The Emancipatory Value of the Public Sphere

(1)

The Emancipatory Value of the Public Sphere

“How can we fill the public sphere with deliberating citizens rather than consumers?”

R S Fleisher August 22 2016 5736056 University of Amsterdam MA Philosophy Philosophy of Public Affairs Supervisor: Dr. G. van Donselaar Second reader: Dr. J. Gledhill

(2)

2 Master’s thesis Philosophy

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056 Preface

“The Adorno critique of mass culture should be continued and rewritten” (Habermas 1985)

This master’s thesis represents the end of the uphill battle of my last three years at the University of Amsterdam (UvA).

In August 2013 I was injured in a car accident. Besides having to learn how to deal with the physical challenges as a result of the accident, I trained daily to regain my short-term memory use. For 2 years I had to put my studies on hold because of severe memory problems, trying to live with a memory capacity comparable to an IQ score of 80 at my lowest point. At the time I believed graduating was out of reach.

During my bachelor, I was told by my peers as well as teachers that I never gave it my all, I was known to cut corners. Today, after three years of rehab, I fully agree, and am willing to admit that I was lazy at times, and stubborn. I have never worked so hard to accomplish anything in my life than to write this thesis. The process of recovery, with all the setbacks, as well as the process of writing, was an experience through which I learned to persevere, to take advice, and to fight. As clichéd as this may sound, I now realize that I took most skills for granted before.

The emancipation of the public sphere is something I find fascinating. It is an area in which my interest in critical theory and political philosophy combine. It was an opportunity to explore the writings of Habermas, but also to revisit Adorno’s writings in a different terrain. It has been a true privilege to have had Dr. Gijs van Donselaar as my supervisor, and as a mentor. During both my bachelor and master’s at the University of Amsterdam, he has been an inspiration to me. With an outstanding sense of humor, and critical take on society, he inspired me to think. Ever since my first year at the UvA, after attending his seminars as part of Introduction to Ethics, I wanted to specialize in practical philosophy. I would like to thank him for his excellent guidance and support.

Also, I would like to express my gratitude for the privilege to have had Dr. Robin Celikates as a teacher. I am thankful for how he challenged me to be a better academic and to write in a

(3)

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056

more mature style. He has inspired me to focus on critical theory, and opened my eyes to the beauty of Adorno’s writing on another level. I would like to thank him for supporting me during the seminars I attended as part of rehab, and for all his effort and all the literature suggestions, as well has his feedback on the outline of my thesis.

I would like to thank Dr. James Gledhill for being the second reader, for reading this thesis and providing valuable feedback.

Special thanks to my dear friend Federico Lafaire for all the laughs, for his support, and for co-reading this thesis and for being my sounding board. For all the classes we attended together, having shared ‘the office table’, all the study-sessions, and all the good times as well as for being there for me through all of the bad times. You are a true friend.

I would like to thank Mike Barbas for all the support over the past couple of months, and for correcting and co-reading this thesis, which was not an easy job. As well as for trolling me and keeping a smile on my face. Thanks for having my back, trolling is “a” art.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents. My old man, Frank Fleisher, who sadly is no longer with us. My dear mother and proud feminist, Marja Hellemons, for making sure I did not starve myself in the process of writing, and for all the moral support. I believe part of this accomplishment was possible because of my gender-neutral upbringing, and the way my mother set a bold example by being a goal-oriented go-getter.

I hope you enjoy reading this. Raisa Fleisher

(4)

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056 Table of contents

Preface ...2

Introduction ...5

1 The Emancipatory Value of the Deliberate Model of Democracy ...7

1.1 Habermas on the Deliberate Model of Democracy ...7

1.2 Habermas on the Public Sphere ... 11

1.3 Young on Inclusion and Overcoming Social Injustice ... 15

1.4 The Adorno Critique of the Deliberate Model of Democracy ... 20

1.5 Criteria for Realizing the Emancipatory Potential of the Public Sphere ... 23

2 Realizing the Emancipatory Potential of the Public Sphere ... 25

2.1 Young on Language and Self-development in the Public Sphere ... 26

2.2 Fraser on the Emancipatory Value of the Public Sphere ... 31

2.3 Young, Fraser, and Adorno’s Critique on Mass Culture ... 36

2.4 Balancing Inclusion and Deepening of the Public Debate ... 37

3 The Paradox of Language-based Inclusion in the Public Sphere ... 42

3.1 The Danger of Populism in the Public Debate ... 42

3.2 Suggestions to Stimulate Inclusion in the Public Sphere ... 44

4 Conclusion ... 46

(5)

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056 Introduction

One of the major challenges facing our contemporary capitalist society, is how to involve citizens in the public sphere, and the deepening of the public debate to ensure citizens are well-informed voters. In the Netherlands, during the referendum concerning the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, on the 6th of April 2016, 32% of Dutch society submitted their votes when asked for their opinion. Within civil society, a little under one third of the Dutch voters used their vote to contribute to the public opinion. There are many possible explanations for why 68% of the voters did not vote, but these numbers do not tell us anything about how well informed the 32% of citizens were (Dool 2016).

The deliberative model of democracy carries much higher expectations of civil society and public opinion, it goes beyond simply voting. As its name implies, it asks citizens to deliberate in the public sphere. It is the model of democracy that is rooted in the tradition of critical theory. And for a theory to be critical, it is a demand that the theory contributes to the emancipatory project. Max Horkheimer, one of the founding fathers of the movement, points this out as an essential difference between what he calls traditional theory and critical theory. More than merely focusing on the subject of emancipation, the theory itself needs to be self-reflective and aware of its influence on society (Horkheimer 1972, 196-197). This means that the theory of deliberate democracy needs to function as a double-edged sword by offering a model of democracy that simulates the emancipation of citizens, as well as being self-aware of its influence on contemporary society.

In this thesis, we attempt to find an answer to following question: “How can we fill the public sphere with deliberating citizens rather than consumers?”

As a starting point, we examine the foundations of the deliberative model of democracy as described by Jürgen Habermas and Iris Marion Young. We examine the strengths and weaknesses of the model. This helps us provide an answer about how the public sphere can help citizens become emancipated from their role as consumers within the Habermasian framework. From here, we trace the steps from Habermas to the culture critique of Theodor Adorno. Habermas’ theory branches away from Adorno’s thoughts on rationality,

(6)

intersubjectivity, and the effect of capitalism on civil society. By returning to Adorno’s culture critique, we gain insight on what conditions are necessary to ensure that the public sphere reaches its emancipatory potential.

In the second chapter, we compare the two concepts of the public sphere and its emancipatory value, provided by Young, and Nancy Fraser. Young uses language and communication as a tool to include minorities in the public debate as an addition to the Habermasian concept of the public sphere. Fraser chooses a more critical approach, in which she argues that the strict separations between different domains of society in the Habermasian discourse stand in the way of the public sphere contributing to emancipation. When we put both concepts to the test of Adorno’s culture critique, there still seem to be some flaws that need fixing. Both Fraser and Young focus on the question of how to include minorities and oppressed status groups in the public debate in order for them to emancipate themselves and reach self-development on the basis of allowing emotional language and the rhetorical use of language.

A similar argument can be found in the writings of the Victorian philosopher, Thomas Carlyle, except that Carlyle uses the argument to defend limiting the influence of the public sphere and public opinion. For here we return to Adorno’s critique of mass culture to reveal that a paradox lies in the use of emotion and rhetorical language in the public sphere for the sake of inclusion. We show that by allowing emotion and rhetorical speech, we hand weapons to populists who wish to influence and manipulate citizens on an emotional level to spread their ideology.

In the third and final chapter we further examine the paradox of language-based inclusion in the public sphere and make a modest attempt to offer suggestions on how to accomplish inclusion by lowering other thresholds and finding other areas to create a functional role for emotions and rhetorical use of language.

(7)

1 The Emancipatory Value of the Deliberate Model of Democracy

In this chapter we create a framework that offers a critical tool to answer the question: does deliberate democracy have emancipatory value for its citizens? Jürgen Habermas and Iris Marion Young provide us with the basic value of what deliberate democracy should be and how it is different from other models of democracy. Within their ideas of what it means for citizens to deliberate, they both have a clear view of how the functioning of deliberation and the use of the public sphere lead to the emancipation of citizens. Young’s theory stands or falls with the notions of communication and rationality, as well as the correctness of Habermas’ discourse model of society.

The term emancipation, in this chapter, refers to the ability of citizens to participate in the process of decision-making in a meaningful way, not to function as mere consumers. To investigate the possibility of emancipation and citizenship, Theodor Adorno’s notions of

regressive mimeses and culture industry offer two criteria to test the strength of the emancipatory value of both Habermas’ and Young’s models. We argue that in order for the concept of deliberate democracy to have emancipatory value, the use of the public sphere needs to take in account that a lifeworld colonized by the capitalistic market economy needs to be self-critical and aware of its limits to avoid the danger of false consciousness that hides behind consumerism. Although we are aware that Espen Hammer’s (Hammer 2006) interpretation of the differences between Adorno and Habermas offers reason to question the entire discourse model, we take the liberty of using his line of thought to formulate two criteria that need to be taken into account when we assess the emancipatory potential of the deliberative model of democracy.

1.1 Habermas on the Deliberate Model of Democracy

To understand the meaning of deliberation in contemporary capitalist society, one must first have a clear view of the place deliberation takes in democracy. Jürgen Habermas sketches a proceduralist view of different concepts of democracy in ‘’Three Models of Democracy’’, and in Chapters 6 and 7 of Between Facts and Norms, from which he shows the need for a deliberative model of democracy.

(8)

The first concept Habermas discusses in “Three Models of Democracy’’ is the liberal model of

democracy. This model seeds from the Lockean view of democracy, in which the government

functions as a public administration as part of a market-structured society. In this model, citizens have political rights, such as voting and freedom of speech, so called negative rights. The government functions as protector of these negative rights of its citizens. The role of the public sphere is seen as a place where people can use such rights to acquire power, in the political sense. The model of communication is comparable to the way people use communicative skills in a market-structured organization; the attitude of citizens required in this model is success-oriented. In this view, a democratic process is more or less a compromise between competing interests. To vote is to look after one’s own best interests. The strongpoint this model has to offer, according to Habermas, is the clear structure of the administrative side of society, and that it is pragmatically workable.

The second concept Habermas examines is the republican model of democracy. This model is characterized by its focus on solidarity among citizens. The government takes on a more active role compared with the liberal model, because the importance of positive liberties is key. The republican model requires that a government does not just protect its citizens’ negative rights. The government is also to include and engage citizens as free and equal individuals involved in the public sphere, which leads to an understanding of goals and norms, and which will eventually lead to a mutual understanding among citizens. The structure of the republican model is closer to social dialog then a market-structured negotiation. Within the republican model lies a presumption of the possibility of an ethical consensus through dialog. The focus on dialog and deliberation that this model offers are the conditions under which the democratic process can become more than a market competition, and allows it to develop toward a normative use of public reason. This state-centered understanding of politics is based on an unrealistic understanding of the ability of collective action, according to Habermas. The boundaries between state and society are unclear.

Habermas appears to direct his critique at the republican model as a whole, although there are major differences between different republican models of democracy. As David Miller

(9)

describes in his introduction to The Liberty Reader, the part consensus plays in reaching collective action differs from author to author (Miller 2006, 7-10). The republican model Habermas describes seems to have most in common with Hannah Arendt’s understanding of politics, based on the ancient Greek polis, in which politics is used to reach ethical self-understanding. Other explanations of the republican model of democracy are provided by, for example, Philip Pettit or Quintin Skinner, who place a different value on dialog and common action. Miller points out that in the works of Pettit and Skinner, the basis of the need for common action is not placed in self-understanding, but in the need to prevent domination (Miller 2006, 9). The larger part of Habermas’ critique on the republican model focuses on the ethical use of political activity, and the value placed on personal development through politics. Habermas seems to thereby limit his examination and critique of the republican model to Hannah Arendt’s theory of democracy (and similar theories).

The third concept Habermas introduces is what he calls the deliberative model of democracy and finds its roots in his discourse theory. To have a full understanding of the deliberate model of democracy, it helps to understand Habermas’ discourse model of society, which is part of his theory of commutative action. Habermas separates civil society and the state as two different compartments of society. Nancy Fraser describes it as follows:

Habermas holds that modern societies differ from premodern societies in that they

split off some material re-production functions from symbolic ones and hand over the former to two specialized institutions - the (official) economy and state - which are system-integrated. At the same time, modern societies situate these institutions in the larger social environment by developing two other ones which specialize in symbolic reproduction and are socially- integrated. These are the modern, restricted, nuclear family or "private sphere" and the space of political participation, debate and opinion formation or "public sphere"; and together, they constitute what Habermas calls the two "institutional orders of the modern lifeworld." Thus, modern societies "uncouple" or separate what Habermas takes to be two distinct, but previously undifferentiated aspects of society: "system" and "lifeworld." (Fraser 1985, 106-107)

(10)

The system, like the lifeworld, contains two compartments, namely the economy and the state. In every different compartment of society, Habermas argues that citizens play different roles that connect the system and the lifeworld. The roles of the consumer and the worker connect the private sphere to the economy, and the citizens and the client connect the public sphere to the state. From this theory of how contemporary capitalist society is built up,

Habermas develops a third model of democracy. To do so, Habermas chooses to take useful

elements from both the republican and the liberal model of democracy to create a deliberative model of democracy. From the liberal model he uses the mechanisms of money and administrative power, such as found in the system, and from the republican model, its mechanism of solidarity, such as found in the lifeworld. The deliberative model of democracy offers a new balance between those three mechanisms.

In the deliberate model of democracy, the public sphere fulfills a very important role. The public sphere remains separate and independent of money and administrative power, so that it can function as a counterweight against the active powers in the system. The solidarity that comes from deliberation in the public sphere can countervail the money and the administrative power through communication. The importance of deliberation is an essential difference between the deliberative model and the republican model of democracy. In the republican model, deliberation is valued as an instrument that leads to collectively acting citizenry, whereas in the deliberative model, the deliberative process as an institute is valued, which informally lead to the development of public opinion.

The communitive process within the public sphere in the deliberate model has meaning in itself, it is not strictly goal-oriented (Habermas 1996a, 298-299). Deliberation within the public sphere of the discourse model is an interplay between democratically institutionalized will-formation and informal opinion formulation. In the republican model, in line with the Greek tradition, deliberation is valuable as a part of personal development. The discourse model and the deliberate model of democracy open the way to a critical view on capitalistic society, without the radical need for revolution, and without denying the functionality of money and administrative power (Habermas 1996a, 308). The way Habermas takes the structures of capitalist society as a given fact, and the way he absorbs it in his discourse

(11)

theory, allows him to work with the powers at play and reshape them, instead of merely fighting against them.

All we need presuppose is a type of public administration that emerged in the early-modern period with the European nation state and developed functional ties with the capitalist economy. (Habermas 1996a, 297)

The discourse model offers an explanation of the negative effects of the capitalist market economy on the lifeworld. He uses the term colonization to describe the process of the rules of the system being applied to the lifeworld. When citizens are goal-oriented and focusing on manipulating others to support them, rather than to deliberate without having such motivations, the communication of the system is colonizing the lifeworld. In a colonized lifeworld, money and power have a stronger influence than solidarity. Through deliberation and by building strong public opinion in the public sphere, citizens can decolonize the lifeworld through solidarity, and minimize the negative influence of money and power.

1.2 Habermas on the Public Sphere

The functionality of the deliberate model of democracy stands or falls with the organization and strength of the public sphere. The public sphere is the area of society in which people become active and critical citizens. In the deliberate model of democracy, the public sphere has a possibility to be a context of discovery as well as a context of justification. These terms describe two assets of the process of deliberation. In this process, opinions are formed, after which they are questioned and tested in dialog with other citizens. This process allows citizens to be critical, and also gives them the power to contribute to questions of fair compromises. It all comes down to communication and dialog. Habermas thinks of

communication as unavoidable, by which he means that communication is vital to human life and that it cannot be replaced by any other kind of action.

If we find ourselves confronted with questions of conflict resolution or concerning the choice of collective goals and we want to avoid the alternative of violent clashes,

(12)

then we must engage in a practice of reaching understanding, whose procedures and communicative presuppositions are not at our disposition. (Habermas 1996a, 310) Communication within the lifeworld must meet certain requirements in order to be functional. In order for the public sphere to be a neutral space for citizens to deliberate, Habermas defines criteria: Even when the public sphere is used as a platform for mere will-formation, the neutrality principle should make it possible for ethically relevant questions such as the good life or collective identity, to be posed. This allows the formal procedure of will-formation to function as a double-edged sword, and to also have an informal function that contributes to opinion of citizens.

In the principle of neutrality of communication, lies the core of how deliberation contributes to emancipation. Habermas uses the well-structured liberal idea of a public sphere that focuses on will-formation, and by adding the concept of neutrality, allows it to gain emancipatory value for citizens. This raises the more complex question of how people gain knowledge, and eventually opinion formulation. Here Habermas’ theory of communicative action comes into play. The knowledge citizens bring to the table in the public sphere comes from their personal experience in the lifeworld. The ability of citizens to deliberate on a rational level, however, beyond the level of yes/no decisions of will-formation, is possible because of the communicative nature of citizens and the ability to use language. Through the process of communication and deliberation in the public sphere, the knowledge that comes from experience in the private sphere reproduces through deliberation and opinion formulation (Habermas 1996a, 324).

The importance of communication leads to Habermas’ description of the public sphere as a

network for communicating information. In contrast to organizations and institutions in the

system, the public sphere is open-structured and unlimited by boundaries that occur within the realm of administrative power and money. The use of language and communication in the goal-oriented system is a structure in which people observe each other, as in negotiations. In the public sphere, the use of language requires a second-person perspective in which a space is created where citizens are each other’s dialog partners (Habermas 1996a,

(13)

361).This difference in the use of language and communication in the public sphere leads away from decision-making, the focus lies on the process of opinion-making and will-formation. An answer of how communication and participation in the public sphere contributes to emancipation of citizens, however, is not yet provided.

To answer this question, the concept of emancipation requires further examination. Habermas divides emancipation in two categories: namely, emancipation of the public as a whole, and emancipation of citizens on an individual level. Firstly, the emancipation of the public as a whole can be measured by its opinions influence on the political system and by the level of participation of its citizens. In order for deliberation and opinion formation to have emancipatory value, inclusion cannot be the only standard by which the success of opinion formation can be measured, because it says little about the strength and quality of the opinion. Secondly, on the individual level, Habermas states that people hold two positions. People are members of the political public sphere and members of society. By this, he expresses that people carry experiences that come from different roles they fulfill in society. He names, for example, the social roles of the private domain, but also the roles of employee and consumer.

To emancipate is to decolonize the lifeworld from the systems administrate power and from money. Emancipation, in the Habermasian sense, combines the personal emancipation of citizens with emancipation of civil society as a whole. This means that the lifeworld needs to be strong enough to influence the political administration and laws by developing public opinion. On an individual level, to be emancipated means to be able to participate as a well-informed citizen within the public domain, and thereby contribute to public opinion. On both levels, this process involves limiting the influence of the system on the lifeworld. The only way for citizens to emancipate themselves is through deliberation, and become a part of what Habermas refers to as communicative rationality. Habermas uses this term to describe the outcome, the making of public opinion, though rational dialog among citizens.

How does the influencing of the system by the public sphere work? A well-organized civil movement inside the public sphere is the start of the influence, which Habermas also refers

(14)

to as communicative power. The labor unions and feminist movements are good examples of civil movements that contribute to a more active and powerful public sphere. Civil disobedience is also a proven method for how the lifeworld influences the system. The first signs of a large scale problem or conflict only become visible in the lifeworld, not in the system. Habermas acknowledges the difficulties in modern, complex society. Mass communication and mass media are unavoidable and create potential danger for the freedom and neutrality of the public sphere. Administrative power and money infiltrate the lifeworld through propaganda transmitted by mass media, but it also offers the possibility for social movements within the public sphere to gather strength through numbers.

Habermas is aware of the pragmatic problems that arise in his communicative model. In modern, complex societies the first issue that has to be dealt with is the issue of asymmetrical information. In reality, not all citizens are equally well informed due to social and economic differences. Cognitively overburdening citizens is a concern, and Habermas does not offer us a strategic method to deal with this problem. On top of that, there is a risk of misuse of the public sphere. Habermas foresees that on a general level, knowledge and communication on a political level will be narrowly limited. Resources, on which the process of deliberate opinion and will-formation depend, are, in practice, very scarce. How are people, while occupying the role of consumer in the private domain, supposed to function as well-informed citizens within the public sphere? Again, Habermas does not offer an answer. Habermas sets the cornerstones for the model of deliberate democracy. He does not, however, fill in all the pragmatic details on how the public sphere becomes a strong and diverse public domain and platform for citizens to emancipate themselves. Practical problems, such as the cognitive overburdening of citizens, and deepening the content of deliberation arise. Young takes the next step in the development of a deliberate model of democracy by providing a more pragmatic approach on how the deliberate model becomes a functional alternative.

(15)

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056 1.3 Young on Inclusion and Overcoming Social Injustice

Cognitively overburdening citizens in the process of deliberation becomes the starting point from which Young takes a closer look at deliberative democracy in Inclusion and Democracy. Perhaps some people enjoy making speeches, or confronting those whom they disagree, or standing up to privileged and powerful people with claims and demands. Activities like these, however, make many people anxious (Young 2000, 16).

The deliberate model of democracy offers an alternative to what Young describes as the

aggregative model of democracy. The way she describes the aggregative model of

democracy is very similar to what Habermas calls the liberal model of democracy. The key element of the aggregative model is the way democracy is looked upon as a competition of preferences (Young 2000, 19). The main weakness of the model is the way it fails to distinguish meaning among preferences and motives. Also, the lack of a distinct idea of a public formed opinion, and the way in which it contains a thin and individual form of rationality are problematic. It follows that a non-rational outcome of the democratic process is acceptable with this model. Young finds this unacceptable. According to Young, the deliberate model of democracy is a practical concept. By deliberating, citizens solve problems and legitimate needs. Whereas in the aggregative model of democracy, people are not challenged to legitimate their preferences.

Young formulates four ideals related to the deliberate model. First and foremost, inclusion and political equality are necessities for citizens to be able to deliberate. By this, Young expresses, comparable to Habermas, the need for all affected citizens to be included in the process of decision-making on equal terms, free from domination. Secondly, reasonableness is listed as an ideal necessary for deliberative democracy. By reasonableness, Young means the willingness of citizens to listen to others in public dialog. Participants must have an open and curious mind, which is not to be confused with an aim for consensus. Discussion and dialog among citizens is used to test and legitimate preferences and ideas, which is different to merely aiming at agreement or consensus. These three ideals add up to the ideal of

(16)

publicity, a term Young uses to describe a public sphere in which people can be hold

accountable.

They must try to explain their particular background experiences, interests, or proposals in ways that others can understand, and they must express reasons for their claims in ways that others recognize could be accepted, even if in fact they disagree with the claims and reasons (Young 2000, 25)..

In Habermasian terms, citizens reach communicative rationality by deliberating and explaining their opinions, based on knowledge that they have gained from the private sphere. In Young’s concept of deliberative democracy, for citizens to deliberate, also means that people learn from each other and gain knowledge through public discussion. This concept lowers the threshold of inclusion and participation. Even if a citizen has no knowledge or expertise to bring to the public discussion, based on reasonableness, one can still contribute to the process of publicity, and be informed by other citizens in the process. In line with Habermas, Young thinks there is emancipatory value for citizens in active deliberation. Deliberation in a public sphere that meets the conditions of inclusion, political

equality, reasonableness, and publicity leads to two principles of social justice, namely self-determination and self-development. Young also relies on the Habermasian distinction

between the system and the lifeworld (Young 2000, 158). She tries to create a less abstract picture of what deliberating in the public sphere looks like, by arguing that the lifeworld is built up out of all kinds of non-state governing bodies, such as universities, churches, and private businesses, in which people collectively face decision-making processes and are collectively faced with problems. Often authors tend to focus on issues of justice on a more abstract level. Problems people face in the lifeworld are mostly specific and contextualized, however, not abstract.

According to Young, deliberating in the public sphere calls for a pragmatic function of political interaction. Ideally, deliberation leads to social justice. The balance between inclusion and the task of deepening democracy becomes problematic, however, especially in

(17)

mass society. To function as a counterweight against injustices in mass society, deliberation needs deepening, but the risk of deepening quickly leads to a narrow and excluding public sphere (Young 2000, 36-37 ).

In order to deliberate, citizens need to be able to rationally construct arguments in order to communicate in dialog. A group of citizens need a shared premise and idioms to discuss problems. Young argues that reasonableness lies in the action of communicating; a willingness to listen and to understand what others have to say. The norm of being well-articulated, to argue in a formal way, is culturally specific, according to Young. If a person fails to express themselves in the culturally required way, this is no reason to exclude the person from the dialog. The dominated speech culture in our society is of the culture of middle-class men. To include minorities in the process of deliberation, means to enlarge the ability of opinions to be expressed. From this, Young concludes that the concept of communication needs to be reassessed.

To reassess communication, firstly Young examines social injustice on a more general level. She distinguishes two kinds of social injustice, namely oppression and domination. Firstly, domination in institutional conditions that inhabit people to participate in the process of decision-making, and thereby inhibit self-determination. Domination consists in systematic institutional processes that prevent people from learning, developing socially recognized skills, communicating with others, and expressing their feelings, perspective, and opinion to others. Domination denies people the possibility of self-development. Young argues that an active public sphere can contribute to self-determination.

Secondly, she examines the mechanism of oppression. Oppression is centralized in the state, not in the lifeworld, for its structures are embedded in economic processes located in the system. Many of those who suffer social or economic injustices are likely to be excluded in the formal democratic process of decision-making. Rooted in the system, the problem is likely to be marginalized rather than addressed and put on the political agenda. Civil society contains the power to end oppression. By creating self-organized groups, oppressed sectors and groups can find ways to express their suffering within the lifeworld, leading to solidarity.

(18)

Hence, deliberative democracy offers a way for the oppressed and the dominated to gain self-determination, that is, to emancipate themselves. On another level, non-profit organizations in civil society provide goods and services to answer people’s basic human needs, such as food and shelter. This also contributes to self-development indirectly because it creates a more equal starting point on the level of basic needs (Young 2000, 165-166). A major necessity to include all citizens, is for the public sphere to be publicly open to all citizens. This means that there need to be public spaces, as well as print and electronic media, that are accessible to all.. Communication and organized public opinion help to oppose the power and hold the state accountable. In mass society, it is almost impossible to locate power because of its complexity.

Although media attend to the persons of the powerful, and in particular to their rhetorical pronouncements, their handshakes, their school choices, their jogging and shopping trips, still, in modern states and corporations, power loves to hide. It lurks between the lines of quarterly reports, executive orders and memos, which circulate and get filed; it feeds the dull routines of everyday professional life. (Young 2000, 174)

Young argues that one of the tasks of the public sphere is to locate power, to expose it. Through exposing power, the public sphere can reduce the harm that can be potentially done by domination. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Habermas argues that a strong public opinion influences the state and the administrative power of law-making. As an addition, Young deepens the connection between the public sphere and the state. The state and administrative power are not a merely necessary evil, but can be a positive ally in the struggle against the potentially harmful domination and the effects of the economic power of money that colonizes the lifeworld (Young 2000, 173).

Similar to Habermas, Young finds a role for civil disobedience in the process of holding the state accountable for its actions. But, as an addition to Young’s exploration of the role of the public sphere as part of society as a whole, Young also focuses on the limitations of the

(19)

public sphere and lifeworld. The self-development of citizens depends largely upon state institutions to undermine oppression from the market-oriented economy. Young argues that the state is a necessity to overcome these problems. Civil society on its own is incapable of overcoming capitalistic injustice.

Young explores arguments against state involvement, from which follows that the state is a necessary evil that cannot be trusted. She explores the argument provided by, whom she refers to as, post-Marxists. The post-Marxists distrust the state and its ability to correct economic injustice because the state itself responds to capital accumulation for reasons other than to represent social movements. Young points out that critique along these lines focuses mostly on self-determination instead of self-development.

Self-development is meeting the basic needs of all citizens, as well finding meaningful and useful employment. To accomplish this, society needs a market-oriented economy. Civil society is not capable of creating the requirements for self-development; simply because it is not able to mobilize the amount of resources necessary to support conditions for the self-development of all citizens. Young’s solution to limit the oppression and injustice rooted in economy is to create a state that is able to regulate and direct the economy, and to build a public sphere that is able to influence the state and expose injustice and power (Young 2000, 185-186).

The point of this argument is not to advocate particular policy solutions to problems of poverty, segregation, or economic domination. It is rather only to argue that democratic citizens should look to law and public policy to address these and related problems, and should consider state institutions and their actions major sites of democratic struggle, not merely for the sake of resisting corruption and the abuse of power, but also for taking action to foster social changes to promote greater justice. (Young 2000, 187)

Hence, Young puts great trust in the ability of civil society and the public sphere to ensure morality and to prevent injustices, such as corruption and domination. The structure of a just

(20)

society in the deliberative model is built up from placing trust in the ability of citizens to form a strong public sphere.

In the preview paragraphs, we have seen that Habermas and Young share many ideas and beliefs. Both believe in a clear distinction between the forces of the system, money, and the public sphere, or, as Young formulates it, between state, economy, and civil society. Without strong public opinion and a well-organized public sphere, strengthened by solidarity, the capitalistic market-oriented system colonizes the lifeworld to oppress its citizens. Both do believe in maintaining the structure of contemporary capitalist society. Furthermore, both Habermas and Young use a communicative concept of rationality. In other words, rationality comes from the ability and willingness of people to listen to each other and to deliberate. A citizen becomes able to emancipate themselves by being a part of the public sphere and thereby becoming a counterweight to the influence and colonization of the lifeworld by administrative power and money. Young formulates a concept of emancipation along the same lines of thought; to limit the social injustices of oppression and domination through reaching self-determination and later self-development by participating in the public sphere. Young patches up the flaws in Habermas’ model, and she provides answers to the questions Habermas leaves unanswered. When combined, Habermas’ and Young’s interpretations form a clear image of the deliberate model of democracy.

1.4 The Adorno Critique of the Deliberate Model of Democracy

The main questions that remain unanswered after examining Habermas’ and Young’s

interpretations, which form a clear image of the deliberate model of democracy, concern the level of reliability of the knowledge and information citizens bring to the public sphere, and of how communicative rationality is established. In Adorno’s culture critique, two concepts can be found that offer the ability to function as a sharpening stone for the level of self-reflectiveness of the deliberation and its emancipatory potential. Espen Hammer, in Adorno

and the Political, points us in the right direction by assessing Habermas’ account of Adorno’s

critique, by tracing back the steps of the development of the deliberate model of democracy to Adorno. By doing so, it becomes clear where Habermas parted from Adorno’s culture critique. Because Habermas moved away from Adorno’s line of thought, applying Adorno’s

(21)

critique to the discourse model and the deliberate model of democracy offers a new perspective. We shall explore Adorno’s critique from two angles: culture industry and

regressive mimesis.

To begin, we shall focus on culture industry and the influence of late capitalism. Capitalism manifests itself in day to day life in various forms, according to Adorno. Propaganda and culture industry are part of daily life in the way mass media offers entertainment; it informs citizens as well. It creates an environment within society where profit is more important than autonomy. Adorno has a gloomy view of modern mass society, with far-reaching implications for further development and the ability of citizens to reflect on society and be critical. The consumerism approach that the cultural industry creates distracts citizens from real needs. Within the realm of mass culture, there is a variety of different options to choose from, different brands as well as different television channels or newspapers, it creates a false sense of pluralism, though in the end every option has the goal of making profit (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944, 137-139).

In Habermas’ model of deliberate democracy, forming public opinion in the public sphere is the way to decolonize the lifeworld from capitalism. If we accept Adorno’s notion of culture industry and mass media, however, it becomes a problem to believe that the colonized lifeworld can provide citizens with knowledge that will lead to decolonization. Mass media, Habermas and Young both argue, if publicly accessible, form a source of information for citizens in the public sphere. A major problem arises when we view this from Adornos perspective. When the sources of information in the lifeworld are polluted by capitalism, how

can public opinion built on this information be used to purify and decolonize the lifeworld of capitalism?

Although culture industry seems inescapable from the Adorno position, Hammer argues that Adorno does see a way to regain autonomy, or perhaps semi-autonomy. In order for politics to be a counterweight to the process of cultural industry, it needs to function in tandem with cultural analysis. Adorno is critical but not fatalistic, according to Hammer. Both Habermas and Young also acknowledge the influence of economy on the lifeworld, but they do not

(22)

consider it a problem on the scale Adorno does. In order for the public sphere to have emancipatory value, a pragmatic approach to its functioning should be able to answer this question without being circular. The aim of emancipation thus has the potential to become a valid point. Stripped down to its bare structure, emancipation of the lifeworld, in the Habermasian sense, relies on communication.

This leads to our second point of critique, the core of Adornian critique on human interaction, described as regressive mimeses and instrumental rationality. Hammer’s starting point in tracing back the origin of Habermas’ use of Adorno, is to look at the origin of Habermas’ notion of intersubjectivity. As discussed in the preview paragraphs, Habermas places great value on the notion of intersubjectivity. On this notion, he builds the concepts of communicative rationality and communicative action, as well as the interaction of the system and the lifeworld, as part of his discourse model. Hammer points out that this is a fundamental point on which Habermas branches away from Adorno.

Adorno uses a dialectical model to explain the interaction between object and subject, which implies a mutual influence between object and subject. Rationality and reason are instruments to manipulate the world around us and to dominate the other by objectification (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944, 71)..Habermas has an idealistic notion of this interaction, communication, and rationality in the lifeworld. In this notion, intersubjectivity is assumed as a given fact.

Adorno uses the notion of regressive mimeses to explain the way humans use reason as an instrument to objectify the other in capitalistic society, and to explain why there is a cultural need for exclusion of the other. Using the metaphor of Odyssey, Adorno and Horkheimer show how human beings no longer try to adapt to the outer world, but try to manipulate it instead. The principle of adapting to nature, and to blend in with its structures in order to survive, is referred to as mimeses. On an epistemological level, the structure of mimeses implicates an equality between the subject and the outer world. Mimeses becomes regressive in the process of mankind using rationality as an instrument to control and manipulate nature.

(23)

Habermas uses the possibility of communication as a foundation for his discourse model. In Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality, the act of recognition among citizens is an assumption. This is in contrast to Adorno, who sees recognition of the other as something that needs to be achieved in society.

This is a problematic difference in the approaches of Habermas and Adorno. Rather than rejecting either the notion of regressive mimesis or the theory of communicative action, we will take the liberty to formulate a criterion that can function as a tool to examine intersubjectivity. Assuming intersubjectivity is a flaw in Habermas’ discourse model, we are looking for a pragmatic theory of how participation in the public sphere can become an emancipatory project.

Habermas assumes that through dialog and deliberation citizens in the public sphere can form a public opinion. Adorno has a different and much wider view of communication that

goes beyond rationally arguing (Hammer 2006, 156). Non-rational aspects of human

behavior, such as irrational urges and bodily desires, define human actions and the structure of society. Young is a step ahead of Habermas when it comes to the use of language and communication. A theory of how the public sphere can become an area in which emancipation takes places, has to contain a broader notion of language and communication in order to offer a pragmatic blueprint for society.

1.5 Criteria for Realizing the Emancipatory Potential of the Public Sphere

For the critique explored in the previous paragraph, we shall attempt to formulate two criteria that can contribute to finding answers to the questions that Habermas leaves unanswered. Elements within Adorno’s theory, such as regressive mimeses and culture industry, point out potential weaknesses in the model of deliberate democracy when it comes to emancipation. Instead of rejecting the option of deliberate democracy as a whole, we can also use parts of Adorno’s critique as criteria to closely examine pragmatic ideas about how to create a public sphere that can function as an emancipatory project. We can distillate twocriteria to sharpen the deliberate model of democracy and the use of the public sphere:

(24)

1. The need for a plan on how intersubjectivity can be achieved with a wider notion of the use of rationality.

2. The need for awareness of the pollution of knowledge and information in the lifeworld.

In this chapter, we have shown that Habermas and Young rely on the emancipatory value of the public sphere for the deliberate model of democracy to succeed. Both of them acknowledge the problem of the system colonizing the lifeworld, and use the public sphere as a solution for the problem. To trace back the steps, from Young to Habermas, and from Habermas to Adorno, shows that in the process of development, Adorno’s culture critique has faded to the background. The notions of regressive mimeses and culture industry can provide us with two criteria that we can use as a sharpening stone for the deliberate model of democracy to ensure the public sphere contributes to the emancipation of its citizens. In the next chapter, we use both criteria when examining the emancipatory potential of the public sphere.

(25)

Raisa Fleisher, 5736056 2 Realizing the Emancipatory Potential of the Public Sphere

In this chapter we examine two methods of realizing the emancipatory potential of the public sphere. First, we use the concept of language and communication that Young provides to explore if there is a pragmatic solution for adjusting the deliberate model of democracy to a level where it is no longer sensitive to the criteria we distillated from Adorno’s culture critique. We argue that although Young does offer a clear method of how intersubjectivity can be established, her account of emancipation and her method of how to reach self-awareness through emancipation in the public sphere are not self-critical.

Secondly, we examine a more radical critique of the Habermasian public sphere, provided by Nancy Fraser. This pays more attention to oppression and injustice in the public sphere, and the explanatory and emancipatory value of the Habermasian discourse model. Although Fraser does not offer a pragmatic alternative to the deliberative model, she does point us in the right direction when it comes to creating a pragmatic way of reassuring the emancipatory value of the public sphere, and thereby ensuring that the deliberate model has a rightful place in the field of critical theory. Where Habermas chooses to part from Adorno’s concept of society for the most part, Fraser returns to a critique that is closer to Adorno and the first generation of critical theorists, by focusing on self-awareness and paying special attention to communicative rationality. Although Fraser’s critique focuses mostly on the emancipation of women (she mostly offers a gender-based critique), we take the liberty of using gender as an example of oppression, then go as far as to place it above other reasons for oppression.

In the final two paragraphs of this chapter, we revisit Adorno’s culture critique from a different angle, and use it as an instrument to uncover a paradox that lies in the attempt to include citizens through changing the use of language in the public sphere.

(26)

2.1 Young on Language and Self-development in the Public Sphere

One of Young’s central themes concerning the deliberate model of democracy is the inclusion of minorities in the public sphere. Young distinguishes two kinds of exclusion,

external and internal. Firstly, external exclusions are methods of exclusion rooted outside

the political discussion. As an example, she uses the effect of media on public opinion and the fact that media-time must be bought. This way, the budget of a lobby or political party determines how well they can influence citizens. Secondly, internal exclusion functions on a subtler level. Even when the public domain is openly accessible to all, the dominant group still finds ways to exclude minorities. Internal exclusion takes place on the level of language and communication (Young 2000, 55).

As an addition to her ideals of inclusion and political equality, Young uses language as an instrument to lower the threshold for participation in the public sphere. Instead of merely assuming inclusion and intersubjectivity, as well as rationality, Young revalues the use of language, reasoning, and other methods of expression in the public sphere. She refers to different kinds of speech culture. This is among the same line of thought as Young’s ideal of reasonableness. To include all citizens in the process of deliberation, the value of articulateness needs to be reconsidered. Young states that this need of articulateness is culturally specific.

The speech culture of white, middle-class men tends to be more controlled, without significant gesture and expression or emotion. The speech culture of women, racialized or ethnicized minorities, and working-class people, on the other hand, often is, or is perceived to be, more excited and embodied, values more expression of emotion, uses figurative language, modulates tones of voice, and gestures widely. (Young 2000, 39-40)

The norms and rules concerning the use of language and expression in the public sphere can be used to include or exclude people. The language and skills of articulateness carried by the notions of deliberation and rationality need to be reconsidered in order to be include all citizens. Young presents language and the culture of articulateness in contemporary

(27)

capitalist society as a tool used to exclude minorities. Young provides us not only with a critical model of the methods of exclusion, but also with a diverse sense of communication, intersubjectivity, and rationality.

At first, Young’s concept does not seem contradict Adorno’s critique of mass culture. Adorno’s concept of regressive mimeses and instrumental rationality show how people use reason and rationality as tools to manipulate the outside world. In the Dialectics of

Enlightenment, Adorno uses the myth of the Odyssey as a metaphor to show how, instead of

adapting to nature and the outside world, Odysseus uses reason as an instrument to manipulate the outside world. The way in which Young describes how the use reason and formal language in the public sphere are used as an instrument to exclude minorities is in line with Adorno’s notion of regressive mimeses; namely, excluding the other by using rationality as an instrument. Young does not simply assume intersubjectivity, she is fully aware of the complicated ways in which exclusion takes place on an internal, subconscious level.

Beyond this awareness of exclusion, Young also provides a pragmatic answer on how to use language and expression to include minorities. She introduces three modes of communication in addition to making arguments: namely, greeting, rhetoric, and narrative (Young 2000, 56-57). Instead of a formal use of language in the public sphere, Young uses these modes of communication to shift to the everyday use of language.

Firstly, greeting is used as an example of showing respect and interest, for without recognition it is likely that citizens will be unable to listen.

If we were to imagine a communicative interaction in which such mode of greeting were absent, it would feel like the science fiction speech of an alien, some sort of heartless being for whom speech is only getting things said, interrogating their truth or rightness, and getting things done. (Young 2000, 59)

(28)

Then secondly, Young introduces what she calls Affirmative use of Rhetoric. In the Habermasian sense, in communicative action, citizens use rational speech in order to defend their standpoint and opinions by reason. Habermas, Young points out, wishes to create a neutral and calm way of communicating. Rhetorical speech, contrasted with the use of rational speech, is a method of manipulating the feelings and thoughts of others, according to Habermas. What Habermas does not realize, according to Young, is that the rational use of language is in itself a method of exclusion. Young argues that Habermas’ distinction between rational speech and rhetorical speech is an arbitrary distinction because the calm and dispassionate tone of rational arguing itself is, in this sense, used as a disguise for rhetoric. It is falsely assumed that the rational use of language implies factual knowledge, and that there are no hidden motives.

Young uses her modes of communication as narratives to embrace hermeneutics and storytelling, and thereby adds a personal element to the domain of political communication. The narrative use of language has the ability to create understanding among different groups of people, as well as the ability to help people express themselves and discover their own identity (Young 2000, 73). Especially in mass society, narrative communication offers a way to remove presumptions, generalizations, and stereotypes.

When compared with Habermas, it seems at first that Young remains truer to Adorno’s culture critique. Habermas breaks with Adorno’s thoughts on the instrumental use of reason; Young offers a more critical account of rationality and human interacting that does not contradict Adorno. Young’s thoughts on the rational use of language allow for a return to culture critique within the frame of the deliberate model, in line with Adorno. Young chooses to include human nature in a broader sense of communication, and thereby acknowledges that people can be seen as merely rational beings. Emotions, passions, and non-verbal elements of communication are included in her account of communication. Beyond simply acknowledging this, she finds a pragmatic method for using these elements to achieve intersubjectivity and inclusion.

(29)

It is in this acknowledgment of the non-rational parts of humankind that the difference between Habermas and Young becomes clear. Young’s view of what the public sphere should be is different from the Habermasian model of political gatherings and hearings in government buildings, in which, citizens gather for dispassionate reason-giving. Instead, she argues that deliberation takes place in the streets and in informal public places, such as theaters and churches. ‘Public communication in civil society is often not unified and orderly, but messy, many-levelled, playful, emotional’ (Young 2000, 168). Domains such as art, cinema, and theater also play a part in the development of public opinion and will-formation. Being exposed to plurality leads to reflectiveness.

We must return to our central question of how the public sphere can realize its emancipatory potential. One of the reasons why public opinion must become strong, according to Young, is because that way it can expose power. In the process of decision-making it sometimes becomes unclear who is responsible for which decisions, and it becomes unclear whether the use of power comes from institutionalized politicians and lawmakers or from the market economy. Researchers, journalists, and activists are essential to trace back the source of decisions and to locate power. A more active role for the ‘average’ citizen is expected in the second function the public sphere fulfills, influence over

policy. Through the public sphere, again in line with Habermas’ thoughts, civil society is able

to influence policies and oppose the government. On a large scale, this process promotes the self-determination of civil society.

What remains vague in Young’s model, however, is how emancipation and participation take place on a smaller, individual level. Young proposes a dialectical process between lifeworld and system through which self-development takes place. By influencing policies, civil society influences political institutions, and (indirectly) the market economy. The market economy influences civil society and creates the resources necessary for self-development and education. In this ongoing process, civil society becomes increasingly emancipated and educated. This results in the deepening of democracy. This growth and progress toward self-development, combined with Young’s thoughts on language and inclusion, creates a pragmatically motivated approach on how to reach emancipation.

(30)

But how does this process start when the lifeworld is so deeply colonized by the market economy? In other words, how do citizens rise above their role as consumers? To answer this question, Young again points us to the power of the market economy and how it ought to be corrected by a strong civil society (Young 2000, 185). In order for the public sphere to have emancipatory value, citizens need to be able to reach self-determination, which will lead to the ability of the public sphere to create an environment in which the market economy will become morally aware and fulfill the needs of citizens, which will lead to self-development. In this way, step by step, civil society will become less polluted, as more people become educated. On an individual level, citizens will no longer be dominated and, on the level of public opinion, there will be a deepening of democracy because of a level higher level of education of the participating citizens.

So far it seems like Young’s notion of language and her pragmatic approach of how to achieve self-development through a moral change of the market economy, provide a non-circular model of deepening democracy. The only element that seems problematic in Young’s model is the notion of self-reflectiveness. Similar to Habermas, Young thinks that self-reflection will take place in the public sphere during the process of deliberation. By trying to explain a point of view to other citizens, individuals will be challenged to reflect upon their beliefs. Among emancipated citizens who have attained the goal of self-development, it seems reasonable to assume that citizens will reflect upon their own beliefs and will become critical of the influences of capitalism on the lifeworld.

This line of thought becomes problematic, however, when we again look at the early stages of the process of decolonization. In an inclusive democracy that has not yet reached a level of depth for deliberation, one can question whether it is reasonable to assume that citizens are capable of the required self-reflection. In the grassroots model of deliberation and will-formation of the public sphere that Young proposes, all citizens are included on everyday topics that concern them in a direct way. If argued that, in line with Adorno’s critique, citizens need to be self-critical in order to emancipate, it becomes visible that Young’s pragmatic solution of how to reach self-development is, after all, circular. It does not provide us with an answer to how consumers become aware of the influence of capitalism. For now,

(31)

we leave this topic and examine another view on how the public sphere can reach it emancipatory potential, that of Nancy Fraser.

2.2 Fraser on the Emancipatory Value of the Public Sphere

The second concept of the emancipatory value of the public sphere that we wish to examine is provided by Nancy Fraser. In her articles, ‘‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’’ and “What's Critcal about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender”, she attempts to add emancipatory value to the public sphere. By doing so, she makes the deliberate model adequate for critical theory. She refers to Habermas’ account of the public sphere as the

bourgeois concept of the public sphere.

By using the term bourgeois, Fraser points out that the public sphere, as presented by Habermas, is not as ‘public’ as it may at first seem. The public sphere is not necessary publicly accessible and inclusive to all citizens. Unlike Young, Fraser does not mainly focus on the use of language, but focuses on neutralization of status. She uses the notion of status in a way comparable to Max Weber’s use of status, namely to express similarities within a group of people within a class. For example, a different ethical group within the proletariat. Even more than merely assuming intersubjectivity, Habermas also assumes that the public sphere neutralizes distinctions in status between different classes and groups without further explanation. This happens mostly because Habermas focuses on one liberal public sphere, instead of other concepts of public spheres. Unofficial public spheres lead to specific groups being organized. Fraser reaches this conclusion by following a historiographical account of the public sphere.

In fact, the historiography of Ryan and others demonstrates that the bourgeois public was never the public. On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counter publics, including nationalist publics, and working-class publics. Thus there were competing publics from the start, not just in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies. (Fraser 1992, 116)