Private governance and public governance in the EU chemical industry

(1)

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Thesis Advisor: Conny Roggeband

Private Governance and Public

Governance in the EU Chemical Industry

M.S. Thesis

Giuliana María Lucca Silva

Political Science Master’s Program

(2)

2

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my family, for granting me unwavering support during this process. Leaving Puerto Rico has been a scary yet exciting adventure. I will always appreciate my parents for supporting this change and helping me with any problems I may have. I would also like to thank my sister, Fiorella for being a happy and constant presence in my life for this process.

Secondly, I would like to thank my thesis advisor; Conny Roggeband. For always being supportive during this process and offering solutions for the problems that may arise.

Lastly, my fiancée Daniel. I would like to thank him for supporting me and giving me the strength to finish my thesis.

(3)

3

I. Introduction

There appears to be a constant argument regarding the influence and manner in which Private Governance plays a role in Public Governance. The argument is “disguised” under the concept of lobbying. Analyzing the concept of lobbying one might REACH to the conclusion that it’s meaning is the influence or alteration of policies by a private actor (Leech, 2010). While this definition is vastly ambiguous, it sets the standard or context for this research. The study of how Private Governance influences Public Governance is relevant to continue understanding how our political system works. It creates sub-questions such as; how much of private governance influences public governance? As well as; how do we known which Non-state actors are playing a bigger part? While these are all relevant and interesting question, the first question that needs to be asked is; how does Private Governance influence Public Governance?

This research will look at the different ways that private governance plays role in public governance. As multi-national companies have continued to grow and expand to other countries, a debate consisting of the amount of power that these companies have has been growing as well (Hale and Held, 2011). One of the ways in which these actors, “show” or use this power is by lobbying. The question of How this happens; is what will be studied in this research. Given the ambiguity of the question it is necessary to establish a case study to be able to identify the parameters of the research and make the research more viable (Bryman, 2012). The case study used in this investigation will be the REACH legislation and its amendments. Establishing a case study for this research question is necessary to study this phenomenon in detail. The chosen case study offers another perspective between the actors and establishes more complexity in the case. This exercise works well for this investigation due to the fact that it is a relevant and impactful topic which affects a large number of consumers and citizens in the EU. The actors involved in this topic are also highly motivated to interfere or influence this legislation according to their interests. This factor adds another level of complexity to this case study, as well as extracting information that can be applicable in different contexts. By creating a model that can be used for different areas of lobbying in the EU; not just Reach.

(6)

6

This exercise will expand on the knowledge of how private governance or non-state actors influence Public Governance. The research looks explicitly at the methods used by non-state actors to influence legislation, their targets and their perceived value. It is relevant to academia because it provides a new perspective to the debate. It establishes actors that are already playing a relevant role in this context, by analyzing the context in a more concrete and practical manner. The research also establishes a lobbying model of non-state actors for the EU. This model can be useful for other academics to establish the process of lobbying and how it occurs in the EU. The investigation focuses on the different aspects of lobbying in the EU and tries to identify a pattern within these actors. This is practical for different companies that are trying to identify how to begin lobbying or other companies that are considering whether or not it is a useful investment. This work can be useful as a steppingstone for future researchers to analyze this practical perspective, in contrast of the theoretical work that already exists.

II. Theoretical Framework

Democracy theory falls under the preconception that all citizens are equal under the law. More specifically it determines that we should aspire to be equal under law as well as an equal legal status. Given that we are unequal, due to our social and economic status, equality in every aspect is not yet viable. The theory of democracy looks to a future were all citizens are equal, while trying to define what it means to be equal. Whether it is equal in opportunity or equal in “satisfaction”, it comes to the philosophical conclusion that the concept is too complex to identify (Dahl, 1990). There are too many factors and complexities to identify equality for a society when there are so many human values and ambitions that rule over citizens individually. This conception still does not stop human

(7)

7

nature to continue chasing equality. A concept that is important to explain in the correct context. Considering that the citizens that continue to chase this equality can only do it because they are free to do it. Freedom is another important aspect inside this theory because it provides a liberation for these citizen (Dahl, 1990).

Given the basis of this research it is important to establish a position within the debate. Taking the nature of my research question into consideration it is assumed that I do approach this phenomenon with a perspective and position. While this research and analysis tries to be as objective as possible, it is important to disclose that it is analyzed from a democracy theoretical standpoint. Democracy theory besides being based on on the political system and its aspects it also studies the institutions that govern society. By adopting the democratic standpoint, we can establish that this institution is formed and elected by the citizens. Reaching the concept, we now understand as Public Governance.

A. Public Governance

Public governance is a term that has emerged recently and it is appearing regularly in scholarly articles (Bovaird, 2005). While the term public governance is closely related to the concept of government, there are some marked differences that suggest that these two terms are not interchangeable (Pierre & Peters, 2000). The differences of government and governance are more between the actions that surround a government than with the institution of itself. While observing and defining the concept of governance as the capability of the government to implement new laws and policy inside the state (Katsamunska, 2016). According to J. Pierre and B. Guy Peters (2000) government is a variable, because it is not constant.

Different models of governments can exist, some that lead towards a society centric system or state centric system (Katsamunska, 2016). These differences transform the concept of government from a constant to a variable. Given this definition, it is important to note the effect that this has on the theory itself. When studying governance there are more variables and standards to calculate or analyze besides government. Governance

(8)

8

includes the process of creating new laws and implementing new policy as well as the citizens that take part of that process.

Taking into account the existence of different types of government; there are also different types of governance. The two types explained in this research paper are Public Governance and Private Governance. Public Governance is defined as being in relation with government. These two concepts while similar, have different definition that separate them. For this reason, it is important to acknowledge the transformation that governments have had across history, these changes have effect on how we view governance as a theory. Different models of Governance range from Weberian Public Administration; which was studied during the 19th_{and beginning of the 20}th_{century. After the mid-20}th century the emerging model was New Public management and Post-NPM (Katsamunska, 2016). After these two models; a contemporary approach of governance emerges from the Neo-Weberian model and the Good Governance model. These last models focused on efficiency and transparency from the state than before (Katsamunska, 2016). The transformation observed from governance goes in par with the creation of new government models and most importantly in the direction that citizens choose to go. Given that government models form a relevant part of governance, the different government systems drastically affect the governance theory at the moment. A model is necessary to define Public Governance, while taking into account the current government as well. Instead of analyzing governance from an abstract perspective, implementing the different factors helps achieve a concrete idea on how public governance function. This is the perspective that will be adopted for this research.

Also, important to note is that Public Governance is the authority that allows corporations to function.

“Corporations, of course, are creatures of state government. Recall that corporations originally were created for specific purposes, through charters and with the permission of the government. They

were and still are defined by the state.[…]” (Sale, 2013)

Public Governance has the authority over corporations to allow them to function as well as provides the restrictions and space for them to be able express their pleads inside the

(9)

9

government. Public Governance also explicitly shapes corporate governance, by the laws and regulation chosen (Sale, 2013). It is important to note that Public Governance is the key aspect that creates the political system and provides the space for corporations to argue these regulations. This argument is necessary to have within this research, considering that this paper looks at private governance and how it plays an important part with public governance.

B. Private Governance

Understanding the relation between Public and Private Governance is an important element to consider for this research. After explaining and defining the concept of governance and Public Governance, it’s still important to define Private Governance as well. The idea of Private Governance as a firm opposition to Public Governance is not the correct approach to this relation (Graz, Jean-Christophe Nölke, 2012). While there does appear to be a separation between these concepts; there is also correlation between them as well. This makes it difficult to establish a firm division between these two concepts. Private Governance is not viewed as separate from Public Governance due to the relation mentioned beforehand. Susan Strange established that one should rather see a continuum between state and non-state authority, ‘whose relation to governments [may be] variable or ambiguous’ (Strange, cited in Graz, Jean-Christophe Nölke, 2012). This idea considers the history between the government and non-state actors.

Taking into consideration the origin of international trade and how it was mainly regulated by non-state actors and later adopted and incorporated by the state. Based on this interaction we can establish an existing relation. It was in the 20th_{century during the}

Industrial Revolution, that the differences between the government and non-state actors commenced being pronounce in terms of authority (Graz, Jean-Christophe Nölke, 2012). This reasoning forms a relation between Public and Private Governance that goes in both ways. Private Governance influencing Public Governance, as well as Public Governance utilizing Private Governance. This provides a critical change inside the argument, because it is not asking whether or not these two types of governance influence each

(10)

10

other, it is already establishing that it does. Public Governance does influence Private Governance, whether it is by policy or regulation, Public Governance creates boundaries for Private Governance to function under. But analyzing this relation from the other perspective is what drove me to pursue this research question. By observing How do Private Governance influence Public Governance. This main question has some tentative answers which are more situated in literature; leading to lobbying. How does lobbying occur? More specifically:

How does lobbying occur by Non-State Actors in the EU?

Lobbying theories such as Access Theory provide an important layout of the situation. Regarding this concept, I utilize Bowen’s Access Theory, to best explain the transactions and interchanges that exists inside the EU.

C. Access Theory

Access Theory begins with analyzing the types of relations that organizations like the EU have with interest groups. These relations are seen as one-sided interest groups demanding their requests from the EU officials. Although this perspective changes when you consider this relation as being two sided. By this logic, both the main organization (EU) and the interest groups should receive an objective that is going to make the relationship beneficial. Lobbying is usually thought of as one sided action, deriving from private actors towards public actors, but this concept is not realistic (Bouwen, 2002). Public actors do benefit from the relationship with private actors as well.

Lobbying in its most essential form, comes down to one important variable, which is access. The method or the amount of access that private actors can have a direct impact on the success or failure of their lobbying objectives. The situation then transforms, into how do private actors such as interest groups receive access. The Access theory is a lobbying theory which tries to explain this phenomenon. The theory looks to identify how do private actors achieve access in Public Governance. Bouwen (2002) establishes what he calls access goods, which are defined by commodities that the private actors have

(11)

11

access to. He defines three types of access the good. The first one, is the most known and studied, which is expert knowledge. It refers to the technical information of how the market functions and similar information that can be given by the private actors and is needed by public actors. The second access good is information about the European Encompassing Interests (IEEI), referring to the information regarding the interest and needs of a certain sector inside the so-called Internal Market. The last access goods represented is Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI), this mainly refers to the information provided by the private sector regarding the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI), like the needs and interest of a sector. These two access goods are pretty similar, although regarding the lobbying strategies and trajectory they can achieve different outcomes. The study of how interest groups and public actors work together to achieve successful lobbying is dense and the concept of access goods is relatively recent. Expert knowledge as a tool for private actors has been researched, but IEEI and IDEI is established mainly inside Bouwen (2002) article.

When describing to the access theory with lobbying, the access good most referred to is Expert Knowledge. The concept of Expert Knowledge as an access good is not a recent term used inside this context. It has a decent amount of literature and research and is widely acknowledge in academia. It relates to the distance found between the administration of member states and the constant change in the markets and their industries. Although, the administration can achieve access to the technical procedures and concepts at their disposals, they can sometimes find themselves too distant from the market (Bouwen, 2002). Coming from an interest group, with a considerable amount economic influence, proximity to the market and a clear access to researchers, it connects as to what this interest group is providing to the public actors.

The literature used to explain Access Theory in this framework may appear to come from an outdated source, considering that it was written over 17 years ago, but the theory remains relevant within this context. Access theory provides fundamental information regarding the context of the research question. Another important part of the research question that needs to be addressed is lobbying. Lobbying is the concept that has been

(12)

12

analyzed and studied to miniscule detail and because of that it is important to analyze and define the concept.

D. Lobbying

Lobbying and interest groups are a critical part of the political process (Anastasiadis, 2014). While some countries consider it as an essential part of their democracy, other countries are more skeptical about the influence and the people that it represents. Lobbying in countries like the United States, is seen as form free speech. “ The act of Lobbying is, in very general terms, an act of representation” (Berry, 1977). Citizens are actively reaching out and contacting their representatives in order to push forward a policy or a bill. Democracy is established by the citizens of the country playing an active part in the political procedures of said country (Dahl, 1990). Lobbying is a tool used by different types of organizations; such as Non-Government Organizations and private corporations to manage their interests. The current perception of lobbying has created a large sense of distrust towards big corporations and the way that they decide to lobby (Teachout, 2014). This type of lobbying, commonly, happens behind closed doors, far from the public. (Campos and Giovanni, 2017)

Given its secretive form, it provokes a high level of distrust. An important recurring argument is defining who actually benefits from lobbying. Although the basis of lobbying from a democratic standpoint is the intervention of citizens within the political system by using their resources to establish their support for a cause (Dahl, 1990). There is a contradiction, regarding the different actors that lobby. Giving the thought that lobbying from big companies tend to benefit a smaller class of citizens (Bernhagen, 2013). The lobbying industry is an unsurprisingly lucrative “industry” where companies and trade associations spend millions of euros in order to meet their goals. Based on the number of registered private organizations against registered NGOs, we can assume that these private organizations are becoming more successful. This statement should be true due

(13)

13

to the fact that these private organizations lobby for larger amount of issues at a higher rate than other public organizations (Ainsworth, 1993). This concept later creates the debate of who is benefiting from lobbying. A problematic discourse about possible flaws within the political system emerges from this notion. Interest Groups play a relevant part inside this system as well. Whether they are Non-governmental organizations, special interest groups or trade associations, based on Beyers’ (2009) definition of special interest groups, they all have three characteristics in common. The first of characteristic is organization, by which he defines as the formation of a group and exclude all types of public opinions that may create a change in policy. The second characteristic which he mentions as well is the political interest, which just reinforces the concept that these groups have as an objective to achieve a political goal. The third characteristic that Beyers (2009) mentions is informality. Informality in the sense that these groups are not looking for a position on public office, nor campaigning for an elected position. Their intentions rely on a having their objectives met (Beyers et al., 2009).

E. Lobbying in the European Union

The act of lobbying is different depending on the context of the country. United States lobbying is very different than lobbying inside the European Union. The reason for this is that lobbying inside the United States is more structured and registered, while lobbying inside European Union is known for its lack of mandatory registrations for lobbyist (Svendsen, 2011). While some organizations like the Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) which try to maintain some sort of good conduct manual for lobbyist to abide through, the European Council does not have one nor something similar. Again adding to the unstructured and somewhat informal way of lobbying found in the EU (Svendsen, 2011). Although it is important to note that the EU has created new legislation to become more transparent, due to a project created by the Commission to create a more transparent system. While from a perspective from a far this can appear to be efficient, Bunea (2018) arguments that this decision was made to benefit high paying interest groups inside the EU. Lobbying in the way of agenda- setting is not a new tactic

(14)

14

used by interest groups in the EU. Bunea (2018) states that the Commission acted as a political agenda-setter to create the boundaries of these regulations. It is important to note the changes that the EU has made for creating a more transparent system. Although, it is also important to consider the context in which these regulations were made and most importantly who do they benefit (Bunea, 2018).

While lobbying occurs in democracies all around the world, it is important to note key differences between them. As well as to consider that United States is a country, while the European Union is not. The European Union is a multilevel organization and lobbying inside occurs in a multilevel setting as well (Nørgaard, Nedergaard and Blom-Hansen, 2014). It is not established whether these vertical and horizontal divisions of the European Union neither help or aggravate the different interest groups (Dür, 2008). Research has established that lobbying in the EU is not a bottom up nor a top down approach, it has evolved into a multilevel process with intervals and loops (Coen, 2007). The European Union is divided by three main “parts” the European Commission, European Parliament and the European Council. Each “sector’ is divided by its functions and based on its responsibilities; it attracts different lobbying actors. The European Commission has the responsibility of creating the agendas and drafting legislation; for this reason it receives a substantial amount of lobbyist looking to set the agenda in favor of their interests (Coen and Richardson, 2009) The Commission officials are also eager to interact with lobbyist in this context, given that they also rely on the resources that lobbyists can provide to them (Bouwen, 2002). The second division of the European Union is the European Parliament; while the parliament in the past was not the target for main lobbying, although the changes in power that have shifted to the European Parliament have created additional attention from lobbyist. Considering that they lack formal regulation on how to interact with interest groups and they do not have a clear election connection it creates an unstable and transparent lobbying “floor” (Dionigi, 2017). Given that the responsibilities of the European Parliament are subjected to the initial legislations approved by European Commission, lobbyist tend to focus on the European Commission and Council, but since this change; lobbyist offer their resources to establish amendments and other changes to current legislation while it is still in this process (Coen and

(15)

15

Richardson, 2009). The last division of the European Union is the European Council; this division is known for being the most closed and secretive division of the European Union. Some of the reasons why it has achieved this reputation is due to the lack of transparency inside the organization and constant speculation about deals and other agreements not being executed inside the “floor”, but behind closed doors (Coen and Richardson, 2009). Another important aspect to establish, is that while the Council is one of the most important divisions inside the European Union; there is still a clear lack of literature on this topic. The author Fiona Hayes- Renshaw (2009), establishes that this could be the effect of lack of traditional lobbying accomplished at this level. Adding to the concept regarding the secrecy in this division, lobbying is made in a more subtle way, making harder for researches to measure or establish clear tactics or strategies. Inside this multi-level setting, lobbying transforms from a one-dimensional action, to a multi-setting exchange. Where lobbyists and officials from the European Union exchange resources. Lobbyists as well, target different divisions of the European Union, in order to receive an outcome that is better suited to their needs; choosing to take a more strategic route.

The European Union has established the importance of interest groups inside the process of public policy, given that 15,000 European Commission and Parliament officials are left to face 20,000 lobbyist each day (Coen, 2007). This large amount of lobbyist can be attributed to the gradual transfers of regulatory functions from member states to the EU institutions (Young and Wallace 2000; Mazey and Richardson, 2006). Especially in the industries of health and safety, product quality, employment law and environmental standards. Given the number of regulatory competencies of the EU and the qualified majority voting on Single Market issues in the EU, the amount of lobbyist and their actions inside the EU has increased dramatically (Greenwood 2002b, 2003). Taking into account that the European Commission is the main player in Agenda Setting, they do appear to receive the most lobbyist (Coen, 2007). It also establishes more competitive and exclusive environment for lobbyists. Statistics show that 76% of interest groups inside the EU are represented by professional and business companies, while 20% of the interest groups are public interest groups (Greenwood, 2003). These statistics are also supportive by the fact that certain groups that have bigger capability, financial resources, expertise,

(16)

16

organizational capacity and information are “known” to enter what is referred to as the insider status. Based on the literature, the insider status and the divisions of interest groups and lobbyists, has transformed EU interest politics into an elite pluralism environment (Bowen, 2002). This clear division of interest groups based on their resources, establishes problems inside the idea of transparency in the EU. As well as questioning the legitimacy of the EU in the process of policy making. Significantly considering that elite interest groups and EU officials have a trust-relationship, mainly due to the agency-style of policy making in Brussels (Coen, 2007). This type of relationship inside the institution of the European Union, is what brought protesters such as Democracy-International to call on EU officials to establish a Transparency Register and other methods to increase trust and accountability between the government and its citizens.

F. Influence

In the first part of this research it is established that Private Governance does influence Public Governance. But what does it mean to influence? While the idea of interest groups and lobbyist are pretty straight forward, lobbyist work inside the political system in order to achieve a change in policy for the groups benefit. This concept is straight forward although the methods used vary depending on the regulations imposed by the government and its context. The part of the conversation which seems to have more contradictions is the actual impact or influence that these groups actually have on policies. First we must assume that these interest groups have a significant amount of influence. Influence is a term that researchers have a problem defining mainly because of its abstract form (Leech, 2010). Influence as concept is materialized when it is in the context of cause and effect. Referring to something that has the power to change or manipulate a specific outcome, in other words a type of control. One that is mostly defined by operationalizing terms and measuring the causes and effects (Chalmers, 2011). Beginning to define influence by comparing it with power, is a logical reasoning because it is something that over-rides another. Although, the concept of power makes it seem as if it were constant like an equation, A + B will always equal C. While power is identified

(17)

17

by something that is constant, influence is seen as softer or weaker form of power in which an actor is persuaded to follow a different path, when it was not necessarily his initial response (Michalowitz, 2007). Early definitions of influence have been greatly criticized for their difficulty in explaining all the different outcomes that are plausible and the difficulties of operationalizing influence as well (Leech, 2010) .A concept that continues to appear in this research is control. Dür & de Bièvre, (2007) define influence as the control over the outcomes. Although, control is somewhat similar to power, considering that they both require to have something to dominate. An action like control or power is not relevant, if it does not have another object by which have control (or power) over. For this reason, it is not defined by its characteristics, it is defined by how it functions. But similar to control, power also implies a certain type of continuity that cannot be found nor predicted when speaking about influence. It can help us narrow down a definition for influence. Given the similarities in the concepts, we can establish that influence, much like power and control, is expressed by the presence of another actor, i.e. there needs to be influence over something. By the context of lobbying, the results of influence are usually policy outcomes.

Lobbying does imply different strategies and levels which complicates the process of not only defining it but operationalizing as well. While we have established that influence is expressed by another actor, it is incredibly difficult to identify all the different actors that take place inside the action of lobbying. This is problematic when also taking into consideration the different factors that affect lobbying as well. One of these is the fact that not all interest groups have the same interest, nor goal. Different lobbyist and different interest groups will create different layers of impact inside distinctive policies. Analyzing this from a more micro perspective we can establish that not all lobbyist are the same, this means that while some lobbyist might get along better with other politicians other lobbyist may have problems with other issues.(Chalmers, 2011). These concepts also contradict with the idea that influence is constant, so this can lead us to believe that the more differences between lobbyist, interest and policies the less constant the influence is going to be. There are also circumstances where influence is not necessarily seen nor expressed in the lobbying activities of companies. Even if this is not the desired outcomes, all of it adds to difficulty of defining influence. All of these concepts then lead us to

(18)

18

question, how do we know is causality and not correlation? While this question can be resolved with the additions of different case studies and variables it is still important to recognized it (Vendrik, 2018). For this case, the variable of influence will not be measured, but a definition is still relevant to this investigation. The definition used in this research comes from Leech (2010). “At the most basic level, influence over public policy is often defined to mean the power to determine outcomes—either to change a public policy or to defeat efforts to have the policy changed.” (Leech, 2010). This definition works within the concept of power and not control, which I believe is more fitting towards this research.

III. Methodology

This research is a descriptive research based on the notion that it does not look to find a relation between two variables. The research describes the relation that is already in place by observing a phenomenon that is currently occurring and describing how it is taking place. The relation between the European Union and Non- State Actors is established in the theorical framework. This relation is already established, this research looks to explain how this relation happens. The unit of analysis of the research is EU legislation. This research looks to describe how this relation happens.

A. Research Design

This research analyzes how lobbying inside the EU takes place. It is important to establish that this research does not look to measure or analyze how much influence Non-state actors have over Public Governance. Instead it takes the approach to try to establish a model to explain how this influence takes place. The best way to analyze this approach is through a case study. A case study gives the opportunity to study and analyze the indicators and variables within a contained scenario. Studying the lobbying process of Non-State Actors without a specific scenario is incredibly complex given the different

(19)

19

reasons and contexts that are very relevant inside this research, the results may turn out to be inconclusive. Because of this a case study is highly relevant to the success of this research.

B. Case Study

The case study chosen for this research is closely related to Chemical Industry. The reason behind this is to provide a well-rounded research of the different actors and different strategies used in lobbying inside this industry. The actors analyzed in this research are divided by lobbying for lenient chemical regulations or more stringent regulations from the EU. This creates a diverse environment to study Non-State Actors and their lobbying process. REACH is considered to be one of the first pieces of legislation that has passed in the European Union that attempted to regulate chemicals found in plastics, medicine and others (Contiero, 2006). The legislation was implemented on December 18 of 2006 and came in force on June 1st_{, 2007. It was implemented} concerning the Regulation, Evaluation, Authorization and Restrictions of Chemicals. Created for the protection of the human health and the environment.

This legislation works with a series of different steps. The first is that all substances imported inside the EU, that are produced over 1 ton per year and defined as chemicals, by the legislation, have to be registered by the European Chemical Agency (ECHA). After this registration, it is then submitted for evaluation by the European Chemical agency. They will assess the level of concern for environmental and healthy safety. Substances that are found or considered to be a substance of very high concern (SVHC), will not be allowed to be placed or used for products inside the European Market. A substance can be considered a SVHC if they fall under one of four categories. The first category is if they are carcinogens, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction. The second is if they are persistent, bio cumulative and toxic. The third category is if the substance is persistent and bio cumulative. Lastly, if they cause very serious and irreversible damage to the environment or human health, like damage to the hormone system. After this evaluation, the substance is listed as a SVHC, it will not enter the market until the company receives an authorization

(20)

20

from the European Chemical agency. Other chemicals that do not receive an authorization, will be restricted and added to the list of restricted substances of the EU. After the process to establish how “dangerous” these substances are, it is important to communicate it down the supply chain and share the information that has been obtained. This process has been active since 2007 and during this period, there has been contestation regarding the strictness and the viability of this regulation. Considering the amount of lobbying occurring during the debate of the legislation two important actors were studied during this process. These actors were; The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and Greenpeace, an environmental NGO. Greenpeace saw this legislation as a way to improve the regulation of harmful chemicals inside the European market and recalled lobbying from chemical organizations as toxic. Publishing an article referring to chemical organizations as Toxic Lobbying (Contiero, 2006), CEFIC on the other side concentrated on the relationships between the EU commission and them as an interest group, stating that it is a two way street, each relying on each other, for information (Barendregt, 2007). CEFIC is an interest group, that can provide a large amount of expert knowledge to the public actors inside the EU (Contiero, 2006). The technical information regarding the amount of damage that different substances can have was critical for the creation of the REACH legislation. Expert knowledge from CEFIC was said to be the manner in which they would gain access ((Barendregt, 2007). Given that other associations such as Greenpeace did not this type of influence or resources to spend on expert knowledge in comparison with CEFIC and other mayor actors (Barendregt, 2007). Given that the REACH legislation was approved in 2006, it has received a fair amount of changes as the chemical market has progressed with it. Since 2006 to 2019 the REACH legislation has been amended 67 times (EU, 2019) This makes sense when taking into consideration the amount of technological changes and advances that have been in these last 13 years. These amendments give more reason as to why this context should be studied because they provide contrasting ideas to be analyzed from different actors. It also continues to be a relevant issue due to its importance for the environmental and human health for those in the areas where these legislations impact. Besides the i impact it has on society, it is also relevant due to the constant amendments that are still taking place 13 years after the implementation of the legislation.

(21)

21 C. Actors

The case study for this research paper establishes a specific context for the investigation. Which is Reach, this legislation created a set of regulations and categorization for chemical distribution. REACH was implemented in 2006, during this time there was some contestation regarding the strictness of the regulations. While some trade associations where looking for more lenient regulations, other environmental NGOs were expecting stricter regulations from the legislation. These expectations then created the current debate that still takes place.

This research will look at some of the actors that take place in this debate. The actors that will be studied in this research are The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), Greenpeace, The European Environmental Bureau (EEB), International Chemical Secretariat (ChemSec) and The European Association of Chemical Distribution (FECC). These five actors have played a major role in not only the creation Reach, but in the amendments as well.

CEFIC or the European Chemical Industry Council is a trade association, founded in 1972 with headquarters in Brussels. They represent large, medium and small chemicals companies. They also provide 1.2 billion jobs and account for 14.7% of the world’s chemical production. CEFIC offers 4 types of memberships; the first one is the Corporate Membership; this is reserved for corporation based in Europe that provide more than 1 Billion euros in chemical turnover. The second membership is Business Members; for sectorial businesses with production value less than 1 Billion euros. The third membership is; Member Federation it is reserved for National Non-governmental Federations representing the Chemical Industry in European Countries. The last membership is the Association Federation; for leading National Non-governmental Federations representing the Chemical Industry in European Countries where no Member Federation is operating. Greenpeace is a global environmental NGO, established in 1971 by a small group of activist sailing to the island of Amchitka to protest and stop the testing of Nuclear bombs. The boat was called Greenpeace. Across the years Greenpeace has established different

(22)

22

sectors of the organization that focus on different areas of the world. The one relating to this context is Greenpeace- Europe Unit.

The European Environmental Bureau or the EEB, is the largest network of environmental citizens organization in Europe and represents approximately 30 million European citizens. It was founded in 1974 in Brussels. The EEB offers 3 types of memberships. These are Affiliate membership. Associate membership and Full membership. Based on the criteria established for each membership, the organization can select which membership is tailored to them. The criteria ranges from being an NGO to attending activities on a continuous basis. These criteria later transfers to the different benefit that the organizations obtain, depending on the chosen membership.

The International Chemical Secretariat or ChemSec is an NGO founded in 2002, established in Sweden. ChemSec works with other organizations; such as EEB and International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN) to establish clear communication between decision makers, researchers and companies in the issue of hazardous chemicals. Based on the smaller NGO that ChemSec is, it does not provide memberships nor services to other organizations, it is funded by financial support for the Swedish governments, foundations, donations and private individuals. Instead of providing services to other organization, it collaborates with political scientists, business experts, chemist to continue its mission.

The European Association of Chemical Distribution or FECC, represents over 1,600 companies which mainly range between small and medium sized Chemical companies. The European Chemical distribution industry employs approximately 30,000 employer and has an annual sales leverage of approximately 28 billion euros. FECC offers 4 types of memberships; these are National Association Membership, Company Membership, Affiliated Membership and Associated Membership. While FECC is larger association that provides services and memberships to organization, countries and company it also forms part of Cefic.

(23)

23 D. Research Model

The model of the research question begins with establishing the process of influence, which for this context will be analyzed by lobbying. Lobbying is the act of Non-state actors manipulating policy and legislation in their favor. In retrospect this investigation will study the process of influence, represented as lobbying. The process of lobbying provides the data which becomes our independent variable. Lobbying as a process is a complex term which reflects directly as a complex independent variable. The characteristics that make this variable so complex, is referred to the number of dependents and actors that play a role in it. Lobbying is a multilevel, multi-setting action, where a number of actors play a relevant role in the process. This investigation observes this process.

The investigation establishes three relevant process that occur inside lobbying. The first concept is the initial investment made by the Non-State Actors. This initial step is arguably the most important one. This investment establishes two ideas. First is how much money the Non-State Actors are willing to spend on lobbying. This establishes how much they perceived that lobbying is valued. The concept behind lobbying is that it is viewed by Non-State Actors as an investment. Which provides the idea of how much they believe that lobbying is worth as well as how much they believe they will receive in this transaction as well. While this initial transaction or investment maybe in monetary terms, the return does not necessarily have to be, due to the range and differences of Non-State Actors. Some trade associations or companies may rely on less lenient regulations, which can benefit their income at the future terms, other Non-State Actors such as NGOs may receive an increase in legitimacy. Either way this initial investment is the starting point to politically present these ideas.

When analyzing the investment, it prompts us to think and consider where this money is going. This leads us to the second unit of analysis that occurs inside the lobbying process, the strategy or method by which the Non-State Actors lobby. There are multiple strategies and methods of lobbying that Non-State Actors use. This research will study the different methods used by the actors to influence policy. These methods each relate to the different aspects of the actors. These could either be secretive and “behind closed doors” or open

(24)

24

and public, depending on the organization and the reason behind the lobbying. Lobbying inside the EU occurs in a multi-level setting which creates a sustainable zone for Non-State Actors to approach the EU. Whether it is the Commission, the Parliament or Council, as explained in the theoretical framework each level has different responsibilities and because of those responsibilities each organization may have different reasons for targeting different levels. It is important to note that this research does not look at the reason nor intentions of the different Non-State Actors.

The third aspect of this investigations that is studied are the targets or what these actors are looking to change inside the legislation. By analyzing what Non-State actors are lobbying for or targeted one can try to establish what is their position inside the debate. The targets can range from specific amendments to new legislation, depending on the current status of each actor and their objectives.

This study observes these three aspects of lobbying, separately to achieve an idea about how each organization lobbies individually. This study analyzes the differences and similarities of lobbying practices between Non- Government Organizations that usually are in favor of regulations and harsher practices, and trade associations that usually favor more lenient and softer regulation. This research looks at the differences considering the levels that each actor lobby at, the methods used and the way that they express the lobbying results as well. The study finally presents these three concepts together as a process. This takes in consideration the combination of the three steps to creates pattern and a process that is able to establish how Non-State Actors lobby.

The data of this investigation will come from two different sources. The first one is the European Transparency Register. The Transparency Register is the database of all the lobbying activities of the European Union. All organizations that participate in lobbying activities in the EU are required to register. The information found in this register is uploaded and updated by the organizations. The public information on the database consist of the amount of money the organizations spend on lobbying, their register number, the number of meetings the organizations had with the Commission, among other information. The main data that will be used for this investigation that comes from

(25)

25

the Transparency Register is the amount of money each actor has invested in lobbying, the number of meetings with the Commission and lastly whether they belong to other interest groups. This first variable that is analyzed in this research is the initial investment. The second variable of this research is the methods of lobbying used by these organizations to achieve their influence. While some information regarding this variable can be found in the Transparency Register, most of the information comes from another source. The other sources used in this investigation are the individual websites of each actor. These websites provide information regarding the activities and actions that each actor is doing for their cause. This information comes in shape of position papers, letters, scientific articles, publications and other forms. Given the fast-paced society we live in, organizations feel the need to update their websites with information regarding their successes or current events to inform their followers. For these reasons, there is a sizeable amount of information found in these websites and they are very through and dense. On these websites, the data for the second and third variable are found. Given that these websites publish the position papers, letters or articles about their current campaign or lobbying activity, this information is interpreted as the methods used by the actors to lobby. As well as what they are lobbying for, in other words, their targets. The reasons for using these two sources are two-fold. The first reason is due to the fact that lobbying is seen as closed-door activity. Obtaining the data from these sources adds a level of legitimacy to this study. Given the fact that the data that is analyzed is coming from the primary source. Obtaining the data from the primary source avoids any type of contamination it might have if I were to obtain the information from a newspaper or a similar source. This clarification is needed due to the amount of overhead information and bias that comes to mind when speaking about lobbying. The second reason consider is the fact that lobbying in the EU has become more transparent as many NGOs, websites and protest have asked for (Dionigi, 2017) even though it is still not considered enough. Although, it is still important to note that there has been progress in this area. This research takes this into consideration, by using the information provided in the Transparency Register and the position papers published by each organization.

(26)

26

IV. Findings

These findings are divided into 3 sections. The first section is the initial investment, with this section I state the amount of money each actor invested in lobbying. The second section are the methods, in this section the different lobbying strategies by the actors are portrayed. The last section is the target. Inside this section it is stated the direct changes that each actor lobby for within REACH.

A. Initial Investment

The first piece of data obtained are the initial investments of the Non-State Actors. This information establishes how much money are the actors spending on lobbying. As well as acknowledging and categorizing the different actors based on their spending budget. This information comes directly from the Transparency Register. Inside the Transparency Register, the actors are divided in two different categories; which are Section II and Section III. Section II refers to in-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations, while Section III refers to non-governmental organizations. Based on these categories, the actors are divided accordingly. The first actor is The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC); it is classified in Section II. Cefic’s estimated annual lobbying cost is 12,000,000€, but its total budget is 40,3000,000€. The second actor is Greenpeace European; which is classified as Section III. Greenpeace Europe Unit’s estimated annual lobbying cost is 660,339€, but its total budget 1,779,966€. The third actor is The European Environmental Bureau (EEB), which is classified as Section III. EEB’s estimated annual lobbying cost is between 3,700,000€ and 3,999,999€, although its total budget is 3,835,196€. The fourth actor is The International Chemical Secretariat (ChemSec), which is classified as Section III. ChemSec estimated annual lobbying cost is between 200,000€ and 2999,999€, but its total budget is 1,159,038€. The fifth and last actor is The European Association of Chemical Distribution (FECC), which is classified as Section II. FECC’s estimated annual lobbying cost is between 25,000€ and 49,999€, there is no information available regarding their total budget.

(27)

27

Stating this information one can clearly establish that CEFIC is the highest investor in lobbying. This is not really a surprise considering that CEFIC is a trade association with various sizeable companies working inside it. Although, considering the amount of money invested in lobbying one can assume that CEFIC believes that a greater amount of money will come from this investment. Whether it is by influencing the EU to create new policies or by amending existing policy in order to provide better opportunities for them. Based in this information and general bias one can assume that organizations that belong to Section II, which trade associations and/ or business, have more incentive to invest or invest more in lobbying. Although, when observing these actors, we can see that while CEFIC does invest a higher amount of money than any other actor, the other actor which is classified in Section II; is FECC, which does not invest as much as the other NGOs. These NGOs invest a large amount of money in lobbying, not as much as CEFIC but more than other businesses and trade association.

B. Methods/ Mediums

The second part of this research observes the companies lobbying strategies or methods regarding the REACH Legislation and its amendments. Considering that each of these Actors are trying to achieve a different goal, the strategies used by them will in turn be affected by this.

1. Greenpeace

Greenpeace Europe Unit has different methods and strategies for lobbying in the EU. These methods range from forming coalitions to meeting with the Commission. Although the method that appears to have the most success, is by public campaigns and article publications. Across the years, Greenpeace has created a campaign dedicated to the awareness and prohibition of chemicals in the EU. This in addition to publications, as Toxic Lobby, in which they speak against corporate lobby and the “watering down” of the REACH Legislation. These types of actively public campaigns give them publicity via other news sources such as CNN and Chemical Watch. They also have a very strong

(28)

28

social media presence, which allows them to continue to distribute the information. Besides these strategies, Greenpeace also lobbies inside the EU Commission. This can be observed by their 82 meetings with the Commission from 2014 to 2019, regarding topics as Reach, Discussion on Plastic Strategy and Neonicotinoids. Besides lobbying at the Commission level, Greenpeace also has 12 employees with access to the Parliament premises. Which gives the impression that they lobby directly at two levels; the Commission and the Parliament. Another tactic used by Greenpeace is the use of expert groups. They have experts working inside Commission expert groups. Most importantly organizations such as Greenpeace do not lobby on their own, they form coalitions. These coalitions made out of other organizations with the same or similar goals work together to lobby to achieve this goal. This can work by creating a document such as a position paper or a letter addressing the concern of the issue and sending it the REACH Meeting Committee. By creating a letter or position paper with more organizations, gives it legitimacy and importance when taking into considerations these demands. These coalitions work best to highlight the group of citizens that are against (or for) these demands. The larger number of people the more substantial weight the document has, in terms of democracy. Lastly, Greenpeace uses a different strategy to lobby, this tactic is research. They are constantly publishing new scientific articles establishing the harmful effect of substances and why they should be restricted or prohibited. This strategy works hand in hand with their social media accounts and other publications. The lobbying strategies used by Greenpeace, rely on both the EU officials and their audience for them to successfully achieve them. It is also important to note that Greenpeace is a well-known and influential NGO. It has offices all around the world and created a relevant name. Considering this information, it would be different if other organizations that did not have the same amount of influence as Greenpeace would try to these strategies. They would probably not have the same amount of success. Because of this it is also important to understand that an issue which Greenpeace pushes for and makes public, could have more success due to the name and the legitimacy they have created.

(29)

29

2. The European Environmental Bureau

The European Environmental Bureau has some lobbying strategies that are similar to Greenpeace. This could be due to the fact that both are Non-government organizations. The EEB meets with the EU Commission same as Greenpeace, they have 68 meetings registered in the Transparency Register, their topics range from REACH Legislation evaluation to Biodiversity and Environmental issues. Lobbying at the Commission level appears to be very useful for these NGOs, given the number of meetings and different topics seen in these documents. Besides lobbying at the Commission level, the EEB also has 8 employees registered with access to the Parliament Premises. The EEB also establishes 34 experts inside different Commission Expert groups. Assuming that they also lobby at the Parliament level. Besides these lobbying strategies, the EEB also works with Coalitions as well as Greenpeace. The EEB works hand in hand with the UN to push forward their Social Development Goals (SDGs). Changing the perspective of this issue from the European Union, into a global concern. The EEB also works with Project Life, a project developed by the EU after the Chernobyl Crisis. The project works to create campaigns and funding for programs that help with biodiversity and environmental health problems. The Project life has created a program called AskReach, it is meant to be published as an app. This program works to educate the citizens on REACH and what it should have, as well as demand more information from companies regarding the chemicals found in their day to day object. This campaign helps consumers find information about substances of very high concern in their consumer goods. This type of indirect lobbying is a way to achieve more public awareness and support for the decisions made by the organization. By achieving more public support and demanding companies to provide this information to their consumers, gives the organization a new level of legitimacy. This public support creates pressure in the EU to demand more compliance of the companies and the companies to provide more information regarding their advances and plans regarding the classifications of new chemicals as substances of very high concern. Besides these tactics, the EEB also sends letters to the Members of the REACH Committee, regarding their positions, thoughts and scientific evidence towards the issue that is being debated. Inside this letter they provide evidence regarding the

(30)

30

substance that is being debated and their reason for it to be voted against. This type of direct lobbying is targeted directly towards the members of the REACH Committee, which provides a direct line of access to the officials that make the decision. This type of lobbying is similar to other strategies used by other organizations, such as position papers, but without the bureaucracy that the position papers entail. Another lobbying tactic used by the EEB is naming and shaming. The EEB website provides a number of publications, within them there is one that expands on the companies that have not been compliant with REACH regulations as well as the chemicals that have not been updated nor have been examined after discrepancies were found. This document names the companies that have not been following REACH regulations, this type of publication shames these companies to eventually follow the regulations. This type tactic is very useful to bring publicity to these organizations and the work that they are doing. Besides these tactics, the EEB does publish studies and articles regarding their position as a way to achieve this knowledge. These tactics used by the EEB are a mixture of direct and indirect lobbying a method that appears to be used by NGOs, considering that they usually are more open about their lobbying successes and strategies, unlike trade associations and private companies that work to maintain this information unregistered.

3. International Chemical Secretariat

Unlike Greenpeace and EEB, ChemSec is a much smaller NGOs that provides a different lobbying strategy. For example; while it does appear that they lobby at the Commission level they only have one meeting registered in the Transparency Register. The meeting was on June 28th_{, 2018 regarding Reach. While other NGOs, have active employees} working on the Parliament Premises, ChemSec does not. Although, they do have 3 experts working inside Commission Expert Group to voice their concerns. The principle lobbying method that ChemSec uses is Coalitions and publications. Considering the smaller size of ChemSec, it really benefits from Coalitions and memberships. ChemSec forms part of The European Environmental Bureau; this membership allows them to manage their lobbying expenses by concentrating their lobbying efforts in one organization. While ChemSec has only had one meeting with the EU Commission; the

(31)

31

EEB has had 68 meetings. These meetings were lobbying for ChemSec’s interests as well. As the employees from EEB with access to the Parliament Premises, they, as well are looking out for ChemSec’s interests. Besides the membership, another strategy used by ChemSec is the publication of documents. These documents published in their websites, contain the relevant policies that they consider pertinent to their research and their position within these policies. The publication regarding Reach, establishes their position towards it and how they believe it would be more productive for future technological innovation. Besides these publications they also have a constant newsletter, informing their audience about future votes and changes in legislation, while establishing whether or not they consider this a success for their organization. These are the lobbying strategies used by ChemSec; which we can establish that is a smaller NGO, without a working office in Brussel, which makes it harder to try to establish a constant line of communication in Brussels. These strategies are useful, for smaller NGOs in the sense that they focus their abilities towards a in strategic manner. Instead of spending their own budget in multiple in house- lobbyist as other organizations, they use the opportunities and tools other organizations, with the same goal to help them achieve this goal.

4. The European Chemical Industry Council

As established in the previous section, in comparison with all the other actors that are studied in this research CEFIC is the actor that spends the highest amount of money. Given this fact, it is already explained that CEFIC is a trade association in which other companies and organization pay to form part of, if their goals line up. This also explains the considerable budget that they have created. CEFIC uses different lobby strategies depending on their chosen outcome. CEFIC has the resources to lobby in at least two levels of the EU. CEFIC lobbies in the EU Commission, as well as other actors mentioned in this research. Inside the Transparency Register, 78 meetings are catalogued between CEFIC and members of the EU Commission. Besides lobbying at the Commission level, CEFIC also lobbies in the Parliament as well. They currently have 23 employees with access to the Parliament premises and 35 experts on different Commission expert

(32)

32

groups. Besides these employees, CEFIC is also part of an Intergroup on Climate Change, Biodiversity and Sustainable development. These intergroups are formed by members of the European Parliament to partake in informal exchanges and discussions regarding certain topics or issues. They also form part of an Industry Forum; Kangaroo Group on the Internal Market. This Industry Forum has been accused of being the most influential Industry Forum in the European Parliament, besides being the oldest (Lobbying under the Radar, 2011). These MEP Industry Forum have been greatly criticized for not being transparent nor public in the way that they function.

Taking into account that CEFIC is a considerably large trade association it does not rely on Coalitions nor memberships from other organization to help them achieve their objectives. They have a vast amount of resources to achieve their objectives. The last method of lobbying by Cefic, is in the way of position papers. CEFIC has actively been publishing position papers in regard to their viewpoint of some debated disputes. They have published 28 position papers since 2014 to February 2019, from these 9 position papers are in regard to Reach. Besides these position papers they also public articles and statement about current events inside the Chemical industry.

5. The European Association of Chemical Distribution

The European Association of Chemical Distribution is considerably the least transparent about their lobbying efforts, in comparison with the other actors studied in this research. While there are some lobbying strategies found, these are limited. The lobbying strategy publicly used by FECC is the memberships. FECC is part of two trade associations. The first one of these is Cefic, while the second is the International Chemical Trade Association (ICTA). As explained in the section of ChemSec, these memberships provide resources that smaller organizations such as FECC would have to spend more money on to achieve separately. Although, FECC does have 8 employees working in the Commission experts’ groups, it appears to be the exemption. Smaller organizations benefit more from obtaining these memberships, than using their resources to achieve the same level of outcomes. Besides lobbying with coalitions and memberships; FECC

(33)

33

has one registered meeting with the EU Commission and no employees with access to the Parliament Premises. These statements add to the idea that FECC prefers to concentrate their lobbying activities inside bigger organizations.

Based on these 5 actors we can acknowledge some similarities between the smaller actors and the methods used. These smaller actors such as EEB and ChemSec; adopt memberships from larger organizations in order lobby efficiently. While larger organizations such as Cefic, Green Peace and EEB; creates and/ or offer membership they posses the resources to lobby in a more direct approach. These are key differences, that will be explained in more detail in the following chapter.

C. Targets.

After establishing the perceived value of lobbying for the different actors and their methods, we can then determine the actor’s targets. Based on the different types of organizations and goals these targets will vary. This section establishes the targets of these actors. By targets I mean, what these organizations looks to influence inside the legislation. Considering the context of the REACH legislation, any changes made to it will be in the form of amendments. The actors inside this case study do no look to create new legislation, their objective is to amend the existing regulations in their favor. This statement is the first target for this research. After acknowledging the first target, we observe the rest of the actor’s targets. To be able to explain this efficiently; the actors will be divided in two groups. The first groups will be the NGOs; inside this groups Greenpeace, EEB and ChemSec targets are analyzed. The second group will be the private organizations; which are CEFIC and FEEC. The reason behind this separation is due to the fact that these two groups of actors have contrasting targets.