FACULTEIT DER MAATSCHAPPIJ- EN GEDRAGSWETENSCHAPPEN Amsterdams Instituut voor Maatschappijwetenschap (AIM)
Bacheloropleiding Politicologie
The curious case of security in a world of
secrecy
A case study on the debate spurred by revelations on NSA data gathering
methods
T R A N S N A T I O N A L S P A C E S
/
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF SECURITY
Lecturer: Stephanie Simon
Bachelor thesis
Leonoor Hogerheijde
10004641
28 January 2014
Amsterdam
Word count: 8986
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Abstract
With regard to the National Security Agency (NSA), 2013 was a year of revelations. Highly classified documents, leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, caused a widespread debate on the necessity and legitimacy of data gathering methods used by the intelligence agency. This article examines the justifications for the revealed methods through speech acts by the Guardian, the White House and the NSA. By means of a qualitative content analysis, the extent to which these speech acts are securitizating or desecuritizating is analyzed. As expected, the Guardian tends to a desecuritizing frame, whilst the White House and NSA tend to a securitizing frame. Inevitably, certain information is arguably chosen to remain secret. The Copenhagen School framework is inadequate for analyzing these secret issues. But then again, which framework is not?
Keywords: securitization, desecuritization, Copenhagen School, NSA, secrecy
Introduction
In early June of last year, the Guardian reported revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden on the intelligence gathering methods of the National Security Agency (NSA). These methods involve NSA’s engagement in a massive collection of information concerning telephone communications of tens of millions US citizens (Bender, 2013:1). Snowden’s main concern was, and continues to be, the need for a public debate on such far reaching measures taken by the NSA for gathering intelligence on US’ citizens. This exposure of secret documents has lead to a wide-ranging backlash against US-led intelligence gathering regimes (website EU observer, 2013). The debate on the necessity and legitimacy of measures for data acquisition by the NSA is ongoing and questions are raised if these are contradictory to US laws on surveillance and privacy. Recently, the world’s leading technological companies like Google, Yahoo and Microsoft have united to demand changes in US laws concerning surveillance (website the Guardian, 2013b). Also, voices are raised in Europe concerning the mass surveillance being a violation of European law (website the Guardian, 2013a).
3 The NSA methods for data acquisition followed from the 9/11 attacks, which prompted several programs and laws by the US Government intended to fight (global) terrorism. Among these were the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT), and the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), signed by George W. Bush in 2001. Both were created to enhance the scope of surveillance activities by the US Government to fight terrorism. In a period of heightened fears and lack of widespread deliberation following from the dramatic attacks of 9/11, the congressional and public resistance to the measures was limited (Simone, 2009:1), or possibly even ignored. The highly classified intelligence activities of the NSA that followed from these programs became part of public scrutiny only after Snowden’s continuous revelations.
The role of intelligence is fascinating, since its function is highly secretive. Secret services involved with intelligence have, in a general sense, been established as an area that is defined as security (Buzan et al, 1998:28). The line between methods of intelligence services that are accepted by the public as legitimate and those that are not can get blurred. Also, because the services are secret, actions that may be disputed in terms of their legitimacy can stay unnoticed for quite some time. Exactly so is the case with the recent upheaval on leaked NSA documents. This brings up the question of justifications for actions by those services, in this case particularly the NSA, when those actions or programs are revealed. How can we talk about justifying security issues through acceptance by the public if the public does not know about it?
In this thesis I argue that there is a discrepancy between this issue of secrecy and the securitization theory of speech acts by the Copenhagen School (CS). This securitization theory thinks of speech acts as constructing existential threats to enable a call for exceptional measures. In this case however, only after exposure of secret issues, speech acts will emerge. And it is only after exposure that those speech acts can be examined through the CS framework as being securitizing (i.e. speaking of an existential threat in need of extraordinary measures) or desecuritizing (i.e. speaking of treating an issue through routine political procedures). Subsequently, the interesting aspect of this case is the fact that it reveals the presence of certain security issues that cannot be assessed by justifications in speech acts, since the issues are secret.
4 Hence, I can only focus on the speech acts that emerged after the exposure of secret NSA methods by Edward Snowden in June 2013. My research questions follow from the CS framework and the connection it makes between securitization and the inherent justifications for measures outside normal political procedures:
- To what extent are secret intelligence issues desecuritized after exposure?
- To what extent are secret intelligence issues justified as security issues after
exposure?
Under secret intelligence issues spoken of in my research questions, I understand the NSA data gathering measures for surveillance that were subsequently revealed by Edward Snowden. It would be logical to expect that the actors that are responsible for the exceptional measures and its implementation, the White House (US Government) and NSA in this case, would create securitizing speech acts. The first question concerning desecuritizing speech acts will probably be more applicable for the critical stance of newspaper the Guardian.
My thesis is structured by firstly setting out securitization theory according to the Copenhagen School, paying attention to securitization and desecuritization, as well as to critiques on CS’s framework of securitization. This theoretical framework will also include additional literature by Simone (2009), in order to enhance my argument. An explanation of the chosen methodology and the coding structure derived from the discussed theory is provided as well. Subsequently, the data analysis is structured by the sources that are examined, namely articles featured in the Guardian and speeches and statements by the White House and NSA. The conclusion will represent my findings and answer the main questions to what extent secret intelligence issues are desecuritized or justified as security issues after exposure.
Theoretical & Methodological Framework
Copenhagen School
Since before the end of the Cold War, scholars started thinking of new interpretations and perspectives on security issues. Security studies main focus on the traditional questions
5 of arms control, nuclear deterrence, the role of conventional arms, military alliances etc. had given way to new forms of security issues (Huysmans, 2006:15). A wider conception of security became concerned with among other issues the environment, migration and refugee flows, societal identity and issues stemming from cyberspace. Along with this development the approach of securitization, associated with the Copenhagen School (CS), gained influence in the fields of international relations and security studies. The process of securitization is the main concept of this particular school, which can be studied through examining speech acts. The core of CS consists of scholars Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, who define securitization as:
“(..) a successful speech act ‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (in Stritzel, 2007:358).
This quote summarizes the social constructivist stance of CS, through which it is believed that threats are constructed by an actor to fit a particular solution. This is done by a speech act, which is not seen as a sign referring to something real, but the utterance itself is seen to be the act. By saying the words, something is done (Buzan et al, 1998:26). The speech acts considered in this thesis are those provided by the White House, NSA and in articles from the Guardian. What is meant by security is: “the move that takes politics
beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al, 1998:23). When an issue is political, it is part of
public policy which requires decisions through government. When an issue is securitized however, it is presented as an existential threat and would require emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal political procedures (Buzan et al, 1998:23-24).
Consequently, the three main themes of the definition of securitization mentioned are: the creation of an existential threat, necessary extraordinary countermeasures for that particular threat, and justifications for those measures. In order to determine to what extent securitizing justifications for the measures taken by NSA are uttered, I will take up the first two themes in the coding structure of this thesis under the category securitizing. In addition to these two themes, the denial of accusations is put in this
6 category. Since it can be assumed that actors that securitize an issue, in this case the White House and NSA, will try to keep up the securitization frame, any accusation that jeopardizes this frame would be denied.
Opposed to securitization, the Copenhagen School also touches on the concept of desecuritization in its framework. From this perspective security should be regarded as negative, as it demonstrates a failure to deal with issues as normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998:29). Ideally political issues should be dealt with through routine procedures, without the extraordinary elevation of specific threats. From this, the concept desecuritization ultimately follows as optimal long-range option. Desecuritization means issues are not phrased as “existential threats against which we have countermeasures”, but are taken out of this threat-defense sequence and put into the ordinary public sphere (Buzan et al, 1998:29). In the abstract desecuritization is thus regarded as ideal according to the CS view. The two themes that I take from this definition of desecuritization are: extraordinary measures are not necessary, since issues are not phrased as existential threats, and deliberation in the public sphere is apparent and/or needed. I argue that the need or wish for a public debate and transparency precedes the issue actually being placed in the public sphere; therefore I include data that expresses the wish for a public debate in this theme. These two themes constitute a substantial part of the category desecuritizing in the coding structure of this thesis.
The authors Buzan and Wæver (1998:33) argue that to study securitization one needs to study discourse and political constellations. The aim of analysis is not objective security assessment, but examining the way in which actors and their audiences securitize certain issues as a specific form of a political act. In this view, the White House and NSA as political actors create, or have created, the designation for what constitutes a security issue. My role as an analyst is to interpret these designations and sort out when these fulfill the security criteria, as set out in my succeeding coding structure. These criteria involve a form of ‘politics of existential threats’, following the argument that an issue takes priority over everything else and allows for a breaking of the rules (Buzan et al, 1998:33-34). The designations by the White House and NSA are seen to be firstly judged by social actors and citizens, and the degree of their compliance is interpreted through analyzing relevant articles in newspaper the Guardian. A question that arises in this regard is: “When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic
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structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” (Buzan et al, 1998:25). What follows from this is the
importance of acceptance by the audience. A discourse that presents an existential threat does not by itself create securitization, it makes a securitizing move. An issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such (Buzan et al, 1998:25).
However, there are security practices that cannot be legitimized in public by security discourse because they are not in public at all, such as NSA data gathering surveillance. When a procedure has been legitimized through security rhetoric, as was the case immediately after the 9/11 attacks, it becomes institutionalized. This institutionalization makes it possible to have black security boxes in the political process. Secret services and intelligence agencies as the NSA form an example of this logic, since those services have been institutionalized as concerned with security:
“Not every act is presented with the drama of urgency and priority, because it has
been established in a general sense that this is an entire field that has been moved to a form of treatment legitimate only because this area has been defined as security” (Buzan et al, 1998:28).
With regard to the case of the recent NSA revelations, security rhetoric after 9/11 created a black security box for the NSA to increase measures for fighting the existential threat of terrorism. Since it was met with little reluctance at the time, public legitimization was assumed and the extraordinary procedures were continuously carried out in secrecy the years that followed. Following from the securitization framework, in which desecuritization is defined as security issues being replaced out of secrecy and put back in the public sphere, I consider critique on these secret methods as a request for bringing the issue back in the public sphere, and thus as desecuritizing. Therefore I will include ‘critique on secrecy’ as a desecuritizing theme in my coding structure.
Critique on Copenhagen School framework
This speech-act framework of the Copenhagen School and its understanding of the concept of securitization has, as every theory, been prone to critique. For instance, it is argued that the study of the process of securitization through speech acts is too narrow.
8 As a theoretical and empirical tool it is said to be inadequate in taking into account the wider context, or in explaining why securitization occurs in the first place (Jackson, 2006; McDonald, 2008).
McDonald (2008:564) argues for including other forms of representation, for instance images or material practices, and other representatives besides dominant actors. McDonald (2008:546) also critiques the nature of the framework and its normative implications. The speech act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security. The way in which security is understood in particular contexts is ignored. Such a framework, which only focuses on representations of danger and threat, encourages an inherently negative and reactionary conceptualization of security (McDonald, 2008:564).
Building from these critiques for the Copenhagen School framework being too narrow and rather unspecific, I will introduce certain aspects of the study by Simone (2009). Her study focused particularly on the context of the PATRIOT Act, created directly after the 9/11 attacks. By including these aspects along with the CS pillars that were previously discussed, I am able to enhance my coding structure through which I can form a more specific analysis of the particular speech acts by the White House, NSA and the Guardian.
Additional features from Simone (2009)
In terms of subject closely linked to the aforementioned securitization framework, is Maria A. Simone’s (2009) case study of the US Government’s discourse on surveillance. In this study the USA PATRIOT Act is considered as the main focus to research the justifications made by the US Department of Justice for increasing surveillance measures after 9/11. In an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, congressional and public resistance against the Act was initially low. In more recent years, various groups have been raising awareness for the threat to civil liberties posed by the Act (Simone, 2009:1). In response, the Department of Justice and former president George W. Bush made attempts to justify the Act as a necessity to obtain intelligence and capture terrorists. One place where these attempts were visible was on the US Department of Justice website www.lifeandliberty.gov. Simone (2009) does not include the Copenhagen School framework, but uses a discourse analysis to examine the justifications made on this
9 website for increasing surveillance measures. Her findings provide a significant addition to the before mentioned themes, derived from the CS framework, in the coding structure of this thesis.
The first research question addressed the manner in which various rhetorical strategies and themes are used to construct the overall argument. Her finding was that the discourse on the lifeandliberty.gov website constituted a four-part syllogistic style argument that claimed that (1) security is necessary for liberty, (2) terrorists have threatened US and global security, (3) the USA PATRIOT Act improves security and (4) thus, the Act, as the symbol for security, enhances liberty (Simone, 2009:5). The first two themes can be seen in the securitization framework, in which exceptional security measures are initiated for liberty and terrorists form the existential threat to the US. For my argument, the last two themes are not relevant, as these are specifically aimed at the PATRIOT Act. However, when the term PATRIOT Act is replaced by NSA measures, the third theme can also be incorporated in the coding structure. I have included the second and third in my coding structure, since these have appeared to be most prevalent in the data. Supporting themes as governmental responsibility for national security are running throughout the discourse. In the case of data gathering methods by NSA, governmental responsibility for the nation’s security can be observed as securitizing theme and is therefore also included in my coding structure.
Although the PATRIOT Act Simone (2009) addresses in her study can be seen as more overt than the secret data gathering measures by the NSA central in this thesis, similarities can be observed in the examination of the way those subjects are talked about and subjectivities are constructed.
Methodology
The last part of my theoretical framework discusses the method of analysis used in this thesis. The research design that is used is a qualitative case study, focused on the case of the 2013 revelations on NSA data gathering methods. As for method, I have chosen for qualitative content analysis (QCA), for my aim is to analyze documents and texts by the Guardian, White House and NSA. By using the qualitative approach to content analysis, I am able to make interpretative inferences about these particular speeches, statements and articles. As my goal is to research the extent to which secret intelligence issues are
10 securitized or desecuritized after exposure, I used a coding structure through which I can interpret the justifications for exposed secret intelligence.
One of the most common definitions of content analysis is given by Holsti (1969:14): “Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” in Bryman (2008). As ‘any
technique’ might be a bit too vague, the technique used for this thesis is qualitative content analysis as set out by Schreier (2012). According to Schreier (2012:1), QCA can be defined as a method to describe the meaning of qualitative material in a systematic way. This is done by means of a coding frame that lies at the heart of the qualitative content analysis. Successive parts of the data are assigned to the categories of the coding frame that I used. My coding structure exists of two main categories: securitized and desecuritized. These two categories are divided further in the previously mentioned themes, following from my theoretical framework.
The QCA approach is flexible in that I am able to adapt my coding frame as to fit my material to make it valid (Schreier, 2012:8). I have done this by leaving out possible themes, for instance ‘security is necessary for liberty’, that are mentioned in Simone’s (2009) argument, but appeared not to be prevalent in my data. In this way, the QCA method also helps to reduce the data by limiting my analysis to relevant aspects of the material. These relevant aspects exist of fitting the themes as laid out in my coding structure below, which were analyzed consecutively. Since my thesis merely focused on one case, the possibility of making generalizable inferences is limited. However, the strength of focusing on one particular case is the ability for a more in-depth approach. As for reliability, intracoder reliability is provided as my coding approach evolved in a persistent manner. Moreover, in QCA, reliability is as important as validity, which means intercoder reliability is not necessarily required (Schreier, 2012:16).
Following from the theory from the Copenhagen School and Simone’s (2009) findings, my coding structure and the included themes looks as follows:
DESECURITIZED Copenhagen School
Theme one Extraordinary measures not necessary
Theme two Public debate necessary
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SECURITIZED Copenhagen School
Theme one Existential threat
Theme two Necessary extraordinary measures
Theme three Denial accusations
Simone (2009)
Theme four Terrorist threatened US & global security
Theme five NSA measures improve security
Theme six Governmental responsibility for national security
During my analysis, I found an occasional overlap between several themes. I included these specific parts in each theme for which it was relevant.
As for data gathering methods, my focus partly lays at official sites of the National Security Agency and the White House that are publicly available. These authorities are examined, since the NSA is the subject of the revelations and the White House is responsible for the creation of the methods revealed. Since the media played a substantial role in opening up the debate on surveillance measures by the US Government, this aspect is covered by including newspaper articles from The Guardian, found by using academic search engine LexisNexis. As the Guardian was the first to give Edward Snowden a podium for his revelations, I chose this newspaper to examine its reporting on the secret intelligence issues. I have started my analysis with the first articles written on the revelations by Snowden on June 7th 2013 and examined news articles written after that throughout 2013. My search involved ‘NSA’ as subject and I selected articles from The Guardian within the time span mentioned above. The White House and NSA speeches are included with the same time span, where the last speech included was on January 17th 2014, as this was an important speech by Obama concerning the Review of Signals Intelligence. I decided to combine the speeches and statements by the White House and NSA in one section, as both are responsible for the implementation and use of the measures and therefore I expect a securitizing frame carried out by both.
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Analysis
Desecuritization in the Guardian
As was explained in the methodological section, the media and specifically the Guardian played a substantial role in opening up the debate on surveillance measures by the US Government. There are three themes of the desecuritizing frame that are clearly coming forth out of the examined articles. The themes: ‘extraordinary measures are not necessary’, ‘public debate is necessary’ and ‘critique on secrecy’, are well represented in the data from the Guardian. A few themes in the securitizing frame became apparent, however this can be explained as these were quotes by NSA and US Government officials.
The first article published on the matter was by the Guardian on June 7th 2013, disclosing undercover operation Prism for secretly collecting private data. This article sets out information about the program, which facilitates extensive in-depth
surveillance and collecting communications made entirely within the US without warrants (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013b). By publishing this previously top secret information provided to the newspaper by Edward Snowden, the article itself can be seen as an opening of a public debate on NSA data gathering methods to improve national security. Looking more closely at the specific texts that followed, all three desecuritizing themes became apparent.
Theme one: Extraordinary measures not necessary
Firstly, the results of my analysis in the coding structure show that the theme
‘extraordinary measures are not necessary’ gets hinted at in six out of twenty-seven
articles. The results also show that this theme is mentioned more often as the publications proceed in time. In the article that initiated the revelations on the measures taken by NSA to collect private data from internet and telecom providers, this proclaimed ‘necessary’ access by the NSA to civilian communications gets questioned. Jameel Jaffer, director of the ACLU’s Centre for Democracy, states that the NSA is part of the military and as such it has been granted unprecedented access to civilian communications, resulting in unprecedented militarization of domestic infrastructure (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013b). He calls this unprecedented access ‘profoundly troubling’ for those
13 concerned about the separation between military and domestic communications. With this message the necessity of the extraordinary measures regarding communications taken by the NSA is called into question, and can thus be regarded under ‘extraordinary measures are not necessary’.
An article published a few days after the initial revelations, shows the concerns of US senators on the US appropriations committee about the exceptionality of the measures. The senators challenge the director of the NSA about: “the extent of the
agency’s domestic surveillance” (Ackerman, 2013a). This can be viewed as questioning
the extent, or exceptionality, of the measures, which inherently questions the necessity of those measures being extraordinary.
A step further in time displays more indications of the necessity of extraordinary measures being disputed. In an article of December 17th 2013, the Guardian reports of a court ruling by federal judge Richard Leon that the bulk collection of US citizen’s telephone records is likely to violate the US’ constitution. In this ruling, Leon expresses doubts about: “the rationale for the programme cited by the NSA: that it is necessary for
preventing terrorist attacks” (Ackerman and Roberts, 2013). The judge argues that the
efficacy of the NSA programme has not been asserted, since: “the government does not
cite a single case in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent terrorist attack” (Ackerman and Roberts, 2013). This stance is shared by
Senator Ron Wyden, as reported by the Guardian on December 20th 2013. This Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee has fought for years to stop what he considers ‘unnecessary surveillance’. Wyden commended a report by a review panel, which undermined NSA’s claim that the collection of all US phone records was indispensable for preventing terrorist attacks (Ackerman, 2013d). These positions mentioned in Guardian articles show to be critical towards the NSA measures and the proclaimed necessity of the measures. This supports a frame that is not phrased in terms of measures that are extraordinary and are as such justified as being necessary to fight terrorism.
Theme two: Public debate necessary
The second theme that supports a desecuritizing frame and is well represented in the data is the necessity for a public debate on the issue of mass communications data gathering by the NSA. This follows from the definition given by the Copenhagen School
14 that issues stop being phrased as ‘existential threats against which we have countermeasures’, and are put into the ordinary public sphere.
Similar to the first theme, the theme of placing the issue in the public sphere is mentioned in one of the first articles published regarding the revelations on 7th June 2013. This article mentions that there is already a public debate present about the scale of surveillance by the intelligence services (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013b). A few days later, whistleblower Edward Snowden’s point of view was expressed. This included his motives for leaking, which mainly involved his thoughts on the urgent need for a public debate on the matter. Snowden warned for the consequences if such a debate was not held or a greater public awareness of the actions by the US intelligence was not reached: “the surveillance state would outrun the ability of the American people to control it and it
would be turnkey tyranny” (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013c).
Snowden was not alone in urging for this topic to be discussed in the public sphere. Microsoft, as a company approached by NSA to hand over its data, expressed its desire for a greater transparency on the volume and scope of national security requests. With greater transparency, the company pleads, the discussion on these important issues can be held more freely (Greenwald et al., 2013). Furthermore, the quest for more transparency on government surveillance is continued by certain senators.
Democrat Al Franken, in the Guardian article of August 3rd, conveys: “the
American public deserves more transparency” (Ackerman and Lewis, 2013). Franken also
mentions a consequence of the presence of the public debate, in that he declared a vote in Congress on more transparency as extraordinary and thought such a vote would not have happened without the public debate. Another Democratic senator, Ron Wyden, while discussing the draft bill on intelligence reform, mentions the relevance of the disclosures for the public view on surveillance. Wyden states: “The disclosures over the
last 100 days have caused a sea change in the way the public views the surveillance system”
(Lewis and Roberts, 2013).
The debate is not only welcomed by these three parties, but also by President Obama. The Guardian reports his acknowledgement to the necessity of the debate on balancing national security with privacy interests (Roberts, 2013).
It is clear from these observations that a public debate has been established by the revelations. What is more, is that the necessity of bringing the matter of intelligence
15 and government surveillance in the public sphere has been expressed in the Guardian by both critics of the government as by President Obama himself. In the part on securitization I will dive deeper in this last point. Wyden’s statement on the sea change in public views on the surveillance system hints at the next theme of secrecy; this sea change would not have happened without the revelations.
Theme Three: Critique on secrecy
As the definition of desecuritization used in this thesis entails placing an issue out of its threat-defense sequence and back in the public sphere, critique on security issues being secret, and thus not in public, is taken into consideration in the analysis. Data results show this theme is even more present than the former two themes.
As was the case with the previous two themes, already at the start of the revelations critique was expressed on the secrecy of the NSA methods. Senator Christopher Coons of Delaware cautioned for the restraint on being able to check safeguards due to the secrecy of the methods: Coons “specifically warned that the secrecy
surrounding the various surveillance programs meant there was no way to know if safeguards within the act were working” (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013b). This position
is supported by senators Wyden and Udall, who expressed their frustrations with the refusal of the NSA to supply statistics and provide an estimate on the amount of American citizens’ communications being collected (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013a). Wyden enhances the doubts about the possibilities to check the asserted safeguards for NSA surveillance measures, by accusing the US intelligence agencies of facilitating a ‘culture of misinformation’. In his words, this culture is “not all right” (Ackerman, 2013b).
The quest for more transparency and less secrecy with regard to NSA’s collection of US communications continues to be expressed in subsequent Guardian articles. Take for instance a bill that was introduced in Congress, which would compel the Obama administration to declassify the secret legal justifications for NSA surveillance (Greenwald and Ball, 2013). This demand for declassification of secret legal justifications was made after repeated calls in public for releasing the legal base of the programs, which was ignited by Snowden’s revelations.
Furthermore, companies as Microsoft and Google have, in their wish for a transparent public debate on the surveillance issues, requested the government for
16 permission on publishing information on surveillance requests these companies have received. The companies even went as far as suing the American government for winning the right to reveal information about official requests for user data. Microsoft’s general counsel Brad Smith complained in a blog post about the government’s ‘continued unwillingness’ to let it publish information about Fisa requests (Carroll, 2013).
Lastly, the Guardian mentions viewpoints that plead for more transparency. Former vice-president Al Gore stated: “this secret blanket surveillance was obscenely
outrageous” (Roberts, 2013). A month later, an article included Matthew Aid’s, an
intelligence historian specialized in the NSA, view of the dangers that ‘unfettered surveillance’ might bring about. Aid warned for the very present possibility of abuses in a “non-transparent society such as the intelligence community” (Pilkington, 2013).
What follows from these appeals for more transparency and public debate is a desecuritizing frame in which the issue of surveillance is not phrased as necessary to counter an existential threat and discussing the matter freely is desired. However, the results of analyzing The Guardian articles on the NSA also put forward certain themes that seem more fitting in a securitizing frame.
Securitization in the Guardian
After analyzing the data from the Guardian on NSA methods for surveillance, not only desecuritizing themes prove to be apparent, but all securitizing themes are mentioned as well. These results appeared to be primarily quotes by White House and NSA officials, which is in line with the expectation that these actors try to uphold a securitizing stance and will be further discussed in the succeeding part on NSA and White House statements.
The main securitizing theme that is represented in the data is ‘denial of accusations’. Parts of the text that provide a contradiction between the revelations and statements by the White House or NSA are included in this theme. Rather quick after the first revelations were published in June, a denial of the scope of the revealed methods became apparent. Reproducing statements of the NSA and the White House, a Guardian article from June 9th mentions a contradiction regarding the alleged tracking of intelligence on American communications. According to the revelations, the NSA is able to perform the tracking of intelligence with Boundless Informant. However, the NSA’s
17 stated position is that it is not technically feasible to do so (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013a). This is not the only instance in which assurances by senior intelligence officials, and also by President Obama, seem to conflict with information from the revelations.
An article from June 21st states: ‘The broad scope of court orders, and the nature of
the procedures set out in the documents appear to clash with assurances from President Obama and senior intelligence officials that the NSA could not access Americans’ call or email information without warrants’ (Greenwald and Ball, 2013). This clash with
repeated assurances by Obama continues after new revelations occur a few months later. In two Guardian articles from August 2013, the conflict is expressed between new Snowden revelations and assurances from the Obama administration to both Congress and the American public that the privacy of US citizens is protected from the NSA’s ‘dragnet surveillance programs’. These examples indicate a profound denial of the accusations on secret intelligence measures that have been put in the public sphere.
Moreover, besides denying the information about the methods revealed by Snowden, the intensity and scope of the methods are downplayed by the intelligence officials and US Government. The Guardian mentions that: ‘on the few occasions when
intelligence officials have publicly discussed their broad surveillance powers, they have affirmed that all problems are mere accidents and are often promptly corrected’
(Ackerman, 2013b). The numerous denials and trivialization of the accusations are accompanied with justifications for NSA’s work methods. This can be seen through the lens of the other securitizing themes of my coding structure.
For example, the theme of the necessity of extraordinary measures is mentioned by NSA director Keith Alexander while defending the bulk collection of US communications. Alexander claims: “it was necessary to give the NSA the widest possible
data pool so it can then query the phone-records database for specific terrorist interaction with Americans” (Ackerman, 2013a). In another statement by Alexander, the subject of
foiling terrorist attacks is associated with the good of the US nation that needs to be defended by means of the debated methods (Ackerman, 2013c). In this instance, an overlap is visible between multiple securitizing themes. The mentioning of terrorist attacks as an imminent threat can be placed under both ‘existential threat’ and ‘terrorists threatened US & global security’, as well as under ‘necessary extraordinary measures’.
18 Lastly, the themes ‘NSA measures improve security’ and ‘governmental responsibility for national security’ are also mentioned in quotes from NSA officials. Keith Alexander implicitly mentions how the NSA measures improve US national security, by saying: “I would rather take a public beating, and let people think I’m hiding something,
than jeopardize the security of this country” (Ackerman, 2013a). Alexander frames his
excuse for not revealing details on the NSA methods as being a risk for the national security of the country. This securitizing frame becomes clearer in the subsequent analysis of official White House and NSA statements.
Securitization in official White House and NSA speeches
It is interesting to place the manner in which the revelations were talked about by the Guardian against the perspective of the White House and NSA. Since, as was said in the introduction, this can be expected to be of quite a different extent. By examining speeches and statements of the White House and NSA by means of my coding structure, a securitizing frame can be observed. The themes that appear to be prevalent are ‘necessary extraordinary measures’, ‘denial of accusations’ and ‘governmental responsibility for national security’. However, all other securitizing themes are well represented as well.
What is also interesting is the fact that the subject was less covered, or more difficult to find, by these official authorities than was the case with the Guardian. This is especially interesting in light of the only desecuritizing theme that was expressed significantly: ‘public debate is necessary’. I will come to this after discussing the main securitizing themes.
Theme one and four: Existential threat & terrorists threatened US & global security
To reiterate, according to the Copenhagen School framework, the securitization of an issue means presenting it as an existential threat, which would require emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal political procedures (Buzan et al, 1998:23-24). In the speeches and statements by the White House and NSA included in this analysis, a certain existential threat is regularly referred to. These often imply the threat of terrorism, so overlap exists between this theme and the theme ‘terrorists threatened US & global security’.
19 For instance, concerning an example of the effectiveness of the NSA data gathering methods, a plot to attack New York City subways in 2009 was characterized by the US Intelligence community as “the most serious terrorist threat on US soil since 9/11” (White House, 2013b). In a press conference in Germany on June 19th 2013, President Obama stated that the measures on internet metadata involved leads on issues related to terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (White House, 2013e). In other words, the threat of terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is believed to be real and detected through the measures taken by NSA. This perspective is repeated in a daily press briefing by press secretary Jay Carney, who claims that the disclosures by Snowden and declassification of highly secret material, is: “extremely
damaging to our national security and gives our terrorist enemies a playbook for our activities designed to thwart them” (White House, 2013a).
The official speeches by the NSA continue using this theme of an existential threat of terrorism, by referring back to the 9/11 attacks on several occasions. The attacks of 9/11 were used as an existential threat for which extraordinary measures were necessary: “to address this shortfall and protect the nation from future terrorist
attacks like 9/11, we made several changes to our intelligence efforts and added a number of capabilities” (NSA, 2013e). In another speech from General Alexander, the need for the
programs and secrecy thereof is justified by referring to the real possibility of terrorists who: “walk among you who are trying to kill you” (NSA, 2013a).
The damage that is supposedly done by the revelations is repeated by General Keith Alexander, who claims: “First, the damage is real. I believe the irresponsible release of
classified information about these programs will have a long-term detrimental impact on the intelligence community’s ability to detect future attacks” (NSA, 2013b). By stating that
the damage that is done by the revelations is real, the threat of those revelations on classified material for future attacks is presented as a reality as well. In order to counter these presumed future threats, certain measures are believed to be necessary.
Theme two: Necessary extraordinary measures
The emergency measures required for these alleged existential threats are frequently mentioned as being necessary by both the White House and NSA. In an initial statement, President Obama refers to the revelations on the collection of metadata as able to:
20 “identify potential leads with respect to folks who might engage in terrorism” (White House, 2013f). Furthermore, in the same statement, Obama shares his assessment of these measures that the measures are useful in preventing terrorist attacks. He calls the impingements on US citizen’s privacy ‘modest encroachments’ and above all that ‘it was worth us doing’.
In a press briefing on June 13th 2013, the necessity for these measures is expressed more explicitly. Press secretary Jay Carney articulates the President’s perspective on the NSA program and mentions: “the necessity to have such programs in
place in order to protect our national security” (White House, 2013b). This explicit
expression of the necessity of these measures is encountered more often in the speeches by the NSA.
For example, in a speech by General Keith Alexander on the defense for the measures that are under heavy debate, he mentions: “we only employ these capabilities
that we believe are both useful and necessary” (NSA, 2013b). In the same speech
Alexander urges for taking the context into consideration when assessing the programs, which could be interpreted as a justifying action outside normal political procedures. This message is repeated in a NSA press statement on July 30th (NSA, 2013d), in which the NSA’s activities are defended as being ‘in response to requirements that our leaders
need for information necessary to protect our nation and its interest’.
When concerned with the future of the actions by the NSA, speeches by President Obama can be interpreted as viewing the measures to remain necessary. In a speech on December 20th 2013, Obama states that the public confidence in the NSA programs and its safeguards has diminished due to the revelations, but that he finds it important to build that public confidence back up (White House, 2013d). This can be read as rendering the measures necessary, even after the reluctance of the public in the debate spurred by the revelations.
Theme three: Denial accusations
Besides referring to an existential threat and necessary extraordinary measures, the securitizing theme ‘denial of accusations’ can also be found in the White House and NSA speeches and statements. Immediately after the initial revelations, Obama denied part of the revelations that claimed the NSA programs were able to listen to the content of
21 people’s phone calls. Obama was also quick to point out that the program was fully overseen not only by Congress, but also by the FISA court (White House, 2013f).
In a press briefing on July 31st 2013, Obama’s flat out denial of the accusations were repeatedly articulated by press secretary Jay Carney: “As we’ve explained, and the
intelligence community has explained, allegations of widespread, unchecked analyst access to NSA data collection are false” (White House, 2013c). The denial of the allegations, or
part of the allegations, on extraordinary NSA measures made public by Snowden, can be seen as an effort to uphold a securitizing frame pertaining these measures. This can be explained in light of my theoretical framework, in which I assume that the White House and NSA will try to keep up the securitization frame by denying accusations that jeopardize this frame.
The NSA is more harsh in articulating their defense of the allegations, for instance in a statement on October 31st: “Recent press articles on NSA’s collection operations
conducted under Executive Order 12333 have misstated facts, mischaracterized NSA’s activities, and drawn erroneous inferences about those operations” (NSA, 2013c). The
securitizing frame that is sought to be maintained in the official White House and NSA speeches can be observed in two more themes.
Theme five: NSA measures improve security
Following from Simone’s (2009) study, the theme ‘NSA measures improve security’ included in my coding structure seems apparent in the analyzed White House and NSA speeches. I interpreted instances where successes of NSA measures are mentioned as a part of improving security.
Several statements by President Obama provide examples of this theme. One example forms a statement in a press conference in Germany on June 19th 2013 (White House, 2013e): “as a consequence, we’ve saved lives. We know of at least 50 threats that
have been averted because of this information, not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany”. By saying this, Obama argues that the NSA measures
have improved the security not only of the US, but also of foreign countries, and attacks have been thwarted.
22
Theme six: Governmental responsibility for national security
The last securitizing theme found frequently in the White House and NSA speeches, is the responsibility of the US government for its national security, also derived from Simone (2009). This theme was mainly present in official statements by the NSA. In a speech in June 2013, NSA Director Keith Alexander links the programs explicitly to the mission of the security agency. Alexander argues that he believes the nation expects the government to disrupt terrorist activities by means of these measures. He claims that: ‘First, our responsibility, my main responsibility is defense of this country. These programs
are part of that effort’ (NSA, 2013b).
In a speech on the 25th of June, Alexander continues this argument of NSA’s mission to defend the nation, thus referring to the agency’s responsibility for national security. The interesting part of this speech however, is the part where Alexander discusses the public debate that was prompted by Snowden’s revelations. According to Alexander: “this issue should not be viewed and debated as a ‘political issue’ but rather as a
‘national security issue’“(NSA, 2013e). Besides overtly using a securitizing frame, by
portraying the issue under “national security” instead of viewing it as political, by stating this, Alexander seems to invalidate the following desecuritizing theme of the necessity for a public debate.
Desecuritization in official White House and NSA statements
The only theme considered as desecuritizing emerging out of the analyzed speeches and statements, is: ‘public debate is necessary’. In several instances, the White House, through the President or the press secretary, appears to make a case for the necessity of a public debate on NSA measures.
In a speech on June 19th 2013 (White House, 2013e), Obama commends his administration from some other governments by welcoming these debates and claiming more transparency. In a speech at the end of the year, Obama repeats this message, by saying: “And so I’m taking this very seriously because I think, as I’ve said before, this is a
debate that needed to be had” (White House, 2013d). In a press briefing in-between these
speeches, the press secretary mentions Obama’s incentive for more transparency on these issues: “So he welcomes the discussion that has begun in the wake of the
23
community to look at programs and see where we can be as transparent as possible”
(White House, 2013c).
This apparent clear stance towards a transparent discussion seems to contradict with NSA Director Alexander’s previously mentioned statement on portraying the issue under ‘national security’. By explicitly stating that the issue of NSA data gathering measures does not belong in the political sphere, Alexander takes on a securitizing frame. Though Obama’s encouragement for an open debate was dated a month after Alexander’s statement, I believe the willingness of the Director of NSA for improving transparency in favor of the public debate can be questioned, due to this firm initial stance.
Then, what can also be questioned is the sincerity of the White House for desecuritizing the issue by welcoming the debate. Is a public discussion on secret intelligence issues, as with the exposed NSA measures, truly welcome, or can these encouragements be seen as hollow phrases? Given the difficulty in finding official speeches and statements by the White House, I tend to argue for this last stance. Since, a truly welcome public debate can be expected to consist of a sufficient amount of publicly available material of speeches and statements by the relevant authorities. Also, given the aforementioned secret nature of intelligence agencies as the NSA, desecuritization and a transparent public debate prove to be difficult to observe, even after exposure. Since, it can be questioned whether or not all the information that exists, is also revealed. As I found this is debatable, it seems to me that the information that is not given speaks louder than the words that are provided.
Conclusion
The revelations by Edward Snowden, on the ability of the NSA for extensive data gathering, spurred a lively public debate in the US and beyond US’ borders. This thesis has examined how speeches regarding this debate were framed by the Guardian, as initiating the publishing of the revelations, and the White House and NSA, as being responsible for the measures. Most interesting is the fact that this particular case reveals the presence of certain security issues that cannot be assessed by justifications in speech
24 acts, since the issues are, or remain secret. By using this case, I have argued for a discrepancy between this issue of secrecy and the securitization theory on overt speech acts by the Copenhagen School (CS). By means of a coding structure, derived from the Copenhagen School framework and complemented by Simone’s (2009) study, the articles and speeches were analyzed and placed in the categories securitizing and desecuritizing in order to answer the main research questions:
- To what extent are secret intelligence issues desecuritized after exposure?
- To what extent are secret intelligence issues justified as security issues after
exposure?
As expected, the themes that were prevalent in the data from the Guardian mainly fall under the desecritizing category. Though all three desecuritizing themes in the coding structure were mentioned often, the most prevalent theme found in the articles was ‘critique on secrecy’. The perspectives from several senators and internet companies such as Microsoft and Google are expressed in the Guardian articles, pleading for more transparency and the declassification of secret legal justifications regarding NSA’s methods. The themes ‘extraordinary measures not necessary’ and ‘public debate necessary’ were also found frequently, which supports the tendency to a desecuritizing frame found in the Guardian. Still, securitizing themes appeared in the analysis of Guardian articles as well. The theme ‘denial of accusations’ proved to be visible foremost, but all other themes were found at least once. These instances of securitizing themes were all derived from speech acts by the White House and NSA, reproduced by the Guardian, which is in line with the initial expectation that these actors will try to uphold a securitizing frame.
Given these results, it can be said that the Guardian, to a substantial extent, used a desecuritizing frame concerning the secret intelligence issue of NSA data gathering after exposure. The only securitizing themes found, followed from publishing quotes from White House or NSA officials.
Besides their contribution in Guardian articles, official speech acts by the latter actors were analyzed in the ensuing part. The initial expectation for speeches derived from the White House and NSA to be securitizing, by justifying secret intelligence issues
25 as security issues, is to a great extent substantiated. The securitizing themes that proved most prevalent were: ‘extraordinary measures necessary’, ‘denial of accusations’ and ‘governmental responsibility for national security’. There also appeared overlap between the themes ‘existential threat’ and ‘terrorists threatened US & global security’. The theme regarding the necessity of the disputed NSA methods was encountered most frequently in official speeches by NSA Director Keith Alexander. Alexander defends NSA activities as being necessary for protecting the US and its interests, which could be interpreted as a justification for placing the measures outside normal political procedures and thus, as securitizing. The theme ‘denial of accusations’ supports the securitizing frame found in the White House and NSA speeches, by appearing recurrently. The third securitizing theme appearing most frequently is ‘governmental responsibility for national security’. This theme was, similar to ‘extraordinary measures necessary’, mainly present in NSA speeches. Alexander even went as far as stating that the issue of NSA data gathering measures should be viewed as a national security issue, rather than a political issue. By uttering this, the only desecuritizing theme found in speeches by the White House and NSA can be put into question.
This theme is ‘public debate is necessary’, which is expressed continually in speeches from the White House. President Obama seems to welcome a public debate on the previously secret NSA data gathering methods. However, I questioned the sincerity of welcoming such a debate in the political sphere, given NSA Director Alexander’s firm securitizing stance. As a securitizing frame was found to a substantial extent in speech acts from these two actors, and given the difficulty in finding a, to my opinion, sufficient amount of speeches, a truly transparent public debate proves difficult to observe. Even after exposure, it can be questioned whether or not all the information that exists, is also revealed.
At this point, the discrepancy between the issue of secrecy and the securitization theory on overt speech acts by the Copenhagen School can be perceived. Since, only after exposure of secret issues speech acts will emerge and can be examined as such through the Copenhagen School framework of securitization. But, as this case showed, even after revelations, it is probable that not all information is given. The Copenhagen School framework is inadequate for analyzing these secret issues. However, given this secret nature, it is improbable to imagine a framework that is capable to do so.
26 As for recommendations, further research can use an even more in-depth approach for analyzing the speech acts, by using a discourse analysis for instance. Also, as I only focused on part of the debate by the Guardian, White House and NSA, speeches by European politicians can be taken in regard, given the wideness of this specific debate. Moreover, the reliability of this study can be improved by using an intercoder approach, where my data is independently coded by another researcher. Although general inferences made from this case are limited, it can function as an onset for further, more detailed research on speech acts regarding secret security issues after exposure. Though, it remains uncertain when and where about such revelations will take place.
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A P P E N D I X I
A N A L Y S I S T H E G U A R D I A N
DESECURITIZATION
COPENHAGEN SCHOOL
Theme one: Extraordinary measures not necessary
June 7 -Jameel Jaffer, director of the ACLU’s Centre for Democracy: The NSA is part of the military. The military has been granted unprecedented access to civilian communications. This is
unprecedented militarisation of domestic communications infrastructure."That's profoundly troubling to anyone who is concerned about that separation
June 13 -US senators on the Senate's appropriations committee sharply challenged the director of the National Security Agency yesterday about the extent of the agency's domestic surveillance,
Dec 2 - Dianne Feinstein, a staunch NSA defender who nonetheless expressed concerns the agency
had gone too far in the monitoring of allied leaders' phones.
Dec 17 - Leon expressed doubt about the rationale for the programme cited by the NSA: that it is
necessary for preventing terrorist attacks. "The government does not cite a single case in which analysis of the NSA's bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent terrorist attack," he wrote.
-"Given the limited record before me at this point in the litigation - most notably, the utter lack of evidence that a terrorist attack has ever been prevented because searching the NSA database was faster than other investigative tactics - I have serious doubts about the efficacy of the programme as a means of conducting time-sensitive investigations in cases involving imminent threats of terrorism.
-Democratic senator Mark Udall welcomed the judgment. "The ruling underscores what I have argued for years: (that) the bulk collection of Americans' phone records conflicts with Americans' privacy rights under the US constitution and has failed to make us safer
Dec 20 -Clearly, this report speaks to what I've heard not just from people here but around the world:
that they know that liberty and security are not mutually exclusive," said senator Ron Wyden, a Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee who has fought for years to stop what he considers unnecessary surveillance
- Wyden hailed a finding of the review group, deep into its lengthy report, that undermined the NSA's claim that the collection of all US phone records was indispensable for preventing terrorist attacks
- Tory MP David Davis welcomed that conclusion. "By pointing that despite what our agencies have been half-briefing there is no indication that metadata and general data collection was necessary to prevent or apprehend any terrorist event. They don't say any American terrorist event. They say any terrorist event, and since they work so closely with our people we must assume that applies to us."
Dec 22 -"The review board floats a number of interesting reform proposals, and we're especially happy
to see them condemn the NSA's attacks on encryption and other security systems people rely upon," attorney Kurt Opsahl said." But we're disappointed that the recommendations suggest a path to continue untargeted spying. Mass surveillance is still heinous, even if private company servers are holding the data instead of government data centers"
- Bulk collection of personal data should simply end," said Alan Butler, an attorney for the Electronic Privacy Information Centre
Dec 19 -"The review board floats a number of interesting reform proposals, and we're especially happy to see them condemn the NSA's attacks on encryption and other security systems people rely upon," attorney Kurt Opsahl said. "But we're disappointed that the recommendations suggest a path to continue untargeted spying. Mass surveillance is still heinous, even if private company servers are holding the data instead of government data centers"
