Preaching politicians : the development and relevance of Dutch small orthodox Protestant parties

Preaching Politicians

The Development and Relevance of

Dutch Small Orthodox Protestant Parties

Abstract

Until well into the 1990’s, Small Orthodox Protestant Parties (SOPP’s) in the Netherlands were regarded as politically irrelevant, utterly predictable and even interchangeable, being dubbed the “small Christian right”. In recent years this has changed, however. Since the ChristenUnie (CU) entered government in 2006 and the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) participated in the so-called “backseat consultations” of 2012, these parties have been closer to political power than ever before. There are also signs of ideological divergence: while the SGP is generally still considered a right-wing Orthodox party, the CU has become more moderate, describing itself as “Christian-social”. This thesis identifies the defining characteristics of both parties – explaining how they differ from mainstream political parties and from one another, and how they developed into the parties they are now – by analyzing historical literature on these parties through the lens of political scientific framework on party typologies. Furthermore, a content analysis of speeches given by the SOPP’s during the

Algemene Beschouwingen (General Debate) from 1990-2016 will be conducted,

analyzing the most recent developments. It is argued that the SOPP’s once represented clearly demarcated quasi-ethnic social bases in society that provided them with natural electoral support. The CU’s connection to such a natural social base has weakened, however, creating the necessity to seek support from new electoral groups and to distinguish itself politically from other religious parties. The SGP on the other hand shows more signs of continuity, although recent developments might herald similar changes in the future.

Key terms: CU; GPV; RPF; SGP; Small Orthodox Protestant Parties; Dutch Politics; Party Typologies; Algemene Beschouwingen; Content Analysis

Introduction

Dutch politics is changing. For decades, it was known for its political stability, (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014), but now extreme volatility characterizes it. At the 2017 Parliamentary elections, the social-democratic Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party; PvdA) lost 29 of its 38 seats; the biggest electoral loss ever witnessed in Dutch Parliamentary history (Houten, 2017). For many years the PvdA, the conservative-liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; VVD), and the Christian-democratic

Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal; CDA) (Andeweg & Irwin,

2014) won most of the votes, but now these parties hold just over 40 percent of the seats. The new government coalition will need at least four parties to reach a majority, a situation not witnessed in the Netherlands for decades.

An indirect effect of this increasing volatility and fragmentation is that the Small Orthodox1 _{Protestant Parties (SOPP’s) – the Staatkundig Gereformeerde} Partij (Reformed Political Party; SGP) and the ChristenUnie (ChristianUnion; CU)

– have gained manifest political relevance (cf. Sartori, 1976/2005). The CU already showed its relevance in 2006, when it became part of the then government coalition, but the more Orthodox SGP has also become relevant by participating in the so-called “backseat consultations” with prime minister Mark Rutte in 2012 (Visser, 2012) and aiding the former government coalition Rutte II in 2013 when it needed its numbers in the senate to pass the parliamentary budget, resulting in the so-called “autumn agreement” (Vliegenthart, 2013). It is quite a change compared to the 1990s, when the SGP and the predecessors of the CU – the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League; GPV) and the Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (Reformatory Political Federation; RPF) – were lumped together under the label “small Christian right” and characterized as utterly predictable and relatively powerless. They now do

1 _{“Orthodox” can be understood as “closely following the established beliefs of a religion”}

(Merriam-Webster, 2017). In the SOPP abbreviation it will be used to distinguish religious political parties that explicitly use religion as their guiding principles, like the SGP and the CU, from those religious parties that have become more general and secular, like the CDA. It will also be used – cf. Bos (2010) – to contrast a sub-group of Reformed Christians that emphasize their “societal responsibility” (Orthodox Reformed) with a sub-group that emphasizes the inner and personalized experience of the faith (Pietistic Reformed), even though the latter group technically also closely follows the established beliefs of their religion.

not only have direct political influence, but are also different ideologically. The SGP is still considered an Orthodox right-wing party, but the CU has become a more environmentally oriented, economically middle-of-the-road party (Hippe & Voerman, 2010). They do no longer fit under one label.

Because of their SOPP’s alleged “irrelevance”, political and social scientists tended to leave this subject matter for historians and theologians to research (e.g. Fieret, 1990; Zwemer, 1992; Klei, 2011; Mulligen, 2014b). With their newfound political influence, however, there is an increased urgency to gain insight into their goals and nature. To fully understand them, however, it is first necessary to seek out the factors explaining different trajectories the SOPP’s took since the 1990’s. The main research questions are therefore: 1. Which factors contributed to the different trajectories of the SOPP’s since the 1990s?

2. What are the defining characteristics of the CU and SGP; how do they differ from mainstream political parties, and from one another?

For answering these questions, a mixed methods design will be applied. In the Theoretical Framework, scholarly literature on party typologies will be discussed, seeking out the different functions and characteristics that distinguish parties from one another. There will be special attention for the specific nature of Dutch politics and the atypical parties it might produce. Given the limited political and social scientific literature on SOPP’s, historical literature on the histories and development of the SGP and CU – including its predecessors: GPV and RPF – will be analyzed in the Historical Framework through the lens of the content discussed in the Theoretical Framework. To extend the analysis into the present, a content analysis of political speeches held by the SOPP’s during the

Algemene Beschouwingen (General Debate) will be covered in the Methods and

Results sections. The Discussion section will integrate the historical and content analyses, answering the main research questions. The thesis will end in the

Theoretical Framework

In the literature on political parties, we can roughly distinguish three ‘families’ of party typologies. The first is based on the genesis and ideological base of political parties, and is heavily inspired by the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on “cleavage theory”. The second is functionalist and focuses on the organizational structure of parties and their relation to civil society. Finally, there is an approach that combines aspects of the other families. They will be discussed consecutively. The chapter ends with some remarks on the specific nature of Dutch politics and the special party types it produces.

The First Family: Cleavages and Ideology

The first type of typology is based on cleavages, the idea that voters can be divided into oppositional voting blocks. While there were numerous cleavages present in western societies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that political parties in 20th _{century Western Europe were the product of four “basic”}

cleavages. Two emerged due to the process of state centralization: the central elites vs. subjects in the periphery, and the nation-state vs. the church. The others emerged due to the industrial revolution: landed interests vs. industrial entrepreneurship, and capital vs. labor. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) saw the Netherlands as a prime example of institutionalized segmentation based on such cleavages, dividing society amongst religious and economic class lines.2

Von Beyme (1985) elaborated upon this line of thinking by arguing that because these basic cleavages were the same across Western European countries, they should also produce similar types of parties. He classified parties into different Party Families, – Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, etc. – a now common way to describe and compare parties across countries. Further elaborations in this branch of literature often seek to prove or disprove the emergence or disappearances of specific cleavages. Inglehart (1977), for example, argued that a new cleavage emerged due to a generational distinction between materialist and post-materialist values, leading to the establishment of new party families like the Greens/Environmentalists. More recently, scholars have argued that globalization has caused a new cleavage, dividing society into

those who do and do not benefit from it, explaining i.a. the success of right-wing populist parties (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2005; Milanovic, 2016).

This branch of literature has also seen some criticisms, however. Although there is general agreement that social cleavages could once explain a great deal of variance in party choice in western democracies – around 30 percent in most countries until the 1960s (Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992) –this has decreased to around 10 percent in the mid-1980s, and for most countries below 10 percent by 2004, showing that individuals are voting less based on group loyalties (Franklin, 2009). It is furthermore unclear whether voters in new voting blocs, organized around new cleavages, are aware of their objective positions and shared interests, and if political parties specifically represent the interests of these groups. If these conditions are not met there is a great chance that people vote for different reasons that just happen to be coterminous with their “group membership”, at which point the cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan offers little explanatory value (Franklin, 2010). The Second Family: Organization and Civil Society The second type of typology finds its genesis in the work of Weber (1919/1946), who made a distinction between parties that had a basis in local organizations of notables and elites, and parties that were based on thick bureaucratic machines. Duverger (1959) used this distinction to differentiate between Cadre Parties led by individuals of high socioeconomic status, and Mass Parties that mobilized broad sections of the electorate through the development of large and complex organizations. Kirchheimer (1966) elaborated on this line of thinking by proposing an additional party type, the Catch-All Party (comparable to the

Electoral-Professional Party cf. Panebianco, 1988), characterized by the fading

role of strong ideology and the appearance of strong leadership, attempting to secure support from different social classes.

Katz and Mair (1994; 1995) argued that most party types appeared in reaction to other party types, while not necessarily replacing each other. They see it as an evolutionary process, which may be simplified as containing four different stages characterized by a gradual shift in the functions of parties as actors between state and civil society. The Cadre Party arose in the late

19th_{/early 20}th _{century when voting rights were limited and civil society and the}

state were overlapping in practice. In this era, “… parties were basically committees of those people who jointly constituted both the state and civil society” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 9). The second stage saw the introduction of the Mass Party, representing and emancipating existing, well-defined social groups left underrepresented by the Cadre Parties. The Mass Parties served as a bridge between civil society and the state, with politicians acting as delegates instead of trustees. The successes of the Mass Parties, however, also led to their demise. With the battles for social and political rights won, the welfare state implemented and economic growth secured, the unifying aspects of their social bases started to weaken. The rise of mass media furthermore enabled political elites to directly communicate with voters without the intercession of extensive bureaucratic party apparatuses typical of these mass parties. The appearance of the Catch-All Party characterized this third stage, recruiting members based on policy agreement rather than social identity, acting as a broker between state and civil society rather than having direct relations with civil society (Katz & Mair, 1995).

Katz and Mair (1995) also proposed a fourth party type, the Cartel Party, as a representative of their final stage. It arose in the 1970’s and is characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and extensive cooperation between ostensible competitors. Due to ideological conversion amongst the major parties, politics had become a profession instead of an ideological battleground, making parties interchangeable and replicable. Parties lost their connection with civil society and became extensions of the state, seeking to implement state resources to guarantee their collective survival and prevent newcomers from entering politics. Katz and Mair received criticisms for their thesis, most notably from Koole (1996), who i.a. argued that they described a political strategy at the state level rather than the emergence of a new party type. Katz and Mair (1996), responded that the characteristics of the parties participating in the cartel have changed strongly enough to justly speak of a new party type, and furthermore argued that recent developments corroborated their arguments (Katz & Mair, 2009).

The Third Family: Integrating the Others

Gunther and Diamond (2003) noted two main problems with the former typologies. Firstly, they were mostly derived from studies on West European parties from specific time periods. Recent and non-western parties may be difficult to incorporate in these typologies without running the risk of “concept stretching”. Secondly, because these typologies are based on different criteria they are not compatible with one another. Besides the two families described above, there are other, less commonly used typologies based on different criteria – e.g. Kitschelt’s (1989) ‘logic of electoral competition’ parties vs. ‘logic of office-seeking’ parties; and Wolinetz’ (2002) ‘policy-seeking’, ‘vote seeking’, and ‘office seeking’ parties – which would also need excessive concept-stretching if they were to be implemented in these two families.

Gunther and Diamond (2003) therefore proposed a new typology that combined elements from the other families, resulting in a typology that is more detailed and accurate, albeit at the loss of parsimony. They distinguish 15 types of parties “… on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the party organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) whether or not these parties are tolerant pluralistic (or democratic) or proto-hegemonic (or anti-system)” (Gunther & Diamond, 2003, p. 167): the Traditional Local Notable, Clientelistic, Class-mass, Leninist, Pluralist-Nationalist, Ultranationalist, Denominational, Fundamentalist, Congress, Ethnic, Catch-all, Programmatic, Personalistic, Left-Libertarian, and Post-industrial Extreme-Right parties. For this thesis’ purposes, it serves to focus on the religious and ethnically based parties.

Gunther and Diamond (2003) distinguish two parties with religion as their programmatic basis, both mass-based parties. The Denominational Party is pluralist, democratic and tolerant. It is distinct from secular parties because it is not fully in control of its own core ideological precepts since these are linked to religious values. Examples are the many Christian democratic parties found in Western Europe and elsewhere. The Fundamentalist Party seeks to reorganize society and the state around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles. In its worldview, there is no separation between state and religion; religious norms

should be imposed on all. Its organizational structure is extensive, hierarchical, undemocratic, and even absolutist, their members disciplined, devoted, encapsulated in a distinct subculture, and disproportionally recruited from the lower and lower middle classes. Examples are Algeria’s Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front; FIS) and Turkey’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party; RP).

The ethnically based parties lack the extensive organizations of mass-based parties but are noticeable for their political and electoral logics: they do not advance a program for all of society but seek to promote the interests of an ethnic group. The Ethnic Party seeks to mobilize the votes of its own ethnic group only, demarcating and emphasizing ethnic boundaries while lacking functional interests, an ideological agenda, or the will to attract voters from other segments of society. Examples are the Romania’s Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania; UDMR) and South Africa’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The Congress Party is a coalition of ethnic parties that may also take the form of a single, unified party. It appeals to national unity, integration, ethnic sharing, and coexistence, and ensures the mutual security of its groups within its broad organization. The archetype of this model is the Indian National Congress (INC) during the first two decades of India’s independence (Gunther & Diamond, 2003).

A recent typology that elaborates on Gunther and Diamond (2003) by specifying different religious parties is Ozzano’s (2013). He distinguishes five religiously oriented party types – conservative, progressive, nationalist, fundamentalist, and camp – based on “… six criteria: their organizational model, their ideology (and particularly their attitude towards democratic pluralism), their relation with interest groups, their social base, their goals, and their influence on democratization processes” (Ozzano, 2013, p. 810).

The Conservative Party includes the well-known denominational mass parties that may show some features of (interdenominational) catch-all parties. They appeal to all voters except for the convinced anti-clericals. Examples are the Christian-democratic parties, the USA’s Republican Party (GOP), and the early years of Turkey’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party; AKP). The Progressive Party is least commonly seen since religious politics is often associated with right-wing conservatism while progressive parties

traditionally face religion as one of their core obstacles. When it appears it is often small, resembling the Cadre Party in size. The party combines the desire to widen the role of religion in society with an orientation for social justice, civil rights, peace, and pluralism, although the former is secondary to the latter. This may result in some forms of socialist thought and the will to seek alliances with secular parties. Its voter base is small, consisting mainly of the educated and urban middle class. Israel’s Meimad party is an example (Ozzano, 2013).

The Religious Nationalist Party subordinates its religious orientation to strong nationalist sentiments. It is often the product of social structures where ethno-religious divides are significant. It is frequently organized as a mass party and may have (symbolic) militia engaged in struggles to control physical space and/or public institutions against other (ethno-)religious communities. It may take different economic stances since economics is secondary to its other interests. Israel’s Kach (This Way), India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party: BJP) and the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are examples. The Fundamentalist Party is comparable to Gunther and Diamond’s (2003), with the addition that its unapologetic, anti-systematic, sometimes even anti-democratic stances often sends the party underground, in banishment, or a state of isolation. The Camp Party takes some characteristics from Gunther and Diamond’s (2003) Ethnic Party. It seeks to represent the interests of a specific religious community – which may coincide with a specific ethnic group – rather than putting forward a generalist ideology. It seeks the preservation and separation of its group in a pluralistic society; it does not seek conflict with other communities and/or political institutions. Examples are found in Northern Ireland, where the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (We Ourselves; SF) support the maintaining of segregated education (Ozzano, 2013).

A final point that both Gunther and Diamond (2003) and Ozzano (2013) make is that their typologies conceptualize ideal types. They are useful because they present easy to understand factors, but limited because real-world parties may not conform to all criteria and/or have elements belonging to multiple categories.

Political Relevancy & Dutch Party Concepts

Before going forward two points should be addressed. First, the Dutch political system is characterized by proportional representation in combination with an extremely low threshold.3 _{This has led to an average of 10.5 parties in}

parliament since 1918.4 _{To classify and determine the nature of different party}

systems, Sartori (1976/2005) suggested that we need to count the number of parties in a system, since it shows the extent to which political power is fragmented and influences the tactics of party competition and formation of government coalitions. Not every party has a direct influence on these matters, however, so Sartori included a criterion of “relevancy” to determine which parties to count. According to this criterion, parties are considered relevant when they have the potential to participate in governing coalitions or when they have “blackmail potential”: the ability to affect the tactics or alter the direction of the party competition of governing-oriented parties.5

These criteria were not necessarily exhaustive. Hertzog (1987), for example, argued that small parties are also relevant if they affect the behavior of larger parties, e.g. by “testing” extreme ideas that may become incorporated into the larger party’s platform. Discussing small (Dutch) political parties, Lucardie (1986) noticed a similar phenomenon which he named prophesying at the

frontier, the difference being that the latter is mainly used to inspire and

motivate the party’s social base, as actually influencing larger parties often proved unsuccessful. He also saw two other functions. On the condition of an ideological kinship between two parties, the smaller can act as the political

conscience of the the larger by emphasizing the latter’s principle program.

Parties must make concessions when in government, so they are vulnerable when called out on their principles. Lucardie’s final function was representing

3 _{Contrary to commonly held beliefs, the Netherlands has a de facto electoral threshold of 0.667%}

of the vote, corresponding to one seat in parliament. In practice, this means that if a party does not reach the threshold, it can also not apply for so-called ‘remainder seats’ (using D’Hondt method) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). This situation creates an incentive for smaller parties with similar ideologies to come out with a common electoral list, offering a shared political program, increasing the chance they will pass the threshold. This goes especially for elections where few seats are divided (e.g. elections to the European Parliament) or where parties might have lower electoral support (e.g. specific municipality elections). 4 _{Calculations done using data from Andeweg and Irwin (2014, p. 60) and Kiesraad (2017).} 5 _{Due to difficulties in assessing blackmail potential, Sartori (1976/2005) suggested that it might} also be measured through the veto-potential of a party.

minorities, which can be done both to win votes and gain political influence. It is

a function expressed by both Ethnic (cf. Gunther & Diamond, 2003) and Camp Parties (cf. Ozzano, 2013). Even without direct access to political power parties can thus be relevant. Even though Sartori (1976/2005) used his criterion to determine the nature of party systems, it is safe to assume that SOPP’s have been generally ignored due to their perceived irrelevance. There is some literature on smaller parties in the Netherlands (e.g. Daalder, 1965; Lucardie, 1986; Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008), but they all leave the specific natures of the parties undertheorized. Still, because of their presence, concepts emerged to describe these parties. They are ill-defined in scientific literature, but well-known throughout Dutch society. The second point that needs to be addressed is properly defining these concepts.

The “Beginselpartij”, or Principle Party, is described by The Van Dale dictionary (1984) as a party whose policies are based on fixed principles, as opposed to more pragmatic parties. Wikipedia describes it as a typically Dutch phenomenon – appearing due to the low threshold and proportional representation – and defines it as a party that focuses on its principles instead of current events or government participation. They offer i.a. the SGP, RPF, and GPV as examples. A local CU (2007) website describes principle parties as those parties with a principle program, a document containing the party’s ideological assumptions. It acknowledges, however, that many parties generally not considered principle parties have such programs. It states that in practice, the term is mostly used to describe parties that are primarily guided by their principle program, in contrast to those parties that are primarily guided by their most recent election program. Here this last definition will be used, since it offers a clear distinction and best describes how the concept is used in practice.

Secondly there is the “Getuigenispartij”, or Testimonial Party. Wikipedia considers it the same as the Principle Party; although the concepts are often confused, they are not the same. The Van Dale Dictionary (1984) defines the Testimonial Party as a party with message, a party that wants to testify, which in turn is defined as “defending an ideal”. Wiktionary defines it as “a political party that doesn’t seek participation in government but only serves to express its principles”. This definition is an improvement because it offers a clearer

distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial parties while also differentiating it from the principle party. It is too strong, however, since testimonial parties does not necessarily shun government participation. A testimonial party finds its raison d’être in using politics as a platform to express its political ideals; consequently, its political success is not determined by the achievement of policy oriented goals. In its function, it is comparable to Lucardie’s (1986) prophesying at the frontier.

Historical Framework

In this section, an historical overview of the SOPP’s through the lens of the Theoretical Framework will be given. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to present a general overview of the Dutch political system.

Pillarization

With its multi-party system, the Netherlands is first and foremost a country of minorities. In parliament, this is visible by the fact that there was never one party with a full majority. To understand Dutch politics is to understand how these minorities interact and try to reach compromise, even though at times they hold strongly different opinions (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014).

From the end of the 19th _{century until the late 1960s, Dutch society was}

characterized by a strong politico-denominational segmentation known as “pillarization”. Using the metaphor of a Greek temple, society was comprised of four “pillars” – subcultures demarcated by socio-economical and/or confessional differences (Lijphart, 1967; 2008) – characterized by separate newspapers, broadcasting organizations, healthcare organizations, hospitals, schools, universities, trade unions, etc. Although the starting point of the process leading up to this state of pillarization is contested, scholars tend to view the 1917’s pacification – a political agreement between religious and secular parties leading to the implementation of universal suffrage, proportional representation, and equal state funding for both public (secular) and private (religious) schools – as its conclusion (Lijphart, 2008).

During pillarization, the Dutch political system could best be described as a five-party system, given that between 1918 and 1963 five parties held between 84 and 92 percent of the vote (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014).6 _{Extending the}

metaphor of the Greek temple, the political elite not only represented the four pillars segmenting Dutch society, but acted as its temple roof, bringing society together: segregation at the base (civil society) and cooperation at the top. After WWII the following parties represented the pillars: the Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party; KVP) for the Catholic pillar, the Anti-Revolutionaire

6 _{Until 1939 the liberals were not particularly strong; they were dispersed over several parties.}

Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party; ARP) and the Christelijk-Historische Unie

(Christian Historical Union; CHU) for the Protestant pillar, the PvdA for the social-democratic pillar, and the VVD for the liberal/general pillar (Sartori, 1976/2005; Lijphart, 1967). Whereas the ARP had strong ties with the mainline Neo-Calvinist Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands; GKN), the CHU was connected to the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church; NHK), a broad protestant church with different modalities (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014).

From 1967 the dominance of the five parties waned and their share of the electoral vote dropped to 72% in 1971. This decline should be understood as part of a broader process of depillarization: the demarcating role of religion and ideology, strong organizational infrastructure of the pillars, and social apartheid were disappearing (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). In response to their electoral losses, the protestant and catholic parties sought closer cooperation, resulting in an official alliance in 1973 and a merger into the CDA in 1980. From then on, the now three largest parties (CDA, PvdA, and VVD) managed to hold around 80 percent of the vote until 1989, after which they suffered heavy losses, fluctuating around 60 percent until 2012, currently holding just over 40 percent of the vote. Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij

The SGP was founded in 1918 by a group of people mostly belonging to the Pietistic Reformed Gereformeerde Gemeenten (Reformed Congregations; GerGem), but its main initiator was Rev. G.H. Kersten.7 _{To understand the SGP is}

to understand the Pietistic Reformed in general, and Kersten specifically (Fieret, 1990).

The Pietistic Reformed constitute a group of Orthodox Christians within the Calvinist tradition. As a social group, they are discernable because of their almost uniform lifestyle, predominantly rural background, old traditions, and ambivalence towards society at large, usually accepting technological developments but rejecting cultural changes. Geographically they have their

7 _{This thesis covers a long time-period, during which the proper way to refer to someone has}

changed. In this thesis people will be referred to in a pragmatic style, using initials if that is generally done in other sources, and writing the first name in full if it is commonly known. Once a person is introduced, they will generally only be referred to with their last name.

stronghold in the “Dutch Bible Belt”, an area ranging from the province of Zeeland in the southwest to the province of Overijssel in the northeast (see Figure 1; Snel, 2007).

Theologically they distinguish themselves from other Reformed by emphasizing the inner and personalized experience of the faith. Their theological foundation lies in the Further Reformation: a Dutch puritan movement (1600-1750) in which Christians started applying systematic and unbiased self-examination to find out whether their faith was pure and if they were predestined to enter heaven (Klinken, 2007). This emphasis on an inner and personalized experience of the faith

had political consequences: where Abraham Kuyper’s – GKN Reverend and ARP-leader – dogma of presumptive regeneration8 _{gave his followers the optimism}

and faithfulness to try and change society for the better, the Pietistic Reformed saw “the world” and “political business” as something dangerous which could lead one astray from the true path towards salvation (Fieret, 1990). These different approaches towards society still characterize these groups to this day (Bos, 2010).

8 _{The dogma of presumptive regeneration is a dogma within the Calvinist doctrine on}

predestination. The doctrine of predestination teaches that God has predetermined who will enter heaven and who will not. People who are considered predestined are regenerated through the Holy Spirit and are “born again”. The question then arises how believers can be certain that they are indeed predestined, and thus born again. The dogma of presumptive regeneration teaches that everyone is born-again unless the contrary becomes apparent (e.g. a baptized child leaving the church at a later age). The Pietistic Reformed argued against this dogma because they believed it gave people a false sense of security. Instead, God should present itself to the believer through a revelation to let him know he is predestined. The validity of this revelation could consequently be measured through objective criteria.

Figure 1: The Dutch Bible Belt

Note: The purple area represents the percentage of voters voting SGP. SGP-voting is often used as a proxy measurement for the number of Pietistic Reformed in a municipality, as it serves as an effective form of self-ascription. The map shows that even in the Bible Belt, the Pietistic Reformed entertain a minority position, giving the Dutch Bible Belt a different character than dominant, sometimes aggressive majority culture that characterizes the better-known American Bible belt (Snel, 2007).

Source: Wikipedia.

This raises the question why these “world-shunning” people would want to establish a political party in the first place. The answer to this paradox can be found in the person Kersten (Figure 2), a charismatic pastor with strong organizational talents. In 1907, when he was only 25, he convinced his older peers to unite two church denominations into the GerGem, which gave him a great deal of authority amongst his people.

Where most of Kersten’s beliefs were exemplary for the Pietistic Reformed, his views on

politics were an exemption. He did not view it as a potential evil, but thought that Christians were given a task to defend the Word of God in politics. When the 1917’s Pacification led to the introduction of the proportional system, he took his chances and founded the SGP. The party gained a seat in 1922 and has since been present in Dutch politics (Fieret, 1990).9 _{Their political representation further}

strengthened the Pietistic Reformed group identity (Fieret, 1990).

Besides Kersten’s wish to politically unite his community, objections against vaccinations, social insurance laws, universal (i.e. women’s) suffrage, and the ARP’s and CHU’s – in their eyes – foundational decay were other motifs to enter politics. The SGP’s primary goal became the utterly unrealistic pursuit of a bibliocratic10 _{society. Instead of focusing on achievable goals the party preached}

in parliament, publically calling for repentance, becoming a testimonial party avant la lettre. This style suited them rather well since most of their politicians were pastors by profession (Fieret, 1990; Post, 2009). The SGP was furthermore nationalistic and anti-Catholic, arguing that the Dutch genesis – especially its independence from Catholic Spain – was guided by God’s will. They were against the League of Nations because they believed closer 9 _{The fact that Pietistic Reformed voted for the SGP despite their dislike of politics probably has}

to do with the fact that 1917’s Pacification also introduced “attendance duty”, a form of compulsory voting where people legally obligated to show up at the polling stations without being obligated to vote. It was introduced in 1917 and abolished in 1970 (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014).

10 _{Fieret (1990) distinguishes bibliocracy from theocracy, stating that in a bibliocracy the Bible is}

the guiding principle for all policies, whereas in a theocracy God himself is the primary ruler of the state, as was the case in Israel in the stories of the Old Testament.

Figure 2: Rev. G.H. Kersten

Source: Photo Archive Spaarnestad

international cooperation was based solely on overoptimistic trust in human action. The ARP – ideologically closest to the SGP – received fierce criticisms because of Kuyper’s “antithesis” – a political strategy to form a united front with the Catholics against secular parties (Fieret, 1990). Article 36 of the Nederlandse

Geloofsbelijdenis (Belgic Confession; NGB) – one of their doctrinal standard

documents – states that it is the government’s task to eradicate “false religions”. The SGP counted Catholicism among them, since the Heidelberg Catechism – another doctrinal standard document – described it as “cursed idolatry”. Its focus on these documents made the SGP a principle party, and since the GKN and ARP subscribed to the same documents, the SGP could act as the ARP’s political conscience (cf. Lucardie, 1986). The SGP would often accuse the ARP of watering down its principles11 _{when the latter participated in coalitions with the KVP}

(Fieret, 1990).

Because of its uncompromising principles the SGP found itself in an almost absolute state of isolation. Amongst the Pietistic Reformed the party instilled a lot of authority; outsiders hardly took them seriously. When Kersten spoke other politicians often left the room for a cup of coffee, leaving him behind to preach for the converted (Klei, 2014). The SGP did revere the authority of the state, however, which it saw as Gods servant after Romans 13.12 _{This respect for}

state authority went so far that that Kersten described the Nazi-occupation of the Netherlands as God’s punishment, which had to be suffered patiently, arguing against joining resistance movements (Fieret, 1990). While its ideals could be described as fundamentalist, the SGP’s small size and obedient attitude ensured that it would never revolt against the state to try and implement its bibliocratic ideals. The label fundamentalist (cf. Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Ozzano 2013) would thus be an ill fit.

Still, it is wrong to state that the SGP had no political influence at all. Kersten gave his party an interdenominational basis, which succeeded precisely

11 _{Kuyper convinced the GKN to remove the paraphrased passage from Article 36 NGB in 1905,}

since it was in his opinion not applicable in a society that was no longer characterized by one encompassing church (Zwaag, 1999). Twists over the status of this article always prevented closer cooperation between the SGP and the ARP/CHU, even directly after WWII when the call for unity was widely spread (Zwemer, 1992).

12 1_{Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which}

God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. … 4_{For the one in} authority is God’s servant for your good. … (Rom. 13:1, 4 New International Version).

because of Pietistic Reformed world-shunning. What separated them theologically did not need to separate them politically, because faith was something primarily experienced personally and in church (Bos, 2010). Even the 1953 schism within the GerGem did not lead to overt political divisions (Zwemer, 1992). Furthermore, its interdenominational basis made the SGP attractive for Protestants from churches with different modalities, like the

Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerken (Christian Reformed Churches; CGK) and NHK;

the SGP was attractive for conservative ARP-voters with the opinion that the ARP had become too pragmatic. Even though the SGP could not directly influence its policies, the ARP was aware of their electoral potential and kept listening to their criticisms to prevent conservative ARP from defecting (Fieret, 1990; Vossen, 2003).

These characteristics typified the party until the early 1960’s. Because of his obedient attitude towards the Nazi occupants, Kersten was not allowed to return to parliament after WWII. Rev. P. Zandt replaced him and ensured that the testimonial character of the party remained its prime feature (Fieret, 1990). Or as Zandt himself put it:

Even if all people turned away from the message we preach, still we cannot stop preaching, for it is the will of the Lord; we cannot stop preaching, even if the government stops listening; we cannot stop preaching even if it will lead to isolation in parliament and will result in hostility, mockery, and ridicule. It is an important task to testify. (as cited in Fieret, 1990, p. 273)13

The SGP also started representing minorities in the 1930s – the years of the great depression – by fiercely criticizing the government’s protectionist measures, which limited the freedom of farmers (Fieret, 1990). The ARP was a party of mass integration, whose main goal was the emancipation of Orthodox Reformed belonging to the (lower) middle class, also known as Kleine Luyden (Little People) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). If the ARP represented Kleine Luyden, it would be just to state that the SGP represented Extremely Kleine Luyden. It

represented the (lower) middle class, but also had strong ties with the agricultural sector, representing farmers, farm laborers, and other peasants (Fieret, 1990; Vossen, 2003).

In his discussion of the Hervormd Gereformeerde Staatspartij (Reformed Reformed State Party14_{; HGS, est. 1922) – a principle and testimonial party acting} as the political conscience of the CHU – Vossen (2003) argued that it is the combination of preaching and representing a distinct (agricultural) social base that laid foundations which ensured the SGP’s survival. The HGS was comparable to the SGP in almost every way except for this representational function. Attempts to rebuild the HGS after WWII failed.

This raises the question to what extent the Pietistic Reformed belong within the Protestant pillar. Fieret (1990) explains that they avoided institutions religiously influenced by either GKN or NHK. In the case of education, for example, Pietistic Reformed preferred public schools because they were afraid their children would be influenced by “wrong” theological teachings of other Christian schools. Using Blom’s (1975) conception of “mini-pillars” – organizational structures for small subsections of the populations that did not fit within the “large pillars”, e.g. communists, national-socialists, and Jews – Fieret (1990) argued that there could be a Pietistic Reformed mini-pillar: they had their own churches, political party, political paper, and schools. On the other hand, using Kuiper’s (1987) “plural Protestant pillar” – a pillar combining three different societal views, namely the ARP’s, CHU’s, and Ultra-Orthodox/Pietistic Reformed, nuancing the dominant image of homogeneity within the pillar – the Pietistic Reformed could also be considered a current within the broader pillar. Fieret (1990) believes that both approaches do justice to their distinct character.

Lijphart (1967, p. 165) once described the SGP (and GPV) as “… representing the most orthodox, fundamentalist, and anti-Catholic of the Calvinist”. He was right to a certain extent. While the SGP represented a specific subsection of the (Calvinist) population, it also remained an attractive party for disgruntled conservative ARP-voters (Fieret, 1990). Although there remains

14 _{The name of this party is rather difficult to translate, since it refers to two different branches of}

Reformed Calvinism – hervormd (NHK) & gereformeerd (GKN) – for which the English language has but one translatable word. The party sought to unite these two strands in its theological battle against Catholicism (Vossen, 2003).

ambiguity about the degree to which the SGP represented a distinct minority, its broader attractiveness differentiates the party from the ethnic (cf. Gunther & Diamond, 2003) or camp (cf. Ozzano, 2013) ideal types.

Its relation with the ARP changed in the 1950’s when the ARP increasingly regarded the SGP a party with a distinct social basis and ideology instead of a lost ARP-wing (Zwemer, 1992). Their distance grew further when the country started to depillarize. The ARP (and CHU) sought closer cooperation with the KVP, resulting in their

eventual merger into the CDA in 1977. The Pietistic Reformed opted for another strategy: segregation.

To put it more aptly, one could say that the pillarization processes of the Pietistic Reformed and the Vrijgemaakten (Liberated)15 _{gained a second wind.}

The Pietistic Reformed mini-pillar strengthened and expanded in the seventies with the foundation of new schools and a newspaper: the Reformatorisch

Dagblad (Dutch: Reformed Daily; RD). The pillar reinforced and protected their

identity; the Pietistic Reformed were now, more than before, clearly distinguished from broader society, forming their own quasi-ethnic community16

(Zwemer, 1992). Their “new” pillar was different from the “old” pillars, however: it did not contribute to a temple, there was no roof connecting it with other pillars, no cooperation at the top. This pillar can best be described as a lonely column in a Greek ruin, standing tall while the rest of the temple has collapsed.

Being a principle party, the SGP’s substantive message was consistent over time, but the way in which the party testified changed depending on its leader. When H.G. Abma became leader in 1971 he took more policy-oriented approach, ending the SGP’s extreme isolation by seeking (limited) political cooperation with the GPV. This led to protests of the party’s more conservative members who wanted to remain true to the uncompromising style of Kersten

15 _{See Historical Framework: ChristenUnie: Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond.}

16 _{“Quasi”, because the community was artificially created, but nonetheless “ethnic”, because it}

was clearly distinct from the rest of society through social and cultural experiences. Figure 3: SGP Election Poster 1971 Source: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen

and Zandt. An internal conflict arose lasting many years, ending only with the nomination of Bas van der Vlies as party leader in 1986. Van der Vlies was one of the more conservative members of the party; his appointment was meant to satisfy some of the protesters. He conducted policy-oriented politics in the style of Abma, however, appealing to the younger, better-educated GerGem-generation that preferred a more managerial style. His political style was appreciated by outsiders and colleagues, but conservative party members longing for return of Kersten or Zandt were disappointed; some left the party (Zwemer, 1992; Klei, 2014).

Recent years have shown substantive changes, however. Although the party was founded in rejection of women’s suffrage and continues to officially reject it (Post, 2009; Willems, 2013), it was forced in 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights to remove its formal barriers against women’s suffrage. Since then one SGP-women has been elected to a city council (Schuyfel, 2014).

Its relation to popular media also changed. Where most Pietistic Reformed denominations used to ban the “worldly” television, they had willy-nilly allowed the introduction of (filtered) Internet. While discussions on euthanasia and same-sex marriage defined 1990’s politics, the rise of right-wing populist parties – e.g. the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List; LPF) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom; PVV) – and debates on immigration, integration and Islam characterized the 2000’s. The SGP’s youth grew up with Internet, Facebook, Twitter, and online forums; they entered the public debate and, in accordance with the Zeitgeist, emphasized the SGP’s conservative, non-religious aspects, engaging with left-wing, liberal, and Islamic groups.

Orthodox Catholics are now even regarded allies in a strife against Islam (Klei, 2014). There are discussions in Catholic newspapers on the question if Catholics should vote SGP (e.g. Ten Hove, 2012; Ten Heuvel, 2012), and although the party still subscribes to the Heidelberg Catechism and Article 36 NGB and refuses them membership, increasing numbers find their way towards the SGP (Veenhof, 2012).

Kees van der Staaij became the emblematic figure of these changes when he took over leadership in 2010. He continues emphasizing the party’s policy-oriented side by i.a. helping the former government to reach majorities in the

Senate bringing his party closer to power than ever before (Vliegenthard, 2013; Klei, 2014). Its reluctance of television once made the SGP quite camera shy, but Van der Staaij has appeared in one of the Netherlands’ most popular talk shows to promote his campaign against “Second Love” – a website supporting adultery (NOS, 2016) – and he actively employ social media for promotional ends. The new party logo (Figure 4) also speaks volumes.

Furthermore, against the wishes of several conservative members, the party deleted passages referring to the rejection of gay marriage and the implementation of the death penalty from their most recent election manifesto (Loon, 2017); officially not because it reconsidered, but because the issues explicit mentioning would only generate negative publicity in the media, which would be difficult to campaign with (RD, 2017), showing that the party valued a good campaign above uncompromisingly expressing its ideals. Or as one SGP’er put it:

“No one can deny that the SGP has developed from a pure testimonial party into a more government-oriented political party. … Everyone can understand that it is difficult to combine the slogan “Vote for Life” with a plea for the reimplementation of the death penalty. How can you explain that you are against abortion and euthanasia, but at the same time in favor of the death penalty? That’s very difficult to do when your campaign message has to be short and catchy.” (Bosma, 2017) Figure 4: SGP Logo’s 1990-2016 (above) and 2016-Present (below)

Note: The triangle (above in orange, below in white) has become a common element in SGP propaganda. It stands for the triad “family, politics and health” (Terpstra 2016). Van der Staaij mentioned on the SGP-website that the triangle represented the direction in which the party wants to move: forward! (SGP, 2016). Still, it would be hard not to also notice the likeness of a “play-button”, like the one of the YouTube video announcing their new logo, embedded on the same webpage. Source: Wikipedia

ChristenUnie

The CU (est. 2000) is a relatively young party; to understand it, one should look at its parents: the GPV (est. 1948) and RPF (est. 1975). In this section, their histories, the process leading up to their merger, and the CU’s recent history will be discussed.

Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond

It is argued above that the SGP can only be understood through the denominational nature of its followers. This goes even more for the GPV. Whereas the SGP represented many, the GPV represented only one denomination, the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (vrijgemaakt) (Reformed

Churches in the Netherlands [liberated]; GKv). This denomination was established

in 1944 because of a schism within the GKN.17 _{The immediate cause was a heated}

conflict about the dogma of “presumptive regeneration”. Before, the Reformed Synod allowed members to hold different opinions on the dogma, but in 1944, against the strong wishes of some, it was declared that pastors were no longer allowed to preach anything in conflict with it.18 _{In the midst of WWII, when the}

Nazi occupation was at its fiercest, GKN-members had to choose to either follow the synod’s decision, staying in the GKN under their authority, or to “liberate” themselves from the synod’s authority, joining the GKv (Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011).

Both denominations considered themselves the true continuation of the GKN and harshly rejected each other’s existence; the conflict was so heated that it tore family bonds and long-held friendships apart. Initially the denominations claimed the same name, but because the group renouncing the synod’s authority was smaller than the group accepting it – ca. 10% of GKN-members joined the GKv – the former soon got the parenthetical addition “vrijgemaakt”,

17 _{To this day the GKN/GKv-schism remains a heated, controversial topic. It is to the best effort of}

the author to present it as neutrally as possible.

18 _{There were also other factors contributing to the conflict – i.a. conflicts about the church order}

(should the national synod [GKN] or the local church [GKv] have the final say in important matters) and polarizing appearances of important individuals, most noticeably Rev. K. Schilder (GKv) (Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011) - but it would go beyond the purposes of this thesis to discuss them all in detail.

distinguishing them from the latter group.19 _{They soon became known as the}

Vrijgemaakten,20 _{while they in turn started referring to the latter group as} Synodalen (Synodicals)21 _{(Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011).}22

The denominational conflict had political consequences. In contrast to the Pietistic Reformed, Orthodox Reformed have always emphasized the societal responsibility of Christians (Bos, 2010). GKN-members were not only politically active in the ARP, but also saw political and societal activity as an important extension of their faith. The gravity of the schism ensured that many Vrijgemaakten felt they could no longer work together with Synodalen in Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) and the ARP; they felt they could not act “as if nothing had happened”. This so-called “ethical conflict” led to the formation of a new mini-pillar, with its own newspaper (Gereformeerd Gezinsblad [Reformed Family Paper], later Nederlands Dagblad [Netherlands Daily; ND]), schools, and political party: the GPV (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2011; Mulligen, 2014a).

The GPV’s history can roughly be divided in four periods. The first (1948-1963) was characterized by the fact that the party had no political representation in parliament; a time in which the identities of the Vrijgemaakten and the GPV were shaped. The party was more akin to an ecclesiastical men’s association than a political party; it lacked a leader and even a political program. This did not bother most members, however, because they believed their primary goal was not to win seats but to testify: entering elections was seen as a testimony in itself. Besides, Vrijgemaakten were expected to vote GPV no matter their political stances: there was a moral compulsion to do so (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2010; 2011; Mulligen, 2014a). 19 _{In earlier years, the parenthetical addition “onderhoudende Artikel 31 Kerkorde” (entertaining} Article 31 Church Order) was also used, referring to the article of their church order that was at the center of the dispute. As such, the Vrijgemaakten also used to be known as Artikel 31-ers (Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011).

20 _{It is important to note that in this context Vrijgemaakten means “those who have freed}

themselves” or “those who have cut themselves loose”. It should not be understood in a passive sense, i.e. “those who were liberated by others”.

21 _{Another term commonly used to refer to the Synodalen was “Gewoon Gereformeerd”}

(Ordinarily Reformed), emphasizing their status as members of the mainline/largest Gereformeerde denomination in the Netherlands.

22 _{Both terms have and may still evoke negative associations. There is unfortunately no neutral}

way to describe these groups, since every term chosen implies a position taken. It is without ulterior motives that these terms are used here.

The second period lasted until the early 1970s. The party gained its first representation in parliament in 1963 under the charismatic leadership of Piet Jongeling. The GPV accepted a political program in 1966 and became a principle party pur sang: “compromise” was a dirty word (Klei, 2011). It took the meaning of testimonial party to its extreme, strengthened by the amongst Vrijgemaakten now widely accepted “one true church”-dogma (see Figure 5). The dogma gave the GKv, and by extension GPV, an exclusivist, quasi-ethnic character (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2011). Although the decentralized structure of the GPV left membership-decisions to local electoral associations, the dogma’s widespread acceptance ensured that only

GKv-members could become (active) GPV-members: local congregations and electoral associations often completely overlapped (Klei, 2011).

The GPV profiled itself as the political conscience of the ARP and CHU, defending right-wing conservative viewpoints from its principle program on issues where these parties had become more progressive, e.g. transnational cooperation, apartheid, and sexuality. Its small but loyal supporters base ensured that the GPV – in similar fashion to the SGP – became a small but stable faction in parliament, distanced from the struggles of political power games. Jongeling profiled himself as the “moral conscience” of parliament, telling it like it is when other parties were constrained by coalition agreements or their own credibility. The party also – unsuccessfully – tried to be a force against the 1960’s cultural revolution and the ongoing secularization (Klei, 2011).

Figure 5: GKv Overview of Schisms in the Netherlands

Note: The GKv used this scheme, and variations of it, to teach church history. The “one true church”-dogma holds that only the GKv teaches the “true” gospel and administers sacraments correctly. All other denominations were false, while the GKv was a direct continuation of the teachings of Christ (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2011). Here, a black, straight line represents the GKv. Over many years, several churches, including the GKN, – here referred to as “Syn. Kerk” (Synodical Church) – had left the “one true church”.

Source: Bosscha, 2015.

In 1967 another schism occurred, sparked by a debate on whether the 1944 schism was the will of God or the result of human conflict and, consequentially, if the “one true church”-dogma was true or false. The GKv-synod defrocked the pastors holding the latter position; these pastors and their followers – ca. 25% of GKv-members – founded the Nederlands Gereformeerde Kerken (Netherlands

Reformed Churches; NGK) (Kuiper, 1994). This

schism can best be understood against the backdrop of ongoing secularization. In a society becoming increasingly less religious, the Vrijgemaakten felt it was of the utmost importance to remain “pure”. In a similar fashion to the Pietistic Reformed, their pillarization process gained a second wind, transforming the mini-pillar into an independent column (Klei, 2011).

The third period took place between the

early 1970s and early 1990s, a period of consolidation in which the position of the GPV became taken for granted. A new generation not involved in the 1944 schism and the creation of the Vrijgemaakte mini-pillar slowly took over. They professionalized the party, which became more policy-oriented: compromise was no longer a dirty word. Although the party remained denominationally exclusivist, it slowly became acceptable to work together with the SGP and the newly founded RPF. From the 1980s onward, for example, these parties presented common electoral lists in certain elections. They also used combined lists to increase their chances of gaining remainder seats (Klei, 2010; 2011).

Although the party internally lost some of its élan, it was more appreciated by outsiders. It tried to act as the political conscience of the newly formed CDA, which only occasionally succeeded. On many religiously inspired issues – e.g. euthanasia – the CDA did not really care what the GPV thought. On several other issues, however, its political opponents took them much more seriously. Gert Schutte, party leader since 1981, proposed many technical

Figure 6: GPV Election Poster 1963

Note: The text in orange is a reference to the Dutch national anthem. Translation: Loyal to the fatherland…

The fortress (here in white) was a common element in GPV posters. It is a reference to a well-known hymn of Martin Luther: “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God” (Klei, 2011).

Source: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen

amendments on legislative proposals, even proposals he disagreed with. Because the GPV’s distanced from political power games, Schutte became known as the parliament’s “constitutional conscience”. During this period, the GPV broke with its testimonial style (Klei, 2011).

The final phase started in the early nineties and lasted till 2000. It is marked by a gradual loss of identity, the breakdown of the Vrijgemaakte pillar, and the merger with the RPF into the CU.

Reformatorische Politieke Federatie

The RPF was founded as a federation of four organizations of concerned Orthodox Christians with ties to the ARP and/or GPV. The most important one was the Nationaal Evangelisch Verband (National Evangelical Connection; NEV), founded in 1966 by ARP-members who felt the ARP had become too pragmatic. The GPV remained true to the original ARP foundations, but because ARP-members were no GKv-members they could not join the GPV. They founded the NEV with the intention to support the GPV in all ways possible and eventually merge with it. Their love was completely one-sided, however. The GPV only became more exclusivist over the years and never had any real intention to merge. What made it worse was that with the 1967 schism NGK-members were forced to leave the GPV. Many of them became NEV-members, which brought the tensions between the GPV and NEV to a boiling point. In 1972 the GPV officially cut all ties with the NEV. In response, they sought cooperation with other organizations (Klapwijk, 1998; Mulligen, 2010; 2014a).

One of these organizations was the Gespreksgroep van AR-gezinden (Discussion Group of AR-minded), established in 1971 under the leadership of elderly professors from the VU University, holding the opinion that the ARP had come under too much influence of a small, radical left-wing group. Another group was the Antirevolutionair Jongerencontact (Antirevolutionary Youth Contact; ARJC), a youth movement that was fearful of the same left-wing influences on society and the official youth movement of the ARP: ARJOS. The NEV succeeded in severing both organizations from the ARP: the ARJC even changed its name to Reformatorisch Politiek Jongerencontact, (Reformatory Political Youth Contact; RPJC) emphasizing its independence from the ARP.

Together with a group of local independent electoral associations called the Reformatorisch Politiek

Contact (Reformatory Political Contact: RPC), they

founded the RPF in 1975 (Haasdijk, 2003; Mulligen, 2010).

Due to the NEV’s historical ties with the GPV, the RPF’s political program was an almost exact copy of the GPV’s. The main distinction between the parties lay in their electoral lists: the RPF accepted candidates from different denominations, including NGK-members. Because the RPF also appealed to GKv-voters, the relation between both parties became outright hostile (Mulligen, 2010).

The RPF’s biggest problems were internal, however. Its first attempt at parliamentary representation was unsuccessful, but in 1981 the party got two seats. One of its parliamentarians was Aad Wagenaar, an old RPJC-chairman and RPF-founder. He wanted to conduct politics in the GPV-manner: professional and policy-oriented. The other was Meindert Leerling, a newcomer to politics, who previously made a career as television programmer and sports journalist. He wanted to get rid of the RPF’s old, conservative, old-fashioned image and make it fresh, modern, dynamic, and confrontational. He rather testified by preaching the Gospel than conduct policy-oriented politics, which gave his appearance an Evangelical vibe. Leerling was made party leader at the expense of Wagenaar, and soon a conflict between the two constrained the party (Mulligen, 2010; 2014b).

Factions formed around the politicians. Wagenaar was supported by the traditional, Orthodox Reformed, who worried about the “evangelicalicization” of the party. The Dutch evangelical movement strongly grew in the 1950s due to missionary work of American evangelists. The movement appeared especially attractive for Christians fearful of modernization, depillarization, and secularization. They organized themselves with several Orthodox Reformed and founded their own broadcasting organization (Evangelische Omroep [Evangelical Broadcasting; EO]), journalistic papers (e.g. CV-Koers [CT-Course], later De

Figure 7: RPF Election Poster 1981

Source: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen