establishment and empowerment of multiple institutions that perform identical or similar functions' leads to competition between institutions (Thaler et al, 2010: 22). This competition is not entirely dominated by the appointed offices, but it reinforces the complex nature of the Iranian system. In theory, this system of double-hatting was designed to ensure the survival and security of the regime, and by extension the Supreme Leader. In practice it leads to friction and competition between different institutions (Thaler et al, 2010: 22).
This chapter will look at the domestic powers of Iran that bear relevance in the functioning of the republic. The first section will provide an overview of the formal structures including both the theocratic and republican constitutional institutions as well as security apparatus. Following this, the chapter will focus on the informal networks that seemingly dominating the system from the
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background. Finally, the chapter will turn to the factionalised nature of the political system, looking at the relevant factions in turn. Because most of the power centres that will be mentioned are in some way connected to the foreign policy-making of the Islamic Republic, looking at the complexity of the decision-making environment is important for any in-depth analysis.
The formal structures
Figure 1.1: Constitutional Distribution of Power in Iran
'Distribution of Power in the Constitution' Source: Thaler, D. et al, (2010), Mullahs, Guards and
Bonyads, RAND Corporation, p. 23.
Figure 1.1 provides an abstract of the distribution of power in the Iranian constitution. It can be noted that the Supreme Leader's position is at the heart of the model. The office of the Supreme Leader provides the bearer with direct and indirect ties to all government institutions (Thaler et al, 2010: 24). Kamrava goes as far as calling the Supreme Leader the 'overseer' of the Iranian system (Kamrava, 2007: 86). Moreover, the Supreme Leader is widely regarded to have the final decision over issues, being the country's ultimate authority, not only in domestic, but also in foreign policy matters (Kamrava, 2007: 86; Beehner, 2006). Therefore, the position of the Supreme Leader is a good starting point for an analysis.
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The Supreme Leader is at the top of the Iranian power structure. Its power is derived from the velayat-e faqih, and is appointed by the Assembly of Experts (Thaler et al, 2010: 24). Kamrava notes that the primary task of the Leader is ensuring the regime's current form of existence (Kamrava, 2007: 86). The Supreme Leader has the final say on Iran's next presidents, as he has to ratify the electorate's choice (Jones, 2011: 106). A number of senior state officials are also directly appointed by him. Moreover, the Supreme Leader is also the commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces, thus he selects and appoints the commanders of the Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), the Artesh (regular army) as well as the Joint Staff (Thaler et al, 2010: 24; Sial and Karim, 2011; Jones, 2011: 106). Additionally, the heads of the judiciary and of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The clerical members of the Guardian Council are also appointed and dismissed by the Leader (Thaler et al, 2010: 24; Sial and Karim, 2011). A number of representatives across the government are also appointed by him (Kamrava, 2004: 509). Thaler et al (2010: 24) point out that these representatives help the Leader to exert his influence and they also serve as informants. Ultimately, this ensures that the Supreme Leader's policies are implemented. Among these representatives are the directors of cultural bureaus in Iranian embassies, '[…] allowing the Supreme Leader to shape Iran's foreign policy independently' (Thaler et al, 2010: 24). The Friday-prayer leaders are also appointed by the Supreme Leader, providing an effective way for the Leader to spread his political message to the population (Jones, 2011: 106). Finally, the Supreme Leader appoints the directors of Iran's bonyads (foundations), which serve as economic entities independent from the state (Kamrava, 2004: 509). The Supreme leader is advised by the Office of the Supreme Leader on matters '[…] including defense and foreign policy' (Thaler et al, 2010: 25). No other position or institution wields similar constitutional powers. However, these are only the formal powers of the Leader. The considerable informal influence of the position will be detailed below. Since the death of Khomeini in 1989, Ali Khamenei has served as the Supreme Leader of Iran. In the absence of a single leader, a council of religious leaders fill the role until a new Leader is selected (Sial and Karim, 2011; Jones, 2011: 117).
The president is the second highest-ranking official, at least constitutionally. For up to two terms, the position is elected every four years by 'majority of universal suffrage' (Jones, 2011: 106). However, the list of candidates is vetted by the Guardian Council (Alem, 2011: 47). The president serves as the formal head of the executives, thus the day-to-day administration and the enforcement of the constitution is part of presidential duties '[…] except in matters directly concerned with the Leadership' (Thaler et al, 2010: 25; Iranian Chamber Society, n.d.). Moreover, the president heads the Council of Ministers, chairs the Supreme National Security Council, is responsible for
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budgetary and administrative matters, implements the laws passed by the parliament, handles the credentials of both foreign and Iranian ambassadors, and finally, '[…] nominates and terminates the tenure of cabinet ministers' (Thaler et al, 2010: 25; Iranian Chamber Society, n.d.). While the Supreme Leader is constitutionally in a higher position, the two offices share a degree of responsibility in fields such as foreign affairs, defence and the judiciary (Jones, 2011: 106). These overlaying functions can easily lead to institutional competition. Thaler et al (2010: 26) note that while the Supreme Leader has the de facto highest authority, the president can sometimes frame issues in a manner that means the Supreme Leader has to align with the president's goals. Notably, ex-President Ahmadinejad's combination of Iranian national right and nuclear policy resulted in Khamenei being 'forced' – this is not to say that the he would have had a fundamentally different approach – to support the track of the president (Thaler et al, 2010: 27). However, this tension can also lead to the curbing of presidential powers – or at least the president's faction – as demonstrated by the vetting of reformist candidates in the 2004 parliamentary elections. This happened despite the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami being in charge of the executive (Thaler et al, 2010: 26). The president is also limited to an extent by the parliament (Majles), as the latter has to the power to approve and to impeach the candidates for the Council of Ministers, which serves as the president's cabinet (Thaler et al, 2010: 27).
The parliament (Majles) reviews and approves budgets, proposes bills relating to the executive, ratifies international treaties and reviews the performance of the presidency (Thaler et al, 2010: 27; Jones, 2011: 106). The speaker of the parliament occupies an influential position, which can be used to 'frustrate a president' (Jones, 2011: 106) and to 'define the relationship' between the Majles and the presidency' (Thaler et al, 2010: 27). However, despite examples of the Majles speaker getting into conflict with the president over foreign policy issues, the parliament is generally concerned with local, as opposed to international, issues (Thaler et al, 2010: 27). Laws passed by the parliament are scrutinized by the Guardian Council. Moreover, the parliamentary candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council (Alem, 2011: 20). The Guardian Council's regulatory powers over the parliament ensure that the Supreme Leader's will is influential in this area as well.
The Assembly of Experts is an elected body composed of 86 senior clerics. It is responsible for the selection of the successor of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly's members serve eight-year terms and are elected by popular vote, although this body is also vetted by the Guardian Council (Jones, 2011: 107). Constitutionally this body has the ability to dismiss the Supreme Leader (Thaler et al, 2010: 28). However, as the selection of the elected clerics is indirectly influenced by the Supreme Leader, it is probable that most members are of a conservative background, and thus loyal to the current regime.
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The Guardian Council is an appointed body of twelve members. Six religious scholars are appointed by the Supreme Leader while the other six are appointed by the parliament at the recommendation of the head of the judiciary (Jones, 2011: 107; Alem, 2011: 18). The Council not only approves the candidates for the presidency, the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, but it can interfere with the legislative functions of the parliament by blocking laws proposed by the parliament if deemed unconstitutional or un-Islamic (Jones, 2011: 107). According to Thaler et al, the Guardian Council's ability to shape elections through vetting '[…] reaffirms the duality of theocracy and republicanism' (Thaler et al, 2010: 30).
The Guardian Council's control over the legislature often led to deadlocks within the system. The Expediency Council was created as a body that would arbitrate between the parliament and the Guardian Council (Kamrava, 2004: 505; Jones, 2011: 106). This Council is made up by a flexible body of around 35-40 members, who also advise the Supreme Leader on '[…] constitutional responsibilities and any other matters where he requests advice' (Jones, 2011: 107). While some of the temporary members are selected from the numerous factions from all over the government, the Supreme Leader himself appoints the permanent members of the Expediency Council for five-year terms (Thaler et al, 2010: 31).
The Judiciary in Iran is an independent power charged with the enforcement of Islamic law (Thaler et al, 2010: 31). Moreover, the judiciary also nominates six members of the Guardian Council. In turn, the head of the judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader. Consequently, his tasks also involve reporting directly to the Supreme Leader (Kamrava, 2004: 506). The head of the judiciary works together with the minister of justice, a figure chosen by the president and given responsibility for the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and the legislature (Jones, 2011: 107). The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) was set up to safeguard the 'national interests [of Iran] and preserving the Islamic Revolution, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty' (Iranian Chamber Society, n.d.). It is chaired by the president and according to the Iranian constitution its powers involve 'determining the defence and national security policies within the framework of general policies determined by the Leader', 'coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, social, cultural and economic fields in regard to general defence and security policies', and 'exploitation of materialistic and intellectual resources of the country for facing the internal and external threats' (Iranian Chamber Society, n.d.). Therefore, the SNSC serves as the key Iranian national defence and security body. Along with the president, the ministers of foreign affairs, interior and intelligence, the IRGC and the regular military chiefs, the heads of the legislative and the judiciary, and two personal representatives of the Supreme Leaders are part of the council (Thaler et al, 2010: 32). Decisions made by the SNSC, provided they are approved by
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the Supreme Leader 'become consensus decisions' (Thaler et al, 2010: 32). Moreover, Thaler et al point out that the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations was set up in 2006 to provide foreign-policy advice. While this is not a constitutionally mandated body, it has become an important advisory council to the Supreme leader (Thaler et al, 2010: 33).
Iran's security institutions are similarly intertwined like its constitutional institutions. The armed forces itself are divided into two distinct branches, the IRGC and the Artesh, the regular army (Thaler et al, 2010: 33). While the Artesh is the larger and the more conventional body, the IRGC is also concerned with internal security and regime survival. This provides another example of double-hatting as this role overlaps with the Law Enforcement Forces' (LEF) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security's (MOIS) (Thaler et al, 2010: 34). An important point to make is that the IRGC controls 'most of Iran's missile forces and is heavily involved in Iran's nuclear program. Additionally, the IRGC's recently accumulated economic and political power has strengthened its position (Thaler et al, 2010: 33). Elements of the IRGC and the MOIS are involved in 'collecting intelligence, intimidating dissidents and nurturing pro-Iranian proxies in foreign nations' (Thaler et al, 2010: 34). The MOIS shares its domestic security obligations with the LEF and the Basij Resistance Force, a reserve force headed by an IRGC official and present almost everywhere in Iranian society (Thaler et al, 2010: 34).
The institutional complexity's significance
The most striking feature of the Iranian formal domestic structure is the duality in the system. Ultimately derived from the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to the establishment of a state of both theocratic and a republican features, the current system is 'bifurcated, with political authority traditionally split between velayat-e faqih on the one hand and a popularly elected executive and legislature on the other' (Thaler et al, 2010: 35). While in theory this system was designed to balance itself, in practice it seems that the theocratic elements tend to dominate the elected ones. The biggest sign of this is undoubtedly the Supreme Leader's reach within the other constitutional institutions. As argued so far, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei either directly or indirectly is connected to the other institutions enabling him to exert his influence throughout the Iranian formal structures as shown in figure 1.1.
This system inherently has foreign policy implications. Many of the institutions have shared functions that can lead to deadlocks or confusion. As the country's foreign policy is formulated in this complex and intertwined system, Iranian foreign policy-making is similarly multifaceted. In turn, this complexity makes it important to analyse the domestic factors of the country, as this allows for a more detailed towards Iran's foreign policy.
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While the constitutional system provides a frame for Iranian domestic power relations, it is not enough to get an in-depth analysis of the matter. The informal networks of patronage and different factions play a large role in shaping Iranian politics and real power from them. This is to such an extent, that Thaler et al went as far as describing the constitutional structure as a 'playing field upon which other, less-formal parts of the system interact' (Thaler et al, 2010: 23). Therefore, the next section of the chapter will look at these informal networks.
Informal networks and their figures
Jones notes that 'while the formal structure is clear, the way power is actually exercised is not' (Jones, 2011: 108). The political landscape of Iran is 'deeply enmeshed in patronage' (Jones, 2011: 108) that draw upon the informal networks. First, Thaler et al argue that 'an office's title is only as meaningful as the person who holds it' (Thaler et al, 2010: 21). Second, they describe this system as 'a web of key personalities, the informal networks upon which these personalities draw, and the institutions these personalities dominate (Thaler et al, 2010: 38). The complexity of the informal system is such that Rafsanjani, one of the influential Iranian politicians who also served as the fourth president of the country as a member of the Assembly of Experts and serves as the chairman of the Expediency Council, was reported as saying that 'even he could not fully describe them' (Thaler et al, 2010: 39).
Figure 1.2: The Supreme Leader's links to formal and informal power centres
'Effective Structure of Power in Iran' Source: Kamrava, M. and Hassan-Yari, H., (2004), 'Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's Political System', The Muslim World, 94, p. 508 note: Shahroodi was succeeded as Chief of Justice by Sadeq Larijani in 2009.
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Kamrava and Hassan-Yari (2004: 508) note that the informal power centres are all under the control of the Supreme Leader, used as powerful instruments to exert power throughout the system. The upper row of figure 1.2 shows Supreme Leader Khamenei's ties to powerful informal nodes (note: Hashemi-Shahroodi no longer serves as the head of the Judiciary, since 2009, Sadeq Larijani serves as the head). Often, power of the Supreme Leader is exercised through these informal centres if 'direct intervention could be politically costly' (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari, 2004: 509). Moreover, the Supreme Leader is at the centre of the informal networks as well, and thus it is often the case that 'proximity to and having the confidence of the Supreme Leader' (Thaler et al, 2010: 40) enables other figures to gain or maintain positions of influence in the Iranian political system. While Supreme Leader Khamenei is at the top of the system, there are other personalities who rely on a variety of these informal networks and power centres. These can include clerical, political, financial or family ties as well as links to other influential persons of the system (Thaler et al, 2010: 40). These networks can provide 'mutual support, strengthen one's ability to respond to threats, reduce risk to the individual, and serve as communications mechanisms' (Samii, 2006: 64).
Thaler et al describe that there are a number of key personalities in Iranian politics who have proven to be quite resilient since the revolution, able to maintain their prominent position because of their adherence to the velayat-e faqih. Additionally, while they do not wield infinite power they serve as 'gatekeepers' to their own system 'vetting new prospects for entry' into their circle. Moreover, these elite individuals are also reluctant to give up power by themselves, in order to preserve their influential status they '[…] remake themselves [...] to retain positions [...] when adversity requires adaptation' (Thaler et al, 2010: 43).
Supreme Leader Khamenei, on his part, is not likely to make major decisions without some form of consent amongst the ruling elite, nor can any major decision be taken without the Leader's approval. The Supreme Leader's position has often been described as one of the ultimate arbiter. This involves hearing out the various factions' positions and then deciding on the track to be taken (Thaler et al, 2010: 45). In reality, 'the more central an issue [...] is to the regime's survival, the more insular the decision-making around Khamenei and the less room there is for others to influence the debate' (Thaler et al, 2010: 46). The Supreme Leader's position as an arbiter has been questioned following his open support for Ahmadinejad in the 2009 presidential elections, and more importantly by having the security forces violently enforce the questionable election results in the face of public discord (Thaler et al, 2010: 45; Jones, 2011: 112). However, after the 2013 elections, it can also be argued that the Supreme Leader sought to reverse this process to some extent or at least to 'remake' his recent image. By openly supporting Ahmadinejad for a second term against popular protest, the Supreme Leader spent his political capital (Monshipour and Dorraj, 2013: 134). Thus, by accepting
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Rouhani's election in 2013, and allowing a moderate instead of someone either amongst his previously supported principlists or trusted traditional conservatives to become president, it can be argued that the Supreme Leader attempted to restore the regime's and his own legitimacy by remaking his own stance to an extent.
While other members of the elite have their own network of patronage, their power is shaped by their relation with the Supreme Leader. A good example for this would be former President Khatami. He became a powerful figure while serving as president of the country for two consecutive terms, but the Supreme Leader and other anti-reform platforms blocked in carrying out many of the reforms he had promised (Thaler et al, 2010: 48). On the other hand, former judiciary chief Hashemi-Shahroudi appears to have an insignificant power base and thus depends on the Supreme Leader for his position. He was appointed as head of the judiciary by the Supreme Leader in 1999. It is now reported that he 'exerts influence over Iran's Iraq policy' (Thaler et al, 2010: 49). The extent of the informal networks go beyond the top of the elite. People connected to them one way or another constitute the khodi (one of us). Among the khodi are 'families and dependents, clergy, government and military officials, members of the security apparatus, and well-connected merchants who have some […] association with [the elite] and derive political, economic and social benefits from that association' (Thaler et al, 2010: 52). Just like the formal institutions of the country, these informal networks are intertwined as well. Affiliations with a particular network can be temporary and issue dependent, and as these networks are not necessarily exclusive, patronage and support can be derived from multiple networks at the same time (Thaler et al, 2010: 53).
Thaler et al select three key informal networks and power centres. These are the clerical network, the bonyads and the IRGC along with associated groups. From most of the 1980s and onwards, revolutionary clerics formed important groups that 'projected clerical influence into key parts of government and society' (Thaler et al, 2010: 54). As the theocratic institution's privileges show, the clerics are still important player as of today. From the 1990s the bonyads became increasingly powerful. These bonyads are powerful public foundations tasked with specific economic functions, whose head is appointed by the Supreme Leader (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari, 2004: 508; Samii, 2006: 67). Moreover they participated in the post Iraq-Iran war reconstruction effort through which they saw their influence grow, particularly under Rafsanjani's presidency (Thaler et al, 2010: 56). These foundations are considered as states-within-the-states and they also control a large portion of the Iranian economy, accounting up to around 20% of gross domestic products (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari, 2004: 509; Samii, 2006: 67).
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goes beyond the defence field, as they became a political and economic force. In the 1990s the IRGC increasingly took part in the reconstruction effort and thus began to cultivate its own economic interests (Thaler et al, 2010: 59). Additionally, during the early 2000s, a number of ex-IRGC political candidates won seats in municipal and parliamentary elections. More importantly, with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, there was an IRGC affiliated president of the country (Thaler et al, 2010: 58). Similarly to the bonyads, the IRGC is solely responsible to the Supreme Leader and through its extensive political, economic and security agenda has acquired '[…] all the trappings of a state within a state' (Thaler et al, 2010: 59).
Ali Larijani, one of the Iranian elite who has been serving as the speaker of the parliament since 2008, reportedly stated that 'the theory of the system is that it is the person (and his ties), not the post, that is the origin of power' (Thaler et al, 2010: 64). In practice this means that an institution is only as powerful as the person at its head. This also means that an institution can gain more power by having a more influential person directing it. More importantly, the institutions can be used to extend one's (and their network's) influence, power and resources. In this light, the formal institutions serve as the main method through which the prominent elite exert their influence while at the same time 'providing the formal structure for implementations of state policy' (Thaler et al, 2010: 66). The competition and the cooperation between these different power nodes often drive policy-making in the country. In this function, the smaller groups tend to gravitate towards three or four main factions. The following section will look at these 'supernetworks', the four main factions in Iranian politics.
Factionalised Iran
Jones describes the factions as 'loose coalitions of like-minded individuals bound together by broad ideological interests, economic ties and familial relationships' (Jones, 2012: 200). Similarly, Thaler et al note that the factions are 'fluid political groupings of like-minded influential personalities, families, clerical institutions, societies, and political parties that transcend familial, experiential, and other personal associations' (Thaler et al, 2010: 67). These larger factions are made up by smaller groupings that have a tendency to shift their allegiance over time (Kamrava, 2007: 87). It has to be added, however, that the fluid state of the Iranian factional system allows the smaller groups within a wider faction to take up different stances on specific issues. Naturally, this means that groups of different factions can easily group together if needed (Kamrava, 2007: 87).
Regardless of their power, all Iranian political players group under these factions. Consequently, the factions appear to dominate the system (Thaler et al, 2010: 67; Jones, 2012: 199). Moreover, 'they have always characterized the system' (Farhi, 2012: 25). Jones adds that while the factions are
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seemingly driven by political and philosophical objectives, they are more concerned with 'continually jockeying with each other (and, importantly, within themselves) for power, money and influence' (Jones, 2012: 199).
There is a degree of divergence in accounting for the main factions. Kamrava in 2007 singled out three: the radicals (principlists in other accounts), the traditionalist conservatives and the reformers (Kamrava, 2007: 84). Farhi groups the factions into the principlist and reformist camps, further dividing the first into principlists and traditional conservatives and the latter into the reformists and groups of more traditional and pragmatic conservatives (Farhi, 2012: 35). Jones and Thaler et al, divide them into four main factions: traditional conservatives, principlists, reformists and pragmatic conservatives (Jones, 2011: 108; Thaler et al, 2010: 68-70). This chapter takes the four faction approach for analysis. It is generally said that the various factions respect the velayat-e faqih, and also agree on the need for Iran 'to maintain its sovereignty, regional status, economic power and access to technology' (Thaler et al, 2010: 67). However, their drive for acquiring influence and power within the system as well as their ideological differences (Kamrava, 2007: 87) outside their smallest common denominator provides a highly competitive and factionalised environment. Thaler et al add that the system itself 'effectively promotes and entrenches factional rivalry' (Thaler et al, 2010: 67).
The traditional conservatives are considered as the most loyal supporters of Khomeini's vision and thus are the most reluctant to reform (Jones, 2011: 108). They constitute the largest faction, and are advocates of clerical rule, traditional Islamic lifestyle and '[…] Iranian economic and technological self-sufficiency' (Thaler et al, 2010: 68). They traditionally constitute the main pillars of the regime (Kamrava, 2007: 88). Moreover, traditional conservatives usually control the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Special Court for the Clergy. Most Friday-prayer leaders are selected from their ranks as well as many of the Supreme Leader's special representatives (Thaler et al, 2010: 68). It is widely accepted that Supreme Leader Khamenei associates most closely with this faction (Thaler et al, 2010: 68; Jones 2011: 108).
Principlists support the return to Khomeini's doctrines. They are against both political and social liberal reforms, and are suspicious of Western countries (Jones, 2011: 108). While they agree on a range of matters with the traditional conservatives, the principlists' economic agenda of redistribution of wealth is a solid base for disagreement (Jones, 2011: 108). This group is most closely associated with the IRGC (Kamrava, 2007: 90). Former President Ahmadinejad came from their ranks, as did Majles speaker Ali Larijani. While the principlist faction is united against reform, their inner quarrels have led to fracture in the past. This was the most visible during the 2009 elections, when even fellow principlist Larijani criticized the security forces' handling of the
