The Indonesian struggle for Independence
1945 – 1949
Excessive violence examined
University of Amsterdam
Bastiaan van den Akker
Student number: 11305061
MA Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Date: 28-01-2021
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ugur Ümit Üngör
Second Reader: Dr. Hinke Piersma
1
Abstract
The pursuit of a free Indonesian state was already present during Dutch rule. The Japanese occupation and subsequent years ensured that this pursuit could become a reality. This thesis examines the last 4 years of the Indonesian struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949. Excessive violence prevailed during these years, both the Indonesians and the Dutch refused to relinquish hegemony on the archipelago resulting in around 160,000 casualties. The Dutch tried to forget the war of Indonesian Independence in the following years. However, whistleblowers went public in the 1960’s, resulting in further examination into the excessive violence. Eventually, the Netherlands seems to have come to terms with its own past since the first formal apologies by a Dutch representative have been made in 2005. King Willem-Alexander made a formal apology on behalf of the Crown in 2020. However, high-school education is still lacking in educating students on these sensitive topics. This thesis also discusses the postwar years and the public debate on excessive violence committed by both sides. The goal of this thesis is to inform the public of the excessive violence committed by Dutch and Indonesian soldiers during the Indonesian struggle for Independence.
2
Index
Introduction ... 3
Defining the problem ... 3
Indonesia Merdeka ... 3
Thesis setup ... 6
Methodology and sources ... 7
Bersiap ... 9
Growing nationalist sentiment ... 9
The proclamation ... 11
English-Dutch relations and intervention... 13
“Be ready” ... 15
Java ... 17
Sumatra ... 21
Allied war crimes ... 22
Casualties ... 23
Linggadjati ... 24
Police-Actions ... 26
Breaking with the Linggadjati-accords ... 26
The way to Indonesia ... 27
Police Actions: an overview ... 28
Excessive violence ... 30
Westerling ... 35
Why? ... 39
Aftermath ... 43
Criticism and reconciliation ... 43
Early criticism ... 43
The Hueting Affair and the Excess Nota ... 44
1970 – present ... 47
Responses by veterans ... 49
Seeking recognition ... 51
The Police Actions in Dutch high-school education ... 53
To conclude ... 56
3
Introduction
Colonial uprisings are centuries old. Be it the American Revolution or the Vietnam war, every uprising started with an oppressed population. The Indonesian struggle for Independence does not differ in this. When people think of Indonesia, most will think of the white sandy beaches of Bali, or the busy streets of Jakarta. Most people, however, will not think of the years of violence between 1942 and 1949 when the Japanese occupation and the ensuing fight for independence ripped the archipelago apart.
Defining the problem
The aforementioned observation encompasses what this thesis is about. What do the Dutch really know about Indonesia? During the last few decades, the general public has been made more aware of the atrocities that were committed by Dutch and Indonesian soldiers. Television-programs like Andere Tijden and Onze Jongens op Java gave the viewer a sense of what happened.1 However, as time progresses, a sense of amnesia seems to have set in, and the last Dutch colonial war is being forgotten. Recent studies also show that in Dutch high schools the Dutch East Indies are rarely discussed during history classes, let alone the Indonesian War of Independence.2 The main task of this thesis is to investigate What happened in Indonesia in the aftermath of World War Two and how these
violent years are being discussed in the Dutch postcolonial discourse.
Indonesia Merdeka
When Japan surrendered in World War Two, Indonesian nationalist leader Soekarno was quick to proclaim Indonesian independence on August 17th 1945.3 Because of the intense Japanese militarization of Indonesia, Soekarno could now count on some 2,000,000 men and women fighting in the Barisan Pelopper, the Indonesian independence army.4 The Japanese were tasked with the security of the archipelago, but were unable to keep the peace. When in September 1945 British troops arrived to ensure peace, the situation escalated. Because the Japanese left and the British did not have enough manpower, most nationalists went on a rampage and it became increasingly dangerous for Europeans to walk the streets. The Dutch, who still had formal control of Indonesia, were unable to send any troops in the aftermath of World War Two. This period between the arrival of British and Dutch troops
1 VPRO ‘Koloniale oorlog’ on Andere Tijden https://www.anderetijden.nl/dossier/9/Koloniale-oorlog; BNNVARA ‘Onze Jongens op Java’ on Onze Jongens op Java https://www.npostart.nl/onze-jongens-op-java/BV_101395134.
2 Ilse Raaijmakers, ‘De Indonesische dekolonisatie’ in Nationaal comité 4 en 5 mei – onderzoek uitgelicht Vol.6.1 (July 11, 2017) 26 – 27.
3George Kahin, ‘Sukarno’s proclamation of Indonesian Independence’, in: Indonesia vol.69 (2000) 1 – 3.
4 Herman Bussemaker, Bersiap! Opstand in het paradijs; De Bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945-1946 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers 2005) 45 – 46.
4 is also known as the Bersiap-period (Be ready).5 Eventually, Dutch Major-General Schilling concluded that it would be impossible for the Dutch to completely restore order and Dutch rule on the archipelago. This reality forced the Dutch government to reflect on what it actually wanted with the Indies, and to what extent the British still wanted to go along with that.6 On November 15th 1946 Dutch representatives Max van Poll, Wim Schemerhorn and Feike de Boer met with Indonesian representative Soetan Sjahrir in the Indonesian village of Linggadjati to discuss Indonesian autonomy.7 It was agreed at the Linggadjati-accords that the Netherlands would recognize the authority of the Indonesian Republic on Java and Sumatra. The Republic would cooperate in a federation of three federal states, which would consist of the Republic, Borneo and Eastern-Indonesia. The sovereignty would lie with the federation. The Netherlands and Indonesia would form a union for their common interests, headed by the Queen of the Netherlands.8
The agreement caused a storm of protest in both the Netherlands and the Republic.9 In the meantime, Republican troops increasingly violated the treaty and little was done for the return of Dutch companies and the protection of Dutch companies. Also, the Netherlands was no longer a colonial power, but reduced to a minor power.10 That is why the Dutch government decided to put things in order through military intervention, this military intervention would be known as the Police-Actions. In two short Police-Actions (Operation Product: July–August 1947 and Operation Crow: December 1948–January 1949) Dutch troops managed to attain nominal control, only to find themselves caught in a guerrilla war and counterinsurgency that proved impossible to win. During these Police-Actions excessive violence on both sides became apparent.11 Obviously, ‘excessive violence’ is not a neutral term but a phrase used to avoid the politically and morally charged term of ‘war crimes’. In this thesis, excessive violence refers to war crimes in the way as they are described in Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International criminal court such as wilful killing, torturing, kidnapping or in any way scar another person for life.12
After the war there was a culture of silence considering the Police-Actions in the Netherlands. This changed when conscript Joop Hueting opened up, first in the newspaper De Volkskrant and a few
5 Marcel van Riessen,‘De Indonesische kwestie’ in: Marcel van Riessen Frits Rovers en Arie Wilschut (red.), Oriëntatie op
Geschiedenis (Assen: van Gorcum 2011) 440.
6 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 27 – 31.
7 Wim van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië – De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Amsterdam: Prometheus 2000) 166 – 169.
8 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 317 – 322.
9 van Riessen, ‘De Indonesische kwestie’, 461.
10 Gert Oostindie, Hoogenboom, Ireen and Verwey, Jonathan, ‘The decolonization war in Indonesia, 1945–1949: War crimes in Dutch veterans’ egodocuments’, in: War in History Vol.25.2 (2018) 256.
11 Oostindie, Hoogenboom, and Verwey, ‘The decolonization war in Indonesia’, 256.
5 days later in the television program Achter het Nieuws.13 Thereafter, a storm of protest broke out in the Netherlands, by veterans who claimed they had done nothing wrong. Hueting and the broadcaster
Vara received many letters after the interview. Some agreed with Hueting, such as volunteer H.
Jenezon who stated: “The number of prisoners killed after endless torture is countless... We were not much better than the SS.”14 On the other end of the spectrum were many more angry letters addressed to the Vara and Hueting. Conscript W.A. de Grijs, for example, called Hueting a traitor and noted that Hueting had desecrated the good name of the Dutch internationally.15 Even during the filming of Onze
Jongens op Java in 2018, not even half of the interviewed veterans admitted that any excessive
violence had occurred. Dick van der Sluis, for example, commented: “No Dutch committed any war-crimes in Rawagedeh. I do not believe any Dutchmen were guilty of the war-crimes committed.”16 This thesis shall research if more men agree with Dick van der Sluis or if he has little support for his statements.
Shortly after the interviews by Hueting, the ministry of Justice of the Netherlands set out to research the excessive violence. The so called “Excessennota”, which was conducted in only three months and led by historian Cees Fasseur. However, only 110 cases of violence were examined, of which only 70 were excessive.17 However, Fasseur himself found, in contrast to Prime-Minister Piet de Jong, that the “Excessennota” was far from complete. More research should have been done according to him.18 A new plan to research the excessive violence in Indonesia was approved by the Dutch House of Representatives on August 14, 2012.19 Thus, after Swiss historian Remý Limpach published his book
De Brandende Kampongs van Generaal Spoor in 2016, the House of Representatives replied that more
research should be conducted. In their letter to the House of Representatives, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, concluded that the research conducted by Limpach was superior to the Excessennota and hailed its extensive research. The reason behind this was, according to the ministers, that the political landscape in the Netherlands had changed and that the discourse about decolonization had opened up.20
13 NOS ‘Fragment uit het interview met Joop Hueting in 1969’ NOS, November 13, 2018,
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/video/2259173-fragment-uit-het-interview-met-joop-hueting-in-1969.html (consulted on 20-04-2020).
14 Remy Limpach, De Brandende Kampongs van Generaal Spoor (Amsterdam: Boom Uitgevers 2016) 5. 15 Limpach, De Brandende Kampongs, 8.
16Onze Jongens op Java. ‘Aflevering 3’ Directed by Coen Verbraak for BNNVARA: Statement made by Bert Hofman on 18:15 (aired on 05-12-2019).
17De excessennota, introduced by Jan Bank (reissued, Den Haag: SDU 1995) 32.
18 Harm Ede Botje, ‘Cees Fasseur pleitte al in 1969 anoniem voor nader onderzoek naar excessen in Indië’ in: Vrij Nederland, March 14, 2016 https://www.vn.nl/onder-pseudoniem-pleitte-cees-fasseur-al-in-1969-voor-onderzoek-naar-excessen-in-indie/ (consulted on 21-04-2020).
19 ‘BRIEF VAN DE MINISTERS VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN EN DEFENSIE’ Parliamentary Paper 26 049, no. 74 (August 12, 2012) 1.
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Thesis setup
This thesis shall discuss the aftermath of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia after World War Two. The years after World War Two were very violent on the archipelago. Why was the post-war period in Indonesia so violent? How are these violent years discussed in the Dutch postcolonial discourse? Also, why in the aftermath of World War Two, did the Dutch government decide to restore their rule in Indonesia with a force of more than 200,000 men? During these years many soldiers on both sides committed excessive violence. How come these men were capable of doing such horrible things? After the Dutch were forced to leave Indonesia there were years of silence considering the excessive violence committed by the Dutch until Hueting opened-up. Most people, however, were not, and are still not, willing to admit any wrongdoing. Why is that? And what does that do to the public discourse in the Netherlands today? The main question of this thesis is What happened in Indonesia in
the aftermath of World War Two and how are these violent years discussed in the Dutch postcolonial discourse? To answer such questions, this thesis shall be divided into three chapters, each answering
one sub-question.
Chapter one of this thesis shall discuss the Bersiap-period. The main question for this chapter is: What was the Bersiap-period, what happened and why? Why was the Bersiap period so violent and what happened during the Bersiap? Many survivors of the violence are not alive anymore. Luckily, many have been interviewed about the events that have unfolded. U.S. historian William H. Frederick, for example, has recorded a fair number of testimonies. These testimonies along with many other primary sources such as the Dutch Opsporings Dienst Overlevenden (ODO), which also recorded many testimonies by survivors and secondary works, shall be the prime resource to discuss the Bersiap-period in detail. Frederick finds that not enough research had been done towards Bersiap-periods of colonial violence where the colonized committed various war-crimes. He notes: “To a greater degree than most, Indonesia’s revolution has been romanticized, but in a peculiar fashion: it has been portrayed as being considerably less violent than was actually the case.”21
Chapter two shall discuss the Police-Actions (1947 – 1949) and the excessive violence conducted by both Indonesians and Dutch during these years. The main question of this chapter is:
What were the Police-Actions, what happened, and why? Why did the Netherlands, in the aftermath
of World War Two, send a force of 220,000 men to reclaim Indonesia? It is, however, not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the entirety of the Police-Actions, but rather the excessive violence committed by Dutch soldiers during the Police-Actions. It shall research what kind of excesses, and how many were committed by Dutch soldiers Also, why were they committed? To research this, this chapter shall use many interviews that were conducted with the men who served in Indonesia. The
21 William H. Frederick, ‘The killing of Dutch and Eurasians’ in: Journal of Genocide Research Vol 14.3-4 (September – November 2012) 359 – 360.
7 Dutch television-documentary Onze Jongens op Java, for example, let eight Indonesia veterans speak about their years in Indonesia. But also, the research conducted on behalf of the Dutch government, as well as many papers and books by national and international historians and researchers. Captain Raymond Westerling published his memoires in 1952 about his time in Indonesia. His memoires shall be of great importance for this chapter as well as it shall give a glimpse in his thinking, what moved him to kill so many people? How does he justify this in his book?
Chapter three shall discuss the aftermath of the Police-Actions in the Netherlands. The main question of this chapter is: ow were the Bersiap-period and Police-Actions treated in the post-war years
in the Netherlands? Shortly after the war, rumour had spread about the excessive violence conducted
by the Dutch soldiers. Statements made by conscript Joop Hueting and other soldiers did not make this any better. Therefore, in 1969 in an attempt to bring forward the committed excesses, the “Excessennota” was formulated in which multiple war-crimes were established.22 However some researchers such as German historian Chris Lorenz find it was conducted too hastily and not well-formulated. According to Lorenz the Excessennota should be re-done as it did not conduct any interviews. Likewise, according to Lorenz, the Excessennota did not do justice to the Indonesian victims. For the Dutch government it was a way to close the chapter on the Police-Actions for once and for all without harming the Dutch government and military.23 The Police-Actions are still a topic of debate in the Netherlands and some veterans still refuse to admit that Dutch soldiers did do anything wrong such as volunteer Dick van der Sluis stated.24 Also, how are the events of the Police-Actions discussed in Dutch high school education? Finally, in the conclusion, the events shall be briefly summarized and an answer shall be given to the main question of this thesis.
Methodology and sources
This thesis shall consult various primary and secondary sources regarding the Indonesian Independence. Primary sources such as the O.D.O. archives (Opsporingsdienst Overledenen) are a proper way to find survivor testimonies of the Bersiap-period. They give a good insight in what happened during this time, and were conducted right after the Bersiap-period. Parliamentary papers are also great sources for primary research as they let the viewer know how politicians thought about a possible war with the Republic, and also how they responded to the excessive violence committed by their own soldiers. Books and papers by various historians shall be used as secondary material. Well-known historians like Remy Limpach and Gert Oostindie have written various books and papers on the
22De excessennota.
23 Chris Lorenz, ‘De Nederlandse koloniale herinnering en de universele mensenrechten De casus ‘Rawagedeh’ in: Tijdschrift
voor Geschiedenis Vol. 128.1 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2015) 115.
24Onze Jongens op Java. ‘Aflevering 3’ Directed by Coen Verbraak for BNNVARA: Statement made by Dick van der Sluis on
8 topic of the Indonesian independence. Their works, combined with the various primary sources, will make sure that this thesis shall find an answer to the question What happened in Indonesia in the
aftermath of World War Two and how these violent years are being discussed in the Dutch postcolonial discourse.
9
Bersiap
“I saw to my left and right piles of human body parts that the murderous crowd had severed from the bodies of their innocent victims, and lying scattered among them were many wounded people. Here in this room, I witnessed a drama that was more than just horrible, it has no equal in history.”25
- Survivor of the Simpang Club massacre (October 15, 1945, Surabaya, Eastern-Java).
What was the Bersiap-period, what happened and why? This chapter shall discuss the Bersiap-period
in Indonesia. The chapter shall be chronologically discussed, starting with the growing nationalist sentiment, followed by the proclamation of independence, interventions by British forces, the Bersiap-period itself and lastly the Linggadjati agreement. The aim of this chapter shall be to dissect the Bersiap-period, to understand why this period was so violent and how the British and Dutch responded to this violence.
Growing nationalist sentiment
According to Dutch historian Herman Bussemaker it is often assumed that the Indonesian Revolution started with the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Sukarno. In his book Bersiap!, Bussemaker addresses that it actually had roots dating back to the early twentieth century, when the country was still under Dutch colonial rule.26 Dutch education in the Dutch East Indies at that time, meant that more and more Indonesians could follow education. The first Indonesian emancipation movement emerged from their circles in 1908: the Boedi Oetomo, or "The clean pursuit". Koesno Sosrodihardjo, later known as Sukarno, founded in 1927 the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI)
which strived for independence from the Netherlands. Sukarno and the PNI mobilized tens of thousands of Indonesians. Another important factor for the growing nationalism was the youth congress in Batavia in 1928. The youth swore an oath that implied that Indonesia would be one nation - from Sabang to Merauke - with one language, one flag and one national anthem. Sukarno was therefore banned to Flores and later the Benkoelen Islands. When in early March 1942 Japanese troops conquered the Dutch East Indies, they were received with open arms and Sukarno was brought back from his banishment. Among the Indonesians there had long been no support for the Dutch colonial administration.27
In his extensive work on the Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War II, Dutch historian and founder of the RIOD (Dutch national institute for war documentation), Lou de Jong notes that the Japanese government was reluctant to give Indonesians independence. But in order to give the
25
Frederick, ‘The killing of Dutch and Eurasians’, 364. 26 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 27 – 31.
10 nationalists input regarding the administration, the Poesat Tenaga Rakjat, Centre of the People's Power, abbreviated Poetera, was founded. This centre would assist the Japanese in mobilizing the people and was led by Sukarno, Mohammed Hatta, Kihadjar Dewantara and Mas Mansoer; all four seasoned nationalists. Sukarno immediately revealed that he wanted a free and independent Indonesian state.28 The Japanese government had hoped to use the Poetera to defend Java, but was not successful due to opposition from the Indonesians who still demanded independence. In early 1945, Sukarno began to turn more and more against Japan, which led to an uprising. Japan began to see that it could no longer ignore Indonesia's desire for an independent state. On March 1, 1945, the Japanese commander, Moichiro Yamamoto, instructed the Central Advisory Council, of which Sukarno was chairman, in Java to investigate Indonesian independence under Japanese supervision. It was there that Sukarno formulated his famous speech in which he formulated the foundations of the Indonesian state: the Pancasila.29 On July 17, 1945, the Japanese cabinet approved the proposal to grant independence to the Dutch East Indies. This independence would then take effect on September 7, 1945. On August 7, 1945, the commander of the 7th Area Army, Lt. Gen. Itagaki, publicly announced in Singapore that a committee to prepare for Indonesia's independence would be established. This became the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdakaan Indonesia (PPKI). The most important figures of this committee were Sukarno, Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir. This proclamation was broadcast throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The commission would be officially installed on August 18.30 The plan seemed to continue until the second nuclear bomb fell on August 14 and the Japanese government capitulated a day later.31
It was of importance for the events after the Japanese surrender that Japan had trained an Indonesian army in order to defend Java and Sumatra from any Allied assaults. Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese authorities believed that the mobilization and militarization of Indonesian society could greatly contribute to the defence of the archipelago and thus to the Japanese victory. Especially Java, with its 60,000,000 citizens, was for the Japanese a great source of manpower. The Hei-Ho troops who were recruited from former KNIL (Royal Dutch Indies Army), were auxiliary soldiers, wore Japanese army uniforms and were trained by the Japanese in warfare. The Sukarela Tentera Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) was a voluntary army and was likewise trained in combat and had received weapons training by the Japanese. Also, the Hizbullah (army of Allah) consisted of some 50,000 soldiers. Furthermore, there was also a militarized youth organization, the Seinendan, with strong similarities to the German
Hitler Jugend. In total, the Japanese trained some 37,000 PETA, 25,000 Hei-Ho and over 670,000
28 Lou de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog , part 11B-II (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 1986) 895. 29 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 11B-II, 922.
30 John Smail, Bandung in the early revolution, 1945 – 1946 (New York: Cornell University Press 1964) 19. 31 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 42.
11
Seindendan. 32 At the end of the war, the nationalists had a militarily anti-Western oriented army that was not eager to wait until the Dutch returned.
August 15 was not only the day on which Japan finally capitulated, but also the day in which the Allies in Potsdam decided that the Dutch East Indies would subsequently fall under the South East Asia Command (SEAC), which was led by the British Lord Mountbatten.33 The British, who had been tasked with the security of Dutch Indonesia after the Japanese surrender, had mainly fought a European war and had little troops to spare in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The troops they did have in the area were mostly spread out over their own colonies and subjects. In light of all this, Japanese troops were now responsible for the safety and welfare of everybody on the islands, until British troops would relieve them. However, the first British landings in Batavia and Surabaya would come six weeks later.34
The proclamation
News of the Japanese surrender came too early for Sukarno and Hatta, according to Dutch historian Wim van den Doel.35 The outlined path towards independence suddenly seemed impassable. The day before, Sjahrir had unsuccessfully urged Hatta to declare Indonesian independence as the Allies would not participate in a Japanese production of Indonesian independence. Both Sukarno and Hatta, however, had decided to stick to the idea that the PPKI was the body to achieve independence. However, a day later, the facts had overtaken the two leaders. Now that Japan had capitulated, there could no longer be an orderly transfer of power.36 In the early morning of August 16, both Sukarno and Hatta were lifted from their beds by an angry mob of pemuda’s (youth) which held them captive throughout the day. Meanwhile, Japanese Admiral Maeda stated that Japanese troops would not act against any proclamation of Indonesian independence, as he noticed that the ambiance in the streets was grim and many of troops could possibly die by the hands of angry Indonesians. With this in mind, Sukarno and Hatta eventually wrote their proclamation of independence in the night of August 17. In the morning Sukarno stood on his balcony and stated: “We, the people of Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Cases concerning the transfer of power will take place in an orderly manner and as soon as possible.” The red and white Indonesian flag was hoisted and the ‘Indonesia Raya’ was sung.37 News of the proclamation of independence filtered out of Jakarta only slowly, according to
32 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 28 – 30.
33 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 11C, 476. 34 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 74.
35 Idem, 76. 36 Idem.
37
Benedict Anderson, Java in time of revolution. Occupation and resistance 1944 – 1946 (New York: Cornell University Press) 80 – 84.
12 Colin Brown, Australian professor of Asian Studies at Flinders University. Except for some of the better-informed urban groups, for some time at least it was treated with caution as people sought to weigh up just what it might mean. But once news did sink in, it provoked a variety of reactions. In Bukittinggi, Sumatra, the centre of the Japanese administration, locals took the initiative to wave the Red and White flag and scrawled nationalist slogans on public buildings and distributed pamphlets explaining the meaning of the proclamation of independence.38
The Indonesians stood, according to Bussemaker, on the moral high-ground towards the Allies because they could rely on the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, which was the basis for justifying the war against Germany, Italy and Japan. Article three of the Charter clearly states: “Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”39 In the Indonesian press, the news about the Charter had already led to critical questions towards the Dutch East Indies government, even before the Japanese attack. However, the Dutch stated that this right of self-determination did not apply to internal situations such as in the Dutch East Indies, but to nations occupied by totalitarian powers. This denial of self-government by the Dutch caused many Indonesians to join any form of rebellion against their colonizers.40
A major problem that emerged on August 17, 1945, was the dissolution of the PETA, Hei-Ho, and all other paramilitary groups. The members had to hand in their weapons and were send home. The purpose of this was to make it difficult for the Republic to form an army. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of men walked around with military training, but without leadership. The idea of revolution among these groups grew every day. Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir agreed that it would be better if the Republic had its own power system but did not want to oppose the Allies at the same time. Therefore, on August 22, the Badan Keamanan Rakjat (public security organization), or BKR, was established. This was organized at a local level and virtually all former PETA, Hei-Ho and other militarily trained youths joined as well as many former KNIL-soldiers. The BKR was on paper just a security apparatus to keep the order in the Republic. In reality it was a well-trained Republican army consisting of hundreds of thousands of men.41
The idea of a revolution grew by the day in Indonesia now that the Dutch were gone. The British would not land for another few weeks and many Japanese officials had declared not to act against any form of rebellion. After the Japanese capitulation, Sukarno and Hatta had initially thought
38 Colin Brown, A short history of Indonesia. The unlikely nation? (Crow’s Nest: Allen and Unwin 2003) 161. 39
‘The Atlantic Charter' Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom’ in: NATO (14 August 1941) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16912.htm (consulted: 12-05-2020).
40 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 327.
13 mainly about how best to sell the Republic to the Allies, but it was now clear that the Republic should strengthen its authority in society as soon as possible. To this end, Sukarno and Hatta entered into an agreement on August 30 with the aristocratic administrative elite of Java and Madura, who had been one of the most important organs with which the Dutch had maintained their colonial authority before the war. As a sign of their confidence, they ensured that three prominent members were appointed governors of the provinces of West, Central and East Java. Furthermore, on September 5, all Indonesian vice-residents were appointed resident to replace their former Japanese superiors.42 Finally, the Soesuhoehan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta also declared their loyalty to the Republic. All the rulers of Central Java had thus joined the revolution.43
English-Dutch relations and intervention
The enlargement of his command area did not come as a complete surprise to Mountbatten, but it did increase his problems. It meant an increase of his command area by 50% and a doubling of the population to 128,000,000, of whom 65,000,000 lived in Java.44 Batavia, Indonesia's main city, was not included in Mountbatten's list of the most important points to occupy in Asia. Singapore, Hong Kong, Saigon and Bangkok were all preferred over the Indonesian archipelago.45 While Bangkok received the help of 26,684 British soldiers and over 2350 vehicles, including tanks, and Saigon 25,748 men and 2400 vehicles in early September 1945, Indonesia received far less. British commander in Saigon, D.D. Gracey, worked actively together with the French, which resulted in relative peace throughout 1945 and 1946. British commander in Batavia Christison, on the other hand, acted, according to Bussemaker, rather clumsy. Of the British 23rd Infantry Division, only two brigades were planned for the occupation of Batavia at the end of September, and only one brigade for Surabaya at the end of October.46 Upon entering Batavia General Christison declared that he would request Republican leaders to assist him in the performance of his duties. Dutch protests at the British government came to nothing. The British government wanted to avoid any form of violence in the Dutch East Indies. At the time of liberation, approximately 150,000 Dutch were in the Japanese camps in Indonesia.47 However, because the British did not want to be involved in the battle between the Republicans and the Dutch, they also did not allow the Dutch troops, who had been on their way to the Dutch East Indies since October 1945, to immediately travel to Java. They had to go ashore in Malacca, where they stayed until March 1946.48
42 Anderson, Java in time of revolution., 88 – 91. 43 Idem, 115.
44 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 73. 45 Idem, 74.
46 Idem, 75.
47 Cornelis Smit, Dekolonisatie van Indonesië (Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1976) 12. 48 Smit, Dekolonisatie van Indonesië, 13.
14 Dutch authorities were halted in bringing soldiers to Indonesia, apart from the KNIL, and would not be able to land in the archipelago to restore their order; they had to abide to British rules. British goals were limited: restoring peace and order in crucial urban areas, disarming and repatriating Japanese troops and evacuating the European internees. The Dutch, on the other hand, wanted to pacify the archipelago. They resented the idea that the British were negotiating with Sukarno and Hatta, who they had persecuted before the war, according to historian and leading researcher at the NIOD, Peter Romijn.49 According to Romijn, as soon as the European war ended, Dutch authorities were already recruiting volunteers in order to “free” Indonesia. “Recruitment of a new army, however, was in 1945 one of the first concerns of the transitional government that came to power after the liberation of the Netherlands from Nazi rule. Such an army had to be built from scratch”, according to Romijn.50 The defeat of 1942 had brought a huge blow to the international prestige of the Netherlands. “Therefore, a return to power could only be credible if it included an impressive display of power.”, Romijn notes. In regaining their full control over Indonesia, the Netherlands was fully dependent on their Allies. “This dependence revived old fears that these allies were conspiring to exert more control in the East Indies, or even that they were scheming to end the Dutch colonial relationship.”, according to Romijn. In total, the Dutch Home-Army produced eighteen battalions of volunteers as well as marines who were prepared to fight until all enemies were dead.51
Prince Bernhard would be the Commander-in-Chief and many of the battalion commanders had been respectable resistance members during the war. During their training, many volunteers also had to guard imprisoned Dutch members of the Waffen-SS. However, the guards subjected the inmates to many forms of abuse. One report notes how the 14th Regiment of Assault Guards from the South, then under the command of Bep van Kooten, would shoot randomly at prison barracks, killing at least 40 helpless inmates. A parliamentary committee confirmed the killings and also condemned them. However, the men were already well underway to Indonesia by then. The prosecuting of the men in question was waived “for the benefit of higher interest”.52 Many Dutch were prone to be trigger-happy, having survived the Second World War and seeing the occupation of Indonesia as an extension of the war. Indonesians were thus seen as the same enemies the Germans had been between 1940 and 1945.53 Indonesians were thus not the only ones to be prone to commit crimes, as shall be discussed in later chapters.
49Peter Romijn, ‘Learning on ‘the job’: Dutch war volunteers entering the Indonesian war of independence, 1945 –1946’ in:
Journal of Genocide Research Vol.14.3/4 (November 2012) 325.
50 Romijn, ‘Learning on ‘the job’, 320. 51 Idem, 321.
52Parlementaire enquête regeringsbeleid Londen, Vol. 5B, annex 153 (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij 1954), 427 –432. 53 Romijn, ‘Learning on ‘the job’, 322.
15 When the first Dutch volunteers finally arrived in Java and Sumatra in March 1946, they discovered the grim reality of the Indonesian revolution. Lieutenant-General Simon Spoor had in July 1945 proclaimed in a pamphlet: “We do not advance to declare war on this country, but to restore peace. You do not come as a conqueror, but as a liberator!”, in order to recruit as many men as possible.54 However, the men did not receive the welcome as liberators they expected. Also, the fighting between the British and Republicans had left the British realizing that it would take too much from them fully secure the archipelago. The heaviest fighting was in Surabaya in November 1945. Eventually British fighters were overwhelmed by the sizeable force of a seemingly endless Indonesian mob. Because of the Battle of Surabaya, it was decided by British Lord Mountbatten that no more British lives should be lost and withdrew the last of his troops eventually in May 1946. Moreover, most of the British soldiers were of Indian descent. India itself was also in a lot of decolonial turmoil and it was feared that the spark of rebellion would be ignited when the Indian soldiers would understand they were fighting in an anti-colonial war. The Dutch troops that had finally landed in and around the archipelago were on their own from now on.55
“Be ready”
At the beginning of September 1945, much of public life, as well as government, had passed into the hands of the Republic. At the end of September, it became clear to the Indonesians that they would not be involved as parties to the Allied negotiations. Just before the arrival of the British troops on September 29, the nationalists tried to attract as much power as possible and to take over as many weapons as possible from the Japanese. With the arrival of the British, a violent period started in Java and Sumatra, also known as the Bersiap (Be ready).56
Australian professor and expert on Asian history, Robert Cribb, notes how, from an Indonesian perspective, the Bersiap was a bottom-up revolution. Resistance to the return of the Dutch pre-war regime came mainly from the youth, the pemudas, and was widely spread over almost all classes of the population. The revolutionary potential consisted mainly of roughly two million militarized youths. Non-Indonesian groups were the victims in particular. This includes Indo-Europeans and Chinese, who according to Cribb, were arrested and prosecuted. Cribb refers to this process as an ethnic cleansing,
54 Johannes Andries de Visser, Dagboek Indië, Belevenissen uit mijn diensttijd als oorlogsvrijwilliger. Het dagelijks
bijgehouden dagboek van een Zeeuwse boerenzoon tijdens de politionele actie in Indië 1945 – 1948 (Almere: van de berg
Uitgeverij 2013) 29.
55Brown, A short history of Indonesia., 163.
56 Elly Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, Petra, ‘Van Banzai tot Bersiap’ in Elly Touwen-Bousma (eds.), Van Banzai tot Bersiap.
16 or even a ‘brief genocide’.57 However, according to Dutch Indonesia expert Remco Raben, the diversity of the mass violence makes it impossible to classify it as genocide, because the extreme violence in Indonesia resists such labelling in terms of system, size and quantity, as it was not clearly aimed at one specific ethnic group or social class.58 However, Raben does not completely avoid the term 'genocide'. Raben concludes that the violence contains "strong genocidal overtones". This also applied to the violence committed by the Dutch troops.59
East Java was, according to Frederick, arguably the revolution’s most violent region, and is the most fully documented. Many of the Bersiap killings in East Java were bound up with the detention of Dutch and Eurasians by pro-Republican forces, official and otherwise, in the city of Surabaya during October 1945.60 Many Dutch and Eurasians who had been imprisoned during the Japanese occupation emerged from their captivity two or three weeks after the hostilities ended. The first of these groups reached Surabaya on September 6th. A sense of outrage and a need to take revenge on their former colonizers heightened in many localities. According to Frederick: “The immediate result was the famous flag incident of 19 September, in which a prominent Eurasian leader was killed by Indonesian youths over the flying of the Dutch flag, an event that heightened Republicans’ view of Eurasians as hostile to the Indonesian independence movement.”61 Tensions grew rapidly as news of an Allied landing spread, it was widely believed that the Allies would try to establish the control of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA).62 Furthermore, at the very end of September, Indonesians in Surabaya seized many Japanese firearms, supported by the BKR. Lastly, in the days after the collapse of Japanese forces, many Japanese were imprisoned themselves. The BKR and PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia), youth wing, who guarded them discovered a thirst for violence against Japanese soldiers amongst their own ranks. Frederick notes about this: “In a memorable incident that began at the PRI’s new headquarters (…) a mob executed Japanese prisoners and forced PRI and government leaders to lick their blood from the executioner’s sword. This was the beginning of the PRI’s very complicated entanglement with mass sentiment and violence.”63 The Bersiap on Java and Sumatra, however, differed greatly. The reason behind this was mainly how the Japanese reacted to the sudden surge in nationalist tendencies.
57 Robert Cribb, Jakarta in the Indonesian Revolution 1945 – 1949 (London: Thesis London University Press 1984) 22 – 23.; Robert Cribb, ‘The brief genocide of Eurasians in Indonesia, 1945/46’, in: Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, colony, genocide:
conquest, occupation, and subaltern resistance in world history (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008) 430.
58 Remco Raben, ‘On genocidal mass violence in colonial Indonesia’ in: Journal of Genocide Research vol.14:3-4 (September, 24, 2012) 492.
59 Raben, ‘On genocidal mass violence’, 499. 60 Frederick, ‘The killing of Dutch and Eurasians’, 361. 61 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 199.
62 Frederick, ‘The killing of Dutch and Eurasians’, 362. 63 Idem, 363.
17
Java
On Java, the Japanese 16th Army worked closely with the Indonesians, who received military instructions and training from them. In the first weeks after the Japanese capitulation, the Japanese in Java strictly adhered to the Allies' command to ensure peace and order. If they had wanted, the Japanese would have been fully able to suppress the young republic and arrest its leaders by the means of power available to them. However, that order was not given by the English. Because the English troops were long overdue, Japanese troops began interning themselves from September 15, 1945, and concentrated the heavy weapons in arsenals.64 The turning point came with the press conference of the British General Christison on September 29, 1945, that the British would disarm the Japanese.65 The interpretation given by the Japanese headquarters in this was that the Japanese were no longer responsible for maintaining order and peace, but that this responsibility would be shared in cooperation with the Indonesian civil authorities. As a result, weapons were allowed to be distributed to police units. The conditions that Indonesian units had to meet in order to qualify for arms distribution were left to the local commanders. However, things went wrong here. In Banjoemas, Magelang and Yogyakarta, firearms were freely distributed by the involved Japanese battalion commanders. In Surabaya, Malang, Surakarta and Besuki this happened after the threatened action of Indonesian battle groups. In some situations, a show was performed to save the Japanese honour, but in other situations the Japanese did fight back. In Bandoeng and Semarang, the local Japanese commanders cracked down on Indonesian battle groups and took back power. On October 5, 1945, the headquarters in Batavia issued an order stopping further transfer of weapons. However, it was already too late then. More than half of the Japanese weapons in Central and East Java were captured by the nationalists.66
With the coming of English troops on September 15, 1945 in Surabaya and Batavia, and the return of many Dutch and other Eurasians from their internment camps, tensions grew.67 The British, however, landed with not enough troops to actually bring peace to Java. Dutch colonial administrator Huib van Mook, who arrived on October 2nd, wrote a personal letter to a friend of his in Australia stating: “The situation we have found here is beyond imagination. (…) The English have landed with only 1000 men and do not have the means to face a single conflict. It took a long time for the number to rise to 5,000 troops.” Van Mook continues: “Today I finally received a promise from General Christison that he has taken over the inner part of Batavia. Every night, rampok (killing) parties took
64 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 331
65
Henri Baudet, ‘The Dutch Retreat from Empire’ in: Bromley, John Selwyn, Kossman, Ernst Heinrich (Eds.), Britain and the
Netherlands in Europe and Asia Papers delivered to the Third Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference (London: Palgrave
Macmillan 1968) 215. 66 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 332. 67 Idem, 105.
18 place and Japanese, Indonesians and Indo-Europeans who are in our service are killed”.68 When on October 13th a boycott was issued against Europeans by the Republic and many Eurasians were unable to buy food, Javanese pemuda’s took actions against all Eurasians who dared to go to the streets. As van der Doel notes, out of the blue many Europeans and Chinese were picked up from the streets by angry mobs and were lynched. Their bodies would then be found in a river sometime later.69 “The feeling of being handed over to an unhinged, unruly gang, driving the streets in overloaded vehicles armed with all kinds of battle and firearms was nerve-racking”, as one witness recalls.70 Especially vulnerable were women and girls, most of whom were not only beaten, but also severely raped before being murdered.71 Chinese were also targeted as the only other group besides Europeans. The reason behind this was that they were still trading with the Dutch. Although Chinese had settled in the Archipelago long before Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century, Indonesian nationalist lore associated them with colonialism. Colonial policy in the Netherlands Indies both utilized and distinguished the Chinese, allowing them a favoured status, according to professor in Southeast Asian Studies at Cornell University, Mary Somers Heidhues.72 Indonesians who were seen as collaborating with the Dutch, such as Ambonese, Timorese and Menadonese, were also targeted as many of them had served, or were still serving, in the KNIL. On November 18th, for example, a family of Ambonese were shot and murdered in Batavia by Indonesian policemen while on their way to a church service because some men in their family served for the KNIL. The KNIL, in retaliation, murdered all policemen in the police building.73
Many of the Bersiap-killings in East Java coincided with the detention of Dutch and Eurasians by pro-Republican forces, official and otherwise, in the city of Surabaya during October 1945, according to Frederick.74 Killings in Surabaya connected in one way or another to the PRI, they were numerous and spread over a period of several weeks. Killings that occurred under direct supervision of top PRI leaders at PRI headquarters on the grounds of the Simpang Club, appear to have involved the greatest number of victims and to have been the most brutal. They took place between 15 and 17 October 1945, but continued on a reduced scale for some time afterwards. On October 15th (known as Bloody Monday) there was an organized effort all over Surabaya to arrest all Europeans as well as Ambonese, Timorese and other “collaborating” Indonesians. They were brought to the Bubutang prisons or the
68 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, ‘Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, nummer toegang 2.02.27’,
inventory number: 8B-I (1984) 680.
69 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 90. 70 Idem.
71 Idem.
72
Mary Somers Heidhues, ‘Anti-Chinese violence in Java during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945 – 49’ in: Journal of
Genocide Research Vol.14.3/4 (November 2012) 382.
73 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 91.
19 Simpang Club (a former white’s-only organization). At the club, prisoners were told to strip down after which they were beaten, raped and sometimes they got “NICA” painted on their bodies. Afterwards they were held in small rooms until they were called to “talk to some PRI officials”. A few survivors reported that they had been allowed to go to the bathroom where they saw bloody body parts scattered on the floor, or dead bodies hung from the ceiling. Other victims were beheaded and their bodies then turned over to young children who cut the bodies into pieces. Survivor Joanes Trouerbach recalls in a report published by the Opsporingsdienst Overledenen, which is now in possession of the NIOD: “On the 15th of October, me and my brother were arrested at around 16:00. (…) When we arrived at the club, I saw the bodies of two young men lying not far from me bathing in their own blood. Their bodies were cut in such a way it was impossible to identify them.”75 Leonore Sinsu-Andries, who was arrested because she had a Dutch flag at home, recalls from the Simpang Club: “Those who were to be executed had to lie flat on their stomach and with their head around ten centimetres in the air. They would then be decapitated. Anyone who dared to look was also executed.” Sinsu-Andries continues: “I was allowed to enter the bathroom. It was there that I saw dozens of dead bodies piled up.”76
On the mass-executions around the city of Tegal in middle-Java in October 1945 miss A.J. Pritrarioa stated that her husband, together with the gentlemen Havelaar and Kraaienhout, were summary executed by a mob pemuda.77 Melanie Koster, too, recalls mass execution around Tegal. Koster states in her ODO report: “A gang of extremists entered the sugar factory stating that they had to bring all men to the prison. The men were shot and piled up in mass graves somewhere in the vicinity of the factory.”78 According to Indonesian eyewitnesses, many of the victims were killed not as a result of the general fighting but later in scenes of grisly torture in which the mouths of surviving women were reportedly cut open and stuffed with the severed genitals of British–Indian soldiers, and more than a dozen youths paraded through the street with the heads of Dutch or Eurasian women and British–Indian soldiers impaled on bamboo spears.79
The first murders in West-Java occurred around Tjidengkamp, near Batavia, where many Europeans were interned for their own safety. On October 12, a twenty-year-old man was pulled from his bicycle. A nearby British soldier was alerted, but decided not to do anything due to the British
Hands-off policy. His answer was: "I had no orders!" Sometime later, the victim was found dead and
75 NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies, Indische Collectie, ‘Opsporingsdienst Overledenen’, Archive
376 Simpangclub Semarang, October 1945, statement No. 431/X/ODO (Surabaya: October 8, 1947) 1.
76 NIOD, ‘ODO’, Archive 376 Simpangclub Semarang, October 1945, statement No. 605/X/ODO ( Surabaya: November 27, 1947) 1.
77 NIOD, ‘ODO’, Archive 885, Tegal, Soerabaja en vermoorde Chinezen te Pasoeroean, statement No. 910/D.D/ODO (Surabaya: January 12, 1948) 1.
78 NIOD, ‘ODO’, Archive 885, Tegal, Soerabaja en vermoorde Chinezen te Pasoeroean, statement No. Unknown (Surabaya: May 10, 1947) 2.
20 severely maimed.80 In the following two months, many Eurasian women and children were murdered in Batavia. They were often defenceless because their men were still trapped in Japanese internment camps. The victims were sometimes severely maimed or even cut to pieces and thrown into the Antjol-Canal, wells and ditches. Sometimes there were bodies on the street early in the morning.81 Witness W.H.M. Colson remembers the discovery of six mass graves in and around Batavia, often with heavily mutilated bodies. Especially girls and young women were severely hurt before being killed. Witness H.E. Termeulen, in turn, remembers that bodies of women and children drifted daily in the Tjiliwoeng River. He had personally seen a European man floating, as well as two naked Indo girls nailed to doors.82 A lot of Chinese, too, lost their lives around Batavia, according to Bussemaker. In December 1945, already, there were reports of around 500 missing Chinese. Bussemaker estimates that in Batavia alone, more than 2000 Bersiap-killings had taken place until March 1946.83
The situation was very different in the West-Javanese city of Bandung from that of Batavia where pemuda’s controlled the streets. The Japanese in Bandung had been attacked by a mob of pemuda in early October. The Japanese invited Bandung BKR-leader Soehari to explain himself why Japanese troops were targeted, and imprisoned him. Later he was driven around in a Japanese tank calling all pemuda not to attack any Japanese, Indo-Europeans or Europeans. All BKR-offices in Bandung had been taken over by Japanese soldiers by this time. Every Indonesian was checked when met by Japanese officials and Japanese made sure to imprison every Indonesian if they had a suspicion of being related to the BKR. Unlike in Eastern-Java and Middle-Java, the Japanese kept their weapons and ammunition in Western-Java. The consequence of this was that pemuda’s had to stick to bamboo-spears, machetes and other knives or swords. Because of this, no more than 1500 Japanese were able to keep the order for the biggest part of Western Java, with the exception of Batavia.84 The situation deteriorated with coming of British troops on October 17th and the take-over of command from the Japanese who had been able to keep the peace. In 1945, the city had about 437,000 inhabitants, 40,000 of them Chinese and 380,000 Indonesian. The British reached a truce with the Republican commanders of Bandung on March 24th, 1946. Republican troops were to leave the city and none would be imprisoned by the British army. However, as the Republicans left, they torched the city. They had learned the “scorched-earth tactic” from the Dutch in 1942 when Japan invaded Java. More than 600 buildings in the city went up in flames, most of these were Chinese owned.85
80 Win Rinzema-Admiraal, Java, het laatste front (Zutphen: Walburg Pers 2000) 140.
81 Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV), ‘Verminkte stoffelijk overschot van een Indo-Europese vrouw in het Antjol-kanaal te Batavia’, archive 14021. (October 1945) Digital photo:
https://digitalcollections.universiteitleiden.nl/view/item/911387
82 Bussemaker, 107 – 109. 83 Idem, 110.
84 Idem, 130.
21
Sumatra
The idea of freedom in Sumatra, too, was great. Aceh and the Padang highlands have traditionally always been freedom-loving, even before the war. However, much more than in Java, the nationalists in Sumatra lacked military power.86 The Japanese 25th army that occupied Sumatra also pursued a purification policy without concession towards the Indonesians. The Bersiap-period in Sumatra was therefore less grim than in Java. Moreover, the British commander of the English forces, General Chambers, was much more willing to supplement his scarce troop strength with armed Japanese units. The latter also adhered strictly to the order to maintain order and peace. So, the Japanese did not intern themselves on Sumatra, but remained armed. This also means that much less blood has flowed on Sumatra than on Java.87
In the PPKI only three representatives were from Sumatra. One of them, Mohammed Amir, returned to Sumatra on August 28, 1945, to the city of Medan where he tried to get the KSI (Komitee
Nasional Indonesia) off the ground. However, most of the people he tried to persuade refused his
offers.88 More successful was Soegondo Kartopradjo. He used his pemuda-network to organize a rally on September 30th in which thousands of participants from all over Sumatra came forward to plead their fealty. It was decided to establish KNI bureaus and to form battle groups everywhere. The red and white flag appeared on all government buildings on 4 October. On October 8, it was announced that Sumatra considered itself part of the Republik Indonesia. In support of this, a mass demonstration was held in Medan on October 9, 1945. Demonstrations also took place in Padan and Palembang.89
The strong Japanese presence, could not prevent that any killings would take place on Sumatra. The British 6th South-Wales Borderers battalion landed in Belawan, North-Sumatra, and took over control of the island from the Japanese who had successfully suppressed any uprising. However, the British landed with only 800 men, and so, were not even able to fully occupy Medan, the biggest city in the area. Furthermore, they disarmed the police force which was allied to the Japanese troops, and not the pemuda. The direct consequence of this was that on October 17th, 1945, pemudas stormed a hotel in Pematang-Siantar which housed numerous Dutch and other Europeans and set it on fire. The Danish owner, his wife, their daughter and four Dutchmen lost their lives in the flames.90 In November, the Bersiap also spilled over to Medan, and Europeans outside the protected areas were no longer sure of their lives. The Dutch commander on the spot, Carel Brondgeest, reported the murder of several Europeans to his superiors in Batavia. Bussemaker writes of an ethnic cleansing like the ones
86 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 332. 87 Idem.
88 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 11C, 568 – 569. 89 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 290.
90 Fokke van Dijk and van Oudenhoven, Bert, Noord Sumatra in oorlogstijd. Oorspronkelijke dagboeken uit
interneringskampen chronologisch samengevoegd [Dl. 14] (Makkum: Stichting Noord Sumatra Documentatie 2001) 204 –
22 that had also taken place in Java, but the English did nothing.91 It was solely because of the Japanese on Sumatra that the Bersiap did not grow as big as it did on Java. Until December 31st, 1945, did the British note twenty pemuda attacks with a total of 35 dead.92 1946 was a year of relative peace for the Europeans on the island. However, with the coming of more British troops a rumour had spread that the sultans of Eastern-Sumatra and Aceh wanted to consolidate with the British and become a part of British Malakka. Pemudas burned down their palaces on March 3th, 1946, destructing the old structures of power on Sumatra, paving the way for a federal republic of Indonesia.93
Allied war crimes
Not just the Indonesians committed various war crimes, likewise did the British, Japanese and Dutch troops. Swiss historian and author of the ground-breaking book: The burning kampongs of
General Spoor notes that it is internationally not well known that the British were involved in massive
violence because men like Mountbatten wanted to uphold the idea that the British were generous helpers in need.94 According to Limpach, British troops contributed to the escalation of violence through theft, arson and violence against the population. British troops, for example, bombed and burned down the entire Western-Javanese town of Bekasi on November 23th, 1945, after 24 British troops in the area had been killed by pemudas. All inhabitants that still remained in the area were killed after the bombing and burning of the town.95 Extreme violence committed by British troops became routine, according to Limpach. Especially the bombing of entire towns became common practice. The West-Javanese town of Tjibadak, too, was burned to the ground after pemuda’s had killed some 50 British troops in the vicinity of the town. Bombings on Javanese towns as a form of retaliation were performed by the RAF until the British left the scene in March 1946.96 On Sumatra the British performed punitive expeditions instead of bombings. For example: The Royal Garhwal Rifles’ A-Company was dispatched after British Major Anderson was murdered in the city of Padang and another Major was shot in a nearby town. The entire town was burned to the ground and its inhabitants killed.97
Dutch troops, too, committed many crimes during their time in Indonesia. The best example of this is Pesing on Eastern-Java. On April 15th, 1946, the Dutch Zeeland Battalion was advancing on the village of Pesing. By noon, a force of 250 Dutch soldiers had occupied and purged the village. Most of the male population had been taken captive. A Dutch whistle-blower, however, revealed that the
91 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 295. 92 Idem.
93 Idem, 297.
94 Limpach, De Brandende Kampongs, 225. 95 idem, 227.
96 Idem, 231.
23 Dutch troops had tortured and killed nearly all captives without even knowing which were Republican forces and which were not.98 Romijn asked the right questions when researching this case: Does this
Does this background of indiscipline and trigger-happiness indicate that the war volunteers were prone to transfer a culture of violence from the liberated Netherlands to the Far East?99 As it shall turn out in the next chapter, this was only just the beginning Dutch brutality in the Indies.
Lastly, the Japanese, too, committed several war crimes. On December 13th, 1945, for example, Japanese officials were captured and murdered near Medan, Sumatra, immediately Japanese soldiers took revenge by encircling the town of Tebingtinggi and killing between 2,000 and 5,000 Indonesians. To further deter any Indonesian attacks, Japanese soldiers impaled dozens of Indonesians' heads on stilts along the main street.100 In Semarang Japanese troops retaliated the killings of Japanese troops as well. In Bandung, Japanese authorities banned the gathering of more than three Indonesians. If four or more Indonesians came together and were caught, the fourth was killed on the spot. When Indonesians were caught with red-and-white pins, they were stabbed in their cheeks, or had to swallow them, according to Limpach.101
Casualties
The estimated number of victims from the Bersiap varies greatly. Official records hold that up to 3500 Eurasians lost their lives during the Bersiap period, and a great many more Chinese. De Jong, however, notes that at least 5500 people lost their lives.102 Bussemaker and Cribb find this figure too low as they estimate that between 20,000 and 25,000 people died. Frederick goes even further and suggests that around 35,000 died. This figure does include non-western casualties as well. Furthermore, as Frederick argues, they have taken into account that all the missing people were indeed killed.103 Romijn finds the official records too low as well as he estimates that between 10,000 and 25,000 lives were lost.104 Dutch historian and specialist on Indonesian history, Bert Immerzeel, notes that these figures are probably too high. These figures include, according to Immerzeel, also casualties from the Japanese occupation. Also, at least 10,000 Chinese are among the casualties noted by Bussemaker, Cribb, Frederick and Romijn, according to Immerzeel. Immerzeel notes that the official figure of 3500 to 5500 casualties is probably the right figure.105
98 Romijn, ‘Learning on ‘the job’, 329. 99 Idem, 322.
100 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 149. 101 Limpach, De brandende kampongs, 244. 102 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 12-II,
103 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 342; Cribb, ‘The brief genocide of Eurasians in Indonesia’, 432; Frederick, ‘The killing of Dutch and Eurasians’, 369.
104 Romijn, ‘Learning on ‘the job’, 320.
105 Bert Immerzeel, ‘Bersiap: de werkelijke cijfers’ in: Javapost (published: 07-02-2014)
24
Linggadjati
Dutch Major-General Schilling concluded after seven months of trying to pacify the archipelago that it would be impossible for the Dutch to completely restore order and Dutch rule on the archipelago. This reality forced the Dutch government to reflect on what it actually wanted with the Indies, and to what extent the British still wanted to go along with that.106 On November 15th 1946 Dutch representatives Max van Poll, Wim Schemerhorn and Feike de Boer met with Indonesian representative Soetan Sjahrir in the Indonesian village of Linggadjati to discuss Indonesian autonomy.107 It was agreed at the Linggadjati-accords that the Netherlands would recognize the authority of the Indonesian Republic on Java and Sumatra. The Republic would cooperate in a federation of three federal states, which would consist of the Republic, Borneo and Eastern-Indonesia. The sovereignty would lie with the federation. The Netherlands and Indonesia would form a union for their common interests, headed by the Queen of the Netherlands. Dutch companies would be allowed to return to Indonesia and would receive full protection from the Republic.108
The agreement caused a storm of protest in both the Netherlands and the Republic. In Indonesia people wanted to be completely separate from the Netherlands, and in the Netherlands the slogan ‘Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren’ (All is lost when Indonesia is lost) became widely used.109 In the meantime, Republican troops increasingly violated the treaty and little was done for the return of Dutch companies and the protection of Dutch companies. Also, the Netherlands was no longer a colonial power, but reduced to a minor power.110 Although the agreement was ratified by the parliaments of the Netherlands and the Republic in March 1947, there appeared to be no real agreement. The text of the agreement offered room for different interpretations and that space was gratefully used. Both parties had to take their radical supporters into account. In the Republic, the youth movements and the military were satisfied with nothing less than complete independence. In the Netherlands, a large part of the population and its political and military leaders were not ready for accelerated colonial independence. They stuck to the speech Queen Wilhelmina had given to American radio on December 7, 1942, in which Indonesians were eventually promised more independence within the Kingdom. No time limit was indicated in the speech. The conflicts between the Netherlands and the Republic focused on which of the two was responsible for maintaining peace and order in Java and Sumatra during the transition period until the transfer of sovereignty. Both parties claimed this responsibility.111
106 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 27 – 31.
108 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 166 – 169. 108 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 317 – 322.
109 Van Riessen, ‘De Indonesische kwestie’, 460 – 461.
110 Oostindie, Hoogenboom, and Verwey, ‘The decolonization war in Indonesia’, 256.
111 Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH), Het Nederlandse militaire optreden in Nederlands-Indië/Indonesië
25 While the negotiations continued, the Netherlands had further strengthened its forces. At the end of 1946, in addition to the aforementioned units of the army and the marines, more than 37,000 KNIL soldiers were operational. Furthermore, a voluntary army in the Netherlands was well underway with their training for a possible escalation in Indonesia.112 That is why the Dutch government decided to put things in order through military intervention, this military intervention would be known as the Police-Actions. In two short Police-Actions (Operation Product: July–August 1947 and Operation Kraai: December 1948–January 1949) they managed to attain nominal control, only to find themselves caught in a guerrilla war and counterinsurgency that proved impossible to win. During these Police-Actions, excessive violence on both sides became apparent.113 The events of the Police-Actions shall be discussed in the following chapter.
112 NIMH, Het Nederlandse militaire optreden, 13.
