MASTER THESIS
THE LIMITS TO TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM:
The EU's lukewarm response to human rights violations in Egypt
Rocío López Martínez
MSc International Organisation
Institute of Political Science
Leiden UniversityThesis supervisor: Olivier Blarel Second reader: Niels van Willigen
Rocío López Martínez: s2100134
Completed in: 9,999 words 11 June 2018
ABSTRACT
Almost two decades have passed since Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink presented “the spiral model”. Drawing on social constructivism, the pattern predicted that sustained transnational activism against human rights violations by repressive states would induce “Western” actors to wield normative pressures on the infringers, which would ultimately force them into compliance. From various theoretical standpoints, scholars have challenged the assumptions of the spiral model focusing on the strategies of unlawful states to resist the enforcement of international norms. Nevertheless, the responsibility of “Western” actors for the ineffectiveness of transnational activism has been overlooked by this strand of the literature. Consequently, this thesis examines the reasons behind the failure of transnational advocacy in Egypt during Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s first term in office (2014-2018) and analyzes both the strategies of the regime and the role of the European Union as an alleged guardian of international law. Building on social constructivism and critical theory, this study concludes that, although the EU has normative objectives towards the Arab state, the Union’s reluctance to jeopardize its strategic goals has neutralized the impact of normative pressures on Egypt’s unlawful behavior.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Introduction……….………...………. 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review………...………. 2
Introduction………..………. 2
Literature on Translational Activism: The Spiral Model….………. 3
The EU: Between Idealism and Pragmatism.……… 4
Gap in the Literature……….………….……… 5
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework……… 6
Egypt’s Norm Contestation……… 6
The EU’s Conflicting Interests in Egypt……… 8
The EU’s normative goals……… 8
The EU’s normative performance……… 9
Chapter 4: Methodology……… 10
Case selection……… 10
Research Method: Critical Discourse Analysis………. 10
Operationalization Strategy………... 11
Data Collection……….. 14
Chapter 5: Empirical research……… 16
Introduction……… 16
H1: Norm Contestation and Other Discursive Strategies………. 16
H2a: The EU's Normative Goals in Egypt………. 20
H2b: Normative Versus Strategic Goals: the EU'S Great Dilemma and its Consequences... 23
Chapter 6: Conclusions………. 29
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1. INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the Egyptian security forces raided two protest camps in which thousands of supporters of Mohamed Mursi demanded that the ousted president be restored to power. Under the command of the then Chief of the Armed Forces and current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, police officers and members of the military launched a violent crackdown that resulted in the killing of at least 817 people according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). Since then, human rights violations committed by the Egyptian State have only increased and impunity has become the rule according to numerous reports. NGOs with global outreach, which work in partnership with local activists through transnational advocacy networks (TANs), have documented systematic torture of detainees, enforced disappearances, unlawful killings and other practices that violate international conventions to which Egypt is party.
For prominent constructivist scholars who have widely contributed to the literature on transnational activism, this would be regarded as an anomalous instance. Following their core analytical framework, if TANs carry out continued campaigns against norm-violating autocracies and make “Western” governments aware of grave infringements, the subsequent normative pressures would force authoritarian regimes to make tactical concessions and, eventually, to comply with international standards (Sikkink & Risse, 1999, 2013). Although the case described above meets the criteria of the model developed by these authors, neither coordinated transnational advocacy nor pressures from the European Union (EU) have caused an improvement in Egypt's human rights record. On the contrary, media accounts and reports produced by local and international NGOs claim that the repression has dramatically increased.
Without abandoning the theoretical foundations of social constructivism and incorporating insights from critical theory, this thesis aims to answer the following
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research question: Why have the continued campaigns by TANs to halt human rights
violations in Egypt not resulted in the EU changing the regime's behavior through normative (or material) pressure? For one thing, it will be tested whether a process of norm contestation by the Egyptian authorities has driven the EU to tolerate human rights violations during Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s first time in office (2014-2018). Subsequently, the EU’s normative goals and its normative performance will be analyzed to assess if the Union’s unwillingness to jeopardize its strategic objectives in the Middle East has hindered its normative power, and thus its ability to positively influence Egypt’s behavior. The present study is organized as follows: chapter two encompasses a critical review of the existing literature on both transnational activism and the normative or pragmatic nature of the EU's foreign policy and identifies a gap in the literature. Sections three and four outline the theoretical framework and the methodology that underpins the empirical analysis which is presented in chapter five. The main findings, limitations, and recommendations of this thesis are included in section six.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Transnationalism is identified as “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (Vertovec, 1999, p.447). The increasing salience of transnational activism has challenged some of the key assumptions of mainstream IR theories, namely realism and neo-realism. Despite their disparities, they both agree that states are the main actors in international politics and that power and given interests prevail vis-à-vis values, ideas, and norms (Morgenthau, 1950; Walz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Hence, these authors confer no role to transnational actors. At the other extreme, constructivism regards norms entrepreneurs capable of changing state
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preferences, stating that the national interest is socially constructed (Wendt, 1992; Klotz, 1999). These competing theories have fed into a debate which directly concerns the current failure of TANs to halt repression in Egypt through a cohesive normative alliance with the EU.
LITERATURE ON TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE SPIRAL MODEL
Challenging the dominant realist state-centered perspective, a group of constructivist scholars started to assess in the 1990s the influence of transnational advocates in international politics. In “Activists beyond Borders”, Keck and Sikkink (1998) outlined the main characteristics of TANs, which the authors defined as networks of activists whose ideas and values are capable of modifying the perception that states have of their own interests and, eventually, alter their behavior. Based on this core assumption, in “The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change” Risse and Sikkink (1999) introduced the spiral model: a five-stage pattern whereby they laid down the conditions under which transnational activism leads from state repression to the incorporation of human rights norms into domestic practices. According to the spiral model, sustained transnational activism alerts “Western” governments and international institutions, who start wielding symbolic and/or material pressure on norm-violating states. The recurrent exposure to the human rights regime, especially of those who aspire to belong to a “community of civilized nations” steers a socialization process on norms that ends with rule-consistent behavior (Risse, 1999, p.539) as it was the case of South Africa (Black, 1999), Chile (Sikkink, 2005), and other regimes studied through this prism.
In the years that followed the publication of “The Power of Transnational Activism”, an extensive literature emerged to highlight the shortcomings of the spiral model in explaining failed cases of transnational advocacy. From a realist perspective, a
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strand of research dismissed the idea that international norms could have an independent influence on the performance of unruly powerful states (Kent, 1999; Foot, 2000; Wan, 2001). Likewise, constructivists criticized the model for its excessive optimism and pointed out that repressive states can actively resist transnational activism, which was ultimately acknowledged by the developers of the spiral model (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 2013). Firstly, unlawful actors can counteract normative pressures by invoking alternative accepted norms that conflict with those related to human rights, which is known as “norm contestation” (Schwarz, 2004; Jetschke, 2011). Moreover, autocracies have responded to transnational advocacy by stifling opposition movements. Harassment has been precisely one of the strategies pursued by the Egyptian government to silence dissent (Liese, 2006). However, repression has not prevented TANs from launching the international campaigns that would force human right’s violators to make concessions under the spiral model.
By and large, these recent studies have focused on the reactions and stratagems of repressive states. Consequently, this thesis contends that the literature on transnational activism does not sufficiently tackle the role of “Western” actors like the EU in the failure of transnational advocacy.
THE EU: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND PRAGMATISM
The European Commission has repeatedly expressed its commitment to democracy promotion and human rights regarding its relations with Mediterranean partners. Accordingly, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements incorporate human rights clauses whose violation allows for the adoption of “appropriate measures” against the infringer, including the suspension of the partnership. Such arrangements have enabled some authors to theorize the normative role of the EU (Manners, 2002; Hazelzet, 2001; Kreutz, 2015), while others have questioned the genuineness of its principled statements
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as well as its alleged uniqueness as an international actor unconcerned with power struggles and material interests (Hyde-Price, 2006).
These different standpoints are part of a wider debate within International Relations related to the role of values in international politics. On the one hand, rationalist perspectives exclude the possibility of values having a substantive influence on foreign policy. Both realists and liberal-institutionalists stress the importance of material interests and other calculations connected whether with military power (Morgenthau, 1973) or with economic interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977). On the other end of the spectrum, constructivists defend the idea that norms and values shape and determine international exchanges (Checkel, 1998).
Although these opposing trends have found support for their assumptions in specific cases, recent scholarship focused on the foreign policy of the EU has successfully shown that there is no inherent incompatibility between normative and strategic approaches (Noutcheva, Pomorska & Bosse, 2013). Therefore, both the EU's determination or hesitance in responding to human rights violations committed by strategic partners like Egypt could be better understood if researchers delve into the complex relationship between pragmatic interests and values.
GAP IN THE LITERATURE
Various scholars have demonstrated the inadequacy of the spiral model in explaining failed cases of transnational activism, but they have primarily focused on the tactics of unlawful actors. Although most of these contributions are highly relevant, the responsibility of “Western” states and institutions for the ineffectiveness of transnational advocacy has been neglected. This thesis aims to fill this gap by connecting the literature on transnational activism with theories that study the normative power of the EU. By
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establishing this link, the present study aspires to provide a better insight on the shortcomings of the spiral model, while furthering the debate on the influence of values and norms in international politics.
The following theoretical framework will present the main theories and the hypotheses that will be tested to answer the research question:
RQ: Why have the continued campaigns by TANs to halt human rights violations in Egypt
not resulted in the EU changing the regime's behavior through normative (or material) pressure?
Provided that the activists have proceeded in line with theoretical expectations linked to the spiral model, the agency of the remaining actors involved, namely the Egyptian regime and the EU, must be analyzed. Accordingly, two alternative scenarios will be examined to answer the following sub-questions:
SQ1: Is the lack of improvement in Egypt's human rights record due to a successful
strategy of the regime vis-à-vis the EU?
SQ2: Was the EU willing to wield the normative pressure required to change Egypt's
behavior in the first place?
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To determine the reasons behind Egypt’s persistence in violating international human rights law, this thesis will draw on three different models: norm contestation, normative power Europe and the EU normative performance.
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EGYPT´S NORM CONTESTATION
Constructivist scholars have pointed out that norms are by no means objective truths, as positivists claim, but shared interpretations shaped in a specific context through social practice (Wiener, 2004, p.200; Welsh, 2013, p.380). Accordingly, they use the concept of “norm contestation” to refer to situations in which states that are compelled to comply with an institutionalized norm question either the norm in its entirety or its scope, aiming to transform the inter-subjectively held beliefs that underpin international law (ibid.).
Various colleagues draw on norm contestation to explain unsuccessful cases of transnational activism that deviate from the spiral model (Schwarz, 2004; Cardenas, 2007; Liese, 2009; Jetschke, 2011). The original pattern assumes that, after being aware of human rights violations by a third party, “Western” actors wield normative pressures on the infringer, forcing the later to automatically improve their behavior (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). However, critics assert that unlawful states can counteract the influence of TANs and regain the support of the international community by invoking other internationally agreed norms (e.g. state sovereignty or national security) while picturing human rights violations as a necessary evil (Schwarz, 2004; Cardenas, 2007; Liese, 2009; Jetschke, 2011). “Whether or not governments get away with their violations thus depends on how persuasively […] they frame their actions, and how acceptable that makes it to the relevant audiences” (Jetschke, 2011, p.4). This strategy has proven to be successful in Indonesia and the Philippines (ibid.) and could similarly explain the ineffectiveness of transnational advocacy in other states.
For one thing, norm contestation will be tested as a plausible explanation for Egypt's resistance to the normative power of transnational activists. If the Egyptian authorities had successfully challenged the universality of human rights vis-à-vis the EU, the latter would have inhibited its normative pressures, allowing the regime to act
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repressively.
H1: Norm contestation by the Egyptian authorities has resulted in the EU tolerating repression, and therefore it explains the persistence of the regime's unlawful behavior
THE EU'S CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN EGYPT
The second hypothesized explanation for the failure of transnational activism in Egypt concerns the agency of the EU. The spiral model presumes that “Western” actors are willing to wield normative pressures on infringers, but this assumption should be empirically tested. To this end, this study builds on theories that suggest that normative dynamics and power politics can be mutually conditioning (Halliday, 1993; Brown, 1999; Youngs, 2004; Meyer & Strickmann, 2011). From this point of departure, scholars have pointed out that the EU has proven to be both a normative and a pragmatic actor, adding that the interplay between value-based and pragmatic logics depends on the context
(Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006; Pace, 2009; Noutcheva, Pomorska & Bosse, 2013). Bearing this in mind, the present thesis seeks to confirm that the EU had normative aims towards Egypt to later analyze whether the Union was determined to act normatively against the regime.
The EU’s normative goals
This study follows Tocci’s (2008) definition of normative objectives, which is linked to Wolfers' concept of milieu goals. While possession goals are those that promote only national interests, milieu goals are also aimed at “shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries” (Wolfers, 1962, as cited in Tocci, 2008, p.7). Furthermore, normative goals pursue that international regulations be binding for all actors through instruments deployed within the confines of the law, that is, drawing on normative means (Tocci,
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2008, p.10).
To establish that the EU’s foreign policy in Egypt had normative objectives during the study period, this thesis will test whether the Union used different normative means aiming to preserve normative principles as introduced by Manners (2002) in his theory “normative power Europe”. Indeed, Manners differentiates between “core norms” (peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law) and “minor” objectives of social solidarity, equality, sustainable development and good governance, all of which the EU seeks to defend through its foreign policy instruments (ibid., pp.242-243).
H2a: The EU’s foreign policy towards Egypt has normative goals.
The EU’s normative performance
The EU might have normative goals and still behave as a pragmatic actor. Bose's “EU normative performance” (2017), which draws on critical theory and particularly on Habermas' work on Discourse Ethics, is regarded as the most suitable analytical framework to address this question. According to the author, the EU's performance in a given context would be normative only if moral and ethical principles constrain its quest for strategic goals (Bosse, 2017, p.61). In this connection, the Union would be less willing to act normatively when its performance becomes “altruistic”, that is, when the implementation of value-based policies entails jeopardizing its economic and security gains (Bosse, 2017, p.63). This pragmatic standpoint would result in a reduction of the European power to normatively influence others (Balfour, 2006; Pace, 2009; Wood, 2009; Bosse, 2017) which could plausibly explain why the EU´s foreign policy has not had a positive impact on the behavior of a strategic ally such as Egypt.
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H2b: The EU’s unwillingness to jeopardize its strategic goals in Egypt has hampered its normative performance, thus hindering its ability to compel the regime to abide by international human rights law.
4. METHODOLOGY
Having described the theoretical foundations of the present thesis, this section outlines the approach used to carry out the empirical research. The chapter comprises the justification for the case selection, the research method and the operationalization strategy and it determines the sources for data collection.
CASE SELECTION
The influential work of Risse and Sikkink on TANs predicts that social mechanisms such as shaming, positive and negative incentives and coercion against norm-violating autocracies result in tactical concessions and, ultimately, in compliance. Nevertheless, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime seems to be immune to the numerous campaigns launched by transnational activists. Bearing this in mind, the deviant case method is deemed the most appropriate, because it is aimed at examining empirical anomalies in relation to general theoretical understandings of a certain topic (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).
With an in-depth study, this thesis is intended to uncover the specificities that render the case selected anomalous and opens the possibility to identify similar deviant cases through further research. The empirical examination will be performed through analytical tools provided by critical discourse analysis (CDA).
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RESEARCH METHOD: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Discourse is understood here as “a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; […] it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse, in this sense, is not an ideal, timeless form […] it is, from beginning to end, historical” (Foucault, 1972, p.117).
From the multiple analytical models that draw on Foucault’s definition of discourse, CDA is deemed the most appropriate given its definition of discourse as partly constitutive of the social world, including social relations and identities (Jorgersen & Phillips, 2002, p.60). Furthermore, CDA is rooted in the premise that not all societal phenomena are of a linguistic-discursive character (ibid.). This feature will allow for the examination of the EU’s foreign policy practices separately from its discourse, in contrast to post-structuralist scholars who regard all social phenomena as discursively-constructed. In addition, CDA is committed to social change by uncovering opaque power relationships (Fairclough, 1995, p.132), which is in line with the spirit of this thesis.
Fairclough offers the most comprehensive toolkit for CDA. His three-dimensional model enables the study of the microstructure of the texts, the articulation of different discourses and genres (interdiscursivity) and the wider social practices (Fairclough, 1992). The constructivist and critical models described in the theoretical framework will be indispensable to shed light on the non-discursive practices of the actors involved.
OPERATIONALIZATION STRATEGY
The spiral model theorizes a chain of causation in which sustained transnational activism against autocracies activates “Western” normative pressure against the infringer and this, in turn, compels the target state to rectify its behavior:
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TANs' campaigns EU's normative pressure Improvement in Egypt's behavior (Independent variable=A) (Intervening variable=q) (Dependent Variable=B)
Whereas the case analyzed here deviates from this model, the following operationalization provides the basis to empirically establish where and why this chain of causation was interrupted, while testing the relevance of alternative theoretical patterns.
H1: Norm contestation by the Egyptian authorities has resulted in the EU tolerating repression, and therefore it explains the persistence of the regime's unlawful behavior
The idea is to illustrate whether the dependent variable (Egypt's persistence in violating human rights) was the consequence of a phenomenon that has been determinant in similar cases, namely norm contestation (Schwarz, 2004; Cardenas, 2007; Liese, 2009; Jetschke, 2011). If the Egyptian authorities convinced the European Union of a narrative that challenged the universality of human rights, that would have inhibited the latter's disposition to act normatively. In such a case, the causal relation between A and q would have been broken, therefore altering the value of B.
To test whether a strategy of norm contestation was successfully displayed (H1), it is necessary to examine how the Egyptian regime has counteracted the pressures of TANs through the dissemination of alternative narratives. A preliminary analysis suggests that Sisi's government has indeed challenged the universal nature of human rights norms. That said, H1 will find support if the examination of the EU's discourse through CDA detects signs that the European institutions and officials have recognized the Egyptian narratives even if this acknowledgment is combined with criticism over the regime's performance. For H1 to be refuted, the analysis should ascertain that the EU has
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unambiguously criticized human rights violations in Egypt.
H2a: The EU's foreign policy towards Egypt has normative goals.
Building on Tocci's (2008) conceptual framework for the analysis of normative foreign policy introduced in the previous section, indicators in support of H2a will be found if statements from the European institutions and officials contain the promotion of
normative principles as described by Manners (2002). The author differentiates between
“core norms” (peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law) and “minor” objectives of social solidarity, equality, sustainable development and good governance (ibid., pp.242-243). In addition, for these aims to be truly normative, the European foreign policy must pursue them through normative means (Tocci, 2008). Consequently, evidence of the soundness of H2a would emerge if the EU has actively pursued normative goals by deploying normative instruments, ranging from diplomatic discussions over human rights to the imposition of conditionality, which is referred to as “the linking of perceived benefits (political support, economic aid, membership in an organization) to the fulfilment of a certain program [aiming] to persuade, induce and at times coerce states into adopting the desired policy” (Kubicek, 2005, p.273).
H2b: The EU’s unwillingness to jeopardize its strategic goals in Egypt has hampered its normative performance, thus hindering its ability to compel the regime to abide by international human rights law.
As stated above, the spiral model was based on the following chain of causation (A → q → B). If evidence is found that the EU has used normative means towards Egypt (q) the key to understanding the failure of the pattern would likely lie in the connection between
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q and B. That causal link was originally taken for granted because the authors of the model ignored that “Western” states have their own strategic goals which might interfere with their willingness to act normatively, either reducing or suppressing their capacity to force unlawful autocracies into compliance.
According to Bosse's model (2017) of EU’s normative performance, when there is a collision between the EU's normative and pragmatic objectives the Union must be willing to decide on policy actions (based on value-based principles) that result in a reduction of its economic or security gains to act normatively (ibid., p.60). Hence, both the EU’s discourse and practice should be analyzed to determine to which extent European policies that have been justified by moral or ethical reasons are “likely to have been influenced by underlying pragmatic strategic considerations” (ibid., 59).
Turning to the selected case study, the first step will be to assess whether there is a collision between the EU's stated normative and strategic objectives in Egypt. From this starting point, the hypothesized dichotomous relationship between normative and
non-normative goals could be assessed by an in-depth study of the EU’s discourse
through CDA, which provides the tools to study the articulation of various discourses (interdiscursivity). Provisionally, H2b will lack support if normative and pragmatic discourses appear to be non-conflicting. However, this indicator is not sufficient to certify the EU's normative performance, which requires that norms and principles constrain its quest for strategic goals (Bosse, 2017, p.61). It is therefore essential to examine the wider social practices that affect the Union's foreign policy towards Egypt. On the one hand, if the EU has mainly behaved as a normative actor, evidence should be found that normative means have been deployed at the expense of the achievement of non-normative goals such as economic gains or regional influence. On the contrary, if the Union proves to be unwilling to use the kind of normative means that would damage its strategic interests, this would hinder its normative performance and limit its ability to influence the
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regime's behavior. A closer look at the power relations present in the partnership
between the EU and Egypt will seek to get a clearer picture of the reasons why the regime has not yielded to external pressure.
DATA COLLECTION
Documents and audio-visual material published between June 2014 and March 2018, mainly primary sources, have been selected for the empirical record. In order to delve into the discursive strategies of the Egyptian regime, 18 communicative events will be analyzed, including interviews given by the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry, to the European newspapers Der Spiegel, El Mundo, and Le Figaro and the TV channels BBC, DW and France 24. The material encompasses press statements that were sent by the government to this researcher during the period she worked as a correspondent in Egypt.
The discursive and non-discursive practices of the EU will be examined through 36 communicative events issued by The Commission, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the European Parliament. The sources selected include statements, speeches, resolutions and press releases that are publicly available on the website of these institutions. Likewise, these documents contain the most relevant agreements between the EU and Egypt in the study period, namely the assessment of the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Arab state in 2014, the Annual Action Programme 2014 in favour of Egypt and its extension to 2015, the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020, the report issued in 2017 on EU-EU-Egypt relations in the framework of the revised ENP, and other files linked to the allocation of European funds for diverse projects in Egypt.
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It is worth mentioning that the need to choose some sources and exclude others increases the chances of obtaining biased results in the subsequent empirical research. To reduce this risk, the researcher has included a fair number of documents -only limited by time constraints- while ensuring that all the relevant entities and individuals are represented.
5. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
In May 2017, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, signed a controversial NGO law which was termed as “a catastrophic blow for human rights groups working in Egypt” by Naja Bournaim, Campaigns Director for North Africa at Amnesty International. Through this restrictive legislation, the government established a formal status for the crackdown on dissent that began after the military takeover of 2013 and continued to escalate afterward.
The following empirical research seeks to explain why the Egyptian authorities seemed to be immune to criticism over their human rights record during Sisi's first term in office. Firstly, this chapter will try to elucidate whether the government successfully completed a process of norm contestation vis-à-vis the EU. The second subsection will focus on the normativity of the EU's foreign policy towards Egypt while the final part will evaluate the Union's normative performance.
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Egypt's efforts to counteract the influence of TANs
In the face of accusations of torture, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and even murder, the Egyptian authorities responded by drawing on different -at times conflicting- discursive strategies, seeking to avoid criticism and reverse the effects of shaming campaigns on their international reputation. Besides the well-known strategy of denial, the analysis of the documents gathered shows the recurrence of various arguments which could be classified into three main discursive strategies: norm contestation, existential threat, and exceptionality. Both existential threat and exceptionality contain features of norm contestation since they challenge the universality of international law.
The discursive strategy of sheer norm contestation identified here is twofold: firstly, the Egyptian authorities invoked state sovereignty as an inalienable right that was being violated by TANs and the institutions that criticized their actions, including the EU. For instance, the State Information Service responded to a Human Rights Watch's report by arguing in a statement sent to journalists that “the organization does not enjoy any legal status that may allow it to operate in Egypt. […] Collecting evidence and interviewing witnesses without any legal backing are activities that constitute a flagrant violation of the established principle of state sovereignty.”1 The second strategy was
primarily utilized by President Sisi, who urged the international community to follow a certain interpretation of human rights: “if you are unable to receive good or even adequate education and shelter [...] and have no hope for the future, that is also a violation of your human rights. Human rights should not be reduced to freedom of expression.”2
Furthermore, he called on his critics to consider “the human rights of the soldiers” who were killed in terrorist attacks, suggesting that a certain balance had to be stroke between the rights of the population and those of the security forces not to leave the latter
1 Statement issued by the State Information Service on 12 August 2014
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unprotected.3 This last argument is closely related to the ensuing discursive strategy.
The words “terrorism” and “stability” were widely present in the statements and interviews analyzed for this section. The discourse of an existential threat posed by jihadist groups was pervasive and it linked Egypt's security with the stability of the region and the world: “if the [Egyptian] state collapses, the whole region will head for disaster and Europe will suffer a terrible harm.”4 Picturing himself as a man who stepped up in
order to “save” his country, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasized his efforts to keep Egypt from entering “a civil war” and becoming “a failed state”, which would have led the whole region to “a cycle of anarchy.” The Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition group to his rule, was consistently described as “the godfather of all terrorist organizations” which posed a “threat to humanity and global stability.” Therefore, the government's actions (which challenged international human rights standards) were “necessary” and carried out against the backdrop of the war on terror.
In the same vein, the discourse of exceptionality used the instability that followed the Arab Spring to demand the international community for its sympathy. In a statement forwarded to journalists, the State Information Service pointed out that Egypt is “in the process of rebuilding the modern state with all its components reached by the developed nations”5 and thus breaches of international law should not be judged severely. The idea
conveyed throughout the material is that foreigners' understanding of the Egyptian reality was, at best, “inaccurate.” Although officials acknowledged that there were cases of torture in the hands of security forces, they labeled them as “excesses of individual nature” that were difficult to prevent due to a lack of state capacity.
Bearing in mind the main discursive strategies displayed by the Egyptian authorities, the next subsection clarifies whether the EU agreed with any of them which
3 Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in an interview with France 24 broadcasted in October 2017 4 Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in an interview with El Mundo published on 22 April 2015 5 Statement issued by the State Information Service on 11 September 2017
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would justify low levels of normative pressure on the regime.
The EU's response to Egypt's allegations
The European Commission, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the EEAS and the Parliament, expressed the EU's position in a similar vein, only with some disparities in their wording, being the latter body that more firmly replied against Egypt's allegations. The regime's three discursive strategies were addressed as follows:
The alleged prevalence of the Egyptian right to sovereignty within the framework of norm contestation barely received any attention from the European institutions. Only the Commission asserted that “Egypt regularly uses the narrative for external influences interfering with Egyptian internal affairs.”6 Instead of being accepted, this discourse was
considered a high risk for cooperation within an environment of “closed political opportunities.”7 Similarly, there is no evidence that the European institutions agreed on
altering their understanding of human rights. On the contrary, they repeatedly called on Egypt to abide by its international obligations, given that the state was party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention against Torture among other international agreements.8
Notwithstanding its stated awareness of the “dangers” that terrorism posed to Egypt and the region, the discourse of an existential threat as a justification for human rights violation was neither validated by the EU. The Commission complained about the “scripted, legalistic replies” provided by the Egyptian authorities when confronted with criticism over repression and disapproved their emphasis on the terrorist threat as the paramount priority.9 By the same token, Federica Mogherini insisted on “the need to
6 Commission Implementing decision of 6.12.2017 on the Annual Action Programme 7 (Ibid.)
8 European Parliament P8_TA(2016)0084
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tackle terrorism in full respect for human rights.”10 Furthermore, none of the European
institutions labeled the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization while the Parliament identified them as “the largest opposition movement.”11
In the same vein, no indicator was found compatible with the idea that the strategy of exceptionality permeated the EU's perspective. Even though Egypt's need to strengthen its state capacities was acknowledged, the European institutions blamed human rights violations not to the weakness of the Egyptian state but to a “lack of commitment” on the part of the regime. Both the Commission and the Parliament denounced the government “reluctance” to halt repression and allow for a genuine democratic transition.
Conclusion
For a process of legal contestation to succeed, the target audience must agree on any of the discursive strategies used by the norm-violating state. In contrast, the results indicate that none of the arguments that the Egyptian government used to justify its coercive actions against civil society were accepted by the European institutions which disproves H1. Provided that norm contestation does not account for the lack of improvement in Egypt's behavior, the following section will clarify whether the EU had normative goals in Egypt during the study period (H2a) which will help analyze the Union’s normative performance and its failure to positively impact on the human rights record of the Arab state (H2b).
H2a: THE EU'S NORMATIVE GOALS IN EGYPT
10 Mogherini's response to the Parliament released on 4 May 2017 (Parliamentary questions O-000036/2017) 11 European Parliament P8_TA(2015)0012
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Stated normative objectives
Core normative goals regarding the promotion of peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights as defined by Manners (2002) were widely present in the documents analyzed. These aims were mentioned both in general and specific terms, including freedom of assembly and freedom of the press, democratic sustainability, and full accountability. Likewise, other objectives such as the support for equality, sustainable development, social solidarity and good governance were mentioned as normative objectives of the EU, including concrete aspects such as the fight against corruption and the achievement of inclusive and sustainable growth.
The use of normative means
For the EU's aims to be truly normative, its stated values must be coupled with specific actions. In this respect, the very act of releasing reports urging the Egyptian authorities to abide by their international obligations is a normative mean. Moreover, the documents analyzed explicitly mention a wide variety of instruments whereby the European institutions have pursued their normative goals.
Given its power to launch external aid programmes, the Commission was the main body through which the EU implemented its normative means. Multiple programmes and agreements have been identified, some of which were outlined in the report on EU-Egypt relations in the framework of the revised ENP released on 13 July 2017. The report covered the period from January 2015 to May 2017 during which the “EU financial assistance commitments to Egypt amounted to over EUR 1.3 billion in grants, with around 45% of the portfolio targeting the wider field of economic and social development including employment creation, 45% devoted to renewable energy, water and sanitation/waste management and environment, and 10% dedicated to support
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improving governance, human rights, justice and public administration” (ibid., p.2). In addition, the bilateral Association Agreement structures, which were suspended in 2011 after the Arab Spring, were resumed in 2015. This decision led to the celebration of the fourth and fifth meeting of the Subcommittee on Political Matters in Cairo in 2015 and 2018 respectively, which “enabled a detailed exchange on human rights policies as well as on specific cases” (ibid., p.12). By the same token, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, held meetings with the Egyptian authorities in February 2017 in which he addressed “all issues of EU concern” with the involvement of members of the local civil society. Specific programmes aiming to support both core and minor normative goals were also detected. For instance, the “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Civil Society” programme was launched for the period 2011-2018 within the framework of the ENP. Actions were taken to safeguard women and children's rights, enhance the capacity of civil society organizations and support the rule of law by training members of the judiciary and the police on the respect for democratic principles. Similar measures were implemented through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) whose main objective is to provide support to human rights advocates who carry out their activities under risky conditions. The EIDHR also allowed for the deployment of an Expert Electoral Mission (EEM) and an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the constitutional referendum in January 2014 and the presidential elections in May 2014 respectively.
The bilateral dialogue was the primary normative mean used by the EEAS in Egypt during the study period. The High Representative, Federica Mogherini, claimed on multiple occasions that human rights issues were always discussed during her meetings with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Shoukry. By and large, the EU opted for a positive engagement with Egypt, and the imposition of a partial arms embargo was the only attempt to draw on conditionality mechanisms. Chaired by the High Representative
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(Catherin Ashton at that time), the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) resolved to halt the export of military technology and security equipment that could have been used by the regime against dissenters. Although the motion was approved in August 2013 and maintained during the following years, the decision was non-binding and ultimately ignored by several Member States (MS).
Considering the inconsistent application of the restriction, the European
Parliament repeatedly called on the MS not only to adhere to an EU-wide arms ban but
to link aid allocation with Egypt's progress towards democracy. Along with their firm criticism of the autocracy's unlawful actions and their demands for conditionality, the Members of the European Parliament maintained exchanges with local activists and human rights defenders like the director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Bahey el-Din Hassan, who testified for the Subcommittee on Human Rights on 28 May 2015.
Conclusion
The results obtained in this section clearly indicate that the EU had normative goals towards Egypt in the period examined, which is consistent with H2a. The European institutions systematically conveyed their will to work for the values of democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Moreover, the three bodies employed multiple normative means, namely diplomatic exchanges, bilateral agreements and development projects. A partial arms embargo was imposed in 2013 and remained in force during the following years, although this measure was non-binding and various MS contravened its provisions. This fragile attempt to impose conditionality mechanisms will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next chapter, wherein the EU's normative performance and its influence over Egypt's behavior will be studied.
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DILEMMA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Along with the previously outlined normative goals, the EU holds paramount strategic aims in the Middle East, and Egypt has been and continues to be a key European partner. Whereas the Egyptian regime has not ceased to violate the rights of its citizens, it seems rather difficult for the Union to reconcile its values and its strategic interests. The way in which this hypothesized dilemma affects the EU's normative performance will be studied through the Union’s discourse and practices as well as the power relations between the two actors involved.
Idealism and pragmatism: a discursive conflict?
Regional stability, reduction of the terrorist threat, economic cooperation and migration management are the main European strategic goals in the Middle East. Accordingly, these objectives appear throughout the documents analyzed, particularly in those that were issued by the Commission and the EEAS. The manner they were connected resulted in a strong partnership discourse, whereby the EU conferred a positive identity upon Egypt. The partnership discourse highlighted the role of the Arab state as a relevant negotiator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a key ally in the quest for regional stability, especially after war erupted in Syria and Libya and the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) consolidated its rule in Syrian and Iraqi territory. Furthermore, the Commission and the EEAS described Egypt as a significant trade partner and praised the government's efforts in the fight against illegal migration. Mogherini repeatedly referred to the Egyptian Foreign Minister as her “good friend”. In this vein, allusions to the “common work” carried out by both parties and a persistent use of an inclusive “we” conveyed the idea of a strong partnership.
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The question arises as to whether it is possible for the EU to reconcile both its value-based and its strategic discourse and objectives. The Union itself was well-aware of this conflict and, consequently, pointed out at mechanisms to ensure the “coherence” of its policies. The Commission asserted that a combination of complementary programs, interventions, and loans granted to Egypt would bring coherence but it did not explain how this would happen.12 Similarly, the High Representative claimed that the EU-Egypt
Partnership Priorities that both parties signed in 2017 provided “a solid basis to address the various challenges faced by the country, including socio-economic development, good governance, human rights, migration and security, in a spirit of partnership.”13 In other
words, it was suggested that normative and non-normative goals were not conflicting and that both of them could be achieved through cooperation with the Egyptian authorities. However, the same document in which the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities were laid out evidence the collision between values and pragmatic considerations. On the one hand, in its introduction, it is said that “the Partnership Priorities are guided by a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights.”14 Nevertheless, the positive identity conferred upon Sisi's government
clearly contradicts the EU's normative discourse, whereby the Union denounced the violent crackdown of the Egyptian authorities on civil society and the lack of political will to implement democratic reforms. Although inconsistencies were already found in previous statements, the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities were the culmination of a path initiated in 2015, when the bilateral Association Agreement structures were resumed. Despite the well-known escalation of human rights violations, the document laid the foundations for a “reinforced partnership” (ibid.) marking a significant turning point in
12 Commission Implementing Decision of 17.12.2015 modifying the Decision C(2004) 7170 adopting a Single Support Framework for European Union support to Egypt for the period 2014-2015
13 Parliamentary questions O-000036/2017, 4 May 2017 14 EU-Egypt Partnership Prioritites 2017-2020
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the conflict between European values and pragmatism. Social justice and democracy were included, but cooperation was strengthened, primarily to “address common challenges” in strategic areas like migration management, trade and investment, energy security, regional stability and counter-terrorism.
While the Commission and the EEAS tried to maintain the illusion of a coherent and balanced foreign policy, the European Parliament expressed concern that strategic goals would prevail at the expense of normative aims. For instance, a group of MEPs questioned Mogherini on how “the continuing human rights violations [would] affect the conclusion of the EU-Egypt Partnership priorities” and how the High Representative would guarantee that human rights were “given precedence over migration management and counter-terrorism.”15 Throughout the whole period, the Parliament stressed the need
to impose conditionality measures and urged the Council, the Commission, and the EEAS to launch a coherent strategy “which should focus on improving the rights, freedoms and opportunities of Egyptians.”16 The use of the modal verb “should” implies that the reality
was otherwise.
The analysis of the European discourse has revealed the coexistence of two opposing perspectives along with an increasingly pragmatic engagement: features that will likely be reflected in its use of normative means. Whether the EU’s foreign policy was truly underpinned by universal values would depend on the extent to which the normative means used to bring Egypt into compliance limited the European quest for strategic gains.
The EU's normative performance: a lukewarm response to Egypt's unlawful behavior On 21 August 2013, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) entrusted the High Representative
15 Parliamentary questions O-000036/2017, 4 May 2017 16European Parliament P8_TA(2014)0007
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and the Commission with the task of reviewing the European assistance to Egypt, after the security forces killed more than 800 protestors. In addition, the MS “agreed to suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment” that could be used for internal repression and proposed a revision of “their security assistance.”17 The FAC's conclusions were the only
attempt to promote measures that could have jeopardized the Union's relations with the Arab state. However, these non-binding decisions were inconsistently implemented in practice. As late as February 2018, the Parliament decried the fact that companies based in several MS had continued “to export surveillance and military equipment” and pointed out that the Council had agreed five years before to “readjust” the EU's aid to Egypt.18
As it was stated in the preceding section, the normative means used by the EU were manifold. Nevertheless, those diplomatic exchanges, aid programmes, agreements, and loans neither limited the Union's quest for strategic objectives nor had a positive effect on Egypt's human rights record. In fact, the Parliament noted that common interests regarding migration management and counter-terrorism could undermine human rights, and persistently called upon the MS to impose conditionality measures based on the principle of “more for more” in their bilateral relations with the Arab state.
Ultimately, this lukewarm response to Egypt's unlawful behavior demonstrates that the EU has not performed as a consistent normative actor as its strategic interests have not been put at risk for the sake of values and norms. This reaction can only be fully understood after analyzing the power relations between both actors.
The EU and Egypt: a two-way power relationship
In 2016, the MS were responsible for 30% of the total foreign trade volume in Egypt which positioned the Union as Egypt's main trading partner.19 Furthermore, with an
17 FAC conclusions of 21 August 2013
18 European Parliament. Joint motion on executions in Egypt (2018/2561(RSP)) 19 Report on EU-Egypt relations in the framework of the revised ENP, 13.7.2017
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overall financial assistance of EUR 11 billion in its various formats (grants, loans, and debt swaps), the EU remained the first donor of the Arab state (ibid.). These figures evidence that the partnership is highly valuable to Sisi's government, especially after the rampant economic crisis that followed the 2011 revolution. However, the MS also have great economic interests in the country which have been pursued regardless of human rights violations. The most paradigmatic case is the concession given to the Italian state-controlled oil company ENI in Zhor (the largest gas field in the Mediterranean) after it was discovered by the corporation in August 2015. Half a year later, the tortured body of Giulio Regeni, an Italian Ph.D. student who was conducting fieldwork in Egypt, was found in a ditch on the outskirts of Cairo. Upon reasonable suspicion that the Egyptian security forces committed the crime, diplomatic relations between Italy and the Arab state suffered. Nevertheless, ENI's business in Egypt continued as expected and in late February the Ministry of Petroleum granted the Italian energy giant the development lease for the field.
The two-way power relationship between Egypt and the EU is perfectly reflected in the sentence uttered by Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos during his visit to Egypt in May 2015: “we face common challenges and we need one another to address them”. In a speech in which he did not mention human rights, he referred specifically to migration and security. Both areas have traditionally underpinned a long-standing alliance but following the rise of ISIS and the growing pressure of the migratory flow after war erupted in Syria, Iraq, and Libya cooperation with Egypt became crucial for the EU. As a result, statements from the European institutions assigned Egypt two opposing identities whereby the Middle Eastern state was pictured as both a committed strategic ally and a norm-violator actor. The power of normative pressures, which lies on the threat of exclusion from a “community of civilized nations” (Risse, 1999, p.539) was thus neutralized because, regardless of the government's disrespect for human rights, Egypt
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still maintained a prominent place within the international community and none of the measures taken by the EU were designed to punish Sisi’s crackdown on dissent.
Conclusion
Along with its normative goals, the EU has increasingly important strategic objectives in the Middle East that underpin its alliance with Egypt, especially in the areas of migration and counter-terrorism. Despite the Commission and the EEAS's efforts to convey the idea that the quest for both aims was not incompatible during the study period, contradictions in their discourse and the dissatisfaction of the Parliament with the lack of conditionality measures demonstrate that there was a conflict between values and pragmatism. The reinforcement of cooperation through the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities in 2017, amid an escalation of human rights abuses by Sisi's government, definitively shifted the balance towards pragmatism. Consequently, the EU did not use normative means that could have jeopardized its relationships with Egypt. The absence of conditionality measures to pressure the regime and its role as a committed ally in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration, allowed the Egyptian authorities to continue with their unlawful practices. This confirms H2b, according to which the EU’s unwillingness to jeopardize its strategic goals in Egypt has hampered its normative performance, thus hindering its ability to compel the regime to abide by international human rights law.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In 1999, the constructivists scholars Risse and Sikkink contested the realist assumption that norms and values have no influence in international politics by developing the spiral model: a pattern that predicted that continued transnational activism against repressive states would trigger normative pressures from “Western” governments and institutions,
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which would compel the norm-violating actor to abide by international standards. Although the model has been confirmed by various instances, this thesis selected a deviant case in order to understand why the pattern's mechanisms are not always activated. Specifically, the study aimed to answer the following research question: Why have the continued campaigns by TANs to halt human rights violations in Egypt not resulted in the EU changing the regime's behavior through normative (or material) pressure?
Given that TANs have continuously raised awareness on the coercive actions of the Egyptian authorities, the reason behind the unexpected outcome had to lie in the agency of the remaining actors involved. Consequently, the discourse and practices of both the EU and the Egyptian regime during Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s first time in office (2014-2018) were examined. Upholding the principles of social constructivism and drawing on Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA), the theories of norm contestation, normative power Europe and EU normative performance were used to test two alternative explanations for Egypt’s persistence in contravening its international commitments.
Firstly, this study analyzed whether the Egyptian authorities completed a successful process of norm contestation, which would have resulted in the EU tolerating repression and reducing its normative pressure on the regime (H1). If that was the case, evidence would have been found that Sisi’s government convinced their European counterparts of a narrative that challenged the universality of human rights. The analysis through CDA showed that the Egyptian government pursued a strategy of norm contestation, but its efforts proved to be unsuccessful since none of the arguments used to justify repression were accepted by the EU. Hence, H1 was refuted.
Secondly, since the spiral model assumes that “Western” governments are always willing to promote normative objectives, it had to be tested whether this core premise
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applied to the selected case study. Manners’ theory of normative power Europe (2002) was used to establish whether the EU had normative goals in Egypt during the study period (H2a). An examination of the discourse and practices of the EU demonstrated that agreements, programmes and diplomatic exchanges were launched to support values connected to peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Therefore, the results confirmed H2a. Nevertheless, the scope of the normative means employed was rather limited, which suggested that the EU’s willingness to pursue a value-based foreign policy in Egypt was constrained by pragmatic considerations.
In light of the previous results, the empirical research concluded by analyzing whether the EU’s reluctance to jeopardize its strategic goals in Egypt hindered its normative performance and weakened its ability to change Egypt’s behavior (H2b). Following the analytical framework of EU normative performance (Bosse, 2017), both the discourse and practices of the European institutions and officials were studied. For one thing, contradictions in the Union’s discourse denoted a conflict between values and pragmatism. Furthermore, it was concluded that the EU did not want to endanger its strategic interests as illustrated by both the unwillingness of the Commission and the EEAS to impose conditionality measures and the reinforcement of the EU-Egypt partnership in 2017 amid grave human rights violations by Sisi's government. The EU did not perform as a normative actor because cooperation with Egypt in areas like migration management and counter-terrorism was deemed indispensable. As a result, its capability to force the regime to end repression was undermined, which is consistent with H2b.
This thesis contributes to the literature on transnational activism by demonstrating that “Western” actors can be responsible for the failure of transnational advocacy when they are reluctant to endanger their strategic interests in states targeted by TANs. Moreover, its results feed into the debate on the complex relationship between values and pragmatism in International Relations. This study supports the idea that norms can have
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a significant impact on the behavior of state actors. However, it also contends that, in instances where normative and strategic goals are in conflict, it is important to determine whether pragmatic considerations hider the quest for peace and justice. Finally, these findings could help activists design their strategies for forging alliances against certain autocratic regimes, shifting the focus from “Western” states and institutions to the local population.
Yet it must be recognized that this thesis was not without its limitations. For one thing, its scope had to be limited due to time constraints. Consequently, the analysis of the EU could only focus on three European institutions and was not able to account for the independent influence that certain MS might have over decisions linked to the EU’s normative performance. Likewise, the generalizability of the results obtained is potentially problematic as with most case studies, particularly those that are deviant. Although the low external validity is one of the weak points of this study, its objective was not to claim otherwise but to lay the foundations for further research on similar cases. Insights taken from the present research could be applied to the study of the EU's relationship with other allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco or Turkey. That is, this thesis could be the starting point for future studies on the conflict between European norms and pragmatic interests with regards to other strategically important allies in the Middle East whose human rights practices breach international law.
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