Do Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas Truly Reflect Utilitarian Reasoning: The Relationship Between Psychopathy Traits, Moral Dilemmas and Monetary Dilemmas
Broeno Rijnders
Universiteit van Amsterdam Psychologie B 2014 – 2017 Bachelorproject Klinische Psychologie
Studentennummer : 10538593
Begeleider : Jamie Elsey
Aantal woorden abstract : 149 Aantal woorden : 5496
Research uses moral dilemmas to assess utilitarian reasoning. Utilitarianism states that actions should be judged by their outcomes instead of the actions themselves, and that moral behaviour should serve the greater good even at the cost of own interest. However, most sacrificial moral dilemmas used in research are highly fictional and do not reflect everyday moral decision-making. Psychopaths give more utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas, but possesses of traits contradictory to what utilitarianism states. To address these objections a modified Dictator game is used where decision-making is applied to donation. Findings from experiment 1 are in line with that psychopaths endorse higher ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas and both experiments found that these judgments are not associated with utilitarian outcomes in the Dictator game, indicating that moral dilemmas do not assess utilitarian reasoning. Furthermore, higher scores on psychopathy did not had any influence on amount of money donated.
Introduction………...1 Experiment 1………. Introduction………5 Participants………6 Materials……….6 Procedure………...7 Results………7 Discussion………10 Experiment 2………. Introduction………...………...10 Participants……….…….11 Materials………...11 Procedure………...11 Results………..12 Discussion………...13 General Discussion.………13 Conclusion………16 References………...17 Appendix A………...19 Appendix B………...22
Do Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas Truly Reflect Utilitarian Reasoning: The Relationship Between Psychopathy Traits, Moral Dilemmas and Monetary Dilemmas
Moral decision-making is a research field which is gaining interest within psychology. Most of these studies focus on moral theories regarding utilitarian and deontological outcomes, since they are considered to be the most contradicted to each other. According to utilitarianism morality of an action is judged by its outcome rather than the action. According to deontology morality of an action is judged by its action rather than the outcome (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). A popular way to study moral judgment is by using moral dilemmas, with utilitarian and deontic outcomes (Tobler, Kalis & Kalenscher, 2008). A classic moral dilemma is the footbridge problem, where a trolley is heading towards a group of five persons and they will die if the trolley will not be stopped. As it happens you are standing on a footbridge and can stop the trolley, but in order to do that you must push a person of the footbridge. The question is will you do that (Tobler et al., 2008). Killing one person over five persons is considered utilitarian, since utilitarianism states that morality is determined by its consequences and thereby focuses on the outcome (Mill, 1861/1998, retrieved from Conway & Gawronski, 2013); saving five persons is more than one, so it is morally acceptable to kill one person to maximize utility. Deontic reasoning on the other hand states that you must not stop the trolley, since the action is where morality lies and it is immoral to use a person as a means to an end (Kant, 1785/1959, retrieved from Conway & Gawronski, 2013) and in that sense you must not kill people regardless of the outcome.
This dilemma is considered personal, since the actor can directly kill or save people and does use a person directly as a means to an end (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier & Newman, 2012). A variation on the footbridge dilemma is the trolley problem, which is impersonal since you can indirectly kill or save people and in that sense use a person indirectly as a means to an end (Koenigs et al., 2012). The same reasoning of morality applies, where utilitarianism states that it is morally acceptable to kill a single person to save many and deontology states that it is morally unacceptable to kill that single person (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) since it is immoral to use a person as a means to an end (Kant, 1797, retrieved from Tobler et al., 2008).
Research suggests that deontic and utilitarian reasoning are based on different processes. Deontic reasoning is influenced by higher levels of empathy and religiosity (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Furthermore, deontic reasoning is related to a more visual cognitive style, because visualizing harmful means would result in more deontic decision-making (Amit & Greene, 2012). Furthermore, it is suggested that deontic reasoning is a more emotionally based process. Brain areas associated with emotion processing are activated during decision-making on sacrificial (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001). Greene et al. (2001) found that emotional processing is greater when deciding in a personal dilemma than in an impersonal dilemma. On the other hand, it is suggested that utilitarian reasoning is based on a more cognitive process. When people experience more cognitive load utilitarian outcomes are affected whereas deontic outcomes are unaffected (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Furthermore, Koenigs et al. (2007) found that patients with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which is necessary for emotion processing, are more inclined to give utilitarian judgments.
Which is of interest is that research found that higher psychopathy traits are associated with higher utilitarian outcomes when deciding on moral dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2012; Gao & Tang, 2013), but psychopaths define themselves on less moral traits than non-psychopaths (Glenn, Koleva, Iyer, Graham & Ditto, 2010). Furthermore, psychopaths score higher on utilitarian decisions because they have a lower concern for harming others and prosocial behaviours (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014), which are considered immoral views within society. Furthermore, low-anxious (primary) psychopaths score higher on utilitarian outcomes on personal moral dilemmas than high-anxious (secondary) psychopaths and non-psychopaths (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier & Newman, 2012). Primary psychopathy is associated with higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 than secondary psychopathy (Swogger & Kosson, 2007).
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by problems in areas of emotional affection, behaviour and interpersonal affection (Cooke & Michie, 2001; Blonigen, Carlson, Krueger & Patrick, 2003). Psychopaths are considered more egocentric, have a lack of
empathy and guilt, are manipulative and violent, fail to accept responsibility for their actions and are impulsive (Cooke & Michie, 2001; Blonigen et al. 2003; Mahmut, Homewood & Stevenson, 2008). Within research, psychopathy is conceptualized by a two-factor model. Factor 1 represents selfish and callous behaviour and remorseless use of others, whereas factor 2 represents social deviance, a chronically unstable and antisocial life style (Harpur, Hare & Hakistian, 1989). These two factors can further be divided into four facets. Factor 1 consist of the facets: Interpersonal and Affective (Hare & Neumann, 2008). The facet Interpersonal consists of psychopathy traits such as grandiosity, having superficial charm, lying and manipulative behaviour. The facet Affective consists of traits such as having shallow emotions, failing to accept responsibility, being remorselessness and callousness (Neumann, Hare & Pardini, 2015). Factor 2 consist of the facets: Lifestyle and Antisocial (Hare & Neumann, 2008). The facet Lifestyle consists of traits such as impulsive and irresponsible behaviour, having lack of goals, socially parasitic behaviour and having the need for stimulation. The facet Antisocial consists of traits such as poor behaviour controls, early behaviour problems, juvenile delinquency, revocation of release and criminal versatility (Neumann, Hare & Pardini, 2015).
Like stated before according to utilitarianism morality is judged by its outcome rather than its action, but psychopaths are not considered moral since they possess several immoral characteristics. In that sense, moral dilemmas are probably not the most optimal way to assess utilitarian reasoning. Firstly, because higher psychopathy traits are associated with higher utilitarian outcomes on moral dilemmas which is contradictory to what utilitarianism states. When deciding in a moral dilemma a person should maximize utility by carefully thinking of each perspective of the person or objects involved (Harsanyi, 1955, retrieved from Tobler et al., 2008), e.g. when deciding on the footbridge dilemma a person should consider the feelings, the utility, the consequences and the perspective of the sacrificial person or the five other persons. Psychopaths are more egocentric and have a lack of empathy (Cooke & Michie, 2001), therefore are probably not considering other perspectives then their own. This is contradictory to what utilitarianism states. Secondly, sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect
an everyday decision at all, because killing a person to save others is highly fictional and people are not making that decision daily. Moreover, the judgment of right or wrong has no consequences for them. Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias & Savulescu (2015) highlighted the problem that sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect genuine utilitarian reasoning: they found no association between moral dilemmas and e.g. helping others or donating to charity, but did not give further practical implications on how to study it otherwise.
One possibility to study more real world moral decision-making is by using economic games, such as the Ultimatum game and the Dictator game. Other than the Ultimatum game, the Dictator game does not use another person directly in the game. The Dictator game, as a monetary dilemma, is therefore a more optimal way to assess utilitarian reasoning since decision-making is based on one’s own reasoning and not in correspondence with another intentions and responses. Within the Dictator game a person gets a sum of money and can divide it at his choice, keep all or give some or even give everything away (List, 2007). The most utilitarian outcome would be to donate it to charity or to donate to someone which is better off with the money than the dictator self. Utility will be maximised since donating to charity will result in more people be helped and the less fortunate person will gain utility because he needs it more than the dictator. The Dictator game could therefore be a more optimal way to assess utilitarian reasoning than sacrificial moral dilemmas.
This thesis will investigate if sacrificial moral dilemmas truly reflect utilitarian reasoning. It will be investigated by using a modified Dictator game, which reflects a more daily moral decision-making task. Psychopathy traits are used to uncover the relationship between sacrificial moral dilemmas and monetary dilemmas. Like stated before, psychopaths score higher on utilitarian on moral dilemmas, but they possess of several characteristics contradictory to what utilitarianism stands for. Therefore, their decisions are probably not based on utilitarian reasoning which moral dilemmas supposedly reflect. The Dictator game could be of interest, since it could reflect truly utilitarian reasoning. Furthermore, it balances out the findings that immoral psychopathy traits are still morally acceptable due to the association with higher utilitarian outcomes on moral dilemmas. Psychopaths are in the
Dictator game probably more inclined to keep more money for themselves then giving it away, which is not utilitarian. These associations will be investigated by using two experiments. Experiment 1 will first try to replicate previous findings and therefore investigate the relationship between psychopathy traits and sacrificial moral dilemmas. Secondly, the association between moral and monetary dilemmas will be investigated. Thirdly, the relationship between psychopathy traits and monetary dilemmas will be investigated. Experiment 2 will try to replicate the findings of experiment 1 and further investigates if a social component is of influence of decision-making on monetary dilemmas.
Experiment 1 Introduction
The first experiment investigated the relationships between psychopathy traits, moral dilemmas and monetary dilemmas. We hypothesize that higher scores on psychopathy traits predicts higher scores on utilitarian outcomes in moral dilemmas. More specifically that higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 traits predicts higher utilitarian outcomes in moral dilemmas and psychopathy factor 2 is not of influence on utilitarian outcomes. Furthermore, that higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 predicts higher utilitarian outcomes in personal moral dilemmas and psychopathy factor 2 is not of influence on utilitarian outcomes.
Secondly, we will analyse if there is a relationship between moral dilemmas and monetary dilemmas. More specifically if either a negative or a non-significant correlation between moral and monetary dilemmas were found, it could imply that moral dilemmas in fact do not reflect a utilitarian view in more real world decision-making.
Thirdly, we hypothesize that higher scores on psychopathy traits predict lower scores on utilitarian outcomes in monetary dilemmas, more specifically that psychopathy factor 1 predicts lower scores on utilitarian outcomes in monetary dilemmas and psychopathy factor 2 is not of influence on utilitarian outcomes.
Participants
Participants were first year psychology students of the University of Amsterdam who had to undergo testing as part of their curriculum. Within this curriculum students must undergo several hours of filling questionnaires from different studies. These students had to take a resit of this curriculum and therefore participated in this study.
In total 285 persons participated in this experiment, of which 28 persons were excluded since they failed the attention-check questions. Of these 257 persons, 176 were female (missing = 9), the mean age was 20.08 (SD = 2.17, missing = 13) and 212 had Dutch as their native language (missing = 9).
Materials
Six moral dilemmas where included in the study of which three were personal and three were impersonal. All the dilemmas were translated to Dutch and were altered. Answer options were corresponding with a six points Likert-scale (1 = completely unacceptable to 6 = completely acceptable). Utilitarian responses are where one sacrifices one person to save many. See Appendix A for the altered English versions.
To assess psychopathy traits, we used the Dutch version of the Self-Report Psychopathy Scales Short Form III (SRP-SF III), which is considered reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .94) (Tew, Harkins & Dixon, 2015). The SRP-SF III consist of 29 questions with a five points Likert-scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree), we added 2 questions (questions 12 and 22) as control questions to check if participants paid attention when answering the questionnaire. The SRP-SF III measures the two psychopathy factors and the four underlying facets.
To assess more daily moral decision-making, we used an alternated version of the Dictator Game. We developed two questions and corresponding sliders. Before performing the task, participants were asked if they would like to donate to charity or randomly to another student. In one of the monetary decision-making task the participants started at €50 for themselves and €0 for donation (50/0). Participants could slide the bar to the left if they want
to alter their answer. Donations were doubled, so giving away money, though against one’s self interest, always maximised the overall utility (e.g. donate €25 and get €37,5). In the other monetary decision-making task the participants started at €25 for themselves and €25 to donate (25/25). Participants could slide the bar to the left to donate double the amount of money and to decrease the amount of money taken self by half (e.g. donate €50 and get €12.5). When sliding the bar to the right the donations decreased by half and what a participant would get increased by half of which was less donated (e.g. donate €12.5 and get €31.25). ‘Utilitarian’ scores were calculated by the total amount of money the decisions would create, where the most utilitarian score would be €175 (because it would generate a greater amount than keeping all the money for themselves (i.e. total amount: €87,50).
Procedure
Participants had to fill in the questionnaires in front of a computer in a reserved room at the University of Amsterdam. Participants were not allowed to communicate with each other and were informed that consequences were enforced if responses were not honest or coherent. Participants were counterbalanced, with half of them doing the monetary task before the moral dilemmas and the other half vice versa. Participants were informed that their monetary distributions could be picked out randomly and be paid out to them (and the selected charity) and were therefore hopefully more inclined to answer it truthfully. This allowed us to offer more meaningful sums of money.
Results
To analyse if psychopathy trait predicts utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas a regression analysis was performed. The average scores on the two-factor model in relation to the average scores on personal moral dilemmas was analysed. Scores were calculated for factor 1, M = 24.65, SD = 7.83 and for factor 2, M = 25.93, SD = 5.65. Average scores over the three personal dilemmas were calculated for each participant, ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, M = -.21, SD = .95. In comparison to a simple regression model, the model with only factor 1 as an
independent variable was significant, F (1, 255) = 10.541, p = .001. Adding factor 2 and comparing it to the simple model was still significant, F (2, 254) = 5.25, p = .06, but was not significant better than the model with only factor 1, F (1, 254) = 10.542, p = .974. The model with factor 1 explains only 4 % of variance on the personal dilemmas scores. Factor 1 predicts positively on the outcome of the impersonal moral dilemmas, b = .024, t (255) = 3.247, p = .001. This indicates that higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 gives higher utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemmas.
For the impersonal moral dilemmas were the same averages scores calculated, M = .46, SD = .95. In comparison to a simple regression model, the model with only factor 1 as an independent variable was significant, F (1, 255) = 7.704, p = .006. Adding factor 2 and comparing it to the simple model was still significant, F (2, 254) = 3.379, p = .023, but was not significant better than the model with only factor 1, F (1, 254) = 7.716, p = .918. The model with factor 1 explains only 2.9 % of variance on the impersonal dilemmas scores. Factor 1 predicts positively on the outcome of personal moral dilemmas, b = .021, t (255) = 2.776, p = .006. This indicates that higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 gives higher utilitarian responses in impersonal moral dilemmas.
Because factor 1 had a positive influence on utilitarian outcomes further analysis was performed for the underlying facets: Interpersonal (M = 12.75, SD = 4.6) and Affective (M = 11.9, SD 3.9). For the personal moral dilemmas a regression analysis was performed. In comparison to a simple regression model, the model with only the facet Interpersonal as an independent variable was significant, F (1, 255) = 10.761, p = .001. Adding the facet Affective and comparing it to the simple model was still significant, F (2, 254) = 5.497, p = .005, but was not significant better than the model with only the facet Interpersonal, F (1, 254) = 11.024, p = .609. The model with the facet Interpersonal explains only 4 % of variance on the personal dilemmas scores. The facet Interpersonal predicts positively on the outcome of the personal moral dilemmas, b = .042, t (255) = 3.280, p = .001. This indicates that higher scores on the facet Interpersonal gives higher utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemmas.
For the impersonal moral dilemmas the same significant results were found, whereas the model with only the facet Interpersonal as an independent variable was significant, F (1, 255) = 8.215, p = .005. Adding the facet Affective and comparing it to the simple model was still significant, F (2, 254) = 4.132, p = .017, but was not significant better than the model with only the facet Interpersonal, F (1, 254) = 8.204, p = .784. The model with factor 1 explains only 3.1 % of variance on the impersonal dilemmas scores. The Facet Interpersonal predicts positively on the outcome of the impersonal moral dilemmas, b = .036, t (255) = 2.866, p = .005. This indicates that higher scores on the facet Interpersonal gives higher utilitarian responses in impersonal moral dilemmas.
To check if moral dilemmas and monetary dilemmas were related to each other a Pearson correlation analysis was performed, resulting in non-significant correlations between total of Euro (M = 142.69, SD = 26.5) and the average of the impersonal dilemmas, r = -.29, p = .647; and the average of the personal dilemma, r = -.11, p = .855. This indicates that there is no association between moral judgments in moral dilemmas and moral judgments in monetary dilemmas.
To check if higher psychopathy scores had a negative influence on the monetary dilemmas a regression analysis was performed with both the psychopathy factors as independent variables and total of Euro as dependent variable. These results were not significant. In further analysis of the underlying facets, a negative significant correlation was found between the psychopathy factor 2 facet Antisocial and total of Euro, r = -.124, p = .024. This indicates that there is a negative association between the facet Antisocial and utilitarian responses in the monetary dilemmas. However, it this should be taken with caution since the overall regression analysis was not significant.
Discussion
The results are in line with previous research, where higher scores on psychopathy traits predicts higher utilitarian outcomes in sacrificial moral dilemmas and more specifically that psychopathy factor 1 is the underlying cause for this. Furthermore, these results indicate that the underlying facet Interpersonal is probably the reason for these higher ‘utilitarian’ responses for both the moral dilemmas. Furthermore, the coefficient values indicate that factor 1, and more specifically the facet Interpersonal, are more of influence on giving utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemmas than in impersonal moral dilemmas.
The non-significant correlations between the total amount of money and both the moral dilemmas are in line with the hypothesis. These results give support that moral dilemmas do not reflect a utilitarian view in more real world decision-making.
The results did not support the hypotheses that higher scores on psychopathy predict lower utilitarian outcomes in monetary dilemmas. However, a negative association had been found between the facet Antisocial and utilitarian outcomes on monetary dilemmas. It could be theorised that the facet Antisocial, as a trait, is causing lower utilitarian responses; hence less money donated. However, these findings do not hold due to the non-significant overall results.
Experiment 2 Introduction
In experiment 2 we tried to replicate the findings of experiment 1 and added a social component. In experiment 1 participants had the choice of donating money to a charity or donating it to a random person participating the same task. We added a social component, where we were interested if monetary dilemmas are influenced by social interactions. It reflects a more daily moral dilemma, since people make decisions mostly in interaction with others, society, social norms and social values. Within this experiment, a person did not have a choice to donate it to charity, since we wanted to see how social interaction influenced decision making in monetary dilemmas.
We hypothesised the same hypotheses in experiment 1, but due to the social interaction we furthermore hypothesise that higher scores on social attractiveness predicts higher utilitarian donations in monetary dilemmas.
Participants
Participants were mostly either first year or third year psychology students who had to undergo laboratory testing as part of their curriculum which was measured by amount of research credit. Participating in this study, participants were rewarded with one research credit. The only exclusion criterion was that participants could not participate if they participate in experiment 1. The only inclusion criterion was that participants could read, speak and understand Dutch fluently.
In total 31 persons participated in this experiment, of which one person was excluded since he participated in experiment 1. Of these 30 persons, 16 were male and the mean age was 21.77 (SD = 3.181). 29 participants were born in the Netherlands. In total 29 participants were student of which 23 were psychology students. Some more demographics were asked, such as political orientation and religiosity, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Material
The same materials were used as in experiment 1, but the only exception was that participants could not donate money to charity. To assess social attractiveness, eight questions were taken from McCroskey & McCain (1974) and translated to Dutch. Scoring was a five points Likert-scale, ranging from (left to right) completely disagree to completely agree. See Appendix B for the English questions.
Procedure
A participant underwent the test at the same time with either an actor participant or another participant, due to the schedule of participants. When entering the laboratory room, they were asked to take a seat and the researcher presented them the information brochure and were
asked if they could read it carefully. The researcher said that he/she forgot the informed consent and would have to get it; when leaving the room, he/she said they could pour some water if they wanted. For the actor participant, this was the cue to pour some water for himself and then asking the participant would like some water as well. After two minutes the researcher came back with the informed consents and asked if everything was clear. If yes, the informed consent was asked to sign; if no, some more information was giving. After signing the informed consent both the participant(s) and the actor were assigned a laboratory room, where the participant had to fill in the questionnaires behind a computer in a closed room at the UvA. They had to fill in some demographics, the SRP-SF III, the social attraction questions and undergo decision-making on the moral and the monetary dilemmas.
Results
In contrast to experiment 1, no significant results were found regarding the influence of psychopathy factor 1 (M = 24.97, SD = 6.55) and factor 2 (M = 27.67, SD = 5.13) on either the average scores of the personal dilemmas (M = -.52, SD = .69) or on the average scores of the impersonal dilemmas (M = .32, SD = .94).
To check if moral dilemmas and monetary dilemmas were related to each other a Pearson correlation analysis was performed, these results were in line with experiment 1. Where non-significant correlations between total of Euro (M = 122.16, SD = 19.98) and the average of the impersonal dilemmas of -.07, p = .727; and the average of the personal dilemma of .01, p = .945. This indicates that there is no association between moral judgments in moral dilemmas and moral judgments in monetary dilemmas.
In line with experiment 1 both the psychopathy factors did not have a significant influence on the total amount of money.
To analyse if social attraction predicts higher utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas a regression analysis was performed. Participants average scores on the eight social attractiveness questions were calculated, ranging from -2 to +2, M = .54, SD = .41. These results were not significant.
Discussion
In contrast to experiment 1 and previous research the results of experiment 2 do not support that higher psychopathy traits predict higher utilitarian outcomes on sacrificial moral dilemmas. In line with experiment 1 non-significant correlations between moral and monetary dilemmas were found. As stated before, these results give support that moral dilemmas do not reflect a utilitarian view in more real world decision-making. Furthermore, as the same in experiment 1 no inclination was found that higher scores on psychopathy factors predict lower utilitarian responses on monetary dilemmas. Lastly, social attraction is not of influence on the monetary dilemmas. This indicates that people do not decide on previous social interaction in monetary dilemmas. However, it should be noted that this experiment was greatly underpowered to detect the relatively small effects observed in the first experiment and previous research.
General Discussion
This thesis support the findings of previous research, where higher psychopathy traits predict higher utilitarian outcomes on moral dilemmas. On basis of experiment 1 and the growing literature supporting these findings, it can be concluded that experiment 2 do not reliably contradict these findings due to its sample size and thereby its power. A possible explanation is that participants gave more socially desirable answers, since they interacted with the researchers. In experiment 1 participants did not have any interaction with whomever. Furthermore, research should investigate the underlying factors and facets of psychopathy, which is shown by that factor 1 and the underlying facet Interpersonal is positively related to higher utilitarian judgments in moral dilemmas. It could be theorised that the facet Interpersonal, as a trait, is the cause giving higher utilitarian responses. It is suggested that further research should perform factor analysis on the underlying domains of the facet Interpersonal in relation to moral decision-making. Furthermore, the results indicate that the facet Interpersonal is more of positive influence on giving utilitarian responses in personal dilemmas than in impersonal dilemmas. It could be theorised that the traits of the facet Interpersonal, such as arrogance and grandiosity (Cooke & Mitchie, 2001), the reason is that
high scores do not consider other perspectives then their own, which is contradictory to what utilitarianism states. Due to traits as arrogance and grandiosity, psychopaths could not consider other perspectives and give higher utilitarian responses because of the lower concern for harming others and prosocial behaviours (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014), which imply that it is not based on utilitarian reasoning. Therefore, indirectly indicates that moral dilemmas do not assess utilitarian reasoning.
Another theoretic interesting finding is that the facet Affective was not of significant influence on utilitarian judgments. The facet Affective consists of traits such as remorselessness and callousness (Neumann, Hare & Pardini, 2015). It could be theorised that these traits are responsible for higher utilitarian judgments in moral dilemmas, since these traits could reflect psychopaths lower concern for harming others. However, these results do not support that the facet Affective is of significant influence on utilitarian judgements. Further research should further investigate the underlying traits of the facet Affective by performing factor analysis in relation to moral decision-making.
A limitation is the low percentages of explained variances, indicating that psychopathy factor 1 and the facet Interpersonal is relatively low of influence on more utilitarian judgments in moral decision-making. A possible explanation is that a non-clinical sample gives relatively low variance in psychopathy scores, which would result in the low explained variances. Literature presents a strong positive association between psychopathy and utilitarian judgments on moral dilemmas. However, almost none reported explained variances and/or (when using different samples) effect sizes. It is strongly suggested than further research should report these statistics, resulting a more comprehensive view.
Which is of main interest is that the results indicate that sacrificial moral dilemmas are not associated with genuine utilitarian reasoning. This is supported by the negative non-significant correlations between the total amount of money and both types of moral dilemmas. However, due to its non-significance and the idea of correlation it should be taken with caution since it also could indicate that the monetary dilemmas do not reflect utilitarian reasoning. It could be reasoned that donating money is in fact utilitarian, since overall utility is maximised
at own cost. Kahane et al. (2015) argued that altruism reflects utilitarianism. Donating money is altruistic and thus more utilitarian. Therefore, our monetary dilemmas do reflect utilitarian reasoning and sacrificial moral dilemmas do not. However, non-significant correlations were found. If negative significant correlation were found, it would give better indications that sacrificial moral dilemmas do not measure genuine utilitarian judgments. Kahane et al. (2015) found a negative significant correlation between higher utilitarian judgments on (self-beneficial and other-beneficial) moral dilemmas and with total amount of money hypothetically donated This indicates that people who make more ‘utilitarian’ judgments on sacrificial moral dilemmas do in fact donate less. These results give further evidence that sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect utilitarian reasoning. Research should incorporate alternative measures to assess utilitarian reasoning, because sacrificial moral dilemmas are highly fictional and do not measure genuine utilitarianism in everyday decision-making.
Furthermore, the results from both experiments do not support the hypothesis that higher psychopathy scores predict lower utilitarian outcomes in monetary dilemmas. The non-significant results imply that psychopaths are not inclined to take more money for themselves than non-psychopaths. This is of interest, since psychopaths are considered more egocentric and egoïstic. Factor 1 represents selfish behaviour and the use of other people, which theorises that higher scores on factor 1 would result in more selfish behaviour; hence less donating to charities or others. In further analyses of the underlying facets, a significant negative correlation was found in experiment 1 for the facet Antisocial in relation to the amount of money donated. This gives an indication that antisocial traits are the cause of less donation. However, it should be noted that this association does not hold in the overall results. Furthermore, these findings contradict the study of Kahane et al. (2015) in where they found a significant negative correlation between primary psychopathy and amount of money donated to charity, which indicates that higher scores on psychopathy traits would result in making less donations. Furthermore, White (2014) found that higher scores on factor 1 psychopathy is associated with more prosocial behaviour when it is public and they score less when it is anonymous and based on altruistic motives. White (2014) found that these associations are
mediated by empathy, so in other words public prosocial behaviour is more based on empathy. This thesis contradicts these results, since experiment 1 was anonymous higher scores on psychopathy factor 1 should result in making less altruistic donations, which is not supported by the results. Secondly, experiment 2 was more public and should therefore result that psychopathy factor 1 give higher scores on prosocial behaviour, which is not supported by the results. However, it should be noted that due to the small sample size of experiment 2 it could be the reason that these results are not found. Further research should investigate if public prosocial behaviour is influenced by social interaction and therefore is based on empathy. Experiment 2 could not give answers regarding this, due to its small sample size and low statistical power. Further research is needed to assess if psychopathy is associated with making less donations or more generally less altruistic prosocial behaviour.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis support the findings that psychopathy is associated with more utilitarian judgments on sacrificial moral dilemmas. However, these sacrificial moral dilemmas do not truly reflect utilitarian reasoning, because of the characteristics of psychopathy are considered immoral traits and the moral dilemmas do not reflect real world decision-making. Sacrificial moral dilemmas are therefore not an optimal way to assess utilitarianism and further research should thereby focus on more effective ways to assess such a highly philosophical construct. Furthermore, higher psychopathy traits did not predict lower utilitarian scores on monetary dilemmas. This indicates that psychopaths do not differ in donating money than non-psychopaths. However, further research should further examine this and should give empathise on alternative measurements to assess genuine utilitarian reasoning.
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Appendix A Moral Dilemmas 1 Completely Unacceptable 2 Unacceptable 3 Slightly Unacceptable 4 Slightly Acceptable 5 Acceptable 6 Completely Acceptable Impersonal Dilemmas 1. Fumes
You are the late-night watchman in a hospital. Due to an accident in the building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital are four patients. In another room there is a single patient. If you do nothing the fumes will rise up into the room containing the four patients and cause their deaths.
The only way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to hit a switch, which will cause the fumes to bypass the room containing the four patients. As a result of doing this the fumes will enter the room containing the single patient, causing his death.
How acceptable is it to hit the switch in order to save the four patients?
2. Mineworkers
You are working in the control room of a mine. An accident has occurred and the mine is flooding. Five mineworkers are mining in a passage that is in the path of the flooding water and there is no way for them to escape: they will drown when the water reaches them. One mineworker is in a separate passage that is closed off by a watertight door and therefore safe from the water.
The only way to save the five mineworkers is to open the watertight door from your control-room. If you do so, the water will be diverted from the passage containing the five miners. The one mineworker in that room will drown, but the water won’t flow into the passage with the five mineworkers and they will live.
3. Standard Trolley
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of six railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen.
The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to press a button on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman.
How acceptable is it to press the button in order to save the six workmen?
Personal Dilemmas 1. Motorboat
You are the driver of a motorboat. You notice four swimmers in severe trouble in the distance. If you do not drive towards them at top speed then you will not arrive on time, and all four will certainly die. You have a passenger on the boat, making the boat too heavy to drive at top speed.
The only way to save the swimmers is to quickly push the passenger off the boat. The passenger cannot swim and will drown, but the boat will be light enough to drive at top speed and save all four of the drowning swimmers.
How acceptable is it to push the passenger off the boat in order to save the four swimmers?
2. Vitamins
You are a doctor flying with a group on a travel expedition. Your group has had to do an emergency landing in the desert. You are several days away from any means of help. The group includes you (the only person with medical knowledge and abilities), the pilot, and a party of five people with a rare genetic disease: they have a vital vitamin deficiency and must receive the vitamin through supplements to their diet or they will die. There is plenty of water for everyone to survive, but without the vitamin the party of five will die before you can reach help. Normal human kidneys contain large amounts of the vitamin they need. You cannot remove your own kidney or teach the others to do it to you, and the kidneys of the people with the disease do not contain the vitamin.
The only way to save the lives of the five people is to remove one of the pilot’s kidneys and use it as a source of the vitamin. He will die if you do this, but the other five people will be saved.
How acceptable is it remove the pilot’s kidney in order to save the five people?
3. Earthquake
You are a doctor in the intensive care unit of a hospital. An earthquake strikes, and you are trapped in a room with seven critically ill patients. One patient is on a life-support machine and can live for several days. The other six patients will die without immediate care from rescue crews.
The only way for to signal for immediate help from rescue crews is to kill the patient on the life support machine, which will trigger an alarm system into “code red.” A “code red” alarm will attract the rescue teams immediately, and the other six patients will be able to live. If you do not kill the patient, the one patient on the life-support machine will live, but rescue crews will not arrive in time and the other six patients will die.
How acceptable is it to take the life of the patient on life support in order to save the other six patients?
Appendix B Social Attractiveness 1 Completely Disagree 2 Disagree 3 Neither Disagree or Agree 4 Agree 5 Completely Agree
1. I think that the other participant could be a friend of mine. 2. I think that the other participant and I could build a friendship. 3. I think that the other participant and I could have a friendly chat. 4. I don’t think that the other participant could fit in my group of friends. 5. I think that it’s pleasant to be with the other participant.
6. I think that it’s unpleasant to be with the other participant. 7. I think that I could be good friends with the other participant. 8. I would like to meet up with the other participant some time.
