Evluating the success of Disarmenent, Demobilization and Reintegration programs in Southeast Asia

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Master Thesis — Master of Political Science

Specialization: Conflict, Power and Politics

Nijmegen School of Management

Radboud University

Evaluating the success of Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Programs

in Southeast Asia; the cases of Cambodia,

the Philippines, Sri Lanka and East-Timor

Student: Alice Privey (s4827368) Supervisor: Dr. François Lenfant

Word count: 24,540 (excluding references from chapter 1 to chapter 6) 12 août 2019

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor for always being available for me, even in the middle of the summer, very patient and understanding.

I would also like to address few words to my friends that supported a very stressed version of myself during the long process of writing a thesis. To July that believed more in my thesis than I did myself and to Kristin Witte, Pieter Jacobs, Sander Van Dam, Michael Bendersky, Margot Ameye, Ella Auckbur and Loic Doussoulin who took great care of my well-being and always provided an encouraging smile and a sympathetic hear.

This master thesis has been an interesting adventure for me and I was thrilled to be able to analyze DDR issues.

Finally, I am very thankful for my years at Radboud University, for the teachers that taught me captivating subjects and the staff in general that made my stay a student experience close to perfection.

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List of Abbreviations

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

CVAP Cambodia Veteran Assistance Program

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DK Democratic Kampuchea

DPKO Department of Peace-Keeping Operations

FALINTIL Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)

F-FLNT FALINTIL-Forsa de Defesa de Timor-Leste FRAP Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program

HDI Human Development Index

IDDRS The Integrate DDR Standards

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

ILO International Labor Organization

IOM International Organization for Migration LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front MILF Islamic Front for National Liberation

NGO Non Governmental Organization

NPA New People’s Army

OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

PPA Paris Peace Agreements

RESPECT Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste)

SIP Social Integration Program

SOC State of Cambodia

UN United Nations

UNAMET United Nations Advance Missions for East Timor UNDP United Nations Development Program

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UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNTAET United Nations Transition Authority in East-Timor UNTAC United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia USAID United States Aid for International Development

WHO World Health Organization

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I. Introduction

1. Introduction

D

isarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are considered by international peace-builders as a necessary condition towards a lasting peace. The priority in a post-conflict context is to limit the violence and control the weapons flows (Lewis, Harris, Dos Santos, 1999:129). Although a large share of DDR programs took place in Africa, there is a considerable number of them in Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka or the Philippines.

These four countries underwent fundamentally different conflicts leading to DDR. There is currently no agreed-upon dominant theory for DDR as it has mostly been implemented from a technical and practical perspective during the past three decades. However, the academic sphere has been actively researching this relatively new concept (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2010; Muggah, 2005; Muggah, 2009). One of the main challenges of DDR is to assess its success or failure. DDR lacks a comprehensive agreement of all involved actors to define clear criteria and indicators to measure the effectiveness of these programs (Williams, 2014). While some consensus is growing regarding the sequencing of DDR, no universal doctrine has been widely accepted regarding the subject. Hence, a considerable number of case studies have been published from both practitioners and scholars. This leads us to examine the regional level more in-depth to create further links between the bureaucratic international sphere formulating guidelines for DDR and the local context where it has to be implemented.

2. DDR

Since the 1980s and the first DDR programs, a wide body of literature emerged on the best practices and the implementation of DDR programs. They have been mostly implemented and designed along with the UN guidelines. Traditionally seen as a short term program, the IDDRS (Integrated DDR Standards) re-formulated DDR in 2006 defining DD (disarmament and demobilization) as short term goals followed by a long-term objective R: reintegration (IDDRS, 2007). In post-conflict contexts, there has been a large consensus among practitioners to value the

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contribution of DDR programs to foster stable peace and limit the violence arising from armed conflicts (Muggah, 2005). These programs generally focus on ex-combatants striving for their complete reinsertion into civilian life. Indeed, the ex-combatants represent the first challenge for a post-conflict society on its path towards a long-lasting peace (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004:39). According to the UN guidelines, DDR programs do not aim at conflict prevention but they are a tool to contain the risks of resurgence of violence after a conflict and sometimes contribute to conflict prevention. DDR programs are conceived as short-term plans to be integrated into a larger process of peace-building. Disarmament and demobilization are generally drafted in order to be achieved in a relatively short period of time. Disarmament involves the collection of weapons from ex-combatants, their identification, and their categorization and possibly followed by their destruction. When destruction is not operated, weapons should be stored in a safe manner to prevent their circulation. Demobilization addresses the necessary fracture of the hierarchy within an armed group. The ex-combatants should not be in touch with their superiors to break the chain of command and stop their usual patterns of violence. The least consensual sphere of the DDR is the last component: the R. Traditionally referring to reintegration, it involves a longer process than disarmament and demobilization (UNDDR, 2010). The reintegration is often perceived as the final goals of any DDR and the best way to measure the program’s success. However, most of the actors are, paradoxically, still measuring the success of a DDR program using traditional criteria focusing on the disarmament part, such as the number of weapons collected (Muggah, 2005). Since the ultimate goals of a DDR program is to contribute to the peace-building process occurring after a conflict, the priority is to reintegrate the ex-combatants in a society preparing for peace and socio-economic development. As they are back in the workforce, they can participate in socio-economic development in order to foster stability. DDR also limits the resort of violence while prioritizing other political channels to express their views and introduce non-violent mechanisms of conflict resolution. Finally, these programs aim at building trust instead of greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). DDR has been implemented in a larger international agenda for peace-building led by the UN. Traditionally linked with national security concerns for peace-building and concepts such as the SSR (Security Sector Reform), DDR has then been implemented while new paradigms started to dominate the UN’s discourses: the human security paradigm followed by the responsibility to protect. Indeed, DDR programs were traditionally emphasizing state security rather than individuals security or community security. The DDR conceptualization, following the UN, also shifted toward more human security (IDDRS, 2006) and more recently, a greater number of

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scholars are stressing the importance of the community when talking about security in DDR (Verkoren, Willems, Kleinfeld and Rouw, 2010). Nonetheless, these shifts at the UN and international level were not necessarily emphasized in the implementation of the programs.

3. A regional perspective

DDR is seen as an essential component of peace-building processes by international actors such as the UN or the WorldBank no matter the place, the country nor the region where the program has to be implemented. However, no research was able to show any universal causal link between the implementation of a DDR program and a lasting peace (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2010). The very few attempts that have been made to assess the effectiveness of DDR programs on a regional scale concentrated their work on Africa (Handson, 2007; Knight, 2008). Such programs are also being implemented in South East Asia; Cambodia was one of the earliest country targeted. Since 1992 and the first DDR programs in South East Asia, several countries experienced armed conflicts followed by attempts of DDR programs’ implementation in the region. While the specificity of each context at the national scale is pointed out and acknowledged, it is also necessary to recognize the importance of the regional context. Indeed, internal armed conflicts are not limited by borders and can affect neighboring countries. Ex-combatants are mobile and able to cross borders with their weapons. Small arms and light weapons are easily smuggled and exchanged on the black market across affecting the security balance and the stability of the region. Therefore, DDR is a matter of local context, international agenda but also regional security. I included Sri Lanka in South East Asia following the political categorization of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the WHO.

4. Scientific and societal relevance

The 2030 agenda for sustainable development was formulated by the UN as the international agenda. The goals 16.1 intends to « significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere » while the 16.4 planned to « significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows » but has not established any clear indicator to measure disarmament (UN sustainable development goals, 2015). Since the first DDR program, a considerable number of reports and lessons learned pushed for a shift in the implementation from national security towards human security. DDR programs

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themselves are in constant evolution. Practitioners, implementers, and donors now acknowledge the need for more comprehensive and inclusive DDR frameworks (Boutros-Ghali, 2012). However, this has not been translated into the evaluation of these programs’ success. The existing literature on in-depth single-case studies already showed that the implemented programs are not always aligned with the official credo (Knight, 2008; Banholzer, 2014). Identifying criteria to evaluate these programs will enable the involved actors to have a clear view of the specific areas to improve and to define clear-cut weaknesses of these programs in particular contexts. Regarding the financial means of DDR programs, a better assessment of their effectiveness will undoubtedly foster more funding to design appropriate programs with the necessary resources. As the ASEAN is aiming at representing a strong security and peacebuilding actor, more reflection is needed on the effectiveness of the programs implemented in Southeast Asia. Cambodia, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and the Philippines represent four countries that encountered internal conflict in post-colonial Southeast Asia. This thesis seeks to add a regional perspective that could be of use for all decision-makers at the international level, at the regional level but also at the local level.

Until 2008, approximately two-thirds of DDR programs were taking place in Africa (Muggah, 2009). This logically led to a focus on Africa when it comes to researching DDR and its effectiveness. This thesis addresses three issues lacking in the DDR literature. First, a focus on the regional perspective would constitutes a middle ground between the specificity of the local context and the international organizations involved in peacebuilding (Colletta, Muggah, 2009). Second, the abundance of in-depth single case studies in the DDR field allows us to operate larger research and compare several cases without generalizing across the whole range of DDR programs. I chose four countries in Southeast Asia as this region appears to be largely under-researched. Finally, while the UN put DDR as a priority of peacebuilding, the academic sphere showed recently more signs of skepticism when it comes to assessing the inputs of DDR programs (Muggah, 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2010). The overall DDR literature tends to show a high level of confidence in the added value of DDR programs for peace-building. Nonetheless, little information is disclosed about the specific factors or strategies contributing to the success of these programs.

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This thesis seeks to identify the objectives, criteria, and factors used in the implementation of DDR programs leading to their effectiveness assessment for four countries of Southeast Asia reflecting different post-conflicts contexts on a time period covering the almost entirety of DDR existence. The research will be carried out for Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. These countries represent different security environments in the region, as they respectively experienced a military conflict, a separatist conflict, an ethnic conflict, and an insurgency. The time period of implementation of DDR for these four countries displays the evolution of DDR’s conceptualization as it covers DDR programs since 1991. To find out the successfulness of the DDR programs in these four countries and the discrepancies to measure it, I formulated the following question:

How effective are different DDR programs implemented in four different South East Asian countries at different times?

Other sub-questions will lead my research:

Is there a shift in the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of DDR? Is there a shift in DDR programs in South East Asia from national security to human security? What are the participants targeted by the DDR programs and do they involve a more inclusive approach beyond the ex-combatants?

6. Structure

The following chapter will review the DDR literature to create a general theoretical framework and identify the current issue in the field. Then the methodology chapter will present the research design and introduce the criteria I will use to answer our question. The chapter 4 reports my analysis of DDR programs in Cambodia, the Philippines, East-Timor and Sri Lanka followed by a comparative analysis to finally present my findings and conclusions in the chapter 6.

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II. Theoretical Framework - Literature review

1. History of DDR

The literature on DDR covers a period starting from the first attempts at DDR in civil wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s until nowadays.

However, disarmament has been an issue before the late 1980s. In 1963, Wright wrote that the termination of a war sometimes led to compulsory disarmament of the defeated power (Wright, 1963:287). It reflected the State-centric vision of war and disarmament at that time. After World War II, the main concern for security was also to disarm the vanquished country. As warfare was evolving from inter-state wars to proxy-wars during the Cold war, and to, a majority of intra-state wars nowadays, DDR has drawn more attention (Kaldor, 1999).

The first DDR program was implemented in 1989 in Central America as part of a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping differs from peace-making as peace-making is happening during a conflict with a third party, most likely from the diplomatic field, trying to broker a peace deal. Peace-building occurs on a long-term period to build a sustainable peace while peacekeeping is a process happening after a peace agreement or to enforce a ceasefire in post-conflict contexts (Fisher, 1993). Usually, DDR programs were mainly carried out by the UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), that are also involved with early peace-building activities, implemented by the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations). It, therefore, had to be voted by a mandate of the UN Security Council. Hence, from its very first steps, DDR has been intrinsically linked with military issues. The first programs operated from 1989 until the early 1990s were « test cases for DDR » (Muggah, 2005:243). Quickly, these programs have been carried out by an always more diverse pool of actors at different levels; national government, local NGOs, international organizations (World Bank) or regional organization such as the EU or the OECD. Nevertheless, the UN is still perceived as a guide when it comes to DDR programs implementation.

Most of the programs have been implemented in Africa but others have been implemented in Latin America, Europe, Central Asia and South East Asia. What Muggah and O’Donnell refer to as the « first wave » of DDR was taking place in Africa and Latin America aiming at contributing to

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small number of actors involved in the program and moderate ambitions regarding its objectives. Their intention was to stick to a strict disarmament, demobilization and fast reintegration. However, multiple programs launched in the 1990s failed to collect considerable numbers of weapons (such as Cambodia) or to demobilize combatants (such as the Philippines)(Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015:3). The late 1990s and early 2000s marked the beginning of a « second generation » of DDR targeting a wider range of issues beyond the traditional and strict DDR. The practitioners defending this new wave of DDR aspired to contribute to social cohesion, economic development and community reconciliation through their programs (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015:3). It represented a shift in the DDR practice towards more peace building than peace keeping and peace making and therefore, towards the R - reintegration. This second generation was, hence, designed to be more context-specific. Since the early 2010s, Muggah and O’Donnell noticed the emergence of a new generation of DDR among the constant evolution of UN’s practices in disarmament involving a complete rethinking of DDR as it has been done during the first and second generation programs (ibid.). This new generation addresses an extensive range of new elements to incorporate new issues and objectives with a more important focus on the political aspects of DDR. As previous programs were aiming at avoiding the politicization of the DDR process, the new generation also acknowledges their intrinsically political aspects.

2. Short summary of the peace building literature

It is an euphemism to say that intra-State conflicts have a deep impact on a country, a society or a community. It weakens every structure of society; political, economic and social. This results in a situation where any attempt at peace is highly vulnerable and needs to be strongly supported to ensure a smooth transition from war to peace. Peace building is a long term process to reach a complete reconciliation and the normalization of the relations between the warring parties. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the peace building process promotes conflict resolution in civil wars to prevent the resurgence of violence in these fragile contexts (Doyle and Sambanis, 2010:779). Indeed, one of the main concerns after an armed conflict is to prevent the resurgence of war. Scholars showed that a nation that experienced a civil war is more likely to experience another one than other nations that never had any civil war (Collier et al., 2003; Quinn et al., 2007:168;). In the transition from war to peace, the peace building process aims at bringing in nonviolent mechanisms to reduce level of violence and strengthen the security environment.

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To ensure peace and stability, several strategies are implemented in post-conflict contexts. It has been argued that DDR should be executed along with SSR (Security Sector Reform) to disarm individuals and strengthen state capacities in security (Brahimi, 2000). The Security Sector Reform concept appeared in the 1990s and was integrated into the UN language in the UNDP’ Human Development Report in 2002. It addresses the political and technical process of implementing good governance principles in the security sector using legislative initiatives or policy-making processes (DCAF, 2007). Transitional justice also plays a crucial role in order to address the crimes committed during the conflict period and participate in the reconstruction of the society. On the other hand, DDR is mostly seen as a short-term intervention compared to SSR. The latter is designed for a long-term strategy of development while DDR is supposed to address the urgent character of the insecurity post-conflict. The reintegration phase of DDR mainly aims at reintegrating the ex-soldiers into civilian life but it can also do so with the security sector, allowing them to reintegrate as servicemen in the police or in the military (Muggah, 2005:242). From the security dimension of the conflict to the development taking place in a post-conflict society, they can use the skills they developed during the conflict and do not have to go through an entire readjustment process to find a job for which they need to be trained. Moreover, several actors and scholars stress the importance of coupling DDR with weapons reduction. The recurrence of civil wars increased the unregulated proliferation of weapons directly threatening the peace building process (Muggah, 2005:240). Therefore a larger effort of weapons reduction initiatives must be conducted unrelated to conflict timelines.

DDR is one of several possible recovery strategies in post-conflict contexts to promote security, stability and development (UN, 2006:1). DDR are usually one of the first step implemented after a conflict to start the process of peace-building. It helps bringing in nonviolent mechanisms to reduce level of violence and diminish the insecurity. DDR programs focused on ex-combatants and individuals that took part in the conflict. It constitutes an essential part of the recovery side of peace-building process. Moreover, it represents an important step to ensure a strong peace building process and enhance security (Berdal, 1996:7). Indeed, post-conflict contexts are highly unstable and fragile. Minor conflicts can easily escalate into armed conflicts. This is due to the facilitated access to weapons after the end of the conflict and to ex-combatants. Ex-combatants need to adjust to a new context emphasizing nonviolent mechanisms to be able to

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deescalate minor conflicts. Most of them gained skills during the conflict that are only military related and they need to acquire new skills related to peace times. Therefore, ex-combatants represent one of the major threat to the peace process after the end of a conflict. From a rational perspective, they might consider that the transition from war to peace is too costly for them and, that the conflict situation was more advantageous. Hence, they can potentially turn into spoilers jeopardizing the peace-building process and increasing the chances for a (re)new conflict when they have been not properly reintegrated (Stedman, 1997; Quinn et al., 2007:168).

The focus of DDR programs have shifted from military issues to human security and socio-economic concerns. Influenced by the UN and its current paradigm, the DDR literature produced more documents mentioning human security as an objective or the responsibility to protect to justify the program during the designing phase of the process (MDMHR, 2009; UNDP, 2002). The human security for example, is one of the ‘new’ paradigms under which the UN has been operating in peace-keeping and peace-building. It aims at protecting « the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment » (UN, 2003). It can be observed in the peace building sphere production of documents. DDR are implemented to limit and control the means of violence. It aims at giving back to the national State a monopoly on all means of violence and assert its legitimacy to coincide with Weber’s theory. Weber identified the monopoly of the violence as the foundation of the State, asserting its capacity to govern successfully. Therefore, the aid coming from the international community is not only material and logistics but also symbolic such as legitimacy. It implies that this international aid will also reflect political choices and a certain subjectivity while choosing its local partners. The choice of its contacts to represent the local authority will lead international aid to give these actors more capacity to ensure their monopoly on all means of violence and give them the legitimacy to govern.

3. Focus of peace-building

Peace building encompasses a broad range of elements such as economic development, social cooperation, democratic process and the straightening of the rule of law.

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3.1.1.Different concepts of security and why is it needed?

Peace building process generally focus on security concerns. It is the priority and can be observed on different aspects. Security concerns cover tangible factors such as disarmament and the collection of weapons. DDR and weapons reduction programs allow to reduce the number of weapons in unregulated circulation (Muggah, 2005:240). It also addresses security when defined along individuals’ perception. Security can also be a feeling. The weapons, usually conventional, small, and light type of arms, provides a sense of security to their owners, the ex-combatants (Hazen, 2005:5). Security environment or tangible security factors must be addressed but ex-combatants’ sense of security should not be overlooked. The peace process requires them to hand in their weapons and adjust to a new security paradigm than the familiar one they experienced during the war.

3.1.2.Security environment post-conflict

The end of a conflict is not synonym of security (Muggah, 2007:240). Post-conflicts contexts can even have higher level of mortality than the conflict it-self (Guha-Sapir & van Panhuis, 2002). There is a proliferation of weapons and arms that are unregulated, which is one of the main vectors of insecurity. As individuals are used to violent mechanisms to solve conflicts, the post-conflict context can undergo high level of tensions. Then, it becomes very easy to access weapons leading to the escalation of minor disagreements into a re-new armed conflict. Hence, it is a priority to foster security through the limitation of this access. The presence of weapons can also foster another sector; criminality. Lacking opportunities in the society and frustrated about unmatched expectations from the peace process, ex-combatants sometimes decide to take the criminal path to be able to sustain their needs. The abundance of weapons result in spiral of violence where criminals « outgunned » the police, military or civilians (Muggah, 2005:241).

3.1.3.Different levels: national, community, individual, human security?

The first DDR programs in the 1990s emphasized national and State security. This focus has shifted since the late 1990s. Indeed, at the international level, the UN Secretary General contributed to the rise of the human security paradigm. Highlighting the importance of peace-building in An Agenda for Peace, he presented human security as a priority for the UN programs, including DDR (Boutros-Ghali, 2012). The shift in the UN paradigm transformed the DDR programs in the guidelines for the entire sector. However, some scholars argue that, in practice, the security is still a

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major focus at the national level. Verkoren et al. assert that the focus should shift from the State to the community level to optimize security promotion (Verkoren et al., 2010:1). A community-based approach would allow for a more horizontal approach while most DDR programs are designed around vertical or top-down mechanisms. More participative approach could strengthen the political will of actors to make the DDR process a success since the lack of political will is often brought up as a factor of failure.

3.2.Economic Development

A major objective and incentive for peace building is economic development. It is sought as soon as the peace building process starts. Indeed, to achieve reintegration, DDR needs to be implemented in a context where economic opportunities are not limited. Economic development needs to be established along with the peace building process as it also strengthens the confidence building process, improve ex-combatants livelihoods and can foster reconciliation.

For some scholars, the economic dimension of peace building is the most important as it creates important incentives and removes a considerable amount of challenges for the peace process such as insecurity, poverty or unemployment. For example, through DDR programs, combatants need to have decent livelihoods replacing the income they had as soldiers. For a successful DDR program, basic incomes should be provided to ex-combatants to make them integrate the program on voluntary basis. During the war, most soldiers are able to sustain to their basic needs through violent mechanisms taking place within a structured society of war. The economic perspectives should be accessible and appealing enough for them to make the shift from their positions in time of war to peace times (Hazen, 2005:6). Not necessarily cash, the delivery administrative or social services are also part peace dividends that can help reducing social tension. This will guarantee ex-combatants an alternative and a more secured path than exclusion, poverty and struggle over resources (Kingma, 1999:6). When opportunities are lacking, ex-combatants are more likely to return to familiar violent schemes and use their weapons to access resources. These peace dividends create incentives for ex-combatants to adopt nonviolent behavior.

3.3.Social Cohesion

Social cohesion has rather been a recent objective compared to security concerns. CSOs and local NGOs have been emphasizing the importance of a reconciliation process within communities between civilian and combatants. Social cohesion allows for a smooth reintegration of

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ex-combatants in their communities. Indeed, the return to the community can be traumatizing for both sides. Some scholars even argue for a shift from the security focus of DDR to a social contract to stress the social perspective of DDR (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:500). The social fabric that was created during the war has to be disintegrated and replaced by a social context facilitating reintegration for ex-combatants (Hazen, 2005:1). Hazen defines social integration as « the establishment of equal opportunity for all; the harmonization or conformity of individuals; or, the established pattern of interaction in a community » (Hazen, 2005:1). It requires a transformation of the society.

3.4.Democratic Development

Peace building process or peacekeeping operations often aim at fostering the development of democratic values. Moreover, for the situation to be stable and the local authority to enforce laws and authority, democratic decision-making processes seem more relevant (Kingma, 1999:12). Indeed, the representativity principle included in democratic systems will guarantee all parties to express themselves in the political arena. The DDR field, and especially the UN sphere, are also influenced by the liberal concept of peace building (Roland, 2010). They assert that the democratic character of the process is the best suited one to push for its society interests. Hence, the peace building process contains elements to promote the creation of democratic structures. The UN considers that it constitutes a desirable alternative to militarized politics (UN, 2000:11; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007:534). However it was not mentioned in the latest UN guidelines about DDR, in the IDDRS, which might indicate a lower salience of the issue for the international organization.

3.5.Rule of law

To stabilize any form of peace, the national government must have the capacity to enforce laws and regulations. It represents the central authority and should be able to guide the peace process at the national level (Kingma, 1999). Such a sensitive process can only be secured and guaranteed if the central power is on board and possess the necessary capacities to carry it out. During conflict, a considerable amount of norms and rules have been violated. The post-conflict situation represents a crucial moment for re-establishing a clear divide between illegal and legal actions. Therefore, rule of law must be an integral objective of any peace building process. It is often displayed by the term of « capacity-building » (Hazen, 2005:11). It aims at giving the State the necessary resources to implement reforms; a necessary step to coordinate the aid from

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international donors and practitioners. Moreover, these international actors usually operate short-term programs requiring the local government to take over for a smoother transition on the long-term peace development.

4. Conflict resolution

4.1.Conflicts in regional and transnational perspective: blurred borders

The evolution of warfare towards more civil wars also blurred the geographic limits of these conflicts. Combatants are able to move beyond borders with their weapons and can quickly affect the security situation and the balance of power of a neighboring country. The situation is similar with post-conflict countries. The neighboring countries or communities, even peaceful ones, can be affected by the consequences of a post-conflict situation; unregulated trade of weapons, increased level of criminality, high level of physical or sexual violence. (Muggah, 2005:241). Therefore ex-combatants represent a threat for the regional balance of power requiring the greatest attention of the actors of that zone (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:510).

4.2.Intra-State wars and end of conflicts

The number of intra-state wars, such as civil wars, has been increasing since the end of the World War II and represents the gist of the worldwide conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The predominance of intra-state conflicts also fostered the proliferation of arms and weapons (Kaldor, 1999; Berdal, 1996:7; Harbom et al., 2006:619). These phenomena fostered a growing interest in DDR. Civil wars resolution processes require a different approach from inter-State wars ones. It is not only about achieving a positive peace but it also involves concepts of development and State-capacity building (Brahimi-Report, 2000). Therefore, the DDR concept also shifted from a military-focused approach towards more development-oriented programs using a wider range of incentives to collect weapons such as development programs or training instead of cash. The causes of the conflicts also evolved; they involve cultural, social, ethnic, and identity dimensions (Berdal, 1996:12). DDR covers a comprehensive range of issue that are better dealt with from a constructivist than realist perspective.

The end of a conflict has a considerable influence on the possibilities of the recovery process. Indeed, the outcome of a conflict affects the probability of civil war recurrence (Quinn et al., 2007:168). Rebellious victories reduce the chances for civil war recurrence while a government victory increases them (Quinn et al., 2007; Toft, 2009). Therefore, the way the conflict ends, the

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causality that led to this conflict, its level of violence and the characterization of the security environment post-conflict must be carefully looked at since they affect the framework of DDR programs for its sequencing, its emphasis on one or several components or its objectives.

4.3.Peace agreements

Peace agreements usually take place after the conflict or once the fights have stopped. Indeed, it is better to implement DDR after the end of conflict once the hostilities officially ended and the context has been stabilized (Banholzer, 2013:2). However, some peace agreements do not include the necessity of a ceasefire for the peace process. It happens when the involved parties already agreed upon a ceasefire before the peace agreement or will include it in a final agreement later after further peace talks (Harbom et al., 2016:623). Ceasefire are not a guarantee of success are a good sign for the peace process. Furthermore, some scholars argued that peace building and disarmament always occurred in contexts characterized by unfinished wars (Berdal, 1996). The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily mean the conflict is finished nor resolved. That is one of the reason justifying for the necessity of DDR (Muggah, 2005:2). According to Berdal, DDR programs should be implemented after a peace agreement, setting up the first stone to build a sustainable peace. However, since DDR is an essential part of the recovery towards the end of the conflict, it can be implemented during the process towards the end of conflict but not after it. After the end of a conflict, DDR is not a necessary process anymore. The type of peace agreement is decisive for the rest of the DDR program implementation. It sets up the security environment conditioning the trust building process as well (Verkoren et al., 2010:14).

There are different types of peace agreements for conflict resolution. The first type can be defined as a « full agreement » (Harbom et al., 2006:622). Full agreements are characterized by one of the warring party agreeing to settle the entire conflict. A second type of agreement is a « partial agreement » (ibid.). A partial agreement involves at least one of the warring parties agreeing to settle part of the conflict. Partial agreement have represented the majority of peace agreements between 1989 and 2005 (ibid.). A partial agreement does not resolve the entire conflict like a full agreement but it defines a clear path towards the signature of a full agreement while dealing with one issue of the conflict at a time. Finally, there is also peace process agreements. This is the third type of peace agreements and it involves the initiation of a formal process to settle the conflict by one of the warring parties. This process is reflected in the drafting of a detailed agenda for talks.

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Peace process agreements have represented the minority of peace agreement between 1989 and 2005 (Harbom et al., 2007:623).

Most of peace agreements involve DDR programs (Quinn et al., 2007). However, they are sometimes used as a political tool in negotiations. They represent a good opportunity to discuss the design and implementation of the DRR programs since all the actors involved in the conflict are assumed to be at the table. The necessary amount of time and resources should be used and dedicated to the inclusion of DDR in the peace agreement. It will ensure a smoother implementation fostered by communication and a better coordination between diverse actors.

4.4.Conflict causes

Conflicts can have a broad range of causes. It is very difficult to identify the precise causality leading to civil wars as there are a great number of interconnected factors involved in the process leading to violence. Moreover, this causality tends to evolve over time which means that the initial cause may have disappeared without stopping the conflict. The general peace building concept aims at addressing the causes of the conflict but it is still uncertain if DDR is used in that regard or could be useful to achieve this goal. Some scholars such as Verkoren et al., or Hazen argue for DDR to address the roots of the conflict. They consider that the chances for recurrence of civil war can only be diminished by finding out the precise conditions that led to war and prevent their re-establishment (Verkoren et al., 2010:8; Hazen, 2005:11). The identification of the conflict roots could help communities to reconcile through DDR. Other scholars argue that the conflict, whether it was fought over ethnical issues or revolutionary or secessionist issues, has no influence on a durable post-conflict peace (Quinn et al., 2007:189). Therefore, it is important to identify these causes to have a better understanding of the local context but it is not a necessary condition for a durable peace. To simplify and gather data for the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Harbom et al. coded two main categories for which most conflicts fall under: conflicts are either due to government or territory incompatibilities (2007:623). Territorial conflicts usually involve secession or autonomy demands.

4.5.Security dilemma

The way the conflict is being resolved or the type of peace agreement influences the security environment. It is primordial for conflict resolution to identify the dynamics shaping this environment to design a peace agenda as it represents the basis and foundations on which the peace

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building process will be implemented (Verkoren et al., 2010:8). After a conflict, a security dilemma emerges (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2007;535; Walter, 1997; Roe, 1999). All actors foster conflict resolution but the lack of capacity of the central State can deter combatants from actually disarming and demobilizing if there are no solid guarantees for their future. Therefore, the conflict resolution process and the peace agreements should take this security dilemma into account and offer solutions to overcome it. Only a solid and safe environment can provide the good conditions to build trust between the conflicting parties. A lack of consideration could result in a fragile security environment fueled by the lack of trust resulting in skepticism over the general peace process and the commitment of all parties.It is necessary to provide conflicting parties the necessary level of trust for them to engage in disarmament and take the first step in resolving the conflict (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2007:535).

4.6.DDR as a tool

Hence, DDR is used as a tool to promote security, trust and development in the larger process of peace-building. It is sometimes even considered as a tool for conflict prevention. Boutros-Ghali, for example, presented peace building as a priority for the future UN strategy, including DDR as a primary step of peace processes and conflicts prevention (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). However, a poorly planned DDR can generate the opposite effects. It can fuel a new conflict or even cause the resurgence of the initial conflict (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:501). For conflict resolution, DDR represents a starting point for a better « social integration, political reform and economic development » (Hazen, 2005:11).

5. DDR

5.1.Consensus over DDR definition

DDR is sometimes referred to as DDR, DDRR, DRR, D + DR or DD + R. The acronym I use in this thesis is the one meeting the largest consensus in the field: DDR (Banholzer, 2013; Muggah, 2005; Muggah &O’Donnell, 2015; Hazen, 2005). It refers to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. However, other scholars uses a different combination. Knight & Özerdem for example, uses DDRR referring to Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration, adding the reinsertion phase (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:499). Kingma writes about DRR which stands for Demobilization, Resettlement and Reintegration (Kingma, 2008:2). Resettlement addresses the need to reintegrate soldiers in their communities to limit the number of internally

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displaced persons (IDPs). It addresses the logistical aspects of it while reintegration focus on the social and economic aspects of reintegration on the long-term development of the society. These scholars highlight reinsertion and resettlement as independent, complete phases while other scholars include these concepts in the Demobilization part. For instance, UNIDIR mentions reinsertion as a crucial step but belonging to the demobilization component. Humphreys and Weinstein emphasize the role of Demobilization and Reintegration as separate from the Disarmament part (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007:531). They emphasize these two components to evaluate DDR programs’ effectiveness as they have been under researched compared to the Disarmament part. The most important dissension over the use of acronyms for DDR programs concerns the reintegration part. Some scholars refers to disarmament as DD + R (Specker, 2008). They see Reintegration as a long-term process that cannot be combined with Disarmament and Demobilization. The two first components (DD) cover short-term operations, framed for emergency contexts, while Reintegration has to do with a long-term process of development. After redefining more in-depth DDR, the debate over DDR or DD+R will be more extensively covered in the following sections.

5.1.1.Disarmament

The process of disarmament requires ex-combatants to hand in their arms. This is done by the collecting of conventional weapons, most of them are small and light. Disarmament should be carefully planned and carried out even if it is taking place in pressing contexts. Indeed, when not completely achieved, partial disarmament can lead to more violence and produce the contrary of the desired outcomes (Kingma, 1999:9; Berdal, 1996:28). A partial disarmament can brutally destabilize the local balance of power creating more insecurities and incentives for ex-combatants to resort to violence using the remaining weapons for banditry such as in Mozambique or in Angola (ibid.).

5.1.2.Demobilization

The goal of demobilization is to break the hierarchy in the armed groups and the chain of command between the soldiers and their officers (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007:534; Spear, 2002). The predominant strategy to do so is the encampment of ex-combatants (Berdal, 1996). During the demobilization phase, ex-combatants are gathered in camps, also called cantonment areas (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:507). It allows to ensure the collection of weapons but also accumulate personal information on the individuals to: evaluate their expectations, frame their profiles and design

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specific reintegration programs. From a social perspective, it can also ease the reintegration of ex-combatants among their families and communities. On the political side, it shows to international actors and donors that the targeted population (the ex-combatants) are willing to participate in the peace process (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:507). However, encampment must be managed with carefulness. Without a good organization, good logistics, and, a solid trust in the process, there are chances that this will result in frustration leading to more violence as it happened in Somaliland or Nicaragua. Eventually it could jeopardize the peace process rather than support it. Hence, some scholars such as Knight & Özerdem offers alternatives for a concept of demobilization without cantonment (2004:508).

5.1.3.Reintegration

The last component of DDR aims at reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life on all aspects: economic, social, political. An assistance system is set up for combatants. This assistance can help, for example, by providing them new skills to integrate the workforce. Indeed, whether they integrated an armed faction on a voluntary or coercive basis, combatants missed educational opportunities and did not develop adequate skills to find a job. They only developed skills related to the military sector (Hazen, 2005:7). Hence, they need assistance to learn new skills and get an education adjusted to the needs of the labor market. This is even more salient for child soldiers as they have only been socialized through the war and violent mechanisms. They need special attention to learn new skills and being eventually able to (re)integrate.

This assistance can be shaped as a cash allowance for ex-combatants. Cash assistance has been traditionally a predominant tool in reintegration. It contributes to the idea that reintegration should provide a « safety net » as an immediate assistance after the conflict (Kostner, 2001:1). This should cover two categories: the household consumption and the household investment (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:510). On one hand, cash is easily attributed in time-constraint context. On the other hand, this system lacks transparency. Without a clear idea about the way the cash is used, donors can be more reluctant. In the same regard, cash assistance can foster corruption leading to a decreased trust of donors in the well management of their investment.

Assistance is also provided though material entities such as school supplies, clothes, vouchers or shelter. In many countries, a reintegration kit is assembled with both cash and material entities such as clothes. Nonetheless, these elements require ex-combatants to take a survey about their needs beforehand. Considering the time constraint, these limitations make cash the most

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accurate assistance in the most urgent situations (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:512). Reintegration assistance should be provided to all the groups involved in the conflict. Therefore, communities and non-combatants population should be included. For ex-combatants, it can also be difficult to reach the help they seek. They are sometimes seen only though the atrocities committed during the conflict. This can be framed to exclude them from the reintegration process. Kingma disagreed with this view displaying four arguments for the reintegration of ex-combatants. They need to be reintegrated from a humanitarian perspective; as a compensation for their sacrifices and missed educational opportunities; because of the potential they represent for the development process; and because the ex-combatants that are not reintegrated represent a major threat to the peace building process (Kingma, 1999:10). The type of assistance provided has been shifting from individual level to community level, from cash incentives to development programs or community training (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Verkoren et al., 2010; Muggah, 2005).

5.2.Types of programs

There are three different types of DDR programs under the UN approach. Consent-based, also called consensual, programs are based on the volunteer participation of all conflicting parties to hand in their weapons (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:502; Berdal, 1996:24; Tanner, 1996). These approaches involve buy-back programs which consist of exchanging weapons against cash or other kind of material entities. These incentives are designed for ex-combatants to intentionally give back their arms and take part in the DDR program. Buy-back programs focus on individuals while weapons-in-exchange-for-development shift the focus on the community (Muggah, 2005:245). These programs are the most favored types operated by the UN to disarm. The price does not need to be above the black market’s price but it should be enough to compensate the journey to bring in the weapon for ex-combatants (Knight & Özerdem, 2004: 505). The effects on the security promotion have been quite negligible and can be even more insignificant, according to Berdal, if the country targeted by the program has porous borders with a neighboring country that has an active weapon market; has not the capacity to enforce laws or regulations; has a climate, either political, economic or social, that fosters the value of owning a weapon (Berdal, 1996:34). Coercive programs are characterized by at least one of the parties forced to disarm. This can be enforced by local, national or international actors but are mostly executed by coalitions forces operating with a mandate from the UN Security Council (Berdal, 1996; Knight & Özerdem, 2008:501; Tanner, 1996). Coercive approaches can be applied when ex-combatants represent too much of a threat for

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the peace process increasing the chances for the conflict to resume. Compelling programs are a middle ground between the two previous approaches (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:501; Tanner, 1996). They rely on a « carrots and sticks » philosophy.

5.3.Current debate - the Reintegration phase

DDR is not made of three equally balanced phases. In the academic debate as well as in the practitioners and donors’ field, one can observe a clear tension between the two DD and the R. Indeed, the reintegration part is the most difficult one and the least agreed upon in the practitioners realm. As explained above, I refer to R as Reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization are generally operated on a short-term basis and focus on military issues while reintegration addresses a long-term objective and a wider range of issues related to development. Reintegration is more related to peace-building and development of the post-conflict society in that perspective than peace-keeping. Therefore the R component has to be differentiated from the DD. Reintegration is often displayed as the weakest link in the DDR chain (Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015:4). The Institute for Security Studies, an African think-tank, called reintegration « the Achilles heel of DDR » (ISS, 2004). Therefore, for a fair portion of the peace building scholars, DD and R can be seen as two complementary approaches but they cannot be conceptualized and designed together. DD is appropriate to foster non-violent means to optimize the future developments of the post-conflict situation, including reintegration (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:513). This difference needs to be acknowledged to strengthen the role of the reintegration process. Currently, the focus of DDR is on disarmament. Donors and practitioners invest more resources on disarmament and demobilization because they are more military-related. It implies that these programs will be quickly carried out and clearly limited in terms of resources and time. This affects the impact of the reintegration process that require important resources as well but has been overlooked to prioritize the first two components of DDR (Verkoren et al., 2010:16). The relevance of the reintegration process should be highlighted. It represents a broader effort to rebuild social cohesion through social norms and structures (Hazen, 2005:10). Some scholars even argue that the entire concept of DDR should be redefined along the same lines as reintegration. The three components should be designed and implemented on a « long-term perspective » (Verkoren et al., 2010:8).

5.4.Call for redefinition of DDR 5.4.1.New objectives

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The goals of DDR also evolved with the transformation of warfare. The causes for conflict to break out, the technology, the weapons, the actors are continuously evolving requiring DDR to constantly adjust. Muggah and O’Donnell point out the difficulty of implementing peace process in contexts of unfinished conflict (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015:1). International challenges such as terrorism also involves the rethinking of DDR. New strategies have been implemented to face this kind of threat. Counter-Violent Extremism and Terrorism (CVE-T) for example, emphasizes more the Demobilization component of DDR since individuals can represent the biggest weapon in these networks rather than conventional arms. The stretching of DDR generates greater expectations in terms of achievement for the concept (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015:1). The transformation of the organized violence produced a shift emphasizing the potential of DDR for conflict prevention and in that case, extremism prevention.

5.4.2.Security promotion over number of weapons collected

To evaluate the fulfillment of their objectives, practitioners have traditionally looked at the number of weapons collected. This has been true for the past decades since the first DDR programs implemented by the UN until today’s programs. This criteria has been often criticized (Verkoren et al., 2010:2; Muggah, 2005). However, it represents a tangible target. The DDR literature, academic and in practice, has been stressing the need to emphasize human security while establishing DDR programs’ goals. Verkoren et al. even argued for an assessment of community security. Community security derives from human security and is defined by the « trust of neighbors and the sense of participation in and belonging to a community » (Verkoren et al., 2010:2). The level of safety is more abstract and difficult to measure than concrete elements like weapon collections but DDR programs should aim at this type of objective to match with the knowledge’s advancement developed in the field. This contributes to the difficulty to evaluate DDR programs using clear criteria with defined indicators when it is not quantitative measures.

5.4.3.A social contract

An increasing number of scholars wrote on the limit of a security-focused paradigm of DDR. Knight and Özerdem for instance, remark the emphasis of UN programs in that regard causing the constant underestimation of social and economic impact of DDR on ex-combatants (2004:506). They argue for a « social contract » highlighting the struggles of ex-combatants. Indeed, they need to earn a sufficient income to access the basic goods even if they do not have the

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adequate education or skills while facing exclusion when they return to their community (Hazen, 2005). The traditional verticality of the DDR organization and structure would benefit from a more « holistic understanding of » the DDR concept to integrate more horizontal awareness (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:506).

6. Actors involved in DDR

DDR programs are conceptualized, designed and implemented by a diverse pool of actors. At each level and each stage of DDR, this multitude of actors should coordinate their efforts to optimize the results of DDR (Knight & Özerdem, 2004:502).

6.1.UN, World Bank and international organizations

The UN is often displayed as the international leader of DDR. Since there is no dominant, wide consensus-based theoretical doctrine for disarmament, the conceptualization of the concept occurs mainly on the ground. Therefore, the best practices, various reports and official guidelines of the UN became a referential for the DDR field. The latest guideline of the UN is the Integrated DDR Standards, published in 2006. The UN official documentation has been influenced by the current paradigm of the organization. The human security paradigm appeared in the early 1990s during the mandate of Boutros Boutros-Ghali. However, it has been reflected in the official guidelines only in the IDDRS, almost 15 years later. Then, a new paradigm took a predominant place in the UN’s discourses and products: the responsibility to protect.

The UN put DDR on its main agenda making it one of the priority of the organization as a part of peace building processes. While the Millennium goals were not successful, the 2030 sustainable development goals raised more expectations. The sustainable development 16.4. aims at « significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows » by 2030 (UN sustainable development goals, 2015). The indicator for that target is the « proportion of seized, found or surrounded arms » (ibid.), a traditional measure as I explained before.

A majority of the DDR programs were designed and implemented by the PKO granted from a mandate of the UNSC. As warfare’s context and DDR evolved, more UN agencies got involved in the process. One can mention the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR or WFP. However, the influence of peacekeeping operations is still very strong and constitutes a major vector of DDR. Indeed, when peace is established with the support of a peace-keeping operations, it has been found to last longer than peace put in place by a victorious government (Quinn et al., 2007:189). The UN usually takes

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care of the DD component of the overall program (Banholzer, 2013:8). Still, the UN agencies are more and more involved in the reintegration component depending on their field of competences.

Other international organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD also took part in DDR. Like the UN, these organizations usually take care of the DD component (Banholzer, 2013:8). They also participate in international investment which help post-conflict contexts to prevent civil war recurrence (Quinn et al., 2007:189). However, external financial contribution have been criticized as they can fuel a dependent relation between the local level and its donors (Hazen, 2005:10). Nonetheless, most national governments do not possess sufficient resources to take care of the entire DDR on their own. Therefore, external donations are unavoidable and highly needed. External donations are influencing the content of the DDR programs as each donor has its own agenda. The programs funded by the World Bank tend to be more involved with development issues and therefore focus more on the Reintegration part. Some donors also take a role of international mediator in conflict resolution. Therefore, they might invest more in DDR processes that can show results quickly. This is the case for the Disarmament component which is short-term sighted with simple indicators such as the number of weapons collected. Moreover, their preconceive ideas about DDR or about the country where the DDR program they fund is implemented also influence the framing of the process (Muggah, 2005:240). Therefore, the agenda and the position of the donors are influencing the content of the DDR programs.

6.2.Regional actors

The transnational character of the new wars (Kaldor, 1999) explains the increasing presence of regional actors in the DDR field. Civil war do not stop at borders and need to be dealt with at the higher level than the local context. However, the actors at the international level cannot address the specificities of the local situation since they are more bureaucratic and disconnected from the events happening on the ground. Therefore, the regional actors have a great potential to contribute efficiently to DDR. In the same regards, the new aspects of conflict such as terrorism or organized crime also spread out across borders require a coordinate action at the regional level (Muggah, 2005:241). The European Union for example undertook a more important role since the 1990s. The ASEAN, while pursuing a greater role in terms of security in the Southeast Asian region, is also concerned by DDR processes. Regional actors can design and implement them (such as the EU for

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the Aceh conflict) but it constitutes only a few cases. They can be donors while funding some share of each component of DDR.

6.3.National actors

The actors at the national level represent the backbone of DDR programs. The objective for the other stakeholders is to achieve a State monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Verkoren et al., 2010:8). It generally concerns the country’s central government where the conflict is located. International and local actors always need a partner at the national level to coordinate their efforts and implement their part of the process. In some cases, DDR have been carried out with only national actors. This is the case for Sri Lanka, for example, where no international organization was involved.

6.4.Local and community level actors

There seems to be a large shared consensus over the importance to include more local and community-level actors. This will foster more horizontal and bottom up approaches to reach an inclusive DDR style. Actors such as CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) are needed according to Verkoren et al., because they own a precious expertise on the ground tailored to the specific context (Verkoren et al, 2010:17). Furthermore, they represent a credible alternative to a « the militarization of the assistance » (Kingma, 2008:11). This militarization involves higher costs and a strict vertical process where local actors could bring more horizontally since their local expertise will likely reduce the costs compared to the military corps. They will probably be not as time efficient but could de-militarize the social environment and represent an interesting substitute to a « war culture » (Kingma, 1999:11; Anderson, 1999). The community level is crucial as it constitutes the closest level to the concrete program application. The local politics should also be empowered as they must take care of emerging dilemmas. For instance, the amount of humanitarian aid can be considerable compared to the resources of the local or even the national context (Kingma, 1999:11). Therefore, local actors must ensure that the aid will not be exploited by local factions for their own agendas. Other actors such as NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are also operating at this level. They usually take care of the reintegration component of the DDR rather than Disarmament and Demobilization (Banholzer, 2013:8).

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After the end of conflict, the State often lacks capacity to enforce any of its decisions. Even if the State was a belligerent and ended up as the winner, it lacks legitimacy. Without capacities or legitimacy, a mutual distrust takes place between the government and the ex-combatants or the communities involved in the conflict. Therefore, a third party can constitute a credible commitment and foster trust building (Verkoren et al., 2010:14; Doyle & Sambonis, 2000). This third party can also contribute to overcome the security dilemma identified in the section 4.7 (Humpreys & Weinstein, 2007:535). The lack of capacity of the State makes its institutions very weak and can deter ex-combatants to integrate DDR programs as they have no guarantees on the reliability of the state’s decisions. Furthermore, the intervention of a third party external to the conflict decreases the probability of civil war recurrence (Quinn et al., 2007:189). Hence, the presence of a third party can be considered as a facilitator and an asset in DDR processes.

7. Challenges

A considerable number of elements are threatening the peace process and, therefore, the good implementation and success of DDR programs.

7.1.Spoilers

The peace process does not represent a positive opportunity for all, and therefore, DDR, as one of the first steps within this process, can be threatened by individuals defined as « spoilers » by Stedman (1997:5). Indeed, these spoilers might find more benefits in conflicting times and the war society structured at that time. Part of a political economy of violence, their power and interests stem from the war (Stedman, 1997:5). Therefore, they will invest their resources and use violence to disrupt the peace process. DDR actors need to address this issue in order to remove incentives for spoilers to hinder the collective effort put into the programs. Moreover, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be carefully designed and implemented in order to avoid ex-combatants to get frustrated and become spoilers themselves. « Higher ranking officers » have been identified as the ex-combatants group struggling the most to reintegrate (Humpreys & Weinstein, 2007:547). It means that special attention should be given to their expectations and needs to avoid them to become spoilers.

Evluating the success of Disarmenent, Demobilization and Reintegration programs in Southeast Asia

Evaluating the success of Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Programs

in Southeast Asia; the cases of Cambodia,

the Philippines, Sri Lanka and East-Timor

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

I.

Introduction

D

II.

Theoretical Framework - Literature review