Enemies of the state: Perceptions of radical right-wing parties on EU and non-EU migration

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ENEMIES OF THE STATE:

PERCEPTIONS OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES ON EU AND NON-EU MIGRATION

Liesa Aitton S1366475

Supervisor: Dr. Johannes Vüllers Second reader: Stef Wittendorp MA

Word count: 21168 Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

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ENEMIES OF THE STATE: PERCEPTIONS OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES ON EU AND NON-EU MIGRATION

Liesa Aitton

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the stances of the Dansk Folkspartei, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, the Rassemblement National, the UK Independence Party, and the Vlaams Belang on EU and non-EU migration. In particularly, a focus is placed on how this division is displayed in the European Parliament through debates and explanations of votes. In the past, the scholarship has disregarded the EU perspective, in order to implement an analysis at the national level. This seems unfortunate, since the EU has gained more competences, making them a valid policy-maker in regards to migration. Additionally, scholars generally perceive migration as just that, and do not distinguish between internal and external migration. This is again regrettable considering that different challenges may pertain to distinct types of migration. This thesis assesses what roles borders, physical threats, and cultural threats play within debates and explanations of votes. It is argued that border management issues can exist without the separation of EU and non-EU migration. Cultural and physical threat-frames, however, appear to specifically pertain to EU and non-EU migration crises respectively. The radical right may have knowingly made this distinction, yet alternatively media frames may have affected the manner through which the party family understood migration issues. Increasing levels of Euroscepticism could also have challenged the radical right’s rhetoric, especially in regards to the border issues.

Keywords: Radical right-wing parties, migration, EU and non-EU migration, cultural threat-frames, physical threat-threat-frames, borders.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EFDD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy ENF Europe of Nations and Freedom

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

DF Dansk Folkspartei

FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs MEP Member of the European Parliament RN Rassemblement National

UKIP UK Independence Party

UK United Kingdom

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Frequencies on Borders, the EU, and the number of migrants……….35

Table 2. Threats regarding Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession debates………..37

Table 3. Threats regarding the Turkish accession talks………..39

Table 4. Threats regarding non-EU migration between 2004 and 2009……….40

Table 5. Frequencies of codes between 2004 and 2009………..41

Table 6. Physical threat-frames regarding short-term visa waivers………43

Table 7. Cultural and physical threats pertaining to the migration crisis………45

Table 8. Frequency of codes between 2015 and 2018……….45

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1 INTRODUCTION

“While European far right parties do not represent a unified bloc in terms of ideology and political strategies, what they share in common is that they have gathered popular support, mostly over the issues of immigration and (in)security” (Lazaridis and Wadia 2015:3). The idea that migration may unite this party family, proves logical in that it relates to the radical right’s core features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007:15-23). Especially nativism explains for anti-migration attitudes, because the ethno-nationalist policies promoted by the radical right strongly advocate for a homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007:15; Ziller and Schübel 2015:368-369). Meaning that foreigners, regardless of their ethnicity and/or background, are perceived as undesirable pariahs.

This anti-migration stance did not fall out of thin air. Indeed, over the years radical right-wing parties have regularly included anti-immigration sentiments in their party programs on both the national and supranational level. In the mid-2000s, the party family came to critique immigrants in light of the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements, which brought 12 new Member States into the European Union (EU). It is well-known, that the radical right feared this expansion, since it was expected to contribute to the further integration of the EU. Additionally, the movement of EU citizens from Eastern to Western Europe could advance the displacement of companies and add to previously existing unemployment issues (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007:33). The radical right maintained that both these points could negatively affect the livelihood of local inhabitants, whilst at the same time benefiting economic migrants. Besides these mostly economic complaints, the radical right also felt anxious because the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the EU would soon apply to the newly included Central and Eastern European Member States as well (Karamanidou 2015:40). Again, the radical right suspected that this could only put their respective states in a disadvantaged position. Whether or not these perceived dangers actually held true hardly mattered, as the radical right’s nativist ideology could simply not allow for an influx of foreigners.

Once the European migration crisis began in 2015, feelings of anxiety only increased, as large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers made their way into the EU. Not only was the number of refugees perceived as too high, in 2015 alone over 1.015.877 individuals tried to make their way into the Union (UNHCR 2019). But the radical right also perceived these asylum seekers as major threats to society, instead of victims of cruel regimes. Indeed, migrants entering the EU were accused of doing so solely to benefit economically and/or socially. Of course, the local population was to suffer the consequences (see Eindinder 2018; Davis and

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Deole 2017). These particular issues were well-known among the radical right. Yet during the refugee crisis, these proved insufficient in expressing the true dangers that migrants posed to society. More physical threats, such as increases in crime and feelings of insecurity, were necessary to fully explicate the scope of the problem. Not only that, but these faux refugees were expected to carry out terrorist attacks on behalf of ISIS or other rebel groups (Eindinder 2018). This would evidently prove devastating to the EU as well as the Member States.

It has become clear that migration ranks high on the radical right’s agenda. Even more so, the radical right depends on these anti-migratory sentiments, as well as modernisation processes, nativist economics, and protest voting, to garner electoral support. Yet when solely looking into migration issues, it has to be acknowledged that the radical right has to respond differently to EU migration compared to non-EU migration. Internal migration, as seen through the EU Enlargements, mostly tampers with the welfare and employment opportunities of locals. Nevertheless, this type of migration hardly poses threats in terms of terrorism. External migration, seen through for example the European migration crisis, however, encompasses both economic and social issues, but also relates to increases in violence and the devaluation of norms and values. The European refugee crisis may thus have amplified and strengthened threats previously associated with internal migration (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). Besides highlighting physical and cultural threats, the radical right also felt the urge to address problems concerning internal and external borders. This mostly because inadequate border controls came to represent feelings of insecurity and chaos among the radical right.

Due to the serious threats emanating from these migration crises, the radical right could do nothing but respond. Within the European Parliament (EP), the radical right did so through debates and explanations of votes. Other avenues for change, such as writing reports and joining committees, remained unavailable to the radical right due to mainstream Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) taking up these positions. Still, their nativist character provided sufficient incentive to strongly advocate for more restrictive migration policies. According to scholars such as Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) (conservative) mainstream parties became also more and more critical of uncontrolled migration. As a consequence, these parties have started to frame the migratory threat in terms of cultural and physical hazards. While this narrative does not necessarily apply to the radical right, this separation of threats does make sense in light of the different challenges experienced regarding EU and non-EU migration. In this thesis, responses by the radical right towards both EU and non-EU migration will be analysed, in order to answer the following research question:

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Under what conditions do radical right-wing parties use different frames regarding EU and non-EU migration in European Parliamentary debates and explanations of votes?

In particularly, a focus will be placed on those challenges relating to migration. Here, a distinction will be made between internal migration, represented by the EU Enlargements taking place in 2004 and 2007; and external migration, as seen through the European migration crisis starting in 2015 and still ongoing at the time of writing. Issues surrounding border control will also be touched upon. In order to answer this question, European Parliamentary debates and explanations of votes between 2004-2009 and 2015-2018 will be analysed.

It should be noted that a significant number of scholars have described the relation between radical right-wing parties and immigration (see Betz and Johnson 2004; Rydgren 2003, 2008; Zaslove 2004a, 2004b). However, very few scholars have acknowledged that radical right responses may differ when EU migration occurs rather than non-EU migration, and vice versa. In fact, it remains unclear if the radical right perceives one as more threatening and detrimental than the other. Even those scholars that do recognise the different implications affecting EU and non-EU migration, generally do not apply this to radical right-wing parties. Instead they opt to highlight mainstream parties.

Additionally, research on the radical right and immigration tends to emphasise behaviour at the level of the state, and not the EU. This decision appears logical since states used to determine their own migration policies. However, these days the EU also impacts the field om migration, asylum seeking, and visa policies, as its competences have significantly increased (Ripoll Servent 2018). The Member States who have to respect and implement Union level decisions are thus limited in their actions at home (Ripoll Servent 2018). Nevertheless, the current scholarship has not sufficiently recognised this shift. Therefore, this thesis sets out to do two things. Firstly, it will engage in an EU level analysis, and in so doing will explain for the migratory challenges in the EP. Secondly, the implications of EU and non-EU migration, as pertaining to the radical right, will be fully explicated.

“One of the key preoccupations of scholars of contemporary politics is the political backlash of social unease about immigration and cultural diversity” (Muis and Immerzeel 2016:1). Throughout time, radical right-wing parties have consciously contributed to these toxic narratives regarding migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Evidently, the public has bought into this rhetoric, as anti-migratory stances have led to increasing levels of support for the party family. This anti-migration behaviour may thus seriously affect the political landscape as we now know it. By analysing perceptions on migration, in particularly in terms EU and non-EU migration, this thesis hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the

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radical right. In so doing, the public as well as other political parties may be better informed on the radical right’s platform, and as a consequence may make more knowledgeable decisions regarding who they do and do not support in the EP. Mainstream factions in the parliament may also be able to use the information presented in this thesis to counter the radical right’s anti-migratory stances.

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2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Radical Right and Electoral Support

After the Second World War ended, most Western European states believed that fascism and Nazism would be no more. Yet, only ten years later, the firsts signs of extremism became visible in Austria and France (Heinisch and Hauser 2016; Ivaldi 2016). At this point in time, however, radical right-wing parties could easily be ostracized as their extreme ideas did not align with the values of the population. Consequently, the radical right remained rather niche (Meguid 2005). This changed in the mid-1980s, as radical parties finally obtained electoral successes at the national level (Mudde 2014:217). As the popularity of these parties increased, so too did the interest of scholars. Initially research focussed on historical accounts, and included mostly descriptive works (Mudde 2016:3). In the 1980s, researchers clearly broke with this tradition and started to question how modernization theories could explain the radical right’s successes (Mudde 2016:3-4). The early 2000s represented yet another turn, “as scholars started to focus increasingly on the supply-side of populist radical right politics and […] [brought] the party back into the equation” (Mudde 2016:4). In the following paragraphs, scholarly explanations for the appeal of radical right-wing parties will be discussed. Next, immigration as a source for electoral support will be highlighted. Finally, a shift will be made to include framing literature in relation to the radical right and migration.

Scholars such as Betz (1994), Norris (2005), and Mudde (2007) have all acknowledged that modernisation processes might contribute to the radical right’s appeal. Hans-Georg Betz (1994) articulates one of the strongest versions of this argument: the ‘new cleavage’ thesis. This thesis suggests that the post-industrialisation process, taking place in the late 20th_century,

could cause certain social strata to fall behind. At the time, low-skilled workers could see their life chances shrink as they lost out on full-time employment, state benefits, and security in the job market (Betz 1994:32). As a consequence, a significant part of society ended up in the ‘underclass’ (Betz 1994:32). Initially, this group was expected to gravitate either towards labour and socialist parties as these used to protect the socially disadvantaged; or towards mainstream right parties as they emphasized principles of law and order (Norris 2005:132). However, mainstream parties never rose to these challenges. “The new cleavage thesis therefore emphasizes that ‘bottom up’ secular trends common in affluent postindustrial societies, […] have created a disgruntled pool of citizens open to the appeals of the radical right” (Norris 2005:134).

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While radical right-wing parties may hold on to this narrative, scholars such as Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie (2005) dispute that one specific disadvantaged class is more likely to vote for the radical right than any other. Mudde (2007) also sees fault in (post-) modernisation theories. Although they may intuitively seem correct, they “are too general and too vague to be considered useful explanations of recent populist radical right party successes” (Mudde 2007:205). Moreover, these theories hardly applied to states in Latin America and Eastern Europe. While mass reforms in the region should have increased the radical right’s popularity, reality proved that it took decades before electoral success occurred (Mudde 2007:203). Hence, the explanatory power of modernisation theories appears rather limited.

A small number of scholars, such as Braun (1997) and Reich (1970) have argued that an authoritarian upbringing may make an individual more susceptible to vote for radical right-wing parties. This upbringing can be at a micro-level, and may thus concern authoritative parental relations (Mudde 2007:216). However, authoritarian upbringings may also occur at the macro-level, in which case regimes shape people’s behaviours through which radical right-wing appeal may increase. This line of research is mostly conducted in relation to post-Communist Europe (Braun 1997). In these states, Communism and attitudes related thereto may come to determine levels of nationalism. This then contributes to a preference for more authoritarian leadership styles, which is commonly promoted by the radical right. Mudde (2007) appears less convinced of this argument, since the electoral successes of the radical right in the post-Communist world have developed rather slowly.

Other radical right-wing scholars have pointed out that neoliberal economic programs may have contributed to the party family’s appeal as well. “Indeed, for many authors neoliberalism was one of the core features of the populist radical right program and one of the main reasons for their electoral success” (Mudde 2007:120). Betz (1994:109) became a particularly strong proponent of this view, suggesting that a shift in economic thinking in the late 1970s aided the radical right in gaining popularity. Around that time, both mainstream and radical right-wing politicians came to the conclusion that state control over economic activities could only hamper growth. In its place a more neoliberal system came to be promoted, which was mean to benefit the people. While a number of scholars have agreed with this perspective (Kitschelt and MacGann 1995), others have argued that the radical right has not always favoured neoliberal views, nor have they truly prioritized economic programs (Mudde 2007:119).

According to Cas Mudde, the radical right prefers nativist economics. Meaning, that the free market economy is to be respected, yet that detrimental social effects are to be

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moderated by the state in order to protect the people (Mudde 2007:124). Daniel Stockemer (2017:1536-1537) adds that the radical right could garner support when unemployment is high. After all, this party family continuously claims to protect those that suffer the consequences. Mudde (2007:206), however, doubts that the radical right will profit from unemployment, as they lack ‘ownership’ over the issue. Hence, it remains debated whether or not the economy actually enhances breeding ground for the radical right.

Another explanation for radical right-wing popularity may be protest voting. “Various observers of anti-immigrant parties [read: radical right-wing parties] assume that their voters have reasons to vote for them that have more to do with deficiencies of mainstream parties than with the attractions of anti-immigrant parties per se” (Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie 2005:541). Indeed, civic malaise, political cynicism, as well as social alienation, may contribute to radical right-wing voting (Norris 2005:149). After all, such a vote would indicate that the mainstream has become deficient to the public. Van der Burg, Fennema and Tillie (2005:541) add that the public may try to either critique democratic institutes as a whole or just the established political elite. In the case of the former, radical right-wing parties may present themselves as antidemocratic, which could align with the wishes of part of the population (Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie 2005:541). However, it is debateable if this will attract many votes, as most people continue to support democratic values and principles. The latter case is thus more likely, as people may simply want to indicate that they no longer support the established elite (Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie 2005:541; Norris 2005:152). It should be noted that this option is only viable if the radical right remains small, as it cannot do any harm that way. Pippa Norris (2005:153) acknowledges this argument, yet highlights that protest votes may also be the result of “alienated and socially intolerant citizens lacking interpersonal trust”. Clearly, protest voters contribute to the electoral success of the radical right. However, both Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie (2005) and Norris (2005) indicate that the strength of this factor remains limited, as the public is less likely give their vote once the party becomes influential.

At the micro-level, individuals may choose to vote for radical right-wing parties simply because they agree with their values and principles. These people place themselves on the far end on the left-right spectrum, which includes radical right-wing parties (Ignazi 2003). However, it remains debatable how right-wing someone has to be, before they vote in favour of radical right-wing parties (Mudde 2007:220). A strong personal ideology may thus come to play a role (Ignazi 2003). After all, those people that look down upon ethnic minorities and the political elite, tend to be the ones who strongly agree with the radical right’s nativist,

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authoritarian, and populist attitudes (Mudde 2007:220-221). Additionally, feelings of insecurity may lead to increasing levels of electoral support (Mudde 2007). In particularly, previously mentioned macro-level explanations may cause the national population to feel insecure about particular aspects of their lives, e.g. their identity, work, and/or social values. Hence, “[t]hey seek salvation in the “simple messages” of the populist radical right, which promises a clear identity and protection against the changing world” (Mudde 2007:223).

Besides demand side factors, electoral support may also be determined by the party’s outward behaviour. Mudde (2007) brings forward three supply-side factors that could positively impact radical right-wing appeal: ideology, leadership, and organisation. In regards to ideology, it is frequently claimed that moderate ideologies lead to support (see Mudde 2007; Ignazi 1992; Taggart 1995). In particularly, moderate parties are believed to be successful because of moderation processes. Extreme parties, on the other hand, show the reverse trend (Mudde 2007:257). Betz (2003:207), however, claims that radical right-wing parties create a ‘winning formula’ by promoting a combination of “differentialist nativism and comprehensive protectionism”. Regardless of their understanding of ideology, most scholars tend to agree that the manner through which the radical right present’s its ideology could have some positive effect on voters (Mudde 2007; Betz 2003; Taggart 1995).

Secondly, Mudde (2007) emphasizes leadership in regards to radical right-wing success. In this case, charismatic leadership may add to the appeal of a party. European radical right-wing leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen (Rassemblement National) and Jörg Haider (Freiheiliche Partei Österreichs) have shown the power of this argument, as their personalities allowed the party to reach new heights in terms of popularity (Mudde 2007:261; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002:351). Finally, organisational aspects may play a significant role in party appeal. After all, a well-developed party is able to represent itself much more adequately (Mudde 2007). Even more importantly, developing the organisational skills early onwards may contribute to more successes in the future (Mudde 2007).

All these demand and supply-side factors contribute in some way to radical right-wing appeal. It should be noted that most scholars discussing electoral support, solely consider the European radical right. Of course, radical right-wing parties exist on other continents as well, but most scholars deliberately chose to highlight parties located on the European continent (see Mudde 2007; Lubbers, Gijsbert, and Scheepers 2002; Betz 1994; Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie 2005; Norris 2005). The motivation for this tendency appears to be linked to the radical right’s popularity and long(er) history in Europe (Mudde 2016). However, just because the

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research prioritises a certain region, does not imply that the factors previously discussed cannot be applied to other radical right-wing parties.

2.2 Migration and the Radical Right

In the previous section, several supply and demand-side factors for radical right-wing support have been discussed. However, the interplay between migration and electoral success should be addressed as well. This mostly because it has been suggested that “the rise of the radical right is fuelled by shifts in public opinion generated by the growth of multiculturalism and more ethnically diverse societies found today in postindustrial nations” (Norris 2005:166). Social change is thus incited and sustained through the increasing number of migrants moving into and throughout the territory of states and/or regions. The outspoken character of radical right-wing politicians only adds fuel to the already existing fire (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). Betz (1994) as well as Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2002) add that poor economic circumstances and high levels of unemployment contribute to the further deterioration of migrants’ image. This logic first became applicable in the 1970s and 1980s, when immigrants started to enter Europe as part of a labour migration wave (Betz 1994:71). However, at this point in time, radical right-wing politicians were unable to claim ownership over the immigration issue. Agenda setting and policy making were after all still controlled by mainstream parties. Hence, the radical right could hardly claim victory, once these mainstream parties started to curb migration inflows (Betz 1994:71).

Throughout time, the radical right has always maintained its anti-immigration stance. Social change instigated by the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and the entering into force of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, all aided the party family in gaining more influence over the migration debate (Mudde 2007:159; Karamanidou 2015:37). Especially the wars in the Balkans as well as the EU’s decision to open up borders contributed to an influx of foreigners. Evidently, the radical right perceived this as a major threat to their state’s values and culture (Mudde 2007:19). Indeed, the norms, ideals, languages, and religions of these migrants were too foreign, and belonged too much to the ‘other’ (Van der Burg, D’Amato, Berghout, and Ruedin 2015:11). Not only that, but migrants were also believed to negatively impact the national security of states (Liang 2007:18). These critiques addressing migration fell on fertile grounds, as the European population had already started to question the further integration of the Union (Mudde

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2007:158-159). Hence, individuals may base their radical right-wing vote on their nativist and anti-migration perspectives (Mudde 2007).

The culmination of both anti-migration stances as well as the increasing number of immigrants explains for individual level voting. However, both Mudde (2007) and Norris (2005) question if this argument holds true on the macro level as well. Golder (2003) clearly believes the argument to be valid, as he found a positive correlation between the number of foreign citizens and electoral success for the radical right. Wendt (2003), however, obtained the exact opposite result. Because of discrepancies like these, little consensus exists on the effect of anti-migration explanations. The fact, that Eastern and Western Europe deal with different types of ‘foreigners’ leads to further confusion. In Eastern Europe the ‘other’ is mostly represented by ethnic minorities stemming from Communist times (Mudde 2007:211). Western Europe, however, has a tradition of dealing with foreign immigrants (Mudde 2007:211). While the radical right’s nativist tendencies would explain for negative opinions on both these groups, levels of electoral success may differ based on the type of ‘outlier’.

Even though the radical right has continuously responded to migration crises, its effect on electoral success remains convoluted. Still, both the EU Enlargements of 2004 and 2007 as well as the 2015 European migration crisis, made it possible for the radical right to criticise the influx of EU and non-EU migrants. Although the number of migrants proved problematic in and of itself, cultural differences were not appreciated by the radical right either (Van der Burg et al. 2015:11). Increases in unemployment, criminality, and welfare abuse, as a consequence of immigration, were soon added to the mix (Zaslove 2004a; Zaslove 2004b; Rydgren 2008). At the moment, immigration is dealt with on the supranational, national, and local level. “Certainly, migration is a type of policy still largely attached to the idea of member states’ sovereignty and their ability to control who enters and leaves their territory” (Ripoll Servent 2018:109). That being said, migration policies have slowly Europeanised, meaning that decisions are now also taken at the supranational level (Ripoll Servent 2018:109). According to Karamanidou (2015), the Schengen Agreement of 1985 paved the way for migration and asylum topics to be discussed at the EU level. In fact, the last decade has shaped institutes like the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Commission into policy-making machines (Ripoll Servent 2018:109). The process through which the EU’s powers increased, continues to develop slowly. That being said, the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (entered into force in 1999) and the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 (entered into force in 2009), have significantly strengthened the position of the Union. The introduction of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FROTEX), may have

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contributed to the further enhancement the EU’s position in multi-level governance processes (Ripoll Servent 2019; Karamandiou 2015). Hence, an EU-centric level of analysis may benefit this research project.

2.3 Framing the Migration Issue

In the early to mid-1980s, political parties started to link migration to principles of law-and-order (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012:482). However, at this point in time immigration was still perceived as ‘low politics’. Meaning that it was mostly believed to affect social and economic problems. The 9/11 terrorist attacks completely overthrew this rhetoric. Suddenly, migration ranked at the top of the political agenda, and was perceived as a potential threat to a state’s national security (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012:482-483). The EU in particularly “talked of invasion, insecurity, loss of identity, sovereignty, control, and terrorism” (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012:480). While this statement emphasises national security concerns, other more symbolic threats remained present as well.

In order to account for these different types of threats as well as their level of importance, scholars within the security studies field, such as Lahav and Courtemanche (2012), Karyotis and Skleparis (2013), and Stansfield and Stone (2018), introduced issue-framing. All agree that immigration poses a multi-dimensional threat. Similarly, these scholars concur that physicals threats tend to be prioritised (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Karyotis and Skleparis 2013; Stansfield and Stone 2018). This because the more tangible threat pertains to basic order needs, such as increases in crime, a lack of public safety, and increases in law-and-order concerns. On the other end of the spectrum, Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) highlight cultural threats, relating to higher order needs such as “identity, cultural homogeneity, language and community survival” (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012:484).

Karyotis and Skleparis (2013) appear to agree on this division between cultural and physical threats. However, these authors feel the need to add a health dimension (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013:693). In particularly, they claim that local elites believe that migrants bring (un)known diseases onto the European continent, which the population is no longer resistant to (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013:693). The poor living conditions of irregular migrants furthers this problem, as it enables the spreading of contagious and sexually transmitted diseases (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013:693-694). Therefore, leading to health disasters. Karyotis and Skleparis (2013) do not limit their argument to health concerns, but also include economic considerations into their threat-frame. Meaning that migrants are perceived as economic

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parasites, who cause unemployment, overburden the welfare system, and take over housing and transportation facilities (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013:694).

Stansfield and Stone (2018) agree that economic and criminal threats play a role in the framing of migration (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Karyotis and Skleparis 2013). However, these scholars diverge in that they do not view cultural factors as an individual frame. Instead, they frame societal aspects as part of a group threat-frame (Stansfield and Stone 2018:594). This particular frame concerns itself with prejudices against migrants, perceived threats to the in-group, as well as the numerical threat that these foreigners pose (Stansfield and Stone 2018:594). Thus, making the group frame an overarching structure that also includes the cultural threat-frame as discussed by Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) and Karyotis and Skleparis (2013). Interestingly enough, Stansfield and Stone (2013) contend that their proposed threat-frames could be applied to both EU and non-EU migration. This logic may have a wider applicability, seeing that politicians as well as the media have used more aggregated threat-frames to solely analyse intra-European migration (Balabanova and Balch 2012:384). However, most of these frames, such as cultural protectionism, public security, and liberal constitutionalism, can be made to fit with Lahav and Courtemanche’s (2012) work. Hence, threat-frames that direct attention to internal migration may also apply to external migration, and vice versa.

Finally, it should be noted that migration is not always framed in solely negative terms. Especially journalists have a tendency to frame irregular migration in accordance with the human-interest frame. Meaning, that they use “human examples, adjectives or personal vignettes that generate empathy, consideration of how individuals are affected, personal or private information, and visual information that generates empathy” (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015:786). In so doing, migrants will be framed as victims or even heroes instead of criminals (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015). However, when migrants discuss their problems with journalists, information about their lives may make them appear like less than ideal victims (Jacobsen 2015:888). Of course, migrants may suffer terribly because of inhumane conditions in camps, violence, and human rights violations (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015:790). Nevertheless , their mere presence on the European continent often already violates national laws, meaning that they tend to be seen as a threat to society (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015:790; Jacobsen 2015:890). Their fuzzy status, thus complicates matters, and could contribute to threat-frames as discussed by Lahev and Courtemanche (2012), Karyotis and Skleparis (2013), and Stansfield and Stone (2018).

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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As outlined in the literature review, different types of threat-framing have been used to try and explain for anti-migration sentiments. This differentiation appears logical, considering that migration crises have become multi-dimensional threats, in which cultural and physical hazards as well as borders play a role (see Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). Still, attitudes pertaining to migration are subject to change. Hence, the radical right may come to highlight different aspects when discussing internal migration, compared to external migration. Changes in rhetoric may also arise in light of the different challenges that EU and non-EU migration bring along. In particularly, it will be argued that external migration proves significantly more threatening because it contributes to the deterioration of a state’s national security and identity. Issues that apply more so to internal migration crises are not underestimated by the radical right either. Indeed, the radical right’s strong desire to establish a homogenous nation-state, makes it difficult, nay impossible, to ignore migration related problems. Which is why the radical right jumps at every opportunity to bash migrants in debates and explanations of votes in the EP. In the following sections attention will be paid to the different challenges affecting internal and external migration, the incentives to respond to these crises, and the resources that the radical right has available to tackle migration issues. Finally, in section 3.4 the hypotheses and causal mechanisms will be introduced.

3.1 Internal vs External Migration

The widening and deepening of the Union as a consequence of the 2004 EU Enlargement contributed to an internal migration crisis. In 2007, two more states were added to the EU, leading to another influx of migrants. Several of the EU-15 Member States were concerned that welfare migration would negatively impact on the functioning of their states (Skupnik 2014:2). Hence, the 2+3+2 rule made its way into the accession accords (Skupnik 2014:2). This particular rule contributed to “a very asymmetric opening of the labor markets in the EU-15 towards the East” (Skupnik 2014:2). Still, even those governments that benefitted from the 2+3+2 system continued to worry that the quality of public services would decline as swaths of migrants moved through the Union. After all, these foreigners would need social care, public housing, education, welfare benefits, as well as help with land-use planning, waste management, and leisure and cultural benefits (Andrews, Boyne, O’Toole, Meier, Walker 2013:175). Regardless of the Eastern European migrants actually using this type of assistance,

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the radical right believed that the native population would end up in a disadvantaged position because of this. Especially, states such as the UK, France, Sweden, and Germany came to be seen as ‘welfare magnets’. Meaning that large numbers of unskilled migrants moved to these particular states to benefit from some form of welfare assistance (Skupnik 2014:3).

Simultaneously, it was also believed that migrants would cause unemployment, as they were likely to take on jobs meant for the local population (Layard, Blanchard, Dornbusch, and Krugman 1992). However, research by Kraus and Schwager (2003) indicates that unemployment does not have to be the result of accession treaties. The authors claim that people whose states are bound to enter the EU, tend to stay put because income and welfare differences between the home and destination state are expected to diminish (Kraus and Schwager 2003:173). Indeed, migrating only makes sense if being in the destination state improves the lives of migrants. Thus, challenges related to internal migration do not always pertain to real threats, but are likely based on threat perceptions. That being said, the radical right will likely remain keen on challenging these imagined threats.

A decade or so later, the EU came to experience an external migration crisis. The shift from internal to external migration, brought about a new set of challenges. Welfare and economic concerns were still occasionally brought up, but the EU mainly debated whether or not humanitarian concerns should trump internal security (Lucassen 2017:383-384; Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer 2017:143). Parts of the population as well as some political parties proclaimed a moral duty to aid people in times of need (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer 2017:143). The EU having a normative commitment to help migrants suffering in war-thorn states such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan supported this logic (Greenhill 2016:323). Yet, states chose to concern themselves with internal safety issues as well. Hence, a uniform approach to helping refugees and asylum seekers was never made into a priority (Lucassen 2017; Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer 2017). Radical right-wing politicians created further diversity by trying to limit the number of migrants entering the EU. This mostly because a small percentage of refugees were thought of as rotten apples, who were likely going to commit terrorist attacks (Lucassen 2017:387-388). Hence, severely impacting the internal security of the Union.

The poor integration of refugees from the 1990s furthered toxic narratives (Lucassen 2017:388). After all, why would a state take in more individuals who, due to their religion or culture, may not support Europe’s core values, such as democracy, acceptance of homosexuality, and gender equality (Lucassen 2017:388). The inclusion of more foreigners was thus seen as problematic at best, and dangerous to Western standards at worst. The radical

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right desiring to maintain the Western standards it is accustomed to, emphasised that certain cultures and traditions simply would not mix together. Regardless of the objective reality of the matter, external refugees were blamed for cultural and physical discrepancies.

Clearly internal and external migration crises present political parties with different challenges. However, some overlap can be found. All migration related anxieties contribute to fears that the EU’s internal and external borders are no longer adequately protected (Greenhill 2016; Giordano 2016; Harteveld, Schaper, De Lange, and Van der Brug 2018). “[T]he Preamble to the Treaty of Rome declares the intention to ‘eliminate the barriers which divide Europe’ and the will to achieve ever closer union between Member States” (Giordano 2016:51). As a consequence of this treaty, internal borders have slowly started to disappear within the Union. However, with the influx of migrants in the mid-2000s and mid-2010s, politicians have started to call for the reintroduction of these internal borders. Additionally, the radical right started to demand that the external dimension receive more attention, as protection was found severely lacking (Giordano 2016). The strengthening and reintroduction of both types of borders could lead to national security principles being harboured, but also guaranteed intra-EU burden sharing (Greenhill 2016:319). The latter point seems especially valuable to Western European states in the 2000s, and to Greece and Italy from 2015 onwards, as these states bear/bore the brunt of the migration influx. This burden as well as the previously discussed threats contribute to a (re)new(ed) focus on border controls.

3.2 Incentives to Respond to Migration Crises

It has become apparent that different types of challenges may arise when an influx of migrants enters/moves through the territory of the Union. However, the reasons why the radical right might want to respond to these migration crises has not yet been divulged. Research by Mudde (2007), Codrea (2016), Giordano (2016), Greenhill (2016), Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer (2018), Harteveld et al. (2018), and Hameleers, Bos, and De Vreese (2018) suggests that nativism may provide an incentive for the radical right to react to these crises. In particularly, the radical right’s ethno-nationalist tendencies explain for the desire to only include native elements into the state and society (Mudde 2007:19). The type of migration thus hardly signifies, as any ethnic, racial, and/or religious diversity is perceived as fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007:19). Of course, most states these days have become rather multicultural, and cannot in any way shape or form be defined as ‘homogenous’. However, to the radical right this level of heterogeneity in combination with

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the increasing number of migrants living in the EU, simply reiterates the seriousness of the migration problem. So much so, that the radical right believes the EU to be “in crisis because the state is in crisis and the state is in crisis because of the Other: the Muslim immigrants, the Roma immigrants, the Eastern-European immigrants and, the most recent ones, the refugees” (Codrea 2016:80). This extremely black and white view of migrants makes it nearly impossible for the radical right to ignore these crises (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer 2018:148).

Besides a strong desire to protect the national identity, the radical right also uses its populist tendencies to lay blame on actors such as the EU (Hameleers, Bos, and De Vreese 2016:381). The Union representing the corrupt elite should be held accountable for placing the vulnerable population in harm’s way (Hameleers, Bos, and De Vreese 2016:381). After all, the people cannot help it that the EU has lost complete control over migration crises. The discrepancy between the desires of the supranationalist Union and individual states further complicates problems. Whilst the EU wants to place fundamental rights on the agenda, individual Member States have started to express a keen interest in expelling asylum seekers (Greenhill 2016:324). The radical right obviously sided with these Member States, and continuously calls for states to receive more control, so that they can guarantee their own national security. Based on this logic, Codrin Codrea (2016:80) states that: “There is an undeniable connection between the disproportionately perceived magnitude of the refugee influx and the rampant anti-EU right-wing extremism; the distorted perception over immigration is the wind beneath the wings of Euroskeptic and nationalist political movements”. Hence, the lack of control over these crises is not only used to criticise migration itself, but may also contribute to Euroscepticism and border critiques. In so doing, catching two birds with one stone.

3.3 Resources to Respond to Migration Crises

Over the last couple of decades, several internal and external migration crises have impacted the European continent. Due to its potential effect on the Union, the European Parliament will almost always engage in debates on the topic. The political factions in the EP, of which there are currently eight, also influence what topics will be tabled during plenary sessions (European Parliament n.d.). Hence, radical right-wing MEPs that are affiliated with the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) groupings may be able to introduce debates on migration when they see fit. The unification through political factions gives even more room to present thoughts and opinions, as each

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faction is allowed to contribute to the discussion before independent MEPs are enlisted to talk (European Parliament n.d.). Additionally, MEPs are able to produce parliamentary inquiries and calls for resolution, which may challenge how the EU responds to migration crises (Minkenberg 2001:12). The fact that the number of radical right-wing MEPs has strongly increased over time, especially through the 2014 elections, further aids the party family in the promotion of their goals (Brack 2015a:9).

Clearly, the radical right has room to speak out against migration crises. However, the fact that only about 30% of the chamber is filled with Eurosceptic MEPs hampers the radical right’s ability to vote in more restrictive migration policies (Brack 2015a:9). The mainstream coalition continuing to show support for pro-migration policies may hold back the radical right even further. Nevertheless, as the number of radical right-wing MEPs is higher than ever before, their influence may still be felt. Research by Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, and Sitter (2010), even suggests that the radical right may benefit from its strong anti-immigration rhetoric. Indeed, it may prove dangerous for mainstream factions to hold onto positions favouring tolerance and multiculturalism “in the face of contemporary, media-fuelled, concerns about terrorism, crime, welfare abuse and dependency, and the sheer pressure of the population on public services and housing” (Bale et al. 2010:413). Mainstream factions may thus try to defuse the situation by choosing to emphasise other issues. Due to the salience of the migration issue, this might be a poor choice, as it could lead to more support for the radical right (Bale et al. 2010:414). Thus, regardless of the behaviour of mainstream parties, the radical right stands to gain on the topic of migration.

While some parties may come to support the radical right’s stances on migration. Others may “deny them any legitimacy by refusing to acknowledge them as credible and respectable political partners” (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015:1140). In so doing, any influence that the radical right might have, may be limited. The tendency to reduce legitimacy is mostly visible on a national level, through for example a cordon sanitaire. However, the EU may also attempt to condemn the radical right’s extreme ideology. For example, in 2000 the EU imposed sanctions on the Austrian government after the FPÖ was included in the national government (Minkenberg 2001:1). These sanctions were later lifted, yet this example reiterates that the EU does not always look kindly upon this party family. With the number of radical parliamentarians in the EP increasing over time, objections to these types of parties have diminished. Nevertheless, the radical right being known as a pariah has not aided the party family in the promotion of anti-immigration sentiments (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015).

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The behaviour of individual radical right-wing MEPs also determines the extent to which the party family is able to respond to internal and external migration crises. According to Natalie Brack (2015b), radical right-wing politicians engage in four types of behavioural strategies: the absentee, the public orator, the pragmatist, and the participant. These strategies indicate how willing MEPs are to engage in debates; the absentee being least involved and the participant fully preoccupying itself with the ongoings of the EP (Brack 2015b:339-345). Evidently, a lack of involvement limits the amount of influence the radical right can exert over issues such as migration. The role of participant may, however, also prove damaging, as these MEPs perceive themselves as legislators looking for a shared middle ground (Brack 2015b:344). Meaning, that they may mainstream to such a large extent that they lose their ideological commitment to the migration issue. Based on this logic, radical right-wing MEPs are best of as public orators and pragmatists, as they (strongly) maintain their ideology but are (somewhat) willing to engage in debates.

3.4 Border Management Issues, Physical Threats and Cultural Hazards

Throughout this chapter it has been argued that the separation of internal and external migration matters. Indeed, challenges associated with EU and non-EU migration seemed to warrant distinct narratives and even threat amplification. However, research by Greenhill (2016), Giordano (2016), and Harteveld et al. (2018) suggests that this differentiation proves irrelevant when linking migration to EU border management. The deterioration of both internal and external borders in the EU can be seen to cause significant anxiety in and of itself, as it facilitates the movement of migrants into and throughout the Union. Having always found the elimination of barriers to be problematic, the radical right now uses migration crises to critique both migrants and EU border policies. Problems specifically pertaining to external border protection, may further the radical right’s argument that the EU has lost complete control over migration, and that power should be returned to the Member States. This, so that the states themselves can be responsible for their own physical safety, and in so doing can be held accountable (Greenhill 2016). Thus, during migration crises, both internal and/or external migration may be used to criticise the EU, in particularly its border management policies. From this logic flows the first hypothesis:

H1: Regardless of the type of migration, radical right-wing parties will use these crises to comment on the manner through which the EU manages its borders.

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Elsewhere in this chapter it was mentioned that the radical right’s incentives and resources to deal with EU and non-EU migration crises have not significantly changed. Over the last couple of decades, the radical right has continuously promoted nativism, and thus remained advocates for the homogenous nation-state. Resources in the EP, such as parliamentary inquiries and motions for resolution, have likewise remained the same. That being said, the increasing number of MEPs as well as their heightened legitimacy, may have led to more influence in EP debates. Nevertheless, these minor changes probably did not inspire different responses regarding these migration crises. Research by Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) also suggested somewhat stable responses. This due to the fact that anti-migration sentiments are expected to take on one of two characteristics. Threats are perceived as having either cultural or physical dimensions. More specifically, these authors predicted that more attention would be directed at the tangible threat (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). This because physical threats pertain to basic orders needs as opposed to higher order needs. Of course, the radical right likely wishes to resolve both threats. However, logically speaking it is expected that the radical right tackles the physical threat first (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). Meaning that the physical threat-frame is always expected to trump over the cultural frame.

While their reasoning may be sound, Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) do not differentiate between EU and non-EU migration. When this division is taken into consideration, it might be found that their logic only applies to external migration. As mentioned in section 3.1, the radical right may be more inclined to focus on physical threat-frames such as crime and issues regarding law and order when non-EU migration is concerned. EU migration, however, appears to inspire socio-economic issues, which would fall under the cultural threat-frame (Andrews et al. 2013; Layard et al. 1992). Hypothesis 2 is based on the presumption that physical threats will trump cultural threats irrespective of the division between internal and external migration, as is in line with Lahav and Courtemanche’s (2012) research.

H2: Regardless of the type of migration, EU or non-EU, it is expected that the physical threat-frame is prioritised over the cultural threat-frame.

If this hypothesis proves false than the division between EU and non-EU migration will be taken into consideration, and used for further discussion.

Research by Snow et al. (1986) indicates that the intensity of both threat-frames may increase in light of the radical character of the party family. Indeed, the different challenges experienced through the internal and external migration crises may contribute to frame amplification. Meaning that a frame is clarified and invigorated because of a particular issue

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or set of events (Snow et al. 1986:469). In the case of external migration, threat amplification may take place because the radical right feels restricted in its dealings with the migration crisis. In particularly, the normative EU stance, makes it nearly impossible to successfully turn asylum seekers away at the border. Since this only leads to more chaos, the radical right may come to the conclusion that foreigners can only represent bad news. Especially since, they are the ones responsible for the increasing number of terrorist attacks and the deterioration of national identities. The radical right’s toxic narratives may hold even more ground, since the media has also started to promote hate cultures as well (Schäfer and Schadauer 2019:109). With racist and xenophobic statements spreading far and wide, the radical right could easily work on amplifying both cultural and physical threat-frames by adding to these fake news stories with rigorous vigour (Schäfer and Schadauer 2019:113). The radical right, with some help from the media, may thus be able to amplify migration threats.

In regards to the Eastern European EU Enlargements, the radical right did not benefit nearly as much from the media and EU policies. In this case, it was known that Member States could use the 2+3+2 rule to limit the opening of labour markets (Skupnik 2014:2). Because of this rule as well as the manner through which the enlargement was organised, Member States, and not the EU, obtained significant control over who could and who could not enter their territory. While the radical right still felt anxious in regards to welfare abuse and higher levels of unemployment, they did not have the same opportunities to exacerbate the problem. Thus, while internal migration as a consequence of the EU Enlargements could lead to both cultural and physical threats, this time the radical right did not have the same resources to amplify threat-frames. Based on this logic, follows the third hypothesis:

H3: When non-EU migration, rather than EU migration, becomes the dominant trend, then radical right-wing parties will amplify both the cultural and physical threat-frames.

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4 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Definitions of Main Concepts 4.1.1 Radical Right-Wing Parties

Although a large number of articles has been published on the radical right, very few have made an effort to conceptualize the party family. Some, like Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie (2005) promote the term ‘anti-immigration parties’. However, this denomination does not explain the full scope of radical right-wing behaviour. Others, such as Ignazi (2003), rank parties from left to right, with the most right-wing party being perceived as the extreme right. However, this approach makes it extremely difficult to separate radical parties from conservative parties (Stockemer 2017:1540). Hence, neither would be appropriate when conceptualizing the radical right.

Instead, I have chosen to use Cas Mudde’s (2007) definition. Mudde’s (2007) conceptualization comprises three core characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Firstly, nativism should be understood as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements […] are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007:19). Meaning that people and ideas that do not conform to the national standard will not be appreciated, or even tolerated (Mudde 2007:19). Secondly, authoritarianism is meant to refer to the desire to organise society with rigorous vigour. In line with this reasoning, principles related to law and order will be prioritized, people will be submitted to ‘punitive conventional moralism’, and authority is likely to be accepted (Mudde 2007:23). Finally, populism is a thin-centred ideology that establishes a division between the good people and the evil elite, in which case the wishes of the former should always trump those of the latter (Mudde 2007:23). Other factors “such as xenophobia or strong anti- immigrant rhetoric, anti-pluralism, (strong) nationalism, (strong) European rhetoric, Islamism, cultural monism, and anti-egalitarianism follow from this definition” (Stockemer 2017:1541).

4.1.2 Migration

It has already become clear that radical right-wing parties do not look favourably on foreigners. In fact, reasons for migrating, may they be political, economic, or due to warfare, do not signify to the radical right, and thus this research project. In a similar vein, I will not distinguish between refugees, migrants, and immigrants, as the radical right will (presumably) wish to treat these groups similarly. Based on this reasoning, migration will be understood in the simplest

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terms, as the “movement and resettlement of human beings from one geographic location to another, in both small and large scale” (Cudd and Lee 2016:2). The IOM adds that migration occurs irrespective of an individual’s (intended) length of stay or legal status. Moreover, the organisation does not concern itself with the motives for moving, nor does it take into account if the decision to move was (in)voluntary (2019: n.p.). While these factors make for a better understanding of migration, this thesis will exclusively concern itself with the migrant’s country of origin, as is in line with the research question. Hence, a distinction will be made between those migrants that have an EU background, and thus move throughout the Union. And those that do not possess an EU passport, and thus move into the territory of the EU.

4.2 Data and Methods

In this thesis debates and explanations of votes, taken from the European Parliament website (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en), will be analysed. Data from 2004 until 2009 pertaining to the EU Enlargement period will be included. I have decided to include the entire sixth term (from 2004 until 2009) as newly admitted Member States were submitted to the 2+3+2 rule, which restricted their movement through the Union for some time (Skupnik 2014). Meaning that their admission may have been discussed in EP throughout the entire period under consideration. Data from 2015 until the end of 2018 was used to account for the European refugee crisis. While this crisis is still ongoing, all data was collected in the first month of 2019, making the 31st_{of December 2018 a logical cut-off point. In particularly, debates on the refugee}

crisis, visas, EU Enlargements, accession of third counties, third country nationals staying within the EU, and illegal migration were included (the finalised list of debates as well as the inclusion/exclusion criteria can be found in Appendix I and II). I intend to highlight internal migration between 2004 and 2009, and external migration between 2015 and 2018. However, the opposite will also be considered to some degree. Meaning that both external migration in the mid-2000s, and internal migration occurring in the mid-2010s will be analysed as well. Chapter 5 will fully explicate how threat-frames were used by the radical right.

The debates and explanations of votes taken from the sixth term are all available in English. However, information from the eight term (from 2014 till 2019) is only accessible in the native language of the member of European Parliament (MEP). In order to guarantee a consistent application of the method, translations of the text will be provided. When a language is not spoken by myself (i.e. Danish), a native speaker will be asked to help interpret the data.

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These translations are believed to be necessary as they guarantee that the reader can engage with the data as well.

In order to answer the research question, I will make use of the qualitative content analysis. This method will be used because it is known for its ability to systematically ascribing meaning to large quantities of qualitative data (Schreier 2013). Additionally, it allows for the further development of older patterns, yet is flexible enough that the new codes can come into existence (Schreier 2013). Hsieh and Shannon add that the qualitative content analysis is best used when some “existing theory or priori research exists about a phenomenon that is incomplete or would benefit from further description” (2005:1281). Even though a significant amount of literature has discussed the relation between the radical right and immigration, hardly any scholars have differentiated between EU and non-EU migration. Hence, this method may be suitable to fill the currently existing gap in the literature.

In order for this method to prove successful, Margrit Schreier (2013), a renowned scholar in the field, prescribes eight mandatory steps. Firstly, a research question needs to be formulated. Secondly, data must be selected. Third, a coding frame will be established (the codebook as well as the coding rules can be found in Appendix III). Next, the materials will be segmented, and the data will be fitted to the frame. Fifth, part of the data will be trail coded, for this software from MAXQDA will be used. After this phase is finished, the coding frame will be evaluated and its effectiveness will be determined. At this point, modifications will be made if the framework is found lacking. Seventh, I will then proceed with the main analysis, and code all data. Finally, the findings will be presented and interpreted (Schreier 2013:7). In order to facilitate transparency, more information on the coding process as well as examples will be provided Appendix IV. All interpretations are qualitative in nature, but frequencies and ratios will be added to further clarify some arguments and alternative explanations.

4.3 Explanation of Coding

In total, 485 responses by radical right-wing MEPs were analysed over two rounds of coding. Research by Lahav and Courtemanche (2012), Greenhill (2016), Giordano (2016), Harteveld et al. (2018) was used to develop the coding frame, which can be found in Appendix III. All (sub-)codes can be separated in three groups: cultural threat-frames, physical threat-frames, and threats related to the border/EU. Codes that do not fit any of these categories, but are perceived as relevant, are coded as ‘other’. As previously mentioned, the cultural threat-frame mostly pertains to dangers affecting higher order values or symbolic insecurities. This

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overarching code includes threats to the (national) identity, threats to the community, and threats to the economy. The latter proves relatively straight forward, in that this code is used to express poor economic prospects as a consequence of mass migration. Issues that directly affect the local population, such as unemployment, are also included under this header. This because the radical right is a strong proponent of prioritising local needs first.

Threats to communities specifically relate to problems of poor assimilation and increasing multiculturalism. These issues are perceived as tremendously dire, so much so that the radical right questions if local groupings can continue to exist in the future. The already tense situation further deteriorates as a consequence of European technocrats, who have a tendency to positively discriminate against foreigners. Consequently, local inhabitants, who (allegedly) already suffer from limited employment opportunities, pay the price. The threat to identity then relates to the hampering of those qualities that make a group belong to a state. This specifically relates to those norms and values that locals might not share with migrants. For example, the radical right perceives Islamism as problematic as it runs counter to Europe’s Christian and/or non-religious traditions. Additionally, the threat to (national) identity may also occur with reference to specific rights (e.g. voting). In this case, the radical right believes that only locals should have these rights, as they are part of the in-group.

The physical threat-frame applies to the deterioration of basic order needs, such as: increases in crime, threats to law and order, and threats to public safety. The former appears least complicated in that concerns an increase in transnational and domestic crime. For example, the radical right may relate migration to human trafficking, rape, increases in violence, or even industrial espionage. These crimes, do not have to be violent, and may also refer to non-violent hazards. The threat to law and order strongly relates to the previous sub-code, but only concerns itself with the institutional level. In particularly, the radical right fears that the increasing number of migrants moving through the Union causes chaos. The inability of the Member States to act, as well as the EU’s flawed policies, can only lead to one thing: a complete lack of control over migration. Finally, the threat to public safety specifically applies to public suffering and national security problems. On a more personal level, people may start to feel unsafe in public and private spheres. This suffering must pertain to physical safety, otherwise it should be coded as a threat to community.

The last category of codes is much less (inter)related, and mostly concerns distinct topics. For example, the number of migrants will be coded in regards to the actual quantity of migrants moving through the EU. Quotas and distribution mechanisms are also included in this category, as the radical right believes that their respective state may be disadvantaged and