How does the Moment of Effort Influences Subjective Product Value?
Master thesis author: Jasmine Corba, 1037183
Under the supervision of: Joris Demmers
MSc in Business Administration – Marketing Track University of Amsterdam
Final version Date: 14/06/2017
Statement of originality
This document is written by Student Jasmine Corba who declares to take full responsibility for the contents of this document.
I declare that the text and the work presented in this document is original and that no sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been used in creating it. The Faculty of Economics and Business is responsible solely for the supervision of completion of the work, not for the contents.
Table of Contents
Abstract ………... 5
1. Introduction ………. 6
2. Literature Review ……… 8
2.1 The effects of effort ………... 8
2.1.1 Endowment effect ………... 9
2.1.2 The sunk-cost effect ………10
2.1.3 Cognitive dissonance theory ………... 12
2.2 The effects of anticipated effort ………....……… 14
2.2.1 Hedonic value of effort ……….………....…….. 17
2.2.2 Task difficulty ..………….……….………. 18 3. Methodology ……….…………...…….... 20 3.1 Experiment 1 ………...……... 20 3.1.1 Measures ………...……... 20 3.1.2 Procedure ………...…….. 22 3.1.3 Results ………...….….. 23 3.1.4 Discussion ………...……... 26 3.2 Experiment 2 ………... 28 3.2.1 Measures ……….……….. 29 3.2.2 Procedure ……….………. 32 3.2.3 Results ……….. 33 3.2.4 Discussion ……… 40 4. General Discussion ………..………... 42 5. Appendices ……… 45
Appendix B. Origami duck instructions …...……….……….... 47 6. Reference list .……… 52
Abstract
Previous research introduced the IKEA-effect; engaging in effort to obtain an outcome increases the likeability and the willingness to pay for that outcome (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). However, the do-it-yourself products of IKEA require people to buy the product first and engage in the effort of assembling the product later. Research on the effects of expectations on subjective product value is underserved. This current research contributes to academia by investigating how the moment of effort influences subjective product value and whether there are differences in this relationship for different task difficulty and task hedonic value expectations. To answer the research question two experiments were conducted. Cognitive dissonance theory is proposed as an underlying mechanism to explain the results. The results in this study show that anticipation of effort leads to a higher willingness to pay and likeability of the product when the task is expected to be difficult. This finding is relevant for practice because not only can companies increase product value for their consumers, they can also decrease their production cost at the same time due to the willingness of customers to exert effort into the product.
1. Introduction
Consumers can buy instant cake mixes in the supermarket, on Instagram and Pinterest you can see coffee tables made from pallets, and at the drug store you can buy do-it-yourself hair mask packages. But the most popular do-it-yourself concept of all is IKEA. With 330 stores in 43 countries, it sells home products that must be assembled by the consumers themselves. With an annual turnover of 32 billion euro’s (Ikea, 2017) the IKEA concept seems to work. Research suggested several mechanisms that may explain why investment of effort leads to a higher valuation. Norton, Mochon and Ariely (2011) introduced the IKEA-effect. They found that when people put effort in assembling a product it increased their subjective product value, such that they liked the specific product more and were willing to pay more for it. Further research supports this effect (Dohle, Rall & Siegrist, 2014; Franke, Schreier & Kaiser, 2014), although the research methods that have been used made
participants engage in the effort before buying the product. However, this is not how IKEA and most of the do-it-yourself products sell. In reality, people buy the product anticipating that they must put effort into assembling the product at a later time. Testing for the
anticipation of effort could elicit different results. One reason for this potential difference is, that anticipation only has a cognitive component, while engaging in actual effort requires physical action.
The current research answers the question how the moment of effort influences
subjective product value. It was tested if anticipation of effort, compared to engaging in it, led to an increase in subjective product value. Such that willingness to pay, purchase quantity and likeability of the product increased. This research contributes to academia because the effects of expectations on product evaluation have been underserved in research. Previous studies showed that prior expectations affected product satisfaction (Patterson, 1993), assessments of service quality and value (Bolton & Drew, 1991) and repurchase intentions (Yi & La, 2004).
However, limited research studied the effects of expectations in the context of effort. With the current offerings of do-it-yourself products this is a new research area to be further developed. Moreover, this research is also relevant for managers. If anticipation of effort leads to an increase in subjective product value, they can be advised on how to increase product value for their consumers, while at the same time saving production costs.
To answer the research question, two experiments were executed. The first experiment was an online experiment. The primary purpose of this study was to measure if there was an effect of anticipated effort on subjective product value. A distinction was made between products high and low in hedonic value. The second experiment was a field experiment. This study had two objectives. The first objective was to replicate the previously found IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011), that is the increase in subjective product value when effort is invested in the product. The second objective was to compare the effects on
subjective product value between participants that had actually engaged in the effort and those who anticipated to do the effort. If anticipation of effort leads to an increase in subjective product value, it can be said there is a true value increase in offering do-it-yourself products to consumers. In the second experiment a distinction was made in task framing for the hedonic value and difficulty of the effort. This was done to uncover the underlying mechanism for the subjective value increase.
In the following section a literature review is presented. This review covers potential underlying mechanisms for the IKEA-effect and the proposed effects of anticipated effort, leading towards the hypotheses for the current research. Next, the methodology section introduces two experiments for which the research set-up, data and conclusion are discussed. Finally, the general discussion addresses the overall conclusion, contributions to academia, and recommendations for future research.
2. Literature Review
2.1 The effects of effortNorton, Mochon and Ariely (2011) proposed that the success of do-it-yourself products can be ascribed to the labour someone engages in when assembling these products. They found that investing effort into assembling a product leads to an increase in valuation of that product, they called this the ‘IKEA-effect’. Compared with identical pre-assembled products, assembling a product led to an increase in likeability of this product and an increase in the willingness to pay. This effect occurred only when the task of assembling the product was successfully completed. Dohle, Rall and Siegrist (2014) tested this effect using food and introduced the ‘I cooked it myself effect’. When people made their own milkshake, following a recipe, they liked the milkshake more compared to when they were given a prepared
milkshake. This increased liking led to an increased consumption of the milkshake. This research extended the IKEA-effect with the finding that putting effort into a product leads to an increased consumption of that product.
Previous research has shown that customization of products increases purchase intention and willingness to pay (Moon, Chadee & Tikoo, 2008). Consumers seem to value the option to customize their products and are prepared to pay a premium price for
customization, because it better fits their personal preferences (Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001). However, Norton, Mochon and Ariely (2011) used products that could not be customized, ascribing the increased valuation purely to the effort someone has put into assembling the product and not to the increased fit of the product with personal preferences.
Traditional economic theories assume that people make rational decisions (Smith, 1991), but the above-mentioned research shows otherwise. People are willing to pay more for an identical product or one of objectively lesser quality, because they invested effort in it (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). However, the product they invested effort in does not have
different or multiple benefits. If anything, the net benefit of the product should be lower, because the consumer accounts for part of the production cost. Therefore, the increase in willingness to pay is irrational. Product value is subjective and can be influenced by different variables, one of them being effort. Three theories can be used to explain the effect of effort on the increase in product value.
2.1.1 Endowment effect
The endowment effect could be used to explain the previously found IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). Thaler (1980) introduced the endowment effect; when someone owns a product, its value increases beyond the value of identical products someone does not own.The endowment effect can be explained by loss aversion; when offered a choice, people place a higher value on losses than on gains. This leads to an increased value of what someone owns, but could potentially lose (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991). As people get older, the experience of losing owned products and obtaining new products increases. However, this does not decrease the occurrence of the endowment effect.
Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (2001) found support for the endowment effect on different age groups, indicating that even though the experience of losing owned products and
obtaining new products increases, the endowment effect remains.
In most literature, the endowment effect is only mentioned when people factually own the product. Yet, the endowment effect is mainly driven on subjective feelings of ownership (Reb & Connoly, 2007). When people spend time touching a product it will increase feelings of ownership (Peck & Shu, 2009). These feelings lead people to omit the product to their endowment and shift their preferences to this product, increasing its value.
In the research about the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) participants had put effort into assembling the product before buying it. Assembling the product most
likely aroused subjective feelings of ownership. Reasoning from the endowment effect, this subjective ownership leads to an increased value of the product. Such that they rather own the product they invested in for a higher price, than an identical product where no effort had gone into the product. Nonetheless, this theory is improbable to account for the IKEA-effect
(Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). In the research, there was an experimental condition where participants had to build and un-build the product. In this condition, time and effort was spent on the product, which is likely to increase perceived ownership of the product (Peck & Shu, 2009). However, there was no increase in product value for this condition. It was necessary to have a finished end-product to increase participants’ likeability and willingness to pay for the product.
In the current research the endowment theory will not be able to explain effects of anticipated effort on an increase in subjective product value, because the product is not factually owned. Furthermore, the current research uses the method where participants buy the product before engaging in any effort. Since no effort is engaged in before buying the product, perceived ownership of the product is unlikely to affect the willingness to pay.
2.1.2 The sunk-cost effect
Another possible theory to explain the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) is the sunk-cost effect. This effect was introduced by Arkes and Blumer (1985); once people made an investment in a good, whether it is money, time or effort, they are more likely to continue the investment. The sunk-cost effect can, like the endowment effect, be explained by loss aversion (Soman, 2004). People place a higher value on losses than on gains. Therefore, they do not want to let their investment go to waste. A practical example that can be explained by the sunk-cost effect is the ‘North-South line’, a subway line that is being built in
and money than initially expected. From an economic perspective, it might have been a rational decision to stop the project. Yet, the town of the local municipality chose to continue the project and invest more. A possible explanation for this case is that the town of the local municipality already invested so much that they did not want their investment to be lost. There would be too much sunk-cost incurred.
Garland (1990) did a research similar to this example where participants chose whether or not to continue investments in a threatened project. The sunk-cost effect was observed, such that when more of the funds were already invested in the project, participants’ willingness to invest the remaining funds increased. This escalation of commitment can be explained by the sunk-cost effect. Participants did not want the money already invested in the project to be lost. The sunk-cost effect also appears in new product development. Managers who initiated new product development have an increased commitment to it and are likely to continue funding. A common explanation for the escalated commitment given by the
managers is that the sunk-cost would be too large if they would stop the project (Schmidt & Calantone, 2002).
Soman (2001) showed that the sunk-cost effect disappeared when a temporal investment scenario, where time is invested in a project, was given to participants. When given this scenario, participants chose for the options they preferred or were objectively better, independent of the investment in time they had already made. However, when given a monetary investment scenario, the sunk-cost effect appeared. When participants had invested money, they chose for the option where the higher monetary investment was made, even though this option was not rationally the best one. This effect can be accounted for by the difficulty hypothesis; people have trouble putting a monetary value to temporal costs. The researchers tested this hypothesis by using a manipulation that indicated the monetary value of time, e.g. a working wage. Time was explicitly converted to money, and consequently the
sunk-cost effect appeared. From this research, the conclusion can be drawn that the sunk-cost effect appears when investments are made in money, but not when they are made in time. However, when the time investment is explicitly linked to a monetary value, like a working wage, there is an increased attention to sunk-cost.
In the research about the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011), the
participants invested time and effort into assembling the product. Following the reasoning of the sunk-cost effect, they do not want this investment of time and effort to be lost.
Consequently, they are likely to show increased commitment to the product. Thereby
increasing its value and their willingness to pay to obtain the product. However, it is doubtful that this reasoning will account for the results. The time investment of participants was unrelated to money and therefore attention to sunk-cost is unlikely to account for the found effects. Moreover, the sunk-cost effect cannot explain the finding that successful completion of effort is necessary for the increase in product value to appear. Even though participants had already spent time and effort in the product, the value of the product did not increase when the task was not successfully completed. The sunk-costs were accepted. This result can be
explained by the fact that the investment was in time, which decreases attention to sunk-cost. In the current research, there will be an anticipated investment of time. Since the effort is anticipated, no costs are already incurred. Therefore, the sunk-cost effect is implausible to serve as an explanation for findings in the current research.
2.1.3 Cognitive dissonance theory
The last theory that could explain the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) is the cognitive dissonance theory introduced by Festinger (1962). This theory states that psychological discomfort is aroused when someone holds two or more beliefs, values or behaviours that are contradictory, i.e. dissonant, to each other. When cognitive dissonance is
aroused, the motivation arises to reduce the unpleasant feeling of psychological discomfort. There are different strategies to achieve this goal. A person can either add consonant
cognitions, i.e. cognitions that are in line with each other, eliminate dissonant cognitions, increase the importance of consonant cognitions, or decrease the importance of dissonant cognitions.
With the cognitive dissonance theory as starting point, different research paradigms developed, one of them is the ‘effort justification paradigm’ (Harmon-‐Jones & Mills, 1999). This paradigm states that cognitive dissonance is aroused when someone engages in effort to achieve some desirable outcome. The psychological discomfort is aroused because the
behaviour of engaging in an unpleasant or difficult activity is contradictory with the cognition of a desirable outcome. To reduce the cognitive dissonance, people have the tendency to increase the desirability of the outcome. The increased desirability serves as a justification for the effort they have invested in obtaining the outcome. With this strategy, the importance of consonant cognitions is increased to reduce the unpleasant feeling of cognitive dissonance. The research that started this paradigm was about the severity of initiating programs to obtain membership to a group. With these programs participants put in effort to become a member of a group. To justify the effort, they liked the group more after the initiation program than the participants that did not go through the program (Aronson & Mills, 1968). Recent research found similar results. White and Dolan (2009) showed that even though work was perceived as unpleasant by their participants, it was still experienced as rewarding. They recognize that cognitive dissonance could explain this result. To justify their work effort, people increase the rewarding feeling they get from their work. Other research showed that the increase in desirability of the outcome when effort is invested also applies to animals. When rats had to exert effort to obtain sucrose, they liked it more (Lydall, Gilmour & Dwyer, 2010).
The authors of the research on the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) proposed cognitive dissonance theory as the underlying mechanism. The effort of assembling a product is dissonant with the behaviour of paying for the product. Psychological discomfort is aroused because people account for part of the production cost and essentially pay for a product they built themselves. To reduce the aroused discomfort, participants increased the desirability of the product they invested effort in. As a result, the likeability of the product and their willingness to pay increased. It also explains why successful completion of the task was necessary for the IKEA-effect to occur. The effort could only be justified if the goal was obtained. If effort does not lead to a result, the effort cannot be justified by increasing the desirability of the result.
Recent research is still working on broadening the cognitive dissonance theory. Cooper and Hogg (2007) found effects of ‘vicarious dissonance’, where people experience cognitive dissonance by seeing others engaging in dissonant behaviour. However, little recent research has been done about cognitive dissonance aroused by anticipation of effort, instead of effort that has already been engaged in. Reasoning from the cognitive dissonance theory, dissonance would be aroused when effort is anticipated, because the cognition of engaging in effort after buying a product is contradictory to the cognition of paying for it.
2.2 The effects of anticipated effort
One recently published study has looked in to the effects of anticipated effort (Olivola & Shafir, 2013). They introduced the ‘martyrdom effect’; when people anticipated pain and effort contributing to a good cause, they have a higher willingness to contribute compared to an easy and enjoyable contribution process. As previously done for the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011), three theories will be discussed as possible underlying mechanisms for the increase in value when effort is anticipated.
Endowment effect
The endowment effect is unlikely to account for the increase in value when effort is anticipated. The endowment effect states that when someone owns a product, its value increases beyond the value of identical products someone does not own (Thaler, 1980). Carmon and Ariely (2000) showed that buyers and sellers differ in how much they value the same product. The buyers’ willingness to pay and the set selling price are based on different variables. The variables someone focuses on reflects what the person owns and is about to lose. If person A would exchange his money for a product person B owns, person A would place a higher value on his money and person B would have an increased focus on the benefits of the product. Even though the buyer, person A, anticipated owning the product, he still valued what he owned, that is his money, more than the product he was about to buy. Therefore, the endowment effect is not applicable to anticipated endowment.
In the research on the martyrdom effect (Olivola & Shafir, 2013), participants contributing to the cause would invest their time and effort. According to the endowment effect they would place a higher value on what they endow, namely their effort, than on the contribution. However, the martyrdom effect showed an increase in willingness to contribute, which signals an increased value of the contribution. Therefore, the martyrdom effect cannot be explained by the endowment theory.
Sunk-cost effect
The sunk-cost effect is unlikely to explain the martyrdom effect (Olivola & Shafir, 2013). The sunk-cost effect states that once people made an investment in a good, whether it is money, time, or effort, they are more likely to continue the endeavour (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). However, in the research on the martyrdom effect (Olivola & Shafir, 2013)
Cognitive dissonance
The current research proposes cognitive dissonance theory, specifically the effort-justification paradigm, as the underlying mechanism of the martyrdom effect. This paradigm states that cognitive dissonance is aroused when someone engages in an effort to achieve some desirable outcome (Harmon-‐Jones & Mills, 1999). In the research on the martyrdom effect (Olivola & Shafir, 2013) participants anticipated effort contributing to a cause. This is likely to have aroused cognitive dissonance within people. Psychological discomfort is aroused because anticipating pain and effort is contradictory with the cognition of donating your money to a cause. To reduce the psychological discomfort, participants increased the meaningfulness of the contribution. This justifies the anticipated effort participants would have to engage in.
The current research proposes that when people buy a product, anticipating that they must engage in effort to assemble this product, their willingness to pay increases. Anticipated effort arouses cognitive dissonance, which leads to an increase in the likeability of the
outcome. This increase in likeability is converted in behaviour by an increase in willingness to pay.
Dohle, Rall and Siegrist (2014) extended the results of the IKEA-effect found by Norton, Mochon and Ariely (2011). They concluded that engaging in an effort to assemble a product, leads to an increased consumption of the product. The ‘martyrdom effect’ (Olivola & Shafir, 2013) suggests that the effort-justification paradigm is applicable to anticipated effort. Therefore, this research proposes that the behaviour elicited by cognitive dissonance when engaging in effort is similar to the behaviour elicited by cognitive dissonance experienced when effort is anticipated. This leads to the second proposition that when people buy a product, anticipating that they must invest effort into assembling this product, their purchase quantity of the product increases.
H1a: The anticipated effort of assembling a product increases the likeability of that product, compared to an identical pre-assembled product.
H1b: The anticipated effort of assembling a product increases the willingness to pay for that product, compared to an identical pre-assembled product.
H1c: The anticipated effort of assembling a product increases the purchase quantity of the product, compared to an identical pre-assembled product.
2.2.1 Hedonic value of effort
This research contributes to previous research by making a distinction in the hedonic value of the effort experience. Products high in hedonic value contribute to a pleasant
experience, for example perfume (Okada, 2005). Previous research shows that consumers are more willing to invest time in hedonic products. However, consumers prefer convenience and are willing to pay more for products low in hedonic value (Okada, 2005). In the research about the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) products were used that differed in their hedonic experience. They used IKEA-boxes that are low in hedonic experience, and origami and LEGO which are high in hedonic experience. No differences were found in effects between products. In further research that supports the IKEA-effect no such distinction has been made. Additional research is required to further investigate if difference in the hedonic experience of products influences the relationship between anticipated effort and subjective product value.
Since people are inclined to spend effort on products which are high in hedonic experience, e.g. baking cookies, it is likely that spending effort on these products will arouse less cognitive dissonance. However, people are less willing to spend time obtaining products low in hedonic experience and are willing to pay more for convenience. Therefore, spending effort on products with less hedonic value is likely to arouse cognitive dissonance.
The current research proposes that the hedonic value of products influences the effect of anticipated effort on subjective product value. Anticipated effort when buying a product, leads to cognitive dissonance and people will be motivated to reduce the uncomfortable feeling. In order to reduce it they will increase the likeability of the product, this is shown in behaviour by a higher willingness to pay and purchase quantity. Yet, people might be less willing to make an effort to assemble a product low in hedonic value. Therefore, anticipation of engagement in effort for low hedonic products, arouses more cognitive dissonance and a stronger uncomfortable feeling. The current research expects that in order to reduce this feeling, the likeability of the outcome will increase more than it will for products high in hedonic value. This is shown in behaviour by a higher willingness to pay and purchase quantity for the products low in hedonic value than for the products high in hedonic value.
H2a: Products low in hedonic value strengthen the effect of anticipated effort on the increase in likeability.
H2b: Products low in hedonic value strengthen the effect of anticipated effort on the increase in willingness to pay.
H2c: Products low in hedonic value strengthen the effect of anticipated effort on the increase in purchase quantity.
2.2.2 Task difficulty
The effort-justification paradigm (Harmon-‐Jones & Mills, 1999) states that if someone engages in effort to achieve a desirable outcome, cognitive dissonance is aroused. If this reasoning is followed it can be expected that an increase in task difficulty increases the psychological discomfort. An increase in difficulty requires more effort to complete the task and therefore increases the need to justify for the effort. The justification of the increase in
effort, leads to an increase in the likeability of the outcome which is shown in behaviour by a higher willingness to pay.
However, in the research on the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011) effort only led to increase in product value when the task was successfully completed. This indicates that if a task is too difficult, leading to an inability to finish, it will not induce a value
increase. When there is no outcome, the aroused cognitive dissonance cannot be justified because there is no end-result of the effort to attribute the value increase to.
This finding is in line with the self-efficacy theory. Self-efficacy is a term given for someone’s belief in his own capabilities to accomplish a certain activity. It influences the activities one chooses to perform, but also the commitment and persistence to and the
satisfaction with the activity (Bandura, 1977). Research has supported this theory and showed that people with high self-efficacy had an increased sustained effort to a physical task
compared to people with low self-efficacy (Hutchinson, Sherman, Martinovic & Tenenbaum, 2008). Furthermore, high self-efficacy has been associated with an increased job satisfaction (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Steca & Malone, 2006; Judge & Bono, 2001).
The current research proposes that an increase in task difficulty leads to an increase in the likeability of the outcome, to justify for the aroused cognitive dissonance. This increase in likeability is shown in behaviour by a higher willingness to pay. However, there will only be an increase in likeability and willingness to pay, when someone’s self-efficacy to accomplish the task is high.
H3a: An increase in perceived task difficulty strengthens the effect of anticipated effort on likeability, to the extent there is confidence in ability to finish the task.
H3b: An increase in perceived task difficulty strengthens the effect of anticipated effort on willingness to pay, to the extent there is confidence in ability to finish the task.
3. Methodology
For the purpose of testing the hypotheses, two experiments were conducted. The first was an online experiment with the purpose of researching if there was an effect of anticipated effort on subjective product value and if this relationship differs for different product types. This first study tested hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1,c, 2a, 2b, and 2c. The second experiment was a field experiment where exerted effort and anticipated effort were compared on their effects on subjective product value. Within anticipation conditions a distinction was made in the framing of the anticipated task to manipulate hedonic value and difficulty expectations. This second study tested hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.
3.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment was an online experiment and used a 2 x 2 experimental design. The purpose of the experiment was to research if there was an effect of anticipated effort on subjective product value. A distinction was made between products low and high in hedonic value to research if these will lead to a difference in the relation between effort anticipation and subjective product value.
3.1.1 Measures:
Independent variables
All independent variables were measured on a categorical scale.
Effort. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions where they were
exposed to a hypothetical situation. The first condition, included a manipulation where participants would have to put effort in the product when it would be delivered to their home. For the second condition, the manipulation stated that a pre-assembled product would be
Hedonic value. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions. In the condition with the low hedonic value product, participants were exposed to a kitchen step (see appendix A), dependent on their condition they either anticipated assembling the kitchen step or
expected it to be pre-assembled and delivered to their home. In the condition with the high hedonic value product, participants were exposed to a jar with chocolate chip cookies (see appendix A). Dependent on their condition they either anticipated baking the cookies or expected them to be pre-baked and delivered to their home.
Dependent variables
All dependent variables were measured on a continuous scale.
Likeability. Participants were asked one of the following questions dependent on their
condition: “How much do you like this kitchen step?”, “How much do you like this cookie bake set?” or “How much do you like these chocolate chip cookies”, they could answer on a 10-point scale ranging from ‘dislike’ to ‘like’.
Willingness to pay. Participants were asked one of the following questions dependent
on their condition: “How much are you willing to pay for this kitchen step (in euros)?” or “How much are you willing to pay for these cookies (in euros)?”, the answer was open for them to give any number.
Purchase quantity. Participants were asked one of the following questions dependent
on their condition: “How many kitchen steps would you buy” or “How many cookies would you buy”, the answer was open for them to give any number.
Control variables
Participants wrote down their age and gender to control if these variables were of influence on the results.
Confidence in ability. As a control question, participants in the anticipation conditions were asked one of the following questions dependent on their condition: “Do you think you can successfully build this kitchen step?” or “Do you think you can successfully bake these cookies?” They could indicate their confidence on a 5-point scale ranging from “definitely not” to “definitely yes”. This question was incorporated because previous research showed that effort only had a positive effect on value increase when the task was successfully completed (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). If participants anticipated that their effort would not result in successful completion of the task it could influence their subjective product value.
Anticipated enjoyability. As second control variable anticipated enjoyability of the
task was incorporated. Participants in the anticipation conditions answered one of the
following questions dependent on their condition: “How much do you think you would enjoy baking these cookies” or “How much do you think you would enjoy assembling this kitchen step?” They could indicate the anticipated enjoyability of the task on a 10-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a lot”. This question was incorporated because differences in anticipated enjoyment of effort could serve as a potential explanation for differences between products low and high in hedonic value.
3.1.2 Procedure
This online experiment was offered to participants using the online program Qualtrics. To start the experiment participants first signed an informed consent where they were assured their data remained confidential and anonymous. On the next page, their age and gender was asked, they then were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. This experiment used two experimental and two control conditions. In the experimental conditions, participants were aware that effort must be invested when the product would be delivered to their home.
The participants in the control conditions did not anticipate effort. The control conditions were used as a baseline for the dependent measures. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions below:
Condition 1. Anticipated effort and low hedonic product. Participants in this condition
were exposed to a picture of a kitchen step with the following text; “This kitchen step can be assembled in four steps.”
Condition 2. Anticipated effort and high hedonic product. Participants in this condition
were exposed to a picture of a cookie bake set with the following text; “Everything you need is in the jar to bake your chocolate chip cookies following the recipe.”
Condition 3. Control group, no anticipated effort and low hedonic product.
Participants in this condition were exposed to the kitchen step. However, they did not anticipate any effort when buying the step. Participants read the text; “You can order this kitchen step online and it will be delivered to your home completely build.”
Condition 4. Control group, no anticipated effort and high hedonic product.
Participants in this condition were exposed to a set of prebaked cookies with the text; “Order these freshly baked chocolate chip cookies and they will be delivered to your home.”
After exposure to the product participants in the anticipated effort conditions were asked the control questions about their confidence in their ability to assemble or bake the product and the anticipated enjoyability of the task. Finally, the dependent variables were measured one by one. The order of exposure to the dependent variables was rotated to make sure the order of questions did not influence the results.
3.1.3 Results
In this study 42 men, 149 women and four people who did not indicate their gender participated (N = 195). The age of participants ranged from 19 to 67 years (M = 31.98, SD =
13.42).
Control variables
Participants’ confidence in their ability to build the kitchen step was positive (M = 1.30, SD = 0.74) and differed significant from the neutral point, t = 11.71, p < .005.
Furthermore, participants’ confidence in their ability to bake the cookies was positive (M = 1.09, SD = 0.84) and differed significant from the neutral point, t = 8.79, p < .005. These results indicate that participants were confident that their effort would result in successful task completion for both product types. The effects on all the dependent variables remained the same after an ANCOVA controlled for confidence in ability. Therefore, we can conclude participants’ confidence in their ability did not influence the results of the experiment.
Participants did not anticipate enjoyment in assembling the kitchen step (M = 0.32, SD = 1.94) it was close to the neutral point t = 1.05, p = .302. Participants anticipated enjoyment in baking the cookies (M = 1.28, SD = 1.99) this differed significant from the neutral point, t = 4.38, p < .005. The difference in anticipated enjoyment between product types may explain potential differences between products low and high in hedonic value. Furthermore, it
confirms participants perceive the cookies as high in hedonic experience and the kitchen step as low in hedonic experience.
Dependent variables Likeability
There is no main effect of product type on likeability. There is no significant
difference between likeability scores for the different conditions F(3,194) = 1.90, p = .132, η2 = .03.
Participants that anticipated effort liked the kitchen step more (M = 1.48, SD = 1.21)
compared to participants in the control condition that did not anticipate effort (M = 1.14 SD = 1.44). However, this difference is not significant (p = .748). These results do not support hypotheses 1a and 2a.
Furthermore, there are no significant differences within the high hedonic product type condition. Participants that anticipated effort liked the cookies less (M = 1.24, SD = 2.23), compared to participants in the control condition that did not anticipate effort (M = 1.89, SD = 1.83). However, this effect was not significant (p = .263). These results do not support
hypothesis 1a.
Willingness to pay
There is a main effect of product type on willingness to pay for the products. There is a significant difference between willingness to pay scores between conditions F(3,194) = 19.07, p < .001, η2 = .23. This variable did not satisfy the assumption of the regular ANOVA in that there is homogeneity of variances, F(3,191) = 26.52, p < .001. Games-Howell post-hoc tests revealed that participants were willing to pay more for the kitchen step when they
anticipated effort (M = 14.70, SD = 10.78) and when they did not anticipated effort (M = 13.24, SD = 1.86), than for the cookies when they anticipated effort (M = 3.63, SD = 1.86, p < .001) and when they did not anticipate effort (M = 5.33, SD = 4.67, p < .001).
There are no significant differences within the low hedonic product type condition. Participants that anticipated effort were willing to pay more for the kitchen step (M = 14.70, SD = 10.78) than participants that not anticipated effort (M = 13.24, SD = 1.86). However, this effect was not significant (p = .916). These results do not support hypotheses 1b and 2b. Furthermore, there are no significant differences within the high hedonic product type condition. Participants that anticipated effort were willing to pay less for the cookies (M =
3.63, SD = 1.86) than participants that did not anticipate effort (M = 5.33, SD = 4.67). However, these results were not significant (p = .113). These results do not support hypothesis 1b.
Purchase quantity
There is a main effect of effort on the purchase quantity of the products. There is a significant difference in purchase quantity between conditions F(3,194) = 33.78, p < .001, η2 = .35. This variable did not satisfy the assumption of the regular ANOVA in that there is homogeneity of variances, F(3,191) = 67.66, p < .001. Games-Howell post-hoc tests revealed that participants were willing to buy less kitchen steps when they anticipated effort (M = 0.86, SD = 0.51) and when they did not anticipated effort (M = 0.68, SD = 0.60) than of the cookies when they anticipated effort (M = 6.35, SD = 6.96, p <.001) and when they did not anticipate effort (M = 9.46, SD = 8.01, p < .001).
There are no significant differences within the low hedonic product type condition. Participants that anticipated effort purchased more kitchen steps (M = 0.86, SD = 0.51) than participants that did not anticipated effort (M = 0.68, SD = 0.60). However, this difference was not significant. (p = .332). These results do not support hypotheses 1c and 2c.
Furthermore, there are no significant differences within the high hedonic product type condition. Participants that anticipated effort purchased less cookies (M = 6.35, SD = 6.96) than participants that did not anticipate effort (M = 9.46, SD = 8.01). However, these results were not significant (p = .200). These results do not support hypothesis 1c.
3.1.4 Discussion
The main purpose of the first experiment was to examine if there was an effect of anticipated effort on subjective product value, and if there was a difference in this relationship
between products high and low in hedonic value.
There was a main effect of product type on willingness to pay. Participants were willing to pay more for a product low in hedonic value than for a product high in hedonic value. This main effect could be explained by the fact that the products used may not be equal in monetary value. People might perceive a kitchen step to be of higher monetary value than cookies. Additionally, there was a main effect of product type on purchase quantity.
Participants purchased less of the product low in hedonic value than of the product high in hedonic value. This effect could be explained because the different products used in this experiment are not comparable when it comes to user situations. A cookie will be consumed, which may be a reason why participants bought more of it. A kitchen step lasts a longer time, therefore buying multiple kitchen steps is not necessary.
It was expected that participants who anticipated spending effort on the product low in hedonic value liked the product more, were willing to pay more for it and would purchase more in quantity, compared to participants that did not anticipate effort and those that
anticipated effort on the product high in hedonic value. As mentioned in the literature review, people are less willing to spend time on products low in hedonic value. Therefore,
anticipating spending time on these products increases cognitive dissonance, motivating people to reduce the unpleasant feeling. To reduce the unpleasant feeling, people justify their effort by increasing the desirability of the product and with that, their willingness to pay and purchase quantity. No significant results were found to support hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b and 2c. However, the results were in the expected direction.
There are a few notes regarding the methodology of the first experiment. First, the questions that measured purchase quantity and willingness to pay for the product high in hedonic value could have been interpreted differently by participants, since they were exposed to cookies in a jar. There could have been confusion regarding if the question
referred to the jar of cookies or a single cookie. Nonetheless, the answers of the product low in hedonic value are still reliable to measure the effect of anticipated effort on willingness to pay and purchase quantity.
The most important note, is that in this experiment two different products were used. However, this assumes the products are perceived by participants as high or low in hedonic experience. The second experiment used framing to influence expectations about the hedonic value of the effort directly. Furthermore, the second experiment contributes to the first because it was executed in the field. In the first experiment participants indicated their willingness to pay for a hypothetical situation. In the second they really purchased the product, this increased the reliability of the results.
3.2 Experiment 2
The second experiment used a 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design. The main objective was to test the potential effects of anticipated effort on perceived product value in the field. It contributes to the first experiment in various ways.
First, there was an extra condition where participants engaged in effort to replicate the previously found IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). This condition was
compared to a condition where participants anticipated effort and one where there was no effort required. Furthermore, a condition was added where participants anticipated effort after exertion. This condition was incorporated to examine if there is a difference in anticipation for participants that are familiar with the task. These participants would anticipate the feelings they had in a previous effort which can influence their value of the product. Furthermore, by increasing their willingness to pay for this product, they could reduce their dissonance aroused by their previous effort. Finally, this experiment used one product consistently and altered the framing of the task between conditions that anticipated effort. By using different
framings, the second experiment manipulated effort expectations directly. The task framing differed on two dimensions. The first was the hedonic value of the task, it was framed as either enjoyable or not enjoyable. The second dimension was task difficulty, it was framed as either difficult or not difficult.
3.2.1. Measures Independent variables
Effort. This experiment used an origami duck that could be assembled in eight steps
(see appendix B). Participants were assigned to either a condition where they anticipated the effort of assembling the origami duck, a condition where the product was already assembled, a condition where they assembled the origami duck directly, or a condition where they assembled the origami duck and then anticipated engaging in the effort again at a later time.
Framing. For all conditions that anticipated effort, framing of the task started with the following text “In a previous study, we also asked participants to assemble the same origami figure. We asked them how difficult they found this task, as well as how enjoyable they found it.” Participants were then exposed to different framing varieties dependent on their condition.
Hedonic value. Participants in the anticipation conditions were exposed to one of two
enjoyability framing varieties. In the condition where the task was framed as enjoyable participants read “On average, people rated the enjoyability of the task with an 8.0.” In the condition where the task was framed as not enjoyable they read “On average, people rated the enjoyability of the task with a 2.0.”
Difficulty. Participants in the anticipation conditions were exposed to one of two
difficulty framing varieties. In the condition where the task was framed as difficult participants read “On average, people rated the difficulty of the task with an 8.3.” In the condition where the task was framed as not difficult they read “On average, people rated the
difficulty of the task with a 2.5.”
Dependent variables
All dependent variables were measured on a continuous scale.
Likeability. Participants were asked the following question: “How much do you like
the end product you made?” or if they were in the no effort condition they were asked “How much do you like the origami figure?”. They could answer on a 10-point scale ranging from ‘dislike’ to ‘like’.
Willingness to pay. To measure the willingness to pay of participants the procedure of Norton, Mochon and Ariely (2011) was followed. Participants read an instruction that they would place a bid and the researcher would draw a random price. If their bid was equal or above that price they would have to purchase what they bid on. This instruction was illustrated with two examples. The random price however, was not random but was kept constant at €0.01, consequently participants would always win. The bidding object differed for different conditions. All questions started with the following: “You are receiving €2,50 for participating in this study. How much of this €2,50 do you bid on…” For the anticipation conditions the ending was “the do-it-yourself origami figure you will assemble if your bid wins?” For the effort condition, it was “the do-it-yourself origami figure you built?” For the anticipation after effort condition it was “the do-it-yourself origami set?” For the no effort condition, it was “the origami figure?” This bidding procedure is in line with the previous research on the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011).
Control variables
At the start of the experiment participants wrote down their gender, age, nationality, educational level and educational program. At the end of the experiment participants were
asked the difficulty and enjoyability they experienced in building the figure. Furthermore, they were asked how experienced they were with origami and how much affinity they had with do-it-yourself products. This was done to control if these variables were of influence on the results.
Control bidding. Since the bidding procedure could arouse confusion the following control question was incorporated, “You bid €1,50 and the researcher draws the price of €1,45. Do you purchase the origami figure?” Participants could respond with either “Yes”, “No” or “I don’t know”. “Yes” was the correct answer. If the question was answered with “No” the researcher explained the procedure again until the participant confirmed he or she understood it. After the extra explanation participants received some time to alter their bidding answer if they preferred to do so.
Participants in the anticipation conditions were exposed to two additional control questions before assembling the origami figure.
Confidence in ability. As a control question participants in the anticipation conditions
were asked the following question: “Do you think you can successfully assemble this origami figure?” They could indicate their confidence on a 10-point scale ranging from “definitely not” to “definitely yes”. This question was incorporated because previous research showed that effort only had a positive effect on value increase when the task was successfully completed (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). If participants anticipated that their effort would not result in successful completion of the task it could influence their perceptions of product value.
Anticipated likeability. Participants were asked the following “How much do you
think you will like the origami figure (the end-result)?”. If participants had a low expectation of the origami figure this could influence their bidding amount.
3.2.2 Procedure
This experiment was executed in student cafeteria’s, where participants answered the questions on paper forms. To start the experiment participants first signed an informed consent where they were informed that they received €2,50 for participation and assured that their data remained confidential and anonymous. On the next page, demographical control questions were asked. They then were randomly assigned to one of the seven conditions. The conditions rotated every 30 minutes. This experiment used six experimental and one control condition. The participants in the control condition did not anticipated or engaged in any effort. This condition was used as a baseline for the willingness to pay and the likeability of the origami duck. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the seven conditions below:
Condition 1. Anticipated effort and challenging framing. Participants received an
unassembled origami paper and the origami duck instructions. They read that previous participants rated the assembling experience with an 8.0 for enjoyability and an 8.3 for difficulty. Next, they placed their bids. Since their bid always won, they had to assemble the origami figure and then answer the dependent variables. Before assembling the figure, they answered the control questions about their confidence in their ability and their anticipated likeability of the end-product.
Condition 2. Anticipated effort and relaxing framing. Participants received an
unassembled origami paper and the origami duck instructions. They read that previous participants rated the assembling experience with an 8.0 for enjoyability and a 2.5 for difficulty. Next, they placed their bids. Since their bid always won, they had to assemble the origami figure and then answer the dependent variables. Before assembling the figure, they answered the control questions about their confidence in their ability and their anticipated likeability of the end-product.
unassembled origami paper and the origami duck instructions. They read that previous participants rated the assembling experience with a 2.0 for enjoyability and an 8.3 for difficulty. Next, they placed their bids. Since their bid always won, they had to assemble the origami figure and then answer the dependent variables. Before assembling the figure, they answered the control questions about their confidence in their ability and their anticipated likeability of the end-product.
Condition 4. Anticipated effort and boring framing. Participants received an unassembled origami paper and the origami duck instructions. They read that previous participants rated the assembling experience with a 2.0 for enjoyability and a 2.5 for
difficulty. Next, they placed their bids. Since their bid always won, they had to assemble the origami figure and then answer the dependent variables. Before assembling the figure, they answered the control questions about their confidence in their ability and their anticipated likeability of the end-product.
Condition 5. Exerted effort. Participants first assembled the origami duck and then
placed a bid on their assembled figure. Next, they answered the dependent variables.
Condition 6. Anticipation after exerted effort. Participants first assembled the origami duck and then answered the dependent variables. Next, they placed a bid on the do-it-yourself origami set.
Condition 7. No effort. Participants received a pre-assembled origami duck. They first
placed a bid on the duck. Next, they answered the dependent variables.
3.2.3 Results
177 students participated in this study, one did not complete the experiment and was withdrawn from analyses. Therefore, the analyses included 69 males, 106 women and one person who did not indicate their gender (N = 176). All participants followed a higher general
secondary education (N = 10) or university education (N = 166) on the moment of
participation. The age of participants ranged from 17 to 39 years (M = 22.90, SD = 3.37).
Control variables
All participants answered the control question for bidding accurately. This indicates that confusion about the bidding procedure did not influence the bidding amount. The effects on bidding remained the same after an ANCOVA controlled for the control question for bidding. Therefore, we can conclude participants’ confusion about the bidding procedure did not influence the results. Furthermore, there was no significant difference between conditions in the experience participants had with origami F(6, 173) = 1.50, p = .182 and the affinity participants had with do-it-yourself products F(6, 173) = .69, p = .655. The effects on both dependent variables remained the same after an ANCOVA controlled for the effects of both covariates. Therefore, we can conclude participants’ experience in origami and affinity with do-it-yourself products did not influence the results.
In the anticipation conditions two extra control questions were asked. There was no significant difference between anticipation conditions in their confidence in their capability to assemble the origami figure F(3, 99) = .50, p = .681. These results suggest that differences in self-efficacy of participants did not influence their answering on the dependent variables. Furthermore, the anticipation conditions were asked how much they thought they would like the origami figure. There was no significant difference in the anticipated likeability of the figure between conditions F(3, 99) = .91, p = .440. No ANCOVA has been conducted for participants’ self-efficacy and expectations of the likeability of the end-product because of missing values.
the origami figure. There was no significant difference between conditions on the difficulty participants experienced in assembling the origami figure F(5, 146) = .88, p = .494.
Table 1. Mean difficulty scores for the assembling of the origami figure per condition. Note. N = Frequency participants. M = Mean. SD = Standard deviation.
Table 2 contains the mean enjoyability scores participants assigned to assembling the origami figure. There was a significant difference in enjoyability scores between conditions F(5, 146) = 3.99, p = .002. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the anticipation boring condition experienced significantly lower enjoyability (M = 5.42, SD = 2.34) than the anticipation challenging condition (M = 7.40, SD = 1.42, p = .008), the anticipation relaxing condition (M = 7.12, SD = 1.76, p = .036) and the anticipation after exerted effort condition
(M = 7.08, SD = 1.91, p = .044). No significant differences were found between the other conditions.
Table 2. Mean enjoyability scores for the assembling of the origami figure per condition. Note. N = Frequency participants. M = Mean. SD = Standard deviation.
Dependent variables Likeability
Table 3 contains the mean likeability scores of the end figure for the different
conditions. There was a significant difference between conditions in participants’ likeability of the assembled origami figure F(6, 173) = 3.03, p = .008. It was expected that an increase in perceived task difficulty strengthens the effect of anticipated effort on likeability.
Additionally, it was expected that products low in hedonic value strengthen the effect of anticipated effort on the increase in likeability. This leads to the expectation that an
unenjoyable and difficult framing would result in higher likeability scores. Planned contrasts revealed that the no effort condition liked the product significantly less (M = 4.59, SD = 2.75) than the anticipation strenuous condition (M = 6.68, SD = 2.17, p = .002). These results confirm, hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a.
Furthermore, Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the no effort condition liked the product significantly less (M = 4.59, SD = 2.75) than the anticipation challenging condition (M = 6.92, SD = 1.82, p = .011). No significant differences were found between the other conditions. There was no significant difference in likeability scores between the exerted effort (M = 5.52, SD = 2.81) and the no effort condition (M = 4.59, SD = 2.75), these results do not support previous research. These results support hypotheses 1a, 3a. However, they do not support hypothesis 2a since the task was framed as high in hedonic value in the challenging framing condition.
Table 3. Mean likeability scores for the assembled origami figure per condition. Note. N = Frequency participants. M = Mean. SD = Standard deviation.
Bidding
Table 4 contains the mean bidding amount for the different conditions. There was a significant effect of conditions on the bidding amount F(6, 174) = 3.32, p < .05. It was expected that an increase in perceived task difficulty strengthens the effect of anticipated effort on willingness to pay. Additionally, it was expected that products low in hedonic value strengthen the effect of anticipated effort on the increase in willingness to pay. This leads to
to pay. Planned contrasts revealed that the anticipation strenuous condition was willing to pay significantly more for the product (M = 1.24, SD = 0.81), than the no effort condition (M = .82, SD = .65, p = .037). These results confirm, hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b.
Furthermore, Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the anticipation condition with challenging framing bid significantly higher (M = 1.61, SD = .68) than the exerted effort condition (M = 0.9, SD = 0.72, p = .012) and the no effort condition (M = .82, SD = .65, p = .002). No significant differences were found between the other conditions. There was also no significant difference between the bidding amount in exerted effort (M = 0.90, SD = 0.72) and the no effort condition (M= 0.82, SD = 0.65), these results do not support previous research. The results support hypotheses 1b and 3b. However, they do not support hypothesis 2b since the task was framed as high in hedonic value in the challenging framing condition.
Table 4. Mean of the bidding amount per condition.
Note. N = Frequency participants. M = Mean. SD = Standard deviation.
3.2.4 Discussion
The current research shows that participants that anticipated effort and had challenging or strenuous framing, liked the origami figure more than participants that did not engage in effort. These results support hypothesis 1a which stated that the anticipated effort of assembling a product led to an increase in the likeability of the product. Furthermore, the results support hypothesis 3a which stated that anticipation of a difficult task leads to a higher
would lead to greater cognitive dissonance and a higher likeability of the product. The results partially support this hypothesis since the challenging framing included a task high in hedonic value. There was no significant difference in likeability of the product between participants that had challenging framing and those with strenuous framing. This suggests that it was the difficulty dimension of the framing that caused the increase in likeability of the product.
Furthermore, participants that anticipated effort and had challenging or strenuous framing, were willing to pay more for the product than participants that did not engage in effort. Therefore, it delivers support for hypothesis 1b. Furthermore, the results support hypothesis 3b in that anticipation of a difficult task leads to a higher willingness to pay for the product. Hypothesis 2b stated that anticipation of a task low in hedonic value would lead to greater cognitive dissonance and a higher willingness to pay for the product. The results partially support this hypothesis since the challenging framing included a task high in hedonic value. There was no significant difference in willingness to pay between participants that had challenging framing and those with strenuous framing. This suggests that it was the difficulty dimension of the framing that caused the increase in willingness to pay for the product.
Previous research showed that when effort was exerted people increased their likeability and willingness to pay for the product compared to people that did not engage in effort (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). However, this effect was not replicated in this study. Differences in willingness to pay and likeability of the product were in the expected direction, however they were not significant.
An interesting and unexpected finding was that participants perceived the assembling of the origami figure as more enjoyable when anticipated effort was framed as challenging, relaxing or when they anticipated effort after they already engaged in it. The effects only differed significantly from participants where anticipation was framed as boring. These results
suggest that anticipation of effort potentially leads to a more enjoyable process of engaging in effort.
From the second experiment the conclusion can be drawn that anticipation of effort leads to a higher willingness to pay and likeability of the product when the task is expected to be difficult. There is no consistent pattern in the effect of enjoyability in effort expectations on subjective product value. Furthermore, anticipation of effort could potentially make the actual experience of engaging in the effort more enjoyable.
4. General Discussion
Previous research showed that engaging in effort to obtain an outcome, increases the likeability and willingness to pay for that outcome. This has been called the IKEA-effect (Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2011). However, do-it-yourself products, like IKEA products, require people to buy the product first and engage in the effort of assembling the product later. The expectation of effort only has a cognitive component instead of a physical one, as with engaging in effort, and therefore represents a different concept. Research on the effects of effort expectations on subjective product value has been underserved in academia. This research contributes to the literature in several ways.
Firstly, this research addresses the literature gap in the effects of expectations on subjective product value. Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of anticipated effort on subjective product value and to investigate whether there are differences in this relationship for different task difficulty and hedonic value expectations. This research did not replicate previous findings where engaging in effort leads to a higher likeability and willingness to pay for the product.
In the second place, this research proposes an underlying mechanism for the effects of anticipation of effort on subjective product value. The results suggest that anticipation of effort
leads to a higher willingness to pay and likeability of the product, whenever the task is expected to be difficult. No consistent pattern was found in the effect of hedonic value in effort expectations on subjective product value. These findings are partially in line with the expected underlying mechanism of cognitive dissonance, which suggests that low hedonic value and high difficulty expectations lead to a higher subjective product value.
Third, this research broadens the literature on the cognitive dissonance theory. Research about this theory is dominantly conducted in a context where effort has already been exerted. However, the results of the current research indicate that the cognitive dissonance theory also applies to anticipated effort. The anticipation of effort is proposed to lead to an uncomfortable feeling, for which people justify by increasing their likeability of the product and their willingness to pay for it. Future research should study this underlying mechanism and its boundaries further and test this empirically within the context of anticipated effort. This can be done by using the misattribution paradigm (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). In this paradigm, participants are given a placebo before participating in the experiment. They are told the placebo may have side effects. Participants will then inaccurately ascribe the uncomfortable feeling aroused by cognitive dissonance to this placebo source. Since the placebo is used to justify for the uncomfortable feeling, participants’ likeability and willingness to pay for the product will not increase. However, when participants do not have a placebo to ascribe the discomfort to, they will justify for the dissonance by increasing the likeability and willingness to pay for the product. By comparing two groups where one is given a placebo and one is not, a conclusive answer can be given on whether the underlying mechanism for the effects of anticipated effort on subjective product value is cognitive dissonance.
Furthermore, it can be expected that a task low in enjoyability and high in difficulty only increases cognitive dissonance up to a certain point. When a task is perceived as too difficult, self-efficacy decreases and the belief that engaging in effort leads to the desired result