The Rise of the Right Wing Populists
A Comparative Case Study of Finland, Sweden and Denmark
Master Thesis in Political Science and International Relations
Franca van Hooren: Politics of Inequality
Emma Erholtz 11265213
23 204 words
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Background
3
1.1 Aim 3
1.2 Research Questions 4
1.3 Outline of the Study 4
2. Conceptual Framework
5
2.1 Defining Populism 5
2.2 Defining Right Wing 6
2.3 Welfare Chauvinism 7
3. Theoretical Framework
9
3.1 Modernisation Losers Theory 9
3.2 Political Opportunity Structures Theory 10
4. Methodological Framework
1
3
4.1 Research Design 13
4.2 Case Selection 14
4.4 Critical Realism 16
4.5 Data Collection and Analysis 17
4.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Methodology 19
5. Populist Right Wing in Denmark
2
0
5.1 Internal Supply 20
5.2 External Supply 26
5.3 Demand 29
5.3.1 Voter Demographics 29
5.3.2 Common Grievances Amongst the Voters 31
5.4 Conclusion 32
6. Populist Right-Wing in Finland
3
3
6.1. Internal Supply 33
6.2 External Supply 36
6.3.1 Voter Demographics 39
6.3.2 Common Grievances Amongst the Voters 42
6.4 Conclusion 44
7. Populist Right Wing in Sweden
4
6
7.1 Internal Supply 46
7.2 External Supply 49
7.3 Demand 52
7.3.1 Voter Demographics 52
7.3.2 Grievances of the Voters 56
6.3 Conclusion 58
8. Comparative Discussion and Analysis
5
9
8.1 Differences and Commonalities of Demand Side Factors 59
8.1.1 Class and Education 60
8.1.2 Socio-Economic Issues 61
8.1.3 Euroscepticism and Globalisation 62
8.1.4 Immigration and Welfare Chauvinism 62
8.1.5 Rural-Urban Divide and the Halo-effect 63
8.1.6 Heteronormative Masculinity 64
8.1.7 Traditional Way of Life 65
8.2 Differences and Commonalities of Supply Side Factors 66
8.2.1 Public Approval and Elite Allies 66
8.2.2 Timing and Benefit of the Economic Situation 67
8.2.3 Politicization of the Immigration Issues 68
8.2.4 Political Cleavages and Niches 70
8.2.5 Party Attachment and Floating Voters 71
8.2.6 Party Origin, Organization and Leadership 72
9. Conclusion
7
4
1. Introduction and Background
1.1 Aim
Populist right wing parties are on the rise all around the world. Whilst many of the continental European countries have witnessed high levels of support for right wing populists, so have the Nordic countries. The True Finns had of 17,7% of all the votes, the Sweden Democrats reaped 12,86% and Danish People’s Party got 21,1% of the votes in the most recent parliamentary elections (Bowden 2015, Mudde 2014). When the phenomena is discussed, the rise of the harsh, nationalistic, right wing attitudes is often blamed on inequalities in the society, yet the Nordic countries are known for high levels of equality and top performance on nearly every societal parameter (Han 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Solt 2011, Carlström 2016, Noack and Gamio 2015, Millington 2017, CIA World Factbook, World Happiness Report 2017, OECD Better Life Index 2017) This brings about the central puzzle of the thesis: how is it that Sweden, Finland and Denmark have experienced such an increase in support for right wing populist parties, when all the preconditions seem to suggest otherwise?
In order to solve the puzzle, a comparative case study between Sweden, Finland and Denmark will be conducted. Whilst all of these countries have been thoroughly researched separately, this kind of comparison has not been done, and it has the ability to bring about new features of the phenomena. All of the countries have relatively similar societies, and the comparison ought to tell us what exactly they have in common and what separates them when it comes to supporting the populist right. In order to do this, the thesis will explore both supply and demand side of these parties. If one is to know how the populist right came to power, it is not enough seek reasons for why people vote for them, but it is equally important to know how they exist in the political structural context. Most of the previous research that studies right wing populist parties has a focus on either demand side, for example by looking
into inequalities or ethnicities, or on the supply side by looking into party structures and such, despite the fact that many researchers encourage combining the two (van der Brug and Fennema 2005, Golder 2016). Often times the two sides are placed against each other, such as in Koopman et al. (2005) research, and demand side is accused of lacking focus on societal networks and structures, whilst supply side disregards the so-called “grievances”. As this is lacking in vast majority of the previous research, this thesis brings unique contribution to the current research by conducting a comparative case study that combines supply- and demand side.
1.2 Research Questions
1. How can we understand the rise of populist right-wing parties in Denmark, Sweden and Finland?
2. What kind of demand- and supply side factors can we identify in these cases, and to which degree are they similar or different?
1.3 Outline of the Study
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter presents the aim and background of the thesis. Chapters two and three are designated to create a methodological and theoretical framework used for the analysis of the material. The following chapters explore the populist right wing parties in Sweden, Finland and Denmark and provide and in depth picture of their nature. Chapter eight focuses on comparative analysis and discussion, and in this section the main focus is in theoretical analysis of the given factors. The last chapter ties the study together by providing more extensive conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2. Conceptual Framework
A clear conceptual understanding of what exactly is populist right wing is still somewhat inadequate, despite the near consensus of what parties ought to be included in that definition (Rydgren 2007, Fennema 1997, Mudde 1996). As this phenomena and the parties manifest themselves in slightly different manners in different contexts, providing a definition of how ‘populism’ and ‘right wing’ are understood in this study is necessary. This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the thesis by first defining populism as it is understood in this study, followed by a discussion of definition of right wing and welfare chauvinism.
2.1 Defining Populism
Characteristic to populism is the division of the society into corrupt elite and the pure people, and diligent use of the anti establishment rhetoric (Mudde 2004, Rooduijn 2015). According to Mudde (2004), this is a universal view that applies to different types of populism, both left wing and the right wing. The division of the society places the two groups against one another, the homogenous group of good people versus the evil elite, and leaves little room for mediation (Rydgren 2007). A common way to create this division between the established elite and the people is to categorise all the other parties in the system as one homogenous group, that collude instead of competing, and hence focus on insignificant, minor issues instead of those that matter, such as national identity and multiculturalism (Schedler 1996). However, when it comes to modern day right wing populism, the elite is not the only group that is separated from the ‘pure people’, the general public. Others, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities face the same treatment (Rydgren 2007). By posing different groups of people against each other and using anti establishment rhetoric, the populist parties aim to distinguish themselves as the opposite of the traditional politics and the political class whilst still trying to avoid appearing anti-democratic (Ibid.). Populist parties tend to face this risk as compromise and mediation are not favoured methods for the nature of these parties, yet both of them are inherently an integral part of the liberal democratic system. Therefore, populist
parties often support increasing the amount of referendums and direct democracy, as they make the people’s voice heard whilst avoiding the hassle of debating and compromising that occurs in traditional democratic system. Ultimately, the populist parties aim to depict themselves as the ‘real champions of true democracy’, fighting for the common man (Rydgren 2007, Mudde 2004).
2.2 Defining Right Wing
To understand the concept of populist right wing parties in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, it must be understood that the conception of ‘right wing’ is very debatable and varies in different parts of the world. Whilst the term “right wing” is an umbrella term underneath which there are multiple different right wings, the common understanding of right wing parties would in its essence focus on right wing economic views. These often include the ideal of free market economy, lack of government involvement in economy and “each man for themselves” policies. For the right wing, there tends to be a strong belief that if the economy is free, it naturally serves everyone’s best interest - quite the opposite of the Nordic welfare model (Betz and Stern 1994). In comparison to traditionally right wing countries, such as the US, the right wing politics as they occur in Finland, Sweden and Denmark are not right wing at all. Taking this into account, it is quite understandable that there is a debate whether or not the parties discussed in this thesis ought to be called right wing in the first place, and possibly it would be better to identify them as centre based populist parties (Ylä-Anttila 2013 & 2014, Niemi 2013, Kunnallisalan Kehittämissäätiö 2015). For this reason, the other often used terms for these parties, such as “extreme right” and “far right” will not be utilized in this thesis . 1
In the Nordic countries, right wing can be distinguished from left wing on the socioeconomic and/or sociocultural standing. Socioeconomic politics include for example debates of desired level of state involvement in economics, whilst the sociocultural politics discuss values, such
as national identity, abortion and immigration. Hence, right versus left can be defined as economic socialism versus economic liberalism or sociocultural liberalism versus authoritarianism (Rydgren 2007). Whilst the parties do hold some more traditional right wing approaches for economy, such as opposition of taxes they deem excessive and ideas of strict individual equality, for chosen cases, the latter definition is the more important one (Rahkonen 2010, Rydgren 2007). Characteristic for the populist right wing in Finland, Denmark and Sweden is their focus on issues relating to national identity, a fear of erosion of the system of ethno-national dominance (Betz and Johnson 2004:323). The idea of ethno-pluralism, the thought that cultures are not inherently better or worse than others, but ought to be separated to preserve the said culture, is prevalent. However, the protective mentality is not limited to immigrants only. Supranationational entities, such as the European Union, and phenomena such as globalisation, are also seen as a threat for the national culture. Essentially, everything and everyone deemed to support homogenisation and globalisation of the culture is a threat to the said culture (Rydgren 2007). These shape the core of the populist right wing politics in Denmark, Sweden and Finland - nationalism, euroscepticism, and anti-immigration mentality.
2.3 Welfare Chauvinism
One of the possibly most striking defining features of these chosen countries is their welfare system, and thus it is not a great surprise that it also plays a crucial role in the agenda of the right wing populists parties (Keskinen 2016, Careja et al. 2016, Norocel 2016). The prevailing concept of welfare has such a high status in all of the three countries that to win the public favour, it must be respected, and in a sense it has become a ‘holy cow’ of a sort. Support for strong, publicly funded welfare regime clearly does not fit in with the common understanding of right wing ideology, yet defending it has become one of the main arguments of the populist right. The concept of right wing populism in Sweden, Finland and Denmark is
rather unique, and according to studies, these parties in fact place themselves in the middle of the spectrum between the ultimate right and the ultimate left (Kunnallisalan Kehittämissäätiö 2015, Andersen 2003, Bolin 2015). Welfare chauvinism, the restriction of immigrants access to welfare services, enables the parties to keep their right-wing policies on socio-cultural aspect whilst leaning to traditionally left-wing positions in some of the socioeconomic issues (Careja et al. 2016). The basic idea is that the welfare benefits ought to be generous, but the receivers should be strictly limited to the citizens of the country. Usually, however, instead of restricting the welfare benefits to all citizens, the aim is to limit it to those citizens who belong to the same ethnicity and have contributed to the state, and are thus “deserving” to receive the said benefits (Kitschelt 2007, Keskinen 2016). This way the economic cost of immigration would remain low. Welfare chauvinism has different manifestations, as it can be either direct, whereby different laws legally apply to immigrants, or indirect, if the laws are the same, yet purposefully affect immigrants in a negative manner (Careja et al. 2016). Policies and attitudes of this type are in contrast with the innate egalitarian nature and principles of the welfare policies, and cause friction in a society. Whilst in the Nordic countries the sentiments of welfare chauvinism are held by many, also the proportion of those deeming immigrants equally deserving of the benefits of the welfare state is higher than in many other countries (Keskinen 2016).
3. Theoretical Framework
This chapter presents the theoretical framework used to select and analyse the material and answer the research question. Theory wise it is important to combine both supply and demand side theories in order to depict the fullest possible picture. In this thesis, this will be done by combining political opportunity structures theory with modernisation losers theory. These are the opposite sides of a the same coin, as the emergence of right-wing populist parties would be impossible without both the will of the public and the suitable political context. This kind of an approach has been neglected in the previous literature that tends to focus either on supply or demand side, yet many researchers have encouraged the combination (van de Brug et al. 2005).
3.1 Modernisation Losers Theory
Modernisation losers theory claims that the support for populist right wing parties derives from opposition of the current trends of globalisation and modernisation from the people who are afraid of being left aside without a status in the future (Golder 2016, Rydgren 2007, Ignazi 1992). It is essentially a combination of the social breakdown thesis, that discusses the breaking down of social structures that creates a sense of not belonging, and the relative deprivation thesis, which focuses on people’s sense of perceived deprivation (Rydgren 2007, Eatwell 2003). For the modernisation losers, a society that is ethnically homogenous and clearly defined, and that values traditional roles, is appealing in order to remain in their current position (Golder 2016, Rydgren 2007). Others state the emergence of right wing populist parties to be a consequence of thorough transformation of socioeconomic and sociocultural structures of Europe from industrial to postindustrial (Betz and Stern 1994). In order to survive in the changed world and be on the winning side in postindustrial world, people need to be flexible and possess cultural capital and individual entrepreneurship, and in
the case those features are lacking, one is in risk to becoming a part of the new underclass that has no part in the new society. Theory of modernisation losers takes into account the great variety of grievances people might have, for example poverty, unemployment and low education, and combines them with a sense of deprivation in the modern society, which whilst compelling, is also rather vague in determining who exactly are the modernisation losers (Minkenberg 2003, Golder 2016). Modernisation losers theory has also been blamed for not yet having researched whether these people indeed feel deprived, and there are claims that the current research lacks in explicitly depicting the causality between being a modernisation loser and voting for the populist right (Rydgren 2007, Golder 2016). However, despite its shortcomings that are inevitably occurring in practically any theory, the modernisation losers theory is the most suitable for the analysis of this topic. As it is essentially a combination of two smaller theories, it gives a broader scope and therefore enables a more comprehensive understanding for why people vote for these populist right wing parties.
For the purposes of this thesis, modernisation losers theory will be employed in order to delve into the demand side of the emergence of the populist right, and shall be used to discover and identify the features that occur in the chosen countries that could explain the rise of the populist right wing. The aim of utilizing this theory is to identify the characteristics of modernisation losers in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and further examine what type of features they possess and whether they are similar or different amongst the chosen countries. The indicators sought after include, but are not limited to the previously named variables that mainly consist of unemployment, poverty, low education level or rural place of residence. As said, a unanimous agreement or rigid and clear definition of who exactly these modernisation losers are is lacking, and therefore prescribing clear variables used to identify them beforehand could hinder the results. To avoid limiting the scope of the study unduly in advance, the theory of modernisation losers is allowed to guide the research in the search of the variables, but not to fully determine it. However, the very nature of the theory encourages to search these variables in a way that acknowledges the context of the phenomena in time and space.
3.2 Political Opportunity Structures Theory
As previously stated, modernisation losers theory, or any other demand side theory in that matter, is not comprehensive or thorough enough to explain why this phenomena occurs. For this reason, the political opportunity structures theory is used along with it. At its very core, it entails that some exogenous factors either enhance or inhibit the mobilization, and furthermore success, of a movement (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Political opportunity can be defined as constant, be it either formal or informal, resources that are external to the party itself. The political opportunity structures identified in relation to voting for populist right wing parties are various and context dependant, but in general discuss the conditions of the context the populist party exists in (Koopman et al. 2005, Betz 2001). What are the structures that have aided those parties rise to power in the three Nordic countries? According to Koopman et al. (2005), political opportunity structures are the force behind mobilizing the feelings of deprivation or any other possible demand side factor, and the reasons on this side explain the great majority of votes on populist right. They are not however the only reasons, and thus the theoretical framework proposed here ought to take into account most of the possible explanations. Rydgren (2004, 2007) identifies five structures that need to be in place for the populist right wing parties to gain support.
1. Niche in political electoral arena needs to exist in order for the populist right-wing parties to emerge and gain support (Kriesi et al. 1995). A niche occurs when the voters and the existing parties location on the political map do not match, and there is a gap for a new party to emerge and gain votes.
2. Realignment and dealignment processes can present favourable political opportunity structures in case that decrease in trust towards political parties occurs whilst the salience of alternative cleavages increases. To the voter, the major parties appear “all the same”, unreliable and distant, and at the similar time the importance of the socio-economic issues lessens whilst the value-laden socio-cultural issues rise in importance.
affected the rise of the populist right wing parties and increased their media coverage.
4. Degree of convergence creates space for emerging parties. It can either cause the sense that all the established parties are essentially the same and hence feed distrust towards them, or directly create niches in the political arena.
5. The presence or absence of elite allies and the cooperation of the established parties can aid the rise in power of the newly emerged parties and give them legitimacy, yet becoming a part of the mainstream can also cause these same parties to fail due to contribution to points 1 and 4.
Naturally these are not all of the possible structures, nor is the gaze in the research process limited to these. One must also keep in mind that the chosen countries do not exist in a vacuum, and thus whilst examining the structures within a country, it must be taken into account that the events occurring in an international level have an affect (Rydgren 2007). These are naturally merely structures that are not necessarily practically favourable, or favourable especially to populist right-wing parties, but that is exactly what the research aims to delve into. Whilst the political opportunity structure theory has faced criticism for being overtly broad and practically including every possible aspect needed to suit the needs of the researches, defining the categories helps in keeping the study under control.
However, Rydgren’s (2007) definitions only focus on the factors that are external to the party, which is somewhat limited for my research and poses a risk of missing important internal factors, and therefore I have turned to the work of Sarah de Lange and David Art (2011) to sufficiently theorise these factors as well. They argue that for the success of these parties, a leader that has strong rhetorical skills, knows how to appeal to people and is generally charismatic to the media and the voters is important. The parties need strong leadership bot internally and externally, but even the strongest leader needs strong party organization. Therefore, in addition to party external political opportunity factors defined by Rydgren (2007), the thesis also looks into the party internal factors in leadership and party organization as presented by de Lange and Art (2011).
4. Methodological Framework
The following chapter discusses the methodological framework chosen for this study. First, overall research design is presented, followed by a discussion of the sampling process of the premises of the thesis. Then, the comparative case study methodology is presented and the critical realist approach to research explained. Finally, the following section handles data collection and analysis, and the whole chapter is finished with a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methodological framework.
4.1 Research Design
This thesis seeks to find explanatory factors behind the rise of populist right wing parties in three of the Nordic countries. Due to the specific setting, the research has a comparative case study design that places great emphasis on the context of the events. A case study, in the most simple form, is an in-depth and thorough examination of a case. Comparative design entails comparing two or more cases to each other, in this case Finland, Sweden and Denmark, in order to discover entailing similarities and differences between the cases (Bryman 2012:72). This is done to achieve more generalisable knowledge, as a single case study has the potential of producing insights that are tightly attached to its premises. Case studies focusing on a single country have been conducted in the past, and whilst they have been extremely useful, conducting a comparison has the ability to bring about new revelations of all three cases. Comparative design allows the deep involvement of a case study design, but also enables further explorations amongst them (Bryman 2012:73, Haverland et al. 2012). This will be done by first exploring the characteristics of each case separately before then comparing them
to each other to find commonalities and differences. As the ultimate goal is to recognise similarities, differences and patterns between the cases, in order to do this in a successful manner, each case is first described to a detail (Goodrick 2014). Aiming for richness in this description aids both the reliability and the validity of the study at hand.
The method of conducting comparative case study research loosely follows the guidelines presented by Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) and George and Bennett (2005, ch. 3) on comparative research, that in the most simple form can be divided into three phases. First, objective, design and structure are formulated, after which this design is carried out accordingly, followed by conclusions that draws from the conducted research and assess the contribution to the design (George and Bennett: 2005 ch.3, p. 73). However, to be more precise, after the initial selection of the research question and formulation of the cases is made, an extensive literature review is carried out to identify variables and conditions that are found to explain the independent variable. In this case, supply and demand side factors of modernisation losers and political opportunity structures theories were identified as having explained the increasing support for populist right wing parties, and thus were singled out for assessment. The selection of variables was kept small, as a large number of variables with a small case selection can lead to a lack of identifiable results. Lastly, the comparisons are conducted by searching for patterns as previously described (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999).
4.2 Case Selection
In order to choose the context best suitable for the study, purposive sampling was used (Bryman 2012:417). As explained by Seawright and Gerring (2008), despite of the inevitable danger of selection bias whenever a researcher actively chooses their cases, it is even more important to pay close attention to the representativeness and appropriateness of the cases. Therefore, random sampling was not a viable option, given the nature and the scope of the research in question (Seawright and Gerring 2008). To begin with, the main interest lies on understanding how populist right wing parties emerged in social democratic welfare regimes.
Therefore the cases chosen could be categorised as deviant cases, as when looking at the bigger picture, they do not quite fit in with the common picture of countries with high levels of support for the populist right wing parties (George and Bennett 2004: 19-55).
However, as the scope of the research is limited to cases with social democratic welfare regimes, the chosen cases are in fact typical cases of that (Bryman 2012: 70, Haverland and Blatter 2012:24, Seawright and Gerring 2008). This implies that the interest to the cases rises from within the cases, and the aim is not to explicitly find what differentiates them, but to gain a deep understanding of the phenomena and identify patterns and tendencies common to them, as is characteristic to typological theorizing (George and Bennett 2005). Typological theorizing allows the combination of within-case analysis and cross-case analysis, and often draws together large bodies of knowledge from various social scientists. It is useful at the initial selection of cases, but also further in the research, as it enables “the promise of cumulation without losing sensitivity to context” (George and Bennett 2005:149). Typological theorizing is especially suitable for this thesis, as it allows the creation of broader, general statements but similarly takes the micro-level into account and allows following of multiple causal relationships (George and Bennett 2005:149, Snow and Ketchen Jr. 2014)
Given the scope of the research, it is evident that one study could not feasibly and reliably conduct a comparative case study amongst all of the countries that fit the description. Focus on too many cases would inevitably water down the substance of the study and it would be especially detrimental for the most important aspect of case study methodology; providing a thorough and in-depth understanding of the cases in question. Yet for the purposes of the this study it would also be problematic to focus on only single case, as then one would risk facing serious problems with generalisability. The explanations found could very well be relevant for other similar states as well, but could also very well be tightly location specific. Therefore, to achieve the main goal of the study, to find the general mechanism behind the phenomena, the scope was limited to three countries: Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The scope of the thesis is also limited by a time period, and whilst the right wing populist parties have long histories in these countries even before taking their current name and form, this research has its main focus on the time after the establishment of the parties as we know them
now, meaning post 1988 for Sweden, and 1995 for Finland and Denmark.
In addition to the previously mentioned criteria, these countries were chosen for multiple reasons. All of these three countries represent the very puzzle in the core of the research, as they are prime examples of states with social democratic welfare regimes that also have a relatively high support for populist right-wing parties. Both theoretically and practically, they are all suitable for the research, and they provide ample data on the aspects of interest. As the conducted study relies on secondary data, it is vital for that data to exist in the first place, and preferably be attainable from multiple sources. This is especially important as the interest is both on the supply and demand side aspects of the phenomena. Extensive research of the phenomena at hand has been carried out by multiple scholars in all of the chosen countries, allowing the use of a plethora of sources for in-depth description of each of the cases. Furthermore, the three chosen countries also have extensive official and government data available of the countries themselves and their political systems. To understand the supply side of the phenomena, namely how these parties have come about and succeeded in the political system in question, there needs to be available data on the political structure of the country. This includes for example information of the other political parties, such as their nature, reputation, voter base and their location on the map of the political system. All of the chosen countries are characterised by the availability of reliable and detailed data and recording of events by the state itself, but also by international organizations. For the reliability of the study, it is vital for each case to fulfill all of the criteria. Additionally, myself having the ability to conduct research in two of these languages gives tremendous advantage to fully understand the nature and the essence of the contexts in the native language, and not having to rely solely on sources written or translated in English.
4.4 Critical Realism
In order to best complement the aim of the thesis, critical realist approach is used. In the most simple sense, critical realism combines positivist and constructivist approaches to research,
and is especially helpful in explaining social events and further exploring the social implications of the thesis (Fletcher 2016). As Bryman (2012:29) explains it by quoting Bhaskar (1989), “we will only be able to understand—and so change—the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. ...These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of the social sciences’. For this critical realist perspective, a great emphasis is on the context, as it “serves to shed light on the conditions that promote or impede the operation of the causal mechanism” (Bryman 2012:29). Therefore, the research does not solely rely on impressions and observations in the manner that constructivists do, nor on formal logic and invariant regularities in search of causality, but combines the two in order to delve into processes and underlying mechanisms (Blatter and Haverland 2012:10). Thus, whilst critical realism was originally presented as an alternative for positivist and constructivist approaches, it in fact draws from both of them (Fletcher 2016).
The implications of the critical realist approach to this thesis ultimately guide the very way of conducting research (Fletcher 2016). As is often the case with critical realism, the study is neither inductive nor deductive, but rather retroductive, a kind of a combination of the two (Bryman 2012:29). A theory guides the research, yet does not determine it, and a suitable theory can be used to reach closer to the reality and the truth (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen and Karlsson 2002). The truth in critical realism consists of three layers that all shape the reality; the empirical or the human experience level, the actual or the unobserved events level, and the real level, which consists of the causal mechanisms to the events observed in the empirical level (Fletcher 2016). For the purposes of this study, the approach supports the understanding of the complex reality in the three chosen cases.
4.5 Data Collection and Analysis
In data collection, the thesis relies on secondary literature analysis. According to Bryman (2012) the principles of purposive sampling can be applied to documents too, and therefore
due to the scope of the research and limitations given by time and resources, the data used will be collected by snowballing data documents and academic articles. Naturally this exposes the study to some issues, such as the publication bias and problems regarding analysis of secondary data, but nevertheless it appears to be most suitable way to fulfill the aims of the thesis. The first and foremost source of information are academic articles. In each of the countries in question, there is ample research done on populist right wing parties, approaching the issue from different angles. These will be utilized as a core when building up each case. In addition, there is plenty of data gathered for example by international organizations and the national governments on income inequalities, levels of unemployment, education and the voting behaviours in each country, and it is far more useful for this thesis to deploy these than make an attempt to contribute to those by myself with limited time and means (Bryman 2012:311, 549). Other often used methods of data collection, such as interviews and questionnaires of individuals, would scarcely add validity or interest to my research, whilst secondary analysis allows more focus be to put in the analysis and interpretation process. Using this kind of data is an attempt to contribute to triangulation, and using data directly from the original source instead of barely relying on academic articles increases the validity of the study.
The data collection and analysis are heavily influenced by the critical realist approach, as it defines the understanding of knowledge that is attainable (Fletcher 2016). It is important to understand that whilst the analysis is not, and could not, aim to provide straightforward answers and strict causalities, the results reflect the context and strive for truthfulness (Fletcher 2016). The analysis begins with search for demi-regularities, or tendencies, instead of strict rules and laws that would imply that ‘in the case of Y, always X’. The complex, layered construction of reality prohibits this, and therefore tendencies of patterns and trends are sought after (Danermark et al. 2002). First, each case is examined on its own for demi-regularities, only after which the same procedure is executed amongst the three chosen cases. This ought to bring about general patterns of different levels, some more specific to the setting, but also those of more general nature.
4.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the
Methodology
Despite its suitability for this particular research, the chosen methodology is not without room for criticism and pitfalls. Case studies are often criticised for subjectivity, largely as a result of failure in transparency, thus raising questions about the validity of the research - some go as far as to question its role as a scientific method (Flyvbjerg 2006). However, this can be avoided by following good practises and with great emphasize on thick description. The strengths of this methodological framework far outweigh the weaknesses, as the comparative case study methodology has the ability to go beyond statistics whilst still holding on to a level of generalisability (Flyvbjerg 2006, Zainal 2007). Case studies are also sometimes criticised for lacking in ability to test hypotheses or theories, and are only recommended to be used in pioneer studies. However, with suitable, strategic selection of cases that provide the richest amount of detail of the question, this can be avoided. For this thesis, this is present by opting out of random sample, and instead choosing few cases based on their validity (Flyvbjerg 2006). Regarding the suitability for theory or hypotheses testing, this kind of comparative case study conducted is heavily described and thus allows the researcher to track down variables that prove to be important later in the research, and that were not initially the primary focused variables. As even the possibly surprising outcomes are not excluded, the research has the ability to adapt and come closer to the reality one aims to depict, and therefore provide valuable insights to the theory as well (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, George and Bennett 2005). Furthermore, the comparisons between the cases bring about extra value by improving the conclusiveness, and as the observed patterns can be systematically compared to other cases in order to avoid strictly case specific results, and it therefore increases validity and generalisability of the study (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, Flyvbjerg 2006).
5. Populist Right Wing in Denmark
This chapter delves into the case of Denmark and the Danish People’s Party. The discussion is divided into three main sections: internal supply, external supply and demand. Internal supply focuses on organizational structures and the active efforts of the party itself to gain popularity (Mudde 2007, Kitschelt 1995, Erlingsson et al. 2012). External supply again explores the context the party exists in, and the opportunity structures the parties must take advantage of if they are to succeed (Hansen 2016). Lastly, the demand section discusses the voter demographics and the common grievances found amongst them.
5.1 Internal Supply
In the beginning of 1970’s, Denmark became famous for having the strongest populist right wing party in Europe, the Progress Party, with 15,9% of votes, a trend that has continued in the Danish politics (Rydgren 2004 & 2010, Pedersen 2006, Meret 2010). The Progress Party was first and foremost an anti-tax party that was extremely popular, yet fell apart due to the nearly anarchical party structure that led to internal disarray and chaos (Andersen 2003, Meret 2010, Smolnikov 2017). The Danish People’s party was founded in 1995 as Pia Kjaersgaard, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Poul Nodgaard and Ole Donner abandoned the Progress Party to establish the Danish People’s Party. At the time of the establishment, the future success of the party could not be anticipated, and it was generally expected to be short lived, yet it first got into the parliament as early as 1998 (Meret 2010, Smolnikov 2017). Prior to the watershed elections of 2001 where the Danish People’s Party gained 12% of the votes, Denmark had witnessed a nearly unbreakable rule of the Social Democrats (Skidmore-Hess 2003, Smolnikov 2017). The Danish People’s Party distinguishes itself from the other successful Nordic right wing populist parties especially by its early rise to power in the first
years of the new millennia (Andersen 2003).
In the elections of 2015, the Danish People’s Party gained the second best results with 21% of the votes, and increase of nearly 9% since the previous elections in 2011, as can be seen in the table below (Leonards 2015, Smolnikov 2017).
Source: danskfolkeparti.dk
The Danish People’s Party is first and foremost profiled as an anti-immigration party. Despite the overwhelming homogeneity of the Danish population, with 98% of the people in 1989 born in Denmark and 5% immigrant population by 2000, the Danish People’s Party established itself as a party with an agenda to preserve the homogeneous Danish ethnic identity, thus politicising the relatively unknown topic of immigration (Skidmore-Hess 2003).
Source: The World Bank
Given this novelty politicisation of the issue and despite of the recent influx of refugees from the Bosnian war, the xenophobic tones took academics by a surprise, especially as the major topic of the elections was predicted to be taxation (Leonard 2015, Smolnikov 2017, Skidmore-Hess 2003). As the party leader Pia Kjaersgaard put it, people were scared of the rising number of immigrants, and “want to send immigrants back to where they came from” (Smolnikov 2017). Due to these fears, restriction to immigration were put in place in 2002, but as the immigration did not slow down immediately, the Danish People’s Party continued to gain popularity with their harsh policy proposals, such as deportation of both the immigrant that has committed a crime as well as their family (Skidmore-Hess 2003, Smolnikov 2017). The party has been able to avoid the racist and anti-democratic stigma by forming a master frame of ethno-nationalistic xenophobia that feeds anti-immigration sentiments and anti-political establishment populism to raise political protest (Rydgren 2004 & 2010, Meret 2010). In addition, the party holds extreme views of immigration, and argues that some immigrants are impossible to integrate into the Danish society and therefore not before long the Danes will become a minority in their own country. They strictly oppose the idea of Denmark becoming a multicultural society and do not see a possibility for different cultures to live side by side, as that would lead to the destruction of national identity, followed by anti-democratic movements and violence (Smolnikov 2017).
Another major issue for the Danish People’s Party, aside from immigration, is the membership of the European Union. The Danish People’s party strongly opposes the membership of the EU, largely due to their ideals of fully independent nation state, national identity and culture (Meret 2010). According the the party, the leaders in Brussels and Strasbourg are much too far from the everyday life and people in Denmark, and are therefore not able to see the real needs of the people, and thus unsuitable to hold power over them. The party does not, however, oppose all European cooperation, but stands against European integration that according to them has gone too far. In their opinion, there should be no higher authority above the national parliament, and therefore they disapprove both the Schengen treaty and any kind of European constitution. Especially the Schengen treaty is perceived negatively, as they perceive the EU to support open borders for all. Given their stance on multiculturalism and immigration, the treaty, and along with it the EU, is problematic to the party policies (Meret 2010).
Table 5.3: European Parliament election results and party attitudes towards the EU and globalisation
Vote share (%) Seats won Attitudes toward EU Attitudes toward globalisation Danish People’s Party 26,6 4 -24 +3 Social Democrats 19,1 3 +27 +36 Left, Liberal Party 16,7 2 +49 +45 Socialist People’s Party 11,0 1 +18 +32 Conservative People’s Party 9,1 1 +66 +70 People’s Movement 8,1 1 - -
Against the EU
Radical Left 6,5 1 +62 +57
Liberal Alliance 2,9 0 +43 +47
Source: Meret and Borre 2014
Despite the Danish People’s Party’s roots in anti-taxation Progress Party, keeping up s strong welfare state is one of their priorities. Along with the anti-EU stance, support for the welfare regime is at the very core of the Danish People’s Party policies (Meret 2010). The welfare services should, however, be a privilege of the native citizens. As the strong welfare regime is perceived to be at the core of the Danish society, it therefore must be safeguarded, mainly against immigrants. For the party, it has been important to support the welfare regime, but also to cut down any misuses and abuses. By creating an image where the party cares especially for those that are elderly or otherwise in a vulnerable position in the society, combined with criticism towards the welfare abuses of the immigrants, the party has gained more electoral appeal (Meret 2010). Unlike the Progress Party, they avoid making the mistake of going against the vastly favourable attitudes towards the welfare state the majority of the Danish voters hold. However, despite the pro-welfare stance, the party does seek to lower taxes to achieve the level of other countries similar to Denmark, but doing so whilst still respecting what is required for a functional welfare state (Dansk Folkeparti 2007).
All in all, the Danish People’s Party has an ideology that appeals to voters. However, similarly important to the success of the party are its internal structures. As briefly mentioned, the predecessor of the Danish People’s Party, the Progress Party, had severe issues with the party structure and internal leadership, leading to near anarchic situations with disobedience and chaos (Andersen 2003, Rooduijn 2015, de Lange and Art 2011). Eventually, the party gained a bad reputation of unreliability and disagreements, and the inner conflicts aided the way for the party to fall apart. Therefore, ever since the establishment of the Danish People’s Party, it has been a dire necessity to secure a more functional and unified party structure in order to avoid the mistakes made in the past (Andersen 2003, Pedersen 2006, de Lange and Art 2011). In the front row of this development has been the long time charismatic party leader Pia Kjaersgaard, a strong internal leader, who has promoted a strict
policy that is intolerant to any internal power struggles or disagreements (Rooduijn 2015, de Lange and Art 2011). She has declared the new, centralised party leadership to be vital to avoid the previous chaotic situations, and kept the rest of the party in close control (Andersen 2003, Pedersen 2006). In practice, the strategy presents itself as strong top-down leadership and exclusion of party members who do not agree with the leaders or hold too extreme ideas (Pedersen 2006, Andersen 2003, Meret 2010). The achieved unified position has been favourable to the party support, along with its strategical decision to remain outside of the government. The party has held a supportive role to other parties instead of seeking to get to the core of power itself. Therefore, they have managed to gain possibly more influence than they would have in the government, and are able to place pressure on issues important to them from the outside, without having to take all of the responsibilities (Meret 2010).
Due to this position, the Danish People’s Party has been able to pose hard criticism towards the political establishment and the old major parties, and albeit less, it still does so even after the parliamentary elections of 2001 when it became the unofficial coalition partner of the non-Socialist government (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). Despite their pivotal position in the parliament and what is undeniably at the very core of the political elite, the Danish People’s Party presents itself as an outsider to the political establishment, whilst the traditional parties are a homogeneous group that is all the same, thus presenting the politics as “us” and “them” instead of “us” (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). In addition of opposing the national political elite, the Danish People’s Party holds similar sentiments towards the European Union. The party has been successful in taking advantage of this niche, and its voters tend to favour strong borders despite being less internationally oriented (Meret 2010). Whilst there are other parties that oppose the membership of the EU, the Danish People’s Party is the only one that also opposes the cultural liberal positions towards immigration and multiculturalism, therefore attracting voters from other EU-sceptic parties that mainly lean on the left (Rydgren 2004).
5.2 External Supply
On the external supply side, many factors have been favourable to the success of the Danish People’s Party. Relatively easily gained public approval has greatly enhanced the party’s access to popularity, especially when compared to countries where similar parties have faced strong objection and stigmatization. The party has its roots in an populist protest party, and it has been a significant asset in comparison to those parties that have their roots in more stigmatised racist and extremist groups (Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). Despite the initial criticism towards Pia Kjaersgaard from the Social Democratic party, the Danish People’s Party did not face severe opposition (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). In fact, despite disagreeing with the party, the other major parties felt a need to respond to people’s fears of increasing immigration and therefore restrictions to immigration were put in place (Smolnikov 2017). Also, since the parliamentary elections of 2001, the Danish People’s Party has been at a pivotal position in the parliament and the political sphere, whilst not in the government itself (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004). To maintain the public approval, the Danish People’s Party has to walk on a thin line: criticise the established elite enough without contradicting democracy, and oppose immigration and criticise immigrants whilst avoiding biological racism (Rydgren 2004). The party does oppose biological racism and anti-democratic attitudes that were in vogue with the populist right wing parties of the World War era, as those opinions are not in favour of the vast majority of the voter base. Therefore, the party promotes more direct democracy that allows the voice of the people to be heard, and tries to fend off groups that associate too much with nazism and fascism to avoid stigmatization.
Another beneficial factor to the success of the Danish People’s Party is the politicization of immigration issues. Prior to the emergence of the Danish People’s Party, and to some degree its predecessor Progress Party, immigration issues did not receive much space in political debates, yet nowadays the issue is at the front and centre of the whole political field (Leonard 2015, Rydgren 2004). This is not to say that anti-immigration, xenophobic attitudes did not exist, they merely had not yet entered the political sphere as the voters found other issues,
such as taxation, more important (Andersen 2003). As Denmark saw increasing numbers of asylum-seekers in 1985, the timing for the Danish People’s Party to politicise the immigration issue was impeccable, and the media soon picked up on it (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004). The politicisation resonated with the voters, and even in the media the immigrant issues were typically presented as problematic. The widespread negatively toned media attention itself brings an air of legitimacy on the topic, and increases its salience both in public and political debate (Rydgren 2004). Naturally, given the newly found salience of the topic, the Danish People’s Party itself received increased media attention as well. In a similar manner as the Social Democrats used to have issue-ownership over welfare issues, the Danish People’s Party gained issue-ownership over immigration (Andersen 2003). Furthermore, the politicisation of immigration issue has become even more important to the political debate in Denmark as the other major parties have taken part in it, making it an important dividing socio-cultural factor. As the Danish People’s Party has a central role in the immigration debate, the way it has been recognised as an important topic by other parties and the media has made the party a legitimate force to be reckoned with (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004).
elections from those who switched from another party they voted in the 2011 elections. Source: DR.dk
Over time, Denmark along with many other countries has experienced shrinkage in the scope of the traditional parties. The political field as a whole has moved closer together, thus leaving room for the populist right wing to grab space from left and right (Leonard 2015). The populist right has been able to attract the working class people with low education levels who traditionally voted for the Social Democratic Party the Liberal Party, whilst in turn the left wing parties have seen increased support from those with high levels of education (Meret 2010). Due to this development of changing political landscape, Denmark of today has a large number of voters that do not have strong party affiliations. Whilst people tended to vote according to the class before, they were also much more tied to a specific party. For the Danish People’s Party, as well as any other new party, this is extremely beneficial, as there are much more voters that can be mobilized to vote (Rydgren 2004). Much of the dealignment can be attributed to the general sentiments of all major parties being the same, with few real alternative options. As the voters could not see any substantial differences amongst the parties, there is space for a new fresh alternative to emerge - which in the case of Denmark was the right wing populist Danish People’s Party. Also, the traditional working class ties to Social Democratic Party were broken, and left voters floating between the parties, many of whom turned to the Danish People’s Party (Meret 2010). Therefore, it is evident how the political realignment was extremely beneficial for the populist right wing.
5.3 Demand
5.3.1 Voter Demographics
The Danish People’s Party enjoys its greatest popularity in the countryside amongst men with blue collar jobs and low education, and it is the biggest party in the large areas Själland and southern Jylland, areas perceived to be the opposite of the capital city of Copenhagen (Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). The people from these areas traditionally used to vote for the Social Democrats, but now vote for the populist right wing party that has morphed itself into new working class party (Andersen 2003). The Danish People’s Party has managed to create an image of a movement that appeals for those in disadvantaged position in the modern world, those who are left behind (Rydgren 2004). The Europe-wide change from industrial to postindustrial society and economy has not left Denmark aside, and has caused a change in voting patterns that used to follow class differences. As the increasingly diverse job market demands more specialisation and education, and as the industrial sector as a whole is shrinking, people struggle with the new demands. Danish Election Surveys point out that unlike the voters of other parties, only very few of the voters of the Danish People’s Party have experienced improvement in their economic situation during the last five years or expect improvement in the near future (Meret 2010). Therefore, they vote less according to their class and more based on socio-cultural values than before, and hence turn to the Danish People’s Party that promises to bring back the simple olden days with traditional values (Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). Thus, whilst the voting for the Danish People’s Party is indeed higher in the rural areas, the location itself is not of much importance. Rather, the change from industrial to postindustrial society and class to socio-cultural voting is more prominent in rural than urban areas.
Table 5.4: Support for the Danish People’s party by age, gender and class
Men Women Men Women
Age 19-29 23 % 15 % 7 % 7 %
Age 30-39 22 % 17 % 6 % 6 %
Age 40+ 17 % 14 % 9 % 7 %
Source: Andersen 2003
Also, despite the fact that the Danish People’s Party has long been under a strong leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard, the voter base and the party remained male dominated until the parliamentary elections of 2001. Compared to other similar parties, the Danish People’s Party has not taken such a harsh line with non-married or homosexual people, and does not seek to refuse their rights, yet the traditional family with children is considered a valuable basis of the Danish society. The party has also taken some interest in gender equality issues, and the party objects the practice of Muslim women wearing a veil to the degree that it has become an emblem in their policy (Meret 2010). Most importantly, in general the Danish women tend not to vote parties labeled as “extreme”, and lean more towards leftist parties as they do not hold conservative values (Meret 2010). As the party has become increasingly accepted by the public and its views are no longer perceived at odds with other right wing parties, the share of female voters has increased.
Source: DR.dk
5.3.2 Common Grievances Amongst the Voters
For the longest time, Denmark was a fairly homogeneous society, with largest numbers of immigrants coming from other Nordic countries or Europe. However, one of the first large scale influxes of immigrants came with the Bosnian war, and sparked fear in many Danes (Smolnikov 2017). The Danish People’s Party remains the only openly anti-immigration party in Denmark, and therefore it attracts those who fear the consequences of so-called open borders and mass immigration. Indeed, when compared to the other parties, the voters of the Danish People’s Party are most concerned of the effects of the immigration. Especially amongst manual workers and pensioners the fear of immigration is prevalent, and as much as 51% see the increased immigration as a threat towards national identity and culture. As Meret (2010) argues, the anti-immigration policy attracts the voters, but the social policy helps keeping them.
As stated in the previous chapter, for a long time, the Danes also used to vote according to their class. The working class voted for the Social Democrats and the more affluent members
of the society voted for right wing Liberal Alliance. However, due to the shift to postindustrial society, the importance of the economic cleavage has increasingly lessened to the voters, whilst the socio-economic cleavage has gained more weight (Andersen 2003, Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). Therefore, the issues that were of high importance for the economic cleavage have become less salient with the socio-economic cleavage, as can be seen with the rising attention given to immigration issues, multiculturalism, gender equality, traditional family values and the EU membership (Kriesi et al. 1995, Rydgren 2004, Meret 2010). These aforementioned issues are the ones that often carry the most importance for the voters when they choose to support the Danish People’s Party, and few people mention economic policy to be a priority when deciding whom to vote (Rydgren 2004). However, to say that the voting does not follow class lines is not to say that class does not matter in the voting process. The Danish People’s Party is, as said, a working class party, and frequently poses criticism to intellectuals, artists and academics as they are without “common sense” and have prejudice against the party (Meret 2010).
5.4 Conclusion
Conclusively it can be said that the overall supply and demand side factors have been extremely beneficial to the Danish People’s Party, and it can be seen in the early success of the party and high voting levels. The party has managed to combine appealing ideology and strong leadership and organization and has greatly advantaged of the public approval and political situation. All of these factors combined with the existing grievances of the people have created a winning formula for the party’s success.
6. Populist Right-Wing in Finland
This chapter discusses the populist right wing party of Finland, the True Finns, and is separated into three sub-chapters. The first chapter aims to give a clear picture of the True Finns party by discussing their ideology and political stances as well as internal supply factors that have affected their success. Secondly, the external supply side factors are discussed in order to to understand why the True Finns have gained such support in Finland, as in addition to understanding how the party works, it is important to know the exact place and situation of the said party in the broader party system. Lastly, demand side factors are explored, and the third section focuses on understanding who exactly are the people that vote for the True Finns, what is it that unifies them and what are the issues that matter for them when casting a vote.
6.1. Internal Supply
The True Finns, or the Finns Party, is the fourth biggest party in Finland that rose to popularity with its populist, nationalist rhetoric after the financial crisis of 2008 (Rahkonen 2010, Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2014). Much of the popularity derived from the stagnation of the political scene that had been dominated by three major parties for decades (Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio 2017). The True Finns party was founded in 1995 after its predecessor, the agrarian populist Finnish Rural Party was dissolved. Originally the True Finns held the same values and identified as a protest party for the rural smallholders, yet over time it has grown into a considerable party that reaches people from many walks of life (Rahkonen 2010). The recently resigned leader of the True Finns, Timo Soini, was already actively involved in the Finnish Rural Party, and he is often seen as the follower of the party’s infamous populist leader, Veikko Vennamo (Yli-Ojanperä 2011). As Soini has been the leader of the True Finns practically as long as the party has existed, he has become its well-known face.
As said, the True Finns party is strongly identified with its leader, Timo Soini, who recently stepped down (Niemi 2013). He is perceived as a strong, charismatic leader, to whom people listened to as he spoke in common language instead of political jargon. Soini managed to make complicated and complex politics understandable to every Joe, partly due to his manner of speaking, but given the party’s populist take, also by simplifying difficult issues. As argued by Matthijs Rooduijn (2015), a party needs this kind of strong external leadership. According to Niemi (2013), for a breakthrough of a populist party like the True Finns, there needs to exist general discontent of the prevailing political situation, ability for the party to exploit and feed on these sentiments, but also a strong, charismatic leader to formulate the message and get it through in the media. Soini has been able to strategically respond to challenges presented by the media already prior to the electoral breakthrough of 2011, but also to influence the voters outside the media presence (Ibid.) However, as said, Soini recently stepped down, and Jussi Halla-aho, who is known for being more extreme in his opinions of immigration and value issues, took the position as a party leader. As the change
in party elite split the party apart, it can be seen that whilst the external leadership under Soini was strong, the internal leadership was not, and the party was not united enough to cope with this change (Rooduijn 2015).
In addition to having a strong leader, the somewhat lenient internal ideological stances of the party have aided the party's success. Being a fairly new party rising from the ashes of a former protest movement, the alignments and different ideological standings within the party are more pronounced than within those parties that are older and more established. Whilst some attributes are common to all of the True Finns candidates, such as immigration criticism, there exists a more radical and a more moderate wing within a party. However, the candidates of the party are also positioned far wider in the right wing - left wing axis than the candidates in other parties (Ylä-Anttila 2014). This division is partly due to the young age of the party, but also their strategy of “exceeding the traditional right-left division” (Ibid.). It can be argued, that by a rough generalisation, the candidates from the rural areas lean more towards left-wing populism in their criticism towards monetary elite, a relic from the preceeding party, whilst in general the party is moving towards a economic right in its way of becoming a more typical Nordic radical right wing party (Jungar and Jupskås 2014, Ylä-Anttila 2014, Pitkänen and Westinen 2016). It must, however, be kept in mind that even the more leftist wing of the True Finns promotes these economic views only amongst the native Finns, not immigrants (Ylä-Anttila 2014).
As previously stated, the True Finns have had two groups amongst them: the relatively moderate group of Soini, that does not find immigration or EU-membership the most important questions and are more cooperative in the government, and the group of Halla-aho, that holds the EU-question and immigration issues at the very top of their priorities (Sundqvist 2017, Kinnunen 2017). As Halla-aho was elected, the whole party leadership was changed to people who support his hard line, a decision that lead to the party falling apart. Currently, there are the hard-line True Finns and Halla-aho, and a new group called the Blue Future, that is the majority of the old True Finns who left the party but remain in the government. The extremist True Finns seek to follow the lead and cooperate with the Sweden Democrats, unlike before when the party was seen too extreme and stigmatized, and they appear to do so to the extent where the government refuses to continue working with them.
The government had indeed chosen to dissolve had not the Blue Future separated from the True Finns (Konttinen 2017, Konttinen and Heima 2017). The Blue Future and the government argue that the True Finns are influenced by racist, nazist and extremist groups, and therefore future cooperation is impossible, much like in Sweden (Loxbo 2015). The newest developments can be seen as a sign of the basic strategy and ideology issue these parties face, the choice between too extreme and electorally weak party, and relatively moderate and more popular party (Rydgren 2007, Golder 2016). In the True Finns, differing views on these difficult issues lead to the whole party tearing apart. Whether the remaining True Finns will face similar political stigmatization and ostracization in the future as the Sweden Democrats, remains to be seen.
