1 Institute of Security and Global Affairs
Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
Title page
Master’s Thesis
Paul Male
Student ID - s2389622
The Efficacy of Scrutiny Mechanisms on
the UK Government and Intelligence
Services
Word Count: 23,914 (excluding abstract,
acknowledgements and tables)
2 Abstract
Following 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, resulting in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, UK troops engaged in warfare for a considerable period in both countries. In the context of the Iraq war, justification was sought by the then Labour Government that Saddam Hussain was attempting to create or bolster his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, as well as furthering his chemical and biological weapons programme. A series of successive inquiries and reports resulted in considerable scrutiny being placed upon the UK Government and the Intelligence Services. Scrutiny can be described as the an examination of the the administration, governmental expenditure and its policies. The main purpose is to improve or learn from any mistakes. In the United Kingdom, this scrutiny is conducted by Select Committees and other Parliamentary committees or procedures. These are tasked with holding government to account for their actions
This research addresses a knowledge gap in the academic literature by analysing the scrutiny that was placed upon the Government following the Iraq War, with the intent of evaluating the extent that the Government was held to account; and the impact on policies for the Government and related agencies. This research is positioned within academic literature that has investigated the Select Committee process, official reports and public inquires relating to the Iraq war. The research method adopted is qualitative and longitudinal, using a linked case study-based approach covering the period 2003-2019. The focus of each case study is on one of the five inquiries conducted in the UK following the Iraq war. An analysis is condcuted of the reports produced, related Parliamentary debates and media commentary. The intent was to establish (i) a comprehensive picture of the nature and extent of oversight mechanisms that are in place (ii) a determinnation in the nature and extent of follow-through into policy and / or legislation and (iii) to reach a conclusion in practical terms on the efficacy of the oversight process associated with the Security Services and Government as a whole. This is currently lacking in the academia literature.
This thesis indicates that the inquiries that were initiated as a result of the Iraq war has led to significant changes to policies and/or the way the Government or associated agencies operate. These inquiries were designed to provide overisight and accountability of the Government. In this light, there was considerable scrutiny placed upon the Government. Having said this, there are positive and negative aspects involved in the scrutiny mechanisms that are in place in the UK.
3 Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Dr Simon Willmetts for assisting me in the many decisions affecting me throughout my thesis during my time at the University of Leiden. His advice and support in guiding me in the best options available have been a great help.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for the love and support they have afforded me throughout my studies. Without them I would not be where I am today. I am truly grateful for their continued support.
Finally, I am grateful to my friends for the encouragement both personally and academically they have given me during my time in The Hague.
4 Contents Title page ... 1 Abstract ... 2 Acknowledgements ... 3 Glossary of Terms ... 5
List of Tables and Figures ... 6
Chapter 1. Introduction ... 7
1.1 The Structure of the Thesis ... 9
Chapter 2. Literature Review – the Body of Knowledge ... 10
2.1. The War on Terror ... 10
2.2 Accountability and Oversight ... 11
2.4 Inquiries in the UK ... 17
Chapter 3. Research Design ... 21
Chapter 4. Case Studies, Analysis and Results ... 24
4.1 The Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry 2003 ... 24
4.1.1 Recommendations of the FAC Inquiry ... 25
4.2 The Intelligence and Select Committee Inquiry, September 2003 ... 27
4.2.1 Recommendations of the ISC Inquiry ... 28
4.3 The Hutton Inquiry , January 2004 ... 30
4.4 The Butler Inquiry, February 2004 ... 32
4.4.1 Recommendations of The Butler Inquiry ... 33
4.5 The Build Up to the Publication of Chilcot ... 37
4.6 The Chilcot report, July 2016 ... 39
4.6.1 Recommendations of the Chilcot Inquiry ... 41
4.7 Additional Reports Dealing with Iraq ... 49
Chapter 5. Discussion ... 51
5.1 Literature Review: Discussion ... 51
5.2 Case Study Analysis and Dicussion ... 54
Chapter 6. Conclusion ... 59
6.1 Objectives of the Study ... 59
6.2 The Strengths, Limitiations, and Constraints of the Research ... 60
6.3 Recommendations for Futher Research ... 61
5 Glossary of Terms
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BIG – Butler Implamentation Group
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CIC - Governments Coalition Information Centre
ECCHR – European Centre of Contitutional Human Rights
FAC – Foreign Affairs Committee
FCO – Foreign and Commenwealth Office
GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters
HCDC – House of Commons Defence Committee
HLSCC – House of Lords Committee on the Constitution
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
ISC – Intelligence and Security Committee
JIC – Joint Intelligence Committee
MI5 – The Security Service
MoD – Ministry of Defence
NAO – National Audit Office
NHS – National Health Service
NSC – National Security Council
PCO - Committee of the Privy Council
SIA – Single Intelligence Account
SIS – Secret Intelligence Services
USA – United States of America
6 List of Tables and Figures
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of different types of formal independent investigation Table 2: The Numner and Status of Recommendations Made by Public Inquires Table 3: Annual Expenditure of the SIA: 2002-2008
Table 4: Annual Expenditure of the SIA: 2011-2020
Figures:
Figure 1: The Fusion Doctrine Figure 2. The Chilcot Checklist
7 Chapter 1. Introduction
Considerable time is spent scrutinising the work of the Government in the United Kingdom (UK). This can be conducted in a variety of ways. This can be done via Select Committees, Parliamentary Comittees or Public Inquiries. These are are designed to oversee the work of the Government and its agencies (Hindmoor et al 2009, White 2015). Typically, there are reports produced as a result of the above scrutiny processes. Following this, the Government is required to respond within 60 days of the publication. The system was set up in 1979 and they receive requests from interested parties or individuals, compel Members of Parliament to attend and give oral evidence, whilst requesting relevant documents are made available (Hindmoor et al 2009).
Scrutiny is aimed at providing oversight and accountability. It can be argued this is highly important when elected governments spend tax payers’ money. People want and deserve to know where their money is being spent and that it is effectively and efficiently used. When a nation goes to war it is probably one of the most important examples of major spending. It not only includes significant expenditure, there is also a major moral imperative as well. Decisions to go to war are not taken lightly in the United Kingdom and require a multitude of intelligence and other requirements to be met in order to justify it. It is a process that can involve many different departments of government (Young 2015). Indeed, “given the huge implications, it is critical that decisions to go to war be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny and review” (Young 2015: 58). As a result, the process by which war is decided in
the UK is intensely scrutinised by governmental committees or inquiries. For example, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) provides accountability and oversight of the UK’s intelligence agencies, namely, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.
The often clandestine nature of intelligence gathering, gives rise to the need for providing assurance that the agencies do not act unlawfully or outside of legal boundaries. Oversight and accountability has an important role to play in this instance, and is best understood as the democratic obligation for the actions of the security services to be held responsible if the powers they have are being abused. It is said, “Parliamentary involvement gives legitimacy and democratic accountability. It
can help to ensure that security and intelligence organisations are serving the State as a whole” (Born
and Leigh 2007: 10). However, it is not just the ISC that investigates UK involvement in armed conflicts, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs also seeks to dissect the decisions for going to war (Gill 2007, Young 2015).
Committees have now become a common feature in the funcitoning of UK government, with the last Labour Government of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown labelled as ‘the government of
8 committees’ (White 2015). That Labour Government ran from 1997 to 2003, and within that period the United Kingdom entered the Iraq war in 2003, the London terrorist bombings occurred in 2005, as well as other incidents such as the new global ‘war on terror’. This meant Parliamentary scrutiny was required at levels that had not been seen since the creation of the committee process nearly 30 years before (Gill 2007). As well as being the ‘the government of committee, Aldrich (2005) remarked that there had also been a ‘season of inquires’ following the decision to support the USA in the Iraq war. This comprised no less than four different inquiries, with a large proportion of all inquiries centred around intelligence. These inquiries were conducted by various Government mechanisms. As such, the inquiries and subsequent reports that are of focus in this thesis are:
1. The ‘Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs’, which in July 2003 investigated ‘the decision to go to war in Iraq’ (referenced as: ‘FAC inquiry 2003’ from here on). 2. The ‘Intelligence and Select Committee’, which in September 2003 examined ‘Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments’ (referenced as: ‘ISC 2003’ from here on)
3. The ‘Hutton Report’ published in January 2004, following the death of Dr Kelly, the WMD inspector for the UN and who worked for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (referenced as: ‘Hutton 2004’ from here on).
4. The ‘Butler Report’ announced in February 2004, tasked with a ‘review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (referenced as: ‘Butler 2004’ from here on).
These four inquires culminated with the largest of the inquiries into the UK’s involvement of Iraq, which was commissioned in 2009 and published in 2016,
5. The ‘Iraq Inquiry’, also known as the ‘Chilcot report’ (referenced as: ‘Chilcot 2016’ or ‘Chilcot Executive Report 2016’ from here on).
The extent and scope of these inquiries are expanded upon in the literature review section. However, despite these five inquiries, there has been little evaluation into the successes of such endeavours (Born & Wetzling 2007, Defty 2008, Gill 2007, Herring & Robinson 2014). Put simply, it is unclear what lessons have been learned from the inquiries and taken into practice; together with the extent to which they have actually changed the way the intelligence agencies work from a policy perspective; in the way they conduct their activities, or how the Government has responded or acted upon any recommendations made in the inquiries.
Therefore, the primary research problem to be investigated is: To what extent does the oversight and accountability mechanisms in the United Kingdom influence Government policies following the Iraq war?
9 Four sub questions have been identified in the section dealing with the literature review/body of knowledge, and these will used to further guide the research problem noted above.
1.1 The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structureed into the following chapters; Chapter 2 deals with the literature review. Within this is an examination of what factors can raise the need for oversight and accountability of the Government. In this vein, overisght and accountabilty is also explore through academic literature. This is focussed on oversight committees as well public inquiries. Chapter 3 of the current thesis is centred on the research design that was adopted. Furthermore, Chapter 4 focusses on the case studies, analysus and discussions. In this chapter the analysis of the five reports is conducted. Moreover, it deals with other reports or inquiries that are related to the five inquiries. Chapter 5 presents the results in the form of a discussion. This is seperated into two sections. First, the literature review is discussed. Second, is the discussion for the analysis that was conducted. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. Given in this chapter is what the objectives of the study were. This leads to the strengths, limitiations and constraints. Closing with recommendations for final research.
10 Chapter 2. Literature Review – the Body of Knowledge
2.1. The War on Terror
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 triggered the period known as ‘the war on terror’, instigated by President George W. Bush. This led to the invasion of Afghanistan to hold those responsible to account for the attacks. However, this was just the beginning of a global effort to root out proponents of terrorism, with Bush claiming there was a need to fight those who are part of the ‘axis of evil’ (Heisbourg 2003). The United Kingdom, perhaps the USA’s most visible partner, decided to enter the war in Afghanistan alongside the latter.
It soon became apparent that Afghanistan was not the end game for the war on terror. Attention soon turned to Saddam Hussain’s regime in Iraq. Bush declared that Saddam Hussain supported the terrorist events of 9/11, which began the process of making a declaration of war against Iraq (Kellner 2007). In order to invade and wage war with Iraq, evidence was needed to support this decision. Intelligence reports were released claiming Saddam was creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as continuing with the development of chemical and biological weapons he had previously used on his own people (Kellner 2007). This became the strongest line of argument for deciding to wage war on Iraq. Both the US and the UK supplied documents relating to the capabilities of Iraq to create, store and use such weapons (Buncombe 2016). This was known as the ‘Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs’ produced by the CIA (CIA 2002). The UK version, known as the ‘Iraq dossier’ was produced by the UK government in 2003, and became known as the ‘dodgy dossier’ due to the apparently falsified or exaggerated intelligence within it (Born & Wetzling 2007). The ‘Iraq Dossier’ comprised of two intelligence reports, one from published in September and the other in February. This dossier was used as the catalyst for gaining Parliamentary and public approval for the upcoming invasion (Phythian 2018).
Tony Blair discussed the dossier in Parliament in order to gain support for the option of entering war. Blair claimed that following the 1991 Gulf War, the full extent of Iraq’s WMD, biological and chemical weapons programmes was clear (Hansard 2002, volume 390, column 1). He went on to claim that the dossier outlines the stock pile of weapons that Saddam possessed following the 1991 war, and from 1998 Saddam’s sole interest was to increase his weapons capabilities (Hansard 2002, volume 390, column 2). Despite a long debate in the House of Commons pertaining to the intelligence in the dossiers, there were still calls for the containment approach to be continued. David Trimble MP said, “it is a reasonable conclusion that it was only the threat of force that led Saddam Hussein to offer
to admit inspectors. There must therefore be hope that a reinvigorated inspection and containment regime will work” (Hansard 2002, volume 390, column 18). Moreover, there was a growing opposition
11 to the policy of war with Iraq both in Parliament and society in general (Dyson 2006, Tyrie 2004). This was due to the ever increasing questions surrounding the need for war based on the issues of Iraq being in possession of WMD. Hans Blix, a Swedish diplomat, was sent into Iraq by the United Nations to locate evidence of WMD. However, he found no evidence of these programmes and reported so to the UN (The Guardian 2003). Moreover, Hans Blix accused the UK Government of exaggerating Iraq’s WMD capabilities in order to gain support for the war (BBC 2010).
Other concerns regarding the potential for the invasion of Iraq were also present. For example, the war was not started by America as a result of an act of aggression by Iraq towards them or their allies. Moreover, there were concerns that the invasion had not been ratified in the United Nations (Kull, Ramsay & Lewis 2003). For example, Lewis (2004) found that 67% of people asked in a poll said they would not support the war if no evidence of WMD was found. Ultimately, this proved to be the case, with no evidence of WMD ever found following the invasion. The scepticism about the war was well founded. This is witnessed with the fact there was the biggest public demonstration in the United Kingdom ever to be held, with an estimated two million people taking part (Laville & Dutter 2003).
The depravity of Saddam Hussain’s regime cannot be disputed. This was also used as an element for waging the war. Evidence he had used chemical weapons on his own people, as well as a long list of human rights abuses indicates the levels Saddam Hussain was willing to go to (Baram 2003). Thus, some intelligence claims were justified. However, the dossier used by the UK as the catalyst for entering the war alongside America has received considerbale criticism. It been widely reported that the intelligence that was produced and/or supplied was heavily politicised, and thus inaccurate (Gill 2009, Gormley 2004, Marrin 2013, Mello & Peters 2018, Pillar 2018, Svendsen 2009). It can be argued that falsified or exaggerated intelligence, whether by the intelligence services or senior members of the UK Government represents a gross abuse of powers. Especially if it was used as a catalyst for war, where so many people have died as a result (Sims 2006). Under such circumstances, the electorate quite righty can demand ‘due process’ in investigating that the necessary accountability and oversight had been exercised.
2.2 Accountability and Oversight
Accountability and oversight is needed as the foundation of trust in any democratically elected government. By having weak accountability and oversight mechanisms of the Government and its related agencies, poor performance, lack of value for money and failure can all occur (Guerin et al 2018). However, accountability and oversight do not only lie at the heart of government via Parliament; the Security Services can also be held to account by the Government, which in turn, is accountable to
12 the electorate and to Parliament. This is perhaps the most democratic action of a modern political society, where government and/or Parliament can hold themselves to account. However, “the most
important safeguard against abuse in a democratic society would be elections: supervision by the people” (Johnson and Post 2003: 1). But, government also must maintain accountability over its
departments and agencies. The examples for this research are the intelligence services of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ being overseen and scrutinised by the ISC.
This was vitally important following the controversies and findings surrounding the intelligence services and Government in the build-up to the Iraq war (Phythian 2007). The apparent failures in the intelligence analysis, the intelligence product or how the Government used the intelligence surrounding Iraq and its WMD programme, led to the UK commissioning the numerous inquiries identified earlier (Svendsen 2009). These were all sanctioned by the UK Government in order to review the processes and decisions that were made in the decision to go to war with Iraq. Thus, effective accountability and oversight is required to not only scrutinise if correct decision were made, but ensure procedures and protocols were followed and ultimately allow for ‘lessons to be learned’.
There is very sparse academic insights into what lessons were learned from the five UK intelligence inquiries surrounding the Iraq war and subsequently enacted. Indeed, Davies (2005) argues that a comprehensive review of the inquires is needed. Especailly in the role specialist committees have on amendments to bills or the legislative process as a whole (Benton & Russell 2013). Moreover, more attention has been placed upon the Public Bill Committees (Thompson 2015). Furthermore, there is limited scholarly work undertaken into the impact Select Committees have on the legislative procedures (Thompson 2015). Many authors have argued that one should ‘treat the UK
as if it lacked legislative committees altogether’ (Russell & Benton 2009: 8). Consequently, this research
investigates the extent to which the academic literature has critically analysed the efficacy of oversight mechanisms in the UK, in the forms of Select Committees, Parliamentary Committees, Parlimanent and Public Inquiries.
In this vein, Benton & Russell (2013) have evaluated the impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees. They analyse data from many different committees, ranging across a multitude of inquiries such as environment, healthcare, education and so forth. Furthermore, they report on the processes that the committee and the Government should follow during an inquiry. Although Benton and Russell (2013) look at the level at which House of Commons Committees influence the policy process, they did not investigated this in regards to the Iraq war and the intelligence agencies.
Peter Gill (2007) has, however, evaluated the Intelligence and Security Committee work in terms of what was found in each of its reports, how the ISC is perceived by the intelligence agencies
13 and how the ISC works in general. For example, Gill reviewed what the ISC inquiry (2003) found in regards to the ’45 minute’ claim that was made about Saddam’s weapons capabilities. He found that the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry, as documented in this thesis, struggled to gain the cooperation from senior actors in Government and the intelligence agencies, including the Prime Minister. However, he noted that the ISC inquiry, also discussed in this thesis, was more influential in this regard (Gill 2007). Furthermore, Gill (2007) also discusses how the ISC investigated claims of prison abuse in Abu-Ghraib prison during the Iraq war. Despite this evaluation, his research did not cover the extent to which policy changes were subsequently adopted. Moreover, Gill’s research was conducted prior to the Chilcot report, published in 2016, which is the most comprehensive evaluation of the involvement of the Government about the Iraq war. Despite this, Gill (2007) does provide groundwork for how the ISC attempts to provide oversight and accountability; which is beneficial for this research. Moreover, Gill (2007) highlights the ISC has exceeded expectations in gaining access to sensitive information from intelligence agencies and providing a critique of these agencies. However, he also finds that the ISC is more an extension of the management of the agencies, rather than an oversight committee per se (Gill 2007: 32). Indeed, this will be outlined through the analysis of the ISC inquiry conducted later in this thesis. Again, this provides an insight into the fact that ISC is of invesitagatory use in the current research, in that it will be worthwhile in determining how effective and what benefits can be derived from having such a committee in place.
Furthermore, other literature does deal with the oversight of government through Select Committees, but again the focus is predominarely targeted towards the processes of conducting such inquiries (Benton & Russell 2013, Danchev 2004, Thomas 2017, White 2015), rather than the extent to which the outcomes and recommendations were subsequently implemented. Aldrich (2005) investigates the findings of the four inquiries prior to the Chilcot report, but again did not look at specific recommendations and policy changes as a result. Essentially, he provides a review of the findings and conclusions of each of the reports, not the consequences of these flowing through into government actions. Robinson (2017) provides a conceptually grounded research paper but focuses on the role of propaganda and deception. Green & Samuel (2016) use the Chilcot report as a basis for international law and legal advice, whilst Phythian (2018) provides an excellent analysis of the Chilcot report, but only through the lenses of politicisation and intelligence failures.
The litrerature review has indicated there is some, but limited, academic research into various aspects surrounding the Government inquires dealing with the Iraq war, and in partcular the operation of Select Committees. Therefore, the proposed research is seen as being important for two reasons. First, at the societal level, because people die due to warfare, and an analysis of oversight and accountability will allow for an inward looking perspective on how governments and intelligence
14 agencies operate; and consequently do or do not over extend their powers or remit. The electorate, and society in general, are owed a duty of care. Moreover, it is important to allow for intensive scrutiny of intelligence agencies and government in order to gain accountability. Therefore, at the societal level structures dealing with oversight and accountability can be seen as a vital component for modern democracy, such as for the UK; and ensure activity is based on law, order and respect of human rights. Second, is the potential academic significance of the proposed topic. There is scant evaluative research conducted into the results of conducting inquiries, committee hearings and reports dealing with oversight and accountability by Select Committee and the Iraq war and this subsequently being taken forward into comprehensive improvements for policy / and or legislation, together with the operations of the intelligence services. By exploring this, and in a longitudinal manner, as set out in the research framework below, it has been possible to determine if these committees are a useful resource for the Government and electorate alike, in what way, and over time.
To conclude, the primary goal of this research is examine the extent that the work conducted and produced through the mechanisms aimed at providing scrutiny, oversight and accountability, can influence policy changes for the intelligence services and/or government in the United Kingdom between 2003-2018. This is supported by a sub-set of questions identified below through the literature review and have shaped the research design. The originality of the current research stems from three identified gaps in knowledge. First, there is a lack of academic knowledge on the link been the extent government scrutiny can influence change in policies or laws. Second, it seeks to address the efficacy of accountability and oversight mechanisms through a detailed longitudinal analysis. Finally, it will effectively provide a substantive tracked longitudinal analysis and supporting research framework spanning from 2003 to 2019 into the effectiveness of each of the five inquiries on the extent to which they have influenced successive Government policies and also the manner in which the intelligence services conduct their operations.
Thus, the proposed research will investigate what lessons were learned and why from the Iraq reports and inquiries. Consequently, the following guiding research questions have been investigated to support the primary research objective:
1. To what extent did the inquiries change how the UK intelligence agencies operate? 2. To what extent have safe guards been put into place to stop inaccurate or misuse of
intelligence being presented regarding the UK’s decision to engage in a future war? 3. What are the effects of the reports on the UK intelligence agencies and UK
15 4. To what extent has there been any concrete policy changes following the inquiries,
and does this lend support to or detract from the legitimacy of conducting such inquiries?
By creating guiding research questions it will enable the focus of the research to remain consistent and with clear guidelines (Gill 2007
2.3 Oversight Committees in the United Kingdom
Committees are now a common aspect of British politics. Examples of such committees include the Defence Select Committee, which is aimed at scrutinising Ministry of Defence policies, expenditure and administration; the Home Affairs Committee which scrutinises the same subjects but for the Home Office. Both of these are known as Select Committees and sit across either of the two houses at Westminster, the Commons and Lords. Finally, there can be Ad-hoc Joint Committees, such as the Commission on Banking Standards, comprised of Lords and Commons ministers (Parliament.uk 2019). It has been said that committees are now “more powerful and independent-minded than ever before…
and more generally, the select committees have amassed more power and respect” (D’Arcy 2011).
Committees specific to the The House of Lords tend to investigate more specialist topics. Whereas, the Commons Select Committees examine spending, policies and the administration that is undertaken by the Government (White 2015). They have a minimum of eleven members who sit on a committee and decide on the line of inquiry and gather evidence to support the purpose of the inquiry. Select Committees provide executive oversight (Benton & Russell 2013: 772).
The fact that the oversight and investigative committees, or Select Committees, have no control over legislative matters has been described as ‘weak’ (Benton & Russell 2013). Moreover, a government is under no formal obligation to accept any recommendations made by the committee (Hindmoor et al 2009). This raises two immediate issues. First, whether there is a need to have such committees and second, should the two remits, public bill and Select Committees, be merged together. Despite this apparent weakness it is said that Ministers often heed the advice of a Select Committees and are more visible in making policy than one might believe (Hindmoor et al 2009). However, there is very little evaluation of the effectiveness of cross committee involvement into new legislation or Government policy (Guerin, McCrae & Shepheard 2018).
With that in mind, the most prominent of the oversight committees for the intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom is the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). The ISC was set up in 1994 through the Intelligence Services Act. The creation of this committee was designed to examine
16 policies, expenditure, and administrative components of the UK’s intelligence agencies and Government departments. The ISC is designed to hold accountability and oversight for the work the Government and intelligence agencies undertake (Gill 2007). However, it should be noted that the committee was reformed in 2013 making it a Parliamentary Committee. This meant it was afforded greater powers than normal Select Committees (ISC 2019). This is a unique committee and there are no other Parliamentary Committees. Moreover, members of the ISC must be nominated by the Prime Minster (Defty 2015). However, this led to criticisms directed at the ISC and the Government. One is that the committee reports directly to the Prime Minster and that he or she has the ability to retract information from reports before they are published (Gill 2007). Furthermore, it is said that the committee lacks adequate funding to conduct the work it is tasked with (Gill 2007). Thus, the ISC only receive written statements from the relevant agencies, as well as weekly meetings with the heads of these agencies. This can be seen as not being adequate enough. More funding should be in place so that more detailed interviews, rather than written statements, can occur (Defty 2008).
Moreover, further criticism was aimed at the handling of the ISC. The ISC recommended to the Government that a procedure be put in place for the committee to verify intelligence during the assessments of Iraqi WMD (Gill 2007). This was to be done by the creation of a position for someone to oversee this. The Government responded and appointed John Morrison to head the task of verifying information. However, he was only appointed on a part time basis and was soon sacked when he made disparaging claims around the intelligence on Iraqi (Gill 2007). This is not something that promotes confidence in an oversight and accountability committee, when a prominent member is sacked when he questions intelligence, especially since its remit is supposed to be investigating intelligence gathering and analysis.
The above illuminates two contrasting views that surround the efficacy of the ISC or such committee’s in general. First, as the ISC is set up by statute in the UK, the committee’s powers and abilities will reflect what the Government has as its preferences, rather than an independent legislator or oversight mechanism (Gill 2007). Therefore, despite having investigatory powers, such as the ability to view highly sensitive intelligence, it can be subjected to politicisation. This in turn could effect the way the intelligence services wish to cooperate with the ISC. However, it has be arged that the ISC has gained much more respect from the intelligence agencies and the Government on the whole following the war on terror (Gill 2007).
However, as previously mentioned, governmental scutiny does not only come from committees. This can also take place in the form of a public inquiry. Therefore, it is also important to understand the process by which an inquiry is set up in the United Kingdom.
17 2.4 Inquiries in the UK
Inquiries are becoming more and more prominent in British political life (Sulitzeanu‐Kenan 2006). The last time there were no active inquiries was 27 years ago (Norris & Shepheard 2017). Since 1990 there have been 68 public inquiries conducted by the British or devolved governments in the United Kingdom, spending approximately £638.9 million (Norris & Shepheard 2017). The need for a public inquiry usually follows a controversial policy or an event of major public concern (Caird 2016). Public inquiries are major investigations and can take either a statutory or non-statutory form (Norris & Shepheard 2017). The main function of a public inquiry is to establish what happened, why it happened and what can be done to prevent it from happening again. An inquiry will start out with its terms of reference and what it is to investigate (Grenfell Tower Inquiry 2019). This is also true of Select Committee inquiries (White 2015). Statutory inquiries are held under the ‘Inquiries Act 2005’. Non-statutory inquiries can be split into three catagories; i) non-Non-statutory ad-hoc inquiries ii) inquiries by a Committee of the Privy Council (PCO) and iii) Royal Commission inquiries (Caird 2016). Non-statutory
ad-hoc inquiries can either be held in public or private. They do not have procedural rules and but
cannot compel witnesses to attend or request documentation. Therefore, they are reliant on the cooperation of the people involved. Moreover, they are tended to be used if there is a requirement for a more inquistoral approach (Caird 2016). An example of a Non-statutory ad-hoc inquiry is the Hutton inquiry, one of the inquiries in focus in this thesis. An inquiry conducted by a Committee of the Privy Council is a variation of a non-statutory ad-hoc inquiry. However, they do have access to senstitive material, such as intelligence reports. An example of this type of inquiry is the Butler inquiry and the Chilcot inquiry, again both featured in this thesis. Another example is the Falklands war inquiry. It can be seen why intelligence reports would be needed for such types of inquiries. Finally, a Royal Commission inquiry is again a form of an ad-hoc inquiry. They do not have the power to compel witnesses to attend. They are typically used to investigate matters of a broad policy, rather than a one off event. The last Royal Commission inquiry was the ‘Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords’ in 2000 (Caird 2016).
An example of a public Inquiry is the ‘Bloody Sunday’ inquiry that investigated the troubles in Northern Ireland that led to the deaths and injuries of many in Derry. Or there is the current, ongoing inquiry investigating the fire that occurred at Grenfell Tower, London in 2017. However, there are different types of investigations that may be conducted in the United Kingdom. Not all have to take the form of an inquiry. Table 1 below highlights the comparison between different types of formal independent investigation as set out by Norris & Shepheard (2017).
18 Table 1: Comparison of different types of formal independent investigation
Statutory inquiry Non-statutory inquiry
Inquest Independent panel
Royal Commission
Establishment By a minister, whenever particular events cause sufficient ‘public
concern’ By a coroner, whenever a death occurs under specific circumstances
By a minister By means of a royal warrant at the
request of a secretary of state
Terms of reference
Terms of reference set by a Minister
No specific terms of reference
Terms of reference set by a Minister
Public or private Public to the greatest extent
possible, with allowances for some
private evidence
Presumed to be public
but can sit partially or wholly in private Public, with an option to hear some evidence in private
Public Can be public or private
Composition Chair-led with the option to include panelists Coroner-led A chair-led panel, of typically 4 to 12 people A large, chair-led panel, of typically 10 to 16 people
Recommendations In most cases the terms of reference will require the delivery
of recommendations for change
Duty to recommend actions as part of ‘Reports to Prevent Future Deaths’
In some cases the terms of reference may require the delivery of recommendations for change
Public access to documents Duty to ensure public access to documents No specific duty to release documents Duty to disclose most relevant documents from an One of the main purposes of independent panels is usually May disclose documents if required to do so by terms of reference
19 inquest when
requested
disclosure of documents
Source: Norris & Shepheard (2017)
As can be seen there are five types of investigations that can take place in the UK. However, all have the same ‘end goal’ in that they investigate something that is of importance to the Government and public as a whole. Like committees, public inquiries should lead to recommendations being made on how to improve or learn from any mistakes. However, there have been criticisms that there is not enough done to ensure that recommendations are adopted by governments. Norris & Shepheard (2017) state that of the 68 public inquiries held in the United Kingdom, only six have had Select Committee scrutiny of the adoption of recommendations. This stregthens the need for more scrutiny in academia on such inquiries.
Of the 68 public inquiries that have been conducted since 1990, 60 of these contained 2625 recommendations for change. The other 8 reports are still running and as a result the final conclusions and recommendations are not available (Norris & Shepheard 2017). However, these are just suggestions for change. They are not mandatory recommendations and Norris & Shepheard (2017), whom worked for the Institute for Government, did not publish the amount of recommendations that were adopted. Nonetheless, the National Audit Office (NAO) did publish some figures on recommendations that were adopted. This can be seen in the table below (NAO 2018):
Table 2: The Numner and Status of Recommendations Made by Public Inquires
20 The table above presents a review of ten inquires. In these, 620 recommendations were made, with 136 of these being either rejected or no repsonse given. This indicates a fairly high level of acceptance in some form, at around 78%. It should be noted that although the NAO has indicated that 72 out of the 73 recommendations made in the Baha Mousra inquiry were accepted in princinple, the reason for acceptance in ‘principle’ is that it takes a long time for the Government to review and then implement changes. In the Government’s repsonse to the inquiry they stated they would adopt 71 of the 73 recommendations (HC 548, paragraph 9).
In a similar vein, the Government noted that due to the extensive amount of recommendations made in the Mid Staffordshire NHS inquiry, namely 290, it would take too long to review and implement the recommendations. The Chairman of the inquiry, Robert Francis stated himself that ‘some recommendations are of necessity high level and will require considerable further detailed work
to enable them to be implemented’ (Cm 8576, parapgrpag 12). Hence, the reason for acceptance in
principle. However, it can be seen that the Iraq Inquiry (the Chilcot Report) indicates there were no recommendations made to Government. But, this is somewhat misleading. Although no ‘official recommendations’ were made, there were ‘lessons to be learned’ resulting from the inquiry. This can result in a distortion of true figures. Moreover, as there is no specific recommendations to work through, the use of a longitudinal research design as set out in Chapter 3 will enable to trace what changes were made as a result of the Chilcot inquiry. The ‘lessons to be learned’ will be expanded upon in the analysis section of this research.
21 Chapter 3. Research Design
The research investigated, first, the content of and results and outcomes from the five UK inquiries dealing with the Iraq war, as listed in the introduction. Second, the extent to which they have influenced subsequent policy development and enactment in connection with the accountability, oversight and operations of the intelligence Services and government. To achieve this, the research adopted a qualitative case-study based approach, utilizing official Select Committee and other relevant committee documents and reports, public inquiry reports, Parliamentary debates and any associated commentaries in the media. As such, a “qualitative case study methodology provides tools for
researchers to study complex phenomena within their contexts” (Baxter & Jack 2008: 554). Thus,
qualitative case study enables a researcher to gather data from various sources and illuminate the cases within the subject field (Yin 2003).
The overarching research framework comprised of a linked case study approach, where each of the inquires under investigation formed a case study in its own right. In opposition to quantative analysis, case studies allowed for data to be examined at the micro level (Zainal 2007). Moreover, a case study approach focusses on contemporary issues within a real life context, using multiple sources as an empirical investigation (Gilson 2012). A single case study evaluation was undertaken of each of the five inquiries, Parliamentary debates and media commentary to evaluate the findings. Moreover, an analysis of the subsequent follow-through into policy or legislation has been conducted. There is a misconception in social science that using a single case study does not allow for generalisation (Flyvbjerg 2006). Indeed, Zainal (2007) argues that using a single case design produces an inability to generalise. Consequently, there are varying arguments for and against using a single case study approach. Despite this, a single case study can be suitable for investigating topics at the preliminary stage of research (Flyvbjerg 2006). Therefore, by conducting a single case study approach from the outset it enabled individual characteristics to become apparent from within each of the five inquiries. Given that the Iraq war produced many reports and inquiries this subsequnerly enabled a multiple case study approach to be adopted in this instance.
Furthermore, a longtitudinal analysis of the case studies has also been adopted. A longtitudinal analysis allows for a systematic way of observing the charactheristics of each case study and reporting the way the results change over time (Zainal 2007). As a result, longitudinal analysis can produce a great deal of quality data (Caruana et al 2015). Additionally, a within and across - or linked case study - examination has also been adopted. This allowed for an enhancement of knowledge that extends beyond the single case study approach (Khan & VanWynsberghe 2008) to one that is more generalisable, and was adopted for this thesis. This was important for three reasons. It allowed for an
22 investigation of: i) whether each subsequent report acknowledged certain aspects, claims or recommendations of the other reports or if it remains self-contained, ii) if patterns emerged between reports. An investigation has been conducted of what government responses were to these recommendations. Thus, it was possible to track what changes were adopted following the publication of the government’s own responses to the reports; and finally, iii) a longitudinal assessment testing over time the efficacy of the Special Committee structures and inquiries for the Iraq war.
Data was gathered from both primary sources and also academic literature and media reports to reinforce a robust perspective, and also relaibility and validity (Yin 2003). This allowed insights to be gained into the extent the media and electorate called for or demand accountability of the work the Government or intelligence services undertake, as well as evaluations of reports produced by committees and inquiries. Data collection involved collation from official government web sites that publish reports and findings from such inquiries, including the Government’s own response and what it intended to do.
Therefore, the research analysed an array of relevant Select Committees and public inquiries, and their reports and findings. As an example, the ISC has their own designated website (isc.independent.gov.uk), which gives access to all reports and inquires that have been undertaken by this committee. These reports typically contain ‘conclusions and recommendations’, the source of analysis for this thesis. This was conducted for the five inquiries listed, as well as any other relevent or linked inquiries and reports. It was possible, therefore, to track these recommendations and determine what each inquiry or report recommended and the extent to which the Government responded or adopted these recommendations. This allowed for an accurate representation of how effetive the scrutiny mechanisms are at influencing the Government. Additionally, a review of the relevant Select Committees and public inquiry reports allowed an insight to be obtained into the types and groupings of questions posed to witnesses, civil servants and Minsters. This permited an investigation of the level and depth of scrutiny that is being applied, vis-à-vis accountability and oversight.
To hightlight this, one finding noted from the ISC annual report 2010-2011 was that it was to be reformed and have more investigatory powers. The ISC commented in this annual report that they felt after 16 years of existence it was now time for radical changes to the ISC (ISC Annual Report 2010-2011: 82). Indeed, as a result, in 2013, the Justice and Security Act was reformed so the ISC was made a Parliamentary committee. This was a clear recommendation of the ISC and one that was enacted.
Moreover, evaluating the level at which the Government responds to the recommendations was not the only method for determining accountability and oversight occurred. This done via Parliamentary debates and an evaluation of the levels to which a government, Parliament and Minsters
23 are held to account and provide oversight. This was tracked through Hansard which ‘substantially
verbatim’ report of what is said in Parliament (UK Parliament 2019).
However, if policy changes were created or adopted, it was possible to see how politicians can be seen to hold a government to account through the scrutiny of Parliamentary debates. Moreover, if policies were enacted, Parliamentary debates also offered an insight into the extent to which MP’s are questioning what, why and how Government conducted its business. This provided a further source of evidence on how the tracking of recommendations were followed in this research. This also signified the importance for not only a singular case study evaluation of the reports, but also a cross-case study and longitudinal examination of successive reports to build a more cumulative picture and uncover any underlying patterns.
Finally, the media and academic literature offered valuable insights into the questions being posed in this current research. For example, after it had emerged that Dr Kelly had died, the Hutton Inquiry was set up to investigate the cause of his death. Yet, it had been claimed by certain media outlets that Dr Kelly committed suicide following the leak of his name as the source of ‘sexed up’ dossier claims (Schlosberg 2011). Additionally, there were certain academics who said that the suicide verdict of death by exsanguination from cutting of the wrist is unlikely (Coole, 2005, Delamothe 2010). This indicated the levels at which the media and academia were involved in examining the extent to which accountability was needed when investigating the issues that surround the trustworthiness of an inquiries conclusions. Moreover, media depictions of the Hutton Inquiry were also investigated by academic scholars (see Robinson et al 2009, Stanyer 2004, Wring 2005 for examples). This offered an insight into the levels at which the reports are digested by society as a whole.
The following chapter presents the results and analysis of the five major inquires in regards to the intelligence and UK involvement in the Iraq war. Four were conducted in very close time proximity to each other.
24 Chapter 4. Case Studies, Analysis and Results
The UK government conducted five inquiries on the UK’s involvement in the Iraq war. Each of the inquiries and reports will be outlined as separate case studies chronologically, including the remit of each of the inquiries, and the findings and conclusions from each. However, it should be noted that there is overlapping contents across them.
4.1 The Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry 2003
Throughout May 2003 there were heated exchanges between Downing Street and the BBC. This was due to Andrew Gilligan reporting that the Iraq Dossiers had been ‘sexed up’ in regards to Saddam Hussein being able to launch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes. Gilligan claims this came from a unnamed source from Downing Street; and that Downing Street also knew that the 45 minute claim was probably wrong (The Guardian 2003). As a result, a few days after the May 29th
broadcast from Gilligan there was an announcement from the Government that the Foreign Affairs Committee was tasked with investigating if the intelligence presented to Parliament was accurate or mis-leading (FAC inquiry 2003: 7). The inquiry was launched in June 2003 and was chaired by Labour MP Donald Anderson.
The FAC inquiry determined that the ‘Iraq Dossier’, comprised of the September and February dossiers, was received in the form of Number 10 publicity machine scripts (Aldrich 2005). However, it was found that there was no evidence to support the claim that the dossier was in fact ‘dodgy’ due to politicisation (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 84). Moreover the claims made in the dossier regarding Iraq’s WMD capabilities “were in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then
available, although as we have already stated we have concerns about the emphasis given to some of them” (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 86). Moreover, the FAC inquiry found that too much importance
was being placed by the Government on the ’45 minute’ issue. This was neither warrented nor justified (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 70).
However, it has been claimed subsequently that this report in itself was remarkably politicised (Aldrich 2005). Furthermore, the FAC inquiry found that the flawed intelligence in the Iraq Dossier was as a result of political meddling, rather than a distortion of the intelligence itself (Aldrich 2005).
One of the biggest errors discovered in the FAC inquiry was that aspects of the ‘Iraq Dossier’ intelligence reports were plagiarised by the Governments Coalition Information Centre (CIC). They took information from a PhD thesis by Dr al-Marashi, who studied WMD and chemical/biological weapons
25 in Iraq, and this facilitated the dossier becoming characterised subsequently and continually as the ‘dodgy dossier’ (Humphreys 2005). The FAC inquiry questioned the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw regarding this. He confirmed that the CIC did use some of the information from three papers al-Marashi wrote on Iraq’s capabilities (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 122, 124 & conclusion 18). The FAC sought clarification from the Government that they still believed the intelligence from the September and February dossiers, the two documents making up the case for the invasion of Iraq, were accurate and despite information coming to light that intelligence was false, as well as being plagiarised (FAC inquiry 2004: conclusions). Here the FAC contradict themselves. On one hand they claim the reports were not from political pressure (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 84 & conclusion 33) vis-à-vis politicisation, and then on the other hand state that they know intelligence was falsified and plagiarised (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 122, 124 & conclusion 18). These are two very contrasting and contradicory views. This is something the Government was be pressed upon again in subsequent inquiries.
4.1.1 Recommendations of the FAC Inquiry
One of the major recommendation made by the FAC inquiry was that there should be safeguards put in place to stop the manipulation of intelligence from occuring in the future (FAC inquiry 2004, page 3). As a result this was debated in Parliament. Mr. Ancram MP argued, “To prevent
manipulation of intelligence material in the future, is there not a way of registering at publication whether a report is based on genuine intelligence material and has been cleared by the JIC?...It would at least allow us to avoid the difficulty arising again” (Hansard 2003: column 577). With that said,
however, the JIC did enact changes so that manipulation of intelligence did not occur again. In the ISC annual report they said that "we have been assured that systems have now been put in place to ensure
that this cannot happen again, in that JIC Chairman endorses any material on behalf of the intelligence community prior to publication" (Cm 5837, paragraph 82). Moreover, in the Government response to
the FAC inquiry (Cm 6062), it was announced that any intelligence reports presented to Parliament will be signed off by members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Cm 6062, page 6), as well as the Foreign Secretary, who is accountable to the FAC (Cm 6062, page 6) Clearly, there is now an attempt to prevent intelligence being mis-used, manipulated or plagiarised as a result of the FAC inquiry.
The FAC inquiry report provided further conclusions and recommendations. A shortcoming the committee found was that there was an outright refusal by members of the Government and senior members of agencies to cooperate in the committee investigation. For example, they requested to interview or question the Prime Minister, Alastair Campbell (the then Director of Downing Street
26 Communications and Strategy), the heads of many agencies, such as the Cabinet Office intelligence Co-ordinator, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (who produced the intelligence reports that were used a basis for entering the war), the head of MI6 and GCHQ. However, none of these responded or attend the hearings. Moreover, the committee was not even allowed Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments and relevant FCO papers (FAC inquiry 2004: paragraph 6). This contradicts the remit of the inquiry, which was aimed at establishing “whether the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, within the Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction”. Therefore, it appears highly inconsistent that the Government did not
attend the inquiry, supply the relevant intelligence and FCO papers to the committee when it was exactly this they were investigating. Additionally, in relation to the FAC stating that information was withheld, one of the conclusions made by the inquiry was that “without access to the intelligence or to
those who handled it, we cannot know if it was in any respect faulty or misinterpreted (FAC enquiry
Paragraph 90). The Government’s response (referenced as Cm 6062) was conflicting. They argued that the Government showed ‘unprecedented openness’ to the FAC (Cm 6062, page 4). Tensions were already growing, and this was only the first of the Iraq inquiries.
A further recommendation made by the FAC was that the Intelligence and Security Committee should be reconstituted as a Select Committee of the House of Commons (FAC inquiry, paragraph 167). Nevertheless, the Government refused this recommendation, stating that the Government felt no reason to change the current arrangements. Moreover, they felt the ISC should in no way have its access to sensitive material removed (Cm 6062, page 7). This is an interesting recommendation to be made by the FAC. It can be seen as a source of frustration at not being granted access to sensitive intelligence reports that the ISC were able to collect. The ISC has full access to intelligence reports, whereas House of Commons Select Committees do not have this privilege. Moreover, the ISC reports directly to the Prime Minister. This means that any information retrieved from the ISC goes through the Prime Minster and it is of their choice what sections can be presented before Parliament.
The lack of information provided to the FAC inquiry, combined with the refusal to attend or even respond to requests to give evidence by senior figures, including the Prime Minister and the heads of two intelligence agencies, meant that a further inquiry was conducted by the Intelligence and Select Committee, which is the focus of the Chapter 4.2. However, these inquiries would run concurrently at points. The scope was to investigate the ‘Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments’. However, this was another source of contention for the FAC. The Prime Minister stated he would cooperate fully with the ISC. Nonetheless, the FAC commented, “this is hardly surprising,
27
Affairs Committee, on the other hand, was appointed by and reports to the House of Commons, and we meet almost entirely in public. We believe that our inquiry is the more credible of the two, and that it would have been in the Government’s best interests to have given full co-operation” (FAC enquiry,
paragraph 7). This ellucidates certain issues that can surround oversight. For example, there will be intelligence that cannot be divulged to the public in the interest of national security. Despite the electorate demanding accountability, there has to be a balance between what intelligence can or cannot be released. Moreover, this is also true of government departments. Not all members of Parliament, or all government departments should have access to highly senstive material. Some things will have to remain a secret. However, this highlights the complaints aimed at the FAC conducting the inquiry. The ISC are better placed to conduct such an inquiry.
4.2 The Intelligence and Select Committee Inquiry, September 2003
The Intelligence and Select Committee (ISC) presented a report which examined ‘Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments’. It was chaired by the Right Honourable Anne Taylor MP. “The purpose of this report is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the
decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications” (ISC Paragraph 11). However, it was not seeking to investigate if the
decision to invade Iraq was correct.
The main finding was that the Iraq dossier, which was endorsed by the JIC, was also found not to have been ‘sexed up’ by Alistair Campbell, or any other Number 10 member, as it had been claimed in many media reports (ISC paragraph 108). Moreover, in a similar fashion as the FAC Inquiry, it found that journalists were incorrect regarding how the Government interpreted the intelligence that was supplied by the JIC in the September and February dossiers (Aldrich 2005). Still, there have been criticisms that the committee did not have the appetite to tackle the extent to which the dossiers were politicised and were constrained by such a narrow focus (Gill 2009).
Furthermore, it has been said that despite the criticisms aimed at the ISC, there is very little in terms of challenging the Government’s agenda for improving the performance of the JIC in regards to the use and publication of intelligence (Gill 2007). For example, Andrew Gilligan, a reporter for the BBC, interviewed the unnamed source that claim the Iraq Dossier was to be sexed up (Day 2003). Gilligan he had been told by a senior official that the Government probably knew the intelligence was wrong (Andrew Gilligan 2003 via BBC website). The intelligence claim of 45 minutes has been a constant thorn in the Governments side. Tony Blair stated that, “it is obvious from what the "Today"
28
the intelligence community who spoke to the media” (Hansard 2003, Column 147). This continued the
rift that had already developed between Downing Street and the BBC, for whom Gilligan worked for (Boig 2005, Montgomery 2006). This is again explored further in the Hutton report section.
4.2.1 Recommendations of the ISC Inquiry
The ISC noted that there was still a delicate balance between what intelligence should be put into the public domain and to what extent there should be protection of intelligence and the intelligence agencies (ISC 04, paragraph 88). The ISC were far from satisfied with the response from the Government in regards to the committee report on the WMD issues. One finding was noted in the ISC annual report of 03/04. They stated, “the Committee is not satisfied with the Government’s Response
to its Report Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments. It emphasised only four key conclusions while either rejecting or failing to address fully many of our other conclusions and recommendations, which we regard as extremely unsatisfactory” (Cm 6240, paragraph 87). Indeed,
evaluating the response from the Government it can be seen that there is a case that the response was totally unsatisfactory. Indeed, the only recommendation adopted as a result from this inquiry is that the Government have put procedures in place so that intelligence-derived material will be checked by the JIC chairman. Something which was also a result from the previous FAC inquiry. This came on the back of the ISC stating that “…it was a mistake not to consult the Agencies before their material was
put in the public domain… and there is the assurance that we have been given that in future the JIC Chairman will check all intelligence-derived material on behalf of the intelligence community prior to publication” (ISC paragraph 134).
The remaining responses from the Government simply stated that they ‘agree’, ‘note’, ‘accepts’ or ‘acknowledges’ findings from the ISC report. Not what one would call a proper response to the recommendations and conclusions raised. Furthermore, some may say this is a rather dismissive response to such important issues that were raised by the committee. Indeed, the passive nature of the Government response can be seen in paragraph 134 of the annual report (as highlighted above). In response to this report, it was said, “the Government regrets that the Committee found its Response
unsatisfactory. It did not intentionally ignore or fail to address fully any of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations. It did, however, following past practice, conflate some points in the Response. As the Government noted in its Response, it is grateful for the considerable work that the Committee put into compiling a detailed and comprehensive Report” (Cm 6241, page 5).
Nevertheless, the committee did not let this issue rest. They recommended that the Government “in its future Responses to this Committee’s Reports, the Government should explicitly
29
address each of our conclusions and recommendation” (Cm 6240, paragraph Q). Still, the government
appears to be somewhat contemptuous or disregarding. They note that, “the Government accepts the
Committee’s recommendation. Future Responses will adopt the format used in this Response” (Cm
6241, page 5). This is not a response that increases confidence that the Government actually had taken on board the recommendation and was willing to fully adopt it. Indeed, this can be seen by a debate in the House of Commons. David Davis MP stated, “after one ISC report and a Government response,
and another ISC report and another Government response, we still do not have the answers to the fundamental questions raised by the ISC. If I ask the Government some of those questions again today, perhaps we will be lucky” (Hansard 2004, Column 1051), and “the simple truth is that only four of the conclusions and recommendations were dealt with explicitly because that suited the Government's agenda at the time” (Hansard 2004, Column 1052).
There was discontent amongst Ministers in regards to the Governments responses. Firstly, it took the Government nearly six months to make a response to the report, and this was lost in the incredulity that surrounded the forthcoming Hutton report (Jones 2011). Secondly, the issue of the Prime Minister being able to somehow shape the way reports were written were a cause for concern for Members of Parliament. Ian Duncan Smith MP stated in the debate surrounding this ISC report that he wanted to “remind the whole House that the Prime Minister will let that Committee see only the
intelligence reports that he wants it to see. It reports directly to him and he can withhold any part of, or all of, its reports” (Hansard 2003, column 149). These are issues that have been made apparent
about the ISC and the efficacy of the way it is run. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice produced a green paper in 2011 that directed criticism towards the ISC. The criticisms included, that the ISC was a separate and different from other committees; it answered to the Prime Minister; it was insufficiently independent; it did not have sufficient knowledge of the operational work of the Agencies; and the process by which the ISC was appointed, operated and reported was insufficiently transparent (Dawson 2018: 8). All criticisms can been seen as a reasonable source of contention.
The ISC took note of one of the controversies of the Iraq war that was thrust into the public domain - the infamous ’45 minute’claim when the BBC presenter Andrew Gilligan reported that Downing Street wanted the September and February dossiers to be ‘sexed up’ (Herring & Robinson 2014). Gilligan claimed conistently an inside source told him this information. It became apparent this ‘inside source’ was Dr. David Kelly (BBC 2004). This leak of his name resulted tragically in his death on July 18th (The Guardian 2003).The severity and tragedy surrounding his death led to the Government
