Sincere board of examination, colleague, friend, reader,
In front of you lays the research to the reason why mass protests broke out in Brazil over the summer in 2013. Various media all over the world reported these significant events and soon the protests spilled over to other countries where expat Brazilians joined in the protests. After living in Brazil for a few months and working in the favelas I feel closely connected to the country. During the protests I was with a group of Brazilian friends in Lincoln, Nebraska. Seeing how individuals responded emotionally to the protests made me call old friend in Rio de Janeiro. The protests were real, I could hear them in the background and via Facetime I could see the events emerging on the streets where I used to work and live. Brazil was making history. For my thesis I could thus not not do research to this sudden emerging dissatisfaction. I always heard friends complain about their government however I had never seen them taking action.
After living in Brazil and having close Brazilian friends I, as a researcher, might very well be biased. This could impact my objectivity and the objectivity of the research for I have emotional bonds with the country and its people. The research is mainly based upon quantitative data which is interpreted and analysed in a qualitative way. Since it is interpretation and analysing data I myself do not expect my social emotional background to impact the research too much.
I have very much enjoyed the writing of this thesis. I have poured my knowledge, energy and power into every single word, which is re-read at least three times. I can never be done revising, every time I read over it I see new correlations, explanations or think of new sources and theories that can be added. I came to a scholarly satisfaction point in the process where the end product is here.
I want to use this space to thank several people for their support and help throughout the process. My family whom motivated me during late nights, which was daytime overseas. My friends:
Fernando Salgado de-Abreu for checking my Portuguese translations, Maria Chavez Alceron for
buying a coffeemaker for our room, Jenny Power for keeping me up and studying with me over 60 hours per week and Jacob Reis for helping me do the simplest calculations and all of their support over the last couple of weeks. My professors throughout my Bachelors at the University of Amsterdam and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for letting me run free whenever I had the chance to write a paper, pushing me to always go above and beyond my own ability and inspiring me that Political Science can be found anywhere, not only in mainstream cases. Above all I want to thank Dr. I. Harbers, I can only imagine that advising and mentoring a thesis is a tough job trying to direct someone in the right direction. We worked together with a 4000 mile distance and 7 hour time difference as a barrier. I have always found our collaboration very pleasant. The clear cut feedback
pushed me every week to try harder and look further. I am thankful for all the time she has put in my thesis since this directly relates back to the quality of it.
Lastly I would like to dedicate my thesis to my grandmother Sophia de Vetten-Vermeulen who passed away during the process. She has been my lifelong inspiration since I was a child, tutoring me in Math, French, Latin and life. She was an intelligent, wise and strong woman who loved nothing more than seeing her grandchildren do what they love and succeed in it. May she rest in peace and find joy out of the end product that you are about to read.
Hester de Vetten Lincoln, Nebraska - USA November 2013
Table of Content
A Reason to Protest ...7
What happened the summer of 2013? ...7
Theory ... 10
Riots & political order - Huntington ... 10
J curve – Davies ... 13
Resource mobilisation – J.C. Jenkins ... 14
Conclusion ... 16
Methodology ... 17
Operationalisation ... 17
Variables & Delineation ... 17
Economic modernisation ... 18
Social modernisation ... 19
Political modernisation... 20
Social class, Incentives & individual gains ... 21
Scientific & Social Relevance ... 21
Concepts & Data ... 22
Research methods ... 22 Analysis ... 23 Huntington ... 24 Economic modernisation ... 25 Social modernisation ... 25 Political modernisation... 26 Conclusion ... 27 Davies ... 28 Economic modernisation ... 29 Social modernisation ... 29 Conclusion ... 29 Jenkins ... 30 Conclusion ... 32 Conclusion ... 33
List of figures and tables ... 37
Figures ... 37
Tables ... 37
References ... 38
Appendix I – Social Modernization ... 43
A Reason to Protest
What happened the summer of 2013?
On June 6th 2013 a local conflict over a rise in public transportation costs in São Paulo evolved into a nationwide accusation of low quality public services, widespread political corruption, and worsening inflation (Moseley, 2013: 1). The protests began in São Paulo, organized by the Free Fare Movement, which advocates free, government-run mass public transportation. The demonstrations were a response to a R$0.20 (US$0.10) increase in bus fares in São Paulo. In other cities the prices also increased. The protests were supported by intense use of social media (Facebook and Twitter) allowing participants to share information about locations, size of protests and police violence. Also social media helped spread the word about police abuse on using force against non-violent demonstrators and press. With the demonstrations growing the message spread beyond rising bus fares to insufficient education and health systems, corruption, government spending on mega-events such as the World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016 and an increasing cost of living. As a result of the protests, president Dilma Rousseff promised to improve public services and combat inflation; several Brazilian cities reduced their public transportation fare on June 18th and 19th (Americas Society, 2013).
Brazil’s background is a very positive one when it comes to economic growth and rising equality. If we look at Brazil we see a growth in GDP when measured in current US$. A social change can be found in the growth of the middle class. Comparing 2003 data with the most recent findings (2009) shows us how considerately the middle class has grown. The income share held by the third 20% of the population grew from 10,7% to 12,4% of the total GDP. The share of the second 20% grew with 1,1% and of the fourth 20% grew with 1,7%. The 20% of the population with the highest income share decreased 3,8% of their income share.
Figure 1: GDP in Current USD in Brazil. The World Bank 2013c Table 1: Growth of Middle Class. The World Bank 2013c
Thus the unequal deviation of income should not be a reason to riot since the middle class is growing. What is interesting to see is that although economy and equality are striving, Brazilians found the need to protest against economic related issues.
Income share held by lowest 20% Income share held by second 20% Income share held by third 20% Income share held by fourth 20% Income share held by highest 20% 2009 2.9 7.1 12.4 19.0 58.6 2003 2.3 6.0 10.7 18.7 62.4
The economic situation in Brazil is striving (Figure 1) and there is a relative growth for the middle class noticeable. It is relative because the share of the highest income group might have decreased however considering the growing economy their net income probably still has increased. Therefore the middle class has a larger share of the overall income now. Yet that does not necessarily mean that their income grew substantially closer to the highest income group. The middle class does have a greater share of the general income, which may be encountered as progress. The dissatisfaction with the economic situation remained under the Brazilian citizenry, which led to the protests. However this is not surprising since Brazil remains a very unequal country economically and it has a history of exclusion and unequal deviation of wealth. “Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. […] Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality” (World Bank, 2013, GINI index). In Brazil’s case in 2003 the GINI index was 58,8 and this decreased to 54,7 in 2009, which implies a small increase of equality (The World Bank 2013e).
It is thus not the case that, although the economic situation and equality is rising, there is no longer a problem with inequality in Brazil, or the rest of Latin America for that matter. Looking at Colombia (57,2 in 2008 and down to 55,9 in 2010) and Argentine (46,3 in 2008 and down to 44,5 in 2010) inequality is still surprisingly high according to the GINI index in various Latin American countries (World bank, GINI index). Brazil also has a history of inequality. In 1981, Brazil scored 57,9 points on the GINI index, this increased slowly until 1989 when it skyrocketed to an amazingly high score of 63,3, after which it stayed over 59 points until 2003. It is surprising that during a moment of growth and prosperity discontent arises.
Lula, former president of Brazil, has his own theory on why the protests broke out now, and why they were highly supported by the Brazilian citizenry:
I think the demonstrations are largely the result of social, economic and political successes. In the last decade, Brazil doubled its number of university students, many from poor families. We sharply reduced poverty and inequality. These are significant achievements, yet it is completely natural that young people, especially those who are obtaining things their parents never had, should desire more. […] They want greater access to leisure and cultural activities. But above all, they demand political institutions that are cleaner and more transparent, without the distortions of Brazil’s anachronistic political and electoral system, which has recently shown itself to be incapable of
managing reform. The legitimacy of these demands cannot be denied, even if it’s impossible to meet them quickly (New York Times, 2013).
The contrast between rising economy and equality versus growing dissatisfaction makes it exceptionally interesting to look at this specific case of public mobilisation. Numerous political theories argue why people mobilize and protest in general which provides theoretical frameworks to research the events in Brazil. This case is very recent and will possibly have a big impact in the near future on public stability. By looking at this case in depth it can help us understand the social phenomenon of the contrast between rising economy and rising social issues. Brazil is part of the BRIC countries; Brazil, Russia, India and China are the fastest growing economies in the world momentarily. Brazil is the only established democracy of these four; the other BRICs also struggle with rapidly growing economies and social tension. By repeating the same research in basis it can be established if the reasons of rising social tension are similar and due to rapid rising economies, or if they differ between democracies and non-democracies. Hereby, over the long term, a theory could be formed about rapid growing economies and social instability. Social movement and change in these fast growing economies can then be standardized over time in new theories. Standardizing social phenomena is important in social science in order to add to science and generalize behavioural patterns.
Protests might take place again if the underlying problem, which leads to mobilisation, is not addressed accordingly. In order to get to the underlying reason, political scientific research needs to be done. It will be challenging to find out if the Brazil case study will fit into the classic political theories on mobilisation because of discontent, and if these theories will have to be reformulated to account for events in Brazil. The focus of this thesis is how the discontent amongst the Brazilian public can be explained if the rising equality and economy is taken into account, according to classic political theories on public mobilisation. The following research question will be the guideline in this thesis: “Why, despite macroeconomic growth, have Brazilians taken to the streets in protest over economic concerns, inequality and corruption?”.
Theory
Various theories add to the social science debate on why citizens mobilize and why protests occur. These debates can be categorized in two different points of view namely: the economic & social development debate and the Resource mobilisation & deviation debate. How economic & social development interact to one another and lead to social mobilisation are argued by Huntington (1968) and Davies (1962), which I shall introduce firstly. The Resource mobilisation and deviation debate is amplified by Jenkins (1983), which I shall explicate lastly. I draw on these three classics in the literature on mobilisation because they complement each other, all three of them have the main focus by looking at a general reason on social mobility from the theory yet have a different point of view on what the main trigger for social unrest is.
The three main arguments show that social mobilisation either arises if: there is a gap between economic modernization and social mobilisation and a lack of political modernisation (Huntington, 1968). If a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal or stagnation (Davies, 1962). And if changes in group resources, organisation, opportunities for collective action and grievances occur. The social class of participants determines what type of grievance will trigger their participation in protesting (Jenkins, 1983).
Riots & political order - Huntington
According to Huntington’s influential theory on riots and political order, violence and instability is most likely to occur in societies which experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political modernisation and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change (Huntington, 1969: 265). With political order in changing
societies his purpose was to develop a theory on how, why and under what circumstances political
order is achieved (Samuel P. Huntington, 1993: XV). Under what circumstances will Huntington’s theory foresee social instability?
According to Huntington, political instability is most likely to occur in situations where political institutions develop at a slower pace than economic and social changes in society. Huntington’s (1969) political modernisation theory involves the expansion of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilisation of these groups into politics. Political modernisation or rationalization consists of three crucial aspects. First of all it involves the rationalization of authority, which means that the nation-state has external sovereignty against transnational influences and internal sovereignty over local and regional powers. Internal sovereignty shows by national integration and
centralization of power, which is propagated in lawmaking institutions. Secondly political modernisation involves differentiation between legal, military, administrative and scientific fields and also the administrative hierarchy becomes more complex. Increased participation is the third aspect of political modernisation. Also participation is broadened throughout society after which citizens become directly involved in governmental affairs. Although in reality, only mobilisation and participation seem applicable to the developing world. Consequently the most fundamental aspect of political modernisation is political participation beyond local level by various social groups throughout society (Huntington, 1969: 34-36).
Social mobilisation manifests in: increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media rises aspirations and expectations which, if remained unsatisfied, stimulate individuals and groups into politics. If political institutions are not strong or adaptable increasing participation leads to instability. The higher the educational level of the dissatisfied the more instability it causes (Huntington, 1969: 47-48). Also social mobilisation increases the awareness of inequality and the resentment of it (Huntington, 1969: 57).
Huntington (1969) argues that economic development leads to political modernisation. “Economic development [...] increases the capacity of a society to satisfy certain aspirations and [...] should tend to reduce social frustration” (Huntington, 1969: 49). Economic growth should create opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment. On the other side Huntington argues that economic development can also be a destabilizing process. Rapid economic growth disrupts traditional social grouping, produces nouveaux riches, increases geographical mobility, widens the gap between rich and poor, requires restriction of consumption to promote investment, increases literacy, worsens regional conflicts over investment and consumption distribution and increases the capacity for groups to organize and consequently the strength of groups and their demands on governments. Economic growth might increase material well being however social frustration increases at a higher rate. It has to be kept in mind here that if a population is very poor they are generally spoken too poor for politics and protest. If someone has to worry about the next meal they are steps away from worrying about big political transformations. They will however worry about essential, minor, improvements in their existing situation (Huntington, 1969 49-53).
Social mobilisation together with economic development leads to social frustration. A gap between aspiration and expectation is formed; this gap can be identified as social frustration. This frustration could be removed by social and economic mobility if the society is ‘open’ and offers opportunities for such mobility. The few possibilities for vertical mobility in urban areas contribute to instability. Besides that this is the case in urban areas this is also the case throughout modernizing countries. If
this is the situation political participation becomes the road to social mobility for individuals and groups, which enforces demands of social mobility. If a country is not politically modernized in terms of political institutionalisation it is difficult to express these demands through legitimate channels what then leads to political instability (Huntington, 1969: 53-55). Concluding it can be stated that political instability in modernizing countries is a function of the gap between expectations and the ability to satisfy them produced by rising aspirations occurring in the early stages of modernisation. A situation like this asks for political development that involves the creation of political institutions, which are adaptable, autonomous and coherent to absorb and order the participation of these new groups and to promote social and economic change in society. Rapid expansion of political consciousness and mobilisation of new groups into politics at a speed, which makes it impossible for existing institutions to assimilate them, makes it a political revolution (Huntington, 1969: 265-266). If the political system lacks autonomy these new groups gain entry to politics without being identified with the established political organisations or involved in the established political procedures. This makes that political organisations and procedures are unable to stand up against the impact of this new social force (Huntington, 1969: 21). However to speak of a complete revolution there should also be creation and institutionalization of a new political order (Huntington, 1969: 265-266).
There are three main concepts distinguished in Huntington’s theory (1969) which are: economic modernisation, social modernisation and political modernisation. Important in his theory is the correlation between these three. If there is an increase of economic modernisation this will lead to an increase of social modernisation aspirations. If these social modernisation aspirations remain unsatisfied this leads to an increase in political participation. If political modernisation does not occur as fast as economic and social modernisation this leads to social mobilisation. In the analysis it will be researched what is the case for Brazil in the summer of 2013.
J curve – Davies
James Davies (1962: 5) argues that revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then intuitively fear that what is gained with great effort will be lost which leads to a revolutionary mind set. His theory presumes that during extended periods of growth, people come to expect a better future as the norm, but with the onset of a sudden downturn in the ability of the economy to satisfy those expectations, there emerges an ‘intolerable gap between what people want and what they get’, driving some individuals to participate in violent protests and even revolution (Davies 1962, 6).
Davies bases his theory on Marx’s (1955) “A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants and social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general”. When there is less pressure on the population because the probability of losing life has gone down, people are generally spoken put in a condition of pro-rebelliousness. This condition can be natural (a bad crop year, fear of hunger) or social (such as political and economic downfalls). On the other hand, recovery from sharp economic decline may take some steam from the rebellion steamer since this will decrease the fear of losing what has gained (Davies, 1962: 7).
A revolutionary state of mind within the citizenry requires a continued and normal but dynamic expectation of a greater opportunity to satisfy basic needs. These basic needs may vary from mere physical (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety) to social (family and friends) to the need for equality and justice. The necessary additional component is a persistent threat to the satisfaction of these needs and not a threat, which actually returns people to a state of sheer survival, which would threaten the citizenry that they would not be able to satisfy one or more basic needs. Although lack of physical needs in some degree may be threatened on the eve of all revolutions, it is not the primary factor for a revolutionary state of mind. If the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing opportunities to satisfy continuous emerging needs or if there is fear that ground which is gained may be lost and if citizenry this will also lead to a revolutionary state of mind (Davies,
1962: 8). If expectations continuously rise and opportunities and prosperity abruptly halts this will likely lead to a revolutionary state of mind.
Davies incorporates the same variables as Huntington, economic and social modernisation or development however he sees another correlation. According to Davies’ theory if there is economic development social enjoyments will rise but also social desires. Social desires grow faster which leads to a gap in between the two and since people are economically more stable and reached an economic minimum that rises them above a poverty line of survival they have the ability to protest. Davies and Huntington thus both see the importance of economic and social development in leading factors for protesting. According to Huntington protests arise by lack of political modernisation and according to Davies when economic and social expectations rise and opportunities halts this will lead to protests. Davies sees, like Huntington does, a role for the government in this halting of opportunities by suppressing or not providing for opportunities. Huntington words this like political modernisation, Davies words this into the fear of people for losing what has gained. In the basis this is the same theory, the gaining of political opportunities provided by the government. Davies does not literally searches this into political opportunity but rather in more social modernisation and opportunities.
Resource mobilisation – J.C. Jenkins
The basic resource mobilisation model considers the plausibility of social movements being extensions of institutionalized actions. Jenkins (1983) argues that national actions are oriented towards clearly defined, fixed goals with centralized organisational control over resources and clearly distinguished outcomes that can be evaluated in terms of concrete gains.
Traditionally analysts assumed that resources come from the people who directly benefit of the social changes pursued and that, since movements lie outside institutionalized politics, they derive their resources from non-institutional sources (Jenkins, 1983: 533). The resource mobilisation theory of social movement emphasizes the connection between movement and institutionalized actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change. A Social Movement (SMO) can either rely on professional or internal recourses. If the movement relies on external professional resources for their crucial victories it will be classified as a professional SMO, if not so and the movement primarily is based on volunteers and resources from direct beneficiaries it is a classical SMO. Collective interests can be seen as relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilisation, instead of being socially constructed and created by the mobilisation process (Jenkins, 1983: 549). Movement supporters act
in terms of internalized values and sentiments of the movement as a whole as well as calculations of self-interest. The major task in mobilisation is to generate solidarity and moral commitments to the broad assembly in whose name movements act (Jenkins, 1983: 538). Different social classes appear to respond to different incentives, the more secure middle- and upper- class groups are more receptive to purposive incentives, while less secure lower-class groups respond to selective incentives and collective solidarity (J. Wilson 1973:72-73 in Jenkins, 1983: 539). In which purposive incentives are those related to the goals of the organisation, the demand for the enactment of laws or the adoption of certain policies (which do not benefit the members in any direct or tangible way), such as elimination of corruption or inefficiency from public service (Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, 1961: 135). Collective or mechanical solidarity is the social integration of members of a society who have common values and beliefs. These common values and beliefs constitute a ‘collective conscience’ that works internally in individual members to cause them to cooperate, selective incentives derive from the perceived benefits of inclusion in an ‘elite’ group (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013a). “Positive selective incentives are effective for motivating small numbers of co-operators and generate pressures toward smaller, more ‘elite’ actions, unless the incentives have jointness of supply. Negative selective incentives are effective for motivating unanimous cooperation, but their use is often uneven and cyclical and may generate hostilities, which disrupt the cooperation they enforce. Examples of these dynamics are found in many arenas of collective action and social movements” (Oliver, 1980: 1356).
Grievances, real or imagined, are relatively constantly deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions. Movements are formed because of long-term changes in group resources, organisation, and opportunities for collective action. While grievances are necessary for movement formation, they are explained either by changes in power relations or by structural conflicts of interest and social movement is thus never formed by short-term inducements or solely by grievances (Jenkins, 1983: 530). Resource mobilisation theorists have adopted a so-called ‘open system’ approach, arguing that the larger political environment shapes the outcomes of social movements. The outcomes depend not only on strategic choices but also on the stand of political elites and the support or opposition of established interest organisations and other movements. The balance of supports and social controls is shaped by changes in governing coalitions, the structure of regimes and societal changes that increase regime crises (Jenkins, 1983: 543).
In order to answer the question why in Brazil protests broke out changes in: group resources, organisation, and opportunities for collective action should be analysed to see which one of these triggered the social movement (Jenkins, 1983: 530). Derived from Jenkins’ theory it is expected that
long-term changes in group resources, organisation, and opportunities for collective action in combination with one or multiple specific grievances fed social mobilisation. Depending on the social class of the actor a fitting incentive for this group will be found, this will depend on their economic situation. This theory also looks at the economic position of protestors but not for a country as a whole. This theory thus looks more specifically to a protest then Huntington or Davies do. Also Jenkins does not look at opportunities or suppressing of the government but rather to individual movements and motivators.
Conclusion
Summarizing the three main arguments show that social mobilisation either arises if: there is an off balance between economic modernisation, social modernisation and political modernisation (Huntington, 1968). If a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal or stagnation. Economic development leads to social desires, which creates a gap between what people want and what they can get (Davies, 1962). And if changes in group resources, organisation, opportunities for collective action and grievances occur. The social class of participants determines what type of grievance will trigger their participation in protesting (Jenkins, 1983).
In order to estimate the predictions Huntington’s theory implies firstly the level of increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media has to be established. This will be the level of social change Brazil currently encounters. Secondly the economic change and development of Brazil has to be mapped out. Because social change leads to increased expectations, if the economy doesn’t rise as fast as the social aspirations a gap arises which leads to political participation. If institutions aren’t adaptable enough nor do they allow increased participation this will ultimately lead to instability. So in order to check Huntington’s theory the adaptability and ability of political institutions to work with increased political participation by the public has to be determined.
In order to check Davies’ theory economic and social development also has to be established where after it can be established if Brazil encountered a sharp reversal in either of these two. However ultimately, Jenkins argues, a gap between what people want and what they get leads to protests. A sharp reversal thus does not necessarily have to be a downfall in economic and social development however it may be stagnation in growth.
To test Jenkins’ theory it is important to determine what social class the protesters belonged to. If this is found the type of incentive the riot provides has to be defined. If the social class of participants
does indeed lead to them participating based on the type of incentive the riot provides them with and if actors were driven by a calculation of self-interest or if they participated on a selfless basis will be approached. How the concepts deriving from these three theories can be measured and what this can teach us about the situation in Brazil will be explicated in the methodology chapter following.
Methodology
In order to work towards an analysis of these theories their main concepts are identified. For every concept a measurable variable is given and the data source that will be used in the analysis. In the this chapter the variables and indicators this thesis works with will be explained and the context is delineated. Furthermore the social and scientific relevance of the research will give insight on why it is socially desirable to execute this research after which the scientific relevance introduces the possibility of theory re-creation. Main concepts used throughout the thesis are initiated after which the research methods that will be used in the next chapter are introduced.
Operationalisation
‘How do we recognize it when we see it?’. In preparation of the analysis it will here be amplified
which indicators will be used in order to be able to measure the theory. Together this will explain under which circumstances social mobilisation is expected. In order to work with the abstract theories of Huntington (1968), Davies (1962) and Jenkins (1983) their concepts are linked to a measurable variable after which the data source which will be used is given.
Variables & Delineation
The dependent variable in this research is protest. The independent variables are the circumstances that lead to protesting. To test if the theories can explain the reality, quantitative measures are used for an in depth analysis of this case study. The following table shows how the various concepts deriving from the theories are measured. The focus lays on the protests in 2013 in Brazil and leave out any other branch protests with the same causes and goals elsewhere in the world at the same time.
Theory Concept to be measured
Operationalisation Data to use
Huntington Economic modernisation
The annual GDP in current USD
World Bank
Huntington Social modernisation Increase in
urbanization, literacy, education and mass media
World Bank & IADB
Huntington Political modernisation
Worldwide Governance Indicators;
World Bank Institute
Davies Economic
development
The annual GDP in current USD
World Bank
Davies Social development Increase in
urbanization, literacy, education and mass media
World Bank IADB OECD & PISA
Jenkins Social class Social class of protesters
IBOPE opinion poll
Jenkins Incentive Gains from
participating in protest
IBOPE opinion poll
Table 2: Operationalisation of theory
Economic modernisation
The annual percentage growth rate of GDP capita is based on the local currency. The cumulative is based on the constant USD in 2005. GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. “GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources” (The World Bank, GDP per Capita Growth).
The percentage growth of GDP in Current USD in Brazil is shown in figure 1. The annual percentage of growth gives a different view of growth in comparison to the GDP growth in USD. Since the annual growth in GDP in current US$ in Brazil is the actual growth of Brazil this will hereafter be used to establish economic growth. This is chosen because in this research it is not relevant to compare Brazil’s growth to that of the world.
Figure 3: GDP per Capita Growth. The World Bank 2013d
Figure 1: GDP in Current USD in Brazil. The World Bank 2013c
Social modernisation
Social mobilisation occurs if there is an increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media because this raises aspirations and expectations (Huntington, 1969: 47-48). Following Huntington’s theory these indicators will be analysed by using the World Bank data, Inter American Development Bank data and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development outcomes. The level of urbanisation is expressed in urban population collected by the World Bank. The Adult Literacy rate is expressed in the percentage of the population aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (Inter American Data Bank, 2013).
To express the level of education the PISA outcomes are used. The research is conducted by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, hereafter OECD. The Programme for International Student Assessment, hereafter PISA, is an international survey which evaluates education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of students (PISA 2013a). The PISA 2003 research is based upon data conducted in 41 different countries testing 15 year olds on their ability in reading, mathematics and science (OECD 2003, 2004: 24). PISA 2009 key findings presents the results from the 2009 survey, which assessed the competencies of 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and science (with a focus on reading) in 65 countries and economies. In 2010 students from another 9 countries took the PISA 2009 test, which is why it is mostly referred to as PISA 2009+ (PISA 2013b). The PISA 2000 and 2006 key findings are similar to those from 2003 and 2009, work with the same structure and scale (OECD 2000, 2003). Because the last available data is focussed on reading in this research the mean performance on the reading scale in used due to limited research time and space, therefore no further analysis into mathematics or science data is conducted.
An increase in mass media is measured by the increase in freedom of press. Freedom of press is needed to create mass media because mass media cannot occur within a country if there is no freedom to legally publish media. Freedom of press thus establishes the basis for mass media, which
can be found at Inter American Data Bank, hereafter IADB. “The media in a country are given a score from 1 to 100 where those scoring 0 to 30 are considered "Free"; those scoring 31 to 60, "Partly Free" and those scoring 61 to 100, "Not Free". This indicator is an evaluation by experts based on a common checklist or framework of analysis” (Inter American Data Bank, 2013b).
All data is conducted from full datasets, the data will be structured in separate tables in Appendix I for interpretation purposes. This data will then be analysed after which the percentage of growth or decline over an established period of time will be measured. To do this the most similar time span available for all indicators will be used which translates back to the period between 2000 and 2009 except for literacy which only has data available over the period between 2001 and 2008. These measurements can be found in Appendix I – social mobilisation.
Political modernisation
Failures in service provision have been linked to poor governance: the lack of transparency and access to public information; weak accountability relationships; and low levels of citizen participation. [...] The World Bank Institute (WBI) believes that supporting open and collaborative governance will enable local change agents to achieve development results in their own contexts. Guided by this vision, WBI seeks to strengthen the capacity of citizens to use innovative tools and practical approaches towards engendering participatory and sustainable change (The World Bank Institute, 2013: 1).
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank Institute (WBI) show the political modernisation of Brazil since the quality of governance illustrates the level of political modernisation. Several indicators for governance measure this. The WBI has done extensive research to which indicators will measure this best:
The WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are based on several hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents, nongovernmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations worldwide (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010: 4).
Social class, Incentives & individual gains
IBOPE held a public opinion survey under 2002 people in eight Brazilian cities (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife, Fortaleza, Salvador and the Federal District), on June 20th,. For this survey the margin of error is two percentage points and the confidence interval is 95%. (IBOPE, 2013). Saad-Filho (2013) used this data in his article for interpretation. Because the data conducted is an opinion poll it is not fully objective, however due to the recent state of the events this is the best available data to estimate what the social class was of participants in the protests over the summer of 2013 in Brazil. In this same dataset an estimate has been made on the reason why people participated and what their motives of participation were. Based upon this information an estimate can be made what people individually think they will gain by participating in the protests. Therefore the IBOPE data and interpretation of Saad-Filho (2013) will be used to establish participants’ social class and help estimate the grievance and incentives of the protests.
Scientific & Social Relevance
Brazil is incredibly interesting to study because it is a case in which a certain level of democracy has been reached however there is still an overall feeling of dissatisfaction amongst the Brazilian population. If the quality of political democracy is analysed focussing on existence of rule of law, socio-political inclusion, public fairness and transparency, the label democracy is questionable. If violence is considered a measure for democratic failure then the region can indeed be seen as fairly undemocratic. Violence such as, crime, police violence, domestic abuse and human rights violations create a democratic region which is far from the perfect westernized democratic model based upon peace and equality (Arias & Goldstein, 2010: 2-3). Since citizens are often unable to secure justice through state institutions, they increasingly employ violence as a means of creating their own extra-legal forms of ‘security’ (Goldstein, 2004 & 2005 in Arias & Goldstein, 2010: 4). This social movement of citizens due to dissatisfaction can thus be explained by lack of democracy however, Brazil is an established democracy although it may not be perfect. The discussion about quality of democracy is interesting here if the research is multiplied in different countries encountering the same phenomenon of rising economy and rising social dissatisfaction. To establish if this is a phenomenon by itself or if the quality of democracy has influence in occurring dissatisfaction this research can be done in other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and established highly functioning democracies. Besides that it is also important to establish the starting point of Brazil before the protests occurred. It is assumed that in highly functioning democracies it is less likely that citizens will protest on a big scale.
The reason for public dissatisfaction has been argued by many scholars all with their own take on theory that can explain this social phenomenon. Brazil is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and therefore part of the BRIC countries. The government is striving in terms of modernization and democratisation and the boom of dissatisfaction is therefore unexpected. The protests in Brazil make a solid fit for an in depth case-study, because this event is very recent and has all components that are argued for in different theories such as Huntington, Davies and Jenkins (chapter 3). Besides that the outcomes of the research will be scientifically interesting, it will also socially be interesting to see how the society responds to levels of economic-, social- and political modernisation and what the relationship between social class and individual gains of protesting is. The media argued a lot about the reason of the Brazilian protests and that this reason could not solely derive from the increase in bus fare. It is up to this thesis to establish the scientific reason and likability of the protests which occurred during the summer of 2013.
Concepts & Data
Riots, Revolutions & Protests, which concept will ultimately be used and why? A protest is “an organized public demonstration expressing strong objection to a policy or course of action adopted by those in authority” (Oxford dictionary). “A riot involves a gathering of persons for an illegal purpose […] (and) involves violence. The concept is obviously broad and embraces a wide range of group conduct, from a bloody clash between picketers and strike-breakers to the behaviour of a street-corner gang” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013b). Revolutions are “in social and political science, a major, sudden, and hence typically violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures. The term is used by analogy in such expressions as the Industrial Revolution, where it refers to a radical and profound change in economic relationships and technological conditions” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013c).
These three concepts overlap each other severely since they all stress the coming together of people in groups, which express a certain level of objection. For a protest this discomfort is targeted against authority, a riot is not necessarily targeted against an authority and a revolution is a group, expressing objection within the government and in associated structures, which leads to radical change. Since the social movement in the summer of 2013 was not quite as radical as a full-blown revolution nor was it a gathering of people for an illegal purpose involving violence the events are best described as a ‘protest’. Therefore hereafter the events will be revered to as such.
Research methods
There are various methods for qualitative research such as participant observation, qualitative interviewing, focus groups and qualitative analyses of texts and documents (Bryman, 2008: 369). The
latter can be a method for data collection or data-analysis. Solely qualitative analysis will be used for this thesis. The in depth study will derive from three main theories analysing the case study from different perspectives. In order to back these theories up quantitative research material will be analysed in a qualitative manner, which means that although it is quantitative data there will not be sought for correlation or causation within these figures. This research method is chosen because the goal of the thesis is to exemplify why disorder arose in Brazil specifically in this year.
Analysis
Starting at June 6th 2013 Brazil encountered mass protests throughout its biggest cities. Starting off small in São Paulo soon over a million protesters took the streets as a response to the raise of bus fares. The protests were fuelled by widespread frustration with Brazil's poor education, health and transportation services, rising crime and cost of living, as
well as over-spending on stadiums that will host the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016 (Reuters, 2013b). Resulting from the protests president Dilma Rousseff made the promise to improve public services and combat inflation and several Brazilian cities reduced their public transportation fare on June 18th and 19th (Americas Society, 2013).
This chapter will analyse the given variables in the context of Brazil’s protests. This research is very much aware of the fact that other factors will have a large impact on the events that took place, like the upcoming World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. These events have a big influence on political stability which has also shown in past events in Mexico (1968) or China (2008), this might have had an impact to the protests in Brazil. The influence of these mega events got manifest by many of the protesting signs: “we don’t need the World Cup. We need money for hospitals and education” (Reuters, 2013a). Due to the size of the research these factors cannot be incorporated within the analysis. However the concern of people is very real and they can be encountered as grievances if we look at Jenkins’ theory. A grievance is necessary for movement formation and are triggered either by changes in power relations or by structural conflicts of interest. The upcoming sports-events triggered semi-structural conflicts of interest. Semi-structural because these events are not lasting however these conflicts are considered structural to a certain extent since the preparation for the FIFA World Cup started in 2003 (Salcedo, 2007: 7). Before the protests broke out, Brazilian civilians endured 10 years of preparatory policy of the government and state expenditure towards these events. These protests will be analysed by the three theories amplified in the theoretical framework. Every theory approaches the empery differently, which will give three explanations on
the events. Therefore in the conclusion of this chapter the usefulness of the theories to approach the empiric findings in Brazil will be discussed.
Huntington
In order to estimate the predictions that Huntington’s theory implies firstly the economic change and development of Brazil has to be mapped out. Secondly the level of increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media has to be established. This will be the level of social change Brazil currently encounters. Because social change leads to increased expectations, if the economy does not rise as fast as the social aspirations a gap arises which leads to political participation. If institutions aren’t adaptable enough nor do they allow increased participation this will ultimately lead to instability. So in order to check Huntington’s theory the adaptability and ability of political institutions to work with increased political participation by the public has to be determined. This will be measured by the World Governance Indicators, a project published by the World Bank.
Theory Concept to be measured
Operationalisation Data to use
Huntington Economic modernisation
The annual GDP in current USD
World Bank
Huntington Social modernisation Increase in
urbanization, literacy, education and mass media
World Bank IADB OECD & PISA
Huntington Political modernisation
Worldwide Governance Indicators;
World Bank Institute
Table 4: Social Modernisation
Economic modernisation
Figure 1: GDP in Current USD in Brazil. The World Bank 2013c
Looking at figure 1 and the GDP growth in current US$ a positive trend is found. In 2003 the Gross Domestic Product of Brazil in current US$ was 644.7 Billion. Growth stagnated in 2008 but rose again from 2009. Between 2011 and 2012 there is a decline visible, the GDP shrank from 2476,6 billion to 2252,6 billion. Between 2003 and 2012 a major overall growth in Brazil’s economy is visible. Huntington’s theory suggests that violence and instability is most likely to
occur in countries that have experienced (some) economic and social development, if political modernisation lacks behind. In 2011 a clearly distinguished downfall in economic growth is visible. Overall there has been positive economic development in Brazil. There has not, yet, been found a permanent negative economic development in Brazil since 2003 nor an actual decline which brought Brazil back to their starting point or below that.
Social modernisation
As discussed in the methodology section, social mobilisation occurs if there is an increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media because this raises aspirations and expectations. Following Huntington’s theory these indicators will here be analysed by using the World Bank data, Inter American Development Bank data and the OECD data on PISA. These analysis derived from the full datasets can be found in appendix I – Social modernisation, where references to the full sets can be found. Unfortunately not all indicators have available data over the same time span. Looking over the period between 2000 and 2009 (except for literacy which is only available between 2001 and 2008) in all data, the following table is created which is showing the percentage of change for all indicators between these years.
Urbanisation increased with 14,8% between 2000 and 2009, literacy with 1,6% between 2001 and 2008. Education shows an increase of 4% between 2000 and 2009. Finally mass media grew with 3% between 2000 and 2009.
Indicator % Growth Years of growth
Urbanisation 14.8% 2000-2009
Literacy 1.6% 2001-2008
Education 4% 2000-2009
The overall trend within the data shows an increase which enables the conclusion of a positive social modernisation rate in Brazil. Mass media and urbanisation show a steady increase between 2009 and 2012 (Appendix I), the other indicators are not yet available until 2012 or any more current dates. However since there is a steady increase over the 9 years tested and two out of four indicators show a continuous increase it is assumed that the remaining two indicators, education and literacy, will not demonstrate a sudden downturn.
Political modernisation
Political modernisation in Brazil is established by looking at governance performance measured by the World Bank Institute (Appendix II). The full dataset goes back to 1996 and includes data for all years up to 2012. The data shown in the table below will be explicated here, more in depth data can be found in Appendix II. A simplified table with the data used in this thesis is generated from the full data set. The overall outcome confirms that two indicators show an increase in governance performance and four indicators show a decrease of governance performance.
The variable ‘voice and accountability’ “reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Appendix II: WGI Dataset). Political Stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. The variable ‘government effectiveness’ looks at the quality of public service, civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Regulatory
quality: “reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (Appendix II: WGI Dataset). By looking at the extent to which representatives have confidence in society and tolerate its rules, in particular contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence the rule of law is measured. Lastly the data showing control of corruption looks at how much public power is exercised for private gain, including minor and major forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.
In this table there are various variables. First of all the measurements include data from 2000, 2006 and 2012. The measurements start at the same time as the social modernisation measurements and are measured until as recent as possible, 2012. The number of sources indicates how many individual data sources The World Bank used for their measurement. The governance score is an index measuring the range of -2,5 (weak) to 2,5 (strong) in governance performance. The percentile rank expresses the position of Brazil in comparison to the world. The standard error “captures the precision of the estimate of governance for each country. Lower values indicate more precision. Standard errors are related to confidence intervals reported elsewhere as follows: a 90% confidence interval is the estimate of governance +/- the standard error multiplied by 1,645” (World Bank, 2013h). The standard error shows the confidence interval of the measurements, the lower the standard error the higher the confidentiality of the outcome. Since this thesis is purely interested in the changes within Brazil we will here look at the changes in governance score. The percentile rank may indicate change however since this is a world ranking the change may lay merely outside of Brazil by other countries getting better or worse in their governance performance. Overall there has been a rise for two indicators and a decline of political modernisation for four indicators. Although the outcome does not look significant the change in governance performance of Brazil is there, and negative. The conclusion will establish what impact this negative change has in relation to social- and economic modernisation.
Conclusion
The balance within modernisation within a country is off if political modernisation does not only grow as fast as economic and social modernisation but even declines. Brazil’s economy boomed between 2003 and 2012. Although the last year of measurement shows a small decline the overall growth between 2003 and 2012 shows an increase of almost 250%. There has been a positive trend on the indicators for social modernisation expressed in levels of urbanisation, education, literacy and mass media. Social modernisation has grown substantially with growth rates between 1,6% and 14,8%. Political modernisation measured by looking at 6 different variables indicates a very mild form of decline of governance performance. Because all scores are so mild it is hard to make a valid
conclusion of overall decline in political modernisation. However, according to Huntington’s theory if there is economic growth this will lead to social change and increased social expectations. If political modernisation does not rise at the same level as economic and social modernisation these new and continuously growing expectations will not be met which leads to dissatisfaction and inherently protesting. Not only did political modernisation not rise at the same speed as economic and social modernisation, which both grew substantially, a decline has been measured. This gap between these three indicators express the off balance within Brazil which, fitting the theory of Huntington, leads to increased probability of social dissatisfaction and social movement. The empirical findings therefore conclude that the theory provided by Huntington is fitting for the empirical evidence.
Davies
As seen in the theoretical delineation there is some overlap between Huntington and Davies. Both scholars use the same indicators however argue these differently in their discussion. Therefore the same indicators as used for Huntington’s theory will also be used to estimate Davies’ empirical outcomes.
Theory Concept to be measured
Operationalisation Data to use
Davies Economic
development
The annual GDP in current USD
World Bank
Davies Social development Increase in
urbanization, literacy, education and mass media
World Bank IADB OECD & PISA
Table 6: operationalisation Davies
James Davies argues that revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then intuitively fear that what is gained with great effort will be lost which leads to a revolutionary mind set. So if wages increase, productive capital does too which will eventually increase wealth, which in turn increases social desires. Ultimately an increase of wealth leads to an increase of social dissatisfaction. This creation of an ‘intolerable gap between what people want and what they get’ drives individuals to participate in violent protests and even revolution. A sharp reversal does not necessarily have to be a downfall in economic- and social development however it may be stagnation in growth.
Figure 1: GDP in Current USD in Brazil. The World Bank 2013c
Table 4: Social Modernisation
Economic modernisation
Economic development can once again be found in the GDP growth in current US$. As seen earlier in this chapter Brazil’s economic change is incredibly positive. There has been a prolonged positive economic development (2003 until 2011) after which a year of reversal occurred. According to Davies’ theory people then intuitively fear that what is gained with great effort will be lost which leads to a revolutionary mindset. Due to the level of
economic growth it is very likely that social desires grew, if social modernisation does not grow is the same pace as economic modernisation a gap between what people want and what they get is formed.
Social modernisation
Looking at social modernisation a positive growth is distinguished. As discussed in the methodology section, social mobilisation occurs if there is an increase in urbanization, literacy, education and mass media because this raises aspirations and expectations. The
overall trend within the data shows an increase which enables the conclusion of a positive social modernisation rate in Brazil. Mass media and urbanisation show a steady increase between 2009 and 2012, the other indicators are not yet available until 2012 or any more current dates. However since there is a steady increase over the 9 years tested and two out of four indicators show a continuous increase it is assumed that the remaining two indicators, education and literacy, will not demonstrate a sudden downturn or stagnation in growth.
Conclusion
If a countries’ economic and social development flourishes yet this is followed by a period of reversal (or halt in growth) people will fear that what is gained will be lost which leads to increased willingness to participate in protests. Economic development leads to increase of social desires, which, if these are not met, will lead to social dissatisfaction because there will be a gap created between what people want and what they can get. This gap is fed by the reversal of economic development which leads to stagnation of social modernisation growth because an increase of economy leads to increase of social development. A downturn in either leads to less likelihood of being able to meet these needs and create a gap between the new higher social desires and what Indicator % Growth Years of growth
Urbanisation 14.8% 2000-2009
Literacy 1.6% 2001-2008
Education 4% 2000-2009
Table 7: Operationalisation Jenkins
people are able to get. It is established that in Brazil a boom in economic development can be seen between 2003 and 2011 after which there has been a small decline. In social modernisation there is a significant and steady increase between 2000 and 2009. Within the measurements of social development there is no downturn visible in the end of the measurement towards 2012. This difference between a downturn in economic development but a continuously rising social modernisation would lead to the gap between social desires and the economic means to meet these desires. This negative gap is explained by Davies which will lead to a likelihood of participating in protests. However the reverse in economic development has been so small, with an overall increase of 250% between 2003 and 2012 that the small decline between 2011 and 2012 is not likely the source of social dissatisfaction. In can therefore not be concluded that in Brazil the economic downturn but steadily rising social aspirations have contributed to the outbreak of the protests in the summer of 2012. Davies’ theory therefore has to be rejected after analysing the protests of Brazil in 2013.
Jenkins
Theory Concept to be measured
Operationalisation Data to use
Jenkins Social class Social class of protesters
IBOPE opinion poll
Jenkins Incentive Gains from
participating in protest
IBOPE opinion poll
Jenkins has a different approach on economic reasons for protests and argues from an individual perspective. Individuals who support movements act in terms of calculations of self-interest, internalized values and sentiments of the movement as a whole. The major task in mobilizing groups is to generate solidarity and moral commitments to the broad assembly in whose name movements’ act. Movements are formed by long-term changes in group resources, organisation, and opportunities for collective action. While grievances are necessary for movement formation, they are triggered either by changes in power relations or by structural conflicts of interest. Social movement is thus never solely formed by grievances. Different social classes appear to respond to different incentives. The more secure middle- and upper- class groups are more receptive to purposive incentives, while less secure lower-class groups respond to selective incentives and collective solidarity. It thus depends on the economic situation and social class someone is in, to what incentive
they will respond. An incentive to move people will be based upon a calculation of self-interest, which is economically driven by the actors’ social class.
To test Jenkins’ theory it is important to determine what social class the protesters belonged to. If this is found the type of incentive the riot provides has to be defined. If the social class of participants leads to participation based on the type of incentive the riot provides them with; and if actors were driven by a calculation of self-interest or if they participated on a selfless basis will be approached. Thus: “What social class belonged the participants of the protests in Brazil to and what kind of incentive(s) were provided by participating in the protests?”
Since the events are very recent there is no data available yet in the databanks, i.e. World Bank, however there are various research articles discussing the protests who base their outcomes on statistical data generated during the protests. Alfredo Saad-Filho (2013) translated the data collected by IBOPE. IBOPE is a private research organisation in Latin-America. Saad-Filho found that the protests included mainly young workers, students and middle class citizens, they organized in localized movements of poor communities demanding improvements for their neighbourhoods, and attracted workers with demands specific to their circumstances (i.e. bus drivers, truck drivers, health sector workers, etcetera). Some of the demonstrations tended to be disproportionately white and middle-class after the explosive growth of the protest movement (Saad-Filho, 2013: 659). An opinion poll in eight state capitals on 20 June (a day of large demonstrations) suggested that 63% of the demonstrators were aged 14–29. 92% had completed at least secondary school and 52% were students. Out of these protestors 76% were in paid employment, and 45% earned less than 5 minimum wages. In other words, they had attended school much longer and had much higher incomes than the population average (Globo and the smoked filled room in Saad Filho, 2013: 666). It is hard to identify the incentives given by taking part in the protests on an individual level because they were mostly organised through civil society organizations (The Smoke Filled Room, 2013). Jenkins differentiates receptive versus purposive incentives in which a purposive incentive refers to a benefit that comes from serving a cause or principle these. People join because they are enthusiastic about the purpose of the event they are participating in, mainly responded to by the higher social class. A receptive incentive entails people, mainly the
lower class, who join because they are willing to listen to new ideas or opposing arguments and they are receptive to collective solidarity. In the case of Brazil, the rising bus fare is clearly the identified grievance for this concatenation of protests. 38% of the participants
